Russia Analytical Report, Oct. 6-16, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant commentary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/saber rattling:
- No significant commentary.
NATO-Russia relations:
“NATO and Russia: Watching the Skies,” Douglas Barrie and Nick Childs, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10.10.17: The authors, senior fellows at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, write that military exercises conducted parallel to the main fictional conflict of Russia’s Zapad-2017 exercises offer important insight. Alongside the main phase of Zapad, Russia also conducted air defense, naval and offensive air operations. Air defense remains of vital importance to Moscow, highlighting anxieties about the need to defend against a conventional aerial attack led by the U.S. Additionally, Russia tested cruise missile land attack capabilities, signaling to NATO that after “two decades of benign neglect,” air defense must again become a priority. Russia has used sea and air-launched cruise missiles in Syria, and according to U.S. allegations, also possesses a ground-launched cruise missile with a much larger range. NATO is faced with “an integrated air and missile defense challenge.” The authors note that Russia’s multi-layered approach to this same problem offers NATO a model for addressing the issue.
“Assessing Russian Reactions to US and NATO Posture Enhancements,” Bryan Frederick, Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe and Edward Geist, RAND Corporation, October 2017: The authors, experts in political science, write that clear analysis of Moscow’s reactions to NATO’s implementation of posture enhancements is important for a variety of reasons. They suggest that analysts take into consideration Russia’s domestic context, including threats to the regime, the power of the elite and Putin’s preferences. They should also look at the effect of posture enhancements on conventional capability and strategic stability, as well as consider the location and extent of infrastructure improvements. Russia has little incentive to attack NATO, and further NATO posture enhancements can continue to limit this incentive. However, Moscow is likely to seek other means of expressing its displeasure with NATO and the U.S., as it sees their strategic goals as a threat to the regime’s long-term security. The authors recommend the following: proposals to enhance deterrence should be considered in a broad context; completion of projects or announcements should be carefully timed to avoid coinciding with periods of heightened tension; and posture enhancement with effects on strategic stability should receive additional scrutiny to avoid exacerbating risk of conflict.
“Crimea Isn't the End of Russia's Black Sea Ambitions,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 10.11.17: The author, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and the current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, warns that Russia’s naval ambitions go beyond the takeover of Crimea on the Black Sea, and he argues that NATO must respond to hold Russia in check. Russia is using its navy to exert a stronger presence over a broad region, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the author writes. “As the Russians consolidate control over bases on the Syrian coast, they will link the Aegean and Mediterranean with their Black Sea Fleet and exert significant influence throughout the region, challenging NATO just as they do in the Baltic Sea to the north.” It’s not just about geopolitics and saber-rattling, the author writes. “In addition to recent oil and gas discoveries, the idea of lucrative pipelines that could ultimately connect the so-called Three Seas -- Adriatic, Baltic and Black -- is attractive to Moscow. Russia desperately wants to be able to control the Black Sea economically in peacetime, while remaining ready to dominate the region in the event of conflict with West.” In order for NATO and the U.S. to counter Russia’s aggressive naval maneuvers, the author has five recommendations: NATO should enhance its program of port visits, exercises and training missions; the alliance needs to develop and fund a coherent contingency plan for Black Sea maritime operations; the U.S. needs to increase its deployments independent from NATO operations; the U.S. needs to work closely with Turkey, which effectively holds the keys to the Black Sea through its control of the straits that guard it; finally, the U.S. can encourage Western businesses to invest in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine to spur development in gas, logistics, fiber cables and other communications. “Helping these countries link their economies both in the Black Sea community as well as to Europe and the U.S. is the sort of ‘soft power’ that can enhance stability in the region.”
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Arms control:
“Mikhail Gorbachev: My plea to the presidents of Russia and the United States,” Mikhail Gorbachev, The Washington Post, 10.11.17: The author, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991, calls upon the presidents of the United States and Russia to put aside the “severe crisis” in relations between the countries and meet in an effort to salvage the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Noting his involvement in crafting the treaty in 1987, Gorbachev writes that it “has proved to be the most vulnerable link in the system of limiting and reducing weapons of mass destruction. There have been calls on both sides for scrapping the agreement.” Only a summit between the Russian and American presidents—Gorbachev does not call out Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin by name—could cut through the political tensions that have arisen between the countries. “I call upon Russia and the United States to prepare and hold a full-scale summit on the entire range of issues. It is far from normal that the presidents of major nuclear powers meet merely ‘on the margins’ of international gatherings,” the author writes. “It will not be easy to cut through the logjam of issues on both sides. But neither was our dialogue easy three decades ago. It had its critics and detractors, who tried to derail it.”
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary.
Cyber security:
- No significant commentary.
Elections interference:
“From Russia With Poison,” Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, 10.11.17: The author, a veteran columnist, writes that the use of Facebook and other social media platforms as part of a suspected Russian campaign to influence the 2016 election raises questions about whether there needs to be a stronger regulatory framework for the internet. The suspected Russian election interference, along with the recent massive hack of the Equifax credit reporting company, challenges the “abiding dream” offered by Silicon Valley, that connecting all of the planet's people and data will make the world a better place. “That may prove true,” the author writes. “But getting there is turning into a nightmare -- a world where billions of people are connected but without sufficient legal structures, security protections or moral muscles among companies and users to handle all these connections without abuse.” The author argues that the vulnerability of these systems imperils American democracy, which is built on two principles of truth and trust. “We trust that our elections are fair and that enables our peaceful rotations of power. And we trust that the news we get from our mainstream outlets is true and that it is corrected if it is not. And we expect our president to defend both. But today many people are getting news from platforms that are easily polluted by Russian or other hackers with fake news. And our president is a liar who refuses to hold Russia to account for anything. It's a terrible combination.”
“Blaming Russia,” Eliot Borenstein, NYU Jordan Center, 10.09.17: The author, professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at New York University, writes that current rhetoric surrounding Russia makes him “profoundly uneasy.” While there is justification for investigation into ties between Russia and the Trump campaign, the shift in focus “from possible acts of collusion to Russian manipulation of American media” is worrisome to the author. Americans moved quickly from deriding Mitt Romney’s characterizing of Russia as America’s greatest enemy five years ago to adopting the same belief today. Additionally, the Russiagate scandal has heightened the “lazy and dangerous habit of personalizing … Russian policy by focusing on Putin himself.” Blaming Russia frees the U.S. from taking responsibility for the Trump presidency, and gives Russian propaganda a major victory. The author argues that Russophobia has steered American actions for over a century, reinforcing the idea of Russia at the center of global affairs, while avoiding responsibility for America’s domestic failures. The author argues that there is much ignorance about Russia in the U.S., which can “go for years without paying any attention to Russia at all.” The tone of the Russia scandal is ultimately “not healthy for American democracy,” allowing Americans to dismiss important domestic developments as nothing more than the work of trolls.
“The CIA’s Fake News Campaign,” Kenneth Osgood, New York Times, 10.13.17: The author, a professor of history at the Colorado School of Mines, writes that Russia’s 2016 election interference is not the first attempt by a government to sway American opinion, and it only seems unprecedented because the technology is new. For over 20 years during the Cold War, another government sought to mold American opinions of Russia through advertisements across television, radio and print media, and it was all organized by the CIA. In 1950, the CIA created Radio Free Europe, ostensibly as an unbiased news provider for Eastern Europe, but in reality a tool in “a subversive campaign to weaken Communist governments behind the Iron Curtain.” To hide the fact that CIA money was funding the project, they pretended that “ordinary Americans” were footing the bill through the annual Crusade for Freedom fund-raising campaign, endorsed by presidents and celebrities alike. The money raised by the campaign would have barely covered the cost of the drive itself, but the CIA did learn that “it could exploit the fund-raising campaign as a conduit for domestic propaganda.” While the campaigns stopped in 1971, they “cemented anti-Communist hostility” that drove conservative opposition to détente throughout the decade. “This counter-propaganda sought to inoculate the public from being receptive to anything said by the other side. It’s a tactic we’ve seen play out in real time on the president’s Twitter feed.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, may even see the 2016 election interference as evening the score with a major Cold War irritant.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“America Will Always Lose Russia’s Tit-for-Tat Spy Games,” John Sipher, Foreign Policy, 10.12.17: The author, a national security analyst and a former member of the CIA’s Clandestine Service, argues that the U.S. has allowed itself to be outplayed by Russia by resorting to retaliatory diplomatic measures in response to what he views as “a multipronged attack to destabilize our democratic system and damage our leadership abroad during the 2016 presidential election.” In fact, in the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats that followed revelations of alleged Russian interference, Moscow has fared better than Washington, the author writes. “They lost 35 people; we lost 755. For the first time, there are more Russians in the United States than Americans in Russia (although Russia has always had more spies in the United States than vice versa).” This “prism of reciprocity” plays into Russia’s hands. “All previous U.S. administrations have rejected this effort as part of Russia’s effort to force the United States and other interlocutors to accept a world of coequal spheres of influence,” the author writes. “That is, we lost.” The U.S. needs to rise to the Russian threat, rather than engage in tit-for-tat measures, the author argues. “The only sensible means to prepare for the future is to empower a 9/11-like commission to look into the Russian attacks on our system once and for all. Maybe that way, although Russia will likely continue to win the short-term, tit-for-tat battles, it will lose the larger war.”
“A Visit to Russia: Can Relations Be Improved?,” Paul J. Saunders, The National Interest, 10.06.17: The author, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, writes that Russian officials are still hopeful that U.S. President Donald Trump will succeed in improving relations between the U.S. and Russia. However, they seem to “not yet fully appreciate … the depth of anger and resentment” towards Russia’s 2016 election interference. Russian officials spoke positively of U.S. officials, and were “largely dismissive” of EU and U.S. sanctions, even indirectly crediting the sanctions for the boost to Russia’s agricultural sector. While there is little empirical evidence that sanctions have damaged Russia’s economy, they have hurt Russia’s investment climate, according to Russian officials. While the officials had a strong reaction to the closing of Russia’s San Francisco consulate, they clearly preferred ending the diplomatic dispute as opposed to continuing it, a comparatively easy goal to achieve. Addressing election interference, which “has poisoned the relationship to an extent that Russian officials … did not seem to appreciate,” will be more difficult. While members of the author’s group argued that Russian leaders must take the matter of election interface seriously, the “vigorous exchanges” between officials did not lead to agreement, but may have heightened awareness of the issue on the Russian side. If the interference issue can be addressed, the author argues that Trump could work towards improving bilateral relations—while the number is down from a year ago, 43% of Americans still think the U.S. should cooperate with Russia, according to a recent poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The two countries will also need to develop workable solutions to some of their most divisive issues, with the conflict in Ukraine being the most difficult case. “The bottom line for the United States is that despite political controversy and a rocky start, Russian officials haven’t given up on the Trump administration.”
“Russia and America Can Reset Relations by Looking North,” Vladislav Inozemtsev, Financial Times, 10.08.17: The writer, the director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow and a fellow of the Polish Institute of Advanced Studies in Warsaw, suggests that relations between Russia and the West could be improved by re-conceptualizing the age-old divide between them. Russia can properly be viewed as part of a band of northern countries spanning the globe. These “northern belt” countries, including the U.S., Canada, the EU and Russia, “controlled 26%of global natural gas and 20% of oil reserves in 2016, and they possessed exclusive rights for Arctic offshore fields and controlled 96% of the world’s nuclear arsenals, while accounting for 61% of global military spending,” the author writes. Integrating Russia into this northern sphere, the author suggests, should hold more allure than a partnership with China, which is seen as the beacon for Russia’s “eastern” policy. “Imagine incorporating Russia into a free-trade zone and a military alliance, offering its citizens the chance to become equal to the westerners and its elite the opportunity to be considered a part of the northern political and business community. This would be a way for the west finally to make peace with a longstanding adversary and to secure a new and enduring geopolitical architecture for the 21st century.”
“The Case of the Missing Foreign Policy,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 10.11.17: The writer, a columnist for the Washington Post, laments the inability of the Trump administration to clearly define or execute its foreign policy priorities. A “hollowed-out bureaucracy” and a lack of clear plans has hobbled objectives for Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Russia—an pattern that is increasingly drawing criticism from top Republican leaders in Congress, including Sens. Bob Corker and John McCain. “Because so many key political positions haven't been filled at the State Department, the interagency process that's supposed to decide and implement policy is something of an ‘empty suit,’ the author states, citing the perspective of veteran officials. “European diplomats say they have been frustrated by the difficulty in finding Trump officials with whom they can frame policies on shared concerns, such as Iranian misbehavior.” Trump, the author observes, “seems weirdly pleased at the many vacant policy positions - evidently not understanding that the vacancies prevent effective action.” Meanwhile, Trump’s tweets have undercut State Department policies and his public feuds remain a weekly if not daily occurrence. “Trump's slurs and insults may be distracting us from a more basic foreign policy problem: On some key issues, when it comes to actual policy plans, the cupboard is bare.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“The Trouble With Arming Ukraine,” Rajan Menon and William Ruger, Foreign Affairs, 10.11.17.
“Is Peace in Donbas Possible?,” Carl Bildt, The European Council on Foreign Relations, 10.12.17: The author, former prime minister of Sweden, writes that a peace operation in Ukraine’s Donbas should first and foremost establish “free and fair local elections in the region.” He argues that entrusting this to “the existing separatist governance structures” is impossible. The “only realistic possibility” of implementing the Minsk agreement’s basic tenets is to begin with an international peacekeeping mission. The author argues that the start of the Ukraine conflict demonstrated the failure of Russian “hybrid warfare” rather than its success, as it led to the “deployment of regular formations of the Russian army in regular battles.” From relying on its regular forces “to prop up” the self-proclaimed republics in Ukraine’s east, Russia moved to training and equipping their two army corps. The governance of the separatist area has been fraught with difficulties. Economic links between the rest of Ukraine and the separatist areas were severed, and the area underwent a “Russification.” The author argues that deploying a limited U.N. peacekeeping operation per Russia’s proposal would merely freeze the conflict and make implementation of the Minsk agreement “even less likely.” Russia may be supporting a limited peacekeeping operation in order to shift the burden of implementing the Minsk agreement onto the U.N. mission. However, the author argues that the political aspects of the agreement are the most important and difficult to implement. Per the Minsk agreement, local elections in the separatist areas are key to implementing the agreement’s political provisions and therefore “must be a core task of an international operation.”
“Peacekeeping in Ukraine: Limited Progress Amidst Uncertainties?: Russia's Proposal for UN Peacekeepers in the Donbas Region is Missing Vital Details,” Anastasia Voronkova, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10.10.17: The author, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and editor of The Armed Conflict Survey, writes that deploying U.N. peacekeepers to the Donbas sounds attractive. However, the core provisions of Russia’s original proposal are too narrow to be optimistic about. Russian President Vladimir Putin has “expressed willingness to consider a wider mandate” for the U.N. peacekeepers, which would provide for a lightly armed U.N. protection force for the OSCE Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. The idea behind the proposal is not new, having been discussed in November 2014, and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has repeatedly called for peacekeepers. The author argues that Putin’s timing for publically supporting a peacekeeping effort is due to a desire to appear as a leader who can compromise and de-escalate conflicts. Putin also stands to gain a popularity boost for the upcoming presidential election and the potential of looser EU sanctions from a softer position on Ukraine. While the proposal itself is welcome and may have far-reaching benefits, its potential effectiveness is still hampered by problems regarding the timing of its implementation, its insufficiently short duration and the lack of specificity for the mandate’s scope. Finally, the self-proclaimed republics in Ukraine’s east could further complicate the issue. The self-proclaimed republics will likely want special autonomy status before agreeing to a U.N. deployment, a move widely regarded in Ukraine as “a dangerous step towards the breakup of the state.”
“How to Turn Battleground Ukraine Into a Success Story,” Anna Tikhonova and Cyril Fokin, The National Interest, 10.09.17: The authors, experts in international relations, write that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s abrupt “U-turn” on deploying U.N. peacekeepers to Ukraine, and the limited scope of his proposal, was met with skepticism from the West. The authors outline the litmus test proposed by former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer to judge Russia’s sincerity. If Russia rejects a wider mandate, Putin’s desire to simply “discredit the very idea of the U.N. peacekeeping operation” becomes clear. However, the authors argue that Pifer’s logic fails to take into account Russian geopolitical interests. They argue that Putin’s peacekeeping proposal is sincere; however, “his rules imply the conservation of non-bloc status of Ukraine.” Testing Putin’s sincerity by demanding peacekeepers on Russia’s border, as Pifer suggests, will sink the initiative, which is what Putin ultimately wants. The authors argue that giving in to Putin’s limited peacekeeping proposal “will not alleviate the problem,” but it will lead to other advancements: “a vision of positive dynamics,” a precedent for successful cooperation, a safeguard against escalation, greater transparency and an avenue for more easily building up an existing peacekeeping force. Additionally, if the conflict freezes without a U.N. force in the area, there is a risk of renewed hostilities and escalation, which will ultimately lead to pushing Kiev away from “European-style reforms.” The authors argue that accepting Putin’s proposal would be “a win-win,” giving the West necessary information on the conflict and straining Putin at the same time.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“A Post-Soviet Anomaly: How Karabakh Could Bring Russia and the West Together,” Sergei Markedonov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.10.17: The author, an associate professor at Russian State University for the Humanities, writes that while Russia and the West are ready to cooperate on the conflict in Karabakh, “the core issues” of the dispute are not being discussed. Negotiations over the longest-running conflict in the post-Soviet region are deadlocked, and seven regions of Azerbaijan are under some kind of Armenian occupation. The region’s ceasefire is maintained by a balance of the two sides’ forces, not peacekeepers. The conflict is far from frozen, as belied by an April 2016 flare-up and regular ceasefire violations since March 2008. Karabakh is not a proxy conflict between the West and Russia. Both sides of the conflict want Russian mediation and trust Putin. The conflict’s risks are reduced thanks to Russia-West cooperation; however, poor relations between Russia and the West outside this peace process strains the effectiveness of the mediators and “encourages Baku and Yerevan to test how united the positions of the foreign mediators really are.” If fighting touches Armenian territory and Yerevan requests assistance, Russia would be put in a difficult position, while for the West, conflict in this region “is a nightmare scenario.” This creates a strong incentive for the West and Russia to cooperate. While the current focus should be on minimizing the risk of new war in the region, the Nagorny Karabakh peace process could eventually act as a successful model for other conflicts in the post-Soviet zone. While working on this peace process will not dissipate tensions between the West and Russia, it can “at least help clear the air.”
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Looking Beyond 2018: Putin and the Technocrats,” Tatyana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.06.17: The author, analytical department director of Moscow’s Center of Political Technologies, writes that as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “final act” as president approaches, the Kremlin is looking to new modes of technocratic rule. Despite not having officially declared it, Putin’s candidacy is a foregone conclusion, with the only unknown factors of Russia’s 2018 presidential election being the size of the voter turnout and the identities of Putin’s opponents. The Kremlin is already hard at work on the reelection campaign, which will also serve as “a test run for a new form of Russia’s post-Putin style of government.” For Putin, who “now sees himself as a historical figure,” elections have negligible importance, the legitimacy of his third term dependent “more on patriotic fervor than on any democratic mandate.” With eighteen years in power behind him, Putin sees history as his judge, not the people, something the Kremlin is “keenly aware of.” While Putin is busy making history in his next term, the Kremlin’s new system “will focus on mitigating the damage” of his disinterest in more mundane things, like the economy. The author notes that the system “needs to look beyond Putin,” and build up institutions that are not dependent on his intervention. Within the Kremlin, there is a shifting from “the public face of politics” to procedures and political institutions that make for a smoothly-run government. These Kremlin strategists want an early start to campaigning, while Putin “has grown tired of democratic window dressing.” Another issue is whether Putin will run as a United Russia candidate or as an independent. Running as an independent would marginalize the Untied Russia party’s political role and also “add a missionary flavor to Putin’s reelection,” distancing him from political elites and allowing for a greater reshuffling of government officials at a later date.
“Alexei Navalny’s Permanent Revolution,” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times, 10.09.17: The author, senior fellow and chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Alexei Navalny could become a major opposition figure in the coming years. Navalny has loomed as a threat to the Kremlin since a strong showing in Moscow’s 2013 mayoral elections; since announcing his candidacy for the 2018 presidential election in December 2016, he has been jailed three times. However, he has not been arrested for good, but not because the Kremlin needs him to play a role in the upcoming election. Rather, they do not want Navalny to become “a charismatic victim of the regime,” preferring instead of obscure and obstruct him. Navalny’s sights are not on 2018 but 2024, when he can run “as a candidate of national standing.” The author calls Navalny “Russia’s only politician”; however, Navalny has been unable to unite those opposed to the ruling regime. Today, most Russians support Putin, and those who do not fail to see Navalny as “their only representative.” Additionally, a “narcissism of petty differences” plagues the opposition. Navalny’s campaign is “something of an ongoing revolution,” but in addition to ousting the current regime, Navalny needs to present something else that is in high demand: “a road map for a better future.”
“Putin Wants to Run Russia Like a Corporation: His System Can't Rely on Loyalists Anymore, But It Will Be Hard to Attract the Next Generation,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 10.13.17: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin is “previewing plans to run Russia as a corporation” following his more than likely 2018 election victory. In recent weeks, Putin has replaced 11 of 85 regional governors, the first steps in setting up a system that is not dependent on “former bodyguards and other loyal retainers.” Instead, he is looking for “low-profile bureaucrats with track records for efficiency.” Putin is also trying to provide opportunity for young people in his government, thus igniting a generational change within it. However, the author does not believe these moves are “likely to work as intended.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.