Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 2-8, 2025

5 Ideas to Explore

In his Washington Post column “What Russia and Ukraine each think happens next in the war,” David Ignatius analyzes the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war in light of Donald Trump’s failing peace efforts. With negotiations stalled and battlefield attrition prevailing, Ukraine has shifted to a doctrine of “strategic neutralization,” as described by its former defense minister, Andriy Zagorodnyuk. “The objective should not be to defeat Russia outright … but to systematically deny it the ability to achieve its military goals,” Zagorodnyuk argued in a recent call, according to Ignatius. “Ukraine may not win this war, Zagorodnyuk concedes, but neither will Russia. And for the defenders, that’s a kind of victory,” according to Ignatius. In contrast, in the public view of the chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, however, Russia is winning. “Today the strategic initiative is completely with the Russian forces,” Gerasimov told his top commanders,¹ with a map behind him showing “a dark boundary line that included all of Odesa in the south, together with all districts east of the Dnipro River, which he evidently sees as part of Russia’s future occupied territories,” according to Ignatius. In his remarks on Aug. 30, Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces have seized 3,500 square kilometers (1,351 square miles) and 149 settlements since March. Some Russian milbloggers and ISW disputed these claims, calling them exaggerated. ISW assessed Russian gains of 2,346 square kilometers (906 square miles) and 130 settlements captured. According to Ukraine’s MoD-associated OSINT group DeepState, in the period from March 1, 2025, to Aug. 30, 2025, the area of Ukrainian lands controlled by Russian forces increased by 2,332 square kilometers (900 square miles) from 112,345 square kilometers (43,377 square miles) to 114,677 square kilometers (44,277 square miles). According to the Sept. 3, 2025, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, in the period of Aug. 5–Sept. 2, Russian forces gained 222 square miles of Ukrainian territory, which marks a 2% decrease in the rate of gains from the 226 square miles these forces gained in the period of July 8–Aug. 5, 2025.
In his interview with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Harvard’s Graham Allison reflects on the precarious state of the international security order, historically upheld by three remarkable feats: 80 years without a major great power war (since WWII), 80 years without nuclear weapon use in conflict and only nine states possessing nuclear weapons, despite many more having the technological capability. He stresses that this order—especially nuclear nonproliferation—has always been fragile, but it has recently become further stressed by Vladimir Putin’s “successful coercive threats in his war in Ukraine,” such as his threats to use nuclear weapons. The order is also stressed by global perceptions, such as that of Ukraine being attacked after surrendering its nuclear arms in the 1990s. In the interview, Allison also discusses Donald Trump’s disruptive approaches to international relations, arguing that they will not necessarily yield bad results in regions such as Europe, which has to deal with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. “If you imagine a post-Trump future in which Europe has taken the shock of Trump to take greater responsibility for its own security, that could be a solid block of international order that actually was quite positive,” Allison told BAS’s John Mecklin. That said, Trump should not count on getting a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in Ukraine, according to Allison. Trump’s “best hope for a Nobel Peace Prize is to make a great peace with China, a great Asian peace. I think the European piece of this is too complicated, because of the Russian angle,” according to Allison, who hopes that “maybe, somehow, out of chaos will come something good.”
Russia launched its largest drone attack of the war Sept. 7, firing 805 Iranian-designed Shahed drones and decoys—surpassing the previous record of 728 on July 9—and striking a protected government building in Kyiv for the first time since the full-scale invasion began, according to a Sept. 7 article by Andrew Kramer in The New York Times. Ukraine’s Air Force also reported 13 cruise and ballistic missiles in the assault; nine missiles and nearly 60 drones penetrated air defenses, killing at least five civilians nationwide, Kramer writes. Russia now produces about 2,700 Shahed drones monthly and launched 21,317 drones in 2025’s first half, up from 8,740 in late 2024, according to Kramer. Ukraine intercepts roughly 80% of incoming drones, but the relentless and inexpensive attacks inflict regular casualties and infrastructure damage while peace efforts stall.
In “To End the Ukraine War, Recapture the Spirit of Helsinki,” Zachary Paikin and George Beebe argue that recent efforts to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war should draw from the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which stabilized Europe through mutual recognition and acceptance of the territorial status quo. Today’s challenge echoes that Cold War precedent, with Russia seeking the revision of post-Soviet borders. The authors urge diplomatic creativity and pragmatic compromise, warning that idealistic or maximalist demands may prolong conflict. They suggest a potential settlement could allow Russia to claim its political aims are met, while the West secures meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine. This would likely necessitate discarding “unworkable” ideas such as Ukraine’s membership in NATO and permanent foreign forces on Ukrainian soil, which could provoke further escalation with Russia. A robust, yet limited, Ukrainian military and phased sanctions relief could further incentivize compromise, according to the authors. Ultimately, Paikin and Beebe assert that Western negotiators must avoid “poison pill” offers unacceptable to Moscow and remain flexible. Only by reviving the spirit of negotiation and compromise embodied in Helsinki can lasting security be achieved for Ukraine and Europe, according to Paikin and Beebe.
"China's leadership believes that it would be against Beijing's interest for Putin to lose the war in Ukraine... But it isn't clear at all that China would find it beneficial for Russia to win," Shi Yinhong, professor at China’s Renmin University, told WSJ’s Yaroslav Trofimov. "If Russia were to win, it would become more troublesome to China than now, when it is at war. It would have much less dependence on China's economy and, if the Republican Party remains in the White House after Trump, Russia would have a bigger chance for a rapprochement with Washington, and China would worry about that," Shi said, according to Trofimov’s WSJ article, "China Shows Unity With Russia and North Korea, but Divisions Linger.” While describing potential Russian-Chinese divisions, Trofimov noted that the issue of annexation of Chinese territories by imperial Russia—a major vestige of colonialism—continues to influence how many Chinese view relations with Moscow. However, China's leadership currently prefers not to emphasize these historical grievances. “We are aware of the past, but our focus is on the future,” said Victor Gao, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing, as quoted by Trofimov.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"Peace Negotiations and Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant," Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 09.05.25.

“The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains on the front line between Russian-occupied and Ukrainian-held territory. As part of any peace agreement or cease-fire, the plant and the satellite town of Enerhodar need to be transferred out of Russian control,” Darya Dolzikova wrote.
“Over the course of the last three and a half years, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated a serious disregard for the safety of the ZNPP and its personnel. The Russian occupiers have tortured, detained and otherwise harassed Ukrainian staff and the residents of the satellite town of Enerhodar,” the author noted.
“According to information shared with the author, as of August 2025, at least 19 residents of Enerhodar — including at least a dozen ZNPP employees — are confirmed or suspected of being under Russian detention,” Dolzikova reported.
“A direct attack on a reactor unit is not necessary to risk a serious nuclear accident; damage to water or external energy supply or to other auxiliary systems resulting from attacks or from poor maintenance…could equally lead to the failure of an NPP’s regular operating and safety systems,” the article stated.
“Even as the plant’s reactors remain in cold shutdown…Russian leadership is likely to pressure to restart operation of at least some of the ZNPP reactor units. According to company leadership, as of 2023, Rosatom had allocated RUB 20 billion for the ZNPP and the city of Enerhodar, with another RUB 90 billion to be allocated through 2026,” Dolzikova explained.
“No peace settlement or cease-fire agreement can be complete or sustainable while Russia maintains control of the ZNPP and Enerhodar. Russian inability to operate the plant safely will only grow worse with time,” the author argued.
“A more workable approach…may be to hand over the plant’s ownership to some kind of international task force or consortium, or to the IAEA. The territory of the ZNPP and a surrounding perimeter, which should include Enerhodar, could be designated a neutral enclave,” the author suggested.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"CRINK Economic Ties: Uneven Patterns of Collaboration," Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, and Tina Dolbaia, CSIS, 09.04.25.

Iran and its nuclear program:

No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"The War in Ukraine Has a Shocking New Weapon," Lilia Yapparova, The New York Times, 09.04.25.

“Small-scale attacks like [the arson attempt by three Russian teenagers] are part of a new kind of hybrid warfare being carried out by Russia and Ukraine. Over the years since the Russian invasion, the security services of both countries have discovered a cheap and accessible asset—youngsters who can be recruited for one-off covert attacks, often without even knowing who they are working for,” Lilia Yapparova wrote.
“Stories about cross-border surveillance and sabotage have been circulating for a couple of years. But the phenomenon…has clearly picked up,” the author reported.
“A 14-year-old Ukrainian schoolgirl was harassed by her Russian recruiters: They gained access to her intimate photos, then threatened to post them online unless she became a saboteur. Similar blackmail has reportedly been used against schoolkids from the Russian town of Myski,” Yapparova wrote.
“On the Russian side, the results are striking. One Ukrainian teenager, taught by the Russian military intelligence service how to use encrypted communications and a timed fuse, carried out an arson attack at an IKEA store in Lithuania,” the article stated.
“Since the spring of 2024, the Ukraine security service has arrested around 175 minors implicated in espionage, arson and bomb plots orchestrated by Russian intelligence agents. The youngest among them is 12 years old. Russia does not disclose such information, but human rights activists…say there are at least 100 equivalent cases,” Yapparova reported.
“According to Igor Volchkov, a lawyer specializing in family law, the children’s block in one of Moscow’s main pretrial detention centers has grown from 20 to 100 teenagers during the war, swelling with kids suspected of pro-Ukrainian sabotage,” the author noted.
“This war of subversion has left a trail of ruined lives—hundreds of children on both sides of the front,” Yapparova concluded.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

“Russia bombs Ukraine almost every night. This is what it sounds like," Lizzie Johnson, Serhii Korolchuk, Anastacia Galouchka, Kostiantyn Khudov et al., Washington Post, 09.08.25.
For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“What Russia and Ukraine each think happens next in the war. Windows into each side’s strategies make one thing clear: The fighting is probably far from over,” David Ignatius,² The Washington Post, 09.05.25.

“President Donald Trump’s peace initiative for Ukraine — with its empty threats and fuzzy deadlines — has all but collapsed. What’s left is the battlefield, where Kyiv and Moscow keep slugging it out in a bloody war of attrition... we’re likely to see more death and destruction without a decisive breakthrough by either side,” according to Ignatius.
“Ukraine is quietly embracing a new doctrine described as ‘strategic neutralization’ by Andriy Zagorodnyuk, the country’s former minister of defense. The concept, as he explained it in a Zoom call Friday from Kyiv, is to paralyze Russia’s forces on the ground and in the air, just as Ukraine has done in the Black Sea. Russia might keep fighting, but if this model holds, it won’t win,” Ignatius writes.
- “Zagorodnyuk described the strategy in Friday’s call, which expanded on an article he published recently. ‘The objective should not be to defeat Russia outright … but to systematically deny it the ability to achieve its military goals,’ he argued. Victory means learning to thrive ‘under constant military pressure,’” Ignatius writes.
“On Aug. 30... Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the Russian chief of staff gathered his top commanders” and told them “‘Today the strategic initiative is completely with the Russian forces’ ... But even by Gerasimov’s account, Russia’s vaunted summer offensive has made only marginal advances. It hasn’t even conquered the four Ukrainian regions claimed by Russia in 2022, when the war began. Three years later, by Gerasimov’s calculation, Russia holds 79 percent of Donetsk, 74 percent of Zaporizhzhia, 76 percent of Kherson and 99.7 percent of Luhansk.”
- “The Telegram post that reported Gerasimov’s briefing didn’t provide specifics about future operations. But a map visible behind him showed a dark boundary line that included all of Odesa in the south, together with all districts east of the Dnieper River, which he evidently sees as part of Russia’s future occupied territories,” according to Ignatius.
  - “Russia’s modest gains have come at the immense cost of more than 1 million Russian dead and wounded, U.S. officials estimate,” according to Ignatius.
- “Ukraine, heroically, is embracing what might be described as ‘strategic pessimism.’ … ‘If it is impossible to dissuade Putin,’ writes Zagorodnyuk, ‘then the question is how to systematically obstruct his efforts. Ukraine’s strategy must now shift from trying to deter attacks to actively preventing Russian operational success, no matter how long the war continues.’ Ukraine may not win this war, Zagorodnyuk concedes, but neither will Russia. And for the defenders, that’s a kind of victory,” Ignatius concludes.

"Russia Strikes Ukraine Government Building in Largest Drone Assault of War," Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 09.07.25.

“Russia attacked Ukraine on Sunday with the largest drone assault so far in the war, Ukrainian authorities said, damaging a key building in the heavily guarded government district of the capital for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022,” Kramer reported.
“Ukraine’s Air Force said that Russia had launched 805 Iranian-designed Shahed exploding drones and decoys across the country, the latest in a relentless offensive that has continued unabated despite the Trump administration’s efforts to mediate peace talks,” Kramer wrote.
“Before Sunday’s assault, the largest attack was on July 9, when Russia launched 728 drones,” Kramer noted.
“Russia also fired 13 cruise and ballistic missiles in the latest volley, according to the Ukrainian Air Force, which said nine missiles and nearly 60 drones had evaded air defenses and made impact,” Kramer reported.
“At least five people around the country were killed on Sunday, according to the Ukrainian authorities, including a woman and child in Kyiv,” Kramer wrote.
“President Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who despite appeals from the White House has given little indication that he has softened any of his maximalist demands for a settlement,” Kramer observed.
“Despite imposing ‘secondary sanctions’ on India and other countries that do business with Russia, Mr. Trump’s threats to punish Russia itself have been so far empty, with deadlines he’s set for action coming and going without consequence,” Kramer noted.
“Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, said on Friday that Russia now produces about 2,700 Shahed-type drones per month,” Kramer reported.
“In the second half of 2024, Russia launched 8,740 drones — but in the first half of this year, Russia launched 21,317 drones, according to the air force,” Kramer wrote.
“While Ukraine has been able to shoot down about 80 percent of the drones launched by Russia, the weapons are cheap to manufacture and Moscow has relied on large volleys that can still kill people and damage infrastructure,” Kramer concluded.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
"Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change," Marco Hernandez and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, New York Times, 09.08.25.
"Ukraine’s Flamingos take to the skies," Fabian Hinz, IISS, 09.05.25.
"For Americans in Ukraine, Opportunity and the Lure of Combat," Andrew E. Kramer and David Guttenfelder, New York Times, 09.07.25.

Military aid to Ukraine

"Ukraine and the coalition of the unwilling," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 09.09.25.

“If Vladimir Putin wants peace, he has a funny way of showing it. Over the weekend, Russia launched its largest aerial attack on Ukraine since the full-scale invasion of February 2022. A day later, Donald Trump was asked if he was ready to intensify sanctions on Russia and responded laconically — ‘Yeah I am,’” according to Rachman.
“The White House argues, with some reason, that the Europeans should get their own house in order first. In Thursday’s call, Trump called out the EU for still importing energy from Russia. The European response was that EU purchases are now down to 20 per cent of prewar levels — and a lot of that is accounted for by Hungary and Slovakia, the two member countries that are closest to Trump’s Maga movement,” Rachman wrote.
“In the call, Trump also criticized European leaders for not doing anything to put pressure on China, the biggest buyer of Russian energy which has just agreed to open a major new gas pipeline with Russia,” according to Rachman.
- “The European response was to agree to work with the US on secondary sanctions aimed at China — with a focus on goods that help the Russian war effort,” Rachman noted.
“Since it is understood that Russia is unlikely to agree to a negotiated ceasefire, there is now talk of creating a ‘de facto ceasefire’ through an American ‘air shield’ for Ukraine. The air shield would involve a big increase in air defenses that could close the skies to Russian drones, although not to ballistic missiles,” Rachman wrote. However, “Many of the most important countries in that ‘coalition of the willing’ are in fact unwilling to deploy troops to Ukraine. The reluctant include Germany, Italy and Poland,” Rachman noted.
“Getting Trump to increase military and economic pressure on Putin — and to stick with it — would be an incredible feat of persuasion. It is certainly worth a try. But Europe needs a plan B, for when the Trump-whispering fails,” Rachman concluded.

"A ‘bad bank’ can solve Europe’s Russian assets conundrum," Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 09.04.25.

“Three and a half years since western countries blocked access to Russia’s central bank reserves invested in their jurisdictions, their governments have gone through all kinds of contortions to avoid the decision of whether to outright take control of the assets to compensate Ukraine,” Martin Sandbu wrote.
“The ERA loan…was entirely predictable…that the ERA loan envelope would quite quickly be exhausted, bringing back the political Gordian knot of what to do with the assets of a state in flagrant violation of fundamental international law,” the author explained.
“The CBR [Central Bank of Russia] said then that it held about $350bn worth across various western jurisdictions. … [A]bout €190bn was frozen in Belgium, about €20bn in France, and about €7bn in Switzerland,” Sandbu reported.
“So, simplifying a little, Russia’s central bank reserves in western jurisdiction now largely amount to a single massive current account in a Belgian bank (and some smaller accounts in other western banks),” the article stated.
“Virtually all securities holdings have converted into a bank deposit. Euroclear…publishes the amount of its deposit liabilities caused by sanctions,” Sandbu noted.
“A bad bank could be reincorporated in a country with fewer qualms. Estonia…already has domestic legislation enabling not just the freezing but the seizing of Russian state property for transfer as compensation to Ukraine,” the author wrote.
“At the end of these four steps…the new banking entity (the bad bank, owned by governments friendly to Ukraine) would hold a single debt liability (Moscow’s deposit), and a single asset (a reparation loan to Kyiv),” Sandbu concluded.

"The ‘Fortress Russia’ economy has adapted well to pressure. But stagflation presents an opportunity for the West," Timothy Ash, Chatham House, 09.05.25.

“The Russian economy has proven much more durable through three and half years of full-scale war in Ukraine, and a decade of Western sanctions, than many would have expected,” Timothy Ash wrote.
“While suffering a 1.4 per cent real GDP contraction in 2022, it grew in real terms by over 4 per cent per annum over the next two years,” the author reported.
“By February 2022, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) had accumulated over $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, with around 10 per cent of GDP in assets in its National Wealth Fund,” Ash noted.
“According to IMF data, Russia has run a current account surplus of around $375 billion for the period since the full-scale invasion, around 50 per cent higher than the comparable period before the invasion,” the article stated.
“I estimate that real GDP growth has been around 1 per cent lower per annum for Russia over the past decade, at least, as a result of Putin’s policy settings. As a result, by 2025, real GDP is around 12 per cent lower than what it might have been. And the cumulative US dollar GDP loss is well in excess of $1.6 trillion,” Ash wrote.
“The $100 billion in additional annual defense spending and the losses to the Russian economy are likely to combine to many trillions of US dollars,” the article explained.
“Inflation has consistently run at more than double the CBR’s 4 per cent inflation target since the full-scale invasion, as a result of sanctions boosting import costs, and ruble weakness,” Ash reported.
“Household and corporate lending has moderated sharply—the former to a near standstill. Economic activity has slowed too. Real GDP growth slowed to just 1.1 per cent YOY in the second quarter of 2025, after growing 1.4 per cent YOY in the first quarter, and less than one quarter the year earlier level,” the article stated.
“The CBR reports a marked 40 per cent reduction in the current account surplus in the first half of 2025,” Timothy Ash wrote.
“A greater sanctions push by the West might just be enough to push the economy closer to the brink… a 10-20 per cent across the board tariff on Russian exports could be effective and workable…seizing the more than $300 billion in CBR assets immobilized in Western jurisdictions and allocating them to Ukraine’s defense would send a strong signal,” Ash concluded.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

"To End the Ukraine War, Recapture the Spirit of Helsinki," Zachary Paikin and George Beebe, The National Interest, 09.04.25.

“Talks to end the Russia-Ukraine war are now advancing at a frenetic pace,” according to Paikin and Beebe. “However, it remains uncertain whether agreed-upon measures will prove acceptable to Russia,” they write. “Still, the adoption of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 offers lessons that remain pertinent to the task of achieving peace in Ukraine and stability in Europe today,” according to the duo.
- “First, and most famously, the Helsinki Final Act resulted in mutual recognition between the two Cold War-era blocs and the acceptance of the post-Second World War territorial status quo. Today, we are confronted with a similar challenge: Russia’s revision of the post-Soviet territorial status quo and annexation of parts of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.”
- [Second it is important to ensure] “diplomatic creativity and compromise,” according to Paikin and Beebe.
- “Diplomacy should not be equated with the pursuit of idealism. Instead, it should be understood as a vital tool for navigating unavoidable ambiguity and managing clashing interests short of war,” according to the authors.
  - “Can a compromise be found today that allows Moscow to claim that its political aims have been met, while simultaneously enabling the West to affirm that sufficient “guarantees” of Kyiv’s security have been agreed? Absolutely.
    - “But this will require unworkable options to be discarded, including NATO membership for Ukraine and the presence of a large European force on Ukrainian soil—both of which would threaten to drag the United States into a future war.”
    - “In exchange for offering that any European deterrent force will be stationed outside Ukrainian territory and that any outside military presence on Ukrainian soil will be limited to conducting training and repairs, Moscow could agree to scale back its demand that Kyiv withdraw from the remainder of the Donbass.”
    - “Moreover, the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security will be allowing Kyiv to maintain a large peacetime military capable of deterring another Russian invasion, albeit with certain restrictions on “long-range” weapons. Pushing for Moscow to revise its demand for Ukrainian “demilitarization” in exchange for frontloading more sanctions relief is one option to consider.”
- “Finally, ... the Helsinki Accords crossed the finish line because Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev ultimately sought a deal—one that could pave the way for the USSR’s recognition as a legitimate great power in Europe. Whether Putin similarly wants a deal or instead wishes to reestablish a sphere of influence incompatible with the norm of sovereign equality is a question with which many analysts have wrestled. But the incentives for a settlement remain strong,” according to Paikin and Beebe.
“As Western governments and militaries now deliberate what sort of security “guarantees” they are prepared to offer Ukraine, they must be careful not to insert any poison pills into the process that they know Moscow will not accept—or be prepared to renegotiate their initial offering in exchange for other measures that will strengthen both Ukraine’s and Europe’s security. In other words, they must rediscover the spirit of Helsinki.”

"Vladimir Putin answered media questions. In conclusion of his official visit to the People’s Republic of China, Vladimir Putin took media questions,” Kremlun.ru, 09.03.25. Clues from Russian Views.

“I would like to point out China’s global governance initiative. I believe that it has been advanced at the right time. More importantly, this initiative is aimed at promoting positive sentiments between the countries that attended the summit in China and our potential partners among the countries that are not willing today to proclaim their readiness for this partnership.”
[On Power of Siberia-2] “The negotiating parties have at long last arrived at a consensus. You know, there is no charity on either side.
“I agree with those who believe that every country has the right to choose its own system of ensuring its security. This applies to all states, including Ukraine. But this also means that the security of one side cannot be built at the expense of the security of another party – in this case, the Russian Federation. We have always opposed Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But we have never questioned its right to conduct its economic and business activities as it wishes, including joining the European Union.”
“Security guarantees are a natural necessity, as I often stress. We proceed from the fact that every country should have them, a security system, and Ukraine is no exception. But this is not connected to any swaps, especially those of territories. To be honest, and I want to emphasize it, we are fighting not so much for territories as for human rights – for the right of people living in these territories to speak their native language, to live within their culture and within the traditions passed down from previous generations, from their fathers, grandfathers, and so on. This is the main point. If these people expressed their will to become part of the Russian Federation as part of democratic electoral procedures, such as referenda, this choice must be respected.” However, we do not tie the issue of territories in with security guarantees. Of course, one can argue that these topics are related, but we do not directly tie them together. This issue was not even framed like that during the discussion in Anchorage.”
“Regarding possible meetings with Mr. Zelensky, I have addressed this matter on earlier occasions. In general, I have never ruled out the possibility of such a meeting. Is there any point in holding these meetings? Let us take a closer look at it... By the way, Donald [Trump] asked me, if possible, to hold such a meeting. I told him it was possible. After all, if Zelensky is ready, he can come to Moscow, and we will have such a meeting.”
“So, what should the incumbent authorities do if they want to stay legitimate and participate fully in the settlement process? They must first hold a referendum.... But a referendum cannot be held under martial law, and this is also a provision of the constitution. Therefore, to hold a referendum, martial law must be lifted. But as soon as it is lifted, elections must be held.”
“As for whether the multipolar world has formed or not –generally, its contours have certainly taken shape. However, I would not speak about any dominants in this multipolar world. Multipolarity does not mean the emergence of new hegemons. “
“Yes, of course, there are economic powerhouses, such as India and China. By the way, our country, too, is among the world’s four largest economies in terms of purchasing power parity.”
“In 2014, ministers from three European countries came to Kiev and signed a document which was essentially an agreement between the then President Yanukovych and the opposition. Under this agreement, all contentious political issues were to be resolved within the constitutional framework, peacefully and legally. Yet literally on the following day, a bloody and violent coup d’etat took place. None of those guarantors lifted a finger to channel the situation back to legal framework. This is where the conflict began... Those who drove the situation to this point, while completely ignoring Russia’s legitimate security interests. If anyone thinks they can treat the people of our country with such disregard, they should understand: Russia will never allow such a thing. We will never sit idly by, meekly watching as events unfold around us without any response. We will never allow this.”
“If common sense ultimately prevails, an acceptable option for ending this conflict can be agreed upon. I operate on this belief. All the more so, since we see the commitment and sincere desire of the current US administration led by President Trump to find a solution, not just to issue appeals. I think there is light at the end of the tunnel. We will see how it goes from here. If not, we will have to achieve the tasks set before us by military means.”
“All groups of the Russian Armed Forces are advancing in all directions.”
“Ukrainian Armed Forces are increasingly running out of reserves, with combat-ready units staffed at no more than 47–48 percent. The situation for them is already at a most critical point.”
“I am not sure about the year, but the UN data show that by 2050, I need to check the year, but by this year, I think by 2050, there will be more people over 65 on the planet than five- and six-year-old children”
“I am absolutely convinced that Mr. Witkoff conveys in his contacts with me and other members of the Russian team the position of the US President and not of anyone else. “

“The ugly truth is Ukraine would be better off trading land for peace,” Mark Brolin, Telegraph.co.uk, 09.03.25.

“Given that neither Washington nor Europe is willing to provide the force needed for an immediate Ukrainian battlefield triumph, realism demands an alternative. The least-bad option now looks like a managed freeze that preserves Ukraine’s legal claims while buying the time Kyiv needs to outlast and outcompete Moscow,” argues Mark Bolin.
“Call it a ‘Korean’ freeze with a ‘German’ endgame – a pause that rejects de jure recognition of stolen territory, locks in robust security guarantees now, and invests in Ukraine’s capacity to eventually undo the occupation. This would not be a surrender but strategic time-buying,” according to the author.
In the author’s view, “Winning time is likely to benefit Ukraine for three reasons. “
- “First: Russia’s economy is teetering.” Russia’s economy is to grow by 0.9 percent this year, according to the IMF. That is not impressive growth, but it is still growth.
- “Second: Washington. Domestic politics in the United States impose real limits on what the White House can credibly commit to long-term.”
- “Third: Europe is waking up.”
“A managed freeze would not be an abdication of principle if it is accompanied by ironclad, verifiable conditions,” the author argues.
The author argues: “History offers both warning and consolation. Korea’s armistice has frozen a terrible conflict for decades; Germany’s division, by contrast, ended in reunification once economic and political incentives shifted. The West should opt for a strategy that accelerates the latter trajectory: accepting a temporary, conditional freeze today to make a genuinely free, reunited Ukraine more likely tomorrow.”

"What a Ukraine Endgame Might Look Like," Lawrence J. Korb, and Stephen Cimbala, The National Interest, 09.03.25.

"The end of the Ukraine war will require solutions to three major issues: land swaps, security guarantees, and nuclear deterrence," Korb and Cimbala wrote.
"The assumption that Ukraine, supported by NATO, and Russia can both continue feeding forces into a meat grinder without existential danger to Europe is cockeyed optimism... Getting to yes is going to require a great deal of grunt diplomacy and a willingness on all sides to engage in controversial trade-offs," Korb and Cimbala concluded.
"President John F Kennedy once said, 'We should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear to negotiate.' The admonition was applicable then and remains relevant now," the authors reminded.

“Trump must back Putin into a corner by blunting gains on the ground,” Fiona Hill, Times Radio, 09.06.25. YouTube.

“What the United States needs to do is to blunt Russia’s ability to take more territory on the ground and to help Ukraine defend itself against this bombardment. Because if Putin thinks he can’t go any further, then that might be a reason for him to actually have some kind of serious negotiations.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"Putin Sends Trump Two More Bad Signals; He says Zelensky should 'come to Moscow,' as a top EU plane is jammed," The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 09.05.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivers Keynote Address," IISS Prague Defense Summit, 09.03.25.³

"Russia and China are investing heavily to build up and modernize their militaries. Their defense industries are producing weapons and heavy military equipment at a staggering rate. And this is not just to show off… but to aggressively exert influence, attempt to reshape the global order, and undermine our freedom and security," Rutte argued.
"Today, Russia allocates 40% of its budget on its war economy—40%. And this year alone, it is expected to roll out at least 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles and hundreds of Iskander missiles," Rutte reported.
"Russia is, and for the foreseeable future will remain, a destabilizing and confrontational force in Europe and the world," he stated.
"NATO allies agreed to invest 5% of GDP in defense by 2035—5%… At least 3.5% of GDP will be invested in core defense requirements to fund our militaries and the equipment they need… 1.5% will go towards investments that support our defense and security, like infrastructure, like cyber security, industry," Rutte explained.
"To give you an idea, we need to increase the number of air- and missile-defense systems fivefold. We need thousands more armored vehicles and tanks. We need millions more artillery shells. We need more drones and cyber and space capabilities," Rutte listed.
"Until recently, Russia was producing more ammunition than all NATO allies … much faster than we possibly could… Having recognized the problem, I can tell you that … we are already turning the tide on defense production… The EU’s annual capacity to produce artillery ammunition will be six times that of just two years ago," Rutte observed.
"Ukraine has ramped up its yearly artillery-systems production from nearly zero to well over 200 heavy artillery systems… Ukraine is now also one of the world’s largest producers of autonomous systems, able to produce more than 4.5 million drones per year," he noted.
"For the industry representatives in this room, there is massive opportunity. The demand for capabilities is real and urgent. It is on the rise, and it will continue," Rutte said.
"Some may worry about a new arms race. But our own aim… is not to provoke. Our aim is to protect and to respond to the threats we face. Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine is the most obvious example," Rutte argued.
"We are combining our forces and leveraging our respective advantages. And that is how we will outproduce and outsmart our competitors… That is how we win the competition and preserve peace through strength," Rutte concluded.

"The Case for a U.S. Alliance With India: Washington Should Draw New Delhi Closer, Not Push It Away," Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, Foreign Affairs, 09.2025.

“Tariffs, Russian oil purchases, and renewed tensions regarding Pakistan have caused a rapid and regrettable downturn in the U.S.-Indian relationship, replete with public insults and recriminations,” Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan wrote.
“The current trajectory risks a split that would be difficult to mend, to the great detriment of both countries. As Modi’s chummy appearance over the weekend with Chinese president Xi Jinping and Russian president Vladimir Putin made clear, the United States could end up driving India directly into its adversaries’ arms,” the authors warned.
“A new strategic alliance between the United States and India would be established by a treaty subject to advice and consent by the U.S. Senate. It would be built on five core pillars, with the aim of enhancing the mutual security, prosperity, and values of both countries,” Campbell and Sullivan explained.
“The agreement that GE Aerospace would manufacture F-414 jet engines in India—an unprecedented technology transfer to a nontreaty partner—showed the promise of a more robust defense partnership,” they wrote.
“There is also the question of whether such an alliance can be built in the face of India’s relationship with Russia, which was brought into sharp relief by the recent Modi-Putin meeting. India will need to make a long-term strategic choice to break its dependence on Russia for defense and energy,” the article stated.
“The United States and India are both proud and independent countries. Alliances are about alignment and common purpose—not about sacrificing sovereignty,” Campbell and Sullivan argued.
“Whether that will happen with the current occupant of the Oval Office is unpredictable, but the strategic aim should be clear. The realities of the emerging era have elevated the value of new shared security arrangements. And India has emerged as one of the United States’ most consequential partners,” the authors concluded.

"Europe Is Playing a Long Game on Ukraine, and With Trump," Jim Tankersley, New York Times, 09.05.25.

“European leaders praised President Trump for his efforts to quickly broker a peace deal to end the war in Ukraine last month. But they also expressed skepticism that he could succeed on the accelerated timeline he envisioned after meeting President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Alaska,” Tankersley reported.
“As the prospect of immediate talks has dimmed, they have instead turned their energy toward keeping Mr. Trump engaged, and more or less on their side,” Tankersley noted.
“That strategy, expressed both in public comments and in numerous private briefings by European officials in recent weeks, is simple enough: try to show Mr. Trump that Europe is willing to do the hard work of preparing for a postwar future in Ukraine—and that Mr. Putin is not,” Tankersley explained.
“‘We don’t know whether the Russian president will have the courage to attend’ a summit with Mr. Zelenskyy, Friedrich Merz, the chancellor of Germany, told reporters afterward,” Tankersley quoted.
“‘President Putin is clearly unwilling to meet with President Zelenskyy,’ Mr. Merz said last week after a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron of France. ‘He is setting preconditions that are downright unacceptable. That sounded quite different in the phone call he had with President Trump last week,’” Tankersley recounted.
“Mr. Macron was equally blunt. ‘One gets the impression that President Putin has overruled President Trump,’ he said,” Tankersley reported.
“The Europeans emerged to promise that continental troops would help to provide security guarantees for Ukraine—once negotiators could finally hammer out a peace deal. And they pressed Mr. Trump to throw America’s full weight behind their plan,” Tankersley wrote.
“European leaders amplified their criticisms of Mr. Putin this week. Mr. Merz called Mr. Putin ‘a war criminal.’ Mr. Macron called him ‘a predator and an ogre,’” Tankersley observed.
“‘Action speaks for itself,’ Kai Sauer, Finland’s ambassador to Germany, said in an interview. ‘We have a group of friends of Ukraine, which is larger than Europe. It is meeting on a regular basis and ready to take responsibility’ for postwar peace, he said,” Tankersley reported.
“Still, she added, ‘95% of all of this is to keep Trump happy and keep a seat at the table,’” Tankersley concluded.

"Understanding Russia’s Calculus on Opportunistic Aggression in Europe," Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Kate Johnston, and Greg Weaver, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 09.04.25.

“The report analyzes the gaps in European security that would emerge if the United States reduced its forces in European theater—either as a result of crisis in the Indo-Pacific or as a deliberate policy choice,” the authors wrote.
“While many of the resources required to defend Taiwan are different than those required for European continental security, the report finds that key capabilities—including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; strategic enablers; ground-based air and missile defense; and long-range precision fires—could be redeployed, threatening European deterrence,” the CNAS report explained.
“Russian President Vladimir Putin could view the absence of certain U.S. capabilities as his last best chance to undermine NATO, judging that Washington would have neither the political interest nor the resources to rapidly come to Europe’s defense,” the authors stated.
“The greater the gaps and vulnerabilities in NATO’s conventional forces that Russia perceives, the greater the risk Moscow is likely to accept in pressing its ambitions,” the CNAS report found.
“A shortage of U.S. ISR capabilities in Europe would…degrade NATO’s situational awareness of Russian activity and early warning, leaving the alliance more vulnerable to missing Russian hybrid attacks,” the report noted.
“U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific would also heighten the risk of a kinetic Russian action against a NATO member state…giving Russia time enough to seize territory and then use coercion to compel NATO to accept the result,” the authors concluded.
“‘There is no guarantee that Putin would directly challenge NATO, but there is a risk that he could try—and one that would grow significantly if the United States were engaged in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific,’ write the authors. ‘It is critical now that the United States and Europe take practical actions to mitigate that risk.’”

"Sergei Karaganov’s remarks at the roundtable 'Russia and the World Geopolitical Storm: Scenarios and Strategies'," ZGlobalaffairs.ru, 09.03.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Usually it’s said that now is the most acute period since the Cold War in terms of international security. That’s not correct. There hasn’t been a situation this dangerous since 1939–1945, except for two or three days during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We are on the threshold, or maybe already at the start, of a huge chain of crises,” Karaganov asserted.
“The main reason is that the modern socio-economic system—global liberal imperialism—has reached a dead end. It was based on endless growth of consumption, which stopped being limited by any ethical or other norms,” Karaganov argued.
“The second crisis is geopolitical. The West’s 500-year dominance in the global system, which rested on military superiority, has ended. It began to crumble in the 1960s–70s, was interrupted in the 1990s with the fall of the USSR, and now has resumed. The result is a powerful geopolitical and geo-economic shift from the formerly dominant, rent-extracting West to a new world. The West is in desperate counterattack,” Karaganov explained.
"The third element of the era is that the old institutions, created mostly by the West, even with our participation, have ceased to function. We are living in a state of chaos and a vacuum of governance," Karaganov stated.
"So our task now is, first, to prevent a Third World War—which is already looming. Second, to think about creating a new model of socio-economic development for our country and possibly for others, and start filling security vacuums," Karaganov proposed.
"Destruction of human civilization as we know it is possible. We could play ourselves into this, considering geopolitics. We are moving towards a Third World War nonstop. We need to think about how to stop this movement or at least protect our homeland," Karaganov warned.
"We must begin consciously to promote a new-old ideology, because since the collapse of communism an ideological vacuum formed. Some of the elite have tried to fill the vacuum with ideas from the West; part became comprador, not only economically but ideologically," Karaganov maintained.
"We are now working to develop a state ideology. It should be mandatory only for officials, for those who aspire to be leaders. We believe it should be instilled from childhood, creatively, through discussion. Without it, the country will perish. I have written many times: States that lose their national idea always die, especially great powers," Karaganov insisted.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Xi, Modi, Putin, and the New Geopolitics," Michael Froman, Council on Foreign Relations, 09.05.25.

"Trump’s policies towards India, including punitive secondary tariffs, risk undermining decades of U.S.-India strategic partnership building—effectively pushing India closer towards China," Froman argued.
"This year was different: it appeared to mark a major step forward in Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s courtship of India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—a symbolic if not a meaningful win, made all the more striking because they had the United States to thank for doing the heavy lifting," Froman observed.
"Trump imposed 50% punitive secondary tariffs on India (and only India) as a punishment for the country's continued import of Russian oil—despite China, Turkey, and other nations purchasing substantial quantities of the very same oil from Russian firms," Froman noted.
"These actions sent the U.S.-India relationship into a diplomatic free fall. It culminated last weekend on a red carpet in Tianjin, where Xi, Modi, and Putin strode together, awkwardly holding hands, beaming for the cameras," Froman reported.
"Modi’s nascent embrace of Xi and warmer relations with China fly in the face of a multi-decade effort, spanning five American presidencies, to court India as a long-term partner… to offset China’s immense industrial capacity, technological prowess, and increasing military capabilities," Froman stated.
"These initiatives are now likely to lose momentum and the costs to trust in the relationship may be quite steep. India is a proud country, and Trump is a proud president. Not an ideal combination," Froman wrote.
"But while it is definitely a setback, it might not represent a tectonic and permanent geopolitical shift. The underlying national interests of each country remain the same," Froman cautioned.
"India’s navigation between China, Russia, and the United States offers an interesting window in the dynamics of the order to come," Froman suggested.
"This new era is less likely to be defined by traditional notions of bipolarity or multipolarity than by fragmentation and plurilateralism: overlapping groups of like-minded countries working together on certain sets of issues—whether that is on trade, technology or security—outside the structure of existing multilateral fora," Froman concluded.
"What remains to be seen is whether these coalitions of the ambitious will form with, around, or despite the United States," Froman wrote.

"China Shows Unity With Russia and North Korea, but Divisions Linger," Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 09.08.25.

"China is very cautious about working with these two countries [Russia and DPRK]. Unlike what is depicted in the West as them being allies, China is not in the same camp. Its view of warfare and security issues is very different from theirs," said Tang Xiaoyang, chair of the department of international relations at Tsinghua University, as quoted by Trofimov.
"China is becoming less discreet about being seen as part of the so-called axis of upheaval… China wants to show that, contrary to America's alienation of allies, it is better capable of uniting friends around itself," Trofimov reported Tong Zhao of the Carnegie China think tank as saying.
"The gap between Beijing's aspirations and those of its junior partners.... is clearly narrowing, Western diplomats and China watchers say," Trofimov observed.
"Neither Russia nor China want to be involved in a major conflict where the other one is involved... We're good friends, good partners, but that's it. We will never become allies," said Xinbo Wu, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, as quoted by Trofimov.
"China's leadership believes that it would be against Beijing's interest for Putin to lose the war in Ukraine… But it isn't clear at all that China would find it beneficial for Russia to win," Trofimov reported, citing Shi Yinhong, professor at Renmin University. "If Russia were to win, it would become more troublesome to China than now, when it is at war. It would have much less dependence on China's economy and, if the Republican Party remains in the White House after Trump, Russia would have a bigger chance for a rapprochement with Washington, and China would worry about that," Shi said,” according to Trofimov.
“The one remaining major legacy of past colonialism is the annexation of large parts of China by Russia, areas that make up the sparsely populated Russian Far East region. That history still colors Chinese perceptions of the relationship with Moscow,” Trofimov wrote… Yet the message from China's leadership isn't to dwell on that history, at least not now. "We know what happened in the past, but we want to focus on the future," said Victor Gao, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank in Beijing,” according to Trofimov.

“They Want Nothing Less Than a New World Order," Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, New York Times, 09.05.25.

“When President Xi Jinping presided over an enormous exhibit of China's military might in Beijing on Wednesday, there were more than fighter jets and missiles on display,” Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor wrote in their commentary for NYT. "Mr. Xi, flanked by the leaders of Russia, Iran and North Korea, was signaling to the world that a viable alternative to U.S. leadership exists," Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor observed.
“The show of unity may have seemed remarkable to some, given that just over two months ago some observers dismissed the understanding between the four—what we have called the “axis of upheaval”—as either dead or overblown from the beginning,” according to Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor.
"The group… seeks, like the World War II era Axis Powers of Germany, Italy and Japan, ‘a new order of things,’ in which each country can claim ‘its own proper place,’" Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor argued.
"The Trump administration is riling America's longtime allies and partners… For Mr. Xi, Vladimir Putin of Russia and others, there may never be a better moment to challenge the U.S.-led global system and hasten American retrenchment," Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor stated.
"Another attempt to reset relations with Russia is not only bound to fail—but also exacerbate the problem. The Kremlin will not abandon its view of Washington as the key impediment to Moscow's aims," Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor warned.
"The good news is that Washington does have the necessary tools at its disposal to overcome the axis… America, if it chooses to, can sustain a global order that is far superior to anything the axis has to offer. The question is whether the Trump administration will choose to do so," Fontaine and Kendall-Taylor concluded.

"Xi Jinping’s anti-American party," The Economist, 09.02.25.

“As President Xi Jinping plays host to over 20 presidents and prime ministers in China, a new reality is taking hold,” The Economist wrote.
“The gathering has a higher significance. It shows, he says, that China has become a global leader and the source of stability and prosperity. The origin of uncertainty today is America, he argues, which is unleashing trade wars with almost everyone, and undermining its own network of military alliances and security partnerships,” the article reported.
“Mr. Xi’s guest list is impressive. It is one of the largest get-togethers of autocratic regimes in living memory, with Vladimir Putin of Russia, Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran and Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus in attendance. Kim Jong Un of North Korea travelled by armored train, in his first visit to China since 2019,” The Economist noted.
“Most striking is Narendra Modi, signaling India’s shift from America towards China. That follows Donald Trump’s disastrous double-fault singling India out for sky-high tariffs and embracing its enemy, Pakistan, following a conflict in May,” the article stated.
“Russia, and increasingly China, are already moving away from dollar payments. Building a trusted, efficient alternative international system is daunting, perhaps impossible, especially for regimes without the rule of law. But more and more countries are interested in exploring options other than America’s dollar system. Even Europe is promoting a ‘global euro’,” The Economist reported.
“Russia and North Korea are working on space and satellite systems. In return for China’s support over Ukraine, Russia is thought to be offering it ever more of its most sensitive military technology, including submarine propulsion and missile-defense systems,” the article explained.
“Mr. Xi’s guestlist does not demonstrate that China yet runs a new world order. But it does show how much damage Mr. Trump is doing to American interests,” The Economist concluded.

“Xi’s Pablum and Power,” Sergey Radchenko, Foreign Policy, 09.03.25.

“Perhaps, then, the SCO holds the key to an alternative future? For some of those who attended Chinese President Xi Jinping’s great gala, the answer would seem to be “yes.” Even United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres—who turned up in China in an evident bid to highlight the continued relevance of his organization—spoke enthusiastically of the need “to build a multipolar world” and of the SCO as one of the “basic conditions” of getting us there.”
“The reality is more complex than the optics might suggest. The SCO has always been less than the sum of its parts. It formerly served a very specific function: helping China and Russia manage their differences in Central Asia. The addition of India; Pakistan; Iran; and, most recently, Belarus has diluted the SCO’s mission. Now, it provides little more than a glamorous opportunity for multilateral banquets.”

"Xi’s New World Order," Alexandra Sharp, Foreign Policy, 09.02.25.

“Chinese President Xi Jinping presented his vision of a new world order this week: one where Beijing’s military and diplomatic might supersedes the U.S.-led status quo,” Alexandra Sharp wrote.
“On Sunday, more than 20 leaders of non-Western countries convened in the Chinese city of Tianjin for this year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting. Chinese state media called the gathering the ‘largest-ever SCO summit in history’,” the article reported.
“China convinced its partner countries to support the creation of a new Chinese-led development bank… In addition, China proposed a Global Governance Initiative aimed at building what Xi called ‘a more just and equitable’ multilateral governance system,” Sharp explained.
“Xi met with several world leaders...including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country has been subjected to high U.S. tariffs for continuing to purchase Russian oil despite Moscow’s war in Ukraine,” the article noted.
“China’s ties with Russia have grown particularly close in recent months. On Tuesday, Xi concluded talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin by announcing that Beijing will begin offering 30-day visa-free access to Russian travelers starting later this month,” Sharp wrote.
“Xi also inked a memorandum with Putin to build a new natural gas pipeline that will bring reserves from Russia’s West Siberia into northern China via eastern Mongolia,” the article stated.
“Experts say that Xi intends...to promote Chinese leadership on the global stage. ‘We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics,’ Xi said on Monday in a thinly veiled allusion to the United States,” Sharp concluded.

"China’s Military Is Now Leading," Sam Roggeveen, Foreign Policy, 09.03.25.

“It is no longer enough to say that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is catching up, or that it is copying foreign military equipment designs. China is now innovating, and it is leading,” Sam Roggeveen wrote.
“The Sept. 3 military parade through Beijing confirms that we must add military technology to this list. The regional military balance that has for decades favored the United States and its partners is being irrevocably changed,” Roggeveen argued.
“Among the highlights was the display of aircraft that will serve aboard China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers, which numbers three ships at present but is likely to be joined in coming years by at least one nuclear-powered supercarrier,” the article noted.
“Four new types of ‘loyal wingman’ drones were unveiled—stealthy unpiloted planes designed to fly alongside crewed aircraft and be tasked by them. And at least four previously unseen anti-ship and ground-attack missile systems were on display, as well as a new uncrewed submarine and new torpedoes,” Roggeveen reported.
“In late January, the Financial Times published commercial satellite photos showing that China was constructing a new military command center outside Beijing that is at least 10 times the size of the Pentagon,” the article stated.
“China… has begun to grow its aerial refueling fleet; such a fleet has long been a key attribute of the United States’ ability to project air power globally. And China now has dozens of ‘blue water’ warships… including aircraft carriers and replenishment ships to keep the fleet at sea,” Roggeveen wrote.
“A recent paper… concludes that even in the most favorable scenario, the United States would lose 45% of its force in that first month [of a Taiwan war]… An arms race would now play to Beijing’s strengths, not to Washington’s. A new equilibrium is indeed taking shape; U.S. military strategy and foreign policy must follow,” Roggeveen concluded.

“The Uncooperative Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Robert Koepp, The National Interest, 09.05.25.

"The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is mainly for show, but its disjointed dynamics warrant more attention from Washington," Koepp argued.
"Images of gleeful huddles between Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, Russian president Vladimir Putin, and Chinese president Xi Jinping defined last weekend’s ... SCO summit. The three leaders’ exaggerated demonstration of unity was meant to show that Washington’s punishing trade tariffs… were not bringing them to heel but were producing a counterbalance of solidarity," Koepp wrote.
"However strong the sense of mutual anger towards the Trump administration, the significance of the SCO leaders’ gathering at the summit and the organization’s overall impact does not extend far beyond photo opportunities. Other than grievances, there are not enough perceived constructive interests to bind members together," Koepp claimed.
"China and Russia currently align due to a lack of better alternatives. ... Even when ties improve, bilateral interactions remain tinged with deep mistrust," Koepp stated.
"India, the world’s largest democracy and fastest-growing major economy, is the odd man out in the tripartite clique of convenience… Indian exports to North America and the EU grew by 67% over the last ten years. Conversely, exports to China have declined," Koepp reported.
"India’s membership in the U.S.-centered Quad provides it with a pathway to a partnership with militarily reliable powers far more than any security guarantees on offer from Moscow or Beijing," according to Koepp.
"Regardless of how hard their leaders try to show otherwise, the three major players of the SCO are fundamentally disjointed. The same applies to the SCO as a whole," Koepp observed.
"SCO members Russia and Iran are led by despotic regimes… Russia’s sustained failure to conquer a free and independent Ukraine show that, other than being disruptive, both are constrained in power projection," Koepp believe.
"Although partners under the SCO, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have fought deadly battles ... China and India have repeatedly clashed over disputed claims… Pakistan is an intractable antagonist for India, something that membership in the SCO has done nothing to ameliorate," Koepp pointed out.
"The Trump administration’s blunt, shock-and-awe approach toward India… risks alienating a strategically valuable and emerging world power," Koepp concluded.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Interview: Harvard’s Graham Allison on the second Trump administration and the international security order,” John Mecklin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 09.04.25.

“The question of the state of the international security order and the future of the international security order is one that was of great concern before Trump—and then Trump adds to the picture. But you need to kind of start with the big picture. To make this vivid, consider 80, 80, and 9. If you can identify the questions to which each of these numbers is the answer, you’ll have the big picture about the international security order during the whole of the lifetime of almost all Americans today,” Allison told Mecklin.
- “We are going to celebrate the first 80 in September. The anniversary of Japan’s surrender on September 2 will mark the longest peace ever in modern history, the longest period without great power war,” Allison told Mecklin.
- “The second 80 is very much in your wheelhouse. If you told anyone in 1945 that we’re going to see 80 years without another use of nuclear weapons in war, people would have said you’re out of your mind. That’s impossible. This is the absolute weapon,” Allison told Mecklin.
- “The third number—9—again is in your space, and is probably the most remarkable of all. How can there only be nine nuclear weapon states, when there are 90 states that could have nuclear weapons if they wanted to?” Allison told Mecklin.
  - “Some now suggest that any use of nuclear weapons in war is ‘unthinkable’—because there is a ‘nuclear taboo.’ But think about it: a taboo is just a convention. So, this achievement again is not to be taken for granted. If Putin had conducted a nuclear strike against Ukraine in the fall of 2022—which he was seriously considering—we would not be celebrating this 80,” Allison argued.
“The non-proliferation regime... is not an accomplished fact. Instead, it is a fragile institution that has to be maintained constantly. And after Putin’s successful coercive threats in his war in Ukraine, that regime was already under great stress—all before Trump arrived. In what has been called the United States of Amnesia, most people have simply forgotten that there used to be great power wars. When I tell my students now that they have to be thankful for the fact that there’s not been a great power war—some imagine that this is equivalent to being thankful that a meteor didn’t hit the Earth,” according to Allison.
“Think about it: How unnatural it is that states have been willing not to have their own nuclear arsenals, particularly after they see what happened to Ukraine and now to Iran. This means that all of these elements of the post-World War II order were under extreme pressure—before the arrival of the great disruptor,” Allison said.
- Trump “is not irrational or incapable of reacting to reality when it bites him,” according to Allison.
“The undermining of the alliances has been spectacular—from the point of view of the Chinese rival,” Allison said with regard to U.S. handling of its alliances during Trump’s rule.
“After allies, secondly, comes stability. The foundation of this international security system that gave us eight decades without global war was a leading power that was stable, predictable, and reliable. So, when the leader of that country becomes the disruptor-in-chief and a constant source of instability and unpredictability, yikes,” Allison said.
“Third is the matter of rules and norms. The international security order has developed a set of rules, some of them written and some tacit. But as Trump has explained about himself, he enjoys violating rules,” according to Allison.
“[I]f we recognize that he’s already done so many extraordinary things that we would think were not possible, including managing the greatest political comeback in American history, it is possible that he will succeed in ways we would not imagine,” Allison said of Trump.
Trump’s “best hope for a Nobel Peace Prize is to make a great peace with China, a great Asian peace. I think the European piece of this is too complicated, because of the Russian angle,” in Allison’s view.
Trump “came to office with several big ideas. First is that he is a great man; that he respects other great men of whom China’s Xi is one; and that great men can do things mere mortals like the rest of us can hardly imagine. Second is that he is a great deal-maker. Third, that he wants to be seen and known in history as a great peacemaker—with a Nobel Peace Prize and maybe even a place on Mount Rushmore,” according to Allison.
“If you ask Biden about China, he says competitor, strategic competitor. If you ask most people today, they say adversary or enemy. But I think you could imagine Trump saying, “No: the right word is partner... I think some normalization of the relationship might follow,” according to Allison.
“With the second round of Trump, I think a lot of this damage is likely to be permanent, and other nations will be thinking about how they can best provide for their own security. Is that necessarily bad? No,” Allison told Mecklin. “If you imagine a post-Trump future in which Europe has taken the shock of Trump to take greater responsibility for its own security, that could be a solid block of international order that actually was quite positive,” Allison argued.
“I take solace in the belief that God looks after drunks, little children and the USA, I still think maybe, somehow, out of chaos will come something good. That’s at least my hope,” Allison said in the conclusion of his interview with Mecklin.

"Extending this nuclear treaty would aid Russia and China, not America," Robert Peters, Washington Post, 09.05.25.

“New START, the last remaining nuclear arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States, will expire in February. Once it does, there will be no limits on how many nuclear weapons Russia or the United States can build or field,” Peters stated.
“Many argue that President Donald Trump should seek an agreement with Vladimir Putin for some type of follow-on agreement, even a nonbinding one, to maintain the limits on nuclear weapons established by New START during the early days of the Obama administration,” Peters observed.
“It is certainly tempting—and perfectly understandable—to want some type arms-control agreement with Russia. From Ronald Reagan onward, American presidents have rightfully sought ways, through presidential agreements or arms-control treaties or unilateral actions, to rid the world of nuclear weapons,” Peters acknowledged.
“But pursuing a follow-on to New START would be reckless. The Russians have cheated on and abrogated treaty after treaty, including President Reagan's landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and New START itself,” Peters argued.
“Russian leaders have not allowed U.S. inspectors into their country for years, and any agreement that did not require inspections or verification measures would incentivize Russia to continue cheating,” Peters cautioned.
“Most important, maintaining current warhead levels would benefit only one party: China,” Peters asserted.
“China is believed to have the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. Since 2020, it has tripled the size of its warhead count. Within a few years, it will have as many operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons as the United States,” Peters warned.
“If New START expires without any follow-on agreement, the United States could add nuclear warheads from its reserve stockpiles to its existing ICBM force—having each ICBM carry two or three warheads, not just one,” Peters explained.
“Imagining that a meaningful arms-control agreement with Russia will emerge after the expiration of New START early next year amounts to wishful thinking,” Peters wrote.
“It would be far better for the United States to create the leverage it needs by fielding a more robust and credible nuclear deterrent. Only that kind of pressure can incentivize both Russia and China to come to the negotiating table at the same time, allowing all three nuclear superpowers to attempt to negotiate a more meaningful and effective agreement,” Peters concluded.

"China should not fuel an arms race, says a close watcher of its nuclear policy," Tong Zhao, The Economist, 09.03.25.

“China’s high-profile display of nuclear might at its latest military parade...showcased a full spectrum of land-, sea- and air-based systems. For land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles alone, it unveiled three new systems simultaneously, including a silo-based missile probably intended for large-scale deployment in the open terrain of north-west China,” Tong Zhao wrote.
“The rapid growth of its arsenal from around 200 warheads several years ago to some 600 today, potentially reaching 1,000 by 2030, isn’t coercing deference. Worse, it is spawning instability China didn’t foresee,” the author explained.
“America… appears likely to boost its nuclear capabilities. American concerns about China’s build-up, more than Russia’s nuclear threats, are driving doubts over the last remaining U.S.-Russia arms-control treaty and hastening the collapse of the global arms-control regime,” Zhao argued.
“China’s nuclear build-up provides political cover for North Korea’s own nuclear expansion, fueling pressure in Japan and especially South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. On China’s western flank, any Indian response to China’s nuclear expansion will increase the nuclear threat facing China and probably trigger Pakistani countermeasures,” the article stated.
“China’s silence about the ultimate size and purposes of its nuclear forces feeds fears of a doctrinal shift from pure deterrence towards a willingness to consider the first use of nuclear weapons,” Zhao observed.
“Confidence-building measures such as transparency on development plans—or more ambitious steps like numerical caps on key...systems—could lay the foundation for a regional missile arms-control regime,” the author proposed.
“To believe that raw power will silence rivals and secure long-term peace is not strategy but illusion. Having risen to unprecedented international strength, China must decide whether to be feared for fueling humanity’s most destructive arms race or respected for helping build shared rules,” Zhao concluded.

Counterterrorism:

No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

"The Rapprochement Between Russia and Syria Is a Temporary Necessity," Nikita Smagin, Carnegie Endowment, 09.04.25.

“The Al-Sharaa government ultimately wants to establish control over the entire territory of Syria. Over time, Russia’s presence will become an obstacle to that goal,” Smagin observed.
“Throughout the first half of this year, Russia was being slowly pushed out of Syria. The new authorities annulled old agreements concluded with the Kremlin under former president Bashar al-Assad… and ended the practice of printing Syria’s national currency in Russia,” Smagin reported.
“In late July, however, bilateral relations took a new turn when a Syrian delegation arrived in Moscow… The Syrian Foreign Ministry immediately dubbed the visit ‘historic,’ and soon after, evidence began to emerge of real changes in Russian-Syrian relations,” Smagin explained.
“For the first time since the fall of the Assad regime, Russian troops resumed their patrols around the city of Qamishli… there were reports that the Syrian government had asked Moscow to resume military police patrols in the country’s southern provinces too. The apparent goal is to balance out the Israeli presence in Syria and reduce the intensity of Israeli operations,” Smagin wrote.
“After his meeting with al-Shaibani, Lavrov said that Moscow and Damascus would review old agreements. And at the end of August, Reuters reported that Syria had changed its mind about no longer printing its pounds in Russia and would continue to do so,” Smagin noted.
“The main goal of Damascus’s new rapprochement with Russia is to try to find at least some kind of counterweight to Israel. Since the end of last year, Israeli forces have not only significantly expanded the area they control around the Golan Heights, but have also carried out regular airstrikes against government targets,” Smagin stated.
“Under Assad, Russia acted as a constraining force on Israel’s actions in Syria, both through the mere presence of Russian troops, and through concrete actions,” Smagin explained.
“The fear of Israel’s intervention does not mean that the new Syrian leadership is prepared to fully restore Russia’s former influence in the country. It’s just that in the current circumstances, Damascus’s position is not strong enough to allow it to be on bad terms with Moscow,” Smagin argued.
“Long-term obstacles to Russia’s presence in Syria have not gone away. Preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Moscow still cannot afford to devote more attention and resources to any other areas,” Smagin concluded.
“If Washington is successful [in pushing for normalization of relations between Syria and Israel], the key reason for the current rapprochement between Damascus and Moscow will disappear, and there will no longer be any need for Russian patrols in southern Syria,” Smagin wrote.

Cyber security/AI:

Energy exports from CIS:

"A new Russia-China gas pact could reshape global energy markets," Tatiana Mitrova, Financial Times, 09.04.25.

“The proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PoS2) pipeline would deliver up to 50 BCM of gas per year from the Russian Arctic to northern China via Mongolia,” Tatiana Mitrova wrote.
“China is unlikely to accept anything close to European or market-based Asian benchmarks. Instead, it will push for a price somewhere between Russian domestic rates and the oil-linked formula used in Power of Siberia 1, already the lowest-priced pipeline gas in China’s portfolio,” Mitrova explained.
“Russian pipelines have typically been funded solely by Gazprom. But the $14bn PoS2 could change that. China’s provision of loans or capital could alter the project’s economics, easing Gazprom’s financial strain,” the article stated.
“Russia, by contrast, has already made its alignment public, with no guarantee of commercial returns. This asymmetry reflects the broader power dynamics,” Mitrova observed.
“A shift towards Russia—with flexible volumes and lower prices—could derail some [LNG] projects before they reach final investment decisions,” the author noted.
“A prolonged LNG oversupply could depress prices into the next decade and delay new capacity. Meanwhile, China’s new role as a swing player gives it unprecedented market influence,” Mitrova concluded.

"A China-Russia sweetheart gas deal could upset U.S. energy exporters," Opinion Lex, Financial Times, 09.05.25.[4]

“The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline is a huge project that would bring 50bn cubic meters of natural gas to China per year, starting perhaps in the early 2030s,” the Financial Times wrote.
“Cheaper Russian imports to China—in volumes that could increase to 60 bcm if some extensions on other routes are factored in—would displace much of the liquefied natural gas China was expected to buy from elsewhere,” the Financial Times explained.
“Longer term, Power of Siberia 2 would cause problems for the developers too. About 250 bcm of potential LNG projects are still on the drawing board, according to consultancy Baringa. In a world in which China uses ever more Russian gas, many of these would struggle to get built. At current European gas prices, that is almost $90 billion a year of lost revenue for U.S. industry—money that could, literally, end up going down the pipe,” according to Financial Times.

"Putin’s petrostate faces a kamikaze petrol crisis," The Economist, 09.03.25.

"Ukraine is believed to have carried out over a dozen strikes on Russia’s oil-refining and distribution system since the beginning of August, and the tempo shows no signs of flagging."
“According to some estimates, up to 20% of Russia’s refining capacity has been taken out, at least temporarily: a loss of well over 1m barrels a day, mainly of petrol but also of diesel,” The Economist reported.
“The wholesale price of petrol has risen by 54% since the beginning of the year, and is at a record level. The authorities have suspended gasoline exports,” the article noted.
“The deficit for the first seven months of 2025 reached $61.4bn, already almost 3% of full-year GDP. Petrol rationing has been ordered in some parts of the country.”
"'Tens of millions of Russians live to the west of this arc,' says Sergey Vakulenko… Fuel shortages have also been reported in places as far apart as Russian-occupied Crimea and Vladivostok in the far east of the country."
“The FP-1 long-range drone… now accounts for about 60% of deep strikes into Russian territory, is already being produced at a rate of 100 units a day. It carries a warhead of 60-120kg; with the lighter weight it has a range of up to 1,600km. Though costing only $55,000 each, the FP-1 is said to have sophisticated software that ensures accurate targeting,” The Economist wrote.
“Sir Lawrence Freedman… warns that Russia will struggle to deal with the impact of the refinery strikes if the campaign continues at its current pace. He concludes: ‘By itself it will not be decisive, but in combination with a weakening economy and Ukrainian forces holding back Russian advances, it will add to the pressure on Putin.’”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Climate change:

No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"How to Understand Trump’s Russia Strategy," A. Wess Mitchell, The National Interest, 09.02.25.

"Diplomacy with Russia is not capitulation, and talking to Vladimir Putin is not a reward for good behavior," Mitchell argued.
"Trump’s diplomacy with Putin was a potentially game-altering move that could pay significant strategic dividends down the road… By focusing on immediate outcomes for Ukraine, critics are missing both the underlying logic of Trump’s moves and their potential benefits for US national interests," Mitchell wrote.
"Talking to Russia helps alleviate the number one danger facing America, which is the possibility of a war on multiple fronts beyond our immediate ability to win… The quickest way to strengthen deterrence in East Asia is to engineer a denouement in Eastern Europe," Mitchell stated.
"Anchorage [summit] has to be viewed in the context of Trump’s overall strategy, which is constraining Putin’s geopolitical field of maneuver," Mitchell explained.
"Trump’s team… persuaded the Arabs to keep global oil supplies up… persuaded the Europeans to launch the biggest defense spending hike in modern history… and persuaded Armenia and Azerbaijan to make peace (eroding Russia’s influence in its own backyard)," Mitchell summarized.
"Trump’s closing of Biden-era loopholes on energy-related banking sanctions and efforts to stipulate a reduction in Beijing’s support for Russia… mean that the United States is turning the screws with one hand while nudging Russia toward the peace table with the other," Mitchell observed.
"All of this may or may not produce near-term results for Ukraine… The end of that conflict (Korea) provides us with the best glimpse of what an eventual deal on Ukraine will likely look like: an armistice rather than a ceasefire, accompanied by prisoner exchanges, humanitarian corridors, and a de facto partition not recognized by all parties," Mitchell predicted.
"Trump’s methods represent an improvement over the previous US approach… By engaging in strategic diplomacy, not only with Putin but also with other players on the gameboard, Trump has altered the dynamic in ways that will work to the US’ advantage over time," Mitchell asserted.
"For too long, the US foreign policy establishment has rolled out the tired old Munich analogy any time a US president talks to an adversary. But diplomacy is not surrender, and talking is not a reward for good behavior," Mitchell argued.
"The point of diplomacy in strategy is not to transform an opponent from within but to shape his incentives in ways that make him more likely to do what you want for reasons of his own interest. That’s what Trump is attempting to do with Putin, and there’s a good chance he will succeed," Mitchell concluded.

"Putin's response to Melania Trump should be the last straw," Marc A. Thiessen, The Washington Post, 09.03.25.

“On Aug. 15, first lady Melania Trump wrote a poignant letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, urging him to make peace for the sake of children affected by the Russia-Ukraine war,” Marc A. Thiessen wrote.
“Putin delivered his response—launching a massive drone and missile strike on residential buildings and a kindergarten in the center of Kyiv, killing at least 23 people, including four children,” Thiessen reported.
“According to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, more than 3,560 schools have been hit by Russian missiles, drones, artillery and even cluster munitions, including 371 that were destroyed. In those attacks, 652 children were killed and 2,142 injured, while another 2,193 remain missing,” the article stated.
“UNICEF estimates that, on average, about 16 Ukrainian children are killed or wounded every week,” Thiessen noted.
“Russia also struck the European Union’s diplomatic offices in Kyiv, as well as the offices of the British Council, a U.K. government organization,” the article explained.
“In a separate strike, Russia targeted an American electronics manufacturer, Flex Ltd., hitting its plant far from the front lines with two Kalibr cruise missiles,” Thiessen reported.
“Putin has demonstrated with his brutality that he won’t stop his assault on Ukraine willingly—that he must be coerced. So let the coercion begin,” Thiessen concluded.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Russia’s New Fear Factor: How the War Is Driving a Wave of Purges and Suicides Among the Country’s Elites," Andrei Kolesnikov, Foreign Affairs, 09.08.25. Clues from Russian Views.

“According to Novaya Gazeta, the independent Russian newspaper, there have been 56 deaths of successful businesspeople and officials under strange circumstances since February 2022. Many of them have fallen out of windows,” Andrei Kolesnikov wrote.
Putin’s strategy is to instill fear among elites to make them more controllable, rather than genuinely combating corruption, he wrote.
The war has made the misappropriation of state funds increasingly sensitive, leading to purges and arrests of officials, especially in regions bordering Ukraine, according to Kolesnikov. Being part of Russia’s elite is now especially perilous; power and wealth depend on the regime’s whims, he wrote.
Recent purges of the Russian elite highlight that Putin is unwilling or unable to backtrack or soften his approach, cementing fear as the main tool of elite control, according to Kolesnikov.

“Putin faces tough choices at home as strain on Russia’s war economy mounts," Anastasia Stognei and Courtney Weaver, Financial Times, 09.07.25.

“Between January and August, Russia’s energy earnings dropped 20% compared with the same period in 2024, according to the ministry of finance,” Stognei and Weaver reported.
“Analysts regularly surveyed by the country’s central bank forecast GDP growth of 1.4% by the end of this year, compared to expansion of 4.3% in 2024, and do not expect it to exceed 2% over the next three years,” Stognei and Weaver cited.
“In the first half of 2025, the budget shortfall reached Rbs4.9tn ($61bn)—about 2.2% of GDP—compared to an initial target of 0.5% of GDP, according to Putin,” Stognei and Weaver reported.
“Non-energy revenues are up 14% year on year in 2025, but the budget deficit still widened as spending jumped much more. ‘Some months they doubled, they tripled the expenditures… It’s a risky strategy,’ a former senior government official told the Financial Times,” Stognei and Weaver wrote.
“The central bank’s decision to keep interest rates high brought inflation below 9% year-on-year in July—it had topped 17.8% in April 2022,” Stognei and Weaver observed.
“Wartime spending has nearly doubled in nominal terms since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” Stognei and Weaver explained.
“VTB, one of the country’s largest lenders, has set aside provisions on a quarter of its corporate loans—a tacit admission that they may not be repaid,” Stognei and Weaver pointed out.
“Moscow has spent half of its reserve fund on the war. Its assets abroad remain frozen because of western sanctions,” Stognei and Weaver reported.
“A strong rouble, which has gained roughly 20% against the U.S. dollar since January, has added to the strain,” Stognei and Weaver noted.

"Vladimir Putin answered media questions at the Vladivostok Economic Forum," Kremlin.ru, 09.05.25. Clues from Russian Views.

“Over the past 10 years, the gross regional product of the Far East has increased more than 2.5 times, from 4 trillion rubles to 11 trillion,” Vladimir Putin said at the 10th Eastern Economic Forum.
“During this time, 20 trillion rubles were invested in the fixed capital of Far Eastern companies and enterprises. A quarter of this amount was channeled into projects with state support in such sectors as mining, oil and gas chemistry, construction and others,” he stated.
“Yakutia, Amur, and Sakhalin regions account for 55% of all fixed capital investment in the Far Eastern Federal District over the past decade,” Putin reported.
“In the past ten years, coal and gold production in the region has grown almost 1.7 times,” the president announced.
“Port capacity in the region has effectively doubled in the last decade, standing at almost 380 million tons of cargo per year,” Putin said.
“Per capita, investment in the Far East today is twice as high as the national average,” he noted.
“Since 2014, the migration outflow in the Far East amounted to 211,000 people over five years, but it decreased to 109,000 the next five years. In 2024, there was a migration influx of 24,000 people,” Putin emphasized.
“Over the past ten years, the average salary in the Far East has increased by 2.5 times. As of the end of last year, it exceeded 100,000 rubles per month in nominal value,” Putin said.
“The unemployment rate in the region went down from 7% to 2.4%. The poverty rate fell from 11.3% to 7.2% nationally, with some Far Eastern regions below average,” the president stated.

"Putin’s Fear of a Humiliating Economic Crisis," Agathe Demarais, Foreign Policy, 09.05.25.

“Putin has every reason to seek a lifeline for the Russian economy. In recent weeks, a flurry of signs has shown Russia’s war-drained, sanctions-constrained economy to be at an inflection point,” Demarais wrote.
“For the first time since the start of the war, nonmilitary economic activity has been contracting, bankers are making plans to weather a financial crisis, and energy firms are worrying about losing their largest customer for seaborne oil exports,” Demarais observed.
“Unlike the impression the Russian leader tries to make, time is far from being on his side. In fact, economic pressure remains the best leverage that Ukraine’s supporters have over the Kremlin,” Demarais argued.
“The latest GDP release does contain an interesting nugget: The economy narrowly escaped a technical recession (defined as two consecutive quarters of GDP contraction) in the second quarter, with reported growth of just 0.1% after a 0.6% drop in the first quarter—the first such fall since the start of the war. Stripping out the booming military sector, the rest of the Russian economy is in a recession,” Demarais reported.
“New car sales dropped by nearly 30% during the first half of the year compared with the same period last year—a sure sign of trouble for consumer demand,” Demarais noted.
“The rate of nonpayment on all loans to individuals (such as mortgages, car loans, and credit cards) is rising fast, shooting up by 32% at VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, since the start of this year,” Demarais stated.
“In the year to July, real estate prices for new homes rose by nearly a quarter in central Moscow, close to three times inflation over the same period—raising fears that such rises could be unsustainable,” Demarais reported.
“The central bank reported that 13 out of the 78 largest Russian nonbank firms cannot service their debt—more than double the figure from last year. The central bank expects to add two additional firms to that list later this year,” Demarais explained.
“With interest rates unlikely to drop much from their current 18% amid persistently high inflation, it is hard to imagine how firms can both service debts and stay afloat,” Demarais noted.
“If Europe and the United States manage to stay patient and united on this topic, Putin’s growing fear of a humiliating economic crisis could get him to the negotiating table,” Demarais concluded.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Speech and answers to questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov at a meeting with students and faculty of MGIMO,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 09.08.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

“The talks in Alaska between President Putin and President Trump vividly showed that, unlike their predecessors or many European ‘leaders,’ the current U.S. administration is not only ready to listen but to actually hear. The conversation in Anchorage demonstrated the understanding by President Trump and his team of the need to resolve all issues, including the Ukrainian crisis, on the basis of respect for the legitimate national interests of all parties,” Lavrov said.
“For years, the West pumped billions of dollars into Ukraine to create a regime fully obedient to it, that would not refuse NATO membership and would remain subordinate to the West, including the EU, which was initially conceived as an economic union but has become a mere extension of the North Atlantic alliance. Our American colleagues have now realized and publicly admitted that the alliance [NATO membership for Ukraine] is off the table. That’s a main reason the crisis in Ukraine arose,” Lavrov argued.
“Russia has never broken off relations with anyone and isn’t going to ignore anyone. When our former Western partners come to their senses and want to resume work in Russia, we won’t turn them away, but we’ll carefully consider the conditions on which they may do so, given that, by fleeing on the orders of their political leaders, they’ve shown their unreliability,” Lavrov said regarding the future of Russia–EU relations.
“Actions of our Western colleagues—Europe plays a more harmful, negative role for the future of the world economy here—only undermine the objective interests of the peoples of the countries that reject advantageous deals and cheap resources solely to ‘punish’ the exporter for what they see as its wrongful behavior,” Lavrov stated.
“Attempts to keep everyone on a short leash and to command everyone do not please everyone. The current processes in NATO are largely happening under the influence of the Trump administration’s position, which believes that Europeans should take more care of their own problems,” the Russian foreign minister argued about U.S.-EU alliance tensions.
“The world will be multipolar. This is an excellent response to those in our scholarly community recently saying that we’ll build a multipolar world without the West. We live on a very small planet. We don’t want any ‘walls.’ We want honest cooperation. If our interlocutors are ready for that, we are ready for dialogue with everyone,” Lavrov asserted.
“Our strategic partnership with China and our ‘especially privileged strategic partnership’ with India go back decades. The photo of Putin, Modi, and Xi traveling the world sparked total incomprehension among some Western leaders, who called it a challenge to the world ‘order based on rules,’” the minister explained.
“The BRICS countries, even before expansion, already exceeded the collective GDP of the G7 by purchasing power parity. Since then, the gap has only increased. We have no desire for revenge or to vent anger on anyone. Anger and revenge are poor advisors,” Lavrov argued about BRICS, China, and the global South.
“Any action meets resistance. There are no prohibitions that cannot be bypassed—most of them are illegitimate, contradicting international law and WTO norms, and workarounds rely on agreements without attempts to harm anyone by illegal means,” Lavrov stated, focusing on the response to Western sanctions.
“When great Eurasian powers, three great civilizations, work together, it worries some Western circles only because they don’t want to lose the opportunity to play them off against one another. This is wrong. These are not our methods; they are remnants of colonialism that some are now trying to revive as neocolonial methods. But we—India, Russia, China—want to live by the talents and unity of our peoples,” Lavrov concluded.

"Prigozhin’s Ghost Haunts Africa Corps," Christopher Faulkner, Foreign Policy, 09.03.25.

“Wagner’s treatment in the Ukraine war and interpersonal conflicts between Prigozhin and Russia’s top brass culminated with a dramatic scene of a Wagner column approaching Moscow,” Christopher Faulkner wrote.
“Africa Corps is somewhere between a new venture and a rebranding exercise; it is an attempt to recycle Wagner’s model under official Kremlin control,” Faulkner explained.
“In early June, Wagner announced it was leaving Mali after nearly three and a half years… But even casual observers… know that Wagner failed to turn the tide of jihadist violence and instead, terrorist activity, separatist conflict, and civilian targeting have all increased at an alarming pace,” the article stated.
“Russia has demanded the Central African Republic formally cut ties with Wagner, sign a new contract with Africa Corps, and pay for the continuation of military and security related services,” Faulkner reported.
“Russia’s interest in Africa is only likely to grow… Africa offers a rare arena where it can still punch above its weight. At relatively low cost, Russia can undermine U.S. and European influence while projecting itself as a global power,” the author argued.
“Russia has already entrenched itself in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the heart of the Sahelian corridor… Port and airfield access expands Russia’s ability to project force, resupply its growing operations, and contest Western influence across multiple domains,” Faulkner wrote.
“Africa Corps represents Moscow’s comparative foreign-policy advantage—transactional security partnerships that undermine governance, weaken institutions, and erode Western influence without requiring large-scale investment,” the article concluded.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"How Russia Distorts the Past," Chloe Hadavas, Foreign Policy, 09.05.25.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Fight at Home: The Battle Against Corruption Is Essential to the War Against Russia," Daria Kaleniuk and Olena Halushka, Foreign Affairs, 09.2025.

“Ukrainians know how to make their voices heard—and to make their leaders listen. They will never accept capitulation to Russia, whether in the form of the surrender of Ukrainian land or the abandonment of Ukrainian citizens to Russian occupiers,” Daria Kaleniuk and Olena Halushka wrote.
“During two whirlwind weeks in July, Zelenskyy’s administration moved to strip two of the country’s key anticorruption institutions…of their independence...Ukrainians responded by taking to the streets…Their message was clear: Ukrainians would not allow backsliding on democratic, transparent governance, even—or especially—amid a brutal war,” the authors explained.
“Ukraine’s comprehensive anticorruption infrastructure…included NABU, established in 2015 to investigate high-profile corruption; SAPO, established in 2016…The High Anti-Corruption Court…became operational in 2019,” Kaleniuk and Halushka reported.
“By ensuring accountability and transparency, Ukraine reduces the vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit. Fighting corruption is thus a vital part of the wider war. Ukraine does not have the luxury to postpone this battle until peacetime,” the article stated.
“Anticorruption efforts have already delivered hard cash for Ukraine’s defense. Since the start of the full-scale war, NABU and SAPO have transferred to the armed forces more than $70 million…In total, NABU and SAPO activities have brought in around $100 million per year in both 2023 and 2024,” the authors wrote.
“Russian President Vladimir Putin disparaged Ukraine’s anticorruption institutions as having ‘zero efficiency.’ This wasn’t the only time these agencies have been in Putin’s sights; he first mentioned them publicly days before launching the full-scale invasion in 2022,” Kaleniuk and Halushka noted.
“Defeating Russia and building a strong Ukrainian democracy go hand in hand. If Ukraine’s partners want to see the country prevail, they must insist on the high standards of governance and accountability that Ukrainian society itself demands,” the article concluded.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"How the Peace Deal Between Azerbaijan and Armenia Could Die in the Cradle," Nima Khorrami, War on the Rocks, 09.03.25.

“Armenia’s traditional reliance on Russia for security and trade has been shaken by Moscow’s ambivalent stance during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the subsequent Azeri takeover of the region in 2023, and by disruptions in vital supply routes linked to Iran and Georgia,” Nima Khorrami wrote.
“Moscow has countered Armenia’s westward tilt by cultivating pro-Russian political actors ahead of the 2026 elections, exploiting local economic dependencies through selective trade restrictions, and leveraging public discontent to undermine Pashinyan’s policy direction,” the author explained.
“For Washington, the stakes involve displacing Russia as Armenia’s dominant power broker and reinforcing the Middle Corridor as a critical Eurasian trade artery,” Khorrami argued.
“Russia is likely to replicate the strategies it has deployed in other parts of its so-called near abroad—discreetly backing pro-Moscow candidates while concealing its role—in order to weaken Pashinyan,” the article stated.
“The memorandum could redefine power dynamics by reducing Russian and Iranian influence, integrating Azerbaijan more closely into Western economic networks, and extending NATO’s strategic footprint,” Khorrami noted.
“Pashinyan’s popularity is declining, and the emergence of a new opposition bloc led by the jailed Karapetian has created a potential rallying point for disillusioned voters… Europeans in particular must prepare for a difficult compromise,” the author wrote.
“The most immediate and unpredictable challenge still lies in Armenia’s own ability to manage its constitutional politics and polarized society… the constitutional reform process will reveal whether Armenia can surmount its domestic hurdles or if internal divisions will undermine a historic opportunity for regional stability,” Khorrami concluded.

"Putin Pays Homage at Xi’s Summit: Beijing is rapidly eclipsing Moscow’s role in Central Asia," James Palmer, Foreign Policy, 09.02.25.

“China hosted 20 foreign leaders in Tianjin for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, seeking to send a message of unity among its allies and partners in contrast with the United States’ attacks on its own friends under President Donald Trump,” James Palmer wrote.
“Central Asian autocrats are now much more deferential to Beijing’s needs than Moscow’s. Despite public anger about the treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang, Central Asian states have curried favor by cracking down on Uyghur-sympathetic activism,” the article explained.
“China has sought to sell not only economic connection but also surveillance and security guarantees along the so-called Silk Road Economic Belt, the Central Asian routes that make up part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Palmer noted.

"Can Belarus move out of Russia’s shadow?" Anastasia Stognei, Financial Times, 09.04.25.

“Belarusians eat more potatoes per capita than any other nation and so the dearth carried symbolic weight, like Greece running out of olives or Italy of pasta… As prices of the country’s ‘second bread’ rose 10% between January and March, public discontent could only be partially stifled,” Anastasia Stognei wrote.
“Belarusian GDP expanded by about 4% [in both 2023 and 2024] after initially contracting 4.7% in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine,” the article explained.
“In the first half of 2025 GDP growth slowed to 2.1%, though it remains well above the prewar level,” Stognei noted.
“Belarus’s population has fallen by more than 250,000, or 2.5%, in the past five years, down to 9.2mn. In reality, just the number of people who left may be up to 600,000, or about 10% of the workforce, analysts say,” the author reported.
“Belarus currently has roughly 50 times more vacancies than the number of officially registered unemployed,” the article stated.
“A 32% jump in incomes since the start of the war, along with falling interest rates, has fueled a property boom,” Stognei wrote.
“As of the end of July 2025, 1,184 political prisoners remained behind bars, including the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski,” the article concluded.

Footnotes

Gerasimov’s Russian-language remarks were translated into English for Ignatius by former Belfer Center senior fellow Kevin Ryan.
Also see “How is the war going in Ukraine? I’m answering your questions,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 09.08.25.
For speeches and remarks at IISS Prague Defense Summit 2025 Plenary Sessions go to this link.
[email protected]

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Ukrainian Emergency Service via AP.

Russia Matters

Main Menu

Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 2-8, 2025

5 Ideas to Explore

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

Iran and its nuclear program:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Military aid to Ukraine

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Missile defense:

Nuclear arms:

Counterterrorism:

Conflict in Syria:

Cyber security/AI:

Energy exports from CIS:

Climate change:

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Defense and aerospace:

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Footnotes

Click to Subscribe

Footer Utiltity

Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 2-8, 2025

5 Ideas to Explore

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

Iran and its nuclear program:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Military aid to Ukraine

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Ukraine-related negotiations:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Missile defense:

Nuclear arms:

Counterterrorism:

Conflict in Syria:

Cyber security/AI:

Energy exports from CIS:

Climate change:

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Defense and aerospace:

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Footnotes

Click to Subscribe