This Week’s Highlights:

• If tensions get out of hand and the United States ends up starting a war against Iran, the Russians will stand on the sidelines, writes Dimitar Bechev, a research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. But given the Trump administration’s penchant to rattle sabers and then back away, Bechev writes, Putin could well reap another opportunity to burnish his image as the Middle East’s rising star.
• A different lens for exploring the emerging Arctic “Great Game” might focus on the level of interest each of the relevant powers attaches to the region, writes Prof. Lyle J. Goldstein. From that perspective, he argues, it is clear that Moscow has and will continue to lead.
• A new report from the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests that the reasons for a sharp divergence in European and American perspectives on an array of foreign policy issues are wider and deeper than annoyance with Trump, writes Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. When asked “Whose side should your country take in a conflict between the United States and Russia?” the majority of respondents in all 14 EU countries said “neither.”
• A survey of students from Beijing and Moscow’s leading universities finds that the next generation of elites expressed disinterest, ambivalence or misgivings about Sino-Russian cooperation; many believed China and Russia did not share sufficient values or interests to work together over the long term, write Thomas Sherlock and John Gregory, a professor of political science and the director of the Chinese Program and the Center for Languages, Cultures and Regional Studies at West Point.
• Ukrainian leaders are trapped in the middle of a Washington firefight, write Washington Post Brussels bureau chief Michael Birnbaum and independent journalist David L. Stern. Kyiv risks the Democrats’ anger if it gives in to Trump’s demand to open an inquiry into the Ukrainian business dealings of Hunter Biden or Kyiv can defy Trump and face the wrath of a president who had previously frozen $250 million of crucial military assistance. If Ukraine becomes associated with one U.S. political party or the other, it could jeopardize ties with its most important security backer.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's rise to power was a reversion to the norm for Russia, not a step backward on the inevitable trajectory the West had imagined for her, writes John Evans, former U.S. consul general in St. Petersburg. What the West needs to do now, Evans writes, is think afresh about the challenge Russia's alienation poses, and set about mending the damage, starting most urgently with Ukraine.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Did Barack Obama, Not Donald Trump, Launch the New Cold War?,” Brian D'Haeseleer, The Washington Post, 09.18.19: In his review of historian Jeremy Kuzmarov’s “Obama’s Unending Wars: Fronting the Foreign Policy of the Permanent Warfare State,” the author, an instructor at Lyon College, writes:

• “Kuzmarov highlights Obama’s mistakes and reckless policies with consequences around the globe, especially the tensions with China and Russia that continue to escalate today. … Most controversially, Kuzmarov accuses Obama of triggering a new cold war between Russia and the United States.”
• “Kuzmarov’s willingness to blame Obama for the deteriorating relationship between the United States and Russia stems in part from seeing Vladimir Putin far more sympathetically than most. He sees the Russian strongman as a nationalist determined to restore Russian prominence and ignores Putin’s alleged involvement in the deaths of his political opponents, viewing accusations of such involvement as unsubstantiated.”
• “When Putin is viewed through this lens, it is easier for Kuzmarov to criticize Obama’s handling of Russia. The administration’s support of the Maidan protests in Ukraine … is depicted not as a stand for democracy and freedom, but as an action that further poisoned relations between Russia and the United States. … Kuzmarov directly links this to the annexation of Crimea, arguing that it reflected the will of the Crimean people as the Ukrainian government grew more corrupt.”
• “Kuzmarov also disputes the standard progressive narrative about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. He argues that Democrats have used this contention to cover their shortcomings and deflect blame. … Obama, not Donald Trump, led the country into another confrontation with Russia that could potentially result in a nuclear war.”
• “[H]is analysis of Putin’s rise to power and explanation of the Russian president’s policies as a reaction against a decade of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy rest on solid ground. Simply dismissing Kuzmarov’s discussion as hyperbolic or contrarian without interrogating and investigating his claims further would risk skewing our understanding of Obama.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“What’s Really Undermining NATO? Europe’s Yearning for Neutrality,” Ted Galen Carpenter, The Washington Post, 09.18.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, writes:

• “Trump is not the main threat to transatlantic solidarity. A shift in European public opinion toward neutrality is sounding the real death knell. A new report from the European Council on Foreign Relations contains a number of startling findings.”
• “The survey … suggests that the reasons for a sharp divergence in European and American perspectives on an array of foreign policy issues are wider and deeper than annoyance with Trump. That is evident even with regard to NATO’s mission of standing up to Russia. When asked ‘Whose side should your country take in a conflict between the United States and Russia?’ the majority of respondents in all 14 EU countries [surveyed] said ‘neither.’ … The results were similar even in NATO’s newer East European members, despite their greater exposure to Russian pressure and potential aggression. … Even in Poland … neutralist sentiment had the edge, 45 percent to 33 percent.”
• “Another finding confirms that Europeans now favor an independent foreign and security policy instead of continuing to be Washington’s junior partner. … Both public and governmental sentiment is building in favor of a ‘Europeans only’ military force independent of NATO.”
• “The easy, intellectually lazy explanation is to blame Trump’s abrasive, ‘isolationist’ statements for the erosion of transatlantic solidarity. But that erosion was well underway before Trump emerged on the scene … [In] a 2015 Pew Research Center survey … France, Italy and Germany all had majorities opposed to fulfilling their country’s obligation to fulfill the Article 5 treaty pledge.”
• “Governmental elites may be able to ignore public opinion for a time, but it will be hard to sustain policies that increasingly run counter to the wishes of popular majorities. A death knell is sounding for NATO and the rest of the post-World War II transatlantic foreign policy system. Both the European Union and the United States will need to adjust to that new reality and pursue their own, independent policies.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“Fighting Shadows in the Dark: Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace,” by Quentin E. Hodgson, Logan Ma, Krystyna Marcinek and Karen Schwindt, RAND Corporation, September 2019: Based on open-source material, the authors of the report examine the issue of cyber coercion. They conclude that:

• “Russia and North Korea appear to be more likely to have used cyber operations as a coercive tool than China and Iran.”
• “[C]ontrary to what coercion theory would predict, states often do not make distinct threats with unambiguous demands for changes in behavior. Rather, states use cyber operations to try to coerce their neighbors while denying responsibility, often hiding behind proxies and without issuing clear demands.”
• “Cyber operations intended to coerce are a small subset of overall cyber operations globally… Russian cyber operations appear to have had some coercive intent in Ukraine and Montenegro.”
• “The United States and its partners need to develop a richer understanding of how cyber coercion might emerge, build systems to provide warning of impending operations, and craft strategies to deter and respond to cyber coercion.”

“Russia and China Are Trying to Set the U.N.’s Rules on Cybercrime,” Allison Peters, Foreign Policy, 09.16.19. The author, who is deputy director of the National Security Program at Third Way, a think tank that identifies as “center-left,” describes “the playing field … in the competition to create the rules governing how countries deal with cybercrime.” She writes:

• “On one side, you have a global treaty, known as the Budapest Convention, which was drafted with strong support from the United States and its allies. … On the other side, you have Russia and China, two countries that have long been accused of sponsoring malicious cyberactivity themselves. These countries have refused to join the Budapest Convention and have instead called for a new global cybercrime treaty at the U.N.”
• “To be sure, the Budapest Convention is hardly a panacea. Indeed, it has been validly criticized for its lack of human rights and legal safeguards. Yet, it’s the only global treaty that exists with a common vision for trying to facilitate international cooperation on cybercrime that also aims to protect the rule of law and an open internet.”
• “Alternatively, a draft treaty that Russia has recently circulated would allow countries to solidify their hold over information and communications technology within their borders, enabling some countries to further restrict activities and speech on the internet, while also stressing governments’ sovereignty in cybercrime investigations.”
• “In the competition between these two visions, the United States has lost before, and this year it could happen again. During last year’s General Assembly proceedings, a resolution on cybercrime pushed by Russia with support from China passed by a vote of 94 to 59 with 33 abstentions. The resolution … was seen by the United States and its allies as an attempt by Russia to put discussions of a new global cybercrime treaty that advances its interests on the U.N.’s agenda. A separate Russian resolution opposed by the United States establishing an open-ended working group to discuss norms in cyberspace also passed in the General Assembly last year.”

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Key to Understanding Vladimir Putin,” John Evans, The National Interest, 09.21.19: The author, a former U.S. consul general in St. Petersburg, writes:

• “I believe we Americans have misunderstood … Vladimir Putin from the moment he entered our consciousness, at the very start of the present millennium. … Those of us who knew Putin in the 1990s recall that his formula for the recovery of Russia consisted of three elements: rebuilding the economy, dealing with the crime problem, and reforming the courts. That was a pretty good prescription for what ailed Russia at the time and is still a good basic recipe. Note that he was concerned exclusively with domestic problems: nothing about geopolitics here.”
• “Putin did not seek the presidency of Russia. … In his first term [as president], Putin made a number of gestures to the United States that were friendly … It is common to ascribe America’s growing difficulties with Russia to President Putin personally, but the sources of Russian discontent predate Putin’s presidency.”
• “I could go on at some length describing the many things that have driven Russia into its present defensive crouch against the West and especially the United States. Our wars in the Middle East … the ‘color revolutions’ … and, perhaps most devastating of all, the full-court press to brand Russia as an aggressor nation not included in the new European security architecture.”
• “Putin's rise to preeminent power in the Kremlin was a reversion to the norm for Russia, not a step backward on the inevitable trajectory that we in the West had imagined for her. What we need to do now is … think afresh about the challenge Russia's alienation from us poses, and set about mending the damage, starting most urgently with Ukraine.” 
• “[I]mputing evil to Russia—or to any country—on the basis of its leader’s imagined personality is a dangerous game. … Imagining, as some do, that Putin is ‘the problem,’ and that when he leaves the scene all will be well, is a naïve delusion. As the leading Russia scholar and diplomat Tom Graham once put it, ‘we don’t have a Putin problem, we have a Russia problem.’ And it is a problem in part of our own making—but blaming Putin is so much easier than reckoning with our own shortcomings.”

“Welcome to the Arctic Wars,” Lyle J. Goldstein, The National Interest, 09.22.19: The author, a research professor at the United States Naval War College, writes:

• “A U.S. strategy in the Arctic may be looking toward more promising days, but tough questions still need to be asked about these new capabilities. … [I]t is quite apparent that America’s new icebreakers cannot compare in any way with the massive icebreaker fleet that Russia already wields. Nor is Moscow’s icebreaker fleet dominance really under any question in the future.”
• “[T]here is little question that both Moscow and Beijing are investing an enormous amount of money in developing the Arctic. … An early May 2019 survey of Chinese interests in the Arctic … does not suggest [Russian] anxiety [about China’s actions in the Arctic], but rather synergistic interests among the two Eurasian giants. … Russians may rest assured, according to this expert [Alexander Vorotnikov], that Chinese will not be encroaching on Russia’s sovereign rights.”
• “Another survey of Chinese activities in the Russian Arctic was published by the newspaper Izvestiya in September 2018. That survey raised a few points of skepticism, noting that many Arctic nations … have declined certain Chinese initiatives in the Arctic due to various concerns. However, the piece generally concludes that Beijing interests are rather benign, focusing on both research and economic development. By contrast, there is an evident mistrust of the West, since discussions of the Northern Sea Route have evidently stirred up bad feeling.”
• “Overall, Washington is viewed by Moscow as continuously disparaging Russian activities in the Arctic. In such an atmosphere of U.S.-Russian hostility, it is hardly likely that the United States will succeed in driving a wedge between Russia and China in the Arctic.”
• “A different lens for exploring the emerging Arctic ‘Great Game’ might focus on the level of interest or strategic priority that each of the relevant powers attaches to the High North. From that perspective, it is rather clear that Moscow has and will continue to ‘drive this train,’ and that includes both the freedom and determination to choose its partners in accord with its own perceived national interests.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin Is Trolling the United States in the Persian Gulf,” Dimitar Bechev, Foreign Policy, 09.19.19: The author, a research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, writes:

• “If Saudi Arabia wants to protect itself, he [Russian President Vladimir Putin] hinted on Sept. 16, it should make a wise decision and follow Iran and Turkey, who bought Russian air-defense systems. … Russia’s response to the recent drone attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities speaks volumes about its place in the Middle East. Had the crisis occurred several years ago, few would have cared what Moscow thought about Gulf affairs. But now, thanks to its military intervention in Syria, Russia is seen as a power broker.”
• “Russia has no dog in the Iran-Saudi fight. The essence of its policy is to try to be on good terms with everyone … Russia … steers clear of other people’s quarrels. It seeks to make geopolitical and commercial gains without taking excessive risks.
• “Beyond that, troubles in the Gulf benefit Russian interests. The rise of oil prices is good news for the Kremlin. … At the same time, the Russian government … signaled that Russia won’t increase production to expand its share of the global market at Riyadh’s expense.”
• “[T]he ongoing rapprochement between Moscow and Riyadh does not change the fact that Iran remains the Russian partner of choice. … Together with the Europeans, Russia is a guarantor of the Iran nuclear deal, or whatever remains of it. Putin is now posing as a peacemaker in Yemen, too. … Moscow is also Tehran’s ally in Syria.”
• “Washington’s bellicose rhetoric about Iran is likely to bring Moscow and Tehran even closer. … [Moscow] pushed back strongly against the U.S. line that Iran is to blame for the drone attacks … To be sure, if tensions get out of hand and the United States ends up starting a war against Iran, the Russians will stand on the sidelines. But given the Trump administration’s penchant to rattle sabers and then back away, Putin could well reap another opportunity to burnish his image as the Middle East’s rising star.”

“Putin Wants to Be the Middle East's Go-To Problem Solver,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg/The Moscow Times, 09.17.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “President Vladimir Putin’s offer to sell Russian air defense systems to Saudi Arabia is about more than mere trolling … Putin was trying to persuade the entire Middle East that working with him is more effective than cooperating with the U.S.”
• “Putin’s foray in Syria was meant, in part, as a sales demonstration to Middle Eastern regimes: Russia will, if asked, intervene on the side of the incumbent ruler in the interest of stability, and it will do so quickly and without political strings attached. The U.S. offers neither of these advantages.”
• “Putin doesn’t care what the public thinks when he feels it’s in Russia’s interest to intervene militarily in some far-off place. … Putin also makes a point of not trying to tell his situational allies—or perhaps ‘clients’ … is a better word—how to run their countries. … Putin defends the right of incumbents to act in line with what they see as their traditions—thus the several references to the Quran he made in Ankara.”
• “This, of course, makes for some awkward exceptions to the ancient rule that says the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s friend. Russia’s closeness to Iran … is an irritant to Saudi Arabia … On the other hand, Russia is Saudi Arabia’s natural ally in protecting the global oil market from the disruption caused by U.S. shale operators. Besides, Saudi Arabia working with the Kremlin could potentially be a way to end Iranian provocations since Moscow will talk with Tehran rather than hit it with sanctions as the U.S. does.”
• “It’s hard to see Saudi Arabia siding openly with Russia and undermining its long-standing alliance with the U.S. … [However,] Trump’s actions against Iran haven’t been overwhelmingly effective. The Yemen conflict … is still raging. … Assad controls most of Syria. And Turkey hasn’t suffered any adverse consequences for defying the U.S. with its S-400 purchase. Putin is waiting in the wings and signaling that he speaks the same language as the clients he’s courting.”

“Democratic Leaders Need to Stop Sending All-Is-Forgiven Messages to Putin,” Garry Kasparov, The Washington Post, 09.17.19: The author, chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, writes:

• “[Putin] has been thrown a lifeline by two supposed leaders of the free world, President Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron. … France has increased trade with Russia despite sanctions, and Macron recently echoed Trump in expressing support for Russia’s return to the group of leading industrialized economies.”
• “When the West sends these all-is-forgiven messages to Russia, Putin immediately exploits them to show Russian elites that he’s still the big man … Instead of deterring Putin from further acts of aggression … such appeasement tells him only that there’s no reason to change his ways. What is needed is a united front of democratic nations declaring that Russia will never come in from the cold until it abandons its repression at home and its malign adventures abroad.”
• “I have helped organize an open letter calling for such a response, with signatories … from around the world and across the political spectrum. The letter urges democratic leaders to deny Putin the international legitimacy he craves and to cut off the economic ties that he uses to spread corruption and to fund his domestic repression, hybrid wars and global assassination campaigns.”
• “The last thing the United States needs heading into a presidential election year is an emboldened Putin, this time with his favorite candidate wielding the powers of the presidency. It was astonishing that in the Democratic presidential debate last week, the word ‘Russia’ wasn’t mentioned. Democrats appear to be joining Trump and the Republicans in ignoring what U.S. intelligence agencies regard as among this nation’s gravest national security threats.”
• “Unlike the people of Russia, citizens of the free world can hold their politicians accountable, and it is long past time to do so.”

“How Vladimir Putin Is Outplaying the US in Africa,” Grant T. Harris and Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 09.17.19: The authors, the former senior director for Africa at the White House and the former U.S. ambassador to Russia, write:

• “[The Trump administration’s] Withdrawal Doctrine is undermining the administration’s commitment to deter and contain Russia. Nowhere is this contradiction more clearly on display than in Africa. … As the United States withdraws … the Kremlin has dramatically and dangerously stepped up its military and commercial dealings across the continent.”
• “Trump’s assault on diplomacy and development programs has left U.S. embassies short-staffed and in policy limbo. … Africa-related work has been especially hard-hit … While Trump loses partners and influence in Africa with amazing speed and indifference, Putin is aggressively seeking deals and security relationships across the region.”
• “Next month, Russia will host more than 50 African leaders at a summit in Sochi. … Moscow is the largest arms supplier to the continent by far, and is even using proxies and military contractors to embed itself within certain African governments. Leaked documents revealed a concerted Russian strategy to expand its influence and military presence. The same is true for Moscow’s broadening economic reach.”
• “Over time, U.S. neglect of the region will weaken our ability to counter Moscow globally. Russia’s growing economic ties in Africa soften the bite of Western sanctions … New deals in Africa help Moscow hedge against Western pressure … Wagner, an infamous mercenary group with close ties to the Kremlin, is designated for sanctions yet deeply entrenched in the government of the Central African Republic.”
• “Rhetoric will never be as compelling to African leaders as infrastructure investment or security cooperation. While the administration is increasing its efforts to support investment … reducing troops and counterterrorism cooperation will give all the more room for Moscow to step in and fill the void. Across Africa, many leaders still eagerly seek deeper engagement with the United States. Doubling down on these relationships would serve U.S. national security broadly, as well as help effectively counter Russia.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“A Sino-Russian Alliance? Don’t Bet On It,” Thomas Sherlock and John Gregory, Wall Street Journal, 09.15.19: The authors, a professor of political science and the director of the Chinese Program and the Center for Languages, Cultures and Regional Studies at West Point, write:

• “Our research suggests the future elites of both countries [Russia and China] … are wary. In mid-2018 we conducted 21 focus groups of students … at the leading universities in Beijing and Moscow. … The students expressed disinterest, ambivalence or misgivings about Sino-Russian cooperation. Many believed China and Russia did not share sufficient values or interests to work together over the long term.”
• “The Chinese students … felt that the legitimacy of a particular political order depends on whether it can produce social and economic ‘development.’ This standard has inadvertently devalued Russia as a partner in their eyes. … They also were skeptical that the Russian political system could modernize the economy and support Moscow’s return to great-power status. By contrast, the students in Beijing identified the U.S. as the kind of dynamic, wealthy and influential country that China aspires to be.”
• “[S]tudents in Moscow often criticized their own government, expressing concern about the future of Russia. … China encompassed a ‘mysterious’ world that was incompatible with dominant strands of Russian culture and identity. Some Russian students also found China untrustworthy, in part because its regime is so authoritarian … A common worry was that in a partnership with China, Russia would be relegated to political, strategic and economic dependency.”
• “[B]oth Chinese and Russian students criticized U.S. policies overseas and American domestic problems. Yet for the Chinese participants, America’s cultural and economic power stimulated intense interest and fascination. The Russian students were also drawn to the U.S. because of its Western identity and by the perceived importance of American political values and institutions.”
• “The U.S. can strengthen these positive views and its soft power by adhering to its liberal-democratic principles. … The U.S. must also avoid demonizing Russia and China as it grapples with the challenge of great-power competition. Otherwise, Washington risks stoking anti-American nationalism as well as support for Sino-Russian collaboration—even as a rising generation of elites prefers to stand apart.”

“Chinese and Russian Creditors in Venezuela: Oil Collapse and Political Survival,” Stephen B. Kaplan, PONARS Eurasia, September 2019: The author, associate professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University, writes:

• “Chinese and Russian investments in Venezuela … share a long-term horizon. However, these two creditors have distinct foreign policy aims, with Russia more willing to challenge the United States geopolitically. To some extent, their divergent approaches reflect their respective roles within the international system. … China aims to project an image of being a defender of the status quo of the global economic system, while Russia has overtly aimed to upend it.”
• “While the United States has pushed for immediate regime change in Venezuela, Russia and China have preferred, in the short term, to help Maduro resist a political transition. … [This way,] China and Russia would be able to protect their oil and commercial interests in the country, which by now are larger than those held by the United States.”
• “By hedging politically, China could foster its long-term commercial interests beyond the current crisis. It could also avoid the perception of being a defender of autocracy in a largely democratic region that had become increasingly critical of the Maduro regime. … Although it shares China’s long-term commercial horizon, [Russia] has prioritized its geopolitical goals, including its desire to challenge U.S. hemispheric power and upend what it perceives to be an unfair and Western-dominated international system.”
• “Russia’s support of Maduro rests on the assumption that the country needs a change of course—especially in economic policy—just one that neither is fully guided by Washington nor jeopardizes Russia’s influence over the Venezuela military.”
• “Similar to China’s tepid support for the status quo in Venezuela, Moscow likely senses that Maduro’s political tenure is limited due to the oil industry’s collapse, the humanitarian crisis and the international condemnation against his autocratic rule. For both countries, given their large stakes in Venezuela’s oil and gas industries, their long-term commercial interests are dependent on economic, political and social stabilization. Despite their role in prolonging the political stalemate in Venezuela, both China and Russia are likely to become more flexible over time, as they jockey for long-term strategic collaboration in a country that is home to the world’s largest oil reserves.”

Ukraine:

“Why Ukraine Being the Focus of Trump’s Whistleblower Complaint Is Particularly Ominous,” Aaron Blake, The Washington Post, 09.20.19: The author, a senior political reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “The Washington Post broke the story late Wednesday [Sept. 18] that the whistleblower’s complaint dealt with the president and a ‘promise’ he made to a foreign leader. … [T]he complaint is focused on Ukraine.”
• “[The] phone call [with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy] took place July 25, and for a host of reasons … it could spell real trouble for Trump and his supporters. … [W]e already knew about demonstrated and very public interest from the Trump team in what Ukraine could provide them when it comes to Trump’s reelection effort. Trump lawyer Rudolph W. Giuliani has publicly urged the Ukrainians to pursue investigations that he has admitted would benefit Trump, and one in particular that could damage what appears to be Trump’s most threatening potential 2020 Democratic opponent, Joe Biden.”
• “In May, Giuliani canceled a controversial planned trip to Ukraine that he had admitted was intended to apply pressure on its government to investigate Biden’s son Hunter Biden and his work for a Ukrainian gas company that had previously been of interest to investigators in the country.
• “[T]he Ukrainian government’s readout of that call mentioned how Trump was ‘convinced the new Ukrainian government will be able to quickly improve [the] image of Ukraine, [and] complete [the] investigation of corruption cases, which inhibited the interaction between Ukraine and the USA.’”
• “While all this was happening, the Trump administration was holding back military aid to Ukraine. … Giuliani appeared on CNN on Thursday night and defended Trump as if there were some kind of a quid pro quo involving foreign aid and investigating the Bidens. … If Trump made any quid pro quos with either [Russia or North Korea], given their statuses as antagonistic foreign powers and even enemies, it would have been bad. But when it comes to countries with which such a ‘promise’ might have been particularly self-serving for Trump, Ukraine is near the top of the list.”

“Ukrainian Leaders Feel Trapped Between Warring Washington Factions,” Michael Birnbaum and David L. Stern, The Washington Post, 09.21.19: The authors, the Brussels bureau chief for the news outlet and an independent journalist, write:

• “Ukrainian leaders are trapped in the middle of a very Washington firefight, facing mounting pressure from President Trump and his allies to investigate the son of political rival Joe Biden, and are searching for a way to escape.”
• “They could give in to Trump’s demand to open an inquiry into the Ukrainian business dealings of Hunter Biden and risk the anger of Democrats and others for engaging in what those interests would see as interference in the 2020 elections. Or the Ukrainians could defy Trump and face the wrath of a president who had frozen $250 million of crucial military assistance for mysterious reasons before releasing it earlier this month.”
• “Either way, they risk cracking the bipartisan consensus that has firmly supported Ukraine against Russia since 2014 … If Ukraine becomes associated with one U.S. political party or the other, it could jeopardize ties with its most important security backer.”
• “The predicament could come to a head Wednesday [Sept. 25], when Trump is to sit down, for the first time, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Zelenskiy has sought the meeting for months, seeing it as a way to demonstrate U.S. support … Trump has been reluctant, and he pressed Zelensky about Biden in a July phone conversation that is the subject of an extraordinary intelligence community whistleblower complaint.”
• “Ukrainian policymakers and analysts worry that their leader is walking into an ambush by meeting Trump on Wednesday. They fear it could set back efforts to improve the rule of law made since the 2014 revolution, which overthrew a deeply corrupt leader.”

“Rudy Giuliani Accused Me of Exposing Paul Manafort’s Ukraine Deals to Help US Democrats. That’s A Lie,” Serhiy Leshchenko, The Washington Post, 09.21.19: The author, a Ukrainian journalist and former member of parliament, writes:

• “On Aug. 19, 2016, I convened a news conference in Kyiv at which I revealed previously secret records of payments made by the former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych to Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort. … I will always be angry at Manafort. His work contributed greatly to Yanukovych’s election victory in 2010; Yanukovych then used his position as president to enrich himself and his inner circle. I have no doubt that Yanukovych paid Manafort for his services out of the funds he robbed from Ukrainian taxpayers.”
• “President Trump’s lawyer Rudolph W. Giuliani … is not only attempting to rehabilitate Manafort but is also working to undermine U.S. relations with Ukraine … Giuliani and his associates are trying to drag our newly elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, into a conflict between two foreign political parties, drastically limiting Ukraine’s room for maneuver in respect to the United States, perhaps its most important international partner.”
• “Giuliani's entire approach is built on disinformation and the manipulation of facts. Giuliani has developed a conspiracy theory in which he depicts my revelations about Manafort as an intervention in the 2016 U.S. election in favor of the Democratic Party.”
• “Giuliani is not only deceiving American citizens. He is not only intervening in Ukrainian politics, smearing parliamentarians and officials of the presidential administration. He is also trying to drag the new president of Ukraine into an American election, which is absolutely unacceptable.”
• “As a person who has had direct experience of many of these events, I express my readiness to testify to the U.S. Congress about what has been happening for the past six months in the gray zone of Ukrainian-American relations.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Is the Russia-Belarus Merger Anything More Than a Mirage?” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.19.19: The author, a journalist and political commentator for the Belarusian portal Tut.by, writes:

• “An article published in Kommersant newspaper on Sept. 16 about the impending economic merger between Belarus and Russia created quite a stir in both countries. Yet the agreements that have apparently already been reached are not accomplishable in the short timeframe laid out, if they are even feasible at all. … A close look at the plans for three area—taxes, customs and energy—shows that the plan is utopian.”
• “The claim that a unified tax system is due to be approved by April 1, 2021, was met with skepticism by Belarusian economists. … The economic damage from this reform would exceed Belarus’s losses from the gradual transition to paying global prices for oil following Russia’s ‘tax maneuver.’ That maneuver … is the whole reason behind the conversation about integration.”
• “As for the … unified regulator for the energy market … it looks set to run aground on the old trap of rivalry. … The customs situation is a little different, since the two nations already form a customs union with shared rules and tariffs. … [But] a unified customs service, like the energy regulator, would encounter the same insurmountable problem of sharing authority.”
• “[I]f Belarus joins Russian countersanctions on Western food imports, it will incur the ire of the Belarusian people and void years of thawing relations between Minsk and the EU … Again, this is too great a price for Minsk to pay.”
• “In the history of integration between Russia and Belarus, many far firmer agreements and deadlines have fallen through … Moscow’s position by December will likely be something along the lines of readiness to take things step by step … If Lukashenko signs the paperwork in exchange for such flimsy guarantees, we can expect years and years of bureaucratic ping-pong over who has done what, and whose turn it is to make a move.”

“In Georgia, Friends of the West Are Suddenly Under Fire,” David Kramer, The Washington Post, 09.19.19: The author, director of European and Eurasian studies at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, writes:

• “Georgia has been an island of democracy amid a sea of authoritarianism … Yet now pro-Russian forces are on the rise … The political environment struck me as more on edge and polarized than I have noticed in more than a dozen previous visits to Georgia over the past few years. Members of Georgian Dream, the ruling party, have vowed to crush the opposition, exacerbating divisions within society. Tensions risk boiling over.”
• “A group of leading civil society organizations recently issued an open letter bemoaning the ‘dire state of affairs’ and ‘democratic backsliding and state capture,’ as well as the ‘concentration of power in the hands of the ruling political party, thus dangerously undermining the balance of power and the viability of institutions.’”
• “A recent poll conducted by the International Republican Institute shows that a majority of Georgians see Russia as Georgia’s greatest political and economic threat, while 52 percent of respondents criticize the government for its perceived soft handling of the relationship with Moscow.”
• “For more than a decade now, Georgia has sought deeper integration in both the European Union and NATO to help protect the country from further Russian aggression and to secure its rightful place in Europe. … Georgia has been a steady contributor to various U.S.- or NATO-led operations around the world … In many respects, Georgia is more qualified for NATO membership than some current members.”
• “Georgians refuse to kowtow to Moscow, but they need support from the West and especially the United States in consolidating democratic, rule-of-law-based institutions and deterring further Russian aggression.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Future Without Putin No Longer Taboo Issue,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 09.21.19. The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “Any thought that Russia is simply a top-down authoritarianism, shaped by a brooding president’s masterplan, should be dispelled by the upsurge in open and indirect debates currently taking place in the higher echelons of the country’s elite.”
• “They demonstrate three things: that there are real differences in opinion, that this is a system where policy emerges from competitive lobbying, and that Vladimir Putin seems unwilling or unable to resolve the main issues of the day. Put together, they demonstrate the increasing dysfunctionality of ‘late Putinism.’"
• “Will he [Putin] step down [in 2024] in favor of a successor, carve out a new position for himself, rewrite the rules to stay in power? Until that issue is resolved, no long-term political strategy can be elaborated, leaving the stakeholders and political technologists relying on tactical gambits and pitching their own favored solutions in the hope one gets the boss’s approval.”
• “Increasingly, a consensus seems to be emerging that whoever replaces Dmitry Medvedev as prime minister would be considered the heir apparent. … Many of the discussions taking place on real policy ought thus also to be considered attempts to strike the right statesmanlike pose or to gather useful allies in some notional future political struggle.”
• The political figures discussed in the article include: Vyacheslav Volodin, speaker of the State Duma; Minister of Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin; Elvira Nabiullina, chair of the Central Bank; German Gref, president of Sberbank; Sergei Chemezov, head of the state technology conglomerate Rostec and a confidant of Putin’s who served with him in East Germany in the 1980s; hardliners Nikolai Patrushev, Alexander Bortnikov and Viktor Zolotov; and others.

“Anders Aslund Examines Russia’s ‘Authoritarian Kleptocracy,’” Chris Miller, Russia Matters, 09.18.19: The author, an assistant professor of international history at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and co-director of Fletcher's Russia and Eurasia program, writes:

• “How does Russia’s political-economic system work? Anders Aslund examines this question in his insightful new book ‘Russia’s Crony Capitalism.” His answer: Russia is an “authoritarian kleptocracy’—a country ruled by a narrow, centralized elite that sees self-enrichment as a primary goal.”
• “The notion that Russia’s rulers are both venal and anti-democratic will not surprise followers of Russian politics. Aslund … argues that corruption is a feature, not a bug, of the Russian political system. Self-enrichment, he argues, is crucial to understanding why Russia’s leaders make the decisions that they do.”
• “Understanding the forces that drive Russian government decision making is no easy task, and Aslund focuses on one of them, rather than undertaking to explain how the system works as a whole or to present a theoretical framework. The book, with its emphasis on corruption, looks primarily at Russian domestic politics, with little to say about national interests or foreign policy.”
• “‘Russia’s Crony Capitalism’ makes four main points about the role of corruption in Russian politics. First, it is now more centralized than it was in the 1990s, with the state much stronger than 20-30 years ago. … [Second,] many of the largest corruption schemes involve these longtime Putin acquaintances, who were not major public figures before his rise to power. Aslund focuses in particular on ‘three prime cronies’: Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Yuri Kovalchuk.”
• “Aslund’s third main argument is that the centralization of corruption schemes has been deeply intertwined with the reversal, over the past 15 years or so, of the Yeltsin-era effort to reduce the state’s role in the corporate sector, especially in banking and energy. … Aslund’s conclusion is that corruption imposes a substantial economic cost—not only due to the funds pilfered but via the reorganization of the economy in a way that benefits state-owned enterprises at the expense of efficiency.”

“The Kremlin Puts Its Faith in Arbitrary Authoritarianism,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 09.17.19: The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “While most of the more than 2000 people arrested during the demonstrations in Moscow before the recent council elections were freed, fined, or given minimal sentences, the state's eagerness to visit its displeasure on a seemingly-random selection of critics is more than just malice, it is a strategy.”
• “In many ways, this is an extension of its internet policy. Russia, unlike China, cannot lock itself permanently behind a virtual wall, and it has a lively, vibrant and irreverent online information space. It tries to block particularly problematic materials … and drown out critical comments with torrents of rebuttal and misdirection. … [I]t is worth remembering that the infamous ‘troll farms’ were initially established for domestic and not international purposes.”
• “The aim is to create a climate of fear and uncertainty. … [B]y being inconsistent and unclear as to quite what will arouse the ire of the authorities, it encourages individuals to censor themselves more rigorously than might otherwise be the case. … A similar calculation appears to be at work in the punishment of protesters. Of course, there are the deliberate and directed prosecutions of particular targets. … The message is simple. If you want to protest, we may let you, but we might also beat you and arrest you, regardless of how you behave. In this way, the authorities hope to prevent protests from becoming normalized.”
• “But it also reflects genuine fear. To be sure, … at present, the state has all the coercive resources it needs and faces no serious challenge on the streets. … As the country becomes increasingly restive, and Vladimir Putin fails to give any clear sense of his plans for 2024, a security elite that lived through the 1980s is uncomfortably aware of how quickly mass, grudging, apathy can turn into active dissent.”
• “For some, the answer is fiscal stimulus and bread and circus … But for others, the lesson of the Gorbachev years is that the state must not only be strong and ruthless, but it must also show itself strong and ruthless.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean,” Dmitry Gorenburg, PONARS Eurasia, 09.18.19: The author, a senior analyst at CNA, writes:

• “Over the last decade, Russia has expanded its military footprint in the Mediterranean. Since establishing its Mediterranean Squadron in 2013, it has largely maintained a permanent naval presence in the region, based primarily on ships from the Black Sea Fleet, with support from ships and submarines of the Northern and Baltic Fleets.”
• “Russia’s strategy uses the Mediterranean’s geography to protect Russia’s southern flanks while seeking to challenge the naval supremacy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia depends on maintaining and gradually expanding its naval presence in the Mediterranean while also securing expanded access to ports and bases, with the possibility of eventually contesting NATO’s dominance in the central Mediterranean as well.”
• “Although the Russian Navy’s missions in the Mediterranean are primarily related to coastal defense and protection of territorial waters, conventional deterrence has come to play an increasingly important role since the development of a ship-based cruise missile capability. The Russian Navy has sought to establish credible maritime conventional deterrence versus NATO through the combination of air defenses and cruise missile–equipped ships, which work together to signal that any use of NATO naval forces against Russian ships and facilities would be highly costly for the adversary.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“How the Moscow Protest Cases Are Changing Russia’s Justice System,” Olga Romanova, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.18.19: The author, director of a prisoners’ rights organization, writes:

• “Russia’s regional elections are over, and the second wave of court cases of those arrested over protests in Moscow in the run-up to the elections is under way. … If anyone had a remaining glimmer of hope that after the elections the courts would pay more attention to the letter and spirit of the law, then they were sorely mistaken.
• “It seems there are new systemic trends within Russia’s apparatus of repression, as well as a possible swing in the public mood on this issue. … [T]he authorities have completely stopped investigating … accusations of the unjustified use of force against detainees. … The second trend is the outright refusal by judges to admit (or even view) what the defense claims is evidence that clears the defendant.”
• “Another important change is the mass reclassification of political protest cases … as more serious crimes. … The sentences themselves are also suspicious. … The harsh treatment of those arrested at the Moscow protests has not failed to impact on the public mood. … With this second wave of sentences over the protests, people generally far removed from politics—as well as those closer to it, but from the Kremlin side—are gradually starting to say things that just yesterday seemed seditious, but which today are bad form not to support.
• “By September, the criminal cases brought against Moscow protesters had stopped being described as a ‘second Bolotnaya case’ (referring to court cases that followed protests on Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square in 2012 … ) … We have entered a new phase. … In this new era, opposition leaders are still apparently protected from lengthy jail terms … But this time … completely random passersby are being jailed … Another difference … is the lack of serious interest in the new Moscow protests from the global community.
• “The sudden loosening of the vise ahead of the elections … points to the fact that … there is no consensus on the best way to reduce the protest mood. … [T]he faction urging for harsh repression currently has the upper hand. This will impact not just the prevailing mood of protest but also the state of the Russian justice system, which was already lamentable.”