Russia in Review, Dec. 19, 2025–Jan. 9, 2026

7 Things to Know

  1. In a wide-ranging assertive interview with The New York Times, Donald Trump declared that he is not constrained by international law, norms or checks and balances, asserting that only his “own morality” limits the use of U.S. military power. In the interview, Trump—who has recently proposed boosting U.S. military spending for 2027 from $900 billion to $1.5 trillion—openly entertained acquiring Greenland and acknowledged he may have to choose between ownership of this island and the preservation of NATO. When commenting on the present state of NATO, Trump claimed that the alliance is effectively useless without the United States, arguing that Russia fears only the U.S. and that without him, “Russia would have all of Ukraine right now.” Trump said he believes Putin wants a peace deal on Ukraine1 and that U.S. contribution to Ukraine’s defense after a ceasefire would be based on his belief that Russia would not re-invade. Trump stated that Europe should carry the primary responsibility for enforcing Ukraine’s postwar security, with the U.S. in a secondary role. Trump also made it clear that he is not unnerved by the expiration of the U.S.-Russian New START treaty on Feb. 5, 2026, implying that not only the U.S. and Russia, but also China as well as “a couple of other players” should sign a “better agreement.”2 If the other two players are the rest of the P5, then this would be a step toward accommodating Russia’s call to include France and Germany in a multilateral nuclear agreement that would involve China.
  2. The U.S. seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro represents a geopolitical shock that Moscow interprets as a demonstration of unrestrained U.S. power against regimes even if they are allied with Russia. Russian diplomats framed the U.S. operation against Maduro as an armed aggression and called for his release, but Vladimir Putin remained mum on the issue, even though his country has invested billions in Venezuela. U.S. control over Venezuela’s oil exports not only threatens Russian investments, but is also fraught with downward pressure on global oil prices—a direct hit to Russia’s war-strained budget. In addition, the U.S. seizures of tankers linked to Venezuelan oil exports have direct implications for Russia’s sanctions-evasion system. More importantly, the events in Venezuela expose Russia’s limits as a security guarantor: despite loud condemnation, Moscow was unable to prevent the operation. Venezuela is not the first ally Russia has come close to losing recently (recall regime change in Syria, with some warning Iran could be next). For Harvard Professor Graham Allison’s take on the potential revival of the Monroe Doctrine by President Trump, see this CNBC video. To read Professor Allison’s, Belfer Center Director Meghan O’Sullivan’s and other BCSIA experts’ takes on the U.S. intervention in Venezela, see this link.
  3. Russia’s winter campaign against Ukraine’s grid is the heaviest since 2022, with massive drone‑missile raids focusing on vulnerable substations and dropping Ukraine’s generating capacity from 33.7 GW pre‑war to about 14 GW, according to The Economist’s Jan. 4, 2026, article. Russia carried out more than 1,100 attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure in 2025, according to The Wall Street Journal. The resulting outages have produced blackouts of up to four days in parts of Ukraine. The latest Russian aerial attack on Ukraine on Jan. 9 killed four people and left close to half a million people without electricity in the Kyiv area, prompting authorities to urge the city’s residents to leave and find “alternative sources of power and heat.” The attack featured 36 missiles, including an Oreshnik MRBM that reportedly targeted Ukraine’s largest gas storage site, and 242 Shahed/Gerbera‑type drones.3 While some leading Western media outlets have referred to Oreshnik’s ability to carry nuclear warheads in the headlines or opening paragraphs of their coverage of Russia’s Jan. 9 strike on Ukraine, it is important to keep in mind that Russia has, in addition to prior use of this MRBM, repeatedly used other surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as Iskanders. Looking beyond surface-to-surface missiles, other Russian dual use systems that have been used to deliver conventional strikes against Ukraine include MiG-31s interceptors, Tupolev long-range bombers and naval platforms, such as surface ships and submarines that are designed to carry Kalibr cruise missiles.
  4. RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Dec. 9, 2025–Jan. 6, 2026) indicates that Russian forces gained 74 square miles of Ukrainian territory in that period, a decrease over the 243 square miles it gained over the previous four-week period (Nov. 11–Dec. 9, 2025), according to the Jan. 7, 2026, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. According to RM’s measurements, also using ISW data, Russia captured 5,622 square kilometers (2,171 square miles)—about 0.93% of Ukraine including Crimea—in 2025. Throughout that year, Russia gained an average of 171 square miles per month, according to RM’s analysis.
  5. In an interview with Financial Times, ex-director of the CIA William Burns says U.S. intelligence correctly predicted Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, but overestimated Russia’s military competence. He argues the Russian armed forces failed at basic war-fighting tasks because the Kremlin was overconfident and assumed Ukraine would collapse quickly. Burns repeatedly characterizes Putin as “cocky.” Burns also notes that the war’s unexpectedly high costs—mass casualties and economic strain—have generated internal disaffection inside Russia, which Western intelligence has been able to exploit. Beyond Russia, Burns says China studied Moscow’s poor performance closely. Beijing had expected a rapid Russian victory and instead drew lessons that likely increased Xi Jinping’s caution about Taiwan.
  6. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has carried out the most sweeping reshuffle of the country’s security and defense leadership since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The shake-up is, in part, designed to neutralize potential political rivals ahead of any eventual postwar election. As part of the changes, Zelenskyy removed Vasyl Malyuk as head of the Security Service of Ukraine, reassigning him to oversee unconventional warfare. Yevhen Khmara was appointed interim SBU chief. Zelenskyy also named Lt. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko to lead military intelligence, proposed Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal as energy minister and appointed Chrystia Freeland as an adviser on economic development.4 Earlier, Zelenskyy appointed military intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov as head of the presidential office, replacing Andriy Yermak, who resigned amid an energy‑sector corruption probe.
  7. Bloomberg reported on Dec. 24 that the ruble has surged about 45% in 2025 to approximately 78 rubles per dollar, making it the best‑performing major currency and one of the top five global assets by spot return.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • The IAEA said Ukraine’s Khmelnytskyi and Rivne nuclear power plants have been forced to reduce output after Russian strikes on electrical substations on the night of Dec. 23 damaged grid infrastructure, further undermining the stability of Ukraine’s energy system. Director General Rafael Grossi again urged military restraint to avoid a nuclear accident. (Korrespondent.net, 12.23.25)
  • The IAEA said on Jan.9 that it has initiated consultations to establish a temporary ceasefire zone in the area where Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) last remaining back-up 330 kV line was damaged and disconnected as a result of military activity on Jan. 2 , leaving the plant entirely dependent on its sole functioning 750 kV line, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today. The proposal requests both the Russian Federation and Ukraine to agree to a temporary ceasefire zone at a location approximately 10 kilometers from the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant 330 kV open switchyard, to enable Ukrainian technicians to safely perform the necessary repairs, according to IAEA. (IAEA, 01.09.26)
  • Rosatom said Russia’s nuclear power plants fulfilled — ahead of schedule on Dec. 27 — their 2025 state target of 215.339 billion kWh of electricity generation and have now moved into over‑plan output, crediting a 149‑day reduction in cumulative maintenance downtime that yielded an estimated extra 3.3 billion kWh this year. (Rosatom, 12.29.25)
  • Rosatom said the first new unit of Kursk NPP‑2, equipped with its latest VVER‑TOI reactor design, was synchronized with Russia’s unified power grid on Dec. 31 and reached 240 MW output, becoming the corporation’s most powerful reactor type at 1,250 MW. CEO Alexei Likhachev called it the “first step” toward a program of 38 new reactors aimed at raising the nuclear energy’s share of Russia’s power mix from 20% to 25% by 2042. (Rosatom, 01.01.26)

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • North Korea appeared to show major progress on a nuclear‑powered submarine, with state media publishing photos of what experts say looks like a largely completed 8,700‑ton hull that could be ready for sea tests within months. Kim Jong Un called the boat a “strategic nuclear attack submarine,” condemned U.S.-backed South Korean plans for their own nuclear sub as an “offensive act,” and framed the project as crucial to expanding Pyongyang’s sea‑based nuclear deterrent amid deepening military ties with Russia. (Washington Post/AP, 12.24.25)
  • Investigative outlet Istories, citing Spanish newspaper La Verdad, reports that the Russian MoD‑linked cargo ship Ursa Major, which mysteriously sank off Spain in December 2024, was carrying two VM‑4SG nuclear‑submarine reactor pressure vessels, likely destined for North Korea—not “icebreaker components” as the captain claimed. (Istories, 12.29.25)

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova condemned recent Israeli statements about possible new strikes on Iran’s territory and nuclear-energy sites as “aggressive” and warned they risk a “serious catastrophe” with radiological and humanitarian consequences, urging “hotheads” to abandon a “destructive course,” avoid repeating the “fatal mistakes” of June 2025. (Anadolu Agency, 01.02.26)
  • Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has drawn up a “plan B” to flee to Russia with about 20 family members and close aides, including his son and presumed heir Mojtaba, if security forces begin deserting during the current nationwide protests, according to an intelligence report cited by The Times and summarized by Istories. The unrest, driven by roughly 50% inflation, a tripling currency collapse, revived nuclear sanctions and escalating executions, has seen IRGC and Basij units violently crack down, with at least 16 protesters killed and hundreds arrested. (The Times, Istories, 01.04–05.26)
    • Writing for Carnegie Endowement, Russian expert on Iran, Nikita Smagin argues that that Iran’s regime is facing one of the strongest protest waves in its history, with demonstrators storming government buildings, seizing cities, and rallying under relatively unified pro‑monarchy slogans despite dozens of deaths in crackdowns. Moscow, now one of Tehran’s closest allies, is supplying weapons that could be used if unrest turns into an armed uprising and is closely studying Iran’s methods of suppressing protests to “learn from others’ mistakes.” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 01.09.26)
  • Iran said it launched three satellites — Paya, Zafar‑2 and Kowsar — into orbit from Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome, using Russian launch services to place the devices about 500 km above Earth for environmental and agricultural imaging, with Paya described as its heaviest, most advanced domestically built imaging satellite to date. The move comes amid U.S. concerns that Iran’s growing space program, already under sanctions for links to ballistic missiles, could bolster its missile and nuclear capabilities, and just before Trump’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss possible new strikes on Iran. (Bloomberg, 12.28.25)
  • Iran’s ambassador to Moscow Kazem Jalali said Russian‑Iranian ties in the “military and security spheres are also expanding,” but that it is “inappropriate to discuss the details,” noting they build on a January 2025 comprehensive strategic partnership in which Putin and President Masoud Pezeshkian pledged to deepen military‑technical cooperation as a key element of regional and global security. (TASS via Factiva, 01.09.26) 

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

  • The EU agreed to provide Ukraine an interest-free $105 billion loan, covering roughly two-thirds of Kyiv’s projected financial needs through 2027 and much of a $42 billion budget deficit for 2026. Ukraine’s official 2026 military budget is $66 billion, but economists estimate actual defense needs at $100–120 billion. Without the loan, officials say Kyiv might have been forced to cut 25–30 percent of planned spending. (New York Times, 12.20.25)

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025

  • Russian forces forcibly deported around 50 civilians from the recently seized Sumy Oblast village of Hrabovske into Russia. (ISW, 12.21.25)
  • Russian soldiers returned from Ukrainian captivity are treated as suspected traitors rather than veterans: commanders urge troops to kill themselves rather than surrender, ex-POWs are isolated and interrogated for weeks, stripped of pay and benefits, sometimes or sent back to the front in low‑trust roles. (Wall Street Journal, 12.21.25)

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Ukraine has accused Russia of abducting 50 civilians in a cross-border attack. (RFE/RL, 12.21.25)
  • Russia returned 60 Ukrainians to their home country last week, including people facing deportation and others with disabilities, Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova said Dec. 22. (MT/AFP, 12.22.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • A New York Times investigation, based on more than 9,000 complaints accidentally exposed by a glitch in the Russian human-rights ombudsman’s new IT system, details a systemic pattern of coercion and abuse used to sustain Putin’s war in Ukraine. Of over 6,000 Ukraine‑related complaints analyzed, about half were missing‑person searches, roughly 1,500 alleged war‑related wrongdoing, including more than 300 from soldiers themselves. (New York Times, 12.31.25, New York Times, 12.31.25)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Wheat exports from Ukraine — one of the world’s major grain exporters — tumbled almost 25% in December as Russia stepped up attacks on the country’s port infrastructure that serves as its main export conduit. Corn exports also dropped about 13%, according to data from analysts at agri-market intelligence platform CM Navigator. (Bloomberg, 01.08.26)

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

  • America’s warnings about Putin’s plans to invade Ukraine proved to be startlingly right. Their expectation that the Russians would rapidly overwhelm Ukraine was not. Why was the U.S. so off-base about how the war would unfold? “We expected them to be much more effective,” former CIA director William Burns says of Putin’s army. Any western military would have moved quickly to take out the country’s air defences as well as its command structures. “The Russians didn’t do that. Partly because they were so cocky, they didn’t think they needed to.” Burns - who travelled to Ukraine 14 times during the war-  comes back to that word a lot to describe the Russian president. “Cocky.” (Financial Times, 01.09.26)
  • In June 2025, beleaguered U.S. military officers met with their CIA counterparts to help craft a more concerted Ukrainian campaign. It would focus exclusively on oil refineries. The energy strikes would come to cost the Russian economy as much as $75 million a day, according to one U.S. intelligence estimate. The CIA would also be authorized to assist with Ukrainian drone strikes on “shadow fleet” vessels in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Gas lines would start forming across Russia. (New York Times, 12.31.25)
  • RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Dec. 9, 2025–Jan. 6, 2026) indicates that Russian forces gained 74 square miles of Ukrainian territory in that period, a decrease over the 243 square miles it gained over the previous four-week period (Nov. 11–Dec. 9, 2025), according to the Jan. 7, 2026, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. Since Dec. 23, 2025, when the previous card was published, Russian forces captured the following Ukrainian settlements, according to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group: SiverskHrabovske, PazenoPereizneKuzmynivka and Novomykolayivka. Throughout 2025, Russia gained an average of 171 square miles per month, according to RM’s analysis of ISW data. (RM, 01.07.26)
    • ISW assesses that in 2025 Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers (1,865 square miles) in Ukraine and regained ~473 square kilometers (183 square miles) in Russia’s Kursk Oblast in 2025—about 0.8% of Ukraine’s territory—compared to 3,604 square kilometers (1,392 square miles) in 2024. In contrast, AFP has reported, using ISW data, that Russia made its biggest territorial gains since early 2022 in 2025, capturing over 5,600 square kilometers (2,162 square miles) of Ukrainian territory—about 0.94% of Ukraine. Advances peaked in November and slowed sharply in December, according to AFP. According to RM’s measurements, also using ISW data, Russia captured 5,622 square kilometers (2,171 square miles)—about 0.93% of Ukraine including Crimea—in 2025. According to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT project, 4,336 square kilometers (1,674 square miles) of Ukrainian territory was occupied in 2025. This is approximately 0.72% of the entire territory of Ukraine. In total, from Jan. 1, 2023, to Jan. 1, 2026, the increase in occupied territory amounted to 7,468 square kilometers (2,883 square miles), or 1.24% of the entire territory, according to DeepState.

Friday, Dec. 19, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near DronivkaVyshneve and in Siversk. (RM, 01.09.25)

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near DronivkaRiznykivkaNovoekonomichne and Huliaipole.  (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Tulsi Gabbard wrote on X on Dec. 20: “The truth is that ‘U.S. intelligence’ assesses that Russia does not even have the capability to conquer and occupy Ukraine, what to speak of ‘invading and occupying’ Europe.” (RM. 12.20.25)
  • U.S. President Donald Trump believes Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal is a complete Russian takeover of Ukraine, according to Trump’s chief of staff Susan Wiles, quoted in Vanity Fair earlier this month. “The experts think that if he could get the rest of Donetsk, then he would be happy,” Wiles told Vanity Fair in August. But privately, Trump wasn’t buying it—he didn’t believe Putin wanted peace. “Trump thinks [Putin] wants the whole country,” Wiles told this magazine. (RM, 12.20.25)
  • U.S. intelligence continues to assess that Putin has not abandoned maximalist war aims in Ukraine, still seeking to capture the entire country and even reclaim parts of Europe once under Soviet control. (Reuters, 12.20.25)
  • A Russian ballistic missile strike on port infrastructure in Odesa killed eight people and wounded 27, including bus passengers. (AP/Washington Post, 12.20.25)
  • Ukraine’s security service says it has used drones to disable four Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers in recent weeks — three in the Black Sea and one, the Qendil, about 1,200 miles from Ukraine in the Mediterranean — and hit Russian oil platforms in the Caspian Sea four times in 10 days. (New York Times, 12.20.25)

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Yunakivka and Svyato-Pokrovske. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Increasingly upbeat, often misleading battlefield briefings have reinforced Putin’s belief that Russia is winning in Ukraine, creating a “self‑sustaining loop of disinformation” in which generals overstate successes and understate setbacks—distorting his expectations in both war strategy and peace negotiations. (Financial Times, 12.22.25)
  • Russia said a drone attack damaged infrastructure and vessels in the Black Sea port of Taman, yet another strike on the country’s commodities assets. (Bloomberg, 12.22.25)
  • Ukrainian forces carried out a broad series of strikes inside Russia and Russian‑occupied territory, hitting the Tamanneftegaz oil terminal, a pipeline, docks, two ships, a Crimean river‑boat brigade base, an ammunition depot and a launch site for attack drones, while partisans sabotaged two Russian jet fighters near Lipetsk. (Washington Post/AP, 12.22.25)
  • Russia’s army has begun conducting mounted cavalry assaults at the front, according to drone footage published by Ukraine’s 92nd Separate Assault Brigade. (Istories, 12.22.25)
  • Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov, head of operational training for Russia’s armed forces, was killed in Moscow when a bomb attached beneath his Kia Sorento exploded as he drove out of a residential courtyard, in what investigators say may be the third bombing in a year targeting senior officers linked to the Ukraine invasion and which Russian authorities are probing for possible involvement of Ukrainian security services. (Financial Times, 12.22.25)
  • Russian security forces shot and killed Stanislav Orlov (“Ispanets”), founder of the neo-Nazi volunteer brigade “Española,” during a Dec. 4 raid on his dacha in the “Flotsky” gardening cooperative in annexed Sevastopol, as part of a weapons-trafficking case. (Istories, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces captured  Siversk and Hrabovske. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Ukraine’s withdrawal from the frontline town of Siversk, a key stronghold on high ground in eastern Donetsk, risks weakening Kyiv’s negotiating hand just as Moscow is demanding that all remaining Ukrainian‑held areas of the region be ceded in a peace deal; the loss exposes Sloviansk and Kramatorsk to greater pressure even as Zelenskyy touts U.S.-backed proposals he calls “quite solid” but still stuck on territorial questions. (New York Times, 12.23.25)
  • Russia launched its largest combined strike of 2025 overnight Dec. 22–23, firing 635 drones (about 400 Shaheds), three Kinzhal ballistic missiles and 35 Kh‑101/Iskander‑K cruise missiles at Ukrainian critical infrastructure; Ukrainian defenses downed 587 drones and 34 cruise missiles, all three Kinzhal failed to hit targets, but 39 drones struck 21 sites, causing near‑total blackouts in Rivne, Ternopil and Khmelnytskyi and outages in at least nine other regions. At least three died in strikes across Ukraine, according to the office of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and witnesses recorded Shahed drones hitting civilian structures in Kyiv and nearby areas. (RFE/RL, 12.23.25, ISW, 12.23.25, New York Times, 12.23.25, Financial Times, 12.23.25)
    • Following Russia’s latest large-scale strike on Ukraine’s energy system, emergency power cuts have been introduced in Kyiv and at least nine regions — including Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Poltava and Ternopil — on the orders of grid operator Ukrenergo, with regional utilities urging residents to conserve electricity to help stabilize the system. (RBC.ua, 12.23.25)
    • With Russia launching far larger and more sophisticated attacks on Ukraine’s grid than in past winters—over 5,000 missiles and long‑range drones in November alone—Ukraine faces its worst energy crisis since 2022, leaving cities like Odesa and Kyiv in blackout for days and forcing residents to endure Christmas with little light, heat, or water. (Wall Street Journal, 12.23.25)
    • Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat said F‑16 pilots intercepted almost all of the 35 Russian cruise missiles launched in the massive overnight attack on Dec. 23, downing 34 of them, but warned that Ukraine still faces a serious shortage of both surface‑to‑air and air‑to‑air missiles, with some air‑defense systems standing idle for lack of munitions. (Ukrainska Pravda, 12.23.25)
  • The U.K. Ministry of Defense assesses that Russia has likely suffered over 400,000 killed and wounded in both 2024 and 2025. (U.K. MoD, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Kindrativka, in Vovchansk and Myrnohrad. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Kremlin‑linked Russian milbloggers have now acknowledged major Ukrainian gains around Kupiansk, admitting that earlier official claims of capturing 11 settlements were exaggerated and that Russia in fact controlled only three villages before recent counterattacks. Updated maps cited by ISW indicate Ukraine has maintained or retaken about 182.6 square kilometers since Dec. 11, cutting some Russian units’ supply lines and exposing manpower and equipment shortfalls in Moscow’s effort to break the northern “Fortress Belt.” (ISW, 12.24.25)
  • Russia launched 116 Shahed/Geran‑type drones on Dec. 23–24, with 48 hitting 19 sites—especially energy and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kherson and other regions—in what ISW assesses as a campaign to split Ukraine’s power grid. (ISW, 12.24.25)
  • An explosion in southern Moscow killed three people, including two traffic police officers, in the same district where Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov was car‑bombed two days earlier; a Ukrainian military‑intelligence official told the AP the blast was a GUR operation and said the officers had served in Russia’s war on Ukraine, though Russian authorities have not named suspects. The incident is the latest in a string of assassinations and bombings targeting senior Russian officers since 2022 that Moscow has blamed on Kyiv, some of which Ukraine has openly claimed. (AP/Washington Post, 12.24.25)

Thursday, Dec. 25, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces occupied Dronivka and advanced near Dvorichanske. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Russia launched 131 Shahed/Geran‑type drones at Ukraine, with air defenses destroying or disabling 106, but 22 still hitting 15 locations, killing civilians and damaging energy and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv during Christmas night. (RFE/RL, 12.25.25)
  • Ukrainian long-range drones struck Russia’s Temryuk port on the Sea of Azov overnight Dec. 24–25, igniting large fuel tanks and damaging industrial facilities in Krasnodar Krai, while Ukraine’s Air Force said it hit the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov region with Storm Shadow missiles. Russian officials reported a 2,000‑square‑meter blaze at oil reservoirs near Temryuk and injuries to an emergency worker in Novoshakhtinsk. Moscow claimed to have downed 141–170 Ukrainian drones nationwide. Ukraine used long-range drones to hit Russia’s largest gas processing facility, the Orenburg gas plant some 1,700 km east of Kyiv, which also handles gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field. (RFE/RL, 12.25.25, Bloomberg, 12.25.25)

Friday, Dec. 26, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Andriivka. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • There have been at least 142 Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and oil depots in 2025, up 51% from 94 in 2024 (27 in 2023; 18 in 2022). Over nearly four years of war it tallies 281 such strikes, of which at least 230 (82%) produced confirmed damage, from minor impacts to multi‑day fires, across more than 100 refineries, depots and marine terminals. Targets include repeatedly hit sites like Ilsky (10), Afipsky (10), Tuapse (7), Volgograd (10) and the Ryazan refinery (13 attempts). Deeper‑range strikes in 2025 reached Salavat and Ufa (≈1,300–1,350 km), Ukhta (≈1,750 km) and Tyumen (≈2,000 km), contributing to fuel supply disruptions in 57 Russian regions. (Verstka, 12.26.25)
  • Zelenskyy said Russia was using Belarusian territory to intensify Shahed/Geran drone attacks on rail infrastructure in western and northern Ukraine, bypassing Ukrainian defenses. (ISW, 12.26.25)

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in HuliaypoleMyrnohradPokrovsk, near ZeleneRodynskeChervonyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Russia carried out another massive, nearly 10‑hour combined strike on the night of Dec. 26–27, launching 519 Shahed/Geran‑type drones and 40 missiles (including Iskander‑M, Kinzhal, Kalibr/Iskander‑K, Kh‑101, and Kh‑22) primarily at Kyiv and surrounding oblasts. Ukraine’s air force reported shooting down 474 drones and most of the missiles, but 10 missiles and 25 drones still hit around 30 locations, striking at least seven sites across the capital, killing at least two people and wounding more than 30, including children. The barrage set multiple high‑rise buildings ablaze, knocked out power and heat for roughly a third of Kyiv, cut electricity to more than 320,000 customers in the city and oblast, and left around 600,000 residents affected overall. The attacks also damaged Naftogaz energy facilities, port and grain infrastructure in Odesa, and more than 120 buildings in Uman, Cherkasy oblast. (Financial Times, 12.27.25, Washington Post/AP, 12.27.25, New York Times, 12.27.25, Moscow Times/AFP, 12.27.25, ISW, 12.27.25)
  • Russia has conducted more than 1,100 attacks this year on Ukraine’s rail network—about as many as in 2023 and 2024 combined—striking stations, substations, bridges and trains in what Ukrzaliznytsia chief Oleksandr Pertsovsky calls a “deliberate, well‑planned” effort to cripple a system that carries over 60% of Ukraine’s freight and military logistics and has suffered at least $5.8 billion in damage since 2022. Despite frequent drone and missile strikes on hubs such as Lozova and Fastiv, rail services are usually restored within hours as the state railway prioritizes keeping the country connected. (Wall Street Journal, 12.27.25)
  • The founder and leader of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), 41‑year‑old neo‑Nazi Denis Kapustin (aka Denis Nikitin, “White Rex”), was killed overnight while on a combat mission in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, the far‑right Russian unit fighting for Kyiv said, vowing revenge and more details after an internal investigation. (Moscow Times/AFP, 12.27.25)

Sunday, Dec. 28, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Myrnohrad, near Chervonyi Lyman, Filiya and Hulyaypole. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Russia launched a massive overnight barrage of 519 drones and 40 missiles against Kyiv, killing one, injuring 32 and cutting heat to nearly a third of the city just as Zelenskyy departed for Halifax and then Florida to meet Trump on a revised 20‑point peace plan. Zelenskyy called the strike Russia’s answer to “peaceful negotiations,” reiterated red lines against recognizing Russian territorial gains or ceding Donbas, and said ironclad Western security guarantees and control over Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant are paramount—issues he will press Trump on before briefing European leaders and a January “coalition of the willing” meeting in France. (Financial Times, 12.28.25)
  • Ukrainian drones struck targets in six Russian regions overnight, with the main attack hitting Rosneft’s Syzran oil refinery in Samara region, where Russian air defenses said they downed 12 drones. Pro‑war and Ukrainian monitoring channels reported impacts on the refinery’s ELOU‑AVT‑5 unit and a nearby high‑voltage substation, triggering explosions, power outages in parts of Syzran and a temporary flight halt at Samara’s Kurumoch airport. The refinery, which also supplies fuel to Russia’s military and was previously forced offline by a Dec. 5 strike, normally produces about 800,000 tons of gasoline and 1.5 million tons of diesel annually. (Moscow Times/AFP, 12.28.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces occupied PazenoPereizne and Kuzmynivka, and advanced near Andriivka and in Myrnohrad. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Ahead of his latest call with Trump, Putin again claimed Russian forces were successfully advancing near Kupiansk and Zaporizhzhia and that Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were being “liberated step by step.” In Moscow on Dec. 29, he ordered his generals to continue pushing to capture the strategic regional capital of Zaporizhzhia, a city of about 700,000 that has so far been largely distant from the most intense fighting but where Russian troops have recently made limited gains. Independent outlet Istories, however, notes that even prominent pro‑war Russian channels now contradict Putin’s upbeat narrative: they report Russian units near Kupiansk hold only three small enclaves and are “completely surrounded” by Ukrainian forces. (Istories, 12.29.25, New York Times, 12.29.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces occupied Novomykolayivka and advanced near VarachyneHrabovske and Molodetske. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Russian forces are extending the range of their drones deeper into Ukraine, ISW reports, citing geolocated footage of Molniya drones striking a Mi‑24 helicopter in Poltava Oblast (150 km from Russia) and an An‑26 at Mykolaiv Airport. Ukrainian EW expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assesses the drones likely used Starlink or LTE modems and were launched via forward groups or “mothership” drones, highlighting Ukraine’s urgent need for more point‑defense air‑defense systems. (ISW, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Bilohirya, in Stepnohirsk and Pokrovsk. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • U.S. national-security officials concluded Ukraine did not target Putin or his residence in the alleged Novgorod “drone attack,” finding instead that Kyiv struck a separate military site in the same region, according to a CIA assessment. After being briefed by CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Trump appeared to soften his earlier outrage, sharing an editorial arguing Russia is blocking peace, while Moscow continues to insist 91 drones were aimed at Putin’s home. (Wall Street Journal, 12.31.25, New York Times, 12.31.25)
  • Russia has doubled down on its unproven claim that 91 Ukrainian drones targeted Putin’s Dolgiye Borody residence near Valdai, with the Defense Ministry alleging waves of drones were shot down over Bryansk, Smolensk and Novgorod and releasing unverifiable footage of wreckage while warning of a “most serious” response and tougher peace terms. Officials have offered no evidence the drones were actually headed for the estate, and Kyiv and EU leaders dismiss the episode as a fabricated pretext to harden Moscow’s maximalist demands and undermine U.S.‑brokered peace talks. (Wall Street Journal, 12.31.25, Moscow Times/AFP, 12.31.25)
  • Russia and Ukraine traded heavy overnight strikes on each other’s Black Sea energy and port infrastructure. Ukrainian drones hit the Rosneft refinery and a berth in Tuapse, damaging a crude unit, pipelines, loading equipment and nearby apartments, injuring at least two, and also reportedly struck the Temp fuel depot in Rybinsk, deep inside Russia. Moscow said additional drones targeted Belgorod and the Moscow region. In retaliation, Russian drones pounded Odesa, damaging four apartment buildings and two DTEK energy facilities, injuring six people including three children and knocking out power, water and heat for some residents. (Bloomberg, 12.31.25, RFE/RL, 12.31.25, Washington Post/AP, 12.31.25, Bloomberg, 12.31.25, Moscow Times/AFP, 12.31.25 Washington Post/AP, 12.31.25)
    • Ukraine has intensified its campaign against Russian energy infrastructure to a new monthly record, with at least 24 December strikes on refineries, oil tankers, offshore installations and key pipelines, according to Bloomberg’s compilation of public data. The raids add to pressure from Western sanctions: oil and gas now account for an estimated 23% of Russia’s budget revenue, a record low. Russia has simultaneously kept up large‑scale attacks on Ukraine’s grid and cities, even as Trump‑mediated peace talks continue. (Bloomberg, 12.30.25)
    • Russian forces struck Odesa, injuring at least six people and knocking out power, water and heat for some residents. Strikes have repeatedly hit port infrastructure, storage and power grids, leaving parts of the city without heat, water or electricity and threatening the maritime corridor that handles roughly 90% of Ukraine’s farm exports. Analysts say Moscow aims to cripple export logistics and long‑term agricultural output, while Kyiv counters with deep strikes on Russian refineries and “shadow fleet” tankers and pleads for more Western air defenses. (Wall Street Journal, 12.31.25, Bloomberg, 12.31.25)
  • ISW says Russia failed in its 2025 objectives to fully seize Donetsk and Luhansk and create buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv, despite gains at Pokrovsk (now ~68% occupied), Toretsk, Siversk and incursions toward Hulyaipole and along the Fortress Belt. A “buffer” offensive in northern Sumy largely stalled, efforts near Velykyi Burluk were mostly dormant, and Ukrainian forces retook most of Kupiansk by December. (ISW, 12.31.25)
  • Russian forces launched over 54,000 long‑range drones and 1,900+ missiles at Ukraine in 2025, including 52 strike packages of 210+ projectiles and 18 barrages of more than 500, with a record 810 drones plus 13 missiles on Sept. 6–7. ISW notes the expanded defense‑industrial base, Chinese components and North Korean KN‑23 missiles/labor underpin this tempo, which increasingly targets Ukraine’s energy grid and rail network using Shaheds with cameras and radio control to hit moving trains. (ISW, 12.31.25)

Thursday, Jan. 1, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near RiznykivkaPredtechyne and Dorozhnyanka. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Ukrainian military intelligence said Russian Volunteer Corps commander Denis Kapustin (“Denis Nikitin,” “White Rex”) is alive, contradicting earlier RDK claims he was killed near Zaporizhzhia. HUR alleges Russian security services paid $500,000 to have him assassinated, but Ukrainian agents intercepted the money and redirected it to Kyiv’s war effort, staging his “death” as part of a month‑long operation; Kapustin appeared alongside then-HUR chief Kyrylo Budanov in a briefing video. (Meduza, 01.01.26)
  • A New York Times dispatch from Ukraine’s front lines paints a grim New Year for units like the “Da Vinci Wolves,” whose 2026 goal is simply to survive as Russian forces grind forward around Pokrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and the Dnipro region. Drone-saturated battlefields make movement perilous; soldiers expect at least two more years of war and view Trump’s shifting peace deadlines skeptically, while rejecting territorial concessions and insisting on “full victory” in Donbas. Despite exhaustion and personal sacrifice, officers say Russia still failed to seize key cities in 2025, giving them some faith “everything will be OK.” (New York Times, 01.02.26) 

Friday, Jan. 2, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in MyrnohradPokrovsk and Svitle. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Kremlin‑installed governor of the occupied part of the Kherson region Vladimir Saldo says at least 28 people, including a child, were killed when Ukrainian drones hit a hotel‑restaurant complex in the occupied Black Sea resort town of Khorly on New Year’s Eve; geolocated images show the strike site at Café Ukrayinska Khata beside the long‑shuttered Hotel Leo. Kyiv denies targeting civilians, and a Ukrainian defense source told AFP the drones hit a closed gathering of Russian military personnel. (Moscow Times/AFP, 01.02.26)
    • At least 12 of those killed in Khorly have been identified, including multiple Russian occupation officials: former Kalanchak MVD chief Sergei Bogan, the Kalanchak IT head, a former occupation election commissioner from Crimea now running for office, and the collaborating owner of the café‑hotel complex. ISW notes this casualty list supports Ukrainian claims that the site hosted occupation personnel. (ISW, 01.02.26)
    • Ukraine has rejected Russian claims it deliberately targeted civilians in occupied Khorly on New Year’s Eve, noting the General Staff’s published strike list doesn’t mention Kherson Oblast. An anonymous Ukrainian defense source told AFP the drones hit a closed gathering of Russian military personnel; local Telegram accounts reported soldiers, families and occupation officials were present. ISW assesses a strike clearly occurred but cannot yet judge intent. (ISW, 01.02.26)

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2025

Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026 

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in RiznykivkaChasіv Yar and Myrnohrad. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Trump on Jan. 4 told reporters that U.S. officials have determined that Ukraine did not target a residence belonging to Putin in a drone attack last week, disputing Kremlin claims that Trump had initially greeted with deep concern. “I don’t believe that strike happened,” Trump told reporters as he traveled back to Washington on Jan. 4 after spending two weeks at his home in Florida. “We don’t believe that happened, now that we’ve been able to check.” (Washington Post, 01.04.26)
  • Local governors said Ukrainian drones killed two people in Russia’s Belgorod and Kursk regions and wounded at least two more, including a child, while three Ukrainians were injured in Kharkiv region drone strikes and the death toll from Jan. 2’s Russian missile attack on Kharkiv rose to five. The cross‑border attacks came as European advisers left Kyiv for Paris, where Zelenskyy hopes to finalize security‑guarantee documents at a leaders’ summit this week. (Washington Post/AP, 01.04.26)
  • Russia’s winter campaign against Ukraine’s grid is the heaviest since 2022, with massive drone‑missile raids now focusing on vulnerable substations: generating capacity has fallen from 33.7 GW pre‑war to about 14 GW, while a very cold spell could require 17 GW. Towns like Vyshhorod have endured four‑day blackouts, but Ukrainians have adapted with generators and household batteries even as anger grows. The article also notes that peace talks remain stuck on territory and Zaporizhzhia, while Zelenskyy’s security shake‑up (Budanov as chief of staff, Fedorov as defense minister) aims to reassure Western partners. (The Economist, 01.04.26)

 Monday, Jan. 5, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Fedorivka and in Novomarkove. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Russia on Jan. 5 said it had seized the village of Hrabovske in Ukraine's Sumy region, from where Kyiv last month accused Moscow of forcibly relocating dozens of residents in a "medieval raid." (MT/AFP, 01.05.26)
  • Russian forces launched a major wave of nine missiles and 165 Shahed‑type drones overnight Jan. 4–5, striking a Kyiv medical center, where at least one patient was killed and three injured, and an American‑owned vegetable‑oil plant in Dnipro that spilled 300 tons of oil, while also hitting energy sites in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. ISW also notes probes into deliberate cuts to Baltic undersea cables as part of Russia’s broader “Phase Zero” campaign against NATO states. Fresh strikes early Jan. 5 killed two more people and forced nighttime evacuations in freezing temperatures, a day before Ukrainian allies meet in Paris, with U.S. Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner expected to attend. (ISW, 01.05.26, MT/AFP, 01.05.26)
  • Russia is modifying Iranian-designed Shahed long‑range drones into improvised air‑defense platforms, mounting Verba man‑portable air‑defense systems (MANPADS), cameras and radio modems so operators can remotely fire missiles forward from the drone to target Ukrainian fighters and helicopters. (ISW, 01.05.26)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Rusyn YarNove ShakhoveDorozhnyanka and Fedorivka. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Ukrainian forces continued long-range strikes on Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight Jan. 5–6, hitting the 100th GRAU arsenal near Neya in Kostroma Oblast and the Gerkon Plus oil depot in Lipetsk Oblast. Ukrainian security sources said the arsenal strike caused secondary ammunition explosions and supplies depots in the Central and Moscow military districts, while the depot fire disrupted fuel supplies to Tambov, Voronezh, and Lipetsk. Russian officials blamed falling drone debris for both fires. (ISW, 01.06.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces occupied Andriivka and Novomarkove and advanced near Mayske. (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Steelmaker Zaporizhstal halted operations after a massive Russian drone strike on Ukraine’s power system caused a blackout in Zaporizhzhia region on Jan. 7, cutting the plant’s external electricity supply. Management said emergency procedures were used to safely shut down equipment and staff are now working to stabilize internal grids and prepare for restart once external power is restored. (RBC.ua, 01.08.26) 

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Huliaipole and Prymorske  (RM, 01.09.25)
  • Power outages reported in the cities of Belgorod and Orel in western Russia following Ukrainian strikes on local energy infrastructure objects. (Status-6 X Account, 01.08.26)
  • Russian missile and drone strikes overnight Jan. 7–8 inflicted some of the worst damage to Ukraine’s energy system this winter, knocking out heat and electricity for more than half a million households in Dnipropetrovsk region and temporarily blacking out the entire Zaporizhzhia region, home to about 1.5 million people. Ukrainian officials said over 600,000 customers in Dnipropetrovsk lost power, with more than 1 million residents initially left without water or heating as temperatures fell below freezing. Utility DTEK reported that electricity in Zaporizhzhia was restored after roughly four hours, but hundreds of thousands in Dnipropetrovsk still lacked service on Jan. 8 afternoon, prompting Dnipro’s mayor to declare a national‑level emergency. The Ukrainian Air Force said Russia launched 97 Shahed‑type drones; air defenses downed 70, while 27 struck targets, largely energy facilities. Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed its own air defenses shot down 66 Ukrainian drones over Russia, occupied Crimea and nearby seas. (Washington Post/AP, 01.08.26, MT/AFP, 01.08.26, Bloomberg, 01.08.26, New York Times, 01.08.26, RBC.ua, 01.08.26, New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Ukraine’s General Staff reported 54 combat engagements along the front by 16:00 on Jan. 8, with Russian forces reducing assault numbers to roughly one-third of the previous day’s level. The heaviest fighting remains on the Pokrovsk axis, where Ukrainian troops have already repelled 16 attacks. (Korrespondent.net, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Russia’s massive overnight strike on Jan. 9 left Kyiv in a state of emergency, with nearly half the city’s multi‑story apartment buildings—about 6,000—without heat, major disruptions to water supply, and roughly 417,000–500,000 households temporarily without electricity. Ukraine’s Air Force reported tracking 278 Russian air attack assets—36 missiles and 242 Shahed/Gerbera‑type drones—launched from multiple locations and mainly targeting Kyiv region, including 13 Iskander M/S‑400 ballistic missiles, 22 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, and one medium‑range ballistic missile from the Kapustin Yar range. Ukrainian aviation, SAMs, EW units, UAVs, and mobile fire groups destroyed or suppressed 244 targets (226 drones, 8 Iskanders, 10 Kalibrs), but 18 missiles and 16 drones still hit 19 sites. The attack killed four people, including a medic, and injured 26, among them five rescuers, four medical workers, and one police officer.  The attack left close to half a million people without electricity in Kyiv and the surrounding region, officials said, as temperatures plummeted — prompting Mayor Vitali Klitschko to urge residents to temporarily evacuate the capital if possible. Klitschko said nearly 6,000 apartment buildings — half of the city’s total — were without heat. Water supply was disrupted in some districts, he said, and he urged residents, “who have the opportunity to temporarily leave the city” to find “alternative sources of power and heat.” (Wall Street Journal, 01.09.26, Korrespondent.net, 01.09.26,  Istories, 01.09.26, Ukrainska Pravda, 01.09.26)
    • The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued an unusual security alert late on Jan. 8, suggesting Moscow may have notified U.S. officials ahead of time as a way to avoid alarming Washington. (RFE/RL, 01.09.26)
    • The Russian Defense Ministry said on Jan. 9 that it had struck western Ukraine with a nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, The nuclear‑capable Oreshnik intermediate‑range ballistic missile was fired from a test site near the Caspian Sea early Jan. 9, striking a critical infrastructure facility near Lviv—likely the Stryi gas field and storage site. The Russian Defense Ministry called the strike a response to an attempted Ukrainian attack last month on one of Putin’s residences in Russia. Kyiv continues to deny the attack on Putin’s Valdai residence ever occurred. (New York Times, 01.09.26, Meduza, 01.09.26, Financial Times, 01.09.26)5 When judging how big is the news of Russia's use of Oreshnik, one should keep in mind that Russia has, in addition to prior use of this MBRM, repeatedly used other missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as Iskanders. Looking beyond surface-to-surface missiles, other Russian delivery systems are dual use (have modifications that can deliver nuclear warheads), including missiles that MiG-31s, for instance, can carry, to say less of Tupolev bombers.
    • Zelenskyy demanded global action to punish Russia in response to the Oreshnik strike. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andriy Sybiha, called the attack a “grave threat to the security of the European continent and a test for the trans-Atlantic community.” (New York Times, 01.09.26)
    • The European Union’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, warned that Russia’s latest mass strikes show “Putin doesn’t want peace,” saying Moscow’s reported use of an Oreshnik missile is “a clear escalation against Ukraine and meant as a warning to Europe and to the U.S.” She argued that this “deadly pattern” will continue until Ukraine has stronger defenses, urging EU states to “dig deeper into their air-defense stocks and deliver now” and to increase pressure on Moscow with tougher sanctions. (Kaja Kallas on X, 01.09.26)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Deutsche Telekom AG has made a strategic investment in Quantum Systems, a German drone developer active in Ukraine, marking one of the most significant forays into defense for Europe’s largest telecom operator. The telecommunication firm’s T.Capital will make the investment through its €2 billion ($2.3 billion) tech fund to develop technology that will protect “critical infrastructure in Germany and Europe,” Deutsche Telekom said in a statement on Dec. 22. (Bloomberg, 12.22.25)
  • Rhode Island-based defense-tech startup HavocAI is attracting growing international attention after Ukrainian officials observed demonstrations in Troia, Portugal, where its software enabled coordinated air and sea drones to find, track and attack targets in GPS-denied environments; the company, whose systems build on Ukraine’s pioneering use of unmanned naval assets, is backed by In-Q-Tel and Lockheed Martin Ventures and has already worked with partners in South Korea and Poland. (Axios, 12.22.25) 

Sunday, Dec. 28, 2025

  • Macron on Dec. 28 said Ukraine’s allies — which he called the “countries of the Coalition of the Willing” — will meet in Paris in early January to finalize each country’s concrete contributions. (Washington Post, 12.29.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Italy’s cabinet approved continued military aid to Ukraine in 2026, resolving months of coalition infighting as Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni overruled pressure from League leader Matteo Salvini to halt support; Rome has already provided at least €2.5 billion in bilateral assistance, including air defenses, and the decision comes as EU partners move ahead with a €90 billion loan package to keep Kyiv financed over the next two years. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25) 

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • Zelenskyy said national‑security advisers from the “Coalition of the Willing” will meet in Ukraine on Jan. 3, with leaders to follow on Jan. 6, and welcomed a U.S. negotiating team’s readiness to attend. He also hailed Romania and Croatia joining NATO’s PURL initiative, bringing total contributions for Ukraine’s U.S.-made weapons to $4.3 billion. (RFE/RL, 12.31.25) 

Friday, Jan. 2, 2026

  • Ukraine’s military announced it has received and deployed two additional Patriot air-defense systems from Germany, strengthening the only platform it has that can reliably intercept Russian ballistic missiles. ISW argues that building a denser Patriot‑based air‑defense umbrella over key cities and infrastructure would significantly degrade Russia’s ability to execute large‑scale long‑range strike campaigns. (ISW, 01.02.26)

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026

  • AFP, using ISW data, says Russia made its biggest territorial gains since early 2022 in 2025, capturing over 5,600 km² of Ukrainian territory—about 0.94% of the country—though still far below the 60,000+ km² seized in the invasion’s first months. Advances peaked in November and slowed sharply in December, and Russia still occupies just under one‑fifth of Ukraine while demanding Kyiv withdraw from all of Donbas as a peace condition. (Moscow Times/AFP, 01.03.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • The United Kingdom has delivered new air-defense assets to Ukraine as Russia intensifies long‑range drone and missile attacks on cities and critical infrastructure. U.K. Armed Forces minister Al Carns said London has already supplied 13 Raven air-defense systems and two prototype Gravehawk systems, with the first batch of the remaining 15 contracted Gravehawks to arrive soon. ISW assesses these systems will help thicken Ukraine’s air-defense umbrella, which remains stretched between front-line and rear-area protection. (ISW, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Ukraine’s defense minister Denys Shmyhal and U.K. defense secretary John Healey signed in Kyiv a 2026 “road map” for the countries’ century-long defense partnership, locking in cooperation on air defense, ammunition, long‑range weapons, naval security, and joint industrial projects. Shmyhal said Ukraine aims from February to produce 1,000 Octopus interceptor drones per month and is discussing localized production of Swedish Gripen jets that use British technology. He briefed the U.K. side on the latest massive Russian strike and stressed that boosting air defenses remains Kyiv’s top priority. (Korrespondent.net, 01.09.26) 

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025

  • Swedish authorities boarded the sanctioned Russian roll-on/roll-off freighter Adler after it reported engine trouble in Swedish territorial waters near Höganäs, with customs, border officials, intelligence services, and prosecutors involved in the inspection. The ship’s owner, M Leasing LLC, is sanctioned by the U.S., EU, and others for transporting North Korean ammunition to Russia, and Adler has previously been stopped by NATO forces over suspected weapons shipments. (Financial Times, 12.21.25)
  • German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s push to use €210 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets and to seal the EU‑Mercosur trade deal was blocked when France’s Emmanuel Macron, constrained by high debt and domestic politics, sided with Belgium and Italy, highlighting a “role reversal” in which a more assertive Berlin is increasingly hampered by a cautious, financially strapped Paris. (Financial Times, 12.21.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • British trading standards officials are probing the appearance of Russian‑labeled Snickers bars in U.K. convenience stores—sold via third‑party wholesalers without English‑language ingredient or allergen information. (New York Times, 12.23.25) 

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Citigroup said its board has approved the sale of AO Citibank, its remaining Russian unit, to Renaissance Capital, and will classify the business as “held for sale” from Q4 2025. The deal is expected to sign and close in the first half of 2026, completing Citi’s multi‑year exit from Russian consumer and local commercial banking. (Wall Street Journal, 12.29.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov settled a German probe into alleged sanctions evasion by agreeing to pay €10 million to the public treasury and a charity, without admitting wrongdoing. Munich prosecutors dropped their investigation into suspected breaches of foreign-trade and payments law linked to EU sanctions, saying the payment is not a fine and presumption of innocence remains. It follows a similar settlement in a separate Frankfurt money‑laundering case. (Bloomberg, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • Finnish police seized a St. Vincent–registered cargo vessel, Fitburg, crewed by Russians, Georgians, Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis on suspicion it severed a telecom cable between Helsinki and Tallinn in Estonian waters. (RFE/RL, 12.31.25, New York Times, 12.31.25)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Telegram bonds in Russia worth half a billion dollars have been frozen under western sanctions, revealing the messaging app’s financial exposure to the country even after founder Pavel Durov has sought to sever ties with Moscow. The company launched a series of bond offerings in recent years, including $1.7bn issued in May, to buy back existing debt. According to people familiar with Telegram’s discussions with investors, it bought back most of the bonds maturing in 2026. However, the company has said $500mn of outstanding bonds have been immobilized in Russia’s central securities depository due to western sanctions, the people said. (Financial Times,  01.06.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Sen. Lindsey Graham said he had a “very productive” Jan. 7 meeting with Trump, after which Trump greenlit a bipartisan Russia sanctions bill Graham has drafted with Sen. Richard Blumenthal and others. The bill would let Trump sanction countries that buy discounted Russian oil—such as China, India, and Brazil—to cut financing for Putin’s war in Ukraine, which Graham notes is continuing even as Kyiv “makes concessions for peace.” He wrote: “This bill would give President Trump tremendous leverage against countries like China, India and Brazil to incentivize them to stop buying the cheap Russian oil that provides the financing for Putin’s bloodbath against Ukraine. I look forward to a strong bipartisan vote, hopefully as early as next week.” (Lindsey Graham on X, 01.07.26, RM, 01.07.26) 

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Trump said he supports a new bipartisan Russia sanctions bill—backed by about “84 or 85 senators”—on the condition that it be “subordinate” to him and used at his discretion, adding he hopes it won’t need to be applied because “we already have serious sanctions” and Russia’s economy is “in very bad shape.” The bill would allow punitive tariffs of up to 500% on imports from countries that buy Russian oil, gas, petroleum products, or uranium. (RBC.ua, 01.09.26)

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

  • On March 11, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stood in a conference room at a hotel in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and spread a large map of Ukraine on the table. It charted the two armies’ line of contact — the line cleaving the country between Ukrainian- and Russian-held land. as the group stood peering down at the map of Ukraine, Waltz handed Umerov a dark blue marker and told him, “Start drawing.” Umerov traced Ukraine’s northern border with Russia and Belarus, then followed the line of contact through the oblasts of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. He then circled the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. [It was] the breakthrough moment, one American official recalled — “the first time that Zelenskyy, through his people, said, in order to reach peace I’m willing to give up 20 percent of my country.” The Ukrainians, Trump’s advisers told one another, were now “in the box.” (New York Times, 12.30.25)
  • In New York in September 2025, according to three American officials, Lavrov had told Rubio that he believed Trump had made a commitment in Alaska to force Zelenskyy to give up the balance of Donetsk. Now, U.S. officials learned, Lavrov had the Russian embassy in Washington send Rubio a letter demanding that Trump publicly acknowledge that. (U.S. officials say that while Trump responded positively to Putin’s proposal in Alaska to end the war for Donetsk, he made no commitment to force it on Zelenskyy.) Trump and his advisers were perturbed. They were told that Putin had not authorized the letter; they saw it as a Lavrov power play. (New York Times, 12.30.25)
  • As Trump saw it in 2025, according to a Trump adviser, that final third of Donetsk was just a sliver of land that “nobody in America has ever heard of.” “The real estate guys look at it as, ‘OK, we’ve agreed on all the other terms of the deal, but we’re fighting over the trim, we’re arguing over the doorknobs,’” another adviser said. (New York Times, 12.30.25)

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

  • The U.S. offered to hold talks together with Ukrainian and Russian representatives in Florida as Trump’s administration pushes for a peace deal, Zelenskyy said. (Bloomberg, 12.20.25)
  • Zelenskyy said he is prepared to consider withdrawing Ukrainian troops from parts of Donetsk region, as urged by both the U.S. and Russia, but only on the condition of a “mirror” pullback by Russian forces and the creation of a special economic zone there without heavy weapons or troops. (Strana.ua, 12.20.25)
  • Rubio said the United States does not intend to force a ceasefire on Ukraine, framing Miami talks as a test of whether Ukrainian and Russian demands “can overlap.” Rubio said both sides will have to “give something” in any eventual peace deal, comments that followed Putin’s televised reaffirmation of his original 2022 war aims and Zelenskyy’s statement that he is ready to hold presidential elections if a ceasefire and conditions for voting by soldiers and millions abroad can be ensured. In Miami on Dec. 19–20, U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner held separate meetings with Ukrainian and Russian delegations: Security Council chief Rustem Umerov and Gen. Andriy Hnatov met U.S. and European security advisers, while Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev attended a parallel session. No direct U.S.–Russia–Ukraine talks took place. (Bloomberg, 12.19.25, ISW, 12.20.25)

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025

  • Witkoff said talks in Florida with Ukrainian and European representatives on ending the war were “productive and constructive” and focused on aligning a shared strategy for a “dignified” peace, while parallel discussions with Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev also continued in Miami. Zelenskyy said the U.S.-led negotiations were “constructive” and moving “at a fairly rapid pace,” with his team working alongside U.S. officials and Europeans. He confirmed Washington had floated trilateral talks involving Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. national security advisers — potentially the first direct Russia–Ukraine meeting in six months — but stressed any such format had to deliver a “fair peace” with strong security guarantees and real deterrence against future Russian attacks. (Bloomberg; Meduza; Moscow Times/AFP, 12.21.25, Bloomberg, 12.21.25, Meduza, 12.21.25 Bloomberg, 12.21.25, MT/AFP, 12.21.25, Bloomberg, 12.21.25, Washington Post/AP, 12.21.25)
  • Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov signaled Putin was ready to speak with French President Emmanuel Macron about the Ukraine.6 At the same time, top foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov moved to dampen expectations of such talks, dismissing most proposals— largely from Ukrainian and European representatives — as “rather unconstructive.” (Washington Post, 12.21.25, Meduza, 12.21.25, New York Times, 12.21.25)

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • U.S. Vice President JD Vance said the Miami talks have not resolved key disputes over the fate of Ukrainian‑controlled parts of Donetsk Oblast, control of the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, the status of civilians in occupied areas and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, or postwar reconstruction—adding that Russia “really wants” all of Donetsk, a demand that would create a “major security problem” for Kyiv and, by ISW’s estimate, would likely take Moscow 2–3 years of costly fighting to achieve militarily. (ISW, 12.22.25)
  • Russia has rejected a U.S.-proposed temporary Christmas ceasefire that Washington hoped would signal mutual interest in diplomacy, with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov insisting Moscow will not back a short truce and instead demands a “permanent” settlement that fixes Russia’s 2022 sham annexations of all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts into law. (ISW, 12.22.25)
  • A new Levada Center poll finds that support for the Russian military’s actions in Ukraine, while still high at 73%, has declined by 7 points since May 2025, while opposition has risen to 18%. At the same time, a record two-thirds of respondents (66%) now say Russia should move to peace negotiations—matching August’s peak—whereas only 25% favor continuing the war, the lowest level recorded. (Levada Center, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Zelenskyy said U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators had completed about 90% of initial work, including classified security‑guarantee clauses requiring U.S. Senate ratification and a first draft on reconstruction, and that additional documents on security, recovery and a basic end‑of‑war framework were prepared after productive Florida talks—while insisting any deal must truly halt hostilities, prevent renewed invasion, and not force Ukraine to withdraw from Donetsk. (Washington Post/AP, 12.23.25. ISW, 12.22.25, RBC.ua, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • Zelenskyy unveiled a revised, U.S.-brokered 20‑point peace plan that would establish a full, unconditional non‑aggression pact with Russia, keep Ukraine’s peacetime army at 800,000, and grant Kyiv “Article 5‑like” security guarantees from the U.S., NATO and a European “Coalition of the Willing,” alongside a defined path to EU membership and up to $800 billion for reconstruction. The plan envisaged Ukraine withdrawing heavy forces from some areas of Donbas it still controlled and turning them into a monitored demilitarized or “free economic” zone under Ukrainian civil administration—on condition Russia pulled back equivalently—while Russia would withdraw from occupied parts of Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Kharkiv and current front lines in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson would become the de facto contact line. (RFE/RL, 12.24.25,Wall Street Journal, 12.24.25, Financial Times, 12.24.25, Meduza, 12.24.25, New York Times, 12.24.25)
    • Moscow views the new U.S.–Ukraine 20‑point peace plan as only a “starting point” and will demand stricter limits on Ukraine’s postwar military, formal guarantees against further NATO eastward expansion, and clarity on sanctions relief and frozen Russian assets. Russia signals it could withdraw from occupied parts of Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv, but still insists Ukraine leave its remaining positions in Donetsk—something Kyiv rejects, pushing instead to freeze the line of contact with strong U.S. security guarantees. (Bloomberg, 12.24.25, New York Times, 12.24.25)

Thursday, Dec. 25, 2025

  • Zelenskyy said he had a "very good" Christmas Day call with Witkoff and Kushner on ending the Russia-Ukraine war, per a post to X Dec. 25 that Kushner reposted. The big picture: Zelenskyy, President Trump's son-in-law Kushner and Witkoff discussed "new ideas in terms of formats, meetings and, of course, timing on how to bring a real peace closer," the Ukrainian leader said in a video address to his nation later Dec. 25 that was posted to his social media channels. (Axios, 12.25.25)
  • At a closed pre–New Year State Council meeting on Dec. 25, Putin focused heavily on the U.S.–Russia–Ukraine peace process, telling business leaders that Moscow still stands by concessions he says were informally agreed at the August Anchorage summit. According to participants, Putin reiterated that “Donbas is ours” and that the Kramatorsk–Kostiantynivka–Sloviansk hub is “not up for discussion,” but hinted at possible partial territorial swaps elsewhere. He also said talks now include joint management of the Russian‑occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant with the U.S.—not Ukraine—claiming American counterparts showed interest in using the station for cryptocurrency mining and exporting electricity to Ukraine, while Ukrainian staff would keep operating the plant under Russian passports. (Kommersant, 12.25.25)
  • Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told reporters Dec. 25 Russian officials were "seeing slow but steady progress" in the peace talks with the U.S. (Axios, 12.25.25)

Friday, Dec. 26, 2025

  • Eight U.S. senators — including Republicans John Barrasso, Jerry Moran and Thom Tillis — joined Democrats in a bipartisan statement urging Trump to take a hard line with Putin, calling the Russian leader a “ruthless murderer who has no interest in peace” and noting he rejected a Christmas truce while continuing attacks on Ukraine, a message aimed at bolstering Zelenskyy ahead of his Florida talks. (New York Times, 12.26.25)
  • Russian officials have signaled broad, public rejection of the emerging 20‑point U.S.–Ukrainian peace plan, underscoring the difficulty of turning any bilateral framework into a wider settlement. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has dismissed the proposal as fundamentally incompatible with Moscow’s demands. Other senior figures have echoed that hard line: Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has vowed Russia will not retreat from its war aims “one bit,” portraying current U.S.–Russian “contacts” as mere outgrowths of an alleged Alaska summit “understanding,” not genuine negotiations. State Duma foreign affairs committee chair Leonid Slutsky has called several provisions of the public U.S.–Ukraine–EU plan “a priori unacceptable,” while Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told CNN that Ukraine ceding the remainder of Donetsk “could contribute significantly” to a deal—an implicit rejection of a simple front line freeze and a signal that even major Ukrainian concessions on territory would likely still fall short of Moscow’s maximalist objectives. (ISW, 12.26.25, Financial Times, 12.26.25, ISW, 12.27.25)

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • A senior U.S. official says Russia has signaled willingness to accept a temporary ceasefire to allow a Ukrainian referendum on territorial concessions—though Kyiv wants 60 days and Moscow reportedly prefers a shorter pause—while the Kremlin publicly denies backing any truce for a vote and still insists Donbas “is ours” and non‑negotiable; Zelenskyy, who calls a U.S.–Ukraine peace deal “almost ready,” says any territorial compromise, including a Donbas “free economic zone,” must be decided by referendum and finalized after his upcoming meeting with Trump. (Istories, 12.27.25)
  • Trump told Politico that he would speak with Putin “soon, as much as I want.” (Financial Times, 12.27.25)

Sunday, Dec. 28, 2025 

  • The Dec. 28 Trump–Zelenskyy meeting at Mar‑a‑Lago ended with both sides claiming momentum but no breakthrough.
    • Trump said he held a “good and very productive telephone call” with Putin ahead of the U.S.-Ukraine summit. In a post on his Truth Social platform, the U.S. president said: “I just had a good and very productive telephone call with President Putin of Russia prior to my meeting.” Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said Putin used his call with Trump to insist any deal must stay within the alleged “Anchorage” understandings from the August 2025 Alaska summit, rooted in Putin’s June 2024 demands for Ukrainian and NATO capitulation and a rollback of NATO to pre‑1997 lines, and added that Trump and Putin shared “mostly analogical views” that a temporary ceasefire would only prolong the war. (Bloomberg, 12.28.25, Financial Times, 12.28.25, ISW; New York Times; Financial Times, 12.28.25)
    • Trump said the revised 20‑point peace plan is “very complicated stuff” yet claimed about 95% of issues are settled, calling the meeting “terrific” and insisting Ukraine and Russia are “far closer than ever before” to a deal. He emphasized that key questions remain unresolved, above all territorial arrangements and whether to create a demilitarized zone in Donbas, saying, “I would not say ‘agreed,’ but we’re getting closer to an agreement on that.” Trump stressed he has “no deadlines” beyond “getting the war ended,” and cautioned that “it’s possible it doesn’t happen” but that “in a few weeks, we’ll know one way or another.” The most concrete outcome was his stated willingness to hold another round of talks in January in the United States, potentially with European leaders at the table. (New York Times, 12.28.25, New York Times, 12.29.25, New York Times, 12.29.25, Axios, 12.28.25, Financial Times, Washington Post, New York Times, 12.28.25, New York Times, 12.29.25)7
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    • Zelenskyy said the Dec. 28 Mar‑a‑Lago talks were “a great meeting” and that he and Trump discussed “all aspects” of a revised U.S.–Ukrainian peace framework. He said the military dimension of the 20‑point plan is “100 percent agreed” and the overall framework “about 90 percent agreed,” with joint U.S.–Ukraine security‑guarantee documents essentially finalized. Zelenskyy stressed that key proposals remain unresolved, notably territorial arrangements in Donetsk and the status of the Russian‑occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, as well as details of a possible demilitarized zone in Donbas Zelenskyy revealed he's willing to bring that plan up for a referendum if Russia agrees to a ceasefire of at least 60 days. Zelenskyy said a 60-day ceasefire is a minimum for both preparing and holding the referendum and to allow security so Ukrainians may campaign and vote without the threat of attacks. Without it, he said, the result of the vote would be illegitimate. (Axios, 12.28.25, New York Times, 12.28.25, New York Times, 12.29.25, Financial Times, Washington Post, New York Times, 12.28.25)
    • Significant gaps remained between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine is ready to pull Ukrainian troops back from the region to create a demilitarized zone, but Russia has made no indication that it would cede control of the region. Another sticking point is over the Zaporizhzhia plant, which Russia controls and would be key to mining the sort of rare minerals the U.S. wants to access. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told state agency Tass that Europe had become “the main obstacle to peace,” accused Kyiv of “evading constructive negotiations,” and warned that any European troops deployed in Donetsk or elsewhere in Ukraine would be “legitimate targets” for Russian forces. (New York Times, 12.28.25, Washington Post, 12.29.25, Bloomberg, 12.28.25, Financial Times, 12.28.25, ISW; New York Times; Financial Times, 12.28.25)
    • Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, the executive arm of the 27-nation European Union, wrote on social media that several European leaders had held an hourlong call with Trump and Zelenskyy to discuss the peace negotiation discussions. “There was good progress, which we welcomed,” she said. “Europe is ready to keep working with Ukraine and our U.S. partners to consolidate this progress,” she added. “Paramount to this effort is to have ironclad security guarantees from day one.” (New York Times, 12.28.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Zelenskyy said he has asked Trump to make a “historic decision” by granting Ukraine long‑term security guarantees against Russian aggression, proposing commitments that last 30–50 years. He told reporters that Trump agreed to “consider” the request, noting the war has effectively lasted “almost 15 years” since Russia’s first invasion in 2014. Zelenskyy also signaled conditional openness to turning the remaining Ukrainian‑held parts of Donbas into a demilitarized “free economic zone,” saying Kyiv could withdraw troops from Donetsk only if Russia pulled back an equivalent distance. Any such compromise, he stressed, would have to be approved by Ukrainians in a referendum held under a ceasefire of at least 60 days to ensure safe campaigning and voting; without that, he said, the result would be illegitimate. (Washington Post, 12.29.25, Financial Times, 12.28.25)
  • Trump’s Ukraine peace push hit new obstacles after Putin told him Russia would “revise” its negotiating position following an alleged Ukrainian drone strike on his Valdai residence—an attack for which Moscow has offered no clear evidence and Kyiv calls a “complete fabrication” meant to sabotage Trump‑brokered talks. Trump said he was “very angry” after hearing Putin’s claim, while Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov warned previously reached understandings would be reconsidered. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25, New York Times, 12.29.25)8
    • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Dec. 29 that Ukraine attempted to attack a presidential residence in the Novgorod region more than 400 kilometers (249 miles) northwest of Moscow overnight with 91 drones, and Russia would retaliate, adding the targets were already selected, according to audio comments published by the state-run Tass news agency. Lavrov said Moscow would reassess its position in the negotiations, but had no intention of withdrawing from talks. Zelenskyy called the claim the residence was attacked a “new lie,” and warned Russia could be using it as a pretext to prepare an attack on government buildings in Kyiv. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Ukrainian officials moved to contain diplomatic fallout from Moscow’s unproven claim that 91 Ukrainian drones targeted Putin’s Valdai residence, calling it “fake” and an effort to sabotage U.S.-mediated talks and justify more strikes. Zelenskyy said partners can technically verify no such attack occurred and warned Russia may be preparing hits on Kyiv government buildings, even as he and Trump explore long-term U.S. security guarantees and a January meeting of “coalition of the willing” leaders. (Financial Times, 12.30.25)
    • European leaders held a coordination call on Ukraine after the Kremlin said it would “toughen” its negotiating stance, citing an unproven claim that Ukrainian drones targeted Putin’s Valdai residence. (Bloomberg, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • In his 21‑minute New Year address, Zelenskyy said a U.S.‑brokered peace deal is “90 percent” complete but stressed Ukraine wants peace “not at any cost,” and will not sign a weak agreement that “ends Ukraine.” He announced Jan. 3 and Jan. 6 meetings of “Coalition of the Willing” advisers and leaders, and urged maximum global pressure on Moscow, as Russia and Ukraine traded fresh strikes and a U.S. assessment reportedly found Kyiv did not target Putin’s residence. (RFE/RL, 12.31.25)
  • Witkoff said he, Rubio and Jared Kushner held a “productive” call with U.K., German and French counterparts on next steps in Trump’s Ukraine peace push, focusing on stronger security guarantees and “deconfliction mechanisms” to ensure any deal endures. Zelenskyy has asked Trump for guarantees lasting up to 50 years; current drafts envision 15‑year commitments with possible extension, alongside a broader “prosperity package” to help Ukraine rebuild. (Bloomberg, 12.31.25)
  • Trump signaled rare public displeasure with Putin by sharing a New York Post editorial arguing Russia is “standing in the way of peace” and urging Trump to “turn up the heat” with tougher sanctions and more weapons for Ukraine; the piece cast doubt on Moscow’s claim that Ukrainian drones targeted a Putin residence, a narrative U.S. intelligence has since also disputed. (Bloomberg, 12.31.25)

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 

  • Asked about Ukraine after announcing Maduro’s capture, Trump said he was “not thrilled with Putin” because “he’s killing too many people,” admitting that ending the war had proved far harder than he initially claimed. Trump said he and Putin did not discuss Venezuela in their recent two‑hour call, and has since grown more skeptical of Russia’s allegation that Ukrainian drones attacked a Putin residence—an accusation U.S. intelligence now disputes. (Reuters, 01.03.26)
  • Kyiv hosted high‑level security talks on Jan. 3 with national security advisers and officials from 18 EU and NATO countries, Canada, NATO institutions and a U.S. delegation joining online, as Russia launched another 95 drones overnight—80 reportedly shot down—and a strike on Kharkiv killed two people, including a 3‑year‑old. Zelenskyy said discussions focused on three tracks of a prospective settlement: draft legal texts, an $800 billion, 10‑year “prosperity package” for reconstruction, and military‑political security guarantees. Pro-Zelenskyy senior MP David Arakhamia said a draft peace referendum could be ready by late February, to be held alongside a presidential election once a ceasefire is in place Zelenskyy told allies in Kyiv that any future referendum on a peace deal should be held alongside a presidential election once a ceasefire is in place, to maximize turnout among Ukrainians at home and abroad, while continuing to press Trump for security guarantees lasting up to 50 years—well beyond the 15‑year term currently on the table. (Bloomberg, 01.03.26, RFE/RL, 01.03.26; Bloomberg, 01.03.26) 

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Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Leaders from more than 35 countries met at the Élysée Palace in Paris on Jan. 6 for the latest “Coalition of the Willing” summit on a Ukraine peace framework, joined by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. European allies agreed on key elements of postwar security guarantees, with 35 states signing a Paris Declaration that provides long‑term financing and arms, U.S.-led ceasefire monitoring via drones and satellites, and legal commitments to assist Ukraine if Russia attacks again. A separate declaration by Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledges British and French troop deployments and protected military hubs in Ukraine after any peace deal. Analysts say the plan, which Trump envoys endorsed, gives Kyiv its first credible multinational security architecture short of NATO membership and strengthens its hand in future talks with Moscow. (New York Times, 01.06.26, RFE/RL, 01.06.26, RFE/RL, 01.05.26, RFE/RL, 01.04.26, Meduza, 01.06.26, Bloomberg, 01.06.25, MT/AFP, 01.06.26)9
    • Witkoff, who represented the U.S. at the Paris gathering, said officials made significant progress on a plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine and “largely finished the security protocols.” He vowed that the U.S.-backed protocols would “deter” and “defend” Ukraine from future attacks. “They are as strong as anyone has ever seen,” Witkoff told reporters following the meeting, which included European, Canadian and other leaders. “The president does not back down from his commitments.” Trump believes "this carnage has to stop," added Witkoff. (Bloomberg, 01.07.26, MT/AFP, 01.06.26)
    • U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said any deployment of British troops to Ukraine as part of post‑war security guarantees would be subject to a vote in Parliament, amid mounting pressure from MPs to clarify the plan. Downing Street described any contingent as a “reassurance and regeneration force,” likely similar in size to the several thousand French troops proposed by Emmanuel Macron, and indicated MPs would effectively have a veto. Conservatives questioned both the lack of detail and whether defense spending will rise fast enough to support such a mission. (Financial Times, 01.07.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Witkoff and Kushner met Jan. 7 in Paris with Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev to discuss the U.S. plan for peace in Ukraine, according to a source with knowledge. The meeting with Putin's envoy took place after Witkoff and Kushner held two days of negotiations with senior Ukrainian and European officials, including Zelenskyy and the leaders of the U.K., France and Germany. Those talks focused on two main sticking points: security guarantees for Ukraine and possible territorial concessions by Ukraine in the eastern Donbas region. (Axios, 01.08.26)
  • Zelenskyy said his team will move on to discuss the “most difficult issues” with Trump’s envoys after negotiators secured a breakthrough on security guarantees for Kyiv. Talks will move to the so-far intractable issues of territory and control over a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant — Europe’s largest — as U.S., Ukrainian and European officials seek to remove the remaining stumbling blocks before presenting a deal to Moscow. “Ukraine does not shy away from the most difficult issues and will never be an obstacle to peace,” Zelenskyy said Jan. 7 in a post on platform X. “Peace must be dignified.” (Bloomberg, 01.07.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Zelenskyy said Jan. 8 that the U.S.-Ukraine security guarantees agreement is "essentially ready for finalization at the highest level," with Trump. "Complex issues from the basic framework for ending the war were addressed, and the Ukrainian side presented possible options for finalizing this document," Zelenskyy said, regarding the negotiations on territory. (Axios, 01.08.26, RBC.ua, 01.08.26)
  • The Kremlin again rejected the U.S.–European security guarantees being negotiated with Kyiv, as Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called planned multinational troop deployments an “axis of war” and vowed any Western units or bases in Ukraine would be treated as “foreign intervention” and “legitimate combat targets.” She restated Moscow’s maximalist demands—Ukrainian neutrality, “demilitarization” and “denazification,” protections for Russian speakers, and recognition of Russian sovereignty over annexed Crimea and all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—underscoring Kremlin refusal to accept the current peace framework. (ISW, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Macron has presented a plan to deploy “several thousand” French troops to Ukraine after a peace agreement with Russia, as part of post‑war security guarantees backed by the United States. In closed consultations at the Élysée with party leaders, military chiefs, and parliamentary committee heads, Macron said French forces would not serve on the front line but as a deterrent supporting Ukrainian units. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said parliamentary debates on the deployment will occur within two to three weeks. (Korrespondent.net, 01.09.26)
  • Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said Jan. 9 the European Union should resume high-level dialogue with Russia as Brussels seeks to end the Ukraine war, urging the appointment of a special envoy. "I think the time has come for Europe to talk to Russia," the far-right leader told a New Year's press conference She said she agreed with Macron, who said in December that it would be "useful" for Europe to re-engage with Putin over the war in Ukraine. With EU-Russia contacts effectively suspended since Moscow's February 2022 invasion, Washington has taken the lead in the negotiations to end the conflict. (MT/AFP, 01.09.26)
  • The final weeks of 2025 brought a flurry of diplomatic activity as U.S., Ukrainian and European officials worked to come up with a peace deal — although Putin doesn’t appear ready to climb down. “I don’t think Putin is serious today because he is too convinced time is on his side,” he says, adding that the way in which the war is brought to a close is likely to have ramifications far beyond Ukraine’s borders, as the world enters a new and as yet unnamed era.” (Financial Times, 01.09.26)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

  • ISW reports that three drones—at least two believed to be Russian models—have entered Turkish airspace or crashed in Turkey since Dec. 15. Turkish and NATO forces shot down one drone approaching from the Black Sea, while an Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone was found near Izmit and a third, likely a Russian Merlin-VR, crashed in Balikesir Province. Turkish authorities have not formally attributed the incidents to Russia. (ISW, 12.20.25)

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • The head of the Royal Navy, First Sea Lord Gen. Sir Gwyn Jenkins, warned that Russia’s elite deep-sea sabotage unit GUGI has restarted deployments of submersibles capable of “physical action” against critical seabed cables and pipelines around the UK, prompting London to expand its “Atlantic Bastion” defensive ring of sensors and autonomous vessels with Norway amid broader concerns that Moscow is investing heavily in undersea and naval capabilities to threaten Britain and NATO. (Financial Times, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Tuesday denied reports that it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Venezuela as the United States steps up pressure on the government of President Nicolás Maduro. Russia on Monday expressed "full support" for Venezuela as the South American country confronts a blockade of sanctioned oil tankers by U.S. forces deployed in the Caribbean. (MT/AFP, 12.23.25)
  • German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said he does not believe a full-scale war between Russia and NATO is likely, contradicting recent warnings by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte; in an interview with Die Zeit, Pistorius said he is convinced that Putin is not aiming for a “full-scale world war against NATO.” (RBC, 12.23.25)
  • Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chief Sergei Naryshkin has resumed direct contacts with European spy chiefs, recently holding calls with Germany’s BND director Martin Jäger and earlier with new MI6 head Blaise Metreweli—an exchange analysts describe as a small but positive step toward managing escalation risks between Russia and Europe amid public rhetoric on both sides about preparing for possible conflict. (Istories, 12.23.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Estonia’s foreign intelligence chief Kaupo Rosin said Russia “currently has no intention” of attacking NATO or the Baltic states and is trying to avoid open conflict with the alliance, noting that Russian jets and drones have become more cautious over Ukraine and the Baltic Sea after forceful NATO responses to past incursions. He warned, however, that Russia is intensifying sabotage and cyber operations in Eastern Europe and said Western oil and finance sanctions are “beginning to take a toll” on Moscow even as the war in Ukraine continues. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Latvia has completed a 280‑kilometer (174‑mile) fence along its border with Russia as part of a €17.9 million project to strengthen the EU and NATO frontier, state real estate firm VNI said. Work continues on patrol roads, pedestrian bridges over marshland, watchtowers and other infrastructure, due largely to be finished by end‑2026; high‑tech surveillance systems are also being installed. Riga has already built a 145‑kilometer barrier on the Belarus border, while Lithuania, Estonia, Finland and Poland are erecting or upgrading their own fences and electronic barriers against Russia and its exclave Kaliningrad, citing security concerns and what they call Moscow’s “weaponization” of migration. (MT/AFP, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • GPS interference has surged worldwide, exposing how vulnerable the U.S.-run satellite system is to jamming and spoofing by states or even hobbyists, with incidents now affecting up to 1,500 commercial flights a day, especially around Ukraine, Russia and the Middle East. Because GPS underpins power grids, telecoms, finance and precision weapons, experts warn a large-scale disruption could cripple modern economies, while Pentagon efforts to field more jam‑resistant military signals remain years behind schedule. (Washington Post, 12.31.25) 

Thursday, Jan. 1, 2026

  • U.S. President Trump announced Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were captured during a large U.S. strike on Caracas and flown to New York to face narco‑terrorism, cocaine importation and weapons charges, drawing sharp condemnation from Russia, Iran, Cuba, Brazil and Mexico as an illegal attack on a sovereign state. The Kremlin demanded their release; Trump said the U.S. will be “very strongly involved” in Venezuela’s oil sector going forward. (RFE/RL, 01.03.26)
  • Russia’s Foreign Ministry said that on Jan. 3, 2026, Sergey Lavrov spoke by phone with Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, expressing “firm solidarity” with Venezuelans “confronting an armed aggression” and vowing continued support for the Bolivarian government, while both sides opposed escalation and backed dialogue. Moscow condemned the U.S. strike on Caracas and the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores as “armed aggression” and an “unacceptable violation” of Venezuelan sovereignty in multiple statements, demanding their release and pledging support for the “Bolivarian leadership.” Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López said U.S. missiles and rockets hit cities nationwide, while Donald Trump confirmed “large scale” strikes, said Maduro was flown to New York, and vowed U.S. involvement in Venezuela’s oil industry. (Russian MFA, 01.03.26, Meduza, 01.03.26, MT/AFP, 01.03.26)

Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026

  • Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev heavily criticized the U.S. military operation in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS, accusing U.S. President Trump of violating international laws and expressing Russia’s support for Maduro. Medvedev also used the U.S. operation to seize Maduro in order to threaten German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Zelenskyy. Russian State Duma deputies also criticized the U.S. operation, claiming that the United States rejects the sovereignty of states in the Western Hemisphere and aims to establish control over Venezuelan oil reserves. (ISW, 01.04.26)
  • The anchor of a vessel that damaged an undersea cable linking Helsinki and the Estonian capital Tallinn dragged along the seabed "at least several tens of kilometers" before it hit the line, Finnish police said Sunday. On Dec. 31, 2025, police detained the Fitburg, a 132-meter-long cargo ship en route from St. Petersburg to Haifa, Israel, following suspicion that the ship's anchor had damaged the subsea cable in the Gulf of Finland. (MT/AFP, 01.04.26)

Monday, Jan. 5, 2026

  • Latvian authorities have searched a ship suspected of damaging an undersea optic cable in the Baltic, the sixth outage or damage to an underwater cable in the region in as many days, as western allies remain on alert for Russian interference. Latvia’s state police said it had inspected the vessel in the port of Liepāja overnight on Sunday and questioned its crew, but had not found any connection with the incident. The cable was reported damaged in Latvian territorial waters off Liepāja on Jan. 2. The police said they were continuing their criminal investigation into “intentional damage.” (Financial Times, 01.05.26)
  • Demark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said that if Trump were to attack the Danish island of Greenland that would mean the end of the NATO alliance. “I believe one should take the American president seriously when he says that he wants Greenland,” Frederiksen said in an interview with Danish broadcaster TV2. “But I will also make it clear that if the U.S. chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops, including NATO and thus the security that has been established since the end of the Second World War.” (Bloomberg, 01.05.25)
  • Russia is intensifying covert attacks on key infrastructure in Germany in a campaign of hybrid warfare that Berlin views as a possible prelude to a wider conflict, according to a military document obtained by Bloomberg. As Germany positions itself as NATO’s main hub in Europe, it expects to be first targeted by Russia covertly via hybrid attacks—which use irregular or non-military tactics—on energy and defense infrastructure, according to the defense ministry document. It summarizes guidelines for cooperation between different levels of government and institutions in case of conflict with Moscow. (Bloomberg, 01.05.25)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Russia has again voiced support for Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said Rodríguez’s swearing-in demonstrated the Bolivarian government’s determination to maintain unity, preserve the constitutionally established chain of authority and reduce the risk of a constitutional crisis. Her swearing-in would also create conditions for Venezuela’s “peaceful and stable development” in the face of what Russia described as “blatant neocolonial threats and external armed aggression,” the Foreign Ministry said. The ministry reiterated Moscow’s call for de-escalation and the resolution of disputes through constructive dialogue and respect for international law, particularly the UN Charter. (MT/AFP, 01.06.26)
    • Moscow’s muted reaction to the U.S. raid that captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has revived memories of an earlier Russian proposal to trade Venezuela for Ukraine. Neil MacFarquhar recounts that former NSC official Fiona Hill testified in 2019 that Russian officials and commentators informally floated a “swap” under which Washington could act freely in Venezuela if it gave the Kremlin a free hand in Ukraine—an idea she personally went to Moscow to reject. Today, Russia officially denounces the U.S. operation as illegal but is focused on preserving its leverage in Ukraine while avoiding a rupture with the Trump administration. (New York Times, 01.06.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Trump administration has told Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez that Caracas must expel China, Russia, Iran and Cuba and sever economic ties before being allowed to ramp up oil production. Venezuela would then be required to partner exclusively with the U.S. on oil and prioritize sales of heavy crude to American buyers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers the U.S. can force compliance because Venezuela’s tankers are already full and the country could be insolvent within weeks, while Trump says up to 50 million barrels will be sold under his control. (ABC News, 01.07.26)
  • President Trump’s renewed threats to “acquire” Greenland are shaking European confidence in the transatlantic alliance even as the U.S. helps finalize security guarantees for Ukraine. At a Paris “coalition of the willing” summit, Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner joined European leaders to unveil largely completed protocols that will include a post‑war deterrence force with British and French troops in Ukraine. Yet Denmark warns any forcible U.S. move on Greenland could spell NATO’s end, and Trump aides now openly say military options remain on the table. (Axios, 01.07.26)
  • Trump claimed NATO members were “at 2% GDP, and most weren’t paying their bills, UNTIL I CAME ALONG,” asserting he “got them to 5% GDP” and that, without him, “Russia would have ALL OF UKRAINE right now.” He said he “single-handedly ENDED 8 WARS,” argued Russia and China “have zero fear of NATO without the United States,” and insisted “the only Nation that China and Russia fear and respect is the DJT REBUILT U.S.A.” (Donald J. Trump on Truth Social, RM, 01.07.26)
  • President Trump has proposed boosting U.S. military spending for 2027 from roughly $900 billion–$1 trillion to $1.5 trillion—a jump of about $600 billion, more than the entire $583 billion Pentagon budget proposed by Obama for 2016 and approaching peak Cold War levels. Trump claims tariffs can fully fund the increase, though tariff revenue was just over $200 billion in 2025, and he has already pledged about $600 billion annually for $2,000 rebate checks alone. For comparison, China’s official defense budget is $245 billion and Russia’s just over $160 billion. (New York Times, 01.07.26)
  • President Trump signed an executive order on Jan. 7 withdrawing the U.S. from dozens of multilateral bodies, many under the U.N. umbrella, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, International Energy Forum, International Renewable Energy Agency, the U.N. International Law Commission, Peacebuilding Commission, Alliance of Civilizations, and the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. This follows earlier exits from UNESCO, the World Health Organization and the U.N. Human Rights Council, and reflects a doctrine that rejects coalition‑building in favor of unilateral U.S. power—creating space, critics warn, for China and Russia, which belong to many of the same forums, to expand their influence. (New York Times, 01.07.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Trump said that he did not feel constrained by any international laws, norms, checks or balances. Asked by my colleagues if there were any limits on his ability to use American military might, he said: “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.” “I don’t need international law,” he added. “I’m not looking to hurt people.” (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Trump talked about his designs on Greenland, which is controlled by Denmark, a NATO ally. It was not enough, in his view, to exercise the U.S. right, under a 1951 treaty, to reopen long-closed military bases on the huge landmass. “Ownership is very important,” Trump said. “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do with, you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.” When asked which was his higher priority, obtaining Greenland or preserving NATO, Trump declined to answer directly, but acknowledged that “it may be a choice.”(New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Trump said NATO was useless without the United States. “I want them to shape up,” he said. “I think we’ll always get along with Europe, but I want them to shape up. I’m the one that got them to spend more on the, you know, more G.D.P. on NATO. But if you look at NATO, Russia I can tell you is not at all concerned with any other country but us.” “I’ve been very loyal to Europe. I’ve done a good job. If it weren’t for me, Russia would have all of Ukraine right now.” (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • President Trump indicated that he was ready to commit to the United States being involved in Ukraine’s future defense—but only, he said, because he was confident that Russia would not try to invade the country again. “I feel strongly they wouldn’t re-invade, or I wouldn’t agree to it,” Mr. Trump said in an interview with The New York Times on Wednesday. Mr. Trump was responding to a question about whether he would be prepared to go to war to defend Ukraine if Russia were to break the terms of any cease-fire and invade again. (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Trump remained convinced of President Vladimir V. Putin’s professed desire for peace, despite Russia’s unwillingness to end the war after nearly a year of negotiations with the Trump administration. “I think he wants to make a deal,” Mr. Trump said of Mr. Putin. “But I’ve thought about that—I’ve thought that for a long time.” “I’ve had cases where I had Putin all done and Zelenskyy wouldn’t make the deal, which shocked me,” Mr. Trump said. “Then I’ve had cases where it was the reverse. I think now they both want to make a deal, but we’ll find out.” (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Asked about a potential peace agreement that would require the United States and its allies to offer Ukraine military support if there is another invasion, Mr. Trump interrupted to underscore that the United States would play a secondary role in such a situation. “Let’s put it this way: its allies, all of Europe, other countries that are going into it—and the United States,” Mr. Trump said. (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • In a departure from his practice last year, Trump declined to say how quickly he hoped to end the Russia-Ukraine war. “We’re doing the best we can. I don’t have a timeline.” (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • On Thursday, in a rare assertion of congressional authority over the president’s war powers, the Senate agreed to debate a resolution aimed at curbing Mr. Trump’s use of military force in Venezuela. Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, said one factor that may have tipped the vote was the president’s comment during Wednesday’s interview that the United States might remain involved in Venezuela for years. (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • Russian and French authorities carried out a prisoner swap, exchanging Russian basketball player Daniil Kasatkin for French political scientist Laurent Vinatier. Kasatkin was detained at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport in June 2025 on a U.S. warrant accusing him of involvement with a hacker group that extorted companies and U.S. federal agencies and faced up to 25 years in prison. Vinatier, an expert on Chechnya, was arrested in Moscow in 2024 and sentenced for collecting military information without “foreign agent” registration, later facing an additional espionage case. (Mediazona, 01.08.26) 

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • FT cites experts saying the Kremlin is now too overstretched by nearly four years of war in Ukraine to defend out‑of‑area partners such as Syria, Iran and Venezuela, and that Putin is unlikely to risk angering Trump over Maduro’s fate or tanker seizures. Former president Dmitry Medvedev even praised the U.S. operation as “tough and cynical,” arguing it was “only oil,” and claimed it leaves Washington with “nothing to formally reproach our country about” regarding Ukraine. (Financial Times, 01.09.26)
  • Russia’s two‑decade Venezuelan bet was heavily loss‑making: Sberbank CIB estimated Rosneft had sunk about $8 billion into Venezuela by 2017—via stakes in joint ventures and multibillion‑dollar oil‑prepayment loans—while Caracas also spent roughly $11 billion on Russian arms, including 100,000 Kalashnikovs and dozens of jets and helicopters. Yet by 2020 Rosneft had offloaded its assets to a state vehicle, effectively writing off much of the investment. (Financial Times, 01.09.26)
    • During the U.S. raid that captured Nicolás Maduro, American helicopters “appeared to bypass with ease” Venezuela’s Russian‑supplied air defenses, including S‑300, Buk and Pantsir systems, underscoring both the vulnerability of those systems in practice and Moscow’s inability to protect a key ally. (Financial Times, 01.09.26)
  • Chinese, Russian and Iranian naval vessels have arrived at South Africa’s Simon’s Town naval base ahead of “Will for Peace 2026,” a week-long “BRICS Plus” exercise starting Friday that follows heightened tensions over recent U.S. operations in Venezuela and the North Atlantic. Iran’s largest warship, the Makran—sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for a previous attempted arms delivery to Venezuela—was spotted entering False Bay, alongside Russia’s corvette Stoikiy and Chinese ships, prompting criticism from South Africa’s Democratic Alliance that BRICS is shifting from an economic bloc toward a military coalition aimed at countering the West. (Financial Times, 01.09.26)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian intelligence had observed a correlation between Chinese satellite imaging of Ukrainian territory and subsequent Russian strikes on the same energy sites, suggesting Russian forces may be using space-based data from Chinese entities to target Ukraine’s power infrastructure. He said Kyiv would raise the issue with allies, warning it undermines diplomacy to end the war, as Russia continues intensive drone and missile attacks on thermal plants and Naftogaz facilities, including a strike on a Kharkiv power plant that caused a major drop in electricity and killed at least one person. (Bloomberg, 12.25.25)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Asked whether his actions might provide a precedent in Ukraine or Taiwan, he shrugged off the idea. President Xi Jinping of China, he said, wouldn’t dare attack Taiwan on his watch. “He may do it after we have a different president, but I don’t think he’s going to do it with me as president,” he said. (New York Times, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Beijing has watched Moscow’s experience closely, says William Burns, who travelled to China in the first year of the war. “The one thing the Chinese were not at all polemical about was the war in Ukraine. They listened carefully. Because they knew they had gotten it wrong before the war started. They thought the Russians would roll right over the Ukrainians,” he says. “I think that honestly had fuelled some of Xi’s doubts about issues such as Taiwan.”” (Financial Times, 01.09.26)

Missile defense:

Sunday, Dec. 28, 2025

  • Orbital data suggest Russia may have just one operational Tundra early‑warning satellite left by the end of 2025, down from three functioning spacecraft as of March (Cosmos‑2541, 2552, 2563). Cosmos‑2541 and 2563 show clear signs of failure after their last orbit‑correction maneuvers, while Cosmos‑2552 has not maneuvered since November and may also be nearing the end of its life. Podvig notes Moscow relies less on space-based warning than the U.S., so the degradation is not immediately destabilizing. (RussianForces.org, 12.28.25)

Nuclear arms:

  • Russia has begun replacing its silo-based single-warhead Topol‑M ICBMs with MIRVed Yars missiles at the Tatishchevo Strategic Rocket Forces division, with the first Yars regiment entering combat duty there in 2025; all remaining Tatishchevo Topol‑Ms, first deployed in December 1997, are slated to be swapped out under this modernization program. (RussianForces.org, 12.17.25) 

Friday, Dec. 26, 2025

  • Russia appeared to make another aborted attempt to test-launch a Yars ICBM from the Plesetsk cosmodrome, issuing NOTAMs for Dec. 25–26 and prompting a long RC‑135 Cobra Ball monitoring flight from the United States, but with no confirmed launch and the warnings ultimately canceled—similar to an apparent scrubbed attempt in early December, analyst Pavel Podvig reports. (RussianForces.org, 12.26.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Russia’s Defense Ministry released the first official images of the mobile launcher for its new Oreshnik nuclear‑capable hypersonic ballistic missile, showing the system entering a wooded area in Belarus and being covered with camouflage netting as it announced the missile’s deployment there. Minsk has said Oreshnik would be on combat duty by end‑2025; researchers believe it may be based at a former airfield near Krichev. First used in combat against Ukraine’s Dnipro in November 2024, Oreshnik has been touted by Putin as having destructive power comparable to a nuclear weapon and being effectively uninterceptable—claims some experts view skeptically—as Russia moves toward mass production and deepens its nuclear signaling from Belarusian territory. (MT/AFP, 12.30.25) 

Monday, Jan. 5, 2026

  • Russian officials frame Trump’s seizure of Nicolás Maduro as both a loss and an opportunity: Moscow has been deprived of a Latin American ally and sees Washington grabbing Venezuelan oil, but also views the raid as confirmation of a revived Monroe “Donroe” Doctrine and the erosion of international law. Some Russian nationalists, including jailed commander Igor Girkin, lament the blow to Russia’s image and contrast the swift U.S. action with Moscow’s slog in Ukraine. (Reuters, 01.05.26) 

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Donald Trump seemed unconcerned that the last major nuclear arms control agreement with Russia was set to expire in four weeks, leaving the world’s two largest nuclear powers free to expand their arsenals without limit, for the first time in half a century. “If it expires, it expires,” he said. “We’ll just do a better agreement,” he added, insisting that China, which has the fastest-growing arsenal in the world, should be incorporated in any future agreement. “You probably want to get a couple of other players involved also,” Trump said. (New York Times, 01.08.26)
    • On Feb. 5, a treaty capping the numbers of deployed Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads will expire, marking the first time in more than half a century that the Kremlin and Washington's nuclear programs will be unconstrained by numerical limits (RFE/RL, 01.08.26)

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • A 18‑month New York Times investigation finds Ukraine’s front has become a live‑fire lab for semi‑autonomous “killer A.I.” drones, with systems like Eric Schmidt–backed Bumblebee and Ukrainian‑built Underdog and X‑Drone modules now routinely handling navigation, target recognition, tracking and even terminal attack once a human “locks” the target. Russian and Ukrainian forces are both adopting A.I.-enhanced weapons and early swarm‑control tools, raising battlefield lethality and ethical alarms as some designs edge toward drones that can hunt humans or critical infrastructure with minimal human oversight, in a domain with virtually no international guardrails. (New York Times, 12.31.25)
  • A pro‑Russian hacking group, Noname057, claimed responsibility for a major DDoS cyberattack that knocked out central IT systems at France’s postal service La Poste—halting parcel tracking and disrupting online banking payments just before Christmas—prompting France’s DGSI intelligence service to take over the investigation amid wider concerns about Russian “hybrid warfare” in Europe. (Washington Post/AP, 12.24.25)
  • Western cybersecurity experts warn that state-backed hackers are rapidly weaponizing AI, with Google researchers alleging that Russian actors have used AI tools to help design adaptive malware for attacks on Ukrainian targets. As attackers automate 80–90% of intrusion campaigns and accelerate exploitation of software flaws and stolen credentials, security chiefs argue that defenders must “fight AI with AI,” using autonomous systems to monitor networks around the clock. (Wall Street Journal, 01.06.26)
  • Russian revanchism and the rise of China have brought to a close America’s three decades as the uncontested global hegemon, while the race is on to dominate new technologies that are shaping the future. “The revolution in technology,” William Burns says, “is truly unlike anything we have seen in human society since the beginnings of the industrial revolution two centuries ago.” As CIA director, Burns put significant emphasis on mastering new and emerging technologies.” (Financial Times, 01.09.26)

Energy exports from CIS:

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Russia’s flagship Urals crude oil slumped to about $34 a barrel in a signal that U.S. sanctions on Moscow are having an impact. The grade in the Baltic Sea slumped to $34.82 a barrel on Friday, while in the Black Sea it fell to $33.17, according to prices provided by Argus Media. Dated Brent, a yardstick for international prices, stood at about $61, after falling far less than Russian supplies this year. (Bloomberg, 12.22.25)
  • Russia’s liquefied natural gas exports to China surged to a record in November, as buyers shrugged off the risk of western sanctions to access the cheaper fuel. Deliveries of the super-chilled gas from Russia more than doubled from a year earlier to 1.6 million metric tons last month, customs data released over the weekend showed. Russia has had to cut prices to increase its appeal—its LNG was the cheapest among the 12 suppliers to China and about 10% below the average at $9.85 a million British thermal units in November, the customs data showed. (Bloomberg, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Serbia has agreed to extend its gas supply arrangement with Russia for three months. (MT/AFP, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • The Financial Times finds the EU actually spent 7% less on U.S. oil and gas in September–December 2025 (about $29.6 billion) despite pledging a $750 billion energy purchase over 2026–28 under Trump’s trade deal; annual 2025 imports are only $73.7 billion (under one‑third of the implied target), and analysts say even replacing all Russian gas with U.S. LNG would reach only ~23% of the commitment, making the headline figure economically unrealistic. (Financial Times, 12.24.25)

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • Russia extended its temporary ban on gasoline exports until Feb. 28, 2026, to stabilize the domestic fuel market, and prolonged similar restrictions on diesel, marine fuel and other gasoils for non‑producers, after Ukraine’s drone strikes on refineries and ports earlier this year helped trigger price spikes and regional shortages. (Bloomberg, 12.27.25)
  • Bloomberg reports that U.S. sanctions on Russian oil giant Lukoil PJSC have thrown roughly 200 independently owned Lukoil-branded gas stations in the U.S. Northeast into turmoil: although the White House temporarily exempted retail outlets, banks like BCB Bancorp cut ties, some operators were forced into cash-only sales, and Lukoil is scrambling to divest its U.S. assets by an April deadline while franchisees fear for their livelihoods and hope a new owner will let them rebrand or buy their stations. (Bloomberg, 12.27.25)
  • Turkey has become a critical hub for Russian oil and refined products despite EU sanctions, with terminals such as Turkis Enerji in Mersin and Opet’s Marmara facility receiving billions of dollars’ worth of Russian diesel and fuel oil and then exporting similar volumes to the EU, often obscuring origin through storage and re-export. EU officials are now scrutinizing these ports and weighing sanctions, but enforcement is hampered by limited access to Turkish infrastructure and complex middleman networks, raising calls for tougher measures such as banning imports of petroleum products from countries that process Russian crude. (Wall Street Journal, 12.27.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • The aging, sanctioned oil tanker Bella 1, pursued by the U.S. Coast Guard for more than 10 days over alleged illicit shipments tied to Iran, suddenly painted a Russian flag on its hull in an apparent bid to claim Moscow’s protection, complicating any forcible boarding under maritime law as U.S. officials work to verify its true registration. The tanker also was renamed Marinera. (Wall Street Journal, Gazeta.ru, 12.30.25)

Thursday, Jan. 1, 2026

  • Russia formally asked the U.S. on New Year’s Eve to halt its pursuit of the oil tanker Bella 1, now renamed Marinera and newly registered in Russia, after the vessel fled a Coast Guard boarding attempt near Venezuela and painted a Russian flag on its hull. Washington still treats the ship as “stateless” under a U.S. seizure warrant, setting up a legal and diplomatic clash as Trump courts Moscow on Ukraine and pressures Caracas with a quasi‑blockade. (New York Times, 01.01.26)

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026

  • Chevron and partners have completed a $48 billion expansion of Kazakhstan’s giant Tengiz oil field, boosting capacity to about 1 million barrels per day—roughly 13% of Chevron’s global output and nearly 10% of Kazakhstan’s GDP—just as key risks mount. Ukraine has begun targeting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route via Russia that carries Tengiz crude, and Astana is entering tough talks with Chevron over extending the Tengizchevroil concession beyond 2033, balancing domestic pressure for a “better deal” against the risk of losing foreign capital and technical expertise in one of the world’s most complex, sour‑gas‑rich fields. (New York Times, 01.03.26)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Russia’s crude exports fell sharply during the final weeks of 2025 and into the new year. A 14th straight drop in prices combined with the smaller flows sent the value of shipments to the lowest since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The country shipped 3.43 million barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 4, according to vessel-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s down by about 440,000 from the period to Dec. 21, with lower shipments from the key Pacific port of Kozmino driving the drop. Urals crude is trading below $35 a barrel in both the Baltic and the Black Sea, about 60% of its price on Oct. 1, with the Pacific ESPO grade down by 25%. In contrast, North Sea Dated crude has lost just 10% of its value over the period, according to Argus Media. (Bloomberg, 01.06.25)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • U.S. European Command seized the Russian‑flagged tanker Marinera (formerly Bella 1) in the North Atlantic after a roughly two‑week chase enforcing Donald Trump’s global blockade on “sanctioned and illicit” Venezuelan oil, signaling a bid to reshape the oil market by controlling both U.S. output and Venezuela’s vast reserves. The empty vessel, part of the “dark/shadow fleet” serving Russia, Iran and Venezuela, had previously carried Iranian oil, evaded an earlier boarding attempt in the Caribbean by switching from a false Guyanese flag to a Russian one as Russian naval vessels and a submarine moved to support it, and was later re‑registered in Russia. U.S. forces ultimately boarded under a federal seizure warrant without resistance. Washington also intercepted another sanctioned tanker, the M/T Sophia (or M Sophia), in the Caribbean with U.K. basing and surveillance support, prompting Moscow to denounce “piracy” and demand humane treatment of the Russian crew. (Financial Times, 01.078.26, Financial Times, 01.07.26, Financial Times, 01.07.26, New York Times, 01.07.26, Wall Street Journal, 01.07.26)
    • “The UK has provided enabling support to the United States at their request to interdict the [suspected Russian shadow fleet] vessel Bella 1 today… the UK provided enabling support to the operation in full compliance with international law.” (UK MOD X Account, 01.07.26)
  • U.S. President Trump said Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was unhappy with him due to Washington’s high tariffs on the South Asian nation, the latest sign of continued strain between the two countries. “I have a very good relationship with him, but he is not that happy with me because they are paying a lot of tariffs,” Trump told a gathering of Republicans in Washington on Tuesday, adding that India’s buying of Russian oil “has reduced substantially.” Trump imposed tariffs of 50% on Indian exports—the highest rate in Asia—in August in part over India’s purchases of Russian oil following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The tariffs have soured ties between the longtime partners and remain in place despite multiple rounds of trade talks and four conversations between the two leaders that have yet to produce a bilateral trade deal. (Bloomberg, 01.06.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • The U.S. operation to seize the Mariner tanker came despite Russia reportedly sending a submarine and other naval assets to escort the tanker. Moscow's Foreign Ministry said the seizure will "only result in further military and political tensions," adding that it was worried by "Washington's willingness to generate acute international crisis situations." The U.S. seizure came as Washington grew frustrated with Moscow as little progress on its diplomatic push to end the war in Ukraine has been made. It seized the ship days after U.S. President Trump said he was "not thrilled" with his Russian counterpart Putin. (MT/AFP, 01.08.26, MT/AFP, 01.07.26)
    • The Russian Foreign Ministry’s latest statement on the Bella‑1/Marinera seizure condemned U.S. Venezuela‑oil sanctions as “illegitimate” but carefully described the tanker as having only “temporary permission” to fly the Russian flag as of late December, signaling some distance from the vessel even as Moscow defends it. Citing Russian registries, ISW notes at least five other sanctioned, previously stateless “shadow fleet” tankers operating in Venezuelan waters have recently reflagged to Russia and declared Sochi or Taganrog as home ports, indicating a broader move to bring the ghost fleet under nominal Russian nationality. (ISW, 01.08.26)
    • The owner of the U.S.-seized shadow‑fleet tanker Marinera (ex‑Bella 1), Crimean entrepreneur Ilya Bugai, is linked via his firm Rusneftekhimtorg to networks that moved Russian oil products into Europe. (Istories, 01.08.26)
  • An oil tanker with links to Russia was hit by a drone in the Black Sea, Turkish media reported. The Palau-flagged Elbus was sailing about 30 miles off the Turkish coast when it was struck, according to NTV. (Bloomberg, 01.08.26)
  • Russia’s “shadow fleet” is increasingly reflagging to Russian registry as Western enforcement tightens: five tankers that recently operated in Venezuelan waters, including the seized Marinera (ex‑Bella 1), have switched to the Russian flag in recent days, while 17 shadow tankers reflagged to Russia in December alone and more than 40 since June, according to Lloyd’s List. Earlier research by the Kyiv School of Economics found that nearly 70% of Russia’s oil exports were already being carried by such shadow vessels two years into the Ukraine war. (New York Times, 01.08.26)
  • President Trump’s team is crafting a sweeping plan to control Venezuela’s oil sector for years, giving the U.S. effective stewardship over much of the Western Hemisphere’s reserves by acquiring and marketing the bulk of PdVSA’s production through U.S. firms and joint ventures such as Chevron’s. Aimed at boxing out China and Russia and driving prices toward Trump’s preferred $50/barrel (with U.S. crude already around $56), the strategy would see Washington “indefinitely” selling Venezuelan crude via traders like Mercuria, Vitol and Trafigura, with proceeds initially held in U.S.-controlled accounts for later distribution to Caracas’s interim authorities. (Wall Street Journal, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • U.S. has seized the tanker Olina in the Caribbean—the fifth vessel taken in recent weeks under Trump’s global blockade of sanctioned Venezuelan oil. Marines from Joint Task Force Southern Spear, launched from carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, boarded the ship “without incident.” Olina, sanctioned in 2025 when named Minerva M, had left Venezuela last week fully loaded and was returning with Venezuelan crude while falsely flying the Timor‑Leste flag. Three other fully loaded tankers from the same flotilla have already turned back to Venezuelan waters, with seven more expected to follow, carrying oil owned by PdVSA. (Reuters, 01.09.26)
  • Russia’s foreign ministry warned the U.S. seizure of the Russian‑flagged tanker Marinera in the North Atlantic “lowers the threshold for the use of force” at sea and risks “further military and political tension in the Euro‑Atlantic.” Moscow called the interception an “egregious violation” of international law and rejected U.S. claims that the ship was stateless, saying it had legally re‑registered under the Russian flag after previously sailing under a false Guyanese flag as part of the sanctions‑evading “ghost fleet.” FT analysis finds at least 11 other formerly stateless tankers carrying Russian oil have been granted Russian nationality since November. (Financial Times, 01.09.26)10
  • Russia’s Foreign Ministry publicly thanked President Donald Trump after he ordered the release of two Russian citizens who were part of the crew of the sanctioned tanker Marinera (formerly Bella 1), seized by U.S. forces in the North Atlantic under the Venezuelan oil blockade. Moscow said it is now working urgently to arrange the sailors’ swift return to Russia, while noting that the U.S. still holds other shadow‑fleet tankers such as the Sophia. (Korrespondent.net, 01.09.26)
  • Russia’s crude oil production plunged by the most in 18 months in December, pincered by western sanctions that are causing the nation’s barrels to pile up at sea and a surge of Ukrainian drone attacks on its energy infrastructure. The nation pumped an average 9.326 million barrels a day of crude oil last month, according to people with knowledge of government data, who asked not to be identified discussing classified information. The figure—which doesn’t include output of condensate—is more than 100,000 barrels a day below November, and almost 250,000 barrels a day lower than Russia is allowed to pump under agreement with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies. (Bloomberg, 01.09.26)

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner and other Trump allies see post‑sanctions Russia as a resource‑rich “El Dorado” where U.S. investors could profit by reintegrating Moscow into the global economy, but veteran Russia hands warn the country remains “uninvestable:” its $2.5 trillion economy has weak growth prospects, depleting easy‑to‑extract oil, pervasive expropriations and legal arbitrariness, plus deep anti‑Western animus and high risks that any future Kremlin or U.S. policy shift could strand assets or even land foreign executives in jail. (Wall Street Journal, 12.25.25)
  • On Dec. 28 Trump said he called Putin before meeting Zelenskyy in Miami on that day and that U.S., Ukrainian and Russian working groups on security and economics will convene in January 2026. (ISW, 12.28.25)

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • A Moscow court sentenced former Foreign Ministry employee Arseniy Konovalov to 12 years in a high‑security colony for high treason, after the FSB accused him of passing classified information to U.S. intelligence for money while serving at Russia’s Consulate General in Houston between 2014 and 2017; state media released arrest and courtroom footage, though details of the alleged leaks were not disclosed. (MT/AFP, 12.27.25)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Aldrich H. Ames, the former CIA officer whose spying for Moscow is considered the most damaging betrayal in the agency’s history, has died at 84 in federal prison (Washington Post, 01.07.26) 

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Republican Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna has invited four members of Russia's State Duma to Washington for a meeting with members of Congress, reportedly regarding peace talks, according to the Congresswoman's X post. (RBC-Ukraine, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • “Over the course of his career, Burns has sat down with some of the most prominent villains of the 20th and 21st centuries. Who, I ask, was … most difficult? “Putin,” former CIA director William Burns said. “He’s just so stubborn… He was utterly unapologetic,” Burns says. “He made no effort to deny [his intention to invade Ukraine].” Burns returned to Washington convinced that Putin was going to go ahead with his war.” (FT, 01.09.26)
  • “Frustration with the war, which has cost Russia an estimated 1.1mn casualties and a good deal of economic pain, created an opportunity for the CIA, according to William Burns. “We had a lot of good fortune in recruiting more Russians over disaffection with the war, once the war started.” (Financial Times, 01.09.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • The Washington Post argues that while Russia’s war economy is still funding the invasion, mounting fiscal and financial strains could trigger a break in 2026. New U.S. sanctions force Urals crude down to about $35 (vs. $69 in the 2025 budget), with December oil and gas receipts forecast 49% lower year-on-year even as military spending hit $149 billion in the first three quarters. The central bank’s 16% rate, $202 billion in opaque defense lending, Gazprom’s $12.9 billion loss, and Rosneft’s 70% profit drop to $3.6 billion all point to growing systemic risk. (Washington Post, 12.22.25)
  • Russia’s government plans to eliminate 45,000 state-funded university slots in the 2026–27 academic year, Education and Science Minister Valery Falkov said Monday. (MT/AFP, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Russia’s central bank has prepared a framework to regulate cryptocurrencies on the domestic market that will allow retail investors to buy them in addition to qualified investors, in a fresh sign of how sanctions have reshaped its approach to the assets. (Bloomberg, 12.23.25)
  • New‑hire wage growth in Russia slowed sharply to 6.9% year‑on‑year in November from 18.9% in January. (Financial Times, 12.23.25)
  • Russia’s state education watchdog on Monday suspended the license of Moscow’s Higher School of Social and Economic Sciences, better known as Shaninka, effectively halting its ability to teach students, Russian media reported. (MT/AFP, 12.23.25)
  • Telegram and VKontakte founder Pavel Durov recounts in a new book that during their only known meeting in 2013, Putin criticized VK’s “underground entertainment” and effectively advised him to run such a business abroad—“in Israel”—a conversation that Durov says convinced him to sell his VK stake, move his projects away from Russia to avoid prison, and ultimately focus on Telegram. (Meduza, 12.23.25)
    • Durov has quietly built a sperm‑donation program that he says has produced more than 100 biological children in at least 12 countries—on top of six children with three women—by supplying “high‑quality donor material” to a Moscow fertility clinic. (Wall Street Journal, 12.23.25)
  • Russian authorities have stripped Roman Anin, founder and former editor-in-chief of investigative outlet “Important Stories,” of his Russian citizenship after a court conviction for “spreading fakes” about the Russian military’s actions in Bucha, applying new laws that allow revoking naturalized citizenship for “military fakes” and a broad range of political offenses; Anin, born in Moldova, acquired Russian citizenship in 2006. (Istories, 12.23.25)
  • A new Levada Center survey finds Russians name rising prices and tariffs (34%), the Putin–Trump summit in Alaska (29%), and Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and facilities (28%) as the top events of 2025, while 63% describe the year overall as “average” and nearly half (48%) say 2025 was harder for Russia than 2024. (Levada Center, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • Bloomberg reports the ruble has surged about 45% in 2025 to ~78 per dollar, making it the best‑performing major currency and one of the top five global assets by spot return, but economists warn the sharp appreciation plus 16% interest rates risk tipping Russia from a wartime boom into stagflation by crushing exporters’ revenues and undermining competitiveness. (Bloomberg, 12.24.25)
  • Russia’s central bank has drafted rules to legalize domestic crypto trading for retail investors, allowing “non‑qualified” buyers to purchase the most liquid cryptocurrencies up to 300,000 rubles (about $3,800) per year after a knowledge test, while qualified investors face no volume cap—another post‑sanctions shift away from the bank’s 2022 call for an outright crypto ban, even as it still labels the assets “high‑risk.” (Bloomberg, 12.24.25)

Thursday, Dec. 25, 2025

  • A new Levada Center poll finds 71% of Russians expect 2026 to be better than 2025, while only 3% think it will be worse; 55% still forecast a “tense” year for the national economy (down 15 points since 2020), as the share expecting a “calm” economic year has risen to 32%. Perceptions of politics show a similar shift: about half still anticipate a tense political year, but that share has fallen 16 points since 2022, while one‑third now expect political calm, up 13 points. (Levada Center, 12.25.25)

Sunday, Dec. 28, 2025

  • Russian business leaders appealed directly to Putin to curb a fast‑growing wave of nationalizations that has seen the state seize companies, ports and other assets worth over 4 trillion rubles ($43 billion), warning that vague claims about protecting citizens’ “right to a decent life” now allow courts to expropriate virtually any property without compensation. RSPP head Alexander Shokhin told Kommersant that executives want clear legal limits and insist the state should pay market price if it needs an asset, even as seizures accelerate to plug budget gaps despite Putin’s repeated assurances that 1990s privatizations would not be reversed. (MT/AFP, 12.28.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • Russia’s annual inflation rate has fallen below 6%, Economy Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said, crediting the Central Bank’s tight monetary policy after earlier ruble depreciation. He claimed the economy has “maintained its stability,” citing positive growth, falling inflation, a “stable” budget, low public debt, and a “strong” ruble despite wartime pressures and Western sanctions. (bne IntelliNews, 12.29.25)
  • Meduza, citing Forbes and Russian business press, reports that at least 320 stores closed in Russian shopping centers in 2025, with about half of the closures in clothing and footwear amid falling real incomes, high interest rates, rising production costs and mounting household debt. Over the past three years, shoe prices have jumped 59% and clothing 36%, and analysts expect the number of brands operating in Russia to keep shrinking in 2026 as chains from fashion labels (Modis, Incity, Etam, Orby) to food retailers and restaurants shut outlets, move online, or file for bankruptcy. (Meduza, 12.29.25)
  • President Putin signed laws scrapping mandatory annual income and asset declarations for Russian officials and judges, ending the 2009‑era public disclosure regime and requiring filings only in limited cases such as job changes. Oversight will shift to a Kremlin‑controlled automated system called Poseidon, run by the Federal Guard Service, which will track officials’ income, spending and assets internally—reducing public transparency while centralizing control of corruption investigations amid a broader anti‑graft purge of regional and defense officials. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25)
  • Top of Form

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • An Istories year‑end analysis says 2025 was a “turning point” as Russia’s war‑driven boom gave way to near‑stagnation: GDP is on track for about 1% growth, quarterly momentum faded, and the Central Bank’s 21% key rate finally choked credit, investment and consumer demand. Inflation slowed to roughly 5.7–5.8%, but at the cost of one of the world’s highest real interest rates and a widening budget gap—federal and regional revenues fell, the consolidated budget deficit jumped to 2.6% of GDP, and the government hiked profit tax, introduced progressive income tax and will raise VAT to 22% in 2026. The piece stresses a widening split between booming defense sectors and a weakening civilian economy. (Istories, 12.30.25)
  • Russia plans to auction Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport early next year, months after a court seized the country’s fourth‑busiest hub from longtime owners Dmitry Kamenshchik and Valery Kogan on grounds they were foreign residents barred from managing it. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said on state TV that “a lot of work” had been done to prepare Domodedovo for sale and that officials already know potential bidders; the auction will be open. The airport is heavily indebted, according to its state‑appointed manager. Domodedovo’s case is part of a broader wave of nationalizations since 2022 that has transferred billions in assets—from domestic tycoons and Western firms like Danone and Uniper—into state hands. (MT/AFP, 12.30.25)
  • Allies of the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny released a new FBK investigation alleging Putin secretly owns a lavish estate at Cape Aya on Crimea’s Black Sea coast, transferred after annexation via companies tied to Putin associates Yury and Boris Kovalchuk. The complex, estimated at about 10 billion rubles ($127 million), reportedly includes a private medical center, spa, indoor pool, cinema and guest house, with technical documents showing oversight by the Federal Protective Service—mirroring schemes FBK says were used for Putin’s Valdai residence and the earlier “Palace for Putin” near Gelendzhik. The Kremlin has not commented. (MT/AFP, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 31, 2025

  • In his New Year’s address, Putin sought to rally Russians around the war in Ukraine, hailing troops for fighting “for truth and justice” and insisting “we believe in you and in our victory,” while portraying society as united by “selfless and devoted love for Russia.” Speaking in front of the Kremlin in a relatively muted, pre‑war style broadcast, he stressed that national “unity” underpins sovereignty, security and the country’s “thousand‑year history,” even as the invasion nears its fourth anniversary and has cost hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties. (MT/AFP, 12.31.25)
  • Russian authorities warned that mobile internet might be shut off in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other regions on New Year’s Eve for “security” reasons, provoking public anger as critics noted reliance on mobile data for taxis, payments and emergency calls. The move follows growing use of restrictive “whitelists” that limit access to approved sites, pushing users onto state‑monitored platforms and prompting comparisons to a “digital North Korea.” (Washington Post, 12.31.25) 

Friday, Jan. 2, 2026

  • A new Proekt investigation, summarized by Meduza, alleges Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill has maintained a “secret common-law wife,” Lidia Leonova, for more than 50 years, despite canon law requiring a patriarch to be celibate. Court records from a 2012 apartment dust dispute first revealed Leonova living in Kirill’s luxury flat opposite Moscow’s Christ the Savior Cathedral; Proekt says she manages his household and frequently travels with him. (Meduza, 01.02.26)
  • The Moscow Times reports Russia’s war‑driven boom has faded: after >4% GDP growth in 2023–24, 2025 growth is expected to slow to around 1% or less, with similar headwinds forecast for 2026. The rebound from the 2022 shock and a 25% jump in federal spending in 2024 have been exhausted, leaving no obvious new growth driver beyond continued high military outlays and higher taxes. (Moscow Times, 01.02.26)

Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026

  • Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said on Monday that he had appointed his 20-year-old son, Akhmat Kadyrov, as acting deputy prime minister of the republic. (MT/AFP, 01.05.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Putin said Russian soldiers were carrying out a sacred mission comparable to that of Jesus Christ as he marked the Orthodox Christmas holiday on Wednesday. (MT/AFP, 01.07.26)
  • It oversees one of the world's biggest railroad networks, employing around 700,000 people and operating 85,000 kilometers of track that stitches together 11 time zones, carrying millions of passengers and millions of tons of cargo every year. And it's on track for bankruptcy. Russian Railways is staggering under a massive debt load estimated at around $51 billion. (RFE/RL, 01.07.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • The Financial Times’ Martin Sandbu argues Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain and “running out of money,” citing new research showing shrinking hydrocarbon revenues, rising domestic taxes (including a planned VAT hike), heavy covert monetization and a rapidly depleted National Welfare Fund. Alternative inflation estimates suggest Russia’s GDP has actually contracted since 2022 and real wages have fallen about 5%, with only roughly 20% of Russians materially better off from the war—evidence. (Financial Times, 01.08.26)

Defense and aerospace:

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Aliya Ozdamirova, the daughter of a former Chechen deputy sports minister, was buried in her home republic of Chechnya on Nov. 12. Ozdamirova had escaped to Georgia weeks earlier after reporting abuse and threats from relatives linked to her bisexuality, according to the North Caucasus SOS Crisis Group (NC SOS). (MT/AFP, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • The Russian Baltic Fleet is reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade in Kaliningrad into the 120th Naval Infantry Division—the ninth new maneuver division identified by ISW since 2022—with the Russian Defense Ministry confirming elements are already undergoing intensive training at the Khmelevka range. (ISW, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • Former President Dmitry Medvedev claims Russia recruited 417,000 contract soldiers and about 36,000 volunteers in 2025—down from an alleged 450,000 contracts and 40,000 volunteers in 2024—as the Kremlin pushes toward Putin’s goal of 1.5 million active personnel by 2026 amid shrinking enlistment bonuses in some regions. (Moscow Times, 12.24.25) 

Friday, Dec. 26, 2025

  • At a Dec. 26 Kremlin meeting on the 2027–2036 state armaments program, Putin said output of key weapons in 2025 had increased sharply versus 2022: tank and other heavy armor production was up 2.2×; light armored vehicles (BMPs, BTRs) 3.7×; military aircraft 4.6×; military trucks 5.7×; rocket and artillery systems 9.6×; communications and electronic‑warfare equipment 12.5×; individual body armor 17.9×; and munitions and “means of destruction” more than 22×. He said these surges reflected rapid expansion of the defense‑industrial base and would shape funding parameters for the new 10‑year armaments and defense‑industry programs. (Kremlin, 12.26.25)
  • Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov appeared to be modeling Russia’s new Unmanned Systems Forces on Ukraine’s drone command, appointing Yuri Vaganov—an ex‑plumbing‑goods businessman turned FPV‑drone supplier via the Sudoplatov Battalion—as USF commander despite his lack of formal military background. The MoD also announced a new USF regiment training on counter‑UAV and unmanned ground systems in the Moscow Military District, while other formations such as the 18th Combined Arms Army are creating separate drone battalions. ISW assessed that Belousov is deliberately bringing in commercially minded figures to scale drone production and integrate specialized units across army and district structures. (ISW, 12.26.25)

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • Russian media report that Yuri Vaganov, a civilian businessman-turned–drone supplier and long associated with the “Sudoplatov—Judgment Day” FPV drone project, has been appointed commander of Russia’s newly created Unmanned Systems Forces despite having no formal military background, a move front-line soldiers and Z‑bloggers criticize as another example of wartime “commercialization” and accuse him of past negligence in a 2024 HIMARS strike that killed dozens of RUS drone operators. (Istories, 12.27.25) 

Tuesday, Dec. 30, 2025

  • Putin signed an order authorizing the military to summon members of Russia’s mobilization reserve in 2026 for “special” assemblies to guard critical infrastructure, expanding their use beyond training or wartime deployment. The government will compile a list of facilities, while the Defense Ministry assigns units for protection duties. The move follows November legislation allowing reservists—volunteers under contract—to be called up in peacetime and comes amid mounting Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries, depots and other energy sites, which have exposed gaps in Russia’s ability to defend key installations. Regional recruitment drives for such protection units are already underway, Kommersant reports. (AFP, 12.30.25)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Russia’s naval and missile procurement points to planning for conflict beyond Ukraine: Baltic Shipyard swung from a $264 million loss in 2023 to a $41 million profit after a surge of state naval orders, with steel use up 98% there and 93% at Vyborg Shipyard. Moscow plans a $2.6 billion consolidation and modernization of five St. Petersburg shipyards, while Ukrainian intelligence estimates Russia is producing 115–130 long‑range missiles per month and building new explosive plants capable of 6,000 metric tons of high explosives annually—capacity the authors say is meant to sustain long-term pressure on NATO. (Foreign Policy, 01.07.26)
  • ISW, citing Ukrainian analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets, assesses Russia is struggling to both sustain losses in Ukraine and build strategic reserves. Of 17 maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades planned for 2025, only four divisions have actually been formed—mostly reflagged naval infantry—and likely at under‑strength, with new formations relying on infantry and light vehicles and lacking organic armor, air defense, artillery, and logistics. (ISW, 01.07.26) 

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Russia is creating new artillery formations—including the 1244th Guards Artillery Brigade (a reserve unit of the planned 31st Combined Arms Army), the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade in the Leningrad Military District, and a new 34th Artillery Division in the Moscow Military District—but will likely struggle to staff them to doctrinal strength given heavy losses in Ukraine. (ISW, 01.08.26)

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Exiled outlet Vyorstka reports that Russia added a record 341 minors to its national “terrorist and extremist” register in 2025—more than double the 161 added in 2024 and exceeding the total 304 added over the previous six years combined—after laws lowered the age of criminal responsibility for sabotage and terrorism to 14, with at least 158 minors convicted on related charges since the full-scale invasion began. (Moscow Times, 12.24.25)

Friday, Dec. 26, 2025

  • A court in Russia’s Kursk region sentenced former regional lawmaker Maxim Vasilyev to 5.5 years in prison for large-scale embezzlement tied to failed border defense construction that preceded Ukraine’s surprise incursion into the region in August 2024; he was also fined 800,000 rubles and ordered to repay 152.8 million rubles to a construction firm, after prosecutors alleged he siphoned off defense funds and paid millions to a former deputy governor accused of running an “organized group” with the ex-governor. (Moscow Times, 12.26.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • A Moscow garrison military court placed ex–FSB Colonel Dmitry Frolov, former deputy head of the “banking” unit of Directorate K, on a wanted list and ordered his arrest in absentia after he failed to appear for a retrial on multimillion‑ruble bribery charges related to protection of Creditimpex Bank; Frolov, who left the FSB in 2013 and was convicted in 2024 but freed due to time served, reportedly left for the UAE in 2024 citing heart disease, while prosecutors successfully appealed his earlier, partially reclassified fraud sentence. (Mediazona, 12.29.25)

Monday, Jan. 5, 2026

  • Russian judges sentenced 100 people to life imprisonment between January and November 2025, the highest annual total in at least two decades, the state-run TASS news agency reported Monday, citing data from Russia’s Supreme Court. (MT/AFP, 01.05.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • French prosecutors are investigating the death of 38‑year‑old Russian journalist Yevgeny Safronov, whose body was found below his seventh‑floor apartment in the Paris suburb of Meudon. Safronov, a former Open Media reporter who had asylum in France, left a farewell letter claiming he was the victim of “massive hacking” and saying he alone bore responsibility for his death; friends told BFMTV his mental state had sharply deteriorated and he showed signs of acute paranoia and suicidal thoughts. (Korrespondent.net, 01.08.26)

     

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Also see the section on great powers above.

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • Russia has sent arms to Madagascar’s military government, which assumed power in an October coup. A Russian air force plane carrying 40 military personnel and 43 crates of weapons landed at the international airport near Antananarivo, the capital, on Dec. 20, National Assembly Speaker Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko said a statement on Monday. “ (Bloomberg, 12.22.25)

Thursday, Dec. 25, 2025

  • The Kremlin confirmed it has made a “proposal” to France over the case of Laurent Vinatier, a French researcher jailed in Russia who now faces espionage charges carrying up to 20 years in prison, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying “the ball is now in France’s court” but giving no details. Vinatier, a longtime Russia expert working for a Swiss mediation NGO, was arrested in June 2024 and initially sentenced to three years for failing to register as a “foreign agent” before prosecutors added espionage counts, in what rights groups see as part of a broader post‑2022 crackdown on Western nationals. (MT/AFP, 12.25.25)

Monday, Dec. 29, 2025

  • President Putin signed a constitutional amendment freeing Russia from any obligation to enforce criminal rulings by foreign or international courts it does not belong to, a move widely seen as pre‑emptively rejecting jurisdiction of any future tribunal on the Ukraine war that might seek to prosecute Russian officials, including over aggression or war crimes. (MT/AFP, 12.29.25)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • Russia targeted South African video gamers as part of a recruitment drive for its war in Ukraine, according to documents involving two men who left to fight. The men in their 20s left South Africa in July last year after talking about joining the Russian military to a gamer over an app called Discord, based on email exchanges with diplomats by a friend seeking information on their whereabouts and wellbeing. Within weeks of signing a military contract near St. Petersburg, a medical certificate showed one of them was killed fighting in Ukraine, according to the person. (Bloomberg, 01.07.26)

Ukraine:

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • Fitch Ratings has raised Ukraine’s long‑term foreign‑currency issuer default rating from “Restricted Default” to “CCC” after Kyiv reached a deal with investors to swap GDP‑linked warrants and completed restructuring of 94% of its sovereign commercial debt, citing normalized relations with most external creditors, the EU’s new €90 billion support package, and manageable external debt service—while still noting high credit risk due to the war and its macro‑fiscal impact. (Korrespondent.net, 12.23.25)
  • Bloomberg reports that the “Ukraine peace trade” has delivered outsized gains in 2025, with a custom index of 12 ceasefire‑sensitive stocks up 33% year‑to‑date and 14% since Trump’s peace push accelerated in mid‑October, versus under 3% for EM equities and the S&P 500. Ukraine’s 2029 dollar bonds have climbed from 57 to about 76 cents on the dollar after an EU €90 billion loan and debt restructuring, while top‑performing EM currencies include the Czech koruna, forint, zloty and even the ruble—yet major investors warn much optimism is already priced in and a forced, fragile peace could quickly unravel. (Bloomberg, 12.23.25)
  • In a new 5½‑hour podcast interview, Hunter Biden said taking a $1‑million‑per‑year board seat at Ukrainian gas company Burisma in 2014 was “absolutely a mistake,” calling Ukraine “a viper’s den” with a “staggering” level of corruption, but insisted he did “nothing” improper in the role. (New York Post, 12.23.25)

Saturday, Dec. 27, 2025

  • Ukraine’s Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and NABU said they were investigating an “organized criminal group” of sitting lawmakers suspected of taking illicit payments for parliamentary votes, and accused the State Protection Agency of initially blocking their access to Rada office buildings before later letting them in—another high‑profile probe following the energy‑sector kickback case that cost President Volodymyr Zelenskyy his powerful chief of staff Andriy Yermak and intensified domestic pressure for elections. (RFE/RL, 12.27.25)

Thursday, Jan. 1, 2026

  • President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has completed a sweeping shake‑up of Ukraine’s leadership and inner circle, appointing 39‑year‑old military intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov as head of the presidential office, replacing Andriy Yermak, who resigned amid an energy‑sector corruption probe. Budanov—a CIA‑trained spymaster known for daring covert operations against Russia, close ties to Washington, and back‑channel contacts with Moscow through prisoner‑exchange talks—is expected to steer security policy, asymmetric tactics, and U.S.‑mediated peace negotiations. As part of the broader overhaul, Zelenskyy has tapped digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov as the new defense minister, moved foreign intelligence chief Oleh Ivashchenko to lead HUR, reassigned Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to focus on the energy sector, and replaced several regional governors. Zelenskyy says the changes are meant to sharpen the presidency’s focus on security and diplomacy, restore domestic trust, reassure Western partners, and “make Ukraine more resilient” (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times; New York Times, 01.02.26, Financial Times, 01.03.26)

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026

  • Zelenskyy deepened his reshuffle by proposing digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov as defense minister to leverage his “Drone Line” and digitization experience, and moving current defense minister Denys Shmyhal to become energy minister and first deputy prime minister. He also plans to make First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya first deputy head of the presidential office, while keeping him on the negotiating team, and is weighing new governors for five frontline or near‑frontline regions. (ISW, 01.03.26)

Monday, Jan. 5, 2026

  • Volodymyr Zelenskyy has removed Ukraine’s popular security service chief, deepening a reshuffle11 of the country’s security services. Vasyl Malyuk, who oversees the hunt for Russian agents and collaborators within Ukraine as well as sabotage and assassination operations in Russia, was forced to accept a new position within the country’s security service (the SBU) to oversee unconventional warfare. Malyuk fought to stay in post as head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) but relented at a meeting with the president. Yevhen Khmara will serve as interim SBU head. The change is part of the most significant shake-up of Ukraine’s security and defense agencies since Russia began its 2022 invasion. Zelenskyy has also appointed a new head of the military intelligence service [Lt. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko] and put new names forward for the posts of energy and defense ministers [Zelenskiy proposed [Mykhailo Fedorov, the digital transformation minister,] Defense Minister Shmyhal as Ukraine's new energy minister]. On Monday, he named Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s former finance minister, as an adviser on economic development. (Financial Times, 01.05.26, Reuters, Guardian, 01.05.26)
  • “In a bid to quell rising protests and reaffirm international confidence, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has unveiled a comprehensive anti-corruption package designed to strengthen accountability and transparency measures across Ukraine’s public sector. The move comes amid national demonstrations and growing scrutiny from international partners demanding tougher reforms against entrenched corruption.” (Brussels Watch, 01.05.26)

Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2026

  • President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has carried out the biggest wartime shake-up of Ukraine’s intelligence leadership, replacing SBU chief Gen. Vasyl Maliuk with Gen. Yevhen Khmara and moving military intelligence head Gen. Kyrylo Budanov to become presidential chief of staff while appointing Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko to lead HUR. Zelenskyy says the changes prepare Ukraine for a prolonged war if peace talks fail, but critics warn they risk disrupting successful covert operations and may be driven partly by politics, sidelining popular generals ahead of possible elections required under a draft peace deal. (New York Times, 01.07.26)
  • The United States should pressure Russia by "carrying out some sort of operation" to remove Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov from power, just like it did with Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, Zelenskyy said Wednesday. (MT/AFP, 01.07.26)

Thursday, Jan. 8, 2026

  • Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation says a National Guard lieutenant colonel illegally authorized “combat” payments totaling over 72 million hryvnias by falsely reporting that 317 State Special Transport Service troops were on the front line in Zaporizhzhia rather than on secondary defensive positions. He is charged with abuse of authority under wartime conditions, faces up to 12 years in prison, and is under house arrest as the state seeks to recover the funds. (Korrespondent.net, 01.08.26)

Friday, Jan. 9, 2026

  • Ukraine on Thursday awarded a bid to mine a major state-owned lithium deposit to investors that include a billionaire friend of President Trump, as his administration has indicated it is looking for investment opportunities in the war-torn country. The deposit, known as the Dobra lithium field, in central Ukraine, is one of the country’s largest reserves of lithium (New York Times, 01.09.26)
  • Ukrainian investigators have uncovered a scheme in which a supplier and complicit defense officials allegedly stole nearly 3 billion hryvnias in advance payments for defective or undelivered mines. A company with no prior experience in mine production won five contracts worth over 10 billion hryvnias to provide more than 360,000 sets of anti‑personnel and anti‑tank mines, received about 2.9 billion hryvnias in advances, then delivered munitions that often failed to detonate or never supplied them at all. Ten suspects are implicated: four members of the criminal group were detained, a fifth is wanted, and five defense‑sector officials face charges, with prosecutors seeking bail of 100–500 million hryvnias each. (Ukrainska Pravda, 01.09.26)
  • “The Supreme Anti-Corruption Court… found the assets that belonged to the family of the former acting head of the Kharkiv Regional Territorial Center for Staffing and Social Support (OTCK and SP) unjustified… The NACP found that during 2023–2024… his relatives bought BMW X6, 2023, and Toyota Camry Hybrid, 2022, with a total cost of UAH 4.85 million. "The NACP analyzed the income and expenses of the official's family and established the impossibility of acquiring the specified property at the expense of legal income," the message says. (Ukrainska Pravda, 01.09.26)
  • Ukrainska Pravda, citing a Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll, reports that 64% of Ukrainians now believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be a prosperous member of the EU, up from 56% in early October 2025 and 43% in May 2025. Over the same period, the share who think Ukraine will be a devastated country with major population outflow fell from 47% in May to 21% in December. Optimism has thus rebounded to slightly above late‑2024 levels, though still below 2022–23 highs. (Ukrainska Pravda, 01.09.26)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

  • President Putin on Monday expressed his condolences to Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon over the killing last week of a 10-year-old Tajik student at a school outside Moscow, describing the attack as an “act of terrorism.” (MT/AFP, 12.22.25)
  • Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev chose not attend an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in St. Petersburg on Monday due to his “busy work schedule,” Azerbaijani state media reported. President Putin welcomed leaders from seven other member states at the Hermitage Museum, where they reviewed cooperation in 2025 and discussed plans for the coming year. (MT/AFP, 12.22.25)

Tuesday, Dec. 23, 2025

  • A little-known Kazakh businessman, 35-year-old Shakhmurat Mutalip, has agreed terms to buy a 40% stake in Eurasian Resources Group from the Chodiev and Mashkevich families for $1.4 billion, potentially gatecrashing an earlier but stalled attempt by ERG chief executive Shukhrat Ibragimov—whose family holds another 20%—to acquire the same shares, in a high‑stakes reshuffle of ownership in the former ENRC miner that still partly belongs to the Kazakh state. (Financial Times, 12.23.25)

Wednesday, Dec. 24, 2025

  • President Trump said he will invite Kazakh President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev as guests to the 2026 G‑20 summit at his Doral resort in Miami, casting the meeting as a more exclusive forum while courting Central Asian partners to diversify U.S. access to critical minerals and deepen trade ties. (Bloomberg, 12.24.25)
  • A secret Trump‑era back channel with Belarus has seen dictator Alexander Lukashenko free more than 250 political prisoners, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski, in exchange for major U.S. concessions such as lifting potash sanctions and allowing Boeing support for Belavia—talks so personal that envoy John Coale even discussed supplying Lukashenko with the weight‑loss drug Zepbound—raising fears among European allies and Belarusian dissidents that Washington is rewarding one of the world’s most repressive regimes to set a template for eventual sanctions relief for Putin. (Wall Street Journal, 12.24.25)

 

IV. Quotable and notable

  • No significant developments.


Endnotes

  1. According to Trump’s chief of staff Susan Wiles’ interview with Vanity Fair in late 2025, Trump believes Putin’s goal is a complete Russian takeover of Ukraine. “Trump thinks [Putin] wants the whole country,” Wiles told this magazine.
  2. “If it expires, it expires,” Trump said of New START. “We’ll just do a better agreement,” he added, insisting that China, which has the fastest-growing arsenal in the world, should be incorporated in any future agreement. “You probably want to get a couple of other players involved also,” Trump told NYT.
  3. Sources used: Wall Street Journal, 01.09.26, Korrespondent.net, 01.09.26, Istories, 01.09.26, Ukrainska Pravda, 01.09.26.
  4. Sources used: Financial Times, 01.05.26, Reuters, 01.05.26, Guardian, 01.05.26.
  5. The New York Times explains that Russia’s Oreshnik is a nuclear‑capable intermediate‑range ballistic missile, likely a variant of the RS‑26 Rubezh, with an estimated range of about 3,410 miles and a speed around 8,000 mph (hypersonic). It carries multiple warheads that can release clusters of sub‑munitions. Jan. 9’s strike near Lviv was only the missile’s second known use after a 2024 attack on Dnipro and hit about 40 miles from Poland’s border, prompting European officials to call it a “grave threat” and “clear escalation.” Analysts say wreckage suggests a slimmer, shorter‑range design than the original Rubezh. (New York Times, 01.09.26)
  6. The Élysée’s wording on the possibility of direct talks between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin is striking and revealing. Paris welcomes what it interprets as Moscow’s readiness to talk, as signaled by Dmitry Peskov, and says it would be “welcome” for the Kremlin to give a public endorsement to such an initiative before deciding on the next steps, according to Russian political expert Tatiana Stanovaya, who lives in France. (RM, 12.22.25)
  7. Trump and Zelenskyy met over lunch in the opulent dining room at Mar-a-Lago, decorated with American and Ukrainian flags. They were flanked by their delegations; Trump was joined by his chief of staff, Susie Wiles; the deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller; Secretary of State Marco Rubio; Defense Secretary Pete
    Hegseth; Steve Witkoff, the U.S. negotiator; and Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner. (New York Times, 12.28.25)
  8. Also on Dec. 29 Trump held what the White House called a “positive” call with Putin to discuss efforts to end the war in Ukraine, a day after Trump’s Mar‑a‑Lago meeting with Zelenskyy produced no breakthrough but left both leaders saying a revised 20‑point peace plan is largely agreed even as Moscow continues to reject key elements, including limits on Ukraine’s post‑war army and its territorial stance. (Bloomberg, 12.29.25)
  9. Le Monde reports that Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev, involved in U.S.–Russia talks on Ukraine, was in Paris on Jan. 7 and was seen near Faubourg Saint‑Honoré. While the Élysée denied he visited Macron’s office, Korrespondent.net says sources claim he was received at the nearby U.S. Embassy, where a Ukrainian delegation was also holding meetings with American officials as Kyiv and Washington work to finalize a bilateral security guarantees document. (Korrespondent.net, 01.08.26)
  10. In the days since the U.S. raid in Venezuela, a network of Russian propaganda websites has been promoting a message that countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia should stop buying American military hardware, according to a firm that tracks the online activities. The websites, known as “Portal Kombat,” have also said that the U.S. seizure of Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan president, shows that the United States is unreliable and dangerous. (New York Times, 01.09.26)
  11. The shake‑up serves multiple aims: shoring up a fragile parliamentary majority, “strengthening defense, while projecting the image of Zelenskyy as a national leader and protector of Ukraine,” and positioning the president for either “a fourth year of grinding war or the fraught prospect of a negotiated peace,” including any eventual postwar election in which Budanov or former commander Valeriy Zaluzhny might otherwise emerge as strong challengers. (“Volodymyr Zelenskyy pulls potential rival into his team to shore up power,” Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 01.06.26.)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI was used in formatting and hyperlinking items in this product.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: A damaged high-voltage substation is seen after Russian air attacks on the energy sector in Odesa region, Ukraine, Tuesday, Jan. 6, 2026. (AP Photo/Nikoletta Stoyanova)

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