4 Things to Know

1. Ukraine's military says it's facing a growing problem of desertion, with experts estimating that 150,000 service members may be missing from their units, according to Amna Nawaz of PBS. Ukrainian soldiers “cite extreme fatigue caused by long deployments without rotation, anger at orders seen as suicide missions and forced mobilization,” according to Jack Hewson, also of PBS. “If, in 2022, 2023, we had one or two, maximum three people in the unit who became deserters, then, since 2024, there have been tens of thousands across the country. And this means that this is a systemic problem,” Ukrainian Chief Sgt. Volodymyr Tkach told PBS.
2. RM’s most recent analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (March 10–April 7 indicates that Russian forces gained 17 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (area equivalent to ¾ of Manhattan Island) during that period, according to the April 8 issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. During the prior four-week period (Feb. 10–March 10), Russia lost 57 square miles.
3. Russia’s Urals crude loaded at the Primorsk hub hit $116.05 a barrel on April 2—the highest Russian price in more than 13 years and nearly double the $59 assumed in Moscow’s 2026 budget, Bloomberg reported April 7. The value of Russia’s oil exports rose to $2.02 billion a week in the 28 days to April 5, the highest since June 2022, driven by the Iran war and a rebound in flows, according to Bloomberg.
4. “The ceasefire in Iran has reinforced views among both adversaries and the NATO alliance that President Donald Trump’s campaign against the Tehran regime marks a strategic setback, bolstering China and Russia while squandering American strengths, according to people familiar with the thinking across capitals in Europe and the Middle East,” Bloomberg reports. While Moscow and Beijing fear U.S. military and intelligence superiority, they have seen that it couldn’t force Iran’s capitulation, the unidentified people told Bloomberg. The last-minute two-week ceasefire, which was mediated by Pakistan and which J.D. Vance now seeks to save when he travels to Islamabad for talks with Iranian negotiators this weekend, will also likely further deter Russia from making concessions in Ukraine, according to the people interviewed by Bloomberg. That the Iran war has bolstered Vladimir Putin’s Russia follows from analysis in the past week by Robert Pape, Nicole Grajewski and Marc Bennetts. That the war has been a setback for Donald Trump’s team follows from analysis by Fareed Zakaria, Ravi Agrawal, Steven Erlanger, Emma Ashford and The Economist. However, Dennis Ross and John R. Bolton argue that Trump can still turn this into a win.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• Rosatom’s fuel division TVEL has delivered the first core load of VVER‑1200 fuel for Unit 3 of China’s Xudapu nuclear power plant in Liaoning province, marking the first Russian fuel shipment to that site. The assemblies were fabricated at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant under a contract covering fuel for Xudapu Units 3 and 4, both Generation III+ Russian‑design reactors; TVEL says it plans to supply initial loads for two additional VVER‑1200 units at Tianwan and Xudapu later this year. (Rosatom, 04.06.26)
• Ukraine is expanding cooperation with U.S. company Westinghouse, after a delegation of Ukrainian nuclear specialists inspected its Swedish fuel plant for Rivne NPP, UNIAN reported. The visit aimed to deepen cooperation and “contribute to the transition of Ukrainian energy from Russian nuclear fuel to Western technologies.” Rivne’s director Taras Tkach said the next step is an 18‑month fuel cycle and higher reactor output using new Westinghouse assemblies, which he called strategically important amid electricity shortages. (Korrespondent.net, 04.10.26)

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• North Korea is hosting China’s top diplomat for the first time in six years. That comes months after Kim Jong Un stood beside Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin at a military parade in Beijing, for what Wang Yi billed as a “historic meeting.” “China will successfully defend, consolidate and develop the China-DPRK friendship no matter how the international situation may change,” Wang said, referring to the North by an acronym for its official name. A meeting with Kim was possible during the two-day trip, Yonhap reported, signaling his warming ties with China, after pulling closer to Russia as a backer of Moscow’s war. (Bloomberg, 04.10.26)
• The New York Times says North Korea’s latest weapons tests – short‑range missiles with cluster and graphite warheads, new air‑defense systems and cheap high‑thrust engines – reflect lessons drawn from both Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Iran conflict. U.S. intelligence warns Pyongyang is gaining battlefield experience and technology from Moscow in exchange for arms and troops, deepening a Russia–China–North Korea alignment opposed to Washington and Seoul. (New York Times, 04.09.26)
• North Korea conducted a slew of tests of new armaments this week including an electromagnetic weapon system and an anti-aircraft missile, as it ramps up efforts to upgrade its conventional arms amid Donald Trump’s attacks on U.S. adversaries. With global attention focused on developments in the Middle East amid a fragile ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, the state-run Korean Central News Agency said Gen. Kim Jong Sik oversaw the tests conducted over three days from April 6 to April 8. Kim said “the electromagnetic weapon and carbon fiber bomb are special assets of strategic nature to be combined with and applied to various military means” in different spheres, according to the KCNA report. This type of weapon typically uses electromagnetic energy rather than explosives to disrupt or damage targets, especially electronics infrastructure. (Bloomberg, 04.08.26)
• Russia’s subsidized Moscow–Pyongyang air link has attracted “virtually no” tourists, Kommersant reports via Meduza. Nordwind flew only five of the 10 one‑way flights required under a 40.8‑million‑ruble subsidy, with most passengers described as technical “specialists.” Nearly 4,000 of the roughly 5,000 Russians who visited North Korea in 2025 still went via Vladivostok on Air Koryo. (Meduza, 04.07.26)

Iran and its nuclear program:

Sunday, April 5, 2026

• In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to destroy “every power plant and every other plant” in Iran, plus its bridges, if Tehran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz by April 7 evening, escalating pressure as behind‑the‑scenes ceasefire talks stalled. He dismissed concerns about civilian suffering, claiming Iranians “want us to do it,” while legal experts warned that broad attacks on civilian infrastructure to “send a message” would raise serious questions under international humanitarian law. (Wall Street Journal, 04.05.26)
• Trump revealed new details of the rescue of two U.S. airmen whose F‑15E was shot down over Iran, saying one pilot was recovered April 3 and a second, wounded aviator was later found hiding in a mountain crevice after a CIA deception campaign convinced Iranian forces the search had already succeeded. He declined to say whether U.S. intelligence believes Chinese or Russian air defenses helped down the jet, answering only, “Maybe they did, maybe they didn’t,” as he prepared a new Iran briefing and a meeting with NATO’s Mark Rutte amid fraying trans‑Atlantic ties. (Wall Street Journal, 04.05.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart on April 5 that the United States should abandon "the language of ultimatums" and return to negotiations with Tehran. (MT/AFP, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Russia and China on April 7 vetoed a resolution at the United Nations Security Council that called for countries to cooperate in taking defensive action to open the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has closed in response to U.S. and Israeli attacks. The move effectively blocked U.N. authorization for the use of military force to address the maritime crisis. (New York Times,  04.07.26) 
  • Russia and China jointly vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution that could have authorized force to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, even as Beijing privately pressed Tehran to accept a two‑week ceasefire with the U.S. and reopen the strait. Iranian officials say China, which buys almost all of Iran’s crude and has also underwritten Russia’s wartime economy, used its leverage to urge “flexibility,” reflecting Beijing’s dual role as Moscow’s partner and a key stakeholder in preventing a wider energy shock. (New York Times, 04.08.26)

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• The Kremlin on April 8 said it welcomed a last-minute ceasefire agreement between the United States, Israel and Iran, as the war risked further escalation amid threats by Trump to strike Iranian power plants and bridges if it did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz. “From the outset, we’ve stressed the necessity of de-escalating tensions as quickly as possible and a shift toward political and diplomatic talks,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters at a daily briefing. (MT/AFP, 04.08.26)
  • The ceasefire in Iran has reinforced views among both adversaries and the NATO alliance that Trump’s campaign against the Tehran regime marks a strategic setback, bolstering China and Russia while squandering American strengths, according to people familiar with the thinking across capitals in Europe and the Middle East. While Moscow and Beijing fear U.S. military and intelligence superiority, they have seen it couldn’t force Iran’s capitulation, the people said. The tensions in NATO, which culminated in Trump threatening to leave the alliance, have left lasting doubts over his commitment to its defense. The two-week ceasefire, mediated by Pakistan, will also dent Trump’s credibility as a negotiator and likely further deter Putin from making concessions in Ukraine, according to the people, who were granted anonymity to speak candidly about their assessments of the war conducted by their ally. (Bloomberg, 04.08.26) 

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, wrote on X that Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz is effectively a “nuclear weapon,” calling its closure a test whose “potential is inexhaustible.” He later added: “The Strait of Hormuz is closed again. The weapons are working,” underscoring how Moscow frames energy chokepoints as strategic deterrents comparable to nuclear arms. (Wall Street Journal live blog, 04.09.26)
• IMF chief Kristalina Georgieva warned that even with a durable Iran ceasefire, the global growth forecast will be cut from 3.3%, noting that oil and gas exporters outside the conflict zone will be “least affected” while importers suffer. The Wall Street Journal notes that high prices tied to Hormuz’s closure have already boosted revenues for producers such as Russia, even as they weigh on energy‑importing European economies that back Ukraine. (Wall Street Journal, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• The fate of the “frail” U.S.-Iran cease-fire will be shaped in Islamabad this weekend, where Trump is sending Vice President J.D. Vance, envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner for talks, Damian Paletta reports. Confusion persists over what is in Iran’s “10 points,” whether Hormuz is truly open and if Israel’s Lebanon campaign is covered. Vance’s role will be “fascinating,” as an antiwar voice and potential 2028 presidential contender. (Wall Street Journal, 04.10.26)
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed for the first time that Ukrainian forces have taken part in “real combat operations abroad,” using Ukrainian-made interceptor drones and electronic warfare systems to shoot down Iranian Shahed attack drones over “several” Gulf states hosting U.S. bases. He told the Financial Times that Ukrainian teams deployed across the Middle East have already delivered “positive” results, saying, “Did we destroy them? Yes, we did,” and that Ukrainian experts quickly helped strengthen local air defenses. Zelenskyy said Kyiv is receiving in return air-defense weapons, fuel and financial arrangements: “We help strengthen their security in exchange for contributions to our resilience.” (Financial Times, 04.10.26, RBC.ua, 04.10.26)
  • Zelenskyy said that Ukraine would receive financial, energy and technical support to defend its infrastructure in return for the help it’s given to nations in the Gulf to fend off Iranian drone attacks. (Bloomberg, 04.10.26)
• Russia condemned Israeli airstrikes in Beirut that killed more than 300 people and warned they “threaten to derail the emerging negotiation process,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement quoted by the Wall Street Journal. Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the attacks risk a renewal of “large-scale armed confrontation in the Middle East,” as U.S.-Iran cease-fire efforts remain fragile. (Wall Street Journal, 04.10.26)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Russia has returned 1,000 bodies of Ukrainian soldiers while receiving 41 Russian bodies in the latest exchange, echoing a similar swap in February (1,000 Ukrainian vs. 35 Russian). Kyiv’s POW coordination center has yet to comment. (Meduza, 04.09.26)
• Ukraine’s crisis committee set 14.6 bcm of gas in storage as its target before next winter, with 13.2 bcm defined as the “critical minimum” needed to survive a cold season and heavy Russian attacks, Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal said. Naftogaz and the GTS operator are now contracting imports and booking “vertical corridor” routes as Russia has already attacked Naftogaz infrastructure around 40 times this year. (Korrespondent.net, 04.09.26)

For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• RM’s most recent analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (March 10–April 7, 2026) indicates that Russian forces gained 17 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (area equivalent to ¾ of Manhattan Island) during that period, according to the April 8 issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. During the prior four-week period (Feb. 10–March 10, 2026), Russia lost 57 square miles. Additionally, according to ISW data, during the past week (March 31–April 7, 2026), Russia lost 1 square mile of Ukrainian territory. This contrasts with the 17 square miles Russian forced gained in the previous week of March 24–31, 2026. In the period of March 31–April 7, 2026, Russian forces made advances near six settlements, while Ukrainian forces cleared areas near five settlements and regained control near another settlement, according to Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState. (RM, 04.08.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• On April 3, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that Ukrainian Defense Forces cleared the area near Stepnohirsk, Novoselivka and Sichneve. (RM, 04.10.26)

Saturday, April 4, 2026

• On April 4, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pryvillia. (RM, 04.10.26)
• In Russia’s Rostov region, Gov. Yury Slyusar said one person was killed and four seriously wounded by a Ukrainian strike in Taganrog, where a logistics warehouse was also set ablaze; Moscow later reported that debris from an intercepted Ukrainian drone damaged a foreign‑flagged bulk carrier off Taganrog in the Azov Sea. A Ukrainian drone commander told Bloomberg that KuibyshevAzot, a major nitrogen‑fertilizer and explosives‑precursor plant in Tolyatti, Samara region, was also hit, though this has not been independently verified. Russia said it repelled 85 Ukrainian drones nationwide the same night, while Ukraine reported shooting down or suppressing 260 of 286 incoming Russian drones; one Russian strike on a market in Nikopol killed at least five people and wounded 19. (MT/AFP, 04.04.26, Bloomberg, 04.04.26)
• Marking the 1,500th day of the full-scale invasion, Russia launched a massive wave of air strikes across Ukraine during the night of April 3–4. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 286 drones, including around 200 Shahed drones. Ukrainian air defenses intercepted 260 of these, according to the air force, while 11 drones struck 10 locations and debris fell in six locations. Fourteen people were reported dead across Ukraine. (RFE/RL, 04.04.26)
• Zelenskyy says U.K. and Ukrainian intelligence now rate the front as Kyiv’s best in 10 months, while Ukrainian drones alone killed or seriously wounded nearly 34,000 Russian troops in March and overall air defenses neutralized about 89.9% of Russian missiles and drones. ISW notes Russian recruitment has lagged battlefield losses for four straight months, and Ukrainian counterattacks in southern sectors have forced Moscow to divert forces and may have disrupted its planned 2026 spring–summer offensive. (ISW, 04.03.26)

Sunday, April 5, 2026

• On April 5, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that Ukrainian Defense Forces regained control near Ambarne. (RM, 04.10.26)
• Russia’s key Baltic export hub Ust-Luga has resumed crude loadings after a shutdown since late March caused by Ukrainian drone attacks, with the Aframax tanker Jewel now loading. Flows from Ust-Luga and nearby Primorsk had been halted or disrupted as Kyiv targeted terminals to choke off Moscow’s oil revenues amid an Iran‑driven price spike. Russia’s Baltic ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk, handle roughly 40% of the country’s seaborne crude exports. (New York Times, 04.07.26, Bloomberg, 04.05.26)
• Ukrainian forces expanded their deep‑strike campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure with coordinated drone attacks on the Baltic export hub of Primorsk and Lukoil’s giant Norsi refinery in Nizhny Novgorod. Ukrainian drone commander Robert Brovdi said drones struck Primorsk and the NORSI/Norsi refinery (Russia’s fourth‑largest, about 340,000 bpd). Leningrad region governor Aleksandr Drozdenko first reported pipeline damage at Primorsk before revising his statement to say shrapnel had damaged a fuel reservoir, while regional officials in Nizhny Novgorod said two units at Norsi were hit and a fire broke out, with debris also damaging a nearby thermal power plant and residential buildings. Russia said 19 drones were downed over Leningrad region near Primorsk, where a tank leaked fuel, highlighting Kyiv’s continued effort to hit refineries and ports to squeeze Moscow’s export revenues. (RFE/RL, 04.05.26; Bloomberg, 04.05.26)
  • Russia’s fourth‑largest refinery, Lukoil’s NORSI plant in Nizhny Novgorod (≈320,000 bpd and the country’s No. 2 gasoline producer), has halted operations following a Ukrainian drone strike and fire on April 5, two industry sources told Reuters. The shutdown, expected to last at least until month’s end, deepens uncertainty in Russia’s energy sector as repeated Ukrainian attacks force refineries and Black Sea/Baltic export terminals offline. (Reuters, 04.07.26)
  • In the 13 days from March 22–23 to April 5, Ukraine hit at least eight major targets from Primorsk and Ust‑Luga on the Baltic to Ufa in Bashkortostan—spanning over 1,700 km—including multiple refineries and the Ust‑Luga and Primorsk export terminals, many more than once, exposing gaps in Moscow’s ability to shield critical infrastructure. (ISW, 04.05.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Ukraine’s General Staff say Ukrainian drones hit Novorossiysk’s Sheskharis terminal, igniting a “large‑scale fire” at Transneft berths, a claim backed by NASA FIRMS data and geolocated video, while Russian and independent reports indicate damage to a Caspian Pipeline Consortium mooring point and tanks at the same port. Ukrainian drone forces also report striking the Black Sea Fleet’s Kalibr‑armed frigate Admiral Makarov and the Sivash drilling platform after a previous hit on sister ship Admiral Essen. On the Baltic, Financial Times analysis finds repeated attacks on Primorsk and Ust‑Luga have destroyed an estimated $200mn of oil and cost roughly $970mn in lost revenue in a single week, slashing Ust‑Luga’s naphtha exports by about 70% and exposing air‑defense gaps that even Putin and Dmitry Peskov concede cannot “100%” protect key infrastructure. (ISW, 04.06.26; Bloomberg, 04.06.26; Financial Times, 04.06.26; Istories, 04.06.26; MT/AFP, 04.06.26)
  • Russian businesses are being forced to fund their own anti‑drone defenses—nets, towers and electronic warfare—after repeated Ukrainian strikes on refineries, ports and fertilizer plants, fueling anger among pro‑war bloggers and executives. One senior industrialist told the FT he has spent at least 1.5 billion rubles ($19 million) on protection, while reservists are now deployed in “mobile fire groups” to guard “critically important” sites, a system critics deride as “reservists with slingshots.” (Financial Times, 04.06.26)
• A Russian drone strike on the southern Ukrainian port city of Odesa killed at least three people, including a two‑year‑old girl and her mother, Ukrainian officials said, as Moscow intensified its air campaign using attack drones and glide bombs. Kyiv says more than 2,800 attack drones, 1,350 glide bombs and over 40 missiles were launched at Ukraine in the past week alone. (RFE/RL, 04.06.26, Washington Post, 04.06.26)
• The New York Times reports that Russia is trying to use spring foliage as a key asset in its renewed offensive, exploiting tree lines and fast‑growing groves along the Dnipro and in eastern Ukraine to conceal infantry from drones in a war now dominated by small foot assaults rather than armored thrusts. Ukrainian officers say the “greenery advantage” favors Moscow because it has more manpower, but constant drone surveillance and extensive minefields and fortifications still make major Russian breakthroughs unlikely. (New York Times, 04.06.26)
• The FSB says it detained a 1974‑born Russian citizen from Ladyzhyn, Vinnytsia region (Ukraine), accusing him of plotting to bomb a “high‑ranking representative” of the Kursk regional government on instructions from Ukraine’s military intelligence. (Mediazona, 04.06.26) 
• ISW cites Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” project as estimating the Defense Ministry recruited only about 940 contract soldiers a day in the first quarter of 2026, below the 1,100–1,150 needed to hit its annual target of 409,000. Roughly 24% of contract troops are under criminal investigation or conviction and ~40% of those are debtors; regions are hiking enlistment bonuses 50–80%, universities are told to send 2% of male students to the army, and governors are ordering firms to “select” workers for contracts. (ISW, 04.06.26)
• The governor of the northern Murmansk region confirmed April 6 that a Russian Navy general was killed in a plane crash in annexed Crimea last week. All 29 people on board an Antonov An-26 military transport plane were killed when it crashed into a cliff near the port city of Sevastopol on March 31. Murmansk region Gov. Andrei Chibis, speaking at a gathering of regional officials on April 6 morning, said Lt. Gen. Alexander Otroshchenko, who headed the mixed aviation corps of the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, had died in the plane crash. (MT/AFP, 04.06.26)
• Former CIA director David Petraeus said Russia “no longer has the upper hand” in Ukraine, noting that despite outnumbering and outgunning Kyiv and having an economy “10 or 12 times the size,” Russian forces have “achieved less than the Ukrainians” on the front over the past two weeks as Moscow’s mass drone, missile and glide‑bomb barrages fail to translate into territorial gains. (The Hill, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• On April 7, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Hryshyne and near Kotlynne. (RM, 04.10.26)
• Russia’s Defense Ministry said it intercepted 69 Ukrainian drones across Russia between April 6 night and April 7 morning. (MT/AFP, 04.09.26)
• Ukrainian and Russian drone attacks continued to inflict civilian casualties on both sides of the front. Authorities in Russia’s central Vladimir region said three people were killed in a Ukrainian drone strike on April 7. In Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk region, a Russian drone hit a municipal bus in the city of Nikopol, killing at least four passengers and wounding 16 others, according to local officials. (MT/AFP, 04.07.26; RFE/RL, 04.07.26)
• By September 2025, roughly 20% of Russia’s refining equipment had been destroyed or damaged, and Ukrainian officials estimate late‑March strikes caused over $500 million in storage‑tank damage and cut export revenues by some $745 million. (New York Times, 04.07.26) 

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• On April 8, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Petropavlivka and Stupochky. (RM, 04.10.26)
• A senior Ukrainian official told ISW that Russia’s 2026–2027 war plans still envision far‑reaching territorial gains well beyond Donetsk: seizing all of Donbas; creating “buffer zones” along the Kharkiv–Sumy–Chernihiv border; setting conditions to take the rest of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson; and ultimately pushing on Mykolaiv, Odesa and even from Transnistria into Vinnytsia. ISW notes Russia has failed to meet earlier objectives and still lacks the operational maneuver capability needed for such breakthroughs, but the plans confirm Moscow’s goals remain maximalist. (ISW, 04.08.26)
  • Commenting on talk of a Russian “buffer zone” in Vinnytsia from occupied Transnistria, Zelenskyy said he “does not see a threat there today” but stressed that “the Russians want to have a buffer zone along the entire border – not only their own, but also Belarus’s,” including Chernihiv and Sumy. The main danger, he said, is where Russian forces are massed: “Their main goal is unchanged – the Pokrovsk direction.” (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.10.26)
• ISW assesses that in Q1 2026 Russian forces suffered about 316 casualties per square kilometer gained in Donetsk, versus ~120 per sq. km across the theater in 2025. Kyiv now fields roughly 1.3 strike drones for every Russian one, with 32% of its fleet EW‑resistant fiber‑optic models (vs. 24% for Russia). Mid‑range strikes on drone launch sites and repeaters have prevented Russia from launching “up to 1,000” UAVs at once, forcing staggered salvos and degrading its long‑range strike campaign. (ISW, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• On April 9, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pishchane and Rodynske. (RM, 04.10.26)
• Ukraine’s HUR says it destroyed Slavyanin, Russia’s last rail ferry in the Kerch Strait and a key link in the “Kerch crossing” used to move fuel, ammunition and equipment to occupied Crimea, with a drone strike on the night of April 5–6. The ferry was previously damaged in March but remained afloat; HUR also hit port Kavkaz infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai. Debris from a Ukrainian drone downed in the southern Krasnodar region killed a man, local authorities said April 9. (RBC.ua, 04.09.26)
• Ukrainian forces now appear to have “achieved a drone advantage over Russian forces on the battlefield,” with over 11,000 combat drone missions per day and more than 150,000 verified targets struck in March alone, according to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. He reported “over 350 mid-range strikes,” including 143 logistics facilities and 52 command posts, as part of a campaign that is “impeding Russian advances across the theater” and undermining Kremlin claims of imminent Ukrainian collapse. (ISW, 04.09.26)
• Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces chief Maj. Robert “Magyar” Brovdi said his troops have destroyed nine Russian air-defense systems in occupied Ukraine since April 1, while drone interceptions jumped from 2,975 in January to 7,674 in March. (ISW, 04.09.26)
• The New York Times profiles Ukrainian start‑up Odd Systems, whose AI‑guided FPV “kamikaze” drones and Zerov interceptors are being used at scale against Russian troops, vehicles and Shahed‑type drones. Founder Yaroslav Azhnyuk, who once built Petcube gadgets for pets, now integrates image‑recognition and autopilot so drones can autonomously fly the last hundreds of meters. (New York Times, 04.09.26)
• “Ukraine's military says it's facing a growing problem of desertion. Experts estimate approximately 150,000 service members may be missing from their units as the war grinds through its fifth year,” Amna Nawaz of PBS reported. “Soldiers cite extreme fatigue caused by long deployments without rotation, anger at orders seen as suicide missions and forced mobilization,” Jack Hewson also of PBS reported. “What would … prompt [Ukrainian serviceman] Andriy's desertion were a series of catastrophic missions in Krasnohorivka in 2024, missions he says convinced him he could no longer trust his commanders,” according to Hewson. Chief Sgt. Volodymyr Tkach told PBS that “if, in 2022, 2023, we had one or two, maximum three people in the unit who became deserters, then, since 2024, there have been tens of thousands across the country. And this means that this is a systemic problem. … The reason is again very simple, mobilization, how it is carried out.” (PBS, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Russia attacked Ukraine overnight with 128 attack drones from five directions, including Oryol, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and occupied airfields in Crimea, Ukraine’s military said. About 85 were Shaheds; air defenses and EW units “shot down/suppressed” 113 drones, but 14 hit six locations and debris fell on seven sites. The Air Force warned that “the attack continues” and urged civilians to follow safety rules, ahead of a brief “Easter truce” announced by Putin for April 11–12. (RBC.ua, 04.10.26)
• A Ukrainian drone attack killed one person near the southern Russian city of Volgograd overnight, authorities said April 10. “Russia’s Defense Ministry said 57 Ukrainian drones were downed in the Volgograd region between April 9 night and early April 10 morning. The military said its air defense systems intercepted nine more drones in the region later on April 10. In the neighboring Rostov region, 54 drones were downed overnight and in the morning. Authorities said there were no injuries. (MT/AFP, 04.10.26)
• The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announces that last night, Ukrainian forces carried out drone strikes on two Russian drilling platforms located in the northern part of the Caspian Sea. Distance to Ukraine: around 1,000km. The two platforms in question are the ice-resistant stationary platform (LSP-1) at the Yuri Korchagin field and the ice-resistant stationary platform (LSP-2) at the V. Graifer field. (Status-6 X Account, 04.10.26)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Saturday, April 4, 2026

• Russia said debris from an intercepted Ukrainian drone damaged a foreign‑flagged bulk carrier off Taganrog in the Azov Sea, as both sides traded intensified drone strikes. The Rostov governor reported one dead and four injured in Taganrog, while a separate attack ignited a logistics warehouse. Ukraine says it shot down or suppressed 260 of 286 Russian drones overnight; a Russian drone strike on a market in Nikopol killed at least five people and wounded 19. (Bloomberg, 04.04.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• ISW notes that Western air-defense aid continues to complicate Russian strike campaigns: Sweden has pledged Tridon Mk2 truck‑mounted 40mm gun systems worth €400 million specifically to counter Shahed‑type drones, bolstering Ukraine’s ability to shoot down the UAVs Russia uses en masse against cities and energy infrastructure. (ISW, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• The EU has already trained over 86,000 Ukrainian soldiers and supplied about 2 million artillery rounds, with a new €150 billion loan scheme to help member states buy arms—steps explicitly designed to improve Ukraine’s ability to “kill Russian invaders more efficiently,” as The Economist puts it. (The Economist, 04.07.26) 

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• Two Libyan officials told AP that Ukrainian drone units, deployed under a covert Western‑backed deal with Tripoli, launched the March 3 sea‑drone attack on the Russian LNG tanker Arctic Metagaz from a military facility in Tripoli. The Russian‑flagged vessel, part of Moscow’s sanctions‑evading “shadow fleet,” was carrying 61,000 tons of LNG when multiple explosions and a fire crippled it in the Mediterranean; it has since drifted off Libya, highlighting how Ukraine is taking the war to Russian energy assets far from the Black Sea. (AP/Washington Post, 04.08.26)
• Russia’s Foreign Ministry said April 8 that it summoned the Japanese ambassador in Moscow to protest a Tokyo-based company’s investment in a Ukrainian drone maker. Terra Drone Corporation, a publicly traded company, announced last week that it would make a “strategic investment” in Amazing Drones, a Kharkiv-based firm that develops and manufactures interceptor drones. The Japanese company said it would launch a line of Terra A1 interceptor drones with Amazing Drones. Reuters reported that Terra A1 is designed to counter one-way attack drones that Russia has used widely in its war against Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry slammed the deal as “overly hostile and detrimental to our country’s security interests” due to “systematic” Ukrainian drone attacks in Russia. It also blamed Japan for “unprecedentedly low” bilateral relations. (MT/AFP, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Six F‑16s promised by Norway to Ukraine remain stuck at Sabena’s Belgian repair shop, with four airframes still in crates needing ~100 parts each and two trainers down for maintenance; a Ukrainian Air Force adviser says bringing them to combat readiness will take about a year once work starts. Norway sold its 32 best jets to Romania earlier, leaving Kyiv older airframes, prompting Norway’s defense committee chair to call the situation a “scandal.” (RBC.ua, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer told ITV there are multiple WhatsApp groups where world leaders coordinate, including on support for Ukraine, and named Finnish President Alexander Stubb as particularly active in corralling counterparts. (Meduza, 04.10.26, Guardian, 04.10.26)
• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has “in recent days” received “a new batch” of missiles for its Patriot air-defense systems, adding: “As of now, partners are delivering missiles for Patriot… and we continue to work with all partners so that air defense exists.” The remark came as he warned that the prolonged war in the Middle East could further undermine U.S. support for Ukraine amid shifting global priorities. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.10.26)
• Zelenskyy proposed a new “European‑centered security bloc” including Ukraine, the EU, the U.K., Turkey and Norway, arguing that “without Ukraine and Turkey, Europe will not have an army comparable to the Russian one.” With Trump repeatedly threatening to quit NATO and conditioning a U.S. security deal on Kyiv ceding remaining parts of Donetsk, Zelenskyy warned Europe must “take greater responsibility for its own defense.” (Intellinews, 04.10.26)
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told German counterpart Boris Pistorius that the next Ramstein-format meeting will be held on April 15 and will present an updated “Plan of war to compel Russia to peace,” Korrespondent reports. (Korrespondent.net, 04.10.26)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Swedish authorities boarded the EU‑sanctioned tanker Flora 1, believed to be part of Russia’s “shadow fleet,” on suspicion it caused an oil spill east of Gotland. The vessel, sailing under a Cameroonian flag, reportedly went dark on AIS after arriving in St. Petersburg on March 15 and re‑emerged leaving the port on April 1. ISW notes that stepped‑up EU actions against Russia’s covert shipping fleet — a key tool to move sanctioned crude — will further constrain Moscow’s ability to export oil and monetize high prices driven by the Iran war. (ISW, 04.03.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• A7, a sanctioned Russian crypto payments network founded in 2024 by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Șor and defense lender Promsvyazbank, is expanding into Africa as part of Moscow’s bid to build sanctions‑proof financial channels. The platform claims—without independent verification—to handle up to 19% of Russia’s foreign trade and has opened an office in Nigeria, announced a branch in Zimbabwe, and advertised for staff in Togo, as Russia pushes ruble‑based settlement systems and deepens trade and security ties with African states. (Financial Times, 04.06.26) 

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Dutch lender ING said April 7 that it is terminating an agreement to sell its Russian business after concluding the prospective buyer was unlikely to secure approval from Putin. (MT/AFP, 04.07.26)
• “Yale University was recognized as an undesirable organization at my request,” lawmaker Andrei Lugovoy said on the state television show Evening With Vladimir Solovyov. (MT/AFP, 04.07.26)

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• On April 8, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance appeared to imply that the resolution to the Russian invasion of Ukraine hinged on Kyiv making territorial concessions. “We’re talking about haggling at this point over a few square kilometers of territory in one direction or another,” he said.  Responding to Vance’s remark, Zelenskyy said that, “with all due respect, the vice president does not take part in negotiations between the U.S., Ukraine and the Russian Federation,” adding that if he did, officials would “more deeply understand what a ‘scrap’ is, what… the territory of Ukraine is, an independent territory of Ukraine.” (Guardian, 04.08.26, RBC.ua, 04.10.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Russia’s Prosecutor General has designated Stanford University an “undesirable” organization, and the Justice Ministry has added it to the official list. The same status was assigned to the U.S. Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and the German NGO “Crisis Simulation for Peace.” (Mediazona, 04.10.26)
• Italian group UniCredit has abandoned plans to sell its Russian subsidiary and instead is running down operations, Kommersant reports via Meduza. Retail business outside key cities is already closed, corporate lending is being wound up and staff cut, with management aiming to shrink the bank to a minimum and eventually surrender its license, rather than accept a heavily discounted sale and “voluntary” budget contribution. (Meduza, 04.10.26)

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

• In a wide-ranging interview with FA for an April 4 podcast, former CIA director William Burns was asked “How do you understand Putin's theory of success in Ukraine right now?” His answer was “I think he thinks he has convinced the White House that it's only a matter of time before he wins. And therefore we should negotiate a solution sooner rather than later as well. I just have not believed that. So I think it's a mistake for us to accept the Putin argument that the Ukrainians are going to lose sooner or later, so we should just negotiate an end to this now.” (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• In parallel to battlefield and diplomatic maneuvering, Zelenskyy is seeking far stronger U.S. security guarantees as part of any Ukraine–Russia peace deal, asking Washington to spell out how it would respond to a renewed Russian attack and to help fund an 800,000‑strong postwar army plus high‑end air defenses such as THAAD. He described a recent call with Trump envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff as “partner‑like,” saying Kyiv will now insert detailed U.S. guarantee demands into draft texts as U.S.‑brokered talks remain frozen by the Iran war. (Bloomberg, 04.03.26) 

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has passed a proposal through U.S. intermediaries for a mutual “energy truce,” under which both sides would halt strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure if Russia stops attacking Ukraine’s grid. He linked the offer to Kyiv’s intensified drone campaign against Russian oil facilities at Ust‑Luga, Novorossiysk and elsewhere, arguing that every extra dollar Russia earns from the Iran‑driven oil surge “goes to war” and must be curbed. (Meduza, 04.06.26)
  • Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk has “partially resumed oil and fuel loadings” at the Sheskharis terminal after suspending operations following a Ukrainian drone attack that ignited fires, two sources told Reuters. Tanker loading has restarted “from one berth only,” with a single 80,000‑ton cargo due to depart Friday, and the post‑strike schedule is expected to be “trimmed.” (Reuters, 04.10.26) 

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has proposed, via U.S. mediators, a mutual Easter halt to strikes on energy infrastructure if Russia will stop attacking Ukraine’s grid, but he doubts Moscow will agree while it profits from Iran‑driven oil prices. The Washington Post notes Kyiv’s long‑range drones are “significantly damaging” Russian export capacity and exploiting overstretched air defenses, even as Russia responds with mass drone and missile barrages and deadly strikes on civilian targets such as buses and apartment blocks. (Washington Post, 04.07.26)
• ISW notes Zelenskyy has again offered Russia an Orthodox Easter ceasefire and a reciprocal halt to energy‑infrastructure strikes—via U.S. intermediaries—while Moscow continues to reject any truce short of Ukrainian capitulation. Washington is also working with Kyiv on formal security guarantees that would accompany any moratorium on attacks, but ISW assesses Russia is highly unlikely to accept, given its current advantage from high oil prices. (ISW, 04.07.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a brief Orthodox Easter ceasefire and are preparing a major prisoner‑of‑war exchange, offering a rare 32‑hour pause in a war now in its fifth year even as broader peace talks remain stalled. The Kremlin said Putin ordered Russian forces to halt combat operations from 4 p.m. Moscow time on April 11 through the end of April 12 and “assumed” Kyiv would follow suit; Zelenskyy, who had earlier proposed an Easter truce, said Ukraine would “act accordingly” and called for an Easter “free from threats and real progress toward peace,” while warning Russia should not resume attacks afterward. Moscow and Kyiv are also nearing agreement on a “significant” POW swap on the eve of Easter, following a U.S.‑ and UAE‑mediated exchange of 500 prisoners each last month and a smaller swap alongside a 30‑hour Easter truce in 2025. Both sides accuse the other of having violated last year’s holiday pause, and officials and analysts caution that even if this ceasefire holds at the tactical level, it is unlikely to unlock longer‑term arrangements while Washington’s focus remains on the Iran war. (Meduza, 04.09.26; New York Times, 04.09.26; Bloomberg, 04.09.26; RFE/RL, 04.10.26; MT/AFP, 04.10.26) 
• Zelenskyy said the Iran–U.S. cease-fire “opens a window” to resume Ukraine peace talks but warned it must yield progress “before summer, when campaigning starts in earnest” for U.S. midterms, after which Washington will be “even more focused on its internal processes.” He said unspecified “partners” asked Kyiv to “scale back strikes” on Russian refineries to ease energy prices and that the U.S. has a “domestic political deadline” for the talks. (New York Times, 04.09.26)
• Zelenskyy said a new three‑way meeting with Russia and the U.S. on ending the war is expected “soon,” with formats under discussion including U.S. envoys visiting Kyiv and then Moscow separately. He stressed unresolved issues around funding an 800,000‑strong postwar army, securing advanced air defenses, and, crucially, how Washington would respond if Russia attacks again. (Korrespondent.net, 04.09.26)
• Zelenskyy criticized U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff for visiting Moscow five times but never Kyiv, arguing they “spent too much time” with Putin to truly grasp Russia’s aims, and warned Donbas concessions would only whet the Kremlin’s appetite for Dnipro and Kharkiv. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.09.26) 

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Ukraine’s chief negotiator Kyrylo Budanov says he sees “huge progress” toward a possible peace deal with Russia and does not think a settlement “will take much time,” arguing that both sides are moving away from earlier “maximalist positions” as Moscow feels the financial strain of “trillions” of rubles in war costs. In interviews with Bloomberg and Ukrainian media, Budanov said Russia “understands the war must end,” but acknowledged that no final decision has been made on territorial compromises, calling Donbas “the most difficult question” while noting that both sides now “clearly understand the limits of what is acceptable.” He stressed that the U.S.-mediated process, paused by the Iran war, is still alive: Ukraine expects a U.S. delegation “plus or minus a week after Easter” to resume talks, and Kyiv maintains direct contacts with Moscow focused on issues such as a large prisoner exchange around Easter. (Bloomberg, 04.10.26; Meduza, 04.10.26; Korrespondent.net, 04.10.26; Ukrainska Pravda, 04.10.26)
  • European defense stocks slumped on April 10 as a senior Ukraine official signaled progress toward a peace deal with Russia, while construction firms rose on bets that a ceasefire could trigger a post-war rebuilding boom. A Goldman Sachs Group Inc basket of defense shares slid as much as 5.1% after Kyrylo Budanov, a top aide to Zelenskyy, said that a resolution to the war may not take long to achieve. (Bloomberg, 04.10.26)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• The EU’s top military officer, Gen. Seán Clancy, says one of his three priorities has been “clamping down on Russia’s shadow fleet,” alongside improving drone defenses and military mobility, underscoring how EU military planning increasingly targets Moscow’s sanctions‑busting oil logistics and long‑range strike capabilities. Clancy argues that what will deter Vladimir Putin “is not our strategies or policies” but their implementation, highlighting EU plans to create a “military Schengen” by 2027 so large forces can cross borders in three days instead of more than a month, and to multiply spending on military mobility tenfold in the 2028–34 budget. (The Economist, 04.07.26)
• European polling now ranks the U.S. as a greater perceived threat than China or Iran, with only Russia viewed as more dangerous. (Wall Street Journal, 04.07.26)

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• The Wall Street Journal reports the White House is weighing a plan to “punish” NATO members that opposed or limited support for Trump’s Iran war by shifting U.S. troops and possibly closing bases in countries deemed unhelpful, such as Spain or Germany, while rewarding Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Greece with more forces. With about 84,000 U.S. troops in Europe, a redistribution would move additional American units closer to Russia’s borders, simultaneously alarming Moscow and deepening rifts inside the alliance even as Trump continues to muse about quitting NATO altogether. (Wall Street Journal, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• After meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump again blasted the alliance but stopped short of announcing a U.S. withdrawal, the Washington Post says, even as European leaders fear his threats mainly benefit Vladimir Putin. Trump’s repeated questioning of Article 5 and earlier talk of seizing Greenland have already spurred a European rearmament drive and raised doubts about whether Washington would defend NATO territory against Russian aggression. (Washington Post, 04.09.26)
  • Rutte said NATO was moving from an “unhealthy co-dependence” between Europe and the U.S. and was becoming a “transatlantic alliance grounded in true partnership,” after Trump criticized the bloc over the Iran war.” (Bloomberg, 04.09.26)
• Britain and its allies say they monitored and deterred a covert Russian submarine operation targeting critical undersea cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic for more than a month, exposing what officials describe as GUGI‑run “nefarious activity” under cover of the Iran war. Defense Secretary John Healey said a Royal Navy frigate, tanker, helicopters, RAF P‑8 aircraft and Norwegian assets tracked three submarines—an Akula‑class attack boat used as a decoy and two deep‑sea spy subs—“24/7” north of the UK, dropping sonar buoys to signal that their movements were no longer covert and warning Moscow that any attempt to damage infrastructure “will not be tolerated and will have serious consequences.” London and Oslo say the mission shows Russia is refining its ability to map and potentially sabotage Western subsea networks in a future conflict, even as the UK faces U.S. criticism for not shifting more forces to the Iran theater. (Financial Times, 04.09.26; New York Times, 04.09.26; Wall Street Journal, 04.09.26; Washington Post/AP, 04.09.26) 
  • [A] satellite image [shows] Russian naval base Olenya in the High North, along with their spy ship Yantar and specialist GUGI submarines before they departed port for U.K. waters. These vessels are designed to survey underwater critical infrastructure during peacetime, then sabotage in conflict. In response to nefarious activity by Russian GUGI submarines and an Akula Class submarine, the Defense Secretary deployed our Armed Forces to track and deter any malign activity by these vessels. We worked in partnership with Norway and other allies responding to increased Russian activity in the Atlantic, north of the U.K. The Akula Submarine subsequently retreated home having been closely tracked throughout and we continued to monitor the two GUGI submarines, in and around wider U.K. waters. Our Armed Forces left them with no doubt that they were being monitored, that their movements were not covert as Putin planned and that their attempted secret operations had been exposed. (UK MOD X Account, 04.09.26)
• Majorities of individuals polled in six countries—that are both NATO and EU members—in March said they would “definitely” or “probably” support sending their country's military to defend a NATO member country or an EU member country when either is attacked by a foreign power, according to Politico. In Germany, 54% said they would definitely support rushing to the defense of a NATO country that's under attack while 40% would probably do so. Some 23% of Germans (highest share of the polled six countries) said they would take up arms and fight to defend their country against an attack by a foreign power, while 44% would support such defense in a non-combat role, according to the March 2026 poll cited by Politico. This contrasts with a August 2025 poll of Germans by Forza, in which only 16% of Germans said they would “definitely” take up arms to defend their country in the event of war while another 22% said they would “probably. "It should be noted that levels of support for Ukraine varied significantly in the March 2026 poll of the six countries (Poland, Spain, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy). While 42% of Italian respondents believe there is too much of such support, 42% of Spanish respondents believe there is not enough of support for Ukraine, according to Politico. Last, but not the least, in four of the six countries polled in March 2026 (in Spain, Italy, Belgium and France) those who view U.S. as a threat outnumber those who view U.S. as a partner or a close ally. Only 12% of those polled in these six countries saw America as a close ally while 36% saw it as a threat. By contrast, China was seen as a threat by 29% of those polled across the six countries, according to Politico. In all, of the six countries, majorities view Russia as a threat (70% of all respondents). (RM, 04.09.26) 
• A new Info Sapiens poll for Kyiv’s New Europe Center finds 68.9% of Ukrainians still support NATO membership, but only 54.7% say they trust the Alliance, while 41.5% do not—up from 32.6% distrust in 2024. Ukrainians fault NATO for “insufficient” and slow help and for the fact that “the war still continues,” even as over 80% of all Western military aid flows through NATO channels. (Eurointegration/Ukrainska Pravda, 04.09.26)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• In a call with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Russia’s Sergei Lavrov framed the Iran conflict as “unprovoked aggression by the United States and Israel” and discussed tightening Russia‑China coordination at the UN Security Council, stressing their “converging approaches” to opposing Western initiatives on Iran. Moscow says it and Beijing will continue close coordination in New York to block any resolutions that could endorse the use of force or legitimize further strikes on Tehran. (Russian Foreign Ministry, 04.05.26)
• Authorities in China have signaled that they are ready to extend a visa waiver program for Russian citizens by one more year, Russia’s Foreign Ministry told the pro-Kremlin newspaper Izvestia on Monday. In September, Beijing lifted visa requirements for Russian passport holders as part of a one-year trial program, allowing them to visit China for 30 days without a visa for business, tourism, family visits and educational exchanges. Putin later signed an executive order temporarily waiving visa requirements for Chinese nationals as a reciprocal measure. Both programs are set to run until Sept. 14. (MT/AFP, 04.06.26)

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

• In a wide-ranging interview that William Burns gave to FA for an April 4 podcast, the former CIA director discussed what his interviewer described as “moment in the fall of 2022 when all the reporting suggests that people within the administration were pretty acutely concerned about nuclear use” by Russia. “I think our judgment at the time was that if a situation emerged in which the Ukrainian advance continued at a rapid rate and put at risk Putin's grip on Crimea, that would be a circumstance in which he'd [Putin] at least consider the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons,” Burns explained. “We didn't believe that there was a high likelihood that his grip on Crimea was going to be put at risk then, just because the Ukrainians, thanks to their courage and innovativeness, had made huge progress. But also they needed to regroup as well. And the Russians had begun to use their head and pull back across the Dnipro to more defensible positions. So I didn't think there was a high likelihood that that circumstance was going to emerge,” Burns recalled. (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26) 
• The Kremlin is using its foreign‑intelligence service SVR to push a new nuclear narrative, ISW reports, falsely claiming unnamed EU leaders are discussing building independent European nuclear weapons and theatrically “warning” Washington. ISW assesses this as part of a broader disinformation effort to drive wedges between the U.S. and EU and to paint Europe as acting against U.S. nuclear interests, echoing earlier SVR fabrications about supposed Western plans to transfer “dirty bombs” or nuclear weapons to Ukraine. (ISW, 04.08.26)

Counterterrorism:

• A man recently sentenced to life in prison over financing the Crocus City Hall terror attack has died by suicide in a Moscow pretrial detention center, the city’s prison service told Russian media. REN‑TV identified him as Yakubdzhoni Davlatkhon Yusufzoda, convicted of transferring money to support the gunmen’s stay before the March 2024 massacre and sending additional funds to one perpetrator afterward. Authorities say resuscitation efforts failed and an internal probe is under way. (Mediazona, 04.06.26)
• A Grozny court has formally designated the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria a terrorist organization and banned 29 of its units active across 14 European countries from operating in Russia. The FSB says Ichkerian detachments fighting for Ukraine have carried out “sabotage and terrorist operations” in Belgorod and Kursk regions and killed Russian soldiers and civilians. Russia’s Supreme Court had already labeled the Ichkeria government‑in‑exile “extremist” and “terrorist” in 2024. (Meduza, 04.07.26)

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

Saturday, April 4, 2026

• European investigators are probing whether a new, previously unknown group calling itself Ashab al-Yamin—which claimed arson and bomb attacks on synagogues, Jewish schools and U.S. bank offices in the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands—is in fact an Iranian intelligence “project” modeled on Russian-style hybrid warfare. Analysts say the group appears to recruit “single‑use agents” online for a few hundred euros, mirroring techniques Russia has used in Europe to sow confusion and fear while preserving plausible deniability. (Financial Times, 04.04.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Russia suffered another major outage of online services on April 6, with users across the country reporting failures in fixed internet from Rostelecom, banking apps and payment systems, state portals, mobile operators, streaming platforms and even the outage-tracking site Sboy.rf. It follows a similar nationwide disruption on April 3 that industry sources linked to an overloaded state blocking system (TSPU) struggling with “multiple blocking rules,” amid an intensified campaign to filter VPN and messaging traffic. (Istories, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Roskomnadzor says it faced record DDoS volumes in late February and early March, claiming attacks jumped from an average of 350 a week (about 23 targeting the watchdog itself) to 949 in the week of February 26–March 4 after reports of a looming Telegram ban. Telecoms and hosting providers were hit most often, the regulator says, touting its National DDoS Countermeasures System even as Telegram became unusable for many Russians without circumvention tools. (Meduza, 04.07.26) 

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• U.S. officials say the FBI and Justice Department have disrupted the American arm of a GRU cyber operation dubbed “Operation Masquerade,” in which Russia’s Unit 26165 (APT28/Fancy Bear) hijacked TP‑Link home and office routers in at least 23 states. The hackers redirected DNS traffic to Russian servers to harvest unencrypted passwords, authentication tokens, emails and other sensitive data from devices on the same networks, using “weaponized routers” for espionage against military, government and critical infrastructure targets. Court‑authorized actions remotely hardened compromised routers, but the FBI is urging Americans to reset and update their devices. (Boston Globe, 04.08.26)
• Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre warned that Russia’s GRU hacking unit APT28 (“Fancy Bear”) has been compromising TP‑Link and MikroTik routers in the UK, hijacking DNS traffic to route users covertly through GRU‑controlled servers and steal passwords and authentication tokens. Germany’s BfV says similar attacks hit German users, underscoring a shift toward exploiting widely used consumer networking gear. (Financial Times, 04.08.26)
• Ukraine’s SBU, working with the FBI, Polish counterintelligence and EU law enforcement, says GRU hackers from unit 26165 (APT28/Fancy Bear) have been exploiting vulnerable home and office Wi‑Fi routers worldwide since 2024, rerouting traffic through GRU‑controlled DNS servers to steal passwords, auth tokens and even SSL‑protected email. The operation, which targeted Ukrainian military, officials and defense workers in particular, was disrupted by seizing over 100 servers and wresting hundreds of routers in Ukraine from GRU control. (Istories, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Hackers connected to Russia’s military intelligence agency snuck into thousands of Internet routers used in homes and offices worldwide and secretly monitored e-mail traffic and website log-ons and passwords for months, authorities said. Underscoring concern about the scope of the hack, which experts said was in use for much of late 2025, law enforcement agencies in several countries released simultaneous advisories this week, warning people to check settings on their own routers. Russian hackers “compromised routers in the U.S. and around the world, hijacking them to conduct espionage,” Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division, said in a statement. According to U.S. computer giant Microsoft, the Forrest Blizzard hackers broke into 5,000 consumer devices at 200 organizations beginning in August 2025. They tweaked Domain Name System (DNS) settings on the routers, allowing them to collect and monitor any communications passing through. (RFE/RL, 04.09.26)
• The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre warned that Russia’s APT28/GRU Unit 26165 has been hijacking TP‑Link and MikroTik routers in Britain, using DNS‑hijacking to reroute traffic through malicious servers and steal passwords and authentication tokens; Germany’s BfV says similar attacks hit German users. The campaign appears “opportunistic,” casting a wide net before focusing on high‑value intelligence targets, and comes as the U.S. FCC moves to ban new foreign‑made consumer routers over supply‑chain risks. (Financial Times, 04.09.26) 

Energy exports from CIS:

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Russia’s oil tax take in March fell 48% year‑on‑year to 494.9 billion rubles, with total oil-and-gas budget revenues down 43% to 617 billion rubles, as taxes were calculated on February Urals prices below $45 a barrel—far under the $59 assumed in the 2026 budget. Bloomberg notes the squeeze widened the deficit just before the Iran war and Hormuz closure drove Urals above $120 a barrel to India, setting Moscow up for a sharp revenue rebound and potentially higher defense spending from April. (Bloomberg, 04.03.26)

Sunday, April 5, 2026

• Serbian military and police officers have found a cache of highly powerful explosives not far from a pipeline that carries Russian natural gas from Turkey to Hungary, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said on April 5. (RFE/RL, 04.05.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry rejected Hungarian hints that Kyiv was behind explosives found near the TurkStream/Balkan Stream gas pipeline in Serbia, calling it a Russian false-flag meant to sway Hungary’s elections. After Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said charges were discovered hundreds of meters from the line feeding Russian gas to Hungary, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó claimed the incident fit a pattern of Ukraine trying to cut Europe off from Russian energy and even blamed Kyiv for Nord Stream. A former Hungarian intelligence officer and opposition leader Péter Magyar instead suggested the Serbia episode was staged to benefit Viktor Orbán. (Meduza, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Urals crude loaded at Primorsk hit $116.05 a barrel on April 2—the highest Russian price in more than 13 years and nearly double the $59 assumed in Moscow’s 2026 budget—with Novorossiysk cargoes at $114.45, Bloomberg reports, citing Argus. The discount to Dated Brent has shrunk sharply, and Urals delivered to India now trades at a premium to Brent. Bloomberg notes that Ukraine’s escalating strikes on Russian export terminals and refineries—especially on the Baltic coast, which handles ~40% of seaborne crude—are partly offsetting the Iran‑driven price windfall by disrupting loadings and trimming commodity revenues, highlighting the tension between record crude prices and damaged infrastructure in Russia’s war‑strained energy sector. (Bloomberg, 04.07.26)
• The Kremlin says “a huge number” of countries are now seeking Russian oil and gas as the Iran war and Hormuz closure deepen a “grave” global energy crisis, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov boasting that Moscow is negotiating new deals that “best suit our interests” and can swiftly shift supplies away from Europe if EU buyers don’t want them. Despite surging demand, Russia may be forced to cut oil output by around 1 million barrels a day—about a fifth of its export capacity—because Ukrainian drone strikes on ports, pipelines and refineries have choked off key routes, Reuters notes, even as Asian buyers from Vietnam to Sri Lanka “line up” for discounted barrels. (Reuters, 04.07.26)

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• Russia is earning more from its oil exports than at any time since the early weeks of the Ukraine war, as soaring prices and an uptick in flows raise the value of shipments to the most since June 2022. War in the Middle East has driven global oil prices to multiyear highs and bolstered demand for Moscow’s barrels after Tehran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. That has trapped more than 12 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude exports in the Persian Gulf, and helped to drain Russian volumes stored at sea as refiners scramble for alternative supplies. Still, the Kremlin’s own war chest is being denied the full benefit of elevated prices by the lingering impact of Ukrainian drone strikes on export ports on its Baltic and Black Sea coasts. And a two-week ceasefire in the Iran conflict, announced on Tuesday night, has sent oil prices tumbling. That may cut Moscow’s income if the truce holds and oil is able to flow through Hormuz again. (Bloomberg, 04.08.26)
• The value of Russia’s oil exports rose to $2.02 billion a week in the 28 days to April 5, the highest since June 2022, driven by the conflict in the Middle East and a rebound in flows. (Bloomberg, 04.08.26) 

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Istories, citing Semafor and Russian Finance Ministry data, says high oil prices and a U.S. sanctions waiver are giving the Kremlin roughly an extra $150 million a day in oil income, with Urals rising from $77 a barrel in March to about $115 in early April and weekly export revenue hitting $2.02 billion. Yet March oil‑gas budget receipts were still down 45% year‑on‑year, and the Q1 deficit already exceeds 120% of the full‑year plan. (Istories, 04.09.26)

• The U.S. plans to extend its temporary waiver on sanctions for Russian oil loaded before March 12, as well as for certain Iranian cargoes, to ease the Iran‑driven energy shock, former Treasury and State officials told Semafor, per Meduza. While officials call the move largely “symbolic,” high prices mean Moscow’s budget revenues from energy exports are set to rise sharply. (Meduza, 04.09.26)

• The Daily Telegraph reports that two Russian “shadow fleet” tankers, Universal and Enigma, transited the English Channel on April 8 under escort from Black Sea Fleet frigate Admiral Grigorovich, despite UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s threat to detain such ships in British waters. Another two tankers passed east the same day. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov later justified naval escorts by citing “piracy” against Russian economic interests and vowed Moscow would take measures to protect its sanctioned oil shipments. (Meduza, 04.09.26)
• Russia is seeking to leverage a global natural gas supply crunch to lure energy-starved South Asia into purchasing shipments from its U.S.-sanctioned facilities, according to people familiar with the matter. The shipments were being offered at a 40% discount to spot prices last week via little-known intermediary companies based in China and Russia, said the people, who asked not to be named as they aren’t authorized to speak with the media. The sellers said that they could provide paperwork to make it appear that the shipments originated from non-Russian sources, like Oman or Nigeria, the people said. Bloomberg News wasn’t able to confirm whether any of the shipments were purchased. (Bloomberg, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Axios reports that the Iran war has triggered an “unprecedented energy shock” in which physical oil prices are far higher than headline futures, masking the severity of the disruption. Dated Brent, a key physical benchmark, hit a record $144 per barrel this week even as Brent futures hover around $95–100, despite roughly 10 million barrels per day of Gulf output being sidelined by the closure of Hormuz. Analysts say this disconnect has lulled markets and politicians into a “benign” view of the crisis, even as import‑reliant Asian states ration fuel and producers like Russia reap windfall revenues from scarce physical barrels. Futures haven't approached 2008's $147 record, or even hit the roughly $122 peak after Russia attacked Ukraine—a crisis that took comparatively tiny amounts of oil off the market. (Axios, 04.10.26) 
• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has made “significant progress” repairing the Druzhba oil pipeline, which carries Russian crude to Hungary and Slovakia, and pledged to finish work by the end of spring. The line has been idle since January; Kyiv blames a Russian drone strike, while Budapest and Bratislava suspect sabotage and are angered that Ukraine has for weeks blocked EU inspectors’ access, fueling a major spat with Viktor Orbán ahead of Hungary’s April 12 election. (Meduza, 04.10.26)
• The FT reports EU imports of Russian LNG from Novatek’s Yamal project rose 17% year‑on‑year in Q1 2026 to 5 million tons, with 69 of 71 cargoes (97%) landing in EU ports and an estimated €2.88 billion paid by member states. The surge comes as Qatari supplies are choked by the Iran war and Hormuz closure, even as Brussels sticks to a phased ban on Russian LNG by 2027—underscoring how Europe’s short‑term energy crunch is still feeding Kremlin revenues. (Financial Times, 04.10.26)
• BP’s 19.75% stake in Rosneft sits uneasily with CEO Bernard Looney’s vow to produce less oil, as Igor Sechin presses ahead with the $134 billion Vostok Oil project, designed to tap “an estimated 6 billion tons of crude” and export 100 million tons a year. BP has exempted Rosneft from its emissions pledge and, Henry Foy warns, may struggle to rebrand as green while its “strategic partner” digs up the Arctic. (Financial Times, 04.10.26)
• Gazprom Neft’s net profit fell to 246 billion rubles in 2025, a 49% drop from 479.5 billion in 2024, marking a third consecutive year of declining profits, iStories notes. Analysts have linked falling Gazprom-group revenues to the loss of the European market and higher mineral extraction taxes. (iStories, 04.10.26)
• The Financial Times notes Starmer has drawn one of his sharpest parallels yet between Trump and Putin, saying both have driven up UK energy prices and using that criticism to push a domestic agenda of accelerating renewables. Despite recent tensions and Trump’s public mockery of him, the two leaders spoke Thursday about Iran and Hormuz, with a UK spokesman saying they agreed efforts must now focus on getting shipping moving again “as quickly as possible.” Starmer added he is “fed up” that British families’ energy bills “go up and down… because of the actions of Putin or Trump,” arguing only a faster shift to renewables can give the UK true energy independence. (Meduza, 04.10.26; Guardian, 04.10.26, Financial Times, 04.10.26) 

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev, who also heads the Russian Direct Investment Fund, arrived in the U.S. at the head of a delegation “focused strictly on economic affairs,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, stressing that “Dmitriev is not engaged in negotiations on Ukraine” and that the trip “does not constitute a resumption of negotiations.” His repeated visits for sanctions‑related talks have “not yet led to tangible results.” His comments followed a Reuters report that Dmitriev was discussing a peace deal for Ukraine with members of the Trump administration. The trip comes days before Washington must decide whether to extend sanctions relief on Russian oil, after a 30‑day waiver for countries to buy stranded Russian oil that followed a March 9 Trump–Putin call and a previous Dmitriev visit on the energy crisis. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.10.26, The Moscow Times, 04.10.26, Reuters, 04.09.26) 

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Alarmed by a surge of foreign disinformation over the Iran war, the Trump administration is scrambling to rebuild parts of the U.S. anti‑propaganda apparatus it dismantled in 2025, when it shut down or gutted units that had exposed Russian and Chinese influence campaigns. A new State Department cable signed by Secretary Marco Rubio orders all embassies to push back harder against hostile narratives online—explicitly invoking Russian, Chinese and Iranian propaganda—while limited broadcasting by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is being restored under court pressure. (New York Times, 04.06.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Russia’s Federal Security Service detained a former freelance journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in eastern Siberia on charges of treason. The individual allegedly used the Telegram messaging app to supply information to Ukraine’s SBU security service that was “used to conduct computer attacks” and “temporarily hampered the ability of regional authorities to fulfill their duties,” the FSB, as the agency is known, said. (Bloomberg, 04.09.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Saturday, April 4, 2026

• Telegram founder Pavel Durov said Russia’s latest effort to throttle VPNs and clamp down on Telegram triggered a nationwide banking outage, briefly making cash “the only payment method.” Bloomberg reports that attempts to filter VPN traffic appear to have overloaded Roskomnadzor’s systems; at the same time, Apple Store payments were cut off after officials asked carriers to block top‑ups, and domestic platforms are being pushed to lock out VPN users or face new fees and sanctions from April 15. (Bloomberg, 04.04.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Russia’s largest business lobby said April 6 it is ready to work with the government on a windfall tax to help plug a widening budget deficit driven by soaring wartime spending. Alexander Shokhin, head of the pro-Kremlin Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), said he raised the idea during a closed-door meeting with President Vladimir Putin and business leaders last month. (MT/AFP, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• New-build housing prices in Moscow and its region jumped about 28% year-on-year in March 2026 (to 435,300 rubles per sq. m on average), while sales of primary-market flats collapsed 41%, Istories reports, citing DataFlat. Within old Moscow, prices rose 27% to 617,300 rubles per sq. m and transactions fell 38%; in New Moscow, prices rose 36% and demand dropped 56%. Developer revenues in the Moscow region fell 23%, even as the national primary market saw only a 13% drop in demand and a 1% dip in prices. (Istories, 04.07.26)
• Despite a Kremlin‑driven crackdown and throttling of the app, 49% of Russians still read Telegram channels, including 20% who do so daily or several times a day, according to a March Levada Center poll taken when Telegram was barely usable without VPNs. Television remains the main news source for 61% of respondents, while reliance on online news sites and Telegram as primary sources has slipped to 27% and 25%, suggesting state TV’s grip has stabilized even as large numbers quietly circumvent censorship. (Meduza, 04.08.26, Levada, 04.07.26)

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• Russia stepped up spending in March in anticipation of a surge in revenue from the jump in oil prices caused by the war in the Middle East. Spending in March rose 44% from a year earlier, following a 16% increase in February, according to Bloomberg calculations. The deficit was 1.1 trillion rubles in March. The deficit for the first quarter was 4.6 trillion rubles ($58.6 billion), exceeding the 3.8 trillion-ruble target for the full year, according to Finance Ministry data published on Wednesday. (Bloomberg, 04.08.26)
• The Kremlin is reportedly weighing the removal of three regional leaders—Belgorod governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, Bryansk governor Alexander Bogomaz, and Dagestan head Sergey Melikov—before the September 2026 elections, Vedomosti sources tell ISW. All three regions have suffered war‑related shocks (cross‑border strikes, raids, or flooding), and ISW says Moscow appears intent on scapegoating local officials for security failures while insulating Putin and United Russia from voter anger in border areas. (ISW, 04.07.26)
  • Gladkov, whose border region has been repeatedly hit by Ukrainian strikes and incursions, is expected to resign and be moved to a deputy minister post in the federal Economic Development Ministry, Vedomosti reports via Meduza. Irkutsk deputy governor and war Hero of Russia Maj. Gen. Alexander Shuvaev is tipped as his replacement, fitting the Kremlin’s pattern of installing loyal front‑line veterans in key regional roles. (Meduza, 04.10.26)
  • Former FSB economic security officer Magomed Ramazanov has become the “main candidate” to replace Dagestan head Sergey Melikov. (iStories, 04.10.26)
• A St. Petersburg court sentenced six activists from the opposition movement Vesna to between six and 12 years in a penal colony on extremism-related charges based largely on anti-war social media posts and “silent consent” to the group’s actions. Vesna, founded in 2013 and later branded a “foreign agent” and “extremist organization,” became a prominent anti‑war voice after 2022; rights groups say the case shows how Russia is using long prison terms to crush even nonviolent dissent. (Meduza, 04.08.26)
• Pro‑war aviation blogger “Fighterbomber” claims the Kremlin has effectively canceled the air component of the May 9 Victory Day parades in Moscow and St. Petersburg and sent ground units back to base “until further notice,” citing fears that new Ukrainian ballistic missiles could strike during the event. He warned on Solovyov Live that a missile alert during “Parade! Attention! At ease!” would cause chaos and questioned whether the state would “risk the lives of servicemen;” the Kremlin has only said preparations for Victory Day are under way. (Istories, 04.08.26)
• Preschoolers across Russia will begin state-backed patriotic lessons known as “Kind Games” later this year, a senior Education Ministry official said April 8. The state-run news agency RIA Novosti described “Kind Games” as the preschool equivalent of “Important Conversations,” which were introduced in high schools in 2022 after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (MT/AFP, 04.08.26)
• Siberia’s republic of Altai will begin fining companies that do not hire a minimum number of Ukraine war veterans after a quota law passed last year saw little uptake. (MT/AFP, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Russia’s federal budget deficit surged past its full-year target in the first three months of 2026, underscored by a sharp decline in energy tax receipts and a double-digit spike in government spending. According to Finance Ministry data released Wednesday, the deficit reached 4.6 trillion rubles ($58.8 billion) in the first quarter, already eclipsing the 3.8 trillion ruble ($48.6 billion) gap originally projected for the entire year. The shortfall represents a staggering 2.6 trillion ruble increase over the deficit recorded during the same period in 2025. Between January and March, total revenues fell by 8.2% to 8.3 trillion rubles, while spending jumped 17% to 12.9 trillion rubles. The pain was felt most acutely in the energy sector, where oil and gas revenues plummeted 45% to 1.4 trillion rubles. (MT/AFP, 04.09.26)
• Russia’s Supreme Court has branded Memorial—one of the country’s oldest and most prominent human-rights and historical‑memory organizations—an “extremist” group and banned its activities nationwide, in a closed hearing on a Justice Ministry suit. Memorial’s predecessors were liquidated in 2021–22 as “foreign agents” and “extremists;” a new Geneva‑based Memorial association created in 2023 was declared “undesirable” in 2026. (Meduza, 04.09.26)
• Journalist Oleg Roldugin, managing editor at independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, has been detained in Moscow on suspicion of “illegally using personal data” and is “being questioned,” the state agency RIA Novosti reported, citing law enforcement. Security forces earlier searched Novaya Gazeta’s Moscow offices in a raid TASS said was connected to Roldugin’s case. A Moscow court ordered the arrest of Roldugin on charges of “illegal use of personal data,” after police seized his phone and Telegram account and cited “appeals to bots in Telegram” as evidence, Meduza reported. (Meduza, 04.09.26, Meduza, 04.10.26)
• Putin has signed amendments criminalizing “denial” or “approval” of what the law calls the Nazi genocide of the Soviet people in World War II, as well as “insulting the memory” of its victims. Offenses now carry fines of up to 5 million rubles or prison terms of up to five years and apply to desecration of relevant memorials at home or abroad; the move was championed by Investigative Committee chief Alexander Bastrykin and further weaponizes WWII memory in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. (Meduza, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Russia’s state pollster VTsIOM rating falling to 67.8% for March 30–April 5, down 2.3 points from late March and below 70% for the first time since the full‑scale invasion began (pre‑war level was 64.3%). A Kremlin‑linked strategist told Meduza the slide reflects anger over Telegram blocks, rising prices and war fatigue. (Meduza, 04.10.26)
• A Moscow prosecutor has requested six years in prison in absentia for Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Berlin Center, on charges of running an “undesirable” organization and violating “foreign agent” rules, Mediazona reported from court. Defense lawyer Aleksandr Lozhmin called the investigation “one‑sided and prejudiced” and said the evidence was “formal and insufficient,” urging acquittal. Gabuev, listed as a “foreign agent” in 2023, was put on a wanted list in 2025 and arrested in absentia in February. (Mediazona, 04.10.26)
• Russia’s Justice Ministry added philologist Ivan Tolstoy, grandson of writer Alexei Tolstoy, to the “foreign agents” registry, accusing him of spreading “false information” about government decisions and opposing the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Electoral expert Roman Udot and several activists were also listed. (Meduza, 04.10.26, Meduza, 04.10.26) 

Defense and aerospace:

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• Russia plans three new lunar missions—Luna‑29, Luna‑30 and Luna‑28—between 2032 and 2036, Russian Academy of Sciences vice president Sergei Chernyshev told an RAS meeting, Kommersant reports. Luna‑29 is slated for 2032, Luna‑30 for 2034 and Luna‑28 for 2036, forming a second phase of the program that moves from site surveys to elements of a lunar base and a nuclear power station, following earlier planned launches of Luna‑26 and Luna‑27 in 2027–28. (Kommersant, 04.07.26)
•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

Saturday, April 4, 2026

• A court in Kursk has sentenced former acting governor Alexei Smirnov to 14 years in a strict‑regime colony and a 400 million‑ruble fine on major bribery charges, plus a 10‑year ban on holding public office. Smirnov, who briefly led the region in 2024, admitted guilt in a plea deal after initially denying wrongdoing; prosecutors had sought 15 years and a 500 million‑ruble fine. He had been jailed since April 2025 over alleged large‑scale fraud and the embezzlement of more than 1 billion rubles earmarked for building fortifications on the Kursk–Ukraine border. (Istories, 04.06.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• A second weekend of major flooding in the North Caucasus republic of Dagestan has left at least five people dead, regional authorities said April 6. (MT/AFP, 04.06.26)

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

• More than 4,000 people have been evacuated from their homes after a dam burst in Russia's southern region of Daghestan. At least four people have died in flooding caused by record rainfall and melting mountain snow. But some residents have blamed local officials for mismanaging the region's infrastructure. (RFE/RL, 04.07.26)
• The vice governor of the southern Krasnodar region was placed in pre-trial detention on Tuesday, as authorities detailed corruption allegations involving land zoning violations and illegal business mergers. Andrei Korobka, who has supervised the region’s agro-industrial complex since 2015, was arrested on fraud charges. (MT/AFP, 04.07.26)

 Wednesday, April 8, 2026

• Russia’s Supreme Court chief Igor Krasnov argued in an article for RBC that foreign courts “resemble poker” while Russia’s judiciary is like a transparent chess match and “the best place to seek justice,” touting predictability, digitization and enforceability of rulings. Under Krasnov’s tenure as prosecutor general and now court chief, prosecutors have seized 550 private companies worth nearly 4 trillion rubles, even as anti‑corruption activists say his family acquired real estate worth about 1.5 billion rubles during the war. (Meduza, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Russia has declared a federal‑level state of emergency in Dagestan and Chechnya after severe flooding killed six people, including three children, and affected more than 6,000 residents. As of April 9, over 1,000 homes, 1,146 household plots and 70 road sections in Dagestan remained underwater, while late‑March floods damaged some 3,000 homes and 30 bridges in Chechnya, forcing evacuations in multiple communities. (Meduza, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• A Moscow military court on April 10 sentenced former Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Popov to 19 years in a maximum-security prison after he was found guilty of a litany of corruption charges, making him the latest former defense official to be sent behind bars following a Kremlin purge of the military. Popov, 69, served as deputy defense minister from November 2013 to June 2024. His arrest in August 2024 came amid a wider shake-up in the military that saw the dismissal of Sergei Shoigu as Defense Minister and criminal investigations against top brass. (MT, 04.10.26)

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• Russia and Hungary signed a 12-point cooperation plan in December covering energy, infrastructure, trade and cultural ties. (MT/AFP, 04.08.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• Cameroon’s foreign ministry says Russia has confirmed that 16 Cameroonian soldiers have been killed while serving in its “special military operation” in Ukraine, underscoring how Moscow is quietly drawing on African personnel as expendable manpower. Kyiv estimates that more than 1,700 Africans have been recruited to fight for Russia, often lured or duped with promises of civilian jobs or training, while investigations have also documented African women being tricked into drone‑assembly factory work supporting the Russian war effort (Washington Post/AP, 04.07.26; MT/AFP, 04.08.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• In Saxony‑Anhalt, Germany’s AfD is poised to become the first far‑right party to govern a German state and plans to normalize relations with Russia, end sanctions on Moscow and expand Russian language teaching, the New York Times reports. Lead ideologue Hans‑Thomas Tillschneider, who attended Putin’s birthday at the Russian Embassy, calls Russia a “partner of values” and wants Berlin to pivot away from U.S.‑led policy over Ukraine. (New York Times, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Hungary’s April 12 election is unfolding under unusually overt Russian involvement, with multiple reports depicting Viktor Orbán as Moscow’s favored partner and potential liability. Kremlin-linked sources told Meduza that Russian officials now see a Fidesz defeat as a real possibility despite a Russian‑designed online campaign casting Orbán as a “strong leader” and smearing rival Péter Magyar as an “EU puppet,” and say state media are ready to brand any loss a Brussels‑backed “color revolution” while privately blaming Orbán’s team for failing “even with our support.” In parallel, the Washington Post and New York Times report that Vladimir Putin has promised continued cheap oil, hosted Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó in the Kremlin, and coordinated on sanctions rollbacks—backed by a leaked 2024 call in which Szijjártó told Sergei Lavrov he would “do [his] best” to get a Kremlin‑linked oligarch’s sister removed from the EU blacklist, which then happened. A separate leak cited by Bloomberg shows Orbán telling Putin in October 2025 he was ready to “help in any way,” likening himself to a “mouse” aiding a Russian “lion” and offering to host a U.S.–Russia summit in Budapest, underscoring how tightly he has aligned with Moscow while blocking EU aid to Kyiv and maintaining Russian energy imports. (Meduza, 04.10.26; RFE/RL, 04.10.26; Washington Post, 04.06.26; New York Times, 04.06.26; Bloomberg, 04.07.26) 
  • France’s foreign minister Jean‑Noël Barrot condemned Hungarian FM Péter Szijjártó’s regular briefings to Sergei Lavrov—documented in leaked calls—as a “betrayal of solidarity” within the EU, saying such coordination with Moscow over sanctions and Ukraine’s EU path undermines the unity needed to avoid becoming “vassals, playthings of empires.” (Korrespondent.net, 04.09.26)
• Cuba will allow Russian companies to manage industrial production on the Communist island as its energy crisis continues under a U.S. embargo, a senior Russian official said Friday. “We discussed with our Cuban partners that Russian companies would be granted access to the management of industrial enterprises in the republic,” Deputy Industry Minister Roman Chekushov told the state-run RIA Novosti news agency. (MT/AFP, 04.10.26)

Ukraine:

Sunday, April 5, 2026

• Zelenskyy traveled to Syria on April 5 for talks with his Syrian counterpart, ⁠Ahmed al-Sharaa, as Kyiv looks to highlight the military expertise it has gained after more than four years of war. (RFE/RL, 04.05.26)

Monday, April 6, 2026

• The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) said on April 6 that it had charged a member of parliament in a Hryvna 13 million ($300,000) illicit enrichment case. The suspect is Oleksandr Kachnyi, who previously represented the pro-Russian Opposition Platform-For Life faction, a law enforcement source told the Kyiv Independent. He did not respond to a request for comment. "From 2020 to 2021, the suspect acquired assets totaling nearly Hryvna 13 million, which significantly exceeded the level of his officially declared income," the NABU said. (Kyiv Independent, 04.06.26)

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine have completed their investigation into a prominent member of Parliament suspected of orchestrating a sprawling vote-buying scheme, clearing the way for the case to go to trial. While authorities did not formally name the suspect in their announcement, Ukrainian news media widely identified the faction leader as Yulia Tymoshenko, the two-time former prime minister and head of the Batkivshchyna party. Under this mechanism, selected lawmakers would receive money in advance in exchange for voting as instructed, abstaining, or deliberately skipping parliamentary votes. (OCCRP, 04.09.26)

Friday, April 10, 2026

• Six people who obtained fictitious disabilities through the MSEC in Lviv have ended up on the defendants’ bench. Even before the verdict, they returned more than 0.5 million UAH in payments to the state. The case involves six people: three women aged 39, 40, and 50 from Lviv, Yavoriv, and Drohobych districts, and three men—a 45-year-old Lviv resident, a 47-year-old resident of Zolochiv district, and a 39-year-old from Prykarpattia. It has been established that from April to August 2022, they received forged certificates from one of the district MSEKs in Lviv confirming the establishment of disability group III. At the same time, none of the defendants had any grounds for this. (Antikor, 04.10.26)
• The High Anti-Corruption Court approved a plea agreement with the deputy of the Odesa Regional Council, former head of the «Servant of the People» faction, Vitaliy Vitikach, in the case of illegal enrichment. The reason is assets acquired in 2023–2024, whose value exceeds his legal income by 11,021,837 hryvnias. The case did not reach a full trial. The SAPO prosecutor and Vitikach entered into a plea agreement, which HACC approved. The main aspect of the agreement is financial payments. Vitikach will pay 11 million hryvnias to the state budget of Ukraine, which is close to the amount of excess income. Plus 2 million hryvnias will go to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Total—13 million hryvnias in payments. (Antikor, 04.10.26)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Thursday, April 9, 2026

• Moldova’s President Maia Sandu signed decrees denouncing CIS founding agreements, completing Chişinău’s exit from the Russia‑led bloc as of April 8 after a year‑long review of CIS treaties deemed incompatible with EU accession. Pro‑Russian parties call the move a “tragedy” for the economy, but Sandu frames it as a logical step toward European integration; Putin earlier said Moldova’s CIS membership had “little value.” (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.09.26)
• Uzbekistan’s sovereign National Investment Fund (UzNIF), which bundles $2.4 billion in minority stakes across 13 state companies including Uzbekistan Airways and a major hydropower producer, plans dual listings in London and Tashkent by mid‑May. Managed by Franklin Templeton and chaired by Finance Minister Jamshid Kuchkarov, UzNIF is billed as the first chance for foreign equity investors to access the reforming, still heavily state‑owned economy and a potential precursor to a multibillion‑dollar IPO of gold giant Navoi. (Financial Times, 04.09.26)
• Greek authorities in Thessaloniki have arrested a 55‑year‑old ethnic Greek from Georgia on a European warrant, accused of financing a planned double assassination in Lithuania of a Russian activist who received asylum there and a political adviser known for criticizing Moscow. Prosecutors say seven suspects from Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Greece coordinated surveillance and offered €40,000 to would‑be killers; the detainee denies the charges and is fighting extradition. (Meduza, 04.09.26)

IV. Quotable and notable

• Commenting on the new Shahed‑inspired U.S. attack drone LUCAS, Harvard University professor and former director of the Belfer Center Graham Allison contrasted it with “exquisite” systems like the U.S.-made MQ‑9 Reaper at $30 million and MQ‑25 Stingray at up to $160 million, noting that Chinese maker DJI sells its Mavic 3 Classic for $1,300 and produces “over 1 million Mavic drones per year,” versus U.S. rival Skydio’s “low thousands.” “So, the LUCAS is comparable to an Iranian Shahed or a Russian Geran in cost while far less than a $2 million Tomahawk cruise missile. There is still a long way to go before it becomes price competitive with the Chinese equivalent, the Feilong‑300D, which sells for as little as $10,000 per unit.” (Allison’s X account, 04.07.26)
• Meghan O'Sullivan, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School said: “… Russia started to use natural gas as a weapon to set the stage for its invasion of Ukraine in 2021, when it began to limit the amount of natural gas it was selling to Europe so that Europe wouldn’t have a lot of stocks or resilience in the face of a cutoff. Why that became a reality has more to do with our geopolitics. You didn’t have great-power rivalry. You didn’t have Russia and China and the United States and Europe at each other’s throats. After COVID, global integration isn’t providing the same kind of reassurance to countries that it did in a world where politics were much more conducive to peace and prosperity.” (Foreign Policy, 04.06.26)
• Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center Meghan O’Sullivan and Jason Bordoff of Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University wrote: “There is little reason to expect energy crises to taper off in the future. Drones and cyberweapons have made disruption cheaper, easier, and more sustainable. Iran has demonstrated that even a relatively weak power can cause global economic harm by threatening infrastructure and chokepoints. At the same time, the norm against targeting civilian energy infrastructure is eroding, as evident in Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s electric grid; in Russian-linked cyber-operations against energy networks, such as the 2021 attack on a U.S. gas pipeline and the 2025 attack on Poland’s power grid; and in Trump’s threat to attack Iranian power stations in late March.” (Foreign Affairs, 04.06.26) 

Endnotes:

1. Additionally, according to ISW data, during the past week (March 31–April 7), Russia lost 1 square mile of Ukrainian territory. This contrasts with the 17 square miles Russian forces gained in the previous week of March 24–31. In the period of March 31–April 7, Russian forces made advances near six settlements, while Ukrainian forces cleared areas near five settlements and regained control near another settlement, according to Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (Mil.gov.ua).