I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“Containing Our Intelligence War With Russia,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 10.31.17: The author, a former chief of Russia analysis for the C.I.A. who served in the George W. Bush administration, seeks to temper claims that Russia is attempting to “destroy” American democracy through cyber espionage, while cautioning that mutual grievances could escalate into a war between “the world’s most capable nuclear powers.” The latest claims of intelligence agencies using unconventional warfare against their adversaries are a continuation of operations that took place during the Cold War, but new technologies have “added gasoline to the flames.” While anger over Russia’s alleged hacking of the Democratic National Committee and its social media campaigns is understandable, these actions should not be seen as an attempt to inflict serious harm on the United States. “Consider the fact that Russian cyber warriors have not turned out the lights in key U.S. regions or disrupted trading on Wall Street, actions within their technical capability that would be far more damaging to civil order than publishing e-mails, paying Internet ‘trolls,’ or buying social media advertisements,” the author writes. Russia, for its part, has charged that the U.S. has long overtly and covertly aided opposition groups in and around Russia. Still, the new wave of espionage and influence operations does pose real danger. “Although neither side wants a real war, the combination of frayed emotions, societal polarization, ongoing proxy wars, new technologies and a lack of agreed rules of the game may produce one.” A first step in avoiding this outcome would be to explore “a bilateral agreement to refrain from targeting election infrastructure and interfering in electoral campaigns.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

“The Paradox of Uzbek Terror. Peace at Home, Violence Abroad,” Marlene Laruelle, Foreign Affairs, 11.01.17: The author, the director of the Central Asia Program at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, argues that a string of terrorist incidents by people with Uzbek backgrounds—most recently a deadly truck attack in Manhattan—has less to do with Uzbekistan and more to do with the difficult circumstances the migrants find themselves in abroad. Uzbekistan, the author notes, is one of the most religiously repressive countries in Central Asia; “several thousand people have been imprisoned—and some tortured—for alleged Islamist convictions.” Terrorism, in turn, has been rare in the country, with the latest attacks dating back to the first half of the 2000s. As the author writes, “Even as the so-called Uzbek terrorist problem spreads further abroad, Uzbekistan itself remains free of terrorist violence. At home, Islamic identity is on the rise, peacefully.” Uzbekistan has not exported terrorists, the author stresses; rather, the country exports labor migrants. Hundreds of thousands live in Europe, Turkey and the U.S., where some may “lose support of their communities, families, and networks” and can “find themselves vulnerable to radicalization.”  If policymakers want to address the phenomenon of Uzbek-committed terrorism, the author writes, “They need to look for domestic factors that can push immigrants to be radicalized here in the United States, and not see the country as a victim of another nation’s alleged ‘exported’ violence.”

“The Russian War on Terror,” Ilan Berman, The National Interest, 11.03.17: The author, the senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, discusses a new report showing that the large share of Russians among Islamic State fighters has only grown and poses a major threat to the country now that the terrorist group’s “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq is rapidly shrinking. According to a new report from the Soufan Group, a leading U.S. counterterrorism consultancy, the number of Russians in the ranks of IS has increased to 3,417 since 2015, even as the group has suffered major losses on the battlefield. The author points to several reasons for the large Russian presence. “Russia’s own Muslim minority is growing rapidly, thanks to more robust birth rates than the rest of the country... It is also radicalizing, as extremist ideologies and groups find greater purchase in response to Vladimir Putin’s pervasive authoritarian rule.” The campaign in Syria can be seen as part of Russia’s own “war on terror” abroad. But the Kremlin has not yet put in place a comprehensive plan to protect the Russian homeland. “To prepare, the Kremlin needs a real plan to mitigate the returnee threat. Moreover, given the quickening pace of the Islamic State’s decline in the Middle East, it is going to need such a strategy very soon.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“Hacking Power Grids: New Tactic of War or Wave of the Future?” Nadiya Kostyuk, Russia Matters, 11.03.17: The author, a doctoral candidate in political science and public policy at the University of Michigan and a pre-doctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, argues that cyberattacks have not yet become a “force multiplier” to conventional military, but that this could change in the coming years given their relative affordability and potential potency. Concerns about hacking as a tool of war have escalated following a report by the cybersecurity company Symantec that concluded that a hacking group, dubbed Dragonfly 2.0, successfully infiltrated U.S. power plants over the past two years. (The report doesn’t identify the perpetrators, although some researchers have suggested links to Russia.) Still, in the case of two active theaters of war studied by the author, Ukraine and Syria, there was a strong disconnect between cyber and kinetic operations. The author cites five reasons for this: first, a lack of resources and capabilities, particularly in the case of the Ukrainian government; second, “a lack of government coordination with hackers due to either the illegality of the latter’s activities or the low priority of cyber operations”; third a lack of targets; fourth, a lack of “audience” due to the peculiarities of the Ukrainian online population; and fifth, a lack of effort by the Russian government. This said, the author notes that cyber-operations as a component of warfare are still in their relative infancy. “Coordination between cyberattacks and military operations today is roughly on the same level as that between air power and ground operations in World War I. … Some 25 years later, in World War II, air campaigns’ role in lethal violence had grown much more direct, to devastating effect.”

Elections interference:

“Russian Interference in the 2016 Election: A Cacophony, Not a Conspiracy,” Masha Gessen, New Yorker, 11.03.17: The author, a staff writer for the magazine and the author most recently of “The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia,” observes that the efforts of Russian “trolls” to influence the 2016 election were anything but a sophisticated conspiracy. The author points to reports that workers at the Kremlin’s so-called “troll factory” in St. Petersburg were required to watch “House of Cards” and urged to exploit hot-button issues around race and gay rights, from both sides of the political spectrum. “‘The trolls’ job was not so much to aid a particular Presidential candidate as to wreak havoc by posting on controversial subjects. Their success was measured by the number of times a post was shared, retweeted, or liked,” the author writes. And the new reports show that the Russian effort wasn’t solely designed to get Donald Trump elected. The author points to a story in the Hill that a Russian account announced plans for an anti-Trump march in New York City four days after the election. The influence campaign reinforced the political outlook of the Russians who orchestrated it. “Russians generally believe politics are a cacophonous mess with foreign interference but a fixed outcome, so they invested in affirming that vision. In the aftermath, and following a perfectly symmetrical impulse, a great many Americans want to prove that the Russians elected Trump, and Americans did not.”

“Clinton’s Link to Putin Is the Underreported ‘Dossier’ Bombshell,” Marc A. Thiessen, The Washington Post, 10.31.17: The author, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the former chief speechwriter for George W. Bush, suggests that new revelations about the work of a Washington, D.C. research firm point to links between Hillary Clinton and the Kremlin that are not being sufficiently scrutinized by the media. The Clinton campaign and the Democratic National Committee paid the firm, Fusion GPS, for research used in the discredited Trump-Russia dossier. “But even more shocking — and overlooked — is the revelation that the firm the Clinton campaign hired to compile that dossier, is the same firm that has been accused in recent congressional testimony of launching a smear campaign in Washington against Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian lawyer who was tortured and killed in a Russian prison in 2009 after uncovering a $230 million tax theft by 23 Kremlin-linked companies and individuals close to President Vladimir Putin,” the author writes, concluding: “None of this absolves the Trump campaign of collusion charges. But there is now more public evidence about Clinton’s collusion with Russia than there is about any such collusion by Trump.”

“Putin, Exposed, May Become More Dangerous,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 10.31.17: The author, a columnist for the newspaper, warns that the special counsel investigation of possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia may provoke a “more aggressive” response from Vladimir Putin. “When covert operations are exposed, nations sometimes adopt more aggressive actions. On the continuum of warfare, Russia has been playing somewhere in the middle, between war and peace. Now, as the world focuses on Russian mischief, will the Kremlin move the dial up or down?” In this respect, the author finds Putin’s recent comments on cybercrime particularly worrying. “He proposed ‘additional measures’ to combat adversaries and protect Russia. He argued that Russia was simply protecting its citizens from cybercriminals, but his language was emphatic: ‘It is necessary to be tough as regards those persons and groups that are using the Internet and the information space for criminal purposes.’” At the same time, Trump would be foolish to try to derail Robert Mueller’s investigation, the author writes: “By many people’s definition, that would be aiding a foreign power, which might be deemed a ‘high crime or misdemeanor.’”

“Brexit Was Not Due to Russian Dark Arts,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 11.06.17: The author, a columnist for the newspaper, downplays the role alleged Russian interference in support of Brexit may have played in the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum, arguing that it’s unlikely to have significantly affected public opinion. Seeking to exert influence over other countries, the author notes, is what governments do, via their embassies and other operations. “In this respect the Russians are like the Americans, British, Chinese and everyone else.” Moreover, the reach of a “handful” of Russia-linked Twitter accounts appears to be very limited, and “the audience ratings for Russia’s RT television channel were too low to justify complaints that pro-Brexit propaganda addled the brains of British voters.” Nor has Facebook unearthed any Russian coordination of advertising or political misinformation in the Brexit campaign. While evidence of Russian financial support for the Brexit camp would be a serious matter, the author writes, so far none has come to light. “Even if it does,” the author concludes, “it makes little sense to attribute the Brexit victory to Russian dark arts. The result’s origins lie in the miscalculations of David Cameron’s 2010-2016 Conservative government and in longer term British political and social discontent, which culminated in a collective howl of protest on referendum day.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“Keep Calm and Carry On: No Risk in the Uranium One Sale,” Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 10.31.17: The author, a senior policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, argues that from a technical perspective, the Uranium One sale “is not a scandal; it’s standard operating procedure.” Uranium One is just one of many such foreign-owned uranium mining companies operating in the U.S., and these commercial companies commonly mine uranium. Additionally, the sale of Uranium One to Rosatom was approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The U.S. and Russia regularly cooperate on nuclear energy, such as the 2011 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement, approved by Congress, allows for “the significant transfer of nuclear material, equipment and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production between the two nations.” This kind of nuclear cooperation has helped the U.S. and Russia dispose of “20,000 bombs worth of nuclear material.” The author argues that mining uranium to produce much-needed energy is and should continue to be an area of international cooperation.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Trump, Eisenhower and Russia: A Chance for Peace,” Jeffrey Burt, James Hitch, Peter Pettibone and Thomas Shillinglaw, The National Interest, 11.05.17: The authors, experts in international law with decades of experience in Russia and the former Soviet Union, write that Mikhail Gorbachev’s October 2017 op-ed brings to mind a similar call by former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 for Washington and Moscow to radically change the direction of their relationship. Although U.S. President Donald Trump also advocated for a new approach to Russia, as the one year anniversary of his election approaches, that relationship has only deteriorated further. This paralysis of relations could continue for years, and the authors believe it “must be avoided at all costs, and is not preordained.” The authors recommend a series of steps to break the stalemate. The White House should coordinate with Congress on proposals for negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump should also “publicly announce an overarching vision for our relationship with Russia,” borrowing elements from Eisenhower’s 1953 speech. The U.S.-Russia summit that Gorbachev called for in his recent piece should be seriously pursued. The authors also recommend that the crisis in Ukraine be addressed per their earlier recommendations. Finally, during the proposed U.S.-Russia summit, Trump and Putin must have “a full and frank exchange on Russian involvement in U.S. domestic elections.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

“The Quiet Rivalry Between China and Russia,” Robert Kaplan, New York Times, 11.04.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, writes that China’s “One Belt, One Road” project is overly ambitious, but it has “the future of Eurasia … written into its design.” It is a branding operation for existing infrastructure linking China to former Soviet countries in Central Asia; it is a development project for China’s Muslim region neighboring Central Asia; and it is a gesture towards alliance with Iran, an important player in Central Asia and the Middle East. China’s broader goal, however, “is to dominate Eurasia, which means relegating Russia to a second-tier power.” The Kremlin’s power is weakest in its resource-rich far east, which is seeing a steady influx of Chinese migrants. China is Central Asia’s biggest energy player, while in the Middle East, Iran’s geographic position makes it an attractive choice for Chinese infrastructure projects, investment and energy deals. While Russia’s relationship with Europe has been diminishing, China has been strengthening its trade relationships there. The trade relationship between Russia and China also favors Beijing. “These deeper geopolitical realities mean China and Russia will be only allies of convenience.” For the U.S., keeping China’s power in check risks “selling out Central Europe and parts of the Middle East to Russia.” The author recommends that the U.S. gain entry to Eurasia through promoting civil society, free trade and human rights rather than attempting to play China and Russia off one another.

Ukraine:

“Futile Effort, New Maidan or Neither? October Protests in Kiev,” Kostiantyn Fedorenko, Wilson Center, 11.02.17: The author, a junior research fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kiev, writes that the October protests in Kiev have opened a new political season for Ukraine. The number of civic and political groups participating in the protests looks like an antigovernmental coalition, which to some extent, it is. Ukrainian society mistrusts government institutions and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who experts believe is “concentrating political power in his own hands.” The coalition, however, is also “highly situational.” Its common denominators include demands for “lifting the parliamentary immunity provision, creating a specialized anticorruption court and adopting a new electoral law that would provide for full proportional representation with open ballots.” At the same time, Mikheil Saakashvili’s demand that Poroshenko leave power if “there are no decisions in favor of the people” was not what the other organizations were after. The protests reached a peak of only 5,000 participants, some of them paid to attend, and the country’s most popular opposition party, led by Yulia Tymoshenko, was missing. Instability in Ukraine’s politics is increasing, even if a “third Maidan” does not appear to be on the horizon.

“Mr. Putin: Turning Neighbor Into Adversary,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution/The Moscow Times, 11.01.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been clumsy in his approach to Ukraine, invalidating its unique history and culture in comments. While anti-Russian sentiment was uncommon in the late 1990s, today, Putin’s mishandling has helped Ukrainians create a strong national identity with “deep anti-Russian sentiment” part of its core. For reconciliation to begin between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow needs to make “major changes in its approach.” As relations with Russia have deteriorated, Ukrainians have looked more the West, which does not appear to advance Russian interests. The author advises the Kremlin “to seek better advice” on dealing with Ukraine. If the proposal for U.N. peacekeepers is a first step for getting Russia out of Donbass, “Putin should move more quickly. His current approach is locking in a generation of Ukrainians who will detest Russia.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Uzbekistan’s New President Tiptoes Toward Liberalization,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.31.17: The Washington Post’s editorial board writes that Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, might be turning in a more liberal direction for a country with a dismal reputation for human rights. Under the 27-year rule of Islam Karimov, journalists and critics were frequently jailed and tortured, and civil society and independent media were mostly wiped out. Changing course “can be agonizing,” so patience will be necessary. Whether Miriziyoyev is seeking to fully transform Uzbekistan or merely trying to improve the country’s image enough to attract foreign investors is unclear. He may also be looking to Russia or China as models of “personal authoritarianism welded onto state capitalism.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“What Does Putin Want? To Maintain His Power No Matter What Democracy,” William E. Pomeranz, Wilson Center, 10.30.17: The author, deputy director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, writes that for Russian, elections serve as “acts of confirmation.” Although he has not yet announced his candidacy, Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to make big campaign promises, but his international and domestic priorities are unlikely to change. The author argues that reform presents the “greatest vulnerability for a Russian leader,” and that above all, Putin wants to maintain control. Most importantly for Putin’s fourth term is keeping the Russian economy afloat and dealing with the persistent issue to corruption, “the one issue that galvanizes the Russian people into protest.” Foreign affairs also seem unlikely to change. Putin’s desire for a neogitiated settlement in Syria appears like it will run into roadblocks, nor does a resolution seem likely in Ukraine. “But no one should expect him to back down if the current balance of forces is challenged, no matter the consequences.” If Putin’s victory in the March 2018 election is big, it would also be “a victory for the Russian state in its current autocratic form.”

“Masha Gessen Is Wrong to Call Russia a Totalitarian State. The Distinction Between Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism Is Not One of Degree, But One of Kind,” The Economist, 11.02.17: This book review by The Economist, looking at Masha Gessen’s “The Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia,” argues that totalitarianism and authoritarianism are different types of political rule, not different intensities on the same scale. Where totalitarianism fully controls the lives of citizens, authoritarian rule necessitates that only certain rules be followed and allows for some liberty, so long as it does not rock the political boat. “Where totalitarianism mobilizes the people, authoritarianism breeds passivity.” The reviewer argues that while Gessen’s book has “genuine emotional force,” its main argument, that totalitarianism has reclaimed modern Russia, “rings hollow.” “The insistence on invoking totalitarianism obscures Ms. Gessen’s more insightful observations about how Russians continue to be shaped by the trauma of the Soviet past.” Apathy and apoliticism, symptoms of authoritarian rule, are the defining features of Putin’s Russia, not politicization and mobilization. The review also notes that state control over economy, travel and ideology is not as complete as Gessen suggests. Opposition to the Kremlin is not unthinkable, and alternative sources of information exist online. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny, for all the tribulations he has endured in this role, notes that “the past 25 years have been the freest in Russian history.” The reviewer argues that sloppy use of language can sap it of meaning, and that for a fuller picture of Russia under Putin, the American public should seek additional sources.

“Russia’s New Bureaucracy Means Tougher Times for Putin’s Friends,” Tatyana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.31.17: The author, director of the analytical department of the Center of Political Technologies in Moscow, writes that Russia’s “non-system elite” no longer play the instrumental role in Russia’s development they once did. Many of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s associates who do not hold public office are private businessmen involved in major energy or infrastructure projects. Their participation in Putin’s decision-making bypasses formal legal procedures, which are only used to legitimize decisions already made. Now, however, the technocrats in power “will gradually become a more significant source of support” for Putin, leaving his friends to find new ways of creating ties with the government. The author argues that the non-system elite must adapt to no longer treating the formal state and Putin as one, or find themselves in trouble. 

“What If the Russian Revolution Had Never Happened?” Simon Sebag Montefiore, New York Times, 11.06.17: The author, an expert in Russian history, argues that the Bolshevik revolution was not, as it may seem, inevitable. The czars had many opportunities for reform that could have saved the Russian monarchy, had they been taken advantage of. As late as 1913, Lenin believed that the revolution would not occur in his lifetime. None of the revolution’s leaders were even present for the “spontaneous, disorganized popular uprising and … crisis of military loyalty that forced [Czar] Nicholas’s abdication.” The famed storming of the Winter Palace was not so much a storming as a drawn out scramble. The Bolshevik grip on power was so tenuous that a coordinated attack by the opposition or Western forces would have been enough to dislodge it. As a result, the 20^th century would have unfolded rather differently: Hitler may not have risen to power, Mao might not have conquered China and wars in Cuba and Vietnam may not have been fought, as there would have been no Cold War. The author argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin “presents himself as a czar,” who, like all czars, fears revolution. “That is why it is victory against Germany in 1945, not the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that is the founding myth of Putinist Russia.” So while the West looks back at the Russian Revolution, “Russia is largely pretending it never happened.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.