This Week’s Highlights:

• There is a mismatch between the Western concept of deterrence and the Russian concept of sderzhivanie, particularly when the latter is strategic, argues Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Strategic sderzhivanie encompasses several Western concepts in a multi-domain, cross-cutting effort to shape the strategic environment to serve Russia’s objectives using a range of both soft and hard power tools of statecraft in peacetime and during conflict. Grouping these disparate behaviors under a term that implies a defensive posture, the author believes, could create misperceptions in the Kremlin and enable destabilizing behavior.
• With military tension among great powers increasing in east Asia, central Europe and the Middle East, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and others have proposed a summit of the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, also known as the P5—to find a way forward. Paul Saunders, a senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Center for the National Interest, argues that, while reducing tension and avoiding direct armed conflict are certainly desirable, a P5 summit is unlikely to offer workable solutions. Perversely, in fact, Putin’s proposed project, Saunders writes, might only succeed if the United States owns it and leads it.
• Russo-German relations have been deteriorating for nearly a decade now, writes Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. It’s unrealistic to think they might be restored to a partnership in the foreseeable future, but there is still a chance to stop the relationship from descending into one of hostility. To achieve that, Trenin argues, Russia needs to dial down the public rhetoric, conduct a thorough investigation of what exactly happened to opposition politician Alexei Navalny on Russian soil and develop a detailed and well-argued position before discussing the issue at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
• Two conditions need to be present for Russia and China to align with the aim of balancing a U.S. threat, argues Simon Saradzhyan, founding director of Russia Matters. First, Russia’s ability to single-handedly deter the U.S./NATO would have to come into doubt, while its relations with the West would have to remain as bad as today or become even more adversarial. Second, China’s ability to single-handedly deter the U.S./NATO would have to come into doubt, while its relations with the West would have to become adversarial.
• Increasing the proportion of women in the Russian military could help Moscow not only meet manning requirements and shift toward professionalization but also provide myriad other advantages, writes Mary Chesnut, a research analyst in the Russia Studies Program at CNA Corporation. Significant obstacles, however, suggest that the status quo will remain: lack of pressure from civil society, associated infrastructural costs of gender integration, violence and sexual assault and pervasive views about gender among the highest ranks and public alike.   
• If a full-scale crackdown by President Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus leads to turmoil, his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, will have little choice but to send in his “reserve,” according to the Financial Times editorial board. Not doing so, they write, would make him look weak in his own backyard; doing so, however, would prompt another perilous stand-off with the West and new sanctions. Sabine Fischer and Astrid Sahm of Germany’s SWP, meanwhile, argue that a constitutional reform could offer a solution in Belarus. But it would have to be flanked by confidence-building measures and guarantees, they write, adding that Moscow might potentially see benefits in such a scenario: The Kremlin’s backing for Lukashenko risks fostering anti-Russian sentiment in Belarus’s traditionally pro-Russian society.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments

Iran and its nuclear program:

“There's a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” Joe Biden, 09.13.20. The author, who is now the Democratic nominee for U.S. president, writes:

• “The bottom line is that Iran is closer to a nuclear bomb today than it was when Donald Trump took office. And Trump has no answer for that. Five years ago, even Russia and China stood with our European allies behind an American-led approach to Iran's nuclear program.”
• “The good news is that there remains a better way. Here's what I would do as President.”
  • “First, I will make an unshakable commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”
  • “Second, I will offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy. If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”
  • “Third, we will continue to push back against Iran's destabilizing activities, which threaten our friends and partners in the region.”
• “If Iran chooses confrontation, I am prepared to defend our vital interests and our troops. But I am ready to walk the path of diplomacy if Iran takes steps to show it is ready too.”

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“The New Cold War Is Financial,” Tom Keatinge, Royal United Services Institute, 09.21.20. The author, director of RUSI’s Center for Financial Crime and Security Studies, writes:

• “A new front is emerging. Not only is the use of sanctions mushrooming, multiplying the risk for financial actors, creating an increasingly complex landscape for businesses to navigate and the risk that they might inadvertently trigger an unseen violation. The financial institutions themselves are also being directly targeted. Whereas in the past, financial actors might become collateral damage as countries exchange financial sanctions, today they are themselves in the crosshairs, threatened by geopolitical rivalries, most recently between China and the U.S.” 
• “Warfare is not only about offense; defense is equally important, and the financial landscape is thus evolving. For example, China’s large banks, that power the country’s expanding global financial domination, have reportedly been preparing contingency plans in case U.S. lawmakers take steps to freeze their access to U.S. dollar markets and settlement systems.” 
• “None of this is to say that the longstanding stranglehold of the U.S. and its dominant currency and allied financial systems will change overnight, but for CEOs and countries whose economic survival relies on their financial relationships with China or the U.S., a chill is descending. This will lead to some uncomfortable financial decisions and will inevitably drive innovation that will further balkanize the global financial system. Choosing sides in the financial world will no longer be about selecting investment winners and losers; it will be about choosing with which side to ally as the brewing cold war turns financial.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments

Impact of the pandemics:

• No significant developments

Missile defense:

• No significant developments

Nuclear arms control:

“Strategic Sderzhivanie: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence,’” Samuel Charap, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 09.16.20. The author, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes:

• “There is a mismatch between the Western concept of deterrence and the Russian concept of sderzhivanie, and particularly strategic sderzhivanie.”
• “Strategic sderzhivanie encompasses the Western concepts of coercive statecraft, deterrence, compellence and intra-war deterrence. It is a multi-domain, cross-cutting effort to shape the strategic environment to serve Russia’s objectives using a range of both soft and hard power tools of statecraft in peacetime and during conflict.”
• “Grouping these disparate behaviors under a term that implies a defensive posture could create misperceptions in the Kremlin and enable destabilizing behavior.”

“Spinning good news on arms control,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 09.16.20. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes in The Hill:

• “The Trump administration has little time before November 3 to produce a new agreement or even the framework for one. Doing so would require that Russian officials, who read the same polls that Americans do, make concessions now as opposed to saving them for a negotiation with a possible, if not probable, Biden administration in 2021.That leaves Trump with a clean, simple extension of New START as the doable deal on the table—if he wants to prove his administration’s arms control happy talk is not just spin.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments

Cyber security:

• No significant developments

Elections interference:

“Trump Takes Election Interference Seriously,”  Robert C. O'Brien, Wall Street Journal, 09.21.20. The author, a White House national security adviser, writes:

• “Microsoft released a report this month documenting the efforts of groups operating from China, Russia and Iran to undermine U.S. election security through cyberattacks and disinformation. William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, sounded a similar warning in August. With voting already under way in some parts of the country, Americans should be concerned.”
  • “Russian actors, according to Microsoft, have aimed advanced cyberattacks at Republicans and Democrats involved in the election, as well as more than 200 civic and policy organizations. Russia continues to gather intelligence on identified targets and maintains the ability to undertake cyber disruption operations in pursuit of its political objectives.”
• “President Trump understands the challenge posed by all three of these state actors, as well as other nations, to the integrity of our elections. He has directed the National Security Council to work closely with federal departments and agencies to ensure that Americans can cast their ballots this year with full confidence.”
• “Election security isn't a partisan issue. Those who seek to use this threat for domestic political purposes themselves undermine confidence in our electoral process. China, Russia, Iran and other adversaries each pose a threat to our elections, and the Trump administration seeks to counter all of those threats in a serious, professional and apolitical fashion.”
• “Abraham Lincoln once noted that ‘the ballot is stronger than the bullet.’ Foreign adversaries, who can't match the military, economic or diplomatic power of the U.S., understand Lincoln's wisdom. They seek to sow chaos and confusion in our electoral process to gain an advantage over us. Rest assured, the Trump administration won't allow their efforts to succeed.”

“What’s at Stake in This Election? The American Democratic Experiment,” Dan Coats, New York Times, 09.17.20. The author, who served as director of national intelligence from 2017 to 2019, writes:

• “We hear often that the November election is the most consequential in our lifetime. But the importance of the election is not just which candidate or which party wins. Voters also face the question of whether the American democratic experiment, one of the boldest political innovations in human history, will survive.”
• “If we fail to take every conceivable effort to ensure the integrity of our election, the winners will not be Donald Trump or Joe Biden, Republicans or Democrats. The only winners will be Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Ali Khamenei. No one who supports a healthy democracy could want that.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Evolving Global Order Makes a P5 Summit Ineffective,” Paul Saunders, Russia Matters, 09.17.21. The author, a senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “With military tension among great powers increasing in east Asia, central Europe and the Middle East, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and others have proposed a summit of the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, also known as the P5—to find a way forward.”
• “Putin may well return to this theme in his address to the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly [this week]… Nevertheless, while reducing tension—and avoiding direct armed conflict—is certainly desirable, a P5 summit is unlikely to offer workable solutions.”
  • “The biggest problem is that the P5 have widely divergent perspectives on the key points of tension in their relationships, which are increasingly evident where the West, China and Russia intersect and where their contested spheres of influence collide.”
  • “Mistrust exacerbates these differences and has become a daily feature in America’s relationships with its two principal rivals, China and Russia.”
  • “The final problem is with the U.N. Security Council; in proposing a P5 summit rather than a meeting of some other collection of world leaders, Russia’s president has invoked their roles as permanent members of the Security Council and the U.N.’s history as an institutional effort to manage international conflicts in ways that prevent war and maintain peace.”
    • “The definition of ‘major players’ is changing. The P5 countries have their roles in the Security Council—and in Putin’s proposal—because they were the key actors (to varying and contested degrees) in defeating the Axis Powers in World War II. Today’s world looks radically different, both among the P5 and in the overall global distribution of power and wealth.”
• “Perversely, in fact, Putin’s proposed project might only succeed if the United States owns it and leads it. Amid the country’s current bitter divisions, that could be the proposal’s biggest flaw. Ultimately, however, Putin’s proposal for a P5 summit should be far less worrisome to Americans than their own government’s and establishment’s lack of alternative ideas to manage the evolving global system.”

“America's popularity plunge,” Washington Post Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 09.19.20. The authors write:

• “A survey this summer by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center in 13 leading democracies delivered results that ought to be sobering for Republicans as well as Democrats. They show favorable views of the United States reaching all-time lows in Pew's 20 years of polling in Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. In only one of the surveyed countries, South Korea, did more than 50 percent of those polled have a positive view of the United States; the median rating was 34 percent. By way of contrast, in 2016, U.S. approval ratings in those same nations ranged from 57 to 72 percent.”
• “Trump's ratings [16 percent] are not only far below those of President Barack Obama, who in 2016 had the confidence of between 68 and 93 percent of those surveyed; shockingly, he inspires less trust in leading democratic countries than Russia's Vladimir Putin and China's Xi Jinping, who were rated positively by 23 percent and 19 percent, respectively.”
• “Global poll ratings can be mercurial. Views of the United States reached a nadir in several European countries following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, then soared after Mr. Obama's election. Yet while it's easy to anticipate an improvement if Democrat Joe Biden defeats Mr. Trump, Mr. Biden lacks Mr. Obama's star power. U.S. prestige is likely to remain depressed even if Mr. Trump leaves office; if he does not, the consequences will be profound.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Russian opposition wins at the polls—while their leader recovers from poisoning,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 09.18.20. The author, a Russian democracy activist, politician, author, and filmmaker, writes:

• “The attempt on [Alexei] Navalny's life has not stopped his movement. Last Sunday [Sept. 13] two of his leading supporters in Tomsk were handily elected to the city council, defeating pro-regime incumbents as local elections were held across Russia. Overall, Vladimir Putin's United Russia party lost 21 of its 32 seats in the Tomsk legislature, along with its long-held majority.”
• “In neighboring Novosibirsk—Russia's third-largest city—Navalny supporters took enough seats in the council to form their own caucus, also knocking United Russia's seat count below the 50 percent mark. Candidates of Navalny's coalition outpolled both United Russia and the Communists, Russia's main (and docile) official opposition party.”
• “Elsewhere in the country, dozens of Kremlin opponents scored other local victories. The winners included members of the liberal Yabloko party and the United Democrats movement backed by exiled Putin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky.”
• “In the end, no amount of fraud will be able to stem the tide.”
• “If Russians are unable to effect change through the ballot box, they will find another way. The ongoing protests in Belarus have prompted predictions of a similar public surge in Russia in 2024. If the Kremlin continues on its current path, this may well come much sooner.”

“Navalny and the Limits of Putin's Ad Hoc Rule,” Maxim Kashulinsky, The Moscow Times, 09.16.20. The author, publisher at Reminder Media and former editor-in-chief of Forbes Russia and Republic, writes:

• “The pilot [of the plane carrying Alexei Navalny when he became ill]—who was not part of the special op—did what any decent person would do in such a situation: He landed the plane at the nearest airport and called an ambulance. The doctors there—who also had no ties to intelligence agencies—injected Navalny with a drug that, as the German clinic Charité later suggested, saved the politician’s life.”
• “It seems that the special op resumed as soon as Navalny was moved from the plane to the Russian hospital. If the German and French leaders had not applied pressure on the Kremlin, Navalny’s fate would have been decided by the doctors—intimidated as they were by intelligence agents and the spooks in plain clothes who suddenly appeared in the hospital’s corridors.”
• “As we know, Navalny was evacuated to Europe a couple of days later and just recently regained consciousness and began breathing on his own, without the aid of a ventilator. I sincerely hope he recovers completely.”
• “I take this whole incident as a reminder of how much better life in Russia would be if not every level of Putin’s power vertical was enlisted to carry out special ops, but only an anti-terrorist unit just large enough to handle whatever threat to national security actually existed—and that within the framework of a drastically reduced intelligence service.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Women in the Russian Military,” Mary Chesnut, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 09.18.20. The author, a research analyst in the Russia Studies Program at CNA Corporation, writes:

• “From the all-women Death Battalion led by Maria Bochkareva in the Russian Revolution, to the 588th Night Bomber Regiment, dubbed the ‘Night Witches’ by the Nazis they fought in World War II, lore of women defending the Motherland is well-known among Russians. Yet, in modern day Russia, a fairly low number of women serve in the military, despite an expanded force structure approaching one million active-duty personnel. Why is this the case?”
• “In May 2020, Minister of Defense [Sergei] Shoygu stated that there were approximately 41,000 women enlisted in the Russian Armed Forces, which constitutes roughly 4.26 percent of total active duty forces, according to official figures. Though this is a slight reduction compared to the totals in 2018 (44,500), a total of around 35,000 to 45,000 has been fairly consistent for Russia over the past 10 years. Compared to a proportion of 10 percent in the 2000s, however, this rate has more than halved. The current rate lags considerably behind most Western countries; for reference, women make up 16.5 percent of the armed forces in the United States. China’s rate is believed to be around 9 percent.”
• “Today, due to a societal perception of women that permeates the highest levels of [the] Ministry of Defense, the role of women in the Russian Armed Forces remains limited and gendered. This mentality, which emphasizes the importance of reproduction and motherhood, and doesn’t see women as particularly qualified for overly complicated or strenuous roles, is likely further entrenched by an unfavorable birth-to-death rate [sic] (10.1 to 12.3 out of 1,000, pre-Coronavirus figures).”
• “In the future, Russia might find some reason to increase the number of female enlistees amongst its ranks or open more roles to women. Increasing the proportion of women in the Russian military could help Moscow not only meet manning requirements and shift towards professionalization but also provide a myriad of other advantages.”
• “Significant obstacles indicate that the status quo will remain: lack of pressure from civil society, associated infrastructural costs of gender integration, violence and sexual assault, and pervasive views about gender among the highest ranks and public alike. Barring either a shift in public sentiment regarding traditional gender roles, or a demographic trend that reduces the supply of service-aged males, a substantial increase in female representation is unlikely in the near term.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia,” Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 09.16.20. The author, a senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Since 2014, Russia has redoubled its efforts to build a sphere of influence, operating frequently under the flag of Eurasian integration. Its undeclared war in Ukraine and hardball tactics vis-à-vis other neighbors demonstrate the lengths to which it is willing to go to undermine their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moscow has pushed hard to expand the membership and functions of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).”
• “However, Russia’s limited economic resources and lack of soft-power appeal; the engagement with the region by other outside powers, including the European Union, China, Turkey and the United States; and societal change in neighboring states are creating significant long-term obstacles to the success of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and exposing a large gap between its ends and means.”
• “Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia are buffeted by unfavorable trends that are frequently overlooked by analysts and policymakers. Russia’s own heavy-handed behavior contributes to both regional upheaval and instability as well as to the creation of diplomatic headwinds that constrain its own room for maneuver.”
• “Russia remains an unpredictable and aggressive power in Eurasia. Squeezed between it and China, the region’s states have to tread carefully and to chart their ties with the West, which Russia especially considers a threat to its interests, with caution.”
• “The United States should remain engaged in Eurasia and develop tailored strategies for engaging with Russia’s neighbors, while remaining aware that some are more able to engage in a constructive partnership with the West than others, based on their dependence on Moscow. The United States should recognize that Russian malign activities and influence are one source of instability in Eurasia. State fragility is another. The United States should pursue strategies that prioritize working with allies and partners to help Eurasian states deal successfully with both challenges.”

“Russian-German Relations: Back to the Future,” Dmitri  Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.16.20. The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Russo-German relations have been deteriorating for nearly a decade now. It’s unrealistic to think they might be restored to a partnership in the foreseeable future, but there is still a chance to stop the relationship from descending into one of hostility. To achieve that, Russia needs to dial down the public rhetoric, conduct a thorough investigation of what exactly happened to Navalny on Russian soil, and develop a detailed and well-argued position before discussing the issue at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.”
• “This position must be credible, above all for the Russian public. The approach of ‘we don’t know what happened, but we have a dozen versions of what might have happened’ didn’t work in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the shooting down of MH17, or the Skripal poisoning, and it won’t work in the Navalny case either.”
• “In terms of the relationship with Berlin, it would be better to take a time-out. Let the Germans decide for themselves whether or not they need another gas pipeline from Russia. After a while, the quest must be renewed to reach mutual understanding with Germany on a new basis: that of neighborly relations, predictability, and mutual benefit. For Moscow, the most important task right now in Europe is not to lose Belarus as it so incompetently lost Ukraine; not to allow Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko to take Putin for a ride; and to make sure Putin does not miscalculate the Belarusian people—or, for that matter, the Russian people either.”

“Where’s Wagner? The All-New Exploits of Russia’s ‘Private’ Military Company. Kimberly Marten, PONARS Eurasia, September 2020. The author, a professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Barnard College, Columbia University, writes:

• “Increasingly Russia’s Wagner Group ‘private’ military company (PMC) seems to be less of a purely Russian organization and more of a hybrid itself, using forces recruited rather quickly in Syria. This reinforces the sense that their use is for peripheral proxy actions, and not on behalf of the key interests that matter most to Putin. Russia’s supposed allies are being rooked if they are paying good money for Wagner Group contracts because they are not getting Russia’s best fighters.”
• “Meanwhile, the Wagner Group is gaining an international reputation for the indiscriminate abuse and killing of civilians—again something that would not seem to be in the interests of foreign state leaders attempting to bolster their chances of staying in power. The Wagner Group is an ugly failure, and yet Putin turns to it again and again.”

“The other tribe: Israel’s Russian-speaking community and how it is changing the country,” Lily Galili, Brookings, 09.21.20. The author, an Israeli journalist and lecturer, writes:

• “The over one million people who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union in a wave from the beginning of the 1990s have changed Israel to its core—socially, politically, economically and culturally. Within the first six years, they formed what became a large secular nationalist political camp that secures right-wing rule to this day.”
• “Its leading political representative, former foreign minister and defense minister Avigdor Lieberman, who heads what is still perceived as the only ‘Russian’ sectarian party, is often seen as a ‘post-Soviet’ leader, void of ideology, promoting an agenda of fear and incitement.”
• “This wave of immigrants finds itself on two unresolved collision courses. First is the unbridgeable gap between the Zionist secular Law of Return that allows all Jews to settle in Israel, and the rabbinical Orthodoxy in charge of their absorption. … The other collision course, between the Jewish Law of Return and the total denial of Palestinian right of return, is a constant source of friction and animosity between the two communities and their leaders.”
• “There is still a distinct Russian-speaking community, culturally and politically, often misunderstood by veteran Israeli society and politicians. While Israel’s shrinking political left continues to perpetuate its detachment from the community, leaving the arena to right-wing indoctrination, gradual changes in the political affiliations of the community can still be detected in recent years. The terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ within the Russian-speaking community differ from their definition in veteran Israeli society.”
• “Unlike others, the Russian immigrants never aimed for ‘absorption’ … but rather for leadership. Some political scientists presume the Russian community will be Israel’s future elite.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Why Russia’s alliance with China is improbable, but not impossible,” Simon Saradzhyan, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, September 2020. The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “Nations can be in an alliance with each other even if that commitment is informal, but it has to be credible, as is the case with the U.S. and Israel. It has to be credible not only in the eyes of the allied powers, but also other states, including those that are threatening one or more members of that alliance.”
• “While one might say with some degree of confidence that Russia and China are in a de facto non-aggression pact, which is one of the conditions of this article’s definition of an alliance, one cannot be sure when it comes to the second condition, which is that Russia and China will render military and security assistance to each other in case of … aggression by a third country (or alliance) against either or both of them. Therefore, their relations [currently] fall short of this article’s criterion for an alliance.”  
• “For the scenario in which Russia and China align to balance a U.S. threat to materialize, two conditions need to be present. First, Russia’s ability to single-handedly deter the U.S./NATO would have to come into doubt, while its relations with the West would have to remain as bad as today or become even more adversarial. Second, China’s ability to single-handedly deter the U.S./NATO would have to come into doubt, while its relations with the West would have to become adversarial.”
• “For Russia to bandwagon with China [in the future], two conditions would need to be present.”
  • “First, Russia would need to feel threatened both by the U.S. and China (but less by China than by the U.S) so much that it would abandon its position that it will not be a junior partner in any alliance.”
  • “Second, China would have to abandon its opposition to forming alliances and accept the costs which it will incur as a result of allowing Russia to bandwagon with it.”
• “Emergence of either of these two sets of conditions is unlikely, but not impossible in the near future. Therefore, the formation of an alliance between Russia and China in the future is also improbable, at least in the short-to-medium term, but not impossible.”

“Russia, China, and the Indo-Pacific: An Interview With Dmitri Trenin,” Diplomat, 09.21.20.

• “Russia has had to recognize that in the East, as well as in the West, it is now flanked by a power with a superior economic strength, a source of investment and a modernization resource. Hence, it has rebalanced its foreign policy more evenly between Europe and China/Asia. Russia has been able to adapt to a strong China; it has managed to build a relationship with it, squarely based on national interests.”
• “The Sino-Russian rapprochement began in 1989 and has been going strong ever since. The outlook is positive, though in many ways it is an asymmetrical relationship, with China’s fast-growing GDP dwarfing Russia’s, which is stagnant.”
• “The Russo-Chinese relationship can be described as an entente—halfway between a partnership and an alliance. Russia still leads China in advanced military technologies, and cooperation in that area partially offsets China’s economic superiority. With the border issue long resolved, and the political relationship cordial at the top level, the two militaries have cooperated closely for over a decade and a half. The recent emergence of the United States as a declared adversary of both China and Russia has given such cooperation a new impetus. Yet, a peacetime alliance between the two would be awkward: neither Beijing nor Moscow would want to tie its hands too much.”
• “Beijing’s nuclear policy is opaque, but historically China did not aim for nuclear weapons parity with Washington or Moscow. It is certainly modernizing and perfecting its nuclear arsenal, but its actual size and capabilities can only be assessed on the basis of intelligence information, which may be incomplete. Russia has offered to assist China in building an early warning system to alert the Chinese leadership of missile attacks: a sign of the level of intimacy achieved in the strategic relationship. For the foreseeable future, due to the relatively small size of its nuclear force and the prevalence of medium- and shorter-range systems—rather than intercontinental missiles—in that force, China remains uninterested in nuclear arms control. New START will be extended or not without China.”
• “India is, in principle, a strategic partner to Russia of the same caliber as China. In reality, the Indo-Russian trade turnover is about one-tenth of the Russia-China exchanges. The now much closer U.S.-Indian relationship should not be an issue for Russia: India as a great power will not want to limit its foreign ties. The only exception is the arms trade area, where America is a strong competitor. There are two problems in the Russian-Indian relations.”
  • “One is the inability of both Moscow and New Delhi, despite their mutual goodwill and traditional friendship, to expand their cooperation beyond the government-led sectors and to engage broader sections of society.”
  • “Two is the rekindled rivalry between India and China, with Russia a close partner of both, but without a chance to mediate.”

Ukraine:

“Moscow’s Calibrated Coercion in Ukraine and Russian Strategic Culture,” Samuel Charap, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, September 2020. The author, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation (see “Nuclear arms control” section above), writes:

• “Russian operations in Ukraine are driven by a senior-level policy decision to pursue a persistent but indecisive conflict—as opposed to a decisive ‘big war’-type military operation or a truly ‘frozen’ conflict (i.e., without regular bloodshed). This paper terms the tactic calibrated coercion and the outcome a simmering conflict.”                       
• “Calibrated coercion seems to be somewhat of a departure from the strategic-cultural preference for quick military operations with overwhelming force to produce decisive outcomes.”
• “The simmering effect, however, is consistent with Russian approaches to managing problems.”
• “Thus far, this approach has produced results, but its effectiveness over the long term remains a question mark.”

Belarus:

“Belarus: Is There a Way Out of the Crisis?” Sabine Fischer and Astrid Sahm, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 09.17.20. The authors—a SWP senior fellow and visiting fellow, respectively—write:

• “A constitutional reform could offer a solution [in Belarus]. But it would have to be flanked by confidence-building measures and guarantees. The following aspects should be considered:”

• “An end to all forms of violence and repression against peaceful demonstrators; no prosecutions for protest-related offences;”
• “Release of all political prisoners, option of return for all exiles and deportees; reinstatement of persons dismissed from state employment;”
• “Convocation of a constitutional assembly integrating all relevant political and social groups;”
• “Constitutional reform to be completed within a maximum of twelve months;”
• “Parallel reform of the electoral code to ensure a transparent election process and appointment of a new Central Election Commission;”
• “Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with OSCE criteria.” 

• “The EU could support such a process by suspending implementation of sanctions as long as implementation of the roadmap is proceeding.”
• “Moscow might potentially see benefits in such a scenario. The Kremlin’s backing for Lukashenko risks fostering anti-Russian sentiment in Belarus’s traditionally pro-Russian society.”
• “This approach would demand substantial concessions from all sides. But the alternative—in the absence of dialogue and compromise—is long-term political instability with a growing risk of violent escalation.” 

“Can Moscow Manage a Power Transition in Belarus?” Artyom  Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.16.20. The author, a journalist and political commentator specializing in Belarusian foreign and domestic politics, writes:

• “Lukashenko understands perfectly the importance of retaining his monopoly on contact with Moscow, and will continue to block separate talks by the nomenclature with Moscow, demolish any structures he sees as a threat, and imprison any possible opposition leaders to ensure that Russia can’t find another point of contact in Belarus, even if it wants to.”
• “From an overripe apple that looked sure to drop into Moscow’s lap all on its own, the Belarusian regime is increasingly coming to resemble a toxic asset that’s as difficult to engage with as it is to get rid of.”
• “If Lukashenko manages to hold on to his seat until the protests subside somewhat, Moscow will have to carefully choose and measure out its carrots and sticks to get the Belarusian leader where it needs him to be, without allowing his position to drastically weaken or strengthen. This will require constant attention and understanding of the Belarusian situation from the Russian regime.”
• “But the Kremlin’s policies in the post-Soviet space are hardly bursting with examples of such intricate craftsmanship. Creating and freezing conflicts is one thing; it’s quite another to manage an orderly transition of power in a country where, despite their shared language, Moscow does not have any reliable footholds.”

“Vladimir Putin’s gamble on the dictator of Belarus,” Financial Times Editorial Board, Financial Times, 09.17.20. The authors write:

• “Putin also believes his country needs a large western buffer of which Belarus, like Ukraine, is historically a part. He may have felt a transition in Minsk was too risky. The removal of an ageing authoritarian in a country so close to his own would involve tricky optics.”
• “Yet his approach could backfire. If a full-scale crackdown by Mr. Lukashenko leads to turmoil, Mr. Putin will have little choice but to send in his ‘reserve.’ Not doing so would make him look weak in his own backyard. Doing so, however, would prompt another perilous stand-off with the west and new sanctions.”
• “Even scenarios short of that could be counter-productive. Moscow’s meddling in Ukraine since 2014 has done more to foster a sense of national identity and anti-Russian feeling there than anything in the previous 25 years. Belarusians crave above all a right to domestic political choice, not a rupture with Russia. If they feel Mr. Putin is trapping them in authoritarianism, the Kremlin will turn an uprising that has not previously been about Belarus’ east-west orientation into exactly that.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments