5 Things to Know

1. Russia’s top commanders have reportedly convinced Vladimir Putin that their forces can seize the whole of Donbas by this fall, according to people in contact with him and a Ukrainian intelligence assessment shared with the FT. Once that is done, Putin intends to “raise the price” of any ceasefire by escalating Russia’s territorial demands, three unnamed sources told FT. Putin remains convinced Ukraine’s defenses will eventually crumble, FT reported, citing people briefed on his thinking. The Russian leader has become “increasingly fixated” on taking Donbas, two people who speak to him told FT. At its average monthly rate of advance so far this year, it would take Russia more than three decades to seize full control of Donbas, according to a May 10, 2026, article in The New York Times. According to a site that reportedly uses Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState’s data for measurements in territorial control, however, it would take Russian armed forces 2.2 years to capture the remainder of Donetsk oblast (79.7% occupied) and 1.1 years to capture the remainder of Luhansk oblast (99.6% occupied) if they keep making the same “daily average progress” they have made in the past 365 days. These two oblasts constitute Donbas.*¹
2. RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (April 14–May 12, 2026) indicates that Russian forces endured a net loss of 45 square miles (about twice the size of Manhattan Island) of Ukraine’s territory during that period, according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This contrasts with the previous four-week period (March 17–April 14, 2026), in which Russian forces lost a single square mile of Ukraine’s territory (net). ^2,3
3. Putin told Russian media on May 9 regarding the Ukraine conflict that “the matter is coming to an end,” instantly triggering a debate among Russia watchers on what exactly he meant by that remark. On the third day of that debate, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov offered some clarification. When asked to comment on Putin’s remark, Peskov said, “Russia remains open to contact, and some work has been done in a trilateral [U.S.-Ukraine-Russia] format. The accumulated experience suggests that completion is near.” In contrast, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said regarding Putin’s remark that “we see that Russia does not intend to end the war.”
4. According to FT’s analysis of Ukrainian Air Force data, a 24-hour period ending on May 14 saw Russia deliver the “largest combined onslaught of the war,” with 56 missiles and 1,560 drones launched against Ukraine, killing 24 people in a Kyiv apartment building. Last month saw Russia launch more than 8,000 drones, the highest monthly total on record since September 2022, according to data published by CSIS and analyzed by RM. The recent targets of the Russian drones and missiles have included “facilities of U.S. companies in Ukraine—including Cargill, Coca‑Cola, Boeing, Mondelez and Philip Morris—attacks many firms see as deliberate attempts to scare off American investment,” NYT reported.
5. Putin will visit Beijing on May 20, which would be days after President Xi Jinping’s summit in the Chinese capital with U.S. counterpart Trump this week, according to SCMP. Speaking after meeting Xi in Beijing, Trump called the war a “senseless bloodbath” and said both he and Xi “want the fighting to end” and are interested in finding ways to resolve the conflict, according Reuters and RBC.ua. China and the United States hope the Ukraine crisis can come to an early end, China's top diplomat Wang Yi said when briefing the press on the Xi-Trump meeting in Beijing, according to Chinese media.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• North Korea has likely earned around $13 billion over three years from supplying Russia with artillery, missiles and manpower for the war in Ukraine, according to South Korean intelligence cited by Nikkei Asia. The transfers—worth up to $13.8 billion in 2025 alone—have provided Pyongyang with hard currency, energy and military technology despite sanctions. Around 20,000 North Korean troops and specialists are believed deployed, with an estimated 6,000 killed or wounded so far. (The Moscow Times, 05.11.26)
• A CNN investigation found that the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major, which sank in December 2024 off Spain after unexplained explosions, was likely carrying components for two submarine‑type nuclear reactors. Spanish investigators were told by the ship’s captain that the cargo resembled submarine reactors, and seismic data suggest the vessel may have been hit by an underwater weapon before later being destroyed near the seabed amid intense Russian military activity around the wreck. According to the same report, the Ursa Major’s captain believed the ship would ultimately divert to North Korea’s port of Rason, raising suspicions that Russia was transferring nuclear‑submarine reactor technology to Pyongyang in return for wartime support. (CNN, 05.12.26)
• North Korea has opened a new “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at Overseas Military Operations” in Pyongyang to glorify its role in Russia’s war on Ukraine, showcasing purported battlefield trophies, bloodstained letters and mass graves of its fallen troops as proof of “noble sacrifices” made for Moscow. Framed as a symbol of an unbreakable North Korea–Russia alliance, the museum is likely intended both to lock in Russian support and to prepare North Korean society for continued or expanded deployments to Ukraine by portraying overseas combat as a path to glory, material rewards and national prestige. (Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2026)

Iran and its nuclear program:

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• The Caspian Sea has become a crucial sanctions‑busting lifeline between Russia and Iran, with Moscow shipping drone components and other goods via “dark” vessels that routinely turn off tracking transponders and are beyond U.S. naval reach. U.S. officials say Russia is helping Tehran rebuild an offensive drone arsenal after recent losses and rerouting wheat, foodstuffs, and other supplies that used to move through the now‑blockaded Strait of Hormuz, while both countries pursue a longer‑term north–south trade corridor from the Baltic to the Indian Ocean that would further bypass Western routes. (New York Times, 05.09.26) 

Monday, May 11, 2026

• Iran has reportedly offered to dilute part of its highly enriched uranium and ship the rest to a third country as part of talks to end the 10‑week war, while rejecting any dismantling of its nuclear facilities. The U.S. proposal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and lift the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports, but Tehran wants sanctions relief and control over the strait. Despite a ceasefire, regional drone attacks and energy market disruption continue. (Bloomberg, 05.11.26)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Friday, May 8, 2026

• U.S. President Donald Trump announced Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a three‑day ceasefire and a 1,000‑for‑1,000 prisoner swap over May 9–11, saying he personally requested the pause, while Zelenskyy confirmed the deal and issued a decree temporarily excluding Red Square from Ukraine’s strike plans. (Wall Street Journal, 05.08.26; Bloomberg, 05.09.26)

Monday, May 11, 2026

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim that Ukraine is sabotaging a planned 1,000‑for‑1,000 prisoner exchange under the three‑day Victory Day ceasefire. After Putin alleged Kyiv was blocking the deal, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had already provided Russia with its POW lists and remains fully committed to the exchange, with the United States acting as guarantor. The dispute highlights Moscow’s use of POW issues for information operations during the ceasefire. (ISW, 05.10.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Several Russian regions switched schools to remote learning this week as authorities warned of possible Ukrainian drone attacks, in a sign of the war's growing disruption to civilian life far from the front lines. (MT/AFP, 05.12.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• Ukrainian officials say intercepted radio traffic shows Russian commanders are explicitly ordering battlefield atrocities. On May 14, Russian infiltrators in the Hulyaipole sector reportedly desecrated and publicly displayed the bodies of two Ukrainian soldiers killed in action, after receiving a direct order from their commander and expressing readiness to comply. (ISW, 05.14.26) 
• R.Politik’s Balázs Jarábik notes that, according to Ukraine’s Social Policy Ministry, the population living on government‑controlled territory may now be under 25 million, with officials expecting only about 2 million refugees to return after the war. If accurate, this would confirm a dramatic wartime demographic collapse, with long‑term implications for labor supply, reconstruction capacity, and the sustainability of Ukraine’s social and defense systems. (Balázs Jarábik on X, 05.14.26)
• The State Duma has appointed MP Yana Lantratova—previously with A Just Russia and closely tied to pro‑Kremlin youth movements—as Russia’s new human rights ombudsman, replacing Tatiana Moskalkova. Lantratova, who has advocated labor camps for alcoholics, bans on “LGBT and violence” in video games, a registry of political émigrés, and removing civics from schools, is also accused by Ukraine’s SBU of helping illegally deport a 10‑month‑old girl from occupied Kherson to Russia. A criminal case against her is open in Ukraine. (iStories, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Russia and Ukraine carried out the first phase of the Trump‑announced “1,000 for 1,000” prisoner exchange, swapping 205 POWs each, including some Azovstal and Chernobyl defenders held for four years. Russian NGOs say about 90% of returned Russians were contract soldiers (many mobilized under pressure), and criticize the Defense Ministry for prioritizing recently captured troops over those in captivity for two to four years who remain unexchanged. (iStories, 05.15.26)

For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• At its average monthly rate of advance so far this year, it would take Russia more than three decades to seize full control of the Donbas, which the Kremlin has set as a condition for ending the war, according to a 05.10.26 article in  New York Times, 05.10.26. According to a site that reportedly uses Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState’s data for measurements in territorial control, however, it would take Russian armed forces 2.2 years to capture remainder of Donetsk region (79.7% occupied) and 1.1 years to capture remainder of Luhansk region (99.6% occupied) if they make “daily average progress they made in the past 365 days. (RM, 06.15.26.)
• RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (April 14–May 12, 2026) indicates that Russian forces endured a net loss of 45 square miles (about twice the size of Manhattan Island) of Ukraine’s territory during that period, according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.  This contrasts with the previous four-week period (March 17–April 14, 2026), in which Russian forces lost a single square mile of Ukraine’s territory. (RM, 05.15.26.)⁴

Friday, May 8, 2026

• On May 8, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Holubivka and Dibrova. (RM, 05.15.26)
• Ukraine’s long‑range drone and missile campaign has exposed serious weaknesses in Russia’s air defenses, forced the Kremlin to strip heavy weaponry from its Victory Day parade, and at one point disabled an estimated 40% of Russian oil export capacity—the “most severe oil supply disruption in the modern history of Russia,” according to Reuters. She notes that at least 136 successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory in 2026, including repeated hits on refineries, ports, and hubs like Perm and Cheboksary, have imposed mounting economic and psychological costs. Ukrainian firm Fire Point is now delivering about 220 FP‑1/FP‑2 drones a day and ramping Flamingo cruise missile production. (Wall Street Journal, 05.08.26)
• ISW says Ukrainian drones are now routinely interdicting Russian ground lines of communication 95–160 km behind the front, including along the T‑0509 Mariupol–Donetsk highway and the M‑14 corridor through Mariupol, threatening logistics that feed Russia’s “Fortress Belt” offensive. (ISW, 05.08.26)

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• On May 9, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces  advanced near Vasylivka. (RM, 05.15.26)
• New estimates by exiled Russian outlets Meduza and Mediazona suggest about 352,000 Russian soldiers were killed in Ukraine through the end of 2025—far above official figures—by extrapolating from nearly 218,000 individually confirmed deaths and excess male mortality in probate records. The tally excludes 2026 combat losses and many foreign and proxy fighters, implying total military deaths on both sides could approach half a million, making the conflict Europe’s deadliest since World War II. (New York Times, 05.09.26)

Sunday, May 10, 2026

• On May 10, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Zakitne. (RM, 05.15.26) 
• Russian attacks continued to hit Ukraine during what was supposed to be a three‑day truce for Victory Day, with Ukrainian officials saying at least nine people were wounded on May 10 and RFE/RL reporting at least three killed in strikes across three regions, including a drone that hit a high‑rise residential building in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second‑largest city. (The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.10.26; RFE/RL, 05.10.26)
• The New York Times reports that, despite Putin’s claims of inevitable victory and demands that Ukraine surrender all of Donbas, Russian forces are “barely inching along”: at their current average monthly pace in 2026 it would take more than 30 years to capture the rest of the region, and in some sectors Russia is losing ground. Drones have transformed the battlefield into a vast “gray zone,” forcing Russia into slow, costly infiltration tactics and leaving an estimated 352,000 Russian dead by end‑2025, while Ukraine’s own shortages and high desertion rates mean both sides are locked in a grinding war of attrition shaped by drone innovation. (New York Times, 05.10.26)

Monday, May 11, 2026

• On May 11, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pazeno, Kalenyky and Riznykivka. (RM, 05.15.26)
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations during the May 9–11 ceasefire, with both sides accusing the other of violations on May 10. Zelenskyy reported over 150 ground assaults, 100 artillery strikes, and nearly 10,000 drone sorties by Russia; Moscow claimed Ukraine conducted thousands of artillery and drone strikes. Satellite fire data indicated reduced but ongoing hostilities, underscoring that ceasefires without monitoring, enforcement, and dispute‑resolution mechanisms are unlikely to hold. (Meduza, 05.11.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• On May 12, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Zakitne. (RM, 05.15.26)
• Russian drones and missiles have repeatedly hit facilities of U.S. companies in Ukraine—including Cargill, Coca‑Cola, Boeing, Mondelez and Philip Morris—attacks many firms see as deliberate attempts to scare off American investment. Executives complain the Trump administration has offered only muted responses while quietly asking Kyiv not to strike Russian infrastructure tied to U.S. interests, fueling accusations of a double standard. (New York Times, 05.12.26)
• The Economist reports that Russian casualties are estimated at 35,000 a month, and now outpace recruitment. WSJ reports that casualties are estimated at about 25,000 killed and wounded a month. (The Economist, 05.10.26; Wall Street Journal, 05.12.26)
• Russia’s top commanders have reportedly persuaded Putin that their forces can seize the whole of the Donbas by autumn, according to people in contact with him and a Ukrainian intelligence assessment shared with the FT. Three sources said Putin then intends to “raise the price” of any ceasefire by escalating Russia’s territorial demands once Donbas is under full Russian control. Putin remains conceived Ukraine’s defenses will eventually crumble, according to people briefed on his thinking. (Financial Times, 05.13.26)
  • Putin has become “increasingly fixated” on taking Donbas, despite earlier private hints he might freeze the war along current front lines, two interlocutors told the FT. One said: “I have been pushing him to end at the current front lines. But he keeps saying, ‘No, I can’t compromise on this.’” While Kherson and Zaporizhzhia lack the “symbolic significance” of Crimea and Donbas, they still remain major war aims. (Financial Times, 05.13.26)
• Ukraine is preparing major reforms to its military recruitment system, including splitting territorial recruitment centers (TCRs) into “Reserve+” recruitment and support offices, according to proposals seen by Ukrainska Pravda. Draft plans introduce fixed‑term service contracts—10 months for serving combat soldiers, 14 months for new combat recruits and two years for other roles. (Meduza, 05.12.26)
• BBC Russia identified 23‑year‑old student Valery Averin from Buryatia as the first confirmed student killed after being recruited into Russia’s unmanned systems forces via a Defense Ministry university campaign. (Meduza, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026 

For a description of Russian aerial attacks, see items for May 14 below.

• On May 13, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pryvillia and Novomarkove. (RM, 05.15.26)
• Russia launched more than 8,000 drones last month, the highest monthly total on record since September 2022, according to data published by CSIS  and analyzed by RM. (The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, 05.13.26)   
• Ukraine is intensifying long‑range drone strikes on Russian oil and gas infrastructure, with at least 27 deep hits since May 1 on ports and energy hubs from Primorsk and Ust‑Luga to Tuapse, Orenburg and Bashkortostan, up to 1,500 km from the border, ISW reports. Recent targets include the Tamanneftgaz Black Sea terminal, the Yaroslavl refinery, the Nurlino pumping station in Bashkortostan, and the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant, where debris from an intercepted drone sparked a fire. (ISW, 05.13.26; The Moscow Times/AFP, 05.13.26)
• Ukrainian Defense Ministry figures cite 2 million draft dodgers and 200,000 desertion cases, conscription now supplies 70% of new troops, and casualties fall heavily on poorer small-town men. With millions of Ukrainians abroad—and officials warning that “70% of those abroad may not return”—Marcetic warns the prolonged war and debt to soldiers’ families risk “gradual destruction” of Ukraine as a viable state, even as Western narratives focus on Russian weakness. (Responsible Statecraft, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026⁵

• On May 14, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map the Ukrainian Defense Forces liberated Odradne. (RM, 05.15.26) 
• Russia launched one of its largest aerial assaults since 2022 on May 13–14, firing 56 missiles (including Kinzhal, Iskander‑M/S‑400 and Kh‑101) and about 1,567 drones over roughly 24 hours—most aimed at Kyiv—just days after Putin claimed the war was “coming to a close” and a brief Trump‑brokered truce ended. Ukraine’s Air Force says it destroyed or suppressed 693 targets by 8 a.m. on May 14 (41 missiles and 652 UAVs) and overall downed about 94% of drones and 73% of missiles, but 15 missiles and 23 strike drones still hit 24 locations with debris at 18 more. A nine‑story apartment block in Kyiv partially collapsed. On May 15 Ukrainian authorities confirmed 24 dead, including three children (girls aged 12, 15, and 17), and 48 injured, with more than 50 people treated overall and 24 still in hospital. Kyiv declared May nationwide at least a dozen were killed and some 180 sites, including over 50 residential buildings, were damaged. Zelenskyy said Moscow has “little intention” of de‑escalating and ordered his defense and security chiefs to propose options for a “response.” (New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, Ukrainska Pravda, RBC.ua, 05.14.26, RBC.ua, 05.15.26)
  • The Ukrainian Air Force said on May 14 that 35 of the 56 missiles fired by Russia in the largest combined onslaught of the war over a 24-hour period were Kh-101 cruise missiles. The missile, which is launched from the underside of an aircraft, has a variant, the Kh-102, which carries a nuclear warhead. Zelenskyy said Russia also launched more than 1,560 drones against Ukrainian cities between May 13 and May 14, marking the largest combined missile and drone attack of the war. (Financial Times, 05.15. 26)
• Robert “Madjar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, says Russia is rapidly copying Ukraine’s drone‑war model, creating a centralized UAV command and sharply expanding personnel from about 86,000 at New Year to 114,000 by early May, with plans for roughly 168,000 operators by year’s end. He cites mass orders of cheap, upgraded Molniya drones (~$1,500 each, 10 kg warheads, 1.1 million units) that can hit a typical Ukrainian brigade with up to 60 strikes a day, plus daily launches of 300–400 Shaheds and widespread mobile EW to hinder Ukrainian FPVs. Brovdi also warns Russia could field a Starlink‑style satellite network along the front within a year, restoring robust battlefield communications. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.14.26)
• Ukrainian weapons maker Fire Point says it launched two satellites this year and plans dozens more in 2027 as part of a push to reduce dependence on U.S. intelligence and Starlink. The company produces long‑range FP‑1/FP‑2 drones and “Flamingo” cruise missiles, now courting European buyers and co‑developing a “Freya” anti‑ballistic shield with German partner Diehl, even as it faces a major corruption probe at home that has already delayed a Danish solid‑fuel contract. (Financial Times, 05.14.26)
• Cheap explosive drones are displacing traditional military snipers in Ukraine, where long‑range marksmen now find themselves supporting drone teams instead of leading kill missions. Vyacheslav Kovalskiy, who once claimed a record 2½‑mile shot, hasn’t fired in combat for more than a year and now helps launch and guide FPV drones. (Wall Street Journal, 05.14.26) 
• U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News that Ukraine’s armed forces are now “the strongest, most powerful” military in Europe, arguing that Russia is losing “five times as many soldiers a month as the Ukrainians,” despite Ukraine’s smaller population and army. He said years of combat plus Western aid have driven “new tactics, new techniques, new equipment, (and) new technology,” creating a hybrid, asymmetric force, and reiterated that the Trump administration is “prepared” to facilitate a diplomatic end to the war once both sides re‑engage. (Kyiv Independent, 05.14.26) 

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Ukraine has completed search‑and‑rescue operations at the nine‑story apartment block in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district destroyed by a Russian strike on May 14. Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko said the effort lasted more than 28 hours, during which over 3,000 cubic meters of debris were cleared; an entire stairwell was “practically demolished” by a missile. Authorities confirmed 24 dead, including three children (girls aged 12, 15, and 17), and 48 injured, with more than 50 people treated overall and 24 still in hospital. Nearly 400 residents received psychological support. Kyiv declared May 15 a day of mourning. (RBC.ua, 05.15.26) 
  • The Kh-101 Russian cruise missiles used in May 14’s deadly attack on Ukraine were produced this year with western components, according to Ukrainian authorities, underscoring Moscow’s ability to circumvent sanctions. Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Ukraine’s top sanctions official, told the FT that all the Kh-101 cruise missiles that struck Kyiv and were evaluated by Ukrainian experts — including the one that targeted an apartment block in the capital — had been manufactured in the second quarter of 2026.“Each missile contained more than 100 western-made components,” Vlasiuk wrote on X on May 14. (Financial Times, 05.15. 26) 
• A Ukrainian drone attack on the Russian city of Ryazan damaged two apartment blocks and the local Rosneft‑owned refinery, killing four people and injuring 12, with residents reporting “oil rain” in parts of the city. Ukraine’s Defense Forces said they struck the Ryazan plant—one of Russia’s largest refineries, with capacity around 17 mn tons/year—causing explosions and a large fire overnight May 15, in an operation involving the 1st Separate Center, “Madjar’s Birds” brigade, “Raid” regiment and special services. The same wave reportedly hit a small missile ship and a minesweeper in the Caspian base at Kaspiysk, multiple ammunition and logistics depots in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk, and an FSB coastal radar/optical post and fuel depot in Mariupol, while Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed to have downed 355 Ukrainian drones over various regions, occupied Crimea, and the Azov and Caspian seas. (Istories, 05.15.26; RBC.ua, 05.15.26)
• Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) says it intercepted Russian planning documents for new missile‑and‑drone strikes on “decision‑making centers,” listing nearly 20 political sites and command posts, including central Kyiv buildings such as the presidential administration, Zelenskyy’s offices on multiple floors, and his state residence. Zelenskyy warned Moscow that unlike Russia, Ukraine’s “source of defense” is a population willing to fight, and said Kyiv is working on new long‑range sanctions and responses to any such attacks. (RBC.ua, 05.15.26)
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov is driving an aggressive shift toward AI-enabled and autonomous warfare, arguing that “autonomous weapons are the new nuclear weapons” and essential for national security. His “Air, Land, Economy” strategy seeks to use drones and advanced systems to intercept most Russian strikes, raise Russian casualty rates beyond Moscow’s ability to replenish forces, and cripple Russia’s economy by targeting key infrastructure, even as some Ukrainian commanders warn his tech-driven vision underestimates the brutal realities of trench combat. (New York Times,  05.15. 26)
• Zelensky says Kyiv is monitoring intensified Russian efforts to bring Belarus into the war against Ukraine. "We know that there have been additional contacts between the Russians and Alexander Lukashenko, aimed at convincing him to join new Russian aggressive operations. In particular, Russia is considering plans for operations in the directions south and north of the territory of Belarus - either against the Chernihiv-Kyiv direction in Ukraine, or against one of the NATO countries - precisely from the territory of Belarus. Ukraine has the details of the conversation between Russia and Belarus. … I have instructed our Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine to strengthen the relevant direction and present a plan for our response, which will be considered and approved at the Headquarters." (Status-6 X account, 05.15.26)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Kyiv and Washington are close to signing a first‑of‑its‑kind statement of intent allowing temporary export of Ukrainian land, sea, and air drones to the U.S. for Pentagon testing under its “Drone Dominance” program. The draft, negotiated with Ukraine’s defense ministry and ambassador Olha Stefanishyna, aims to inform future U.S. requirements and possible co‑production or purchases, while stopping short of the $50bn joint “drone deal” Zelenskyy has sought. It comes as Ukraine’s drone industry booms—and as some domestic drone makers are swept into a major corruption probe. (Financial Times, 05.12.26) 
• European allies are increasingly uneasy over the U.S.-run Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) as the Iran war drains American precision weapons and delays deliveries. Some capitals are hesitating to commit more money amid mistrust over Pentagon plans to use $750 million of PURL funds to refill U.S. stocks rather than send new arms, even as Ukraine urgently needs Patriot interceptors and other high‑end systems. (Washington Post, 05.12.26)
• Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said Palantir’s technology is being used to analyze Russian air attacks, process large volumes of intelligence with AI, and help plan deep‑strike operations inside Russia. During CEO Alex Karp’s visit to Kyiv, Zelenskyy discussed further military and civilian tech cooperation. Fedorov added that over 100 firms are training more than 80 AI models on a battlefield‑data platform jointly built with Palantir. (Meduza, 05.12.26)
• German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced in Kyiv that Germany will provide over €10 million to an EU initiative to establish military training centers in Ukraine. The funding will support full‑scale training infrastructure meant to keep Ukraine’s armed forces at high readiness even after a possible peace deal. Pistorius said nearly 27,000 Ukrainian soldiers have already been trained in Germany and framed the new centers as part of long‑term deterrence. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.12.26)
• German arms giant Rheinmetall is launching a joint venture with Swiss‑based startup Destinus to produce cruise missiles and long‑range artillery systems for European customers, with production slated to start in late 2026 or early 2027. The new Ruta Block 2 cruise missile will have a range of over 700 km, aiming to reduce EU dependence on U.S. systems. Destinus, co‑led by Ukrainian ex‑finance minister Oleksandr Danyliuk, already supplies drones and missiles to Ukraine. (RBC.ua, 05.12.26) 

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Support for Ukraine is regaining momentum in Washington as lawmakers move to bypass House GOP leaders. The Ukraine Support Act—authorizing about $1.3 billion in direct security aid, up to $8 billion in loans, tighter Russia sanctions, and new limits on the president’s ability to lift existing sanctions—had been stalled for months amid Republican resistance and uncertainty over Trump’s stance. On May 13, backers hit 218 signatures on a discharge petition led by Rep. Greg Meeks, with all 215 Democrats plus Reps. Brian Fitzpatrick, Don Bacon, and independent Kevin Kiley signing on, forcing a floor vote expected after Memorial Day, though the measure still faces steep odds in the Senate and White House. (Axios, 05.13.26; RFE/RL, 05.14.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has asked allies to commit additional “billions” in long‑term military and financial support for Ukraine, according to Politico, as U.S. weapons stocks are strained by the Iran war and some European leaders fear a window in which Russia could test NATO. Rutte is pushing for multi‑year, predictable funding to replace ad‑hoc packages and to signal resolve despite U.S. uncertainty. But the idea for allies to commit 0.25% of their GDP to Kyiv is running into opposition from countries like France and the U.K. (Politico, 05.14.26)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Monday, May 11, 2026

• The EU sanctioned 16 more individuals for aiding Russia’s abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children, bringing to over 130 the people and entities under travel bans and asset freezes for this campaign. Brussels says nearly 20,500 children have been taken since 2022, many re‑registered, given Russian passports, adopted, or sent to indoctrination schools and camps. EU officials and Latvia’s foreign minister warn these forcible transfers meet a potential genocide criterion. (Foreign Policy, 05.11.26)
• The British government on May 11 sanctioned 85 individuals and entities accused of meddling in Armenia’s upcoming elections and orchestrating the forced deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children. The new measures target 49 employees of the Social Design Agency (SDA), a group already under Western sanctions for alleged election interference. (MT/AFP, 05.11.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Finland is planning to tighten restrictions on exports of medical equipment and healthcare technology to Russia, citing concerns that such products could ultimately be used for military purposes. (MT/AFP, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Russia’s Interior Ministry has issued an arrest warrant for former British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace on charges of “justifying terrorism,” the exiled news outlet Mediazona reported May 13. (MT/AFP, 05.13.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers approved an agreement in Chișinău to create a governing committee for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, with 36 states and the EU joining. Secretary General Alain Berset called it “a decisive step” toward holding Russia accountable, though the tribunal’s statute bars indicting a sitting president, prime minister, or foreign minister—meaning Putin and top leaders cannot be tried while in office, but other Russian officials and military commanders could. (Meduza, 05.15.26)
• A Moscow arbitration court has fully upheld a lawsuit by the Central Bank of Russia against Belgian depository Euroclear, ordering it to pay €200 billion (about 18.2 trillion rubles) in damages and lost profits over blocked Russian assets, a ruling Euroclear’s lawyers called a violation of its right to a fair trial and vowed to appeal. (Kommersant, 05.15.26)

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• Putin told journalists on May 9 that he believes the war with Ukraine is “drawing to a close,” saying “things are moving toward a conclusion, though it remains a serious matter,” and claiming Western countries had bet on a “crushing defeat for Russia” and the collapse of its statehood that “is not happening.” He said any peace treaty must be designed “with a long‑term historical perspective” as a definitive conclusion, and that talks are primarily a matter for Russia and Ukraine, though Moscow is “not opposed” to U.S. mediation; he added that “the United States seeks a resolution to the conflict” and that Russia is “grateful” it has “many other priority tasks.” Putin also said he can meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a 3^rd country if it is to sign the final peace deal. (Meduza, 05.09.26; Kommersant, 05.09.26)  
  • Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin’s recent claim that the war is “nearing an end” reflects accumulated “peace process groundwork” and U.S. mediation, but offered no timeline. He insisted Russia remains open to contacts and said the war could end “at any moment” if Kyiv makes “necessary decisions,” which he said Ukrainian leaders “know well.” Peskov added that Putin is ready to meet Zelenskyy in Moscow, while talks elsewhere would only make sense to finalize a settlement. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.12.26) 
  • Zelenskyy said Russia shows no sign of wanting to end the war and that daily fighting continues despite the nominal ceasefire, so Ukraine is preparing for new attacks. He stressed that the conflict is driving global change in warfare, especially drones, and said Kyiv is working with about 20 countries on unmanned systems, air and missile defense, and a new drone‑technology cooperation agreement with Canada. (RBC.ua, 05.12.26)
  • German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Putin’s claims that the war in Ukraine is “coming to an end” are meant to distract from Russia’s military weakness, noting that Russian forces are losing previously seized territory. He argued the conflict could end immediately if Putin withdrew troops or agreed to talks without preconditions, and warned that such statements are likely another element of Russia’s hybrid warfare. (RBC.ua, 05.12.26) 
  • Putin’s remark that the war in Ukraine is “coming to a close” reflects mounting domestic exhaustion, not a real shift toward peace, analysts tell the Washington Post. After a muted Victory Day with internet blackouts, rising taxes, inflation and long‑range Ukrainian strikes, public frustration is growing even as the Kremlin doubles down on maximalist demands that Ukraine withdraw from Donbas. Elites are debating how to craft an eventual “image of victory,” while security hawks push harsher controls that risk alienating the once‑passive majority. (Washington Post, 05.14.26)
• ISW says the first day of the Trump‑brokered May 9–11 ceasefire saw 51 combat engagements and continued strikes by both sides, with NASA fire data showing reduced but not halted hostilities; the Ukrainian Air Force reported one Iskander‑M and 43 drones launched after 18:00 on May 8, while Russia’s Defense Ministry wildly claimed 8,970 Ukrainian “violations.” ISW notes that without clear terms, enforcement, monitoring, or dispute‑resolution mechanisms, such ceasefires mainly allow Russia to regroup, rotate units, and improve logistics for renewed offensives. (ISW, 05.09.26)

Monday, May 11, 2026

• EU foreign ministers are planning to discuss the possibility of engaging in direct talks with Russia when they meet later this month, the bloc’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said May 11, as U.S. efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine remain at a standstill. “First, before we discuss with Russia, we should discuss among ourselves what we want to talk to them about,” Kallas told reporters. (MT/AFP, 05.11.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• On May 12, before flying to China, Trump said that the end of the Russian‑Ukrainian war was “already getting close.” (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.15.26)
• Russia and Ukraine see “little prospect” of reviving U.S.-brokered peace talks even after the Middle East war ends, according to people briefed on both sides’ thinking. Moscow has reportedly shifted to a strategy of taking more Ukrainian territory by force and plans to toughen its terms further if it secures full control of Donbas. Kyiv, having halted Russia’s advance and expanded deep drone strikes, now feels less exposed to U.S. pressure for a “quick, unfavorable deal,” Ukrainian officials say. They believe talks effectively stalled in February and are frustrated Washington has not pushed Putin to soften his demands. Russia has recently declared further negotiations pointless unless Ukraine withdraws from Donbas, the frontline region largely under Moscow’s control, underscoring that both sides currently treat the battlefield—not U.S. mediation—as the primary arena for shaping any eventual settlement. (Financial Times, 05.13.26)
• Former Zelenskyy spokeswoman Yuliia Mendel claimed in an interview with Tucker Carlson that Ukrainian negotiators at the 2022 Istanbul talks “agreed to everything” and that Zelenskyy “personally agreed to give up Donbas,” but offered no evidence or named sources. Ukraine’s Presidential Office dismissed her remarks as baseless, noting she took no part in the talks, had no role in decision-making, and “has long lost touch with reality,” and stressing Kyiv has denied ever agreeing to concede Donbas despite reports of exploratory draft proposals. (Kyiv Post, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Asked if he had agreed that Russia should get all of Donetsk and Luhansk, Trump said May 13 he had no such understanding with Putin, pushing back on claims that Washington had privately accepted full Russian control of the Donbas as part of a future settlement. (ISW, 05.13.26)
• Russia and Ukraine now see little chance of reviving U.S.-brokered peace talks, with Moscow refocusing on seizing all of Donbas and then “raising the price” of any ceasefire by demanding more territory. Despite slowed advances and mounting Ukrainian deep‑strike drone attacks, Russian commanders have convinced Putin they can take Donbas by autumn; Western and Ukrainian officials say he still ultimately seeks control at least to the Dnipro, including Kyiv and Odesa. (Financial Times, 05.13.26)
• Kim Barker writes that with peace talks “dead” and Ukraine more self‑reliant, Zelenskyy is openly distancing himself from Washington—complaining U.S. negotiators have “no time for Ukraine,” that easing sanctions on Russian oil gives the Kremlin “a sense of impunity,” and that Trump’s team still pressures Kyiv more than Moscow. Ukraine now produces most of its own drones, is signing export deals and is preparing for a longer war with less American help. (New York Times, 05.13.26)
• ISW reports the Kremlin is hardening its preconditions for talks, with Peskov insisting Ukraine must cease fire and withdraw from all four Russian‑claimed regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson) before negotiations. Anonymous sources say Putin still dreams of control up to the Dnipro and possibly Kyiv and Odesa, despite Russia having gained only ~350 km² in Donetsk in 2026 and facing strong Ukrainian fortifications, counterattacks, and deep‑strike campaigns that make those ambitions increasingly detached from battlefield reality. (ISW, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• On the war in Ukraine, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that only the United States is currently acting as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, asserting that European states are “directly” participating in the conflict on Ukraine’s side and therefore cannot serve as mediators. (TASS, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Trump said a deadly Russian missile and drone strike that destroyed a Kyiv apartment block and killed 24 civilians, including three children, could undermine his stalled push for a peace deal in Ukraine, telling reporters that before the attack talks “were looking good” and that “they (the Ukrainians) took a big hit.” Speaking aboard Air Force One after meeting Xi Jinping in Beijing, Trump called the war a “senseless bloodbath” and said both he and Xi “want the fighting to end” and are interested in finding ways to resolve the conflict, though he warned the strike could set back efforts toward a settlement; Putin is due in China next week to brief Xi as U.S. lawmakers press new Ukraine aid and sanctions. (Reuters, 05.15.26; RBC.ua, 05.15.26)
• Zelenskyy told representatives of the U.S. Hudson Institute that Ukraine expects an end to the current pause in U.S.-mediated peace talks and wants Washington to “actively participate” in renewed diplomacy, calling this vital to saving lives and restoring European security. He briefed them on the latest Russian strikes and stressed the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses, while thanking the U.S. Congress and public for sustained support since the full‑scale invasion began. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.15.26) 

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• A major NATO war game on Sweden’s island of Gotland tested how allies would respond to Russian “hybrid” attacks and sabotage before Article 5 is invoked, while also probing Europe’s dependence on a volatile United States. Ukrainian drone teams, invited as advisers, repeatedly wiped out Swedish units in exercises, underscoring Kyiv’s frontline expertise and NATO’s need to rapidly improve drone and counter‑drone tactics along Russia’s borders. (Washington Post, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• In a Swedish‑led war game on Gotland, Ukrainian FPV‑drone pilots “destroyed” Swedish units acting as defenders, forcing the exercise to be stopped three times and delivering a blunt warning about NATO’s vulnerabilities. Invited as advisers, the Ukrainians showed that Western forces are far behind in drone and counter‑drone tactics, prompting commanders to stress survivability, stealth and integrated “deep” detection as key lessons—while also highlighting Gotland’s strategic role in any future Russian test of NATO. (Washington Post, 05.13.26) 
• The U.K.-led “Northern Navies Initiative” will knit together a “family of allied fleets” from 10 Joint Expeditionary Taskforce countries (U.K., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands) to contain Russia in the Arctic and Baltic. By combining control of the GIUK gap, Greenland, Iceland and the Danish straits, the grouping could one day attempt a partial blockade of Russia’s access to the Atlantic—raising the risk that any future NATO–Russia clash erupts at sea rather than on NATO’s eastern land flank. (Asia Times, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• The Pentagon abruptly canceled the deployment of more than 4,000 U.S. troops from the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, to Poland, even though many soldiers and much of their equipment have already arrived there. It follows a separate decision to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany and scrap a planned missile artillery unit in Europe, moves critics say weaken deterrence amid wars in Ukraine and Iran. The Pentagon has offered little explanation; Trump says deeper Europe cuts are coming. (New York Times, 05.14.26)
• Hungary summoned the Russian ambassador to protest recent attacks on Ukraine, setting a sharp break from the pro-Kremlin tenor of Viktor Orban’s 16-year rule. (Bloomberg, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• A senior U.S. State Department official warned that Russia is likely to reposition forces toward NATO’s eastern flank once the war in Ukraine ends, raising concerns that the Baltic states could face intensified military and hybrid pressure from Moscow in the years ahead. Christopher Smith, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, on May 14 told U.S. lawmakers that while Russia currently has “about 90 % of its combat power” committed to Ukraine, Moscow would eventually seek to “rebalance its forces and look for opportunities to project power and also create dilemmas for NATO.” (RFE/RL, 05.15.26)
• The U.S. has too much at stake in Europe to exit the NATO defense alliance and its own vested interests will dictate a continued presence on the continent, according to Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Through military bases in Europe and with the Nordic countries all part of the bloc, the U.S. gains “proximity” to address its number one threat: Russian nuclear weapons, Stubb said at the Lithuania-Finland Business Forum in Vilnius on May 15. “The mass of those nuclear weapons are situated in the Kola peninsula and in Murmansk,” he said, adding that’s just 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the border of Finland. “They are pointed at New York, Washington DC, and LA.” (Bloomberg, 05.15.26)
• CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a rare trip to Havana to deliver Trump’s message that the U.S. is willing to “seriously engage” on economic and security issues only if Cuba makes “fundamental changes,” amid a four‑month U.S. oil blockade that has left the island without diesel and fuel oil. (Financial Times, 05.15.26) 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• China and the United States hope the Ukraine crisis can come to an early end, China's top diplomat Wang Yi said here on Friday. Wang made the remarks when briefing the press on the just-concluded Xi-Trump meeting in Beijing, adding both China and the United States are willing to maintain communication over the Ukraine crisis and play a constructive role in working for its political settlement. (Xinhua, 05.15.26) 
• Putin will visit Beijing on May 20, the South China Morning Post reported, which would be days after Xi’s summit in the Chinese capital with Trump.⁶ The one-day trip is seen as a routine part of the Kremlin’s relationship with Beijing, the SCMP cited unidentified sources as saying, adding it’s unlikely to feature any elaborate ceremonies like a parade. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. The Kremlin hasn’t officially announced the date of the visit so far. (Bloomberg, 05.15.26)
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow does not interfere in trade relations between third countries, downplaying concerns that expanding U.S.–China energy cooperation—discussed by Xi and Trump in the context of reducing China’s exposure to Strait of Hormuz risks—could drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. (TASS, 05.15.26)

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

• Russia conducted a second confirmed successful test of its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile on May 12, launching from a Dombarovskiy/Yasnyy silo toward the Kura range after a string of reported failures in 2023–25, including a 2024 explosion that destroyed a Plesetsk silo. Analyst Pavel Podvig notes the program, begun around 2010–11, is “seriously behind schedule,” but the Strategic Rocket Forces and Vladimir Putin both say the first Sarmat missiles—likely only one or two—will finally enter combat duty with the Uzhur division by the end of 2026, after repeated missed deployment deadlines. (RussianForces.org, 05.13.26; iStories, 05.12.26)
  • Putin received a report via videoconference from Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev on the successful test of the Sarmat missile. Putin said of Sarmat: “it is the most powerful missile system in the world… The combined yield of the payload is more than four times greater than that of any existing Western counterpart… The Sarmat will indeed be placed on combat duty by the end of this year.” (Kremlin, 05.12.26)
  • Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said no foreign governments have officially reacted to Russia’s latest successful test of the Sarmat strategic missile system, but argued that intense global media coverage shows “the world understands its significance” for Russia’s long-term security. (TASS, 05.14.26)
• Finnish President Alexander Stubb said the U.S. has too much strategic interest in Europe to leave NATO, arguing that American bases in Europe and the Nordics give Washington vital proximity to its “number one threat” — Russian nuclear forces clustered on the Kola Peninsula — and insisting that despite troop drawdown rhetoric, “America needs Europe.” (Bloomberg, 05.15.26) 
• Kyrylo Budanov, now head of the Presidential Office and formerly Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, told The Times there are “no signs” Russia is preparing a nuclear strike, saying any such preparations would be detectable. He called fears of imminent Russian nuclear use “groundless,” while stressing that Moscow’s arsenal remains a serious threat and its use would be a matter of political will rather than capability. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.15.26)
• By fall 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had stalled, raising U.S. fears that a collapsing Russian front or a threatened Putin regime might trigger nuclear use, with intelligence estimates of the risk reaching 50%. Former CIA Director William Burns later called this a “genuine risk.” Accounts by Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright show tensions peaking in late October, when Sergei Shoigu accused Ukraine of plotting a radiological attack, prompting fears of a Russian false flag. Washington warned of “catastrophic consequences,” including possible Western intervention. Russia’s subsequent evacuation of Kherson and stabilized lines eased nuclear-war concerns as Ukraine’s offensive faded. (Bloomberg, 05.15.26)

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• Kaspersky Lab co‑founder Natalya Kasperskaya has sharply criticized Russia’s FSB Second Service, which has reportedly taken over internet blocking, saying its officers have “no idea” how networks work. She says chaotic VPN and service blocks are constantly breaking her company’s infrastructure and that most developers must use VPNs because key tools are inaccessible from Russian IPs. Despite her long‑standing access to Putin, industry figures doubt she can reverse the FSB’s politicized approach. (Meduza, 05.11.26)
• Valery Fadeev, head of Russia’s presidential Human Rights Council, said it is technically impossible to “ban or switch off” VPN services without risking damage to the entire Internet and harming banks, businesses, and programmers. He argued further legal restrictions are pointless but condemned VPN use to access blocked media as consuming “enemy propaganda,” framing access limits as security measures rather than censorship. Fadeev himself says he does not use circumvention tools. (Meduza, 05.12.26) 

Energy exports from CIS:

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• Bloomberg reports a newly Russian‑flagged LNG tanker, Merkuriy, appears to be loading fuel from the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project via the Saam floating storage unit near Murmansk, highlighting Moscow’s effort to expand a “dark fleet” that can quietly move sanctioned gas to Asia amid Hormuz‑related supply disruptions. The older vessel recently shifted flag and ownership to an obscure company, Celtic Maritime & Trading SA, and is one of several former Omani tankers now under Russian flags heading to the Arctic that may be used to ferry blacklisted LNG at deep discounts to energy‑hungry Asian buyers. (Bloomberg, 05.09.26)

Monday, May 11, 2026

• Discounts on Russia’s flagship crude widened for the first time since the start of the Iran war, as shifting expectations over a possible end to the Middle East conflict rattled oil markets. The average discount on Urals crude from Russia’s western ports broadened to $23.9 a barrel below the global benchmark Dated Brent on May 14 and May 8, according to data from Argus Media. That marks the first increase since U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for Gulf producers, and boosted appetite for Russian barrels. (Bloomberg, 05.11.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Russia expects its oil production to remain flat in 2026 and grow modestly in the coming two years as its energy infrastructure comes under intense drone attacks from Ukraine. The nation’s oil producers are projected to pump about 511 million tons of crude oil and condensate this year, equivalent to roughly 10.26 million barrels a day, according to the base-case scenario in the Economy Ministry’s outlook published May 12. Annual output is seen edging up to 516 million tons in 2027, and 525 million tons in the following two years. Russia, second only to the U.S. (Bloomberg, 05.12.26)
• Russia’s crude exports from its Novorossiysk port on the Black Sea tumbled last week, dragging down overall shipments and denting flows into the Kremlin’s Ukraine war chest. Four-week average crude flows were propelled down by the first drop in weekly shipments since March, with just one crude tanker leaving Novorossiysk in the seven days to May 10. On this basis, exports averaged 3.64 million barrels a day, down from 3.68 million in the 28 days to May 3. (Bloomberg, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Russia’s oil export revenues climbed for a second consecutive month in April, as a temporary U.S. sanctions waiver and the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz continued to reshape global energy flows, the International Energy Agency said May 13. According to the IEA’s monthly market report, Russia’s revenue from crude and petroleum shipments rose to $19.18 billion in April, a modest increase of $180 million from the $19 billion recorded in March. (MT/AFP, 05.13.26)
• The European Union’s imports of Russian liquefied natural gas climbed to their highest levels since early 2022 in the first quarter of this year, according to a report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). According to the IEEFA report, the EU imported 6.9 billion cubic meters of Russian gas in the first three months of the year, a 16% increase from the first quarter of last year and the highest volume since 2022. The IEEFA told AFP that this trend accelerated in April, with imports rising 17% year-over-year. Russia now maintains its position as the EU’s second-largest LNG supplier, accounting for roughly 14% of the total market. (MT/AFP, 05.13.26)
• Russian oil output fell in April 2026 to 8.8 million barrels per day, its lowest level since the Covid slump, down 460,000 bpd year-on-year, as repeated Ukrainian drone attacks hit ports, pipelines, and refineries. Crude exports nonetheless rose to 4.9 million bpd as Middle East disruptions pushed buyers toward Russian oil, while product exports dropped to a record low 2.2 million bpd because damaged refineries could not process crude. (iStories, 05.13.26)
• Indian imports of Russian oil have been running at a record pace as refiners go all out before a U.S. waiver expires, with processors also broadening their slate of suppliers to cope with the Iran war’s fallout. So far in May, daily inflows have totaled an unprecedented 2.3 million barrels, according to Kpler data, as the waiver allowed imports of already-loaded Russian oil. Full-month flows may come in at a still-substantial 1.9 million barrels a day, Kpler’s predictive data shows. (Bloomberg, 05.13.26)
• The highly vaunted Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline remains stalled months after Gazprom signed what it called a “legally binding” memorandum with China to build it, even as the Iran war has renewed Russian hopes that concerns over energy security could push Beijing closer to a deal. Moscow sees the project, which would transport gas from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to China via Mongolia along a 2,600-kilometer (1,615-mile) route, as critical to replacing lost European gas sales after the invasion of Ukraine. (MT/AFP, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham said Chinese leader Xi Jinping could “end the wars in Ukraine and Iran with one phone call” by halting purchases of Russian and Iranian oil and gas, arguing that because Beijing is the main buyer of Russian energy and takes around 90% of Iran’s oil, cutting those flows would cripple both war efforts; he is proposing tariffs on China over such imports and urged Trump to impose a “price” on Beijing for destabilizing the world. Meanwhile, backers of a Ukraine aid and Russia sanctions bill have reached 218 signatures on a discharge petition in the U.S. House, allowing them to bypass GOP leaders and force a floor vote on the Meeks bill, which would provide over $1 billion in security aid and up to $8 billion in loans but is unlikely to pass without Trump’s support and Senate action. (RBC.ua, 05.14.26; Washington Post, 05.14.26)
• Russia is getting a further boost from the Iran war as the price for its flagship Urals oil export blend reached the highest since October 2023 for tax purposes this month. The finance ministry will calculate taxes for oil producers in May based on an average Urals price of $94.87 a barrel and an exchange rate of 76.938 rubles per U.S. dollar, according to the nation’s tax service. That amounts to nearly 7,300 rubles per barrel, a 18% increase from the previous month and a 60% jump from a year ago. (Bloomberg, 05.14.26)
• India has asked the U.S. to extend its waiver on Russian oil, according to people familiar with the matter, as the nearly 11-week war in the Persian Gulf disrupts energy supply (Bloomberg, 05.14.26)

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia is open to joint economic projects with the United States if Washington “delinks” trade from a Ukraine peace settlement, pointing to potential Arctic and even Alaska ventures once sanctions are lifted. He simultaneously reiterated Putin’s June 2024 terms for ending the war — a ceasefire and talks only if Ukraine first withdraws from all territory it still holds in four regions Russia claims to have annexed, conditions Kyiv has called unacceptable. (Reuters, 05.13.26)
• Thomas Gibbons‑Neff reports that civilian AK‑type rifles, once cheap and ubiquitous in the U.S., are “disappearing from shelves” as tariffs, sanctions, and soaring ammunition prices linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine drive up costs and shift European factories toward arming their own continent. AKs that sold for a few hundred dollars in the 1980s now cost five times more and have become boutique items, losing ground to cheaper AR‑15s and ammo. (New York Times, 05.13.26)

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• More than 100 U.S. ambassador posts worldwide are vacant under Trump, an absence veteran diplomats say is unprecedented and undermines U.S. influence. Washington currently has no confirmed ambassadors in key Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, nor in Ukraine or Russia; in Africa, 37 of 51 embassies lack ambassadors. For the Ukraine war, Trump leans instead on special envoy Steve Witkoff, while acting Kyiv envoy Julie Davis is double‑hatted as ambassador to Cyprus and set to retire in June. (Wall Street Journal, 05.14.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• Russia held a sharply scaled‑back Victory Day parade in Moscow, with no tanks, ICBMs or other heavy hardware on Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades, as the Kremlin cited “terrorist” drone threats from Kyiv and instead showed videos of equipment in action. Putin used a brief speech to liken the Ukraine war to World War II and claim Russian troops are “resisting an aggressive force…armed and supported by the entire NATO bloc,” even as Western estimates say more than 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded. (Wall Street Journal, 05.09.26)

• The pared‑down event, attended mainly by leaders from Laos, Malaysia, some post‑Soviet states and Republika Srpska—and featuring a North Korean contingent for the first time—highlights Russia’s shrinking circle of major partners as China’s Xi skipped this year’s parade and Kremlin‑friendly leaders in Hungary and Venezuela have left office. Inside Russia, growing anger over wartime internet shutdowns, economic strain, and repeated Ukrainian strikes on cities and energy infrastructure has eroded Putin’s aura, with analysts noting rising public frustration even in hard‑hit regions like Tuapse. (Wall Street Journal, 05.09.26)
• Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade on Red Square was sharply downsized for the first time since 2007, featuring only marching troops and flyovers as Moscow cited “terrorist” drone threats from Kyiv and omitted its usual display of tanks and missiles. Matthew Luxmoore notes the muted spectacle comes amid over a million Russian military casualties by Western estimates, growing domestic anger over wartime internet shutdowns and Ukrainian strikes on cities and refineries, and a visibly shrinking roster of major foreign guests, even as Putin again framed the war as resistance to “an aggressive force armed and supported by the entire NATO bloc.” (Wall Street Journal, 05.09.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Russia has sharply cut its 2026 GDP growth forecast from 1.3% to 0.4% after the economy contracted about 0.2–0.3% year-on-year in the first quarter, its first drop since 2023. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak cited labor shortages, surging military and social spending, sanctions pressure, and stubbornly high interest rates, warning that tight monetary policy will keep restraining growth as long as the supply–demand gap in the war economy remains wide. Meanwhile. Putin points to a 1.8% month-on-month GDP rise in March as a “positive” sign.  (Financial Times, 05.12.26; Meduza, 05.12.26; Bloomberg, 05.12.26; The Moscow Times, 05.15.26, Bloomberg, 05.15.26)
• A Levada Center poll shows 55% of Russians believe the country is moving in the “right direction,” down 15 percentage points since September 2025, while 28% say it is on the “wrong track,” up 11 points. Seventeen percent were undecided. The nationwide survey was conducted April 22–29, 2026, among 1,604 adults in 137 localities. (Levada Center, 05.12.26)
• Yulia Navalnaya, the widow of the late Russian opposition activist Alexei Navalny, has dismissed accusations of financial impropriety within the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), which her husband founded in 2011 to investigate corruption among government officials. Ivan Zhdanov, who served as FBK’s CEO from July 2022 until his removal in September, called for an internal audit of the organization after claiming in a recent interview that former chairman Leonid Volkov had hired “fictitious employees.” (MT/AFP, 05.12.26)
• A judge in Moscow on May 12 sentenced exiled television journalist Tikhon Dzyadko to eight years in prison in absentia after finding him guilty of spreading “fakes” about Russia’s armed forces and violating the country’s law on “foreign agents.” (MT/AFP, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Russia’s Central Bank recorded a record surge in cash demand over the May 1–11 holidays, with cash in circulation jumping 210.5 billion rubles—five times the increase a year earlier and the highest since tracking began in 2011. Economists link the spike to widespread warnings of planned internet shutdowns and possible ATM outages around Victory Day, prompting Russians to stockpile cash amid broader digital‑access fears. (Meduza, 05.13.26)
• In a long interview, former Anti‑Corruption Foundation director Vladimir Ashurkov denied ex‑deputy PM Alfred Kokh’s claims that he sought $100 million from oligarchs in exchange for Gazprom, calling the story “lie after lie,” and said Kokh’s promised $100,000 donation never arrived. Ashurkov defended Navalny’s decision to return to Russia, called FBK’s use of banker Alexander Zheleznyak as a U.S. treasurer a “genuine mistake,” and said Leonid Volkov’s letter supporting sanctioned tycoon Mikhail Fridman was meant to pull business elites away from Putin but was later acknowledged as an error. (Meduza, 05.13.26)
• Russia’s official “happiness index,” compiled by state pollster VTsIOM from the question “are you happy or not?”, fell to 52 points in April 2026, its lowest level in 15 years. The index has dropped 11 points in a year (from 63 in April 2025) and is now only slightly above its September 2011 low, when the “castling” that returned Putin to the presidency was announced. (Meduza, 05.13.26)
• Russia’s three‑week March mobile‑internet blackout and repeated regional shutoffs around Victory Day signal a shift toward Iran‑style control of the web, with authorities moving from a narrow blacklist to whitelisting only approved services and throttling VPNs. The disruptions are crippling payments, logistics and communications and have sparked public anger, work‑arounds (multiple VPNs, improvised tools, even smart‑device hacks), and elite infighting. Analysts say Putin is effectively asking citizens to trade everyday connectivity for his personal security as drone attacks and long‑range strikes deepen Kremlin paranoia. (Washington Post, 05.13.26) 

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• A day after resigning as Bryansk Region governor, Alexander Bogomaz was approved as a State Duma deputy by Russia’s Central Election Commission, filling a seat vacated earlier this spring. Bogomaz had led a United Russia regional list in the 2021 Duma elections but declined his mandate at the time. His exit from the governorship coincided with the appointment of Yegor Kovalchuk, former “LNR” prime minister, as acting Bryansk governor. (Meduza, 05.14.26)
• Putin has removed Belgorod governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, who had openly questioned federal internet blackouts and Telegram throttling used to manage war‑related security, and replaced him with Gen. Alexander Shuvaev, a decorated commander whose brigade is accused by Kyiv of executing Ukrainian POWs. The simultaneous ousting of Bryansk governor Alexander Bogomaz, replaced by former occupation official Egor Kovalchuk, signals Kremlin anxiety over growing discontent in frontline regions suffering frequent Ukrainian strikes, power cuts and failed reconstruction, and a turn toward war‑hardened loyalists in key border posts. (Financial Times, 05.15.26) 
• A new survey by the Orthodox St. Tikhon University finds the share of Russians identifying as Orthodox has fallen from 78% in 2011 to 65% in 2026, while 16% now claim no religion, 6% call themselves atheists, and 9% Muslims. Most self‑described Orthodox are non‑practicing: nearly a third never attend services, and only 17% go a few times a year. Researchers say society is polarizing between active churchgoers and those for whom Orthodoxy is mainly cultural identity. (iStories, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Former Rosnano chief Anatoly Chubais, now in exile, condemned criminal and civil cases against ex‑Rosnano managers as “repressions” and “a mockery of the law,” noting claims totaling 25 billion rubles and a recent nine‑year sentence for former Plastic Logic head Boris Galkin. Prosecutors allege embezzlement in projects from Chubais’s 2010–20 tenure; he says the new management has “built no factories” and turned Rosnano into a “corporate raiding outfit” destroying both technology and people’s lives. (Meduza, 05.15.26)
• Nina Litvinova, a prominent Russian human rights activist and dissident whose suicide was reported recently by Russian media, left a note blaming Putin for her death, according to her cousin. (RFE/RL, 05.15.26)
• A BBC Eye investigation into financial records of “Russian Community,” the largest nationalist organization in today’s Russia whose members target migrants and LGBTQ people, concludes that the group is funded not only by member donations, as it claims, but also by structures linked to pro-Kremlin political commentator Sergey Mikheev and billionaire Igor Khudokormov—owner of agroholding Prodimeks, a major landowner seen as operating in the orbit of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev. (Meduza, citing BBC Russian Service, 05.15.26)

Defense and aerospace:

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Russian regions are sharply increasing bounties for recruiting contract soldiers: average monthly spending on recruiter payments more than doubled in 2026 to 802 million rubles, with at least 7.7 billion rubles paid out since the bonuses were introduced. Half of Russia’s regions now offer such payouts—sometimes over 500,000 rubles per recruit—diverting funds comparable to budgets for schools, health care, or social services, and increasingly involving local officials, security services, and even private businesses in the recruitment drive. (iStories, 05.15.26)
• Dismissed Russian army general Aleksandr Lapin, previously commander of the Central and later Leningrad Military Districts, may head the Russian State Duma’s defense committee after the September elections, sources told Kommersant. Lapin is expected to run on United Russia’s list from Tatarstan, where he now serves as a deputy director at investment firm Svyazinvestneftekhim and as an adviser to the regional head on “SMO, defense, and veterans,” despite criticism over past battlefield failures and reported abuses of mobilized soldiers. (iStories, 05.15.26)
•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• Russia’s Prosecutor General has asked a Moscow court to seize 5.5 billion rubles in assets from former Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov and relatives, alleging they were acquired through corruption schemes involving inflated Defense Ministry contracts. The claim targets cash, corporate accounts, high‑value real estate around Moscow and in North Ossetia, luxury vehicles, and property registered to associates of Shoigu’s entourage. Tsalikov, under house arrest since March, denies guilt. (Meduza, 05.12.26)
• Former deputy environment minister Denis Butsaev, who fled Russia via Belarus in late April after resigning, has been named a suspect in a fraud case and placed on a federal wanted list, according to law enforcement leaks. Investigative outlets report he is linked to an earlier embezzlement probe at the Russian Environmental Operator, which he headed before joining the ministry, and is now believed to be in the United States. (iStories, 05.13.26)

• Prisoner numbers in Russia have fallen by 39.3% since the start of the full‑scale war, from 465,000 at end‑2021 to 282,000, FSIN chief Arkady Gostev admitted—linking the drop for the first time to inmates signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. Officials had previously attributed the sharp 2024–25 decline to “humanization” of the law; independent analysts say the real driver is offering suspects and convicts the option to go fight in Ukraine instead of serving time. (iStories, 05.14.26)

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Saturday, May 9, 2026

• Japan may send government officials to Russia as early as the end of May to maintain communications with Moscow to support its companies that are still operating there, the trade ministry said in a post on X. (Bloomberg, 05.09.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Russia’s Federal Protective Service has reportedly banned officials from wearing both electronic and mechanical wristwatches in meetings with Vladimir Putin, extending an earlier prohibition on phones. The rule, in force since mid-April, appears to apply to most regional and corporate officials but not to Putin’s long‑time associates. Putin himself has been seen removing his watch before meetings, amid reports that he has sharply tightened personal security over assassination fears. (Meduza, 05.11.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Russia’s State Duma passed a law allowing the president to deploy the armed forces abroad to “protect” Russian citizens from prosecution by foreign or international courts that Moscow does not recognize. Legal group First Department calls the measure largely symbolic but says it signals a willingness to threaten armed “rescues,” even though such operations would remain illegal under international and most national law. (iStories, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• Moscow is building “pragmatic” and “full-fledged” relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said May 14 at a regional security gathering. Speaking at the Russia and China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Kyrgyzstan, Shoigu underscored that Moscow had established a “pragmatic dialogue” with the Taliban to “meet the goals of regional security and economic development.” “We’re consistently building a full-fledged partnership ranging from political and security contacts to trade, economic and cultural and humanitarian cooperation,” Shoigu was quoted as saying by the state-run TASS news agency. (MT/AFP, 05.14.26)
• Italian visa centers have stopped accepting documents for Russian travelers via intermediaries following a scandal involving an alleged illicit Schengen visa scheme, the Association of Tour Operators of Russia (ATOR) said May 14. “ (MT/AFP, 05.14.26)

Ukraine:

Monday, May 11, 2026

• Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau has named former presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak a suspect in “Operation Midas,” a sweeping graft probe seen as a major blow to Zelenskyy’s leadership during wartime. Investigators say a group of officials laundered about $8.9 million between 2021 and 2025, using illicit funds—some allegedly skimmed from state nuclear company Energoatom—to build four luxury “Dynasty” mansions near Kyiv. NABU released an 18‑minute video showing the properties and an interior allegedly designed for Yermak’s house. Yermak, who resigned in November after a search of his home, denies owning any houses and has declined substantive comment. (Wall Street Journal, 05.11.26)
• Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies have named six more suspects in a 460‑million‑hryvnia ($10.5 million) money‑laundering case tied to luxury housing construction near Kyiv, part of “Operation Midas.” Media reports identify them as former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov and businessman Timur Mindich, close to ex‑presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak, who was earlier linked to the case. All face 8–12‑year sentences if convicted. It remains unclear whether Yermak is among the six. (Meduza, 05.12.26)
• Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies have formally named former presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak a suspect in laundering more than 460 million hryvnias (over $10 million) via elite construction projects outside Kyiv. Yermak, long seen as Zelenskyy’s most powerful aide, resigned in November 2025 amid Energoatom corruption scandals and later claimed he was going to the front, though officials said he never mobilized. He now faces charges under Ukraine’s money‑laundering statute. (Meduza, 05.11.26)
• Ukraine’s anti‑graft agencies formally served a notice of suspicion to “the former head of the presidential office,” widely reported as Andriy Yermak, in a 460‑million‑hryvnia ($10.5 million) luxury construction and Energoatom embezzlement scheme near Kyiv. The widening “Operation Midas” probe has already forced out ministers and close Zelenskyy allies; Zelenskyy is not listed as a suspect but faces renewed scrutiny from donors over entrenched corruption. (New York Times, 05.11.26)
• Residents of an apartment complex in the western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk recently received an unusual message. "Starting from Monday, May 4, the territory of your residential complex will be cleaned by migrant workers from India," the firm behind the housing development announced, adding, "Our company was forced to take this step due to a critical shortage of workers." (RFE/RL, 05.11.26)

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies have widened “Operation Midas,” a money‑laundering probe centered on the “Dynasty” luxury housing complex in Kozyn near Kyiv, ensnaring senior ex‑officials from Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inner circle. NABU and SAPO say more than 460 million hryvnias (≈$10–10.5 mn) in illicit funds—partly from corrupt schemes at state nuclear company Energoatom—were funneled via a housing cooperative and cash payments to build four $2 mn mansions and shared spa facilities. Former presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak has been formally named a suspect, alongside ex–deputy prime minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, ex‑energy and justice minister Herman Halushchenko, and businessman Timur Mindich; Yermak denies owning a house, saying he has only an apartment and a car. Charges carry 8–12 years in prison with asset confiscation. The case, described as the biggest corruption scandal of Zelenskyy’s presidency, tests Kyiv’s reform credentials as it pursues EU accession and U.S. backing for peace talks. (RBC.ua, 05.12.26; Financial Times, 05.12.26; Wall Street Journal, 05.12.26; Washington Post, 05.12.26; Bloomberg, 05.12.26)
• The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology’s (KIIS) poll, conducted between April 20 and 27 and released on May 6, asked Ukrainians who lived in territory controlled by Ukraine what they “consider the biggest threat to Ukraine’s development.” They were given two choices: government corruption or Russia’s military aggression. Some 54% said they were more concerned with corruption; 39% identified the Russians. (Responsible Statecraft, 05.12.26)
• New polling conducted by KIIS suggests that not only concern with corruption is going up, but that trust in Zelensky is going in the wrong direction too — though the majority of those polled still trust the Ukrainian president rather than not, 58% to 36%. This represents a 4-point drop from the 62% who trusted him only a month earlier. (Responsible Statecraft, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation says it has dismantled a criminal group that illegally moved weapons and ammunition from the front to western regions for sale to organized crime. Investigators allege a wounded soldier organized the scheme in 2024, recruiting two ex‑servicemen and a civilian; they allegedly obtained arms directly from frontline troops and transported them in a vehicle disguised as delivering humanitarian aid. Several sales worth over 4 million hryvnias have been documented. (Ukrainska Pravda, 05.13.26)

• Amnesty International and Human Rights First accuse Poland of helping U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deport more than 50 Ukrainians via Rzeszów‑Jasionka Airport on flights from Arizona in November 2025 and March 2026, with another flight on April 30 under review. The NGOs say forcing Ukrainians back into an active war zone breaches international law and urge Warsaw to halt cooperation and offer reparations, highlighting tensions between Poland’s strong pro‑Kyiv stance and its desire to stay close to Washington. (Financial Times, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation has notified former infrastructure minister Volodymyr Omelyan of suspicion for evading military service. Investigators say that after mobilization he was assigned as a planning‑staff officer but allegedly spent long periods not performing his duties, misleading commanders by claiming other “logistics” tasks. He is charged under Part 4, Article 409 of the Criminal Code (evasion of military service by deception under martial law), carrying up to 10 years in prison. (RBC.ua, 05.14.26)
• Ukraine’s top anti-corruption court on May 14 locked up Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s former adviser, for two months in a pre-trial detention center over money-laundering charges with bail set at $3 million. (Politico.eu, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026 

• Ukraine’s ambassador to Slovakia, Myroslav Kastran, condemned Slovak Agriculture Minister Richard Takáč for claiming, based on a Tucker Carlson interview with ex–Zelenskyy spokeswoman Yuliia Mendel, that Zelenskyy is a drug user who should resign and is “blackmailing” ministers over EU funds. Kastran warned such “absurd” statements endanger recently improved Kyiv–Bratislava ties and effectively play into Russia’s hands, urging the minister to treat unverified, hostile narratives more responsibly. (European Pravda, 05.15.26)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

• A senior Russian diplomat on May 12 accused Western powers of trying to turn Central Asia into an anti-Russian “staging ground,” warning in particular that the United States and its allies seek to take control of the region’s strategic resources and transportation corridors. Russia has long viewed Central Asia, which is made up of five former Soviet republics, as its “near abroad.” Today, the West continues its efforts to reshape the region to suit its own interests, seeking to secure access to its natural resources and gain control over its transit corridors,” Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said during a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club. (MT/AFP, 05.12.26)

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

• Two Estonian men who crossed into Russia over frozen border lakes seeking asylum have been charged with illegal border crossing, held in Pskov pretrial detention and sent for involuntary psychiatric evaluations in different St. Petersburg hospitals. One, 25‑year‑old Danil, describes cold, vermin‑infested conditions and forced injections, but still hopes for “political asylum” and Russian citizenship, despite experts noting Russia is breaching the Refugee Convention. (Meduza, 05.13.26)
• Latvia plans to ban all scheduled bus routes to Russia and Belarus, including transit lines crossing Latvian territory, after already blocking irregular services in November 2025. The Transport Ministry cites heightened risks of “influence and recruitment” of Latvian citizens by Russian and Belarusian security services at border crossings; affected carriers such as Ecolines estimate losses of at least €6 million annually but will be eligible for compensation. (Meduza, 05.13.26)

Thursday, May 14, 2026

• Latvia’s government collapsed after Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned when coalition partner the Progressives quit over her sacking of Defense Minister Andris Sprūds, following several incidents of Ukrainian drones—apparently bound for Russia—crashing in eastern Latvia, including at an oil depot in Rēzekne. Siliņa accused Sprūds of failing to deploy anti‑drone systems fast enough and tried to replace him with a military officer, triggering the rift. The crisis comes months before elections in a key NATO frontline state rapidly ramping defense spending amid fears of Russian provocations. (Financial Times, 05.14.26)

Friday, May 15, 2026

• Ukrainian long-range drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure around St. Petersburg are increasingly spilling into the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland—often after being thrown off course by Russian electronic warfare—triggering diplomatic friction, temporary flight disruptions, and even a political crisis in Latvia that led to the resignations of the defense minister and prime minister. (Meduza, 05.15.26) 

IV. Quotable and notable

• Speaking before Donald Trump in the Great Hall of the People, Xi Jinping said the world had reached a new crossroads. “Can China and the United States overcome the ‘Thucydides Trap’ and establish a new paradigm for relations between great powers?” he asked, citing the concept dubbed as such by Harvard University Professor Graham Allsion. (New York Times, 05.14.26)

V. Useful Data

Levada’s April 2026 poll of Russians on their potential for protest with economic demands.

Levada’s April 2026 poll of Russians on whether Russia is headed in the right direction

Endnotes

1. RM emailed DeepState to inquire about affiliation of the site that reportedly uses Ukrainian DeepState’s data for measurements in territorial control, but received no response as of 4.00 pm, May 15, 2026.
2. Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState reported no advances by Ukrainian armed forces in its map during the period of May 5–12, 2026, even though ISW data, as analyzed in RM’s war card, showed that Russia recorded a net loss of 12 square miles in that period. That period, according to updates posted by DeepState on its map, saw Russian armed forces advance in or near 13 distinct Ukrainian settlements. (RM, 05.13.26) If one expands the data range to the past three full calendar months, RM’s analysis of ISW data shows Russian armed forces attaining a new gain of 46 square miles in February 2026, followed by net losses of 13 square miles and 46 square miles in March and April, respectively. In contrast, looking at RM’s analysis of data supplied to RM by Finland’s Black Bird Group, it shows that Russia endured a net loss of territory in Ukraine in February 2026 (14 square miles), but then attained net gains in March (+10 sq miles)  and April (37 square miles).
3. Discrepancies in figures may be a result of the date of data collection: RM takes measurements from ISW as of every Tuesday, while the Black Bird Group takes its measurements on the 1^st and 15^th of each month.
4. RM collects data from ISW on territorial control in Ukraine as of every Tuesday. 
5. Russia launched a total of 1,428 drones and decoys into Ukraine between 8 a.m. May 13 and 8 a.m. May 14, by far the largest sustained daylong drone attack against Ukrainian cities during the war, according to a data set maintained by The New York Times, based on numbers from the Ukrainian Air Force. (New York Times,  05.14 26) 
6. Russian analyst Georgy Bovt argues that Trump’s China visit leaves Russia in a strategically weaker and more dependent position. Beijing emerged with a “formula of stabilization” with Washington: better channels, some easing on U.S. chips (Nvidia H200) and agricultural exports, and only partial loosening on rare‑earths, while keeping its core leverage intact. For Moscow, that means China continues to control critical inputs for high‑tech and defense industries and remains free to prioritize its own rivalry–management with the U.S., rather than defending Russian interests. On Iran, Xi agreed only in principle that Tehran shouldn’t have nuclear weapons and that the Strait of Hormuz must stay open, but offered no real help to Trump—an outcome that suits Beijing, since a distracted, overstretched U.S. indirectly benefits China, not Russia. (Georgy Bovt, BFM.ru, 05.15.26)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Rescue workers clear the rubble of a house heavily damaged after a Russian strike on a residential neighborhood in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Thursday, May 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)