NB: There will be no Russia Analytical Report on Monday, Oct. 9, due to the Columbus Day holiday in the U.S.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“The Effects of a Single Terrorist Nuclear Bomb,” Matthew Bunn and Nickolas Roth, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 09.28.17: The authors, a professor of practice at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a research associate at Harvard’s Belfer Center, write that just one terrorist nuclear bomb set off in a city would have horrific consequences. As such, the authors argue that preventing, not managing, this kind of event should be the primary focus. Weaknesses in nuclear security need to be addressed, and other layers of defense need to be built up in order to deal with nuclear smuggling. Deterrence plays an important role, and greater investment in nuclear forensics is also recommended. Finally, the authors urge a greater intelligence effort and greater international intelligence cooperation in order to to prevent nuclear terrorism.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Does North Korea Matter to Russia?” Sarah Lain, Royal United Services Institute, 09.28.17: The author, a research fellow with RUSI, writes that Russia’s perception of the threat posed by North Korea is different from the West’s, despite a shared interest in de-escalating the situation. Moscow is likely to see a greater U.S. presence in the area as more of a threat than Pyongyang’s missiles. South Korea’s deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system is of particular concern for Beijing, and in a political move, Moscow has sided with Beijing against the system’s deployment. While Russia’s leverage over North Korea is not as strong as China’s, Russia does have political access that could play a large role in de-escalating tensions. The author notes that Russia could lead peaceful engagement with North Korea and in turn earn some of the international “‘respect’ it so often demands.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

“The Iran Deal Is Working. Here's How We Know,” John F. Kerry, The Washington Post, 09.29.17: The former U.S. Secretary of State writes that if the U.S. decertifies Iran’s compliance with the nuclear agreement, Congress will then have to make a decision about U.S. security, “not a referendum on President Trump or former President Barack Obama.” Iran’s destabilizing behavior was not curbed by the deal because “certainty on the nuclear issue” was not going to be part of a quid pro quo. Kerry argues that the deal achieved multiple things. Iran had to do a great deal of work before receiving sanctions relief, and eight consecutive reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency have confirmed that the agreement is working. The deal, like most arms-control agreements, does contain time elements, but these often lead to “follow-on accords, once confidence is built on both sides.” Kerry argues that the agreement includes provisions that make it comfortable: the cap on Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile is in place until 2030, and the monitoring and verification aspects of the agreement don’t expire—if Iran was trying to make a nuclear bomb, the world would not be caught unawares. Kerry argues that fixating on the possible growth of Iran’s nuclear program in ten years “seems irrational” when unraveling the agreement would mean growth of that same nuclear program “tomorrow.” There is no leverage to be gained by walking away from the agreement now and there is much to lose. The agreement, a result of negotiation, not a wish list, is working by all standards that can be measured.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia's Growing Military Prowess,” Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 10.01.17: The author, a senior writer covering terrorism and national security for The New York Times, writes that Russia’s Zapad-2017 military exercises showed “significant strides” in the kind of modern warfare capabilities “that would be part of any all-out war with the United States in Europe.” The scope and scale of the exercises was significantly larger than the fewer than 13,000 troops Moscow promised, according to Western military officials. The exercises were part of a larger effort to show Russian military prowess and reassert Russia as a world power. The exercises showed a Russian military more capable of assimilating new technology and equipped with sophisticated communications equipment. New technology was used “to conceal and protect … vital supply lines,” and drones were part of nearly every exercise. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, “Russia's forces are becoming more mobile, more balanced and capable of conducting the full range of modern warfare.” It remains unclear if the exercises were partly used to leave Russian troops in Belarus, but some analysts say the move would be unnecessary because Putin “successfully carried out an exercise in intimidation” reminiscent of “the most ominous days of the Cold War.” The focus of the exercises also showed “what Moscow fears most” about the U.S. and NATO: their technological superiority in the air.

“Five Things to Know About the Zapad-2017 Military Exercise,” Mathieu Boulègue, Chatham House, 09.28.17: The author, a research fellow with Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes that despite Western instance on there being 100,000 troops at Russia’s Zapad-2017 exercises, Russia kept them “small, managed and contained.” While the actual number remains unconfirmed, it was below the West’s initial report. The author notes that this is because the focus of 2017’s Zapad exercises was on “strengthening Command and Control.” The exercises sent several messages to the West: Moscow wants control over “escalation dominance” in a conventional conflict with NATO; intimidating NATO allows Russia to use Western insecurity as a reasonable deterrent; breaking Russia’s “A2/AD bubble” would come with a high cost and likely lead to the opposing side’s defeat; and that Russia’s borders with Eastern Europe are both “conventionally tough to breach and also benefit from solid anti-access capability.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Arms control:

“With Zapad Over, Is It Time for Conventional Arms Control in Europe?” Ulrich Kühn, War on the Rocks, 09.27.17: The author, a nonresident scholar with the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that Russia’s Zapad-2017 military exercise highlighted the tenuous state of European security. Due to the disparity between Russian and NATO troops in the Baltics, the author recommends a new conventional arms control initiative. While arms control will not solve all problems in the region, it can help create “a more stable status quo.” For NATO, confidence-and-security-building measures would help mitigate concerns about accidental escalation, at least until conventional arms control can step in. However, for Moscow, manipulating the risk of escalation helps it “appear unpredictable and dangerous.” Due to military and political concerns, it is hard for Russia to see the security gains from arms control or security-building steps. “As long as Europe remains a heterogeneous entity and not a serious security actor, Moscow and Washington will continue to determine the fate of security, and thus of arms control, in Europe.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Not-So-Soft Power: Russia’s Military Police in Syria,” Mark Galeotti, War on the Rocks, 10.02.17: The author, head of the Center for European Security at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, writes that Russia’s military police force was formed in 2011 and today stands at 20,000 strong. The first deployment of Russian military to police to Syria in December 2016 was made up of nearly 400 Chechens. A force from neighboring Ingushetia followed. Moscow considered the experiment a success. By July 2017, four battalions totaling 1,200 effectives were operating in Syria, primarily providing security for Russian personnel and facilities and manning stations monitoring Syria’s de-escalation zones. Made up largely of professionals, these units make it easier for Moscow to “form contingents for overseas deployment,” and the experience they gain is not lost as quickly as that of conscripts. It also helps Russia’s public relations campaign for a war that is domestically unpopular. The military police also allow Russia “to send soldiers able to fight if need be” and to “burnish its battered reputation.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Russian Active Measures in Germany and the United States: Analog Lessons From the Cold War,” Laura Daniels, War on the Rocks, 09.27.17: The author, a German Chancellor Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, writes that Russia’s methods during the 2016 U.S. presidential election are nothing new. During the Cold War, Soviet news agencies like TASS and Novosti “cooperated with the KGB active measures department to disseminate covert propaganda—that is, propaganda that masks its origin—abroad.” Incidents such as the Spiegel Affair had respected journalists unwitting advancing Moscow’s goals while “holding their own governments to account.” Another tried and true tool is using leaks to influence a nation’s political trajectory, like the 1964 collaboration between Czechoslovakia and the KGB to have West Germany extend the statute of limitations on Nazi war crimes. Moscow also used ostensibly altruistic organizations that in reality answered to the Kremlin to further its goals by redirecting social and political movements. The Soviet Union also supported the promotion and use of violence to exploit existing divisions in a country. This practice helped isolate the West German capital of Bonn from the rest of the world in 1959, and in the 1970s, Moscow funded multiple West German terrorist groups. The author notes that “information remains the best antiseptic” to such active measures, and argues that raising awareness is even more important today.

“Enough Is Enough: How to Stop Russia's Cyber-Interference,” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 09.28.17: The author, an academic and a former ambassador to Moscow, writes that Russia conducted a number of operations to sway the U.S. presidential election and generate doubt about the democratic process. To counter these actions, the U.S. needs to strengthen its cybersecurity and provide the public with “information about Russian state propaganda.” He argues that foreign entities must not be allowed to buy advertisements aimed at influencing elections, and those who colluded with Russian operatives "must be punished.” These violations of U.S. sovereignty, even if they only had a “negligible influence,” must be prevented via a comprehensive strategy, or “they will happen again in the future.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“On the Day of My Departure: We Need to Rebuild Trust Between Our Two Countries,” John F. Tefft, The Moscow Times, 09.28.17: The former U.S. ambassador to Russia writes that the U.S. and Russia need to rebuild trust. Tefft highlights Russian-American cooperation in business and agriculture, which has increased investment and trade and strengthened ties. He writes that he is “particularly proud” of the positive impact U.S. companies have had on Russia’s business culture by increasing transparency and promoting a sense of business ethics and corporate social responsibility.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russian-Saudi Rapprochement? Iran and Economic Strain Will Make It Tough,” Mark N. Katz, Russia Matters, 09.28.17: The author, a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University, offers a sober take on the prospect for improved Saudi-Russian ties. While a scheduled visit of the Saudi crown prince to Moscow, cooperation on oil production, and a prospective weapons deal have stoked speculation that the adversarial relationship could be turning a corner, any improved ties will be complicated by Tehran and some harsh economic realities. Cooperating on oil prices could have the effect of stabilizing oil prices but could in turn encourage more American shale production and thus lead to more downward pressure on oil prices. “Saudi Arabia’s constrained economic circumstances will make it difficult either to raise bilateral trade from its modest levels—less than half a billion dollars in 2016—or to generate some of the gains Putin may be hoping for, like expanding Saudi investment in Russia,” the author notes. And while Saudi leaders appear to have come to accept that the Assad regime is here to stay, their greater concern is Assad’s ally, Iran. Russia may be able to exert some pressure on Tehran, but whether it will do so and to what degree is an open question. “If Riyadh’s willingness to improve relations with Moscow is based on the belief that only Russia can effectively limit Iranian influence in Syria and elsewhere, then the emergence of strong evidence that Russia cannot or will not do so could lead to yet another downturn in Saudi-Russian relations.”

“The Revolutionary Roots of Russian Foreign Policy,” Jeremy Friedman, Current History, October 2017: The author, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School, writes about the history of Soviet and Russian foreign policy, which is defined by a centuries-old tension between wanting to integrate itself into the West and maintain its independence. The author notes that if post-Soviet Russia learned anything from the legacy of Soviet foreign policy, “it is that any initiative, no matter how self-interested and cynical, must be framed within an ideological narrative that is consistent with Russia’s broader positioning in the global arena.” Even the Russian Revolution was meant to link to the country to likeminded workers in European capitals. When the revolution in Europe failed to come about, the Soviet leadership, through the Comintern, shifted its focus to the colonial world, and Asia in particular, “as the weak underbelly of the imperialist system.” Soviet interests, the author notes, often seemed to “require cooperation with disparate allies under a variety of political pretexts that amounted to fighting some greater evil, whether capitalism, imperialism, or fascism.” But in the post-World War II era, the Soviets’ message was undermined by China, whose message of anticolonial struggle, without prioritizing ties with the West, found receptive audiences in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Meanwhile, with rapid economic growth in the West and the expansion of the social welfare state, the prospect of a working-class takeover seemed less and less likely. “Many in the Soviet leadership began to wonder if their commitments in the Third World had been a great mistake—a quixotic attempt to support revolution where no real revolution was to be had, miring the USSR in an unnecessary confrontation with the West.” The collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the chaotic period of the 1990s has ushered in a new chapter in Russian foreign policy. “Putin and his minions in the Kremlin are employing many tools learned in Soviet days in what they imagine to be a rearguard action to defend Russia’s geopolitical footprint while they attempt to figure out how to reverse its long-term decline on the world stage,” the author writes.  Only now, the Russians, rather offering an alternative ideology, are “attempting to discredit democracy and rally global opposition to American ‘hegemony.’”

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“A UN Peacekeeping Operation Is the Only Way Forward In Ukraine,” Alexey Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.28.17: The author, head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal for a peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine is "exceedingly narrow." Representatives from Ukraine and the West want to explore the proposal's positive aspects "without boxing themselves in." The Minsk II agreements have been stalled for over two years, locking in place the West's and Russia's mutual sanctions and exacerbates tensions between NATO and Russia. Putin's peacekeeping proposal would be a "first step toward ending the crisis," but it needs refinement and expansion. To end the violence in the Donbas will require a full U.N. peacekeeping mission. To secure Moscow's support, a roadmap for sanctions relief once the mission becomes operative would need to be offered. If left alone, the situation in Ukraine is not likely to change. "The current military, political and economic confrontation between Russia and the West could become permanent and lead to a new Cold War." A U.N. peacekeeping mission would act as a means of allowing the parties of the Minsk II agreement to fulfill their obligations and take first steps on the road back to stability. 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Brains, Not Oil, Should Fuel Russia’s Economy: Success in AI and the Energy Industry Means Allowing Creativity to Flourish,” John Thornhill, Financial Times, 10.02.17: The author, a columnist for the Financial Times, argues that Russia needs to turn its focus to technology, both to expand its economic portfolio and to revive its oil industry. One promising sector in Russia is artificial intelligence (AI), which President Vladimir Putin alluded to in a recent talk. “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will be the ruler of the world,” Putin is quoted as saying. The meaning of Putin’s comments aren’t exactly clear; some experts speculate that AI programs may even have been deployed during Moscow’s meddling in last year’s US presidential election. Still, the author notes that while Russia has undoubted human potential in this area, “it is not clear that the country will realize it. Many of the best Russian experts in AI are now working in San Francisco, Tel Aviv or London.” In the oil sector, Russia needs to deploy technology to adjust to the U.S. shale boom and the growing adoption of electric vehicles, which is diminishing demand for oil. “The only way Russia could escape this vicious circle would be to launch its own US-style shale gas revolution to boost productivity and profitability,” the author notes. But in order to boost its tech sector, Russia needs to give more scope to “the creativity and initiative of its people than the Kremlin has traditionally allowed.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.