I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“Russian Nuclear Forces: Buildup or Modernization?” Hans M. Kristensen, Russia Matters, 09.14.17: The author, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, writes that Russia is not building up its nuclear arsenal, but modernizing it. Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal has continued to decrease and is expected to be in compliance with the New START treaty for February 2018. The author argues that the modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, set to be completed in the mid-2020s, is worth more attention. Soviet-era land-based ICBMs are being replaced with new versions. With fewer strategic launchers than the U.S., Russia is making up for it by maximizing the number of warheads per launcher, something for which New START has no sub-limit. Russia’s strategic submarine force is also undergoing significant modernization with the new Borei-class submarines. Heavy bombers are also being modernized, but at a slower pace. While the trend for Russia’s nuclear arsenal appears to be “fewer strategic warheads deployed on fewer strategic launchers,” both Moscow and Washington have slowed down their pace of reduction. Despite the tensions between Russia and the West, the U.S. Defense Department affirms that even the unlikely scenario in which Russia conducted a first strike “would have little to no effects on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities.” Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal, however, is more difficult to pin down. Russia still relies heavily on these kinds of weapons for national defense. The author argues that while Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces are also undergoing modernization, like those of the U.S., claims that the arsenal is increasing appear to be false. Claims that Russia is diversifying this arsenal likely refer to the SSC-8 new ground-launched cruise missile that is in violation of the INF Treaty, a development the author advises Russia to reverse if true. Russia’s ground-launched nuclear weapons do appear to have increased in number and diversified. While the overall nuclear arsenals of both Russia and the U.S. are decreasing, large inventories of non-deployed warheads only add fuel to existing tensions. The author advises reduction or control by new arms control agreements, and underscores the necessity of cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in this field.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“Yes, Russian Generals Are Preparing for War. That Doesn’t Necessarily Mean the Kremlin Wants to Start One,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 08.30.17 and “100,000 Troops Will Engage in Russia’s Zapad-2017 War Games,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 09.13.17: The author, director of Russia Matters and assistant director of the Belfer Center's U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, writes that many fear that the Zapad-2017 military exercises are “a prelude to some sort of invasion.” While these fears are understandable, the author writes that the conditions necessary for Russian military intervention are not present in this situation. Additionally, while Russian generals are preparing for war, they, like generals the world over, are simply doing their jobs. While the Kremlin doesn’t necessarily want this scenario to occur, they do want Zapad-2017 to make a statement. The first condition for Russian military intervention is the belief that Russia’s vital national interests are under serious threat. The second condition necessitates that the situation “be conducive to the use of force” and would result in victory or stalemate. With no new threats to Russian vital interests, no neighbors entering NATO, no allies threatened and no great prospects for military triumph, Russian military intervention appears unlikely. Additionally, NATO is watching Russia’s military closely and has built up its own forces near Russian borders. Speculation that Russia plans to annex Belarus is also unlikely. Finally, the Russian public is unlikely to support more military intervention. Russia has held major military exercises every year since 2000, rotating through four different regions. The author also notes that when Russia’s economy is doing well, its military expenditures rise, while a shrinking economy spells less military spending. With the Russian economy on the rebound in 2017, a wide variety of war games will likely proceed. The details of Zapad-2017’s official scenario show that the exercises are meant to “prepare the Russian and Belarusian armed forces for foiling a covert operation resembling what Russian forces themselves pulled off in Crimea in 2014.” The size of the exercises has also drawn much attention, due to the gap between official numbers and Western assessments. One reason for this discrepancy may be that Russian planners only count servicemen, while Western numbers are also accounting for other personnel. By claiming to be under the Vienna Document’s 13,000 troop limit, Russia is able to restrict observers. While NATO is displeased by the “lack of access and transparency,” the alliance will have three observers in attendance. The author recommends more transparency from Russia and Belarus to reassure their neighbors, changes to the Vienna Document to allow for more opportunities for observation and “reviving arms control and verification in Europe with Russia’s participation.” However, as long as the underlying causes of tension remain unaddressed, the potential of conflict will also remain.

“Zapad-2017: Why Do the Numbers Matter?” Igor Sutyagin, Royal United Services Institute, 09.12.17 and “Zapad-2017: Moscow’s Rules,” Igor Sutyagin, Royal United Services Institute, 09.14.17: The author, a senior research fellow in Russian studies at the Royal United Services Institute, writes that while Russia and Belarus claim that only 12,700 troops will be participating in Zapad 2017, the actual number is somewhat higher. Poland has estimated the number at 100,000, while Ukraine has claimed 240,000 troops will be participating. Conclusive evidence from available data suggests the actual number is closer to 65,000-70,000 troops. By claiming that there will be fewer than 13,000 troops, Moscow reserves the right to not allow foreign observers as the exercises fall within the limits set by the Vienna Document. This kind of distortion and concealment undermines the Vienna Document. While the information Russia provides is known to be unreliable, Russia “has enjoyed full unopposed access to the Vienna Document-envisaged information on the military exercises of its European counterparts.” The author argues that as such, the Vienna Document “has outlived its purpose.” Future documents of its ilk should include provisions for deterring or preventing this kind of manipulation, as it is clear, the author argues, that Moscow’s violation of the Vienna Document will clearly continue for the foreseeable future.  

“Valery Gerasimov, the General With a Doctrine for Russia. The Armed Forces Chief Sets Out a Vision That Prompts NATO to Beef Up Its Deployment,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 09.15.17: The author, the paper’s Moscow correspondent, writes that the Zapad 2017 military exercises are a reflection of Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov’s military vision. Gerasimov’s “hybrid war” doctrine has “made Russia more of a threat than at any point since the Cold War.” Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, relies on Gerasimov’s military advice. Gerasimov’s assertion in a 2013 essay that the lines between states of war and peace have blurred in the 21^st century has “marked out his tenure as operational head of Russia’s armed forces.” Gerasimov also wrote that Russia should not “copy foreign experience,” but rather “outstrip … and occupy leading positions ourselves.” Western observers have since traced back Russian actions from funding anti-establishment EU politicians to Russian hacking to this “Gerasimov Doctrine.”

“Russian Military Buildup in the West: Fact Versus Fiction,” Michael Kofman, Russia Matters, 09.07.17: The author, a senior research scientist with the CNA Corporation, writes that change to Russia’s principally defensive, aging forces in the Baltic region is inevitable, but will be gradual. The Russian military has been transforming and modernizing since 2008 after a period of neglect, and the recent shift in attention to the Baltic region is part of this. Russia’s war with Ukraine upended initial plans to reduce forces on the borders of NATO and Ukraine. The conflict forced Russia to return units moved prior to 2014 back to the Ukrainian border. Russia is now setting up three new divisions of six formal regiments, along with other support. This area is also a priority for modernization, particularly Crimea. Once Russia has “permanently garrisoned forces along [Ukraine’s] borders running north to south,” it may even totally withdraw from Ukraine. Comparatively, the Baltic region has received “only a modicum of attention.” Despite rhetoric that suggests otherwise, Moscow has not militarily prioritized the Baltic region. However, the modernization of Russia’s army is now moving from Ukraine to the Baltics, with the existing military footprint in the region set to expand. Russia has also focused more on advancing its air defense and related capabilities more than on ground forces. The author writes that Moscow is “moving about capabilities to threaten and engaging in military activity that generates headlines, while the actual presence remains largely defensive in nature.” However, the coming years will see this change. With both Russia and NATO engaging in gradualism, “nobody should be surprised if some years from now the Baltic region finds itself host to a force bidding contest.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“An Era of Authoritarian Influence? How Democracies Should Respond,” Thorsten Benner, Foreign Affairs, 09.15.17: The author, director of Berlin’s Global Public Policy Institute, writes that Russia’s 2016 election interference fits into a larger pattern of authoritarian states seeking to influence Western democracies. Modern authoritarian states have many influencing tactics at their disposal thanks to strong ties to Western economies and the use of digital techniques. “Democracies’ openness to foreign money and ideas, the eagerness of their professional classes to profit from illiberal clients and their political weaknesses have made authoritarians’ jobs easier.” Liberal states can become weak from this kind of influence, authoritarian rule can become entrenched in illiberal states, and democratizing societies can be undermined, like Montenegro in the Balkans. The author advises closing off certain channels of authoritarian influence “while preserving democracies’ commitments to openness.”

“RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War,” Jim Rutenberg, New York Times, 09.13.17: The author, media columnist for The New York Times, writes that politicians the Kremlin sees as hostile can find themselves in “media storms” involving conspiracy theories and lies. After Russian media outlets gave platforms to pro-Brexit politicians, the British Parliament released a report that foreign governments may have attempted to influence the British vote to exit the EU. The author argues that Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, however, was far greater. While Russian officials openly admit that the goal of Sputnik and RT is to disrupt “the Anglo-Saxon global information streams,” Russia sees the U.S. claims of election interference as little more than hysteria. While internet security can be tightened and sanctions can be enacted, “RT and Sputnik operate on the stated terms of Western liberal democracy; they count themselves as news organizations, protected by the First Amendment and the libertarian ethos of the internet.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“What’s the US’s Best Chance With North Korea? Russia,” Dmitri Trenin, New York Times, 09.18.17: The author, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russia is more than the spoiler it is often portrayed as. In 2015, Russia was careful to not disrupt U.S. attempts at a nuclear deal with Iran, and more recently, has voted twice at the U.N. to impose sanctions on North Korea. Russia, like China, is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, “with established lines of communication to Pyongyang.” It is not under direct threat from North Korea’s nuclear ambition, like the U.S. is, but has strong reasons to work to de-escalate the crisis. The author argues that it is too late for North Korea to denuclearize, and that eventually, Pyongyang will have “crude nuclear weapons with which to strike United States territory.” The next best step is to convince Pyongyang that it needs no further deterrent and that developing further nuclear weapons would in fact be counterproductive, a strategy Russia can help with. With neither Washington nor Pyongyang cool enough for direct talks yet, third countries will need to organize secret contacts. Until then, Russia remains an “unlikely broker” of de-escalation.

“Reclaiming America's Values,” Joe Biden, New York Times, 09.14.17: Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden argues that “a strong, democratic America” is necessary for keeping “illiberal powers like Russia” from disrupting the established global order and creating further division. He argues that while the U.S. is in a good place to shape the future of the 21^st century, the U.S. “cannot abandon” the values it has spent the better part of century fighting for.

“How to Resist Russian Propaganda on a Tight Budget,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 09.13.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that Russian media outlets Sputnik and RT “never break news themselves.” Following their links and references at times leads to “obscure and untrustworthy” original sources, a twisted version of the story, a more coherent version of the story or statements by Kremlin officials. While fact-checkers are paid to follow links and google numbers, all a reader needs to do to be “safe from Russian propaganda” is decide whether he or she is “comfortable with the original source rather than the general thrust of the story.”

“Why Americans Keep Falling for Russian Propaganda,” Patryk Babiracki, The Washington Post, 09.13.17: The author, an associate professor of history, provides options for addressing Russian manipulation of Western media. These include having Republicans and Democrats pressure the White House to take “aggressive countermeasures,” starting with the State Department accepting the funds set aside for this very purpose.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The Election Putin Doesn't Need to Hack; Germans Will Go to the Polls Without a Serious Debate on Russia Policy, and Voters Seem to Like It That Way,” John Vinocur, Wall Street Journal, 09.12.17: The author, former executive editor of the International Herald Tribune, writes that German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s readiness to lift EU sanctions on Russia is a reaction to the refusal of German citizens “to recognize Russia as a menace.” A recent Pew Research poll showed that Germans saw American, not Russian, “power and influence” as posing the greatest threat to them. For Moscow, German disengagement is a “crack in the West,” supporting Russian rhetoric that Western dominance is dwindling. While Russia is not winning the German election, “the campaign is taking place without a single prominent pro-Western voice to be heard.”

“Russia's Hand Is Visible Everywhere in the Middle East,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 09.13.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that Russian influence is visible throughout the Middle East. In Syria, Moscow is spearheading the effort to establish deconfliction zones. It has “inserted itself into the volatile Kurdish issue” and played a large role in maintaining the “Shi’a Crescent” in Iran, Iraq and Syria while also in talks with the Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia on keeping the region’s fragile balance of power steady. Israel and Egypt have established direct lines of communication with Moscow and see the Russian president as “a more reliable statesman,” as does Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, the author warns that looking at these developments “in light of the Cold War experience” is a mistake. Russia is not interested in displacing the U.S., but rather, it wants to be the “hedge bet,” an escape from U.S. conditionality. An active role in the Middle East not only validates Russia as a global power, but can also increase demand for Russian services and goods, such as arms, making it vital to Russia’s geo-economic strategy. Due to Russia’s new role in the region, Saudi Arabia, instead of being used by the U.S. as a “pressure point against the Russian economy,” is working with Moscow to benefit both countries’ economies.  

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Ukraine’s Volunteer Militias May Have Saved the Country, But Now They Threaten It,” Kimberly Marten and Olga Oliker, War on the Rocks, 09.14.17: The authors—the first a professor of political science at Barnard College and the latter the director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies—advocate a series of steps to ensure that armed militias do not impede democratic development in Ukraine. The power of the militias was highlighted earlier this year when armed protesters used violence and threats to force Kiev into a substantial policy reversal: a ban on anthracite coal imports from separatist-controlled territory. The protesters were representatives of or pro-state militias credited with helping Ukraine survive the early days of its conflict with Russian-backed separatists in the east. While such groups may serve an important purpose in the near term, they can “undermine unity, impede democratic development, violate human rights, and even become so strong that they are untouchable if they are allowed to endure,” examples of which can be found in Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, Liberia, and even the United States. Several steps can be taken to prevent this outcome: Kiev should cease negotiations with Right Sector and declare its armed forces illegal, prosecuting those who continue to fight under its banner while allowing qualified former members to enroll in the National Guard and other state security organs as individuals; other battalions that are already formally integrated into the security services should be held to strict standards of de-politicization; state assistance and training should be provided to former fighters so they are less economically dependent on their former comrades; the state must gain high quality intelligence about the business interests and other incentive structures that tie militias together, because this can help drive their members into the arms of the government; Ukraine and its Western supporters must ensure that respect for the contributions of the volunteer battalions does not translate into tolerance of extremist violence; and finally, Western partners must take this problem seriously and provide assistance to Kiev in implementing these recommendations.

“Test Putin’s Proposal for UN Peacekeepers,” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 09.11.17: The author, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, argues that a recent proposal from Russian President Vladimir Putin to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine should be considered seriously if cautiously. “It makes sense to test Moscow’s sincerity. If the Russian diplomats at the UN agree to negotiate a serious and robust peacekeeping mandate that, in particular, allows the force to operate throughout Donbas, that would boost the prospects for peace in Ukraine’s east.” Still, the author doubts Putin’s sincerity for several reasons: he conditioned the peacekeepers’ deployment on disengagement of forces and removal of heavy weapons in Donbas; the Russian mission at the United Nations gave no details about Putin’s idea; and Putin’s proposal would have the UN peacekeeping force deploy only along the line of contact in Donbas and nowhere else. “These points raise the question: was Putin’s suggestion a genuine proposal aimed at advancing a settlement or just a throwaway line at a press conference?”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“In Uzbekistan, Signs of a Thaw After Decades of Repression; Former Soviet Republic on Afghanistan's Border Says it Wants to Improve Ties With the US,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 09.14.17: The author, a Wall Street Journal journalist, takes note of signs of a thaw in Uzbekistan, one of the world’s most closed countries. Since the country’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, took office last year, “the regional heavyweight has sought to improve ties with the U.S.” and help in neighboring Afghanistan. Recent notable moves by the new government include: freeing several high-profile political prisoners and removing some 16,000 other Uzbeks from a “black list” of people barred from jobs or travel; allowing the Uzbek media to explore some topics previously considered taboo; and a personnel purge in which “a cadre of young technocrats—many educated in the West—have pushed out Soviet holdovers in key ministries.” In addition, Uzbekistan has moved to repair hostile relations with its Central Asian neighbors, opening borders that had been closed for more than a decade. Not all proposed changes have gone through: the removal of Soviet-era exit visas for Uzbek citizens who want to travel abroad has been delayed until 2019. “Uzbekistan is still far from being a democracy, and the overhauls so far are neither systemic nor irreversible.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Vladimir Putin Has an Enthusiasm Problem. His Legitimacy Hinges on People Caring Enough to Find a Ballot Box,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 09.14.17: The author, a Bloomberg columnist, writes that declining voter turnout in Russia, as evidenced by local and regional elections on Sept. 10, could spell trouble for President Vladimir Putin’s expected bid for another term in 2018. In just three regions out of the 16 that elected governors was turnout higher than 40 percent, and turnout at the municipal level was even worse. It’s “a level of apathy to which Russia is getting accustomed,” the author writes, noting that last year’s parliamentary election, turnout hit a record low at 47.8 percent. Throughout his rule, Putin claimed democratic legitimacy; “despite reports of widespread rigging, it was always clear that lots of Russians voted for him and his backers.” While Putin's preferred candidates won all the gubernatorial elections and most of the local ones in the recent election, “even relative legitimacy is elusive.” As the author observes: “Without a solid turnout, Putin’s all-but-certain certain victory will mean a formal transition from a relatively popular dictatorship to one based on sheer suppression. Putin may already suspect that he runs a country of cynics who tolerate him because they have no choice or because they profit from it. A low turnout could make this official.”

“Why Gorbachev Likes Putin More Than You Might Expect. When Democratic Reforms Faltered, Russians—including Gorbachev—Hungered for Authoritarians,” William Taubman, The Washington Post, 09.12.17: The author, an emeritus professor of political science at Amherst College whose latest book is “Gorbachev: His Life and Times,” discusses how the seemingly opposing views of Russian leaders Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Putin have come to converge in some ways. While Gorbachev once expected Russia to rapidly welcome Western-style democracy, he now believes the transition might take the whole 21st century. “And that is bad news both for Russia and the world,” the author writes. While Gorbachev defended his milder, more democratic approach to the end, he came to understand what so many Russians wanted. “A czar must conduct himself like a czar,” the author quotes Gorbachev saying. “And that I don’t know how to do.” Putin does. Gorbachev has joined Putin in disputing NATO expansion and welcoming the Crimean annexation. Still, Gorbachev hasn’t always seen eye to eye with Putin. Gorbachev opposed his reelection in 2012, charging him with aiming to, in his words, “completely subordinate society” and his party, United Russia, with “embodying the worst bureaucratic features of the Soviet Communist Party.” Gorbachev’s views reflect his partial disillusionment with Russia herself. “The man who tried to democratize the Soviet Union in a few short years has come to fear that the task may take ‘decades,’” the author writes. “In the meantime, Russia may have to follow the advice of ‘the wise Moses,’ who was ‘right to make the Jews roam the desert for forty years … to get rid of the legacy of Egyptian slavery.’”

“A Problem Much Bigger Than Putin,” Mikhail Khodorkovsky, New York Times, 09.12.17: The author—the founder of Open Russia and a former oil executive who was imprisoned in Russia on fraud charges until his pardon in 2013—argues that 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has once again become an authoritarian state. The inability to build democratic institutions is a deep-seated problem; it plagued the leaders of the February Revolution of 1917 and led to the Bolsheviks gaining power later that year. “Russian authoritarianism has profound consequences not just for Russian citizens, but also for neighboring countries and the rest of the world,” the author notes. “Still burdened by a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality, the Kremlin pursues a foreign policy aimed at achieving a ‘balance of forces’ between Moscow and the West.” The most important task is to create a justice system based on the rule of law rather than on arbitrary power. But the solution must be homegrown. “The 1990s teach us lesson: that it is the Russian people, and the Russian people alone, who must find their own way forward. The West cannot do it for us.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.