4 Ideas to Explore

1. Multiple Western commentators view Russia’s drone incursion into Poland overnight on Sept. 9–10¹ as a strategic test for NATO and the United States.² Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft argues that while the incursion was meant as a warning to Europe and the U.S. against deeper involvement in Ukraine, it was not a direct attack or a cause for panic. Lieven further noted that the incident highlighted European countries’ military weakness and their reliance on U.S. support, and urged measured, de-escalatory responses rather than alarmist reactions. Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times is among the commentators who sees the incident as a test of Western resolve as well as a revelation of NATO’s shortcomings in counter-drone defenses, warning that weak or delayed responses would embolden Russia. The Economist’s writers also contend that Russia was probing for NATO’s weaknesses, calling the incursion "The Kremlin’s plot to kill NATO’s credibility," which required the alliance to come up with a robust response, including enhanced air policing and forward defenses. In their turn, The Wall Street Journal’s editors criticize Donald Trump’s lack of response to Vladimir Putin’s actions, arguing that the U.S. president “hasn’t backed up his repeated warnings and deadlines” and calling for more sanctions, weapons for Ukraine and NATO reinforcement.
2. In 2022, a typical Russian salvo on Ukraine involved about 100 weapons and occurred roughly once a month, according to Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan’s analysis of Russia’s “massed strikes” in the Ukraine war for CSIS. “By 2025, the average has tripled to nearly 370 munitions per salvo, with salvos now coming every eight days," note Jensen and Atalan, who believe that "Russia’s firepower strike campaign relies on two distinct patterns: routine strikes and salvos ... salvos are larger, coordinated barrages ... signaling a deliberate shift in tempo.” “These massed salvo attacks are now a core feature of Moscow’s coercive punishment campaign,” according to Jensen and Atalan. Russia has significantly escalated strikes on Ukraine since Trump took office, according to The Wall Street Journal’s Jane Lytvynenko, Ming Li and Emma Brown. In July 2025 alone, Russian forces used nearly 6,300 attack drones—up from just 426 the previous July, the three WSJ journalists write. According to the estimate of drone attacks by Paul Sonne and Kim Barker of The New York Times, “so far in 2025, Russia has launched over 34,000 attack drones and decoys—nearly nine times higher than the same period last year.” This dramatic increase follows “a huge surge in one-way attack drone production” in Russia, according to the two NYT journalists. “Russia is now able to produce about 30,000 of the attack drones modeled on the Iranian design per year [and] some believe the country could double that in 2026,” they write.
3. Chinese drone technology and components are fueling both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, according to Quinn Urich’s analysis of procurement and use of UAVs in this conflict. In his analysis published by Russia Matters, this Belfer Center researcher argues that while Western media and officials criticize China’s support for Russian drone and arms production, Ukraine is also heavily reliant on Chinese-made drones and parts. Urich cites statistics showing that just 5% of Ukrainian defense firms report not using Chinese components, making most “domestically produced” Ukrainian drones effectively “made in China, assembled in Ukraine.” Both Russian and Ukrainian forces routinely use and adapt Chinese commercial drones, notably from DJI, even though Chinese export bans in late 2024 reduced direct shipments, according to Urich. China controls about 90% of the global commercial drone market and produces much of the key hardware. Thus, the idea of fully homegrown Ukrainian drones is overstated, as most airframes, batteries, cameras, motors and radios originate from China and are found on both sides of the conflict, according to Urich.
4. In summer 2025, Russian equipment losses on the battlefield dropped significantly, with 83 tanks and 189 armored vehicles lost between June and August—down from 252–274 tanks and 411–619 vehicles in the same summer months of 2022–2024, according to Oryx data analyzed by iStories. The report attributes this decline partly to much less active use: Ukrainian sources describe sectors where Russians fought without any equipment support. OSINT analysts estimate just 46% of Russia’s prewar tanks, 42% of IFVs and 49% of APCs remain, as drones now account for 75% of strikes on Russian equipment. Analysts say Russia may be conserving armor for a massed autumn offensive, hoping to overwhelm Ukrainian drone defenses.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "The Iranian case: why it is urgent to strengthen the NPT," Pierre Goldschmidt, FRS, 09.10.25.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "A Ukrainian Farmer Fought Back Against the Russians. He Paid With His Life."
  Jane Lytyvnenko and Oksana Grytsenko, The Wall Street Journal, 09.09.25.
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"These Charts Show How Putin Is Defying Trump by Escalating Airstrikes on Ukraine," Jane Lytvynenko, Ming Li and Emma Brown, Wall Street Journal, 09.13.25. Visit the hyperlink to view WSJ's useful visualizations of changes in the Russian rates of drone launches and related developments.

• “Russia has sharply escalated drone and missile attacks on Ukraine since President Trump took office in January 2025; July 2025 saw nearly 6,300 attack drones launched—up from 426 a year earlier,” WSJ reports.
• “Major bombardments regularly follow high-level U.S.-Russia contacts, with a record combined attack of 728 drones and 13 missiles just days after a Trump-Putin phone call in July.”
• “The lead-up to the August Trump-Putin Alaska summit brought a short lull, after which Russia resumed strikes with greater intensity—causing the deadliest assault yet on Kyiv and killing 18 in a single incident.”
• “Moscow’s capacity for attacks has surged as Russia now produces about 2,700 attack drones per month domestically, per Ukrainian intelligence, allowing frequent, large-scale raids rather than sporadic attacks relying on foreign imports.”
• “Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, previously reduced after March negotiations, resumed over the summer, targeting gas, oil, and electricity sites with drones and missiles.”
• “Three of the deadliest months for Ukrainian civilians have occurred since spring 2025, with a pronounced rise in attacks on government and symbolic targets—including Kyiv’s Cabinet of Ministers building and EU Delegation offices.”
• “Despite Ukraine’s steady interception rate, the sheer volume of drones launched means more are getting through to urban and civilian targets, resulting in growing casualties and destruction.”

“Chinese Drone Tech Fuels Both Sides of Russia-Ukraine War,” Quinn Urich, Russia Matters, 09.10.25.

• “In a recent editorial by The Wall Street Journal’s Editorial Board, entitled “Russian Drone Parts, Made in China,” the editors make the point that “Trump hasn’t been able to stop Xi Jinping’s support for Putin.”
• “But what the WSJ editorial doesn’t ask is whose war machines are also powered by Chinese drones and components? Who supplies Ukraine’s drones? And, for that matter, who provides the components for America’s own drones?”
• “With only 5% of Ukrainian defense firms reporting they do not use Chinese components in their systems, the vast majority of drones that fill the sky are likely either made in China or contain a number of key components made in China.”
• “A more accurate way to describe these so-called ‘domestically produced’ Ukrainian drones, therefore, would be ‘made in China, assembled in Ukraine.’”
• “Today, ‘China currently controls close to 90% of the global commercial drone market and manufactures most of the key hardware used to build them.’”
• “Ukraine may have stopped flying DJI quadcopters, but given China’s dominance in drone manufacturing, it’s likely that most air frames, batteries, cameras, motors, radios and cameras used in the ‘domestically-manufactured’ Ukrainian drones were made in a Chinese factory.”

"Russia’s Army Has Started Losing Far Less Equipment. What’s the Reason?" Istories, 09.09.25.

• “In the summer of 2025, Russian equipment losses dropped significantly, according to Oryx data analyzed by iStories. From June to August, Russians lost 83 tanks and 189 other armored vehicles. In the same summer months in previous years, the losses were: 252 tanks and 411 armored vehicles in 2022; 274 tanks and 468 in 2023; and 268 tanks and 619 in 2024,” the article reports.
• “This decline in equipment losses, especially armored vehicles, has an obvious explanation: they are being used much less,” the report states.
• “Sometimes, Russians on certain stretches of the front are fighting without any equipment support at all. According to Ukrainian soldiers, this was the case last spring in the southern sector and in summer 2025 near Toretsk,” iStories observed.
• “According to Oryx data, since the beginning of the war, the Russian army has lost 4,113 tanks and 9,065 armored vehicles. A year ago, the administrator of Oryx said, ‘The Russian command realized that it didn’t have an infinite amount of equipment,’” relayed the outlet.
• “In June 2025, OSINT analyst @Jonpy99 analyzed satellite images of storage bases and concluded that compared to the start of the war, only 46% of tanks, 42% of IFVs, and 49% of APCs remain, and not all of this equipment is operational,” istories.media quoted.
• “Drones are now one of the main factors in the war. The area within 10 kilometers of the line of contact is called the ‘kill zone’ by Ukrainian soldiers. Enemy troops and especially equipment become easy targets there,” analysts state.
• “According to Ukrainian military, in 2024, drones accounted for 75% of hits on Russian equipment and 69% on personnel. In April 2024, a NATO official said two-thirds of Russian tanks are being destroyed by drones,” the article reports.
• “Analysts suggest Russia may be conserving equipment for a large-scale offensive in autumn. OSINT experts predict a buildup of armor for mechanized assaults and see signs of such columns being used near Pokrovsk, with predictions of attacks utilizing massed vehicles,” iStories noted.
• “The main problem with the use of equipment in the Russian army is not that it is destroyed, but that it’s used inefficiently,” according to military analyst Kirill Mikhailov.
• “There are signs that Russian command hopes massed use of vehicles could overload Ukrainian drone units and break through the front in one or more areas,” the publication concludes.

 "Russia’s Massed Strikes: The Strategy of Coercion by Salvo," Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, CSIS, 09.09.25. 

• "Russia unleashed its largest aerial barrage of the war over the weekend of September 7–8, striking Kyiv and multiple regions across Ukraine in an unprecedented display of firepower... more than 800 munitions—primarily Shahed drones supported by... cruise and ballistic missiles—were launched in coordinated waves," Jensen and Atalan wrote.
• "Russia’s firepower strike campaign relies on two distinct patterns: routine strikes and salvos... Salvos are larger, coordinated barrages... signaling a deliberate shift in tempo... These massed salvo attacks are now a core feature of Moscow’s coercive punishment campaign. What began as rare events early in the war has become regular practice," the authors argued.
• "In 2022, a typical salvo involved about 100 weapons and occurred roughly once a month. By 2025, the average has tripled to nearly 370 munitions per salvo, with salvos now coming every eight days," Jensen and Atalan noted.
• "Negotiations have a direct impact on Russia’s salvo strategy... the data show Moscow calibrates the scale and tempo of its strikes depending on the political environment—reducing major salvos during negotiations and resuming them after talks concluded," the authors reported.
• "Russia’s strategy is not only about destroying infrastructure but also about shaping political outcomes," Jensen and Atalan explained. "Moscow times its escalations to influence negotiations, control headlines, and preserve leverage."
• "From a psychological and coercive standpoint, Russia’s strategy has an impact... The goal is not only destruction but also to wear down morale, exhaust defenders, and force Ukraine’s backers to question the sustainability of support," Jensen and Atalan wrote.
• "The West must provide Ukraine with significant increases in air defenses and consider new aerial policing missions or no-fly zones. Drone saturation and firepower strikes are likely to remain enduring aspects of modern war for the next generation," the authors concluded.

"Russia Made Drone Production a Supreme Priority. Now It Swarms the Skies," Paul Sonne and Kim Barker, New York Times, 09.14.25. 

• "Russia has achieved a huge surge in one-way attack drone production, now assembling them at two main domestic facilities and prioritizing drones as a national project—with students and even regional governments enlisted in manufacturing," Sonne and Barker reported.
• "Russian barrages are now reaching an unprecedented scale: in one night this month, more than 800 exploding drones and decoys crossed into Ukraine; so far in 2025, Russia has launched over 34,000 attack drones and decoys—nearly nine times higher than the same period last year," the authors wrote.
• "These mass drone attacks are overwhelming Ukrainian defenses and bringing the war to cities far from the front, killing civilians, demoralizing the population, and sapping Ukraine’s will to endure," Sonne and Barker observed.
• "While Ukraine claims to shoot down around 88 percent of incoming Russian drones, that figure is down from 93 percent last year—and even small percentages getting through result in significant destruction given the scale of the attacks," they explained.
• "Russia has improved its drone technology with better guidance, jamming resistance, new warheads, and confusing tactics involving decoys and wave attacks; drones are now flown via more circuitous routes and urban corridors, making them harder to intercept," according to Sonne and Barker.
• "Analysts say that Russia is increasingly closing the gap with Ukraine in frontline drone warfare, as Moscow deploys fiber-optic-controlled drones and elite units, and even plans to establish a dedicated Drone Forces branch," the article noted.
• "With drone attacks now spilling into Polish and Romanian airspace, the West faces new challenges: repelling mass drone swarms will require further upgraded defenses and smarter technological and tactical responses both for Ukraine and NATO," Sonne and Barker concluded.

"Do Drones Make Helicopters Obsolete?" Elena Davlikanova and Yevhen Malik, The National Interest, 09.12.25. 

• "The shift is not total: helicopters still have unique roles, such as rapid medical evacuation and heavy lift, but their use in frontline attack and deep-strike missions is increasingly limited by the ubiquity and lethality of drones," according to the authors.

Military aid to Ukraine: 

 "A Better Way for Europe to Guarantee Ukraine’s Security," Ivo H. Daalder, Foreign Affairs, 09.10.25.

• Daalder observes that convincing Russia to halt its war in Ukraine has proven much more difficult than Trump expected, as seen in Russia escalating attacks on Kyiv with massive barrages of drones and missiles, even striking major government targets.
• Daalder notes that Trump has ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine and insists that Europe—not the United States—should bear the main burden of securing Ukraine, with the U.S. declining any specific security commitments.
• Daalder argues that European leaders must realistically accept that they will need to guarantee Ukraine’s security largely on their own, and the best way to reassure Kyiv and deter Russia is through robust military support, including NATO operations and troop deployments.
• Daalder writes that developing effective, long-term security for Ukraine requires three things: a strong Ukrainian military, significant European military commitments on or near Ukraine and Ukraine’s eventual integration into institutions like the EU and NATO.
• Daalder proposes that Europe should organize a credible defense for Ukraine through collective security agreements (similar to West Germany’s Cold War era status), by deploying thousands of troops and equipment, boosting Ukraine’s defense industry, and recognizing that Ukraine’s security is crucial for wider European stability.

"Ukrainian Missile Fuel, Made in Denmark," Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 09.08.25.

• "Ukraine's domestic military suppliers are under bombardment, while Russia's mostly are free of attack, and that gives an advantage to Vladimir Putin's industrial base. So note the announcement last week that a Ukrainian defense company is setting up shop in Denmark to produce rocket propellants for its new long-range missiles," the Editorial Board wrote.
• "Copenhagen set aside some $78 million this year to help Ukrainian weapons firms establish facilities there… The inaugural project involves Fire Point, a Ukrainian company that said last month it had developed a new cruise missile, the Flamingo, that can go more than 1,800 miles with a 2,500-pound warhead," the editorial stated.
• "Beginning in December Fire Point plans to make solid rocket propellants near Denmark's Skrydstrup Air Base… and that's one way to keep the missiles coming. Ukraine's defense industry is a priority target for Russia, and not all its domestic manufacturing can be done in relative safety in underground facilities," the Editorial Board explained.
• "Mr. Putin has mainly enjoyed a sanctuary at home since he invaded in 2022, because the U.S. and Europe have been reluctant to let Ukraine use Western weapons to hit Russian territory. The development of the Flamingo and other domestic arms could change that, and offering Ukraine a haven to make components is a move to even the balance," the Editorial Board observed.
• "Denmark is getting a chance to learn from Ukrainian innovators, especially if the Fire Point outpost is followed by drone makers and others, and maybe the site will turn into a defense manufacturing hub. That's a partnership worth replicating elsewhere," the Editorial Board concluded.

“Why Sweden Is Giving More Military Aid to Ukraine,” Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 09.14.25.

• “Just a few hours after Russian drones violated Polish airspace and forced NATO to scramble F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets, Sweden announced its latest military aid package to Ukraine. Worth approximately $836 million, the military aid package includes a plethora of weapon systems and logistics support to the Ukrainian military.”   
• “The latest military package will also include civil defense initiatives and services through the Swedish Defense Research Agency and Swedish Defense University. ‘Sweden is now increasing its military support to Ukraine to put greater pressure on Russia. More Archers, drones, and ammunition will make a difference on the battlefield. Europe’s right to peace and freedom must be defended,’ Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson said in a press statement.”
• “The Swedish government has proposed an increased military aid package for Ukraine over the next few years. Stockholm has announced that it intends to raise a further $3.38 billion (SEK 31.5 billion) for Ukraine’s defense in 2026, while also officially extending support until 2027. If the additional funds are cleared, Sweden will commit a total of $8.6 billion to Kyiv over 2026 and 2027.”
• “Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine had a dramatic impact in Sweden, which has remained militarily neutral since the days of Napoleon and did not choose a side during the Cold War. The Russian invasion was near-universally condemned in Sweden, and fears of future Russian aggression led the Swedish government to abandon its neutral stance and join NATO alongside neighboring Finland.”
• “In that regard, the Kremlin’s decision to launch the ‘special military operation’ helped to strengthen NATO and unite it against Russia, backfiring on Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s intent. Indeed, Sweden’s latest military package to Ukraine highlights the country’s desire to support the Ukrainian defense and counter Russia’s aggression.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"My Theory Says Sanctions on Russia Won’t Work. So Why Do I Want Them Anyway?"
Daniel W. Drezner, Foreign Policy, 09.10.25. 

• “It has been more than 40 months since Russia invaded Ukraine … the very fact that Russia launched its full-scale invasion revealed how the threat of sanctions failed as an instrument of deterrence—and Russia’s unceasing prosecution of the war since February 2022 is powerful evidence that they have failed as an instrument of coercion,” Drezner wrote.
• “The Trump administration’s position on this subject has been erratic. U.S. President Donald Trump has periodically threatened to further ratchet up sanctions against Russia, only to back down every time. He recently imposed extremely high tariffs on India…yet failed to impose similar measures against China,” the author observed.
• “My argument was simple: Expectations of future conflict help to explain why sanctions are so frequently imposed and why they rarely seem to yield concessions. The more conflict that the sanctioner and the target anticipate, the more eager the sender is to impose sanctions … The true sanctions paradox is that the sender is usually most eager to employ sanctions in the situations when concessions are least likely,” Drezner explained.
• “The West has demanded that Russia renounce all of its territorial ambitions on Ukraine. At this point, it legally cannot do it. Even though it is a violation of international law, Russia officially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts during the first year of the war. In order to acquiesce to Western demands, Russia would have to renounce its annexation—an unlikely outcome,” according to Drezner.
• “There are two reasons to maintain and even ratchet up the sanctions against Russia. The first reason has to do with reinforcing the territorial sovereignty norm … The other reason is that economic sanctions can weaken a country’s ability to prosecute a long-term war,” Drezner argued.
• “In the case of Russia, this means expanding the oil embargo to limit its ability to import strategic goods. Harsher sanctions—combined with enhancing Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war—would exact an enormous toll on Russia’s ability to fight,” Drezner concluded.
• “In thinking about the Russia case, my theory correctly predicts that sanctions will not lead to successful coercion. That does not mean that the sanctions will not work in other ways,” Drezner wrote.

"The U.S.-Europe Divide on How to Hurt Moscow," Alexandra Sharp, Foreign Policy, 09.12.25. 

• "The United States urged its G-7 allies and European Union partners on Friday to impose a new round of 'meaningful tariffs' on China and India for continuing to buy Russian oil," Sharp reported.
• "Such secondary duties are part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest strategy to force Moscow to the negotiating table, with promises that the tariffs would be rescinded the day that the war in Ukraine ends.³ The White House has already imposed an additional 25 percent duty on Indian imports for the country’s actions," Sharp explained.
• "Trump’s tariff demands demonstrate a clear divide in strategy between Washington and Brussels. Whereas the Trump administration prefers to use tariffs on third-party countries to drain the Kremlin’s economy, Europe seeks formal sanctions on Moscow’s business and financial partners," Sharp wrote.
• "The EU is currently finalizing a new package of sanctions—the 19th to be imposed since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022—and on Friday, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on 100 Russian oil tankers, companies, and individuals," according to Sharp.⁴
• "Washington is also demanding that Europe seize hundreds of billions of euros in frozen Russian assets. The EU has already agreed to use the profits from these assets to fund Ukraine’s war effort, but several member nations remain wary of seizing them entirely, fearing legal challenges and market instability," Sharp concluded.

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"How to Reconcile Ukrainian Sovereignty with Russian Security," Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 09.11.25. 

• "The Russian and US positions are diametrically opposed. The Kremlin wants a rump Ukraine stripped of its sovereignty and firmly anchored in Russia’s orbit, much like Belarus. The United States seeks a secure, fully sovereign, and independent Ukraine that will gradually integrate into the West," Graham wrote.
• "Putin will consider concessions only when the Ukrainians demonstrate that they can halt Russian progress on the ground and reliably defend against aerial assault. Continued US aid is thus imperative for a negotiated settlement, and freezing the battle lines becomes the first necessary step to resolving the question of Ukraine’s status through negotiations," Graham noted.
• "Two insights are essential. First, the sovereignty issue is fundamentally a matter of security for both sides. The Ukrainians are seeking ironclad guarantees against renewed Russian aggression. The Russians are demanding credible assurances that Ukraine can never become a staging ground for a NATO attack on them," Graham explained.
• "The task then becomes devising a formula that guarantees the future security of a sovereign Ukraine while satisfying Russia that a sovereign Ukraine does not pose a grave threat to its security. Broadly speaking, armed neutrality for Ukraine, coupled with a Russia-West arrangement to stabilize the frontier dividing them, which would stretch from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea," Graham proposed.
• "Ukraine would have to abandon its ambition to join NATO and accept the status of a non-aligned, non-nuclear weapons state. In exchange, Russia would be expected to drop its insistence on Ukraine’s demilitarization. ... Ukraine needs to retain the right to build and sustain forces sufficient for territorial defense," Graham argued.
• "While Russia would insist that no forces from any NATO member be based in Ukraine or conduct joint exercises on Ukrainian territory, it would have to recognize Ukraine’s right to continue receiving security assistance from Western states," Graham added.
• "The West’s commitment to lift sanctions on Russia [would be] tied to Russian implementation of agreed-upon steps to establish a permanent ceasefire," Graham wrote.
• "It is unlikely that either Ukraine or Russia would accept such a compromise at the moment. ... But a reality check by the Ukrainians and a firm message from the United States could bring the conflict to an end much sooner than most observers anticipate," Graham concluded.

"A Pragmatic Endgame for the Russia-Ukraine War," Cynthia Roberts, Foreign Policy, 09.11.25. 

• “U.S. President Donald Trump says he wants the Russia-Ukraine war to end. But his administration’s oscillations—stopping and restarting support to Kyiv; urging action while accepting Kremlin talking points; and insisting Ukraine must cede Crimea and NATO hope—have confused and slowed progress to peace,” Roberts wrote.
• “Expectations for a territorial agreement are thus converging around the current line of control—except the Kremlin is demanding additional land it has already annexed on paper but failed to take by force. Victory is not imminent for either side and the war has become attritional. Given the stalemate, policy should be guided not by maximalism but by realism,” Roberts argued.
• "Kyiv can give the current front line greater salience by immediately passing legislation that redraws its internal oblast borders, so that Ukrainian-held portions of illegally annexed regions are incorporated into unannexed oblasts—thus avoiding formal surrender and letting Putin claim a headline victory without international recognition," Roberts suggested.
• “Make Ukrainian capacity and its right to self-defense—not sweeping Western promises—the core security guarantee. Ukraine’s model should be Finland: militarily strong, nonprovocative, with a track record of repelling Soviet conquest, and harmonizing defenses with NATO standards,” according to Roberts.
• “Accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the European Union while parking the NATO membership question. EU accession ties Ukraine into Europe’s defense-industrial base and manpower pool, and gradually shifts security burdens to Europe as U.S. commitments contract,” Roberts recommended.
• "The alternatives are unpalatable for all parties. A realistic settlement that matches battlefield reality, spares Zelensky and the Ukrainian people intolerable legal concessions, and lets Moscow claim the optics it demands, is the best available path to stop the killing now—without pretending that Ukraine and the West's long contest with Russia is over," Roberts concluded.

“The Wrong Way to Do Diplomacy With Russia: What Trump Could Learn From Reagan," Celeste A. Wallander, Foreign Affairs, 09.09.25.  

• Trump’s Alaska summit with Putin strengthened the Russian president’s domestic position and prolonged both the war in Ukraine and Putin’s hold on power, Wallander argued.
• Unlike the 1986 Reykjavik summit, which weakened Gorbachev and hastened the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Anchorage meeting enhanced Putin’s popularity, with 79% of Russians viewing the summit as a success for Putin, according to Levada Center polling.
• The summit failed to achieve concrete progress on Ukraine; Trump rolled out the red carpet for Putin, shifted the responsibility for ending the war to Zelenskyy, and publicly praised his “fantastic relationship” with the Russian leader.
• Putin’s public relations victory in Alaska bolstered his claim of legitimacy, allowed him to push Russian narratives about “legitimate concerns,” and enabled him to avoid additional sanctions—all strengthening his hand both at home and abroad.
• Wallander concluded that Putin’s goal was never peace, but to bend the international order and maintain his grip on power, believing—as reinforced by the outcome of the Alaska summit—that time remains on his side.

"As Putin pushes his advantage, Trump twiddles his thumbs," Fareed Zakaria, Washington Post, 09.12.25. 

• "The dominant facts of life in Ukraine are now Russian drone attacks and, therefore, air raid warnings... Most come after dark, and locals complain about nights of constant interruptions, sleeplessness and trips to shelters," Zakaria reported.
• "For most, this is a battle for national survival. People seem resigned to a long, grim fight," Zakaria observed.
• "Trump seemed determined to end [the war in Ukraine]... He would force Ukraine to accept terms... Russia would probably get to keep what it had conquered, Ukraine would never become a member of NATO, the U.S. would not send in troops, and Trump would reengage economically with Russia after the war ended... [but] before even reaching the negotiating table, Washington had acceded to most Russian demands," Zakaria explained.
• "It didn't work. Despite the preemptive concessions, despite a personal invitation to negotiate from Trump and despite a red-carpet welcome, Putin stood his ground. His demands for Ukraine have always been maximalist," Zakaria argued.
• "The peace overtures and concessions seem to have convinced Putin that... he can press forward. In the past few weeks, Russia has launched attacks on an American factory, offices of the British Council and the EU in Kyiv, and now violated Polish airspace," Zakaria noted.
• "Putin seems to be following Lenin's famous 'probe with bayonets' strategy: 'If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.' Finally, after the violation of Polish airspace, NATO fighter jets shot down the Russian drones," Zakaria recounted.
• "Neither [Trump] nor anyone in his administration acts like securing a free and independent Ukraine is itself a crucial goal... As long as what Putin hears from Washington is mush, he will keep pressing his bayonet forward," Zakaria concluded.

"On Ukraine and Gaza, Trump Casts Himself as a Bystander, if He Can’t Be a Peacemaker," David E. Sanger, New York Times, 09.13.25. 

• "President Trump often insists he can bring peace to global conflicts. But when allies and adversaries alike appear to be ignoring him or testing American will, he adopts a what-can-you-do shrug," Sanger wrote.
• "After Russian drones flew into Poland—leading to the first shoot-downs of enemy targets over NATO territory since the alliance was created—Trump simply wrote on social media, 'What's with Russia violating Poland's airspace with drones? Here we go!'" Sanger reported.
• "It was the latest example of the bystander phase of the Trump presidency. Much of the time, Mr. Trump insists he alone can bring about peace... But during weeks like this one... he adopts a what-can-you-do shrug, as if he is an observer with minor stakes in the outcome," Sanger noted.
• "In a video posted on Wednesday, [Polish Deputy Prime Minister] Radoslaw Sikorski said the drones 'did not veer off course, but were deliberately targeted.' He said Mr. Putin was 'mocking' Mr. Trump's peace efforts," Sanger reported.
• "'Salami tactics' are nothing new. The Soviets used to slow traffic on the highway to Berlin or cause incidents at Checkpoint Charlie to measure a reaction. Now, it’s drones instead of tanks—but the testing is the same," Sanger explained, quoting historian Michael Beschloss.
• "Only last week, the Trump administration announced it was ending a training program for frontline European states, mostly in the Baltics, that was the most visible reminder that the United States was participating in the defense of vulnerable NATO allies," Sanger noted.
• "But [the move] was likely to be interpreted by the Russians as another sign that the Americans were leaving the defense of Europe to the Europeans, and that the time to test those defenses had arrived," Sanger concluded.

“Fiona Hill: Trump could easily have ‘upper hand with Putin,’” Conflict Zone, DW, 09.11.25.

• Sarah Kelly: “Russia has been pounding Ukraine with its biggest air strikes of the war, is it too late to stop Putin now?”
  • Fiona Hill, member of Harvard’s Board of Overseers: “It’s never too late to do anything, honestly, but I think what we’re seeing here is Putin feeling that he’s very close to being able to compel Ukraine to surrender. So he’s giving everything that he’s got at this particular juncture because he thinks that this is the time for him to press his advantage. So what we really need to do is to push Russia to stop in its tracks, and that’s going to be the really difficult task for Europe and the United States if they can work together on this issue along with Ukraine.”

"Is Europe deliberately sabotaging Ukraine War negotiations?" Zachary Paikin, Responsible Statecraft, 09.10.25.

• “After the recent Paris meeting, 26 countries pledged to contribute troops to a postwar force in Ukraine—despite Moscow’s repeated insistence that any Western military presence would make those troops 'legitimate targets,'” Paikin reports.
• “Russian officials have escalated their threats after proposed deployments, even as European leaders reaffirm states’ right to choose security partners freely while downplaying the Paris Charter’s countervailing principle of indivisible security,” Paikin notes.
• “The EU’s public support for a ceasefire only emerged after Trump pressured Zelensky into accepting one, highlighting Europe’s ongoing dependency on the U.S. for its security calculus,” Paikin argues.
• “By planning postwar deployments certain to provoke Moscow, European leaders may be undermining diplomatic prospects and incentivizing Russia to keep fighting, thus signaling a lack of genuine commitment to peace,” Paikin warns.
• “European insistence on troop deployments and continued threats of sanctions—without offering sanctions relief—suggests a preference for protracted conflict over an unfavorable negotiated settlement,” Paikin concludes.

See these links  for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "GOP Russia Hawks Have a New Plan to Outmaneuver Isolationists," Jonathan Martin, Politico, 09.13.25.
• "The Ghost of Finlandization Is Haunting the Ukraine Debate," Kristi Raik, FP, 09.15.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:⁵

"Russian drones over Poland no reason to panic and start a war," Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 09.10.25. 

• "It seems unlikely that the handful of Russian drones that entered Polish air space did so accidentally," Lieven wrote.
• "This was however not an 'attack.' None of the drones hit a significant target, or seem to have been intended to do so. The Russian move was most likely intended as a warning to the European 'coalition of the willing' to abandon its hopes of establishing a 'reassurance force' in Ukraine," Lieven argued.
• "It was probably also a warning to the U.S. not to provide air cover or a 'backstop' for such a force," according to Lieven.
• "During the Cold War, there were a number of far more serious violations of air space by both sides… These incidents led not to threats of war, but careful attempts to de-escalate tensions and develop ways to avoid such clashes," Lieven explained.
• "While the incident was undoubtedly a provocative act by Russia, the immediate European response showed the extent of Europe’s (though not Poland’s) military weakness, and that any European force in Ukraine would be utterly dependent on U.S. support and guarantees," Lieven observed.
• "Amidst wild ravings from Poland and some British commentators… former NATO Deputy Commander General Sir Adrian Bradshaw struck a sensible note: 'The point of the consultations is to do things which lower the tension… and it’s reasonable to assume that even Mr. Putin doesn’t want a conflict between the whole of NATO and Russia, because it would be disastrous for all of us,'" Lieven quoted.

"Three Thoughts After Russia's Drone Incursion Into Poland," Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, 09.12.25. 

1. "This was a test of whether the West will take this violation of NATO territory seriously, or just debate and delay—to see if Putin can get away with further escalation,” Kristof wrote.
2. "This is a test of Donald Trump: Will he ever stand up to Putin and make good on his threats of tougher sanctions?" he asked.
3. "The incursion tests Western military capabilities, revealing a lag in developing cost-effective defenses against cheap enemy drones,” according to Kristof.
   • "I see no indication that Putin is interested in a peace deal with Ukraine. ... There are no good choices here, but merely fussing and granting Putin effective impunity would be the worst choice," Kristof concluded.

"What is Vladimir Putin’s game plan against NATO’s eastern flank? “Henry Foy, Courtney Weaver & Charles Clover, Financial Times, 09.09.25.  

• “If Vladimir Putin’s intention was to use an early-morning drone foray into Poland to test NATO’s air defenses, the Russian president would be most pleased with the result,” the authors wrote.
• “The incursion into Polish airspace prompted NATO fighter jets to take to the skies and shoot down some of the projectiles—the first time the U.S.-led military alliance has engaged directly with the Russian armed forces since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” Foy, Weaver, and Clover reported.
• “Officials, defense experts and analysts say, it also will have shown just how unprepared Europe is for the type of mass air assault that Russia inflicts on Ukraine almost every night, laying bare the scale of the investment needed to shore up NATO’s eastern flank,” the article explains.
• “Europe needs a multi-layered, integrated air defense system that could assess the scale of an inbound attack and divert the right resources, unlike Wednesday morning’s response, where high-value fighter jets such as Dutch F-35s were scrambled to shoot down cheap drones,” according to Ben Hodges, as quoted by the authors.
• “Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk said of an estimated 19 drones that entered Polish airspace, only about four ‘that presented a direct threat’ were shot down. According to the Polish military, most of the drones were decoys routinely used by Russia to distract and deplete Ukraine’s air defenses,” the Financial Times correspondents wrote.
• “NATO has acknowledged that its eastern air defenses are one of its weak spots and in urgent need of investment, as part of a pledge to raise national defense spending to 5% of GDP over the next decade,” the article noted.
• "The Polish arms industry official said the attack was designed to 'create a division in NATO between people who say “we must respond and help Poland” and those who say “relax, they are just testing us, it’s no big deal," Foy, Weaver, and Clover reported.
• “Analysts say this year’s Zapad [war games] will seek to achieve three things: test NATO’s responses to provocations such as the drone incursions, demonstrate that despite its military failures in Ukraine it is still a formidable fighting force, and maintain a state of anxiety in NATO states bordering Russia and Belarus,” the Financial Times team explained.
• "Russian officials in recent days have stepped up their rhetoric against NATO neighbors, accusing them of military offensives and setting the stage for Moscow to justify its own retaliatory actions," the authors wrote.

"The Kremlin’s plot to kill NATO’s credibility," The Economist, 09.10.25. 

• "Nineteen drones were fired, largely from Belarus, a client state where Russian troops freely operate. They ended up deep in Polish airspace, where some were shot down. Others crashed, fortunately with no loss of life," The Economist reported.
• "Much more likely is that Russia was deliberately probing Poland, and NATO, for weakness, both military and political, and doing so with just the sort of ambiguity and deniability in which the Kremlin delights," The Economist argued.
• "Unless the response is immediate and unequivocal, weakness is exactly what Russia will surmise," The Economist warned.
• "NATO should state that all incursions in Poland and other front-line states will be intercepted, overturning the practice of playing these down. It should deploy more aircraft on Baltic and Polish air-policing missions, and shift air-defense systems, providing this does not denude Ukraine," The Economist advised.
• "NATO should also mount a forward-defense, shooting down drones and missiles inside Ukrainian and perhaps Belarusian airspace if these are bound for NATO airspace… and strengthen Ukraine’s ability to strike drone-production facilities deep inside Russia," The Economist recommended.
• "Much of this will require more spine from Mr. Trump. Despite having promised to end the war in Ukraine in a day, he has let Vladimir Putin lead him by the nose," The Economist criticized.
• "Mr. Trump claims to hate bloodshed, but has remained passive as Mr. Putin has intensified his drone strikes on Ukraine. Mr. Putin’s answer to Mr. Trump’s peace initiative is 800 drones a night," The Economist remarked.
• "His ambiguity about America’s position is a gift to the Kremlin, which aims to sow doubt about American resolve," The Economist wrote.
• "The task before Mr. Trump is simple. He must find the words that have long failed him and declare that America will uphold its treaty obligations, and defend its allies," The Economist concluded.
• "Anything less will invite further aggression, not only from Russia but from autocrats elsewhere," The Economist warned.

“A test for NATO—and for Trump," Editorial Board, Washington Post, 09.12.25.

• "When asked by reporters on Thursday about the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, President Donald Trump was nonchalant. 'Could’ve been a mistake,' he shrugged. 'But regardless, I’m not happy about anything having to do with that whole situation,'" the Editorial Board wrote.
• "Poland is a NATO ally and as such enjoys treaty guarantees. Guarantees are nothing but pieces of paper—until they are tested. Regardless of whether the drones were deliberately sent into Polish airspace, they have become a test of allied resolve," the Editorial Board argued.
• "Trump equivocated again: 'The Poland thing, I mean, I’m not going to defend anybody. But the Poland—they were actually knocked down and they fell' within Polish airspace. 'But he shouldn’t be close to Poland anyway,' the president added, not very menacingly," the Editorial Board observed.
• "The U.S. ambassador to NATO quickly reacted on X: 'We stand by our NATO Allies in the face of these airspace violations and will defend every inch of NATO territory.'" the Editorial Board reported.
• "NATO itself has also stepped up. Secretary General Mark Rutte announced an operation dubbed Eastern Sentry, effective immediately. Denmark, France, Britain and Germany have committed fighter jets and other assets to securing the alliance’s eastern flank," the Editorial Board noted.
• "Rutte called the incursions 'reckless and unacceptable,' adding: 'We can’t have Russian drones entering allied airspace,'" the Editorial Board stated.
• "The American president could be just as forthright… 'The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art,' John Foster Dulles famously said. 'If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war,'" the Editorial Board concluded.

"Russia is probing NATO’s resolve," Editorial Board, Washington Post, 09.10.25.

• “Russia’s provocation in Poland this week represents a serious threat to the stability of the NATO alliance, and it is only the latest insult Vladimir Putin has directed at President Donald Trump in recent weeks,” the Editorial Board wrote.
• "Early reports indicate that 19 Gerbera drones flew into Polish airspace on Tuesday night… The operation was meant as a test of NATO unity," the Board argued.
• "This comes as Putin is derailing Trump’s attempts to make peace in Ukraine… Trump then said he would pick a side in two weeks’ time. That deadline passed last Friday," the Editorial observed.
• “On Wednesday, Trump posted glibly, ‘What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!’ That won’t be enough to stop the Russian president, who understands how ambiguities drive wedges into alliances,” the Editorial Board noted.
• "A security guarantee such as NATO’s Article 5 is ultimately just a promise written on paper. An incursion that unnerves one ally but prompts another to wave it off as insignificant sows further doubts about what will happen if Russia escalates," the Editorial Board warned.
• "Trump has made 'peace through strength' his motto. Ambiguity in the face of aggression telegraphs nothing but weakness—and only invites further war," the Editorial concluded.
• “There are plenty of actions he can take short of war… [Trump] could move additional battalions and equipment already on the continent into Poland as a show of support. NATO might even declare that it is ready to shoot down drones over Ukrainian airspace if they appear to be heading for the territory of any member country," the Editorial suggested.
  "Putin Taunts Trump and NATO," Review & Outlook (Editorial), The Wall Street Journal, 09.11.25.
• "President Trump thought he could negotiate peace in Ukraine with his friend Vladimir Putin, and perhaps it was worth a shot. Yet the Russian has offered nothing but brutal escalation for eight months, and now he is taunting Mr. Trump and NATO by flying drones into Poland. Your move, Mr. President," the WSJ Editorial Board wrote.
• "An estimated 19 Russian drones violated Polish airspace on Tuesday night, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allied assets from Patriots to F-16s scrambled to take down the projectiles. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte called the drone foray 'absolutely reckless' and 'not an isolated incident.' That many incursions can't be explained by incompetence or bad directions," the editorial argued.
• "Mr. Putin thinks he can get away with this provocation as he pummels Ukraine with hundreds of missiles and drones, and it's a reasonable bet based on Mr. Trump's record… Mr. Trump hasn't backed up his repeated warnings and deadlines, and Mr. Putin may figure he can always count on another two weeks," the editorial stated.
• "The Trump Administration appears to be cutting back U.S. security funding for NATO's Baltic states that understand the threat from Mr. Putin and prove it with their high defense spending," the Board observed.
• "This soft touch may in part be a quixotic attempt at a grand bargain with Beijing, but the President can forget about that if he lets Mr. Putin con him on Ukraine," the editorial warned.
• "A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia would be a disaster for the world that nobody wants, but a limp U.S. response increases the odds of war. It's a direct security risk to the U.S. that Mr. Putin thinks he can send drones into Poland, a U.S. treaty ally that hosts roughly 10,000 American troops," the Board wrote.
• "Mr. Trump on Wednesday mused on social media 'What's with Russia violating Poland's airspace with drones? Here we go!,' and a President sounding like a sidewalk gawker isn't encouraging," the editorial stated.
• "The President knows the pressure he can apply on Mr. Putin: More sanctions, more weapons for Ukraine and fewer restrictions on their use, and a reinforcement of NATO's military power so it isn't caught off guard by Russia's probing," the Editorial Board concluded.
• "The drone parts now scattered all over Poland bear an old message, and it's that weakness invites aggression," the Board warned.

"Russia Tests NATO With Poland Drone Breach," Liana Fix and Erin D. Dumbacher, Council on Foreign Relations, 09.10.25. 

• "More than a dozen Russian drones entered Polish territory overnight, with several intercepted and shot down by NATO forces. This is the first time NATO is known to have fired shots in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine," Fix and Dumbacher wrote.
• "The amount of drones, as well as the deep incursion into Polish territory, make this a much more serious and likely deliberate provocation from the Russian side," the authors argued.
• "The incident comes at a delicate time in Ukraine negotiations. Moscow views the Alaska summit as a victory, while the United States appears reluctant to increase pressure on Russia to negotiate directly with Ukraine and drop some of its maximalist demands," Fix and Dumbacher explained.
• "If NATO were faced with the amount of drones that Ukraine destroyed that same night… it would be in a much more difficult position. Countering small, unmanned vehicles is a difficult mission for all NATO militaries… Scrambling fighter jets is a costly approach to countering low-cost drones," the CFR fellows noted.
• "The drone incursion gives reason to be skeptical of Belarus and Russia’s claims that the drones simply 'lost track' … Russia bears responsibility for its war against Ukraine and any incursion into NATO territory," they stated.
• "NATO allies should invest in expanded sensor networks on the Polish and Baltic borders… and need systems at the border with a low cost-per-shot… doubling down on jamming or directed energy, which the U.S. military is already working to develop," Fix and Dumbacher recommended.
• "If it is proven that this was a deliberate Russian incursion, NATO leaders have to respond diplomatically and militarily in a way that deters Russia from a similar incursion… NATO leaders could consider a wide variety of military responses, from increasing air patrolling to supporting a Ukrainian attack on Russian drone production sites, or ratcheting up sanctions," the CFR experts concluded.

"Europe’s Delusions Over What It Means to Deter Russia," Franz-Stefan Gady, Foreign Policy, 09.10.25. 

• "Today, as European leaders craft their response to Russian aggression in Ukraine—and as NATO holds emergency Article 4 talks after Russia’s overnight drone attack on Poland—they risk repeating the fundamental error that doomed Singapore: substituting tactical gestures for strategic clarity and allowing political convenience to drive what should be comprehensive strategic imperatives," Gady argued.
• "Europe’s current approach to Ukraine follows a similar self-delusion. The continent’s leaders have embraced a strategy of limited steps—providing enough support to prevent Ukraine’s collapse while avoiding commitments that might require genuine strategic sacrifice and risks," Gady wrote.
• "Europe has not reached a consensus on whether keeping Ukraine independent is worth the risk of a direct military confrontation with Russia," Gady stated.
• "A European coalition-of-the-willing deterrence force might deploy three to five brigades—about 15,000 to 34,000 troops—to Ukraine in order to help deter renewed Russian aggression following a future cease-fire," Gady suggested. "But even this would stretch European capacity to the absolute limit, and it remains unclear how long such a force could sustain itself."
• "Without an honest conversation with European voters about what deterring Russia… requires—accepting the possibility of European casualties, sustaining permanently expanded forward deployments, and restructuring NATO’s regional defense plans—a European coalition of the willing risks becoming another 'boasted fortress' that might look impressive on paper but turns out to be strategically hollow when tested by reality," Gady concluded.

"How to Build a Post-American Liberal Order: The World’s Democracies Must Work Together—and Constrain Washington," Phillips P. O’Brien, Foreign Affairs, 09.10.25. 

• "Trump is not only pulling away from the United States’ traditional partners; he is flirting with working directly against them. Trump has made it known for years that he often prefers engaging with dictators—including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping—to engaging with democracies," O’Brien argued.
• "The risks emanating from Washington go beyond abandonment. Trump is reorienting the U.S. away from historic allies, toward a new 'Three Emperors League' of spheres of influence, leaving democratic states to confront autocracies alone," the author explained.
• "Other liberal states will need to construct nuclear deterrents of their own. Europe could build warheads but would need help with delivery systems; Pacific democracies could assist with conventional missile technology and, in turn, learn from Europe about warhead development and nuclear security," O’Brien suggested.

"The decline of the West and the rise of ‘the Rest’ will lead to a new world order," Amitav Acharya, Chatham House, The World Today, 09.15.25. 

• "As Donald Trump rampages through the global economic system with his tariff war and throws the United States’ commitment to NATO into serious doubt, fears—even panic—are mounting about the collapse of world order," Acharya wrote.
• "Trump is not creating this crisis—he is accelerating forces that had already undermined the old order," Acharya argued.
• "Globalization is not disappearing, but taking a new, eastern turn," Acharya explained.
• "Multiplexity will define the new order: no single nation, or cluster of powers, will dominate, and power will be issue- and time-specific. The U.S. will likely remain the most powerful nation, but China will be pre-eminent in development and trade," the author wrote.
• "Asia accounted for 57% of global GDP growth between 2015 and 2021 and 42% of world GDP (at PPP). More than half of global trade is now accounted for by Asia," Acharya highlighted.
• "Countries will avoid rigid alliances and instead ‘hedge’ or avoid taking sides in great power rivalries. The tendency towards a more non-aligned foreign policy will grow," Acharya contended.
• "International cooperation may move to a ‘world-minus-one’ mode, with more multilateral deals emerging without U.S. participation but leaving the door open for its return after Trump," Acharya suggested.
• "Short of a nuclear catastrophe, a new international order will emerge on the back of the old, with important differences to correct its failings, but also with continuities," Acharya concluded.

"Don’t Overestimate the Autocratic Alliance: Washington Still Has Significant Leverage Over China, North Korea, and Russia," Patricia M. Kim, Foreign Affairs, 09.15.25. 

• Patricia M. Kim argues in Foreign Affairs that the apparent unity between China, Russia, and North Korea is a tactical display masking “deep-rooted mutual suspicions” and a lack of genuine trust or shared values.
• Kim notes that historical frictions—including the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split—created persistent distrust and competition, undermining any real solidarity among the three regimes.
• She highlights “cracks” within the alignment, such as Russia’s deepening relationship with North Korea unsettling Beijing, and ongoing wariness about each side’s intentions in the region.
• According to Kim, Xi, Putin, and Kim each hedge their bets, leveraging relationships for concessions while maintaining distance, rather than building a strong or unified bloc.

"Are We Overestimating Autocracies? Russia and Iran have proved weaker than many thought. So will China." Matthew Kroenig, Foreign Policy, 09.15.25. 

• "Leading military analysts predicted that Russia would easily roll over Ukraine in February 2022… Now, they tell us that Beijing’s rapid military buildup will make it difficult for the United States and its allies to defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Are they wrong about this, too?" Kroenig asked.
• "As Russia and Iran reveal, autocracies have systematic weaknesses that are consistent blind spots for U.S. military analysts… democracies are more fit for great-power rivalry and autocracies have recurring and systemic flaws," Kroenig argued.
• "For dictators, poor decisions arise from 'yes men,' ideological meddling, and corruption. Russian officers waited for orders from above, and more than 10 Russian flag officers have been killed in Ukraine due to these command and control issues," Kroenig reported.
• "Three and a half years later, Russia’s supposed cakewalk over Ukraine has instead bogged down into trench-style warfare with more than 1 million Russian casualties," Kroenig noted.
• "Western analysts often overlook autocratic vulnerabilities and instead imagine illusory advantages, picturing U.S. adversaries as 10 feet tall," Kroenig observed.
• "China’s autocratic dysfunctions are affecting its military… Xi’s push for ideological purity and control has led to CCP representatives embedded in military units, purges of officers, and prioritization of ground-based missiles over survivable submarines, all weakening operational effectiveness," Kroenig explained.
• "Correctly evaluating the threat from China matters greatly… If China is weaker than some believe, denying a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be a viable military objective, and Washington may be able to secure interests across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia," Kroenig concluded.

"East is East: Fears of an India-China-Russia Alliance Are Overblown," Sadanand Dhume, The Wall Street Journal, 09.11.25. 

• "Should the U.S. fear an emerging India-China-Russia alliance? ...Their worry is largely unwarranted. Despite a sharp downturn in U.S.-India relations, the odds that New Delhi will align itself with Beijing remain vanishingly small," Dhume argued.
• "While there's no doubt that Mr. Trump has set back American diplomacy with India, it doesn't automatically follow that New Delhi will ally with Beijing. The differences between the two countries run too deep for that," the author wrote.
• "India and China share a roughly 2,200-mile disputed boundary… Despite more than 30 rounds of bilateral talks, China has refused to return to the pre-2020 border," Dhume explained.
• "India's ties with Russia are more complicated… Over the years, India has drastically reduced its arms purchases from Moscow… New Delhi remains dependent on Moscow for military spare parts and advanced weapons technology," Dhume noted.
• "This complicated situation makes a Russia-China-India alliance highly unlikely… India's most natural partner is Washington, not Beijing," Dhume concluded.

"The EU can stop Russia controlling the Black Sea—here’s how," Interview with Natalie Sabanadze by Sara Seth, Chatham House, The World Today, 09.15.25. 

• "The Black Sea is where Russia’s domestic priorities meet its external ambitions. Putin has a vision of Russia as a ‘civilization state’, which requires territorial expansion… Controlling the Black Sea is key to Russia’s ambitions because it would enable it to project influence into the Middle East and Africa and dominate critical trade and energy routes," Sabanadze explained.
• "If Odesa and other Ukrainian ports were to fall, Russia would control 30% of the global grain trade. This could be used as an instrument to influence grain-dependent countries in the Global South," Sabanadze noted.
• "Russia wants to control as much of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast as possible. Beyond that, it is increasing its influence in Romania and Bulgaria through hybrid warfare, and expanding the naval base in Ochamchire, Abkhazia," Sabanadze stated.
• "Turkey is seen as the gatekeeper of the Black Sea because it controls the entire southern coast, including access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits… While Russia knows it can’t dominate Turkey, it wants to ensure Ankara doesn’t become firmly part of the western camp," Sabanadze observed.
• "The EU and NATO must coordinate their approaches in the region. The EU needs to get better at deploying its soft power to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics… Strengthening the Bulgarian and Romanian navies should be a priority for NATO," Sabanadze advised.
• "Turkey remains the main counterweight to Russia in the Black Sea… it wants Ukraine to remain a naval power and in control of its Black Sea coastline. It’s important that the EU and NATO build on this common interest with Turkey," Sabanadze concluded.

“‘Flawed Assumptions’: How CIA Saw Through Putin’s Plan to Invade Ukraine,” Alex Raufoglu, Kyiv Post, 09.10.25.

• [William] Burns believes that Putin’s decision to invade was based on fundamentally flawed assumptions. Putin was convinced the timing was tactically favorable and that the Russian military was modernized enough to easily overcome Ukraine. He also held a dim view of the ability of Europe and the US to respond effectively.
• Putin thought he had “sanctions-proofed” the Russian economy. These assumptions stemmed from a closed decision-making process where his inner circle was small and filled with individuals who either shared his hardline views or were unwilling to challenge his judgment.
• Burns maintained that Putin’s war has already been a “strategic failure” for Russia. He pointed to Moscow’s military weaknesses being laid bare, its economy being “badly damaged,” and its future being shaped as a “junior partner and economic colony of China.”
• He also noted that Putin’s “revanchist ambitions” have been “blunted by a NATO that has only grown bigger and stronger.” But the Kremlin leaders still held a “dim view” of Europe’s ability to respond and believed the US would not likely provide significant support.
• “Those were fundamentally flawed assumptions,” Burns said. He attributed these errors to Putin relying on an ever more narrow circle of advisors made up of those who either shared his views or had learned it was not “career-enhancing to challenge his judgments.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Boosted by summits in Alaska and China, Putin moves against Europe, Ukraine," Robyn Dixon & Catherine Belton, Washington Post, 09.14.25.
• "Will NATO make its red lines clear after Putin’s drone foray into Poland?" Henry Foy, Financial Times, 09.11.25.
• "Russia’s Alarming Drone Incursion Into Poland," Jillian Kay Melchior, Wall Street Journal, 09.15.25.
• "Vladimir Putin’s dangerous drone probe is a moment of truth for NATO," The Economist, 09.10.25.
• "Europe’s new battle to defend its skies from Russia," The Economist, 09.14.25. 
• "What's behind Putin's incursion in Poland," Max Boot, Washington Post, 09.11.25.
• "Russia Just Attacked NATO. Again." Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 09.10.25.
• "America risks making frenemies of old allies," Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, 09.16.25.
• "The Beginning of the End of NATO," Robert Kagan, The Atlantic, 09.10.25.
• "Five Lessons From Putin’s Reckless Drones in Poland," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 09.10.25.
• "In the Same Boat: Security Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific," Aylin Matlé and Hanna Gers, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 09.09.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

​"China’s 'Trump' Card," Ian Bremmer, Project Syndicate, 09.09.25.

• "Don’t mistake the photos of Chinese President Xi Jinping alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Beijing’s Victory Day parade for a new world order. Xi is in no position to lead one. But he does see a global leadership vacuum and he is moving to exploit it," Bremmer observed.
• "The real story from last week wasn’t the military hardware rolling through Tiananmen Square. It was the guest list for the preceding Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, the largest since the organization was founded in 2001... more than two dozen world leaders—overwhelmingly from Asia and the Global South—turned up at Tianjin with one thing in common: a shared desire to diversify away from the United States," Bremmer wrote.
• "In what I call the 'G‑Zero world'—where no country is willing and able to set global rules, and where the U.S. is increasingly seen as not just unpredictable but unreliable—the premium on optionality has gone through the roof," Bremmer argued.
• "Xi used the SCO summit to pitch a sovereignty-first multipolar alternative to the Western-led order, to criticize Trump’s 'unilateral coercive measures,' and to add a new Global Governance Initiative... the summit’s joint statement echoed his talking points, and members agreed to create yet another development bank to facilitate transactions in national currencies rather than the dollar," Bremmer reported.
• “The incremental creation of new global plumbing—including a new SCO bank... more national-currency settlement, anti-sanctions mechanisms, and more South-South coordination—could matter down the line… These are small steps, but they will make diversification away from the U.S. easier over time, and harder to unwind later. American unilateralism has made the costs of overreliance unmistakable, handing China an obvious opening. All it needs to do is present a simple contrast: at least we are consistent. In a G-Zero world, that counts more than perfection,” Bremmer concluded.

"China and Russia Are Winning the Hypersonic Missile Race," Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 09.11.25. 

• "At China’s massive military parade this month celebrating the end of World War II in the Pacific, Beijing showcased its line of anti-ship hypersonic missiles—an implicit warning that in a future conflict, the United States could see its $13 billion aircraft carriers at the bottom of the sea," Skove reported.
• "China is not the only U.S. adversary investing in the weapons. Russia has also made strides in fielding hypersonic missiles, whose high speeds and maneuverability make them the ideal weapon for destroying high-value targets," Skove explained.
• "U.S. hypersonic weapons, meanwhile, are trailing behind, although experts say the country is making progress… 'While we were busy on counterterrorism, China worked in earnest on this. They have had a lead, but we’re catching up,' said Tom Karako, CSIS," Skove wrote.
• "Russia’s key programs are the Avangard, a glide vehicle, and the Zircon, a cruise missile. Russia also fields the Kinzhal, a weapon derived from older, less maneuverable ballistic missile technology… Ukraine in April said it had shot down 40 of the missiles since 2022," Skove noted.
• "The United States’ slow pace in hypersonic weapons development may sound worse than it is… For Washington, hypersonics are 'more of a niche capability,' Harrison [AEI] added," Skove concluded.

"Trump’s Inaction Hands Putin a Lifeline Through China," Maximilian Hess, The Moscow Times, 09.09.25. 

• "Since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022... the Russian president has had three asks of his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping: political-military support, a deal on the Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline, and unfettered access to Chinese financial markets," Hess wrote.
• "In the past week, Putin has finally come close to securing all three... The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline is crucial for Russia’s future status as a global energy exporter," Hess explained.
• "On Aug. 28, Russian LNG carrier Arctic Mulan unloaded its cargoes at the Beihai LNG terminal in China’s Guangxi province—the first-ever delivery of Russian LNG from the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic 2 LNG export facility," Hess reported.
• "Beijing is now reportedly preparing to give a signal to its financial market that such [panda bond] deals should be approved… The about-face on accepting Russian LNG with a clear sanctions risk… and the opening of Chinese financial markets to Russian state entities is a remarkable turnaround," Hess argued.
• "These developments have not come in a vacuum. They come as President Donald Trump’s Administration has failed to enact a single new sanction against Russia since coming to office, except for a tariff targeting India that Beijing has managed to avoid despite buying more Russian oil than New Delhi," Hess observed.
• "Beijing has clearly been emboldened to increase its support for Putin’s Kremlin and Russia’s struggling economy," Hess stated.
• "By failing to prioritize the mortal threat posed by Russia over his perception of the risks posed by China, Trump has only further enabled both," Hess concluded. 

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "From USSR to Xi's vassal: how Russia is becoming a cog in global technological bipolarity," Aaron Lea and Boruch Taskin, The Moscow Times, 09.14.25.
• “China and Russia sign more deals, but Beijing keeps the upper hand,” Katrina Northrop, Robyn Dixon and Lyric Li, Washington Post, 09.11.25.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

"Don’t renew New START. It only helps our adversaries," Robert Peters, Washington Post, 09.05.25. 

• "New START, the last remaining nuclear arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States, will expire in February. Once it does, there will be no limits on how many nuclear weapons Russia or the United States can build or field," Peters wrote.
• "Many argue that President Donald Trump should seek an agreement with Vladimir Putin for some type of follow-on agreement, even a nonbinding one, to maintain the limits on nuclear weapons established by New START… But pursuing a follow-on to New START would be reckless," Peters argued.
• "The Russians have cheated on and abrogated treaty after treaty, including Reagan's landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and New START itself," Peters asserted.
• "Russian leaders have not allowed U.S. inspectors into their country for years, and any agreement that did not require inspections or verification measures would incentivize Russia to continue cheating," Peters observed.
• "Most important, maintaining current warhead levels would benefit only one party: China," Peters explained.
• "Since 2020, [China] has tripled the size of its warhead count. Within a few years, it will have as many operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons as the United States. And when it reaches that point, the United States will not have the number of operationally deployed warheads to cover—and therefore deter—both Russia and China simultaneously," Peters warned.
• "If New START expires without any follow-on agreement, the United States could add nuclear warheads from its reserve stockpiles to its existing ICBM force—having each ICBM carry two or three warheads, not just one," Peters suggested.
• "The United States would then be able to hold 450 targets at risk, allowing it to cover significant portions of China's nuclear force. Both Russia and China could be deterred in the immediate term without additional ICBMs having to be deployed," Peters wrote.
• "Critics argue that Russia could react by adding additional warheads to its own existing ICBM force. But this would not change U.S. targeting requirements," Peters contended.
• "Imagining that a meaningful arms-control agreement with Russia will emerge after the expiration of New START early next year amounts to wishful thinking. There is simply no good deal to be had at this point. Instead, it would be far better for the United States to create the leverage it needs by fielding a more robust and credible nuclear deterrent," Peters concluded.

"Chinese triad: a nuclear family affair," Henry Boyd & Douglas Barrie, IISS Military Balance Blog, 09.09.25. 

• "Beijing parades its nuclear trinity for the first time as a show of strength and as anything but subtle warning to the United States and its regional allies," Boyd and Barrie reported.
• "For the first time, China publicly displayed all three elements of its nuclear triad—land-based missiles, ballistic-missile submarines, and nuclear-capable bombers—signaling a new level of maturity and confidence in its deterrent," the authors wrote.
• "The parade demonstrated not only expanding numbers and improved quality, but also advancements in the survivability and readiness of Beijing's nuclear forces," Boyd and Barrie observed.
• "China's rise as a peer nuclear competitor comes as the U.S. and Russia's arms control framework is under threat, making strategic calculations more complex in both Asia and globally," the authors argued.
• "This nuclear show was clearly aimed at the United States and its allies, as China seeks to caution Washington against escalation and force regional actors to consider its deterrent in any military planning," Boyd and Barrie concluded.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Is NATO Prepared for Autonomous Warfare?" David Kirichenko, The National Interest, 09.10.25.

• “The Russia-Ukraine war, as one Ukrainian soldier put it, is “a war of drones” and “a war of technology.” The next phase of this technological war will have a growing focus on autonomous systems and ground robotics. While Russia helps the Axis of Evil advance technologically, Europe, together with Ukraine, has the capacity to become a global leader in these fields and ensure it is prepared for the wars of the future,” the author concludes.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Europe and the U.S. Still Haven’t Choked Off Russia’s Energy Riches," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 09.09.25. 

• "Three and a half years into Russia’s invasion, the West still hasn’t found a way to choke off Russia’s energy exports, still the Kremlin’s biggest source of money," Johnson reported.
• "Europe and the U.S. have tried price caps, sanctions, tanker crackdowns, and going after buyers like India—but Russia’s energy sector is surprisingly resilient, and U.S. policy has often pulled punches," Johnson observed.
• "Russia is still making about $600 million a day from energy exports, even as drone attacks have set some refineries on fire—meaning the West’s measures have so far failed to empty the Kremlin’s coffers," Johnson wrote.
• "Further U.S. action is needed—especially against Russia’s shadow fleet—but the Biden and Trump administrations have hesitated, and European unity is always a challenge," Johnson argued.
• "Without the United States and without aggressive secondary sanctions, it is hard to bring Russia’s energy earnings to heel; as one analyst put it, 'people remain hesitant to tackle this issue,'" Johnson concluded.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Gazprom and the New Pipeline: How to Correctly Understand the Power of Siberia-2," Mikhail Krutikhin, The Moscow Times, 09.15.25.
• "U.S. sanctions face liquefied challenge," Mikhail Krutikhin, The Moscow Times, 09.09.25.

Climate change:

"Western Sanctions Have Unintended Climate Consequences in Russia," Tom King, The Moscow Times, 09.10.25. 

• "Western export controls against Russia... prevent access to the technology Russia could use to stem such climate change issues," King reported.
• "Emissions throughout the Arctic have ballooned in recent years. Alaskan permafrost warmth records broke in 2024 and the region now emits more carbon than it absorbs," King noted.
• "Russia knows it is warming 2.5 times faster than the global average, resulting in a government-predicted cost of 3% of the country’s GDP by 2030. But efforts to mitigate this are limited and pragmatic," King observed.
• "Many climate change monitoring and remediation projects in the Russian Arctic depend on Western technology and investment, from permafrost monitoring to LNG efficiency upgrades. Sanctions have prompted the exit of critical Western suppliers like Siemens and ABB and complicated Russia's move toward lower emissions," King wrote.
• "Russia has substituted some Chinese technology and tried to continue projects domestically, but gaps remain, especially in calibration, research equipment, and long-term technical support," King explained.
• "With Russia isolated from Western tech and data-sharing, global science has lost access to crucial Russian permafrost data, hindering climate research. At the same time, lost collaboration raises the risk of miscalculation and environmental disaster as infrastructure ages and new projects lag in technical standards," King argued.
• "Sanctions impede Russian climate work, but their removal is no silver bullet: war priorities and mismanagement tie up funds and sap momentum for emissions reductions. Policymakers now face a difficult trade-off: cripple Russia’s economy and limit its climate efforts, or accept that international cooperation is vital in the Arctic," King concluded.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"What Could Postwar Economic Cooperation Between Russia and the U.S. Look Like?" Robert Agee’s interview with RBC.ru, Russia.Post, 09.13.25. Machine-translated.

• “At the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of Russia and the U.S. in four years, the agenda… included not only settling the war in Ukraine, but also potential economic cooperation,” Agee told RBC.
• “From 2011 to 2014, trade between Russia and the U.S. fell from $31 billion to just over $3 billion. Even prior to sanctions, the countries were not major trading partners,” Agee noted.
• “U.S. firms, unlike Chinese ones, have invested about $100 billion in Russia over 30 years, built around 50 factories, and created many jobs. Even under current pressures, about 200–250 U.S. companies continue to work in Russia, mainly in FMCG, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment,” Agee explained.
• "Future cooperation could focus on the Arctic (shipping and resource extraction) and rare earth metals, both of which offer enormous economic benefits and strategic importance," Agee argued.
• “Resumption of business will require the settlement of the war and at least a partial lifting of sanctions. A key signal would be the ability for companies to transfer dividends out of Russia,” Agee said.
• "Many U.S. companies are watching and waiting for conditions to change, particularly in energy and IT. Even firms that stayed cannot transfer profits out of the country—lifting such restrictions would build trust, not trigger mass exits," Agee stated.
• "Even a small joint project could open the door to broader collaboration. The main thing is that business should be free to operate and transfer dividends; this will be beneficial for both Russia and the U.S.," Agee concluded.

“We betrayed Russians in 1945. We’re doing it again in 2025," Jeff Jacoby, Boston Globe, 09.14.25.

• "In May 1945… Soviet citizens who had fled Josef Stalin’s tyranny… were now in Allied custody. They pleaded not to be sent back to the USSR, knowing what awaited them… Nearly 3 million men, women, and children were forced across the lines. Many were executed… countless others vanished into the gulag," Jacoby wrote.
• "It is repeating that betrayal yet again in 2025... the Trump administration has been deporting Russian dissidents who fled Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship. On Aug. 27… dozens of Russians were rounded up and forced onto planes… facing a decade in prison—or conscription back to the front line," Jacoby argued.
• "Washington is now frankly cooperating with Putin’s secret police in the persecution of political dissidents… America is not only sending critics of Putin back to Russia but turning them over together with evidence that can be used to fabricate criminal cases against them," Jacoby stated, citing Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
• "This policy began under Joe Biden, who allowed smaller-scale deportations of Russians back to Moscow. But under Trump it has intensified, both in numbers and in ferocity," Jacoby observed.
• "To return refugees to certain persecution is a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law… It is wicked to betray the defenseless, grotesque to deliver them… to the very tyrants they opposed," Jacoby wrote.
• "Strategically, the folly is just as clear… Refugees from tyranny are not a burden but an asset. Russians fleeing Putin often bring education, technical skills, and entrepreneurial drive; keeping them strengthens us, deporting them strengthens him," Jacoby concluded.

“America’s Greatest Threat to Democracy Comes from Within” Gary Kasparov interviews Jake Sullivan, The Atlantic, 09.12.25.

• Kasparov: “I, of course, want to ask you to analyze the war in Ukraine as it stands now, but first let’s add some context to the conversation. Let’s go back to the early 2000s. Vladimir Putin rose to power, and every subsequent U.S. president has had to deal with him. Tell me how you view America’s foreign policy, specifically its Russia policy in this quarter century.”
  • Sullivan, the Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School: “Well, what’s clear is that Vladimir Putin has become an increasing menace to his neighbors, to the world, to his people, and neither the United States nor anyone else has been able to reverse that trend. And it is certainly the case over the course of the past quarter century that President Putin, Vladimir Putin has just kept growing his appetite for death and destruction, disruption. And I think it’s fair to say that the sum total of U.S. policy from the late ’90s through the 2000s and the 2010s was not able to turn that around.”
• Kasparov: “Let’s go back to the early days of Vladimir Putin’s rise. Why does every new administration seem to fall into the same mistake with Putin, negotiating with him as though he’s someone who would keep his word?”
  • Sullivan: “Well, it’s harder for me to speak—I wasn’t in the Clinton administration or the Bush administration… Interestingly, Garry, when I was the director of policy planning at the State Department from 2011 to 2013—and thanks, actually, to some really, really smart Russia experts on my team—I actually produced a memo for Secretary Clinton in 2012 that basically said, This is going to go in a very dark direction as President Putin comes back to power, and we have to be ready for a very aggressive and assertive Russia.”
  • “And in fact, Secretary Clinton ended up sending her own memo over to the White House, essentially making that case at the end of 2012. That was when, watching Putin come back into power, that I really saw the threat and challenge that he posed. And I put that down on paper and made my views clear at the time.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:⁶

"Orthodox Faith with Soviet Aesthetics: What a Rare Moscow Parade Says About Power in Russia," Sergei Chapnin, The Moscow Times, 11.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• “The Sept. 7 religious procession, led by Patriarch Kirill, revealed less about Orthodox faith than about power dynamics—demonstrating the regime’s capacity to orchestrate managed loyalty in public life,” Chapnin observes.
• “While the event honored the Synaxis of Moscow Saints, its true significance lay in authorities permitting, then tightly choreographing, a mass street gathering in a country where civil society is dismantled and public space is secure-state property,” Chapnin notes.
• “Participants seemed less motivated by faith than by habit or compliance, accepting banners, QR code tracking, and even petty official absurdities as the price of temporarily shared public life. The joyous atmosphere masked a deeper social atomization: Muscovites now celebrate the mere ability to walk together under state supervision,” Chapnin explains.
• “The turnout exceeded strict parish ‘participation quotas,’ showing that citizens largely accept the status of the Orthodox Church as a state-dependent institution, not an independent spiritual authority,” Chapnin argues.
• “The event’s administrative style—and the growing prominence of Archbishop Savva (Tutunov), a dual French-Russian citizen—highlight the Church’s transformation into an ecclesiastical department fused to the state machine,” Chapnin asserts.
• “Aesthetically, the march mimicked Soviet May Day parades: orchestration over spontaneity, loyalty over inspiration, precision over imagination. Both Church and state value conformity more than creativity,” Chapnin laments.
• “Ultimately, this was not faith in action but a controlled demonstration of allegiance to power. The state permitted, the Church organized, the people obeyed, and authorities monitored silently. A religious ritual became political theater—the true ‘miracle’ was how smoothly the machinery of managed consent functioned,” Chapnin concludes.

"Logistics for Greater Eurasia," Sergei Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 09.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Russia is entering the final stage of acute conflict with the West on the fields of Ukraine. Without a victory comparable to 1815 or 1945, the world will continue to slide toward a Third World War. Achieving such a victory is our duty not just to the country, but to humanity,” Karaganov wrote.
• “Russia’s three-hundred-year European journey is over. The main direction of our development is now obvious: a turn back to ourselves, to our historical roots in Siberia and the East, moving away from the declining and increasingly Russophobic Europe,” Karaganov argued.
• “The strategy for Russia’s future must focus on shifting spiritual, economic, technological, and political development eastward—towards the Urals and Siberia, which will be the country’s primary source of growth and strength,” Karaganov asserted.
• "Russia must prioritize developing its 'North–South' logistics—meridian transport corridors connecting Siberia with the rising markets of Asia," Karaganov explained.
• "External ties should be complementary to, not substitutes for, internal cohesion. Siberia’s rivers and local resources are underused assets for development and must be connected to new infrastructure," Karaganov noted.
• “Key principles for this new logistics: prioritize long-term security and development over short-term economic calculations, shift the center of infrastructure building to Siberia, revive river transport, use infrastructure to support small cities and local development, and make projects as psychologically uplifting as the construction of the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur Mainline,” Karaganov listed.
• “The aim is to create a new Russian elite focused on building a sovereign, Eurasian power—purged of West-centrism and committed to a major national project: constructing the logistics, economy, and spirit of a new Siberian Russia, integrated into Greater Eurasia,” Karaganov concluded.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Russia prepares tax hikes. Again," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 09.12.25. Clues from Russian Views.
• "Clumsy officials and the third IT revolution in Russia," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 09.11.25.
• "Propaganda in Russian schools," Denis Kasyanchuk, The Bell, 09.09.25.
• "What angered the Russian media in Alla Pugacheva's statements," Vladimir Ruvinsky, The Moscow Times, 09.13.25.
• Vladimir Putin’s remarks at "Plenary Session of the Forum of United Cultures," Kremlin.ru, 09.12.25. Clues from Russian Views.

Defense and aerospace:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "On the possibilities of mobilization," Vladislav Inozemtsev, The Moscow Times, 09.10.25. See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Resilient Against Putin, But Struggling at Home," Mark Landler, New York Times, 09.13.25. 

• "The foreign policy successes of Keir Starmer of Britain, Emmanuel Macron of France and Friedrich Merz of Germany are in contrast with their dismal domestic performances," Landler wrote.
• "Rarely have Europe's leaders acted so united and resolute on the global stage, while suffering so many domestic political setbacks. Their resilience reflects a determination to confront Russia's aggression," Landler noted.
• "While majorities across Europe still favor supporting Ukraine, Europe's capacity to do so in the long term will be constrained if its leaders are not able to tackle domestic economic weaknesses. Their current solidarity could easily fracture if countries are asked to commit troops to a peacekeeping force," Landler explained.
• "Mr. Merz of Germany got off to a strong start by negotiating the loosening of state debt limits to finance a mammoth increase in military spending… Back in Berlin, Mr. Merz has had a bumpier ride… The far-right party Alternative for Germany, which now leads Mr. Merz's Christian Democrats in polls, is a growing threat," Landler reported.
• "Mr. Macron… has the freedom and the limitations of being a lame duck. Under France's presidential system, he has more leeway on foreign policy than his British and German counterparts. Analysts say he has made the most of it since last summer… his vision of a strategically independent Europe is vitiated by France's inability to pay for it," Landler explained.
• "Poland, which suddenly finds itself on the war's front lines, provides a pertinent example. Its centrist prime minister, Donald Tusk, had taken a staunchly pro-Ukraine position. But after the election of a right-wing president, Karol Nawrocki, who opposes Ukraine's membership in the European Union, the nation is now bitterly divided over how to treat Ukrainian refugees," Landler noted.
• "For Mr. Starmer, the calculus is different. His Labor Party has a 148-seat parliamentary majority, and he is not obliged to call an election until 2029… he will meet Mr. Trump next week as the major European leader most likely to be in office until after Mr. Trump himself is gone," Landler concluded.

Ukraine:

"How Ukraine and Gaza scrambled the ideological map," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 09.16.25. 

• "Ukraine and Gaza have scrambled the ideological map: among commentators and governments, there are now pro-Israel and pro-Ukraine, pro-Ukraine and pro-Palestine, pro-Russia and pro-Israel, and pro-Russia and pro-Palestine camps," Rachman wrote.
• "The 'pro-Ukraine, pro-Israel' crowd closely correlate with the group once known as neoconservatives. They see both Ukraine and Israel as democracies under attack that deserve support," Rachman explained.
• "The pro-Ukraine, pro-Palestine crowd are more focused on human rights and war crimes—rather than the questions of democracy and who fired the first shots," Rachman stated.
• "There is a pro-Russia and pro-Israel position common among admirers of strongman rule, exemplified by Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister… Variants of the Orbán position can be found across the European far right, where hostility to Muslim immigrants can translate into support for Israel; and nationalism, social conservatism and suspicion of NATO can create sympathy for Russia," Rachman noted.
• "There is also a strain of isolationist far-right thinking in America that is pro-Russia and increasingly pro-Palestine… Both Carlson and Greene have been accused of antisemitism. But their positions on Israel and Ukraine can be seen as an expression of an uncompromising form of 'America First' nationalism," Rachman observed.
• "For me, at least, Ukraine and Israel are now on different sides of the moral ledger. Ukraine is still genuinely fighting for its existence… Israel’s mass killing of Palestinian civilians and use of hunger as a weapon of war cannot be justified as legitimate self-defense," Rachman concluded.

"Ukraine is struggling to challenge Russia in Africa," Jenny Mathers, Chatham House, The World Today, 09.15.25. 

• "In April 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a state visit to South Africa—his first formal visit to Africa—as part of Kyiv’s effort to make new allies on the continent," Mathers reported.
• "Since 2022, Ukraine has opened eight embassies in Africa, including in Mauritania, and provided more than 300,000 tons in food aid as well as substantial military assistance to conflict-stricken countries," the author noted.
• "In 2024, Ukrainian special forces were reportedly operating in Sudan to support the army against Russian-backed rebel forces, and Kyiv managed to send 10 million tons of grain to Africa, rebuilding trade ties lost after the Black Sea blockade caused a 30 million ton shortfall in 2022," Mathers wrote.
• "Ukraine’s ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative has offered food aid to over 8 million people in Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, and Mauritania," Mathers observed.
• "At the UN General Assembly emergency session in March 2022, just 28 of Africa’s 54 countries voted to condemn Russia’s invasion. Since then, Ukraine has lost further support, with more African countries siding with Russia," Mathers explained.
• "Russia maintains twice as many embassies in Africa as Ukraine, a strong cultural presence through 15 'Russian Houses,' and a sophisticated social media campaign in local languages," Mathers reported.
• "In 2024, Mali and Niger broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine after allegations of Ukrainian involvement in training Tuareg rebels. Meanwhile, many African governments are skeptical of Ukraine's perceived western alignment and support for values—such as secularism and LGBTQ rights—that are less popular in Africa," Mathers concluded.

"The Perils of Irresponsible Reporting on Russia’s War," Edward Lucas, Foreign Policy, 09.11.25. 

• Sensationalism and Scaremongering:
• Geographical and Demographic Minimization:
• Framing Estonia as an “ex-Soviet” State:
• Exaggerating Ethnic and Linguistic Divisions:
• Lack of Context and Precision about Populations:
• Othering and Exoticizing:
• Downplaying or Ignoring Estonia’s Capabilities:
• Failure to Consider NATO’s Role and Capabilities:
• Scaremongering about Russian Minorities as a Monolithic Threat:
• Underestimating Estonia’s Willingness and Ability to Fight:
• Neglecting Historical and Policy Context:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Zapad against the West: How Europe should read the Russian-Belarusian military drills," Vasil Navumau and Kirill Shamiev, ECFR, 09.11.25.⁷

• "Zapad 2025, a joint Russian–Belarusian exercise scheduled in Belarus, has revived an unpleasant European memory—the 2021 drills simulated offensive operations and pre-positioned equipment deployed in Ukraine the following year. This week’s Zapad will be the first exercise since the full-scale invasion," Navumau and Shamiev wrote.
• "European governments should treat Zapad 2025 primarily as political theatre. For Lukashenko and Putin, it is a form of 'iron diplomacy,' a staged escalation to ratchet up the security climate in eastern Europe and influence talks between Moscow, Minsk and Washington," the authors argued.
• "The Belarusian military will use Zapad 2025 to test the Regional Forces Group command, supported by the Russian Baltic and Northern fleets. Advances in drone warfare will be highlighted, with both countries expanding UAV units," Navumau and Shamiev observed.
• "The exercise is just one part of a wider set of Russian and Belarusian drills this year—Belarus has held large-scale mobilizations, air-defense trainings, and electronic-warfare tests; Russia has staged naval and submarine drills and nuclear-missile preparations," the authors reported.
• "Lukashenko is pursuing ‘prisoner diplomacy’ and aims to leverage Zapad 2025 to bolster his role in U.S.-Russia negotiations—though his standing depends on their progress. For the West, understanding the mix of military theatrics and diplomatic signaling is crucial for crafting a coherent response," Navumau and Shamiev concluded.

"Not so quiet on the Western Front: Why Russia’s Zapad exercise highlights the need for military confidence-building measures," Alexander Graef, European Leadership Network, 09.09.25. 

• "The active phase of Russia’s strategic Zapad exercise begins this week (Sept 12–16). Held every four years, Zapad alternates with Union Shield drills and is designed to test the warfighting capacity of the Russia–Belarus Union State," Graef wrote.
• "Concerns are not unfounded: in 2008, 2014, and 2022, major exercises preceded Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Yet these drills are also instruments of strategic communication, aimed at signalling resolve and shaping perceptions," Graef explained.
• "For Zapad 2025, Lithuanian intelligence estimates no more than 30,000 troops will participate—less than half the figures in 2021—with only 8,000 stationed in Belarus," Graef reported.
• "Belarusian officials have deliberately played the nuclear card. Defense Minister Khrenin said Minsk would 'together with our Russian colleagues, work through questions of planning the employment' of 'nuclear weapons' and the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile, linking Zapad directly to nuclear signalling," Graef stated.
• "Russia has evaded the Vienna Document’s notification thresholds by breaking large exercises into smaller ones and stopped implementing the document after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Belarus, by contrast, has notified participants about Zapad 2025 and invited observers," Graef noted.
• "Inviting observers to major exercises can bolster deterrence by showcasing capabilities, but confidence-building only works if observers view full-scale activities—not just staged segments—and are given meaningful access," Graef argued.
• "CSBMs (confidence- and security-building measures) could still help manage Europe’s growing divide, provided all sides prioritize stability. But non-compliance must be treated as a political signal and have clear consequences to be credible," Graef concluded.

"A Month After Historic Armenia-Azerbaijan Summit, Has Trump Secured a Lasting Peace?" Olesya Vartanyan, Carnegie Politika, 09.11.25. 

• "A month after the White House ceremony in which Armenia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement aimed at ending decades of conflict, it still remains unclear how much the United States is ready to invest to make it stick," Vartanyan wrote.
• "The breakthrough owes much to U.S. mediation… but both societies remain deeply skeptical. The challenge now is rebuilding trust between neighbors who no longer remember how to live side by side in peace," Vartanyan observed.
• "Negotiations with Armenia had largely wrapped up a year earlier, and the final details of the peace treaty were agreed this spring. But Azerbaijani President Aliyev insisted the deal be finalized only if he was invited to the White House—a prestige that the Trump administration was eager to offer," Vartanyan explained.
• "The peace treaty requires Armenia to amend its constitution to remove references to Nagorno-Karabakh, a process that will take time. Meanwhile, exchanges of legal documents in international courts have stopped, and diplomatic talks have begun about ambassadorial appointments," Vartanyan noted.
• "The Trump-branded TRIPP project (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) would connect Azerbaijan’s exclave Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan via southern Armenia, managed by a private U.S. company. Yet Baku and Yerevan still disagree over sovereignty, fees, and practicalities such as emergency services," Vartanyan wrote.
• "The EU offered to help finance new transit routes, but Washington does not want to coordinate with Europe, and Brussels is no longer central to the process," Vartanyan reported.
• "Türkiye's role is critical. While Ankara has promised to normalize ties with Yerevan after a peace deal, its follow-through is uncertain, especially since it is wary of Moscow and reluctant to associate too closely with a Trump-branded project," Vartanyan concluded.

“The Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Agreement and Its Enemies,” Olivier Guitta, The National Interest, 09.08.25.

• “On August 8, against all odds, US president Donald J. Trump oversaw the signing of a historic peace deal between Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev at the White House. This was despite the fact that just a few days earlier, the French daily Le Monde ran an article entitled ‘Peace remains elusive between Armenia and Azerbaijan,’ claiming that a possible peace deal ‘fuels a sense of despair’ in Armenia.”
• “Needless to say, this does not please Moscow. Indeed, Russia has accused the West of trying to ‘usurp’ the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal and ‘conform it to its own interests.’”
• “Another party that is quite unhappy about the US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal is Iran. One of the significant issues involves the Trump Route of Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), formerly known as the Zangezur Corridor, a trade and transportation corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its enclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.”
• “Vocal enemies of the peace deal, orchestrated by the United States with the help and goodwill of Armenia and Azerbaijan, are also enemies of the West, and are repeating messages pushed by Russia, Iran, and their propaganda outlets. This is unsurprising, as the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal killed two birds with one stone. By establishing peace in a key strategic region, it boosted American interests while undermining Russian and Iranian influence and signaling their relative weakness at the same time.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Eurasia’s Shifting Strategic Paradigm," Nargis Kassenova, Project Syndicate, 09.15.25.
• "Why Belarus Is Forging Ever-Closer Ties With Russia," Aliaksandr Kudrytski, Bloomberg, 09.15.25.

• "The secretive corporate empire that captured a breakaway state," Polina Ivanova, Financial Times, 09.11.25.

   

Footnotes

1. After a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace last week that forced NATO jets to scramble, Poland’s foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski called for NATO and EU states to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine to better protect Europe from drone and missile debris. Sikorski insisted Poland could not act unilaterally, urging collective action as Ukraine seeks more air defense amid escalating Russian drone attacks. While NATO has previously rejected a no-fly zone over escalation fears, the 19-drone incident and similar violations reported by Romania have revived the debate, as Western allies summoned Russian diplomats and Poland invoked NATO Article 4. Top Kremlin officials responded with heightened rhetoric: Dmitry Medvedev warned that a NATO-backed no-fly zone or shooting down Russian drones would amount to “a NATO war with Russia,” while Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared NATO is “at war with Russia.” (Newsweek, 09.15.25, Washington Post, 09.15.25, Newsweek, 09.15.25)
2. On Sept. 13, 2025, Romania’s defense minister said a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace that day and was tracked by the air force for nearly an hour before leaving—Moscow’s second violation of NATO territory in a week. The incident followed a swarm of 19 Russian drones breaching Polish airspace, which led to NATO jets shooting them down in the alliance’s most serious direct clash with Moscow since the Ukraine invasion began. (Financial Times, 09.14.25)
3. U.S. imports from Russia fell from $14.14 billion in 2021 to $2.50 billion in the first half of 2025, though they still totaled $24.51 billion since January 2022, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Notably, U.S. fertilizer imports from Russia rose to $1.27 billion in 2024, up from $1.14 billion in 2021, while enriched uranium/plutonium imports held steady at around $624 million. Russian palladium exports to the U.S. dropped sharply to $878 million in 2024, down from $1.59 billion in 2021. (Reuters, 09.15.25)
4. EU exports to Russia have plunged 61% and imports from Russia have dropped 89% since Q1 2022, but Europe still trades billions with Moscow, according to Eurostat data reported by Reuters. The EU’s share of oil imports from Russia fell from 29% in early 2021 to just 2% by Q2 2025, and Russian gas now covers only 12% of EU supplies, down from 48% in Q1 2021. Despite these drops, Russia’s fertilizer market share in the EU rose to 34%. (Reuters, 09.15.25)
5. Romania’s defense minister said a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on Saturday and was tracked by the air force for nearly an hour before leaving—Moscow’s second violation of NATO territory in a week. The incident followed a swarm of 19 Russian drones breaching Polish airspace, which led to NATO jets shooting them down in the alliance’s most serious direct clash with Moscow since the Ukraine invasion began. (Financial Times, 09.14.25)
6. Pro-Kremlin incumbents swept Russia’s regional elections, with United Russia dominating most of the 45,000 seats up for grabs, including 19 governorships. Regional turnout totaled 27.5 million, according to the Central Election Commission. Kursk’s acting governor won re-election with 86.9%, Bryansk’s with 78.8%, and Tatarstan’s with 88.1%—the nation’s highest. Only Chuvashia retained a non-United Russia governor. United Russia fell below 50% in just Komi and Kostroma regions, cementing Kremlin control ahead of next year’s parliamentary vote. The three-day election was the first since authorities shut down Golos, Russia’s main independent election monitor. (The Moscow Times, 09.15.25)
7. U.S. military officers observed joint war games between Russia and Belarus on Monday and were told by Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin that they could look at “whatever is of interest for you.” (Reuters/NBC News, 09.15.25) This, along with recent visits of U.S. officials to Minsk and the lifting of some U.S. sanctions on Belarussian entities, coupled with Alexander Lukashenko’s decision to release scores of political prisoners, signals Washington’s renewed interest in mending fences with Minsk, if only to acquire more leverage vis-à-vis Moscow.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP.