This Week’s Highlights

• “Beneath the surface brinkmanship, the two global rivals [the U.S. and Russia] are now also doing something else: talking,” write Anton Troianovski and David E. Sanger of The New York Times. “There is a serious conversation underway [between the U.S. and Russia] on arms control, the deepest in years. ... The most notable talks between Russian and American officials have been on what the two call ‘strategic stability’ ... Working groups have been set up, including one that will discuss ‘novel weapons’ like Russia’s Poseidon, an autonomous nuclear torpedo.” The New York Times also reports that “[s]everal weeks ago—after an extensive debate inside the American intelligence community over how much to reveal—the United States turned over [to Russia] the names and other details of a few hackers actively launching attacks on America ... Putin welcomes such gestures of respect. Analysts noted that he recently also sent his own signal: Asked … in October whether Mr. Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan heralded the decline of American power, Mr. Putin countered by praising Mr. Biden’s decision.”
• “Is Russia using directed-energy attacks on U.S. diplomats and spies overseas?” asks Prof. Daniel Drezner. “I have serious doubts that this is anything more than a psychogenic illness. But I have only moderate confidence in those doubts and could be persuaded otherwise. Such persuasion, however, cannot be assertions of U.S. intelligence officials or members of Congress. There will need to be more.” Meanwhile, The Washington Post’s David Ignatius writes: “The first task is to keep investigating [Havana Syndrome] … Message to the Kremlin: We're not making any allegations. But we need to talk.”
• “Politicians in western Europe have been slower to point fingers at Russia than their counterparts in eastern Europe. But in the past two weeks that has started to shift,” the Financial Times reports. “Data from Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), show that in countries where Gazprom does not own storage facilities, such as in France and Italy, the level of gas in storage has reached near-normal levels for this time of year ... Include Gazprom-controlled facilities, however, and the overall level in Europe is well below, at just above 75% compared with 85 to 95% in each of the past five years. Gazprom has influence over almost one-third of all gas storage in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.”
• “German policy toward Russia is unlikely to change in any major way, notwithstanding Merkel’s departure,” writes Jonas Driedger, a DAAD Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies. “[T]he next government will be formed by a coalition. This will give sway to status quo parties. ... Scholz could only become chancellor with the combined support of two of the three remaining parties: the Greens, the FDP or Merkel’s Union. All of these oppose rapprochement [with Russia]. ... Currently, the most likely future ruling coalition consists of the SPD, Greens and FDP. They recently published the results of their ongoing coalition talks. The paper does not mention Russia once … [and] the Social Democrats themselves are far from being a Kremlin-friendly party nowadays.”
• “A renewed buildup of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border has raised concern among some officials in the United States and Europe who are tracking what they consider irregular movements of equipment and personnel on Russia's western flank,” The Washington Post reports. “The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity … said the troop movements have reignited concerns that arose in April, when the largest buildup of troops by Russia near the Ukrainian border in years sparked an international outcry. … The renewed movements of Russian forces in the area come as the Kremlin embraces a harder line on Ukraine. Russian officials from President Vladimir Putin on down have escalated their rhetoric in recent months, attacking Kyiv's Western ties and even questioning its sovereignty. Putin has warned that any expansion of NATO military infrastructure on Ukrainian territory represents a ‘red line’ for Moscow.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Rivals on World Stage, Russia and U.S. Quietly Seek Areas of Accord,” Anton Troianovski and David E. Sanger, The New York Times, 10.31.21. The authors, the Moscow bureau chief and a White House and national security correspondent for the news outlet, write:

• “[B]eneath the surface brinkmanship, the two global rivals [the U.S. and Russia] are now also doing something else: talking. … There is a serious conversation underway on arms control, the deepest in years. … The most notable talks between Russian and American officials have been on what the two call ‘strategic stability’ … American officials describe them as a ‘bright spot’ in the relationship.”
• “The White House’s top adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, Anne Neuberger, has engaged in a series of quiet, virtual meetings with her Kremlin counterpart. … Officials in both countries say the flurry of talks has so far yielded little of substance but helps to prevent Russian-American tensions from spiraling out of control.”
• “For the United States, however, the outreach is fraught with risk, exposing the Biden administration to criticism that it is too willing to engage with a Putin-led Russia that continues to undermine American interests and repress dissent. … There are clearly areas the Kremlin does not want to discuss: Russia’s crackdown on dissent and the treatment of the imprisoned opposition leader Alexei A. Navalny have gone largely unaddressed, despite the disapproval that Mr. Biden voiced on the matter this year.”
• “Dmitri S. Peskov, Mr. Putin’s spokesman, said in October that another meeting this year “in one format or another” between the two presidents was “quite realistic.” Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov said on Sunday that he spoken briefly with Mr. Biden in Rome and that the president “stressed his commitment to further contacts.”
• “Mr. Putin, finely attuned to the subtleties of diplomatic messaging after more than 20 years in power, welcomes such gestures of respect. Analysts noted that he recently also sent his own signal: Asked … in October whether Mr. Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan heralded the decline of American power, Mr. Putin countered by praising Mr. Biden’s decision and rejecting the notion that the chaotic departure would have a long-term effect on America’s image.”

“Would Russia or China Help Us if We Were Invaded by Space Aliens?” Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, 11.01.21. The author, an opinion columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “In a recent essay on great-power competition and climate change, Rob Litwak, an arms control expert at the Wilson Center, recalled a question that President Ronald Reagan posed to Mikhail Gorbachev … As Gorbachev put it later: ‘President Reagan suddenly said to me, ‘What would you do if the United States were suddenly attacked by someone from outer space? Would you help us?’’ ‘I said, ‘No doubt about it.’ ‘He said, ‘We too.’”
• “Global warming is challenging every nation with more extreme weather, wildfires and sea level rise and once-in-a-century storms coming much more frequently. Unlike with a space alien, though, there’s zero possibility of negotiating with Mother Nature. … She’s got the whole wide world in her hands—as she demonstrated with the COVID-19 pandemic.”
• “Yet neither China’s president, Xi Jinping, nor Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is attending the Glasgow climate summit in person with President Biden and many other world leaders that opened Sunday [Oct. 31]. And even more important, The Washington Post reported last week that some in the Chinese leadership want to resist any substantial cooperation with America on climate issues until the United States dials down its pressure on China ‘over human rights, Hong Kong, Taiwan, trade and a range of other issues.’”
• “There is never a good time for a great-power conflict. And we’ve already seen how deadly the lack of global cooperation in the face of Mother Nature’s COVID-19 stressor has been. But this is even more dangerous. A shootout between the United States and China over Taiwan or between NATO and Russia over Ukraine—just as human-made climate change is putting a gun to all of our heads—would be insane. But it’s a real possibility.”
• “Challenging China and Russia over who can produce the most tools for global resilience, not just resistance, is a way for America to reclaim some moral leadership on the world stage and focus our economy, and our competitors, on the most important industries of the future.”

“What George Kennan can teach us about US-Russia relations,” Geoffrey Roberts, Responsible Statecraft, 10.25.21. The author, emeritus professor of history at University College Cork, National University of Ireland, writes:

• “A realist as well as an idealist, Kennan was fond of quoting John Quincy Adams’s aphorism that America ‘goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.’ It was through example that America should lead the world, argued Kennan on innumerable occasions. He believed the United States would win the Cold War simply by being true to its liberal, democratic self. Attempts to forcibly refashion the world in its own image only served to undermine America’s fundamental values and beliefs.”
• “Kennan’s Russian policy odyssey showed how even the sharpest-beaked hawks could become dove-like peacemakers if they took the trouble, as he did, to recognize how different the world looks through the eyes of their rivals and adversaries.”

“America's Crumbling Global Position,” Bret Stephens, The New York Times, 10.26.21. The author, an opinion columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “America desperately needs the Biden presidency to succeed. And the world desperately needs a successful America. The alternative to a failed Biden presidency isn't a change in administration. It's a transformation of the global order that leaves us poorer, more vulnerable, and more susceptible to the siren songs of illiberal populists, including those at home.”
• “Bottom-line advice to the president: Assemble a new national security team, now. Be the bigger man and invite people like Bob Gates to join it.”

“'Havana Syndrome' is a dilemma for policymakers,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 10.29.21 The author, a columnist for the news outlet and long-time Russia watcher, writes:

• “The ‘Havana Syndrome’ health cases are gut-wrenching. As the U.S. government gathers information, there's growing speculation that the attackers may be Russians. But there's no proof. It's an assault case with no hard evidence—other than the suffering of the victims.”
• “These mysterious attacks are a policymaker's nightmare. You can't accuse another country of warlike assaults without solid facts; the Iraqi WMD fiasco taught a generation of intelligence analysts that lesson. … Russia has denied any involvement in such attacks, including in private conversations with U.S. officials.”
• “With its freewheeling network of mercenaries, hackers and thugs, Russia is an obvious suspect. But that's not the same thing as having proof. So, what should the Biden administration do about these anomalous health incidents to make sure they stop, when it lacks the evidence to support a potential military confrontation?”
• “The first task is to keep investigating. That's what CIA Director William J. Burns is doing aggressively, assigning the probe to one of the targeters who found al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden a decade ago. While this investigation continues, it might also make sense to draw Russia into a discussion about ‘rules of the road’ for directed energy systems.”
• “Like hypersonic missiles, space weapons and cyberattacks, these directed energy systems will be weapons of the future, regardless of what emerges in the investigation of Havana Syndrome. They're double-edged swords—as dangerous to Russia as to America. Message to the Kremlin: We're not making any allegations. But we need to talk.”

“What's the deal with Havana Syndrome?” Daniel W. Drezner, The Washington Post, 10.27.21. The author, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, writes:

• “Is Russia using directed-energy attacks on U.S. diplomats and spies overseas? … What is not in dispute is that beginning in late 2016, diplomats in Havana reported symptoms that included hearing a loud ringing sound and serious headaches. … According to Politico … U.S. intelligence officials are showing greater confidence about the what and who of Havana Syndrome … As for the who: ‘Lawmakers are also growing increasingly confident that Russia or another hostile foreign government is behind the suspected attacks, based on regular briefings from administration officials—although there is still no smoking gun linking the incidents to Moscow.’”
• “Well, it sure seems like that's that! Except that maybe it is not. The New Republic's Natalie Shure recently expressed deep skepticism about the plausibility of intentional directed-energy attacks causing these cases. She cites Robert Bartholomew and Robert Baloh pointing out the lack of physical or medical evidence beyond vague symptoms. … She cites chemist Cheryl Rofer writing in Foreign Policy … and concluding, ‘The evidence for microwave effects of the type categorized as Havana syndrome is exceedingly weak. No proponent of the idea has outlined how the weapon would actually work. No evidence has been offered that such a weapon has been developed by any nation.’”
• “It is also hard not to point out that the most vocal proponents of Russia being behind a directed-energy attack do not have a lot of credibility. Entous's sources are Trump White House officials. Politico quotes Sen. Marco Rubio … accusing skeptics of being ‘influence agents that are being paid and or encouraged to write these on behalf of those — foreign government or whatever — that don't want this to be discussed out there and want to cast doubt about it.’”
• “So I have serious doubts that this is anything more than a psychogenic illness. But I have only moderate confidence in those doubts and could be persuaded otherwise. Such persuasion, however, cannot be assertions of U.S. intelligence officials or members of Congress. There will need to be more.”

“Is ‘Havana Syndrome’ an ‘Act of War’ or ‘Mass Hysteria’?” Spencer Bokat-Lindell, The New York Times, 10.26.21. The author, a staff editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “The leading theory among American intelligence officials reportedly ascribes the illness not just to ‘targeted attacks,’ but to targeted attacks executed with secret microwave weapons wielded by agents of hostile foreign powers—Russia, in particular.”
• “In 2018, the well-regarded Journal of the American Medical Association published a study of the 21 diplomats … Smith and his team said they found signs of brain damage, but no signs of impact to the patients’ skulls … In December 2020, the National Academy of Sciences offered an alternative explanation that attributed the illness not to sound but to light, in the form of microwaves. … Many scientists have argued that the microwave weapon theory is implausible. … ‘The idea that someone could beam huge amounts of microwave energy at people and not have it be obvious defies credibility,’ Kenneth Foster, an emeritus professor of bioengineering at the University of Pennsylvania.”
• “So what might have caused the ‘Havana syndrome’ brain damage, if not sound or light? That turns out to be something of a trick question, Dan Hurley reported for The Times in 2019: Many neurologists and psychologists assert that the JAMA paper provided no convincing evidence of any brain damage at all.”
• “Many scientists say that the ‘Havana syndrome’ is much more likely a mass psychogenic illness, a phenomenon whereby people become sick because they think they have been exposed to a health threat.”
• “Perhaps most shocking, Natalie Shure argues in The New Republic, an anonymous member of the intelligence community quoted in Ioffe’s story seemed to call for punishing the alleged culprits, alluding to intelligence of ‘medium confidence’ that the alleged culprits were Russian. ‘Of course, we also invaded Iraq with ‘medium confidence,’ Shure writes. ‘If ‘Havana syndrome’ has mercifully yet to be used to agitate for war as concretely as the imaginary nukes of Iraq were, it’s clearly been seized on by a national security apparatus formidably expanded since 9/11 — and if more people don’t come to their senses, harm will surely result.’”

“Notes on Valdai 2021: Putin Touts Russia’s ‘Healthy Conservatism,’” Angela Stent, Russia Matters, 10.27.21. The author, senior adviser to the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and professor emerita of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, writes:

• “This year’s session of the annual Valdai International Discussion Club was organized in hybrid fashion, with most participants attending in person but some (myself included) choosing to participate remotely.”
• “Since 2014 there have been fewer experts on Russia and more people whose expertise includes international economics and politics. … The message now is that Russia is an essential global player and can offer solutions to global problems, including climate change. And yet, as this year’s meeting showed, Russia’s unique civilization is offered as an antidote to the fractious mores of a declining West. The conference theme was ‘Global Shake-Up in the 21st Century: The Individual, Values and the State.’”
• “He spent more than 3 1/2 hours giving a speech and answering questions from the audience (both in-person and virtual). His speech was wide-ranging, touching on topics both domestic and international, but he began with a theme that he has raised in previous Valdai meetings—excoriating the West for what might be called its culture of wokeness, likening the enforcers of this culture to the Bolsheviks and praising Russia for its ‘healthy conservatism.’”
• “He claimed that the Western obsession with gender and race is ‘even worse than the agitprop department of the Central Committee’ of the Soviet Communist Party. He said that his intellectual mentors were Nikolai Berdyayev and Ivan Ilyin—conservative philosophers who were expelled from their homeland after the Bolsheviks took over. One might ask who the intended audience was for this attack on Western culture and praise of ‘heathy conservatism.’ Presumably it was largely domestic, but it may also have appealed to some of the foreign participants who view Russia as a bastion of traditional values amid a sea of Western immorality.”

“Economic Sanctions on Russia and their Effects, Part II,” Iikka Korhonen, NYU Jordan Center, October 2021. (Part I can be found here.) The author, Head of Research at the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies, writes:

• “This post reviews the recent literature on the economic effects of Russian sanctions.  The emerging consensus is that sanctions have had a detrimental effect on Russia’s economic performance. However, their relative significance pales in comparison with the effects of oil prices on the Russian economy. Sanctions have reduced Russian companies’ access to foreign finance, while America’s relatively recent unilateral sanctions … have increased uncertainty toward many Russian companies. These consequences are likely to have adverse economic effects going forward.”
• “Russia’s own counter-sanctions have also had their economic effects. Food variety in Russia has been reduced and food prices are higher. At the same time, production of some varieties has increased.”
• “In recent years, Russia’s economic performance has not been stellar. Growth had already decelerated in 2012 and 2013, though the price of oil remained high … In 2014, Russia’s GDP increased by 0.7%, while in 2015 it declined by 2.3%. After its recovery, Russia’s GDP growth has continued to trail global economic growth, meaning that Russia’s share in the global economy continues to decline. … But how much of this disappointing economic performance can be attributed to sanctions?”
• “A full lifting of EU and U.S. sanctions is likely some ways off. Moreover, the way the U.S. has introduced many additional sanctions against Russian entities and individuals since 2018 … would lead many to believe that the immediate future will see more economic sanctions, not fewer. The same also holds for Russia’s counter-sanctions.”
• “Therefore, it appears that Russia and its most important trading partner—the European Union—have in many ways become less integrated because of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and violations of international law. While sanctions have, in all likelihood, helped to deter further deterioration of the situation in eastern Ukraine, it is difficult to be optimistic about a speedy resolution to the crisis.”

“The Collapse of the Afghan Government Provides a Challenge for China and Russia, Not a Windfall,” Elizabeth Wishnick, PONARS Eurasia, 11.01.21. The author, a professor of political science at Montclair State University, writes:

• “The collapse of the Afghan government and takeover by the Taliban is not a net win for China and Russia, nor will these developments automatically cement their partnership. … [I]n the near future, Russia and China will face an unpredictable political and security environment close to their borders, as well as new challenges to their strategic partnership.”
• “After the Taliban took power, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke by telephone about coordinating their Afghanistan policy. Despite some optimistic reporting about developments in Afghanistan prodding the two countries to ‘synchronize their clocks’ and bind their ties more tightly, it is far from clear that they are coordinating their strategies. Although some of their concerns overlap … the two countries approach Afghanistan from different strategic vantage points and have divergent interests in the endgame that they wish for the broader region.”
• “Some observers have suggested that Chinese and Russian objectives are in alignment, and Russia would even allow China to take the lead in the new security environment. However, early indications show that Russia and China each face their own complex geopolitical calculations that have points in common but are far from identical.”
• “Their interactions in the unfolding situation in Afghanistan continue to tell the international community a great deal about the degree of coordination in their strategic partnership.  Although China and Russia may be in agreement about the broad brushstrokes of international relations and authoritarian governance, it remains to be seen whether or not they will speak with one voice on Afghanistan and if Russia will welcome a more active Chinese role in regional security in Eurasia.”
• “Russia appears to be retaking the initiative in regional efforts to address security concerns in Afghanistan, but China has its own agenda for the region, thus far largely connected to the security of Xinjiang and the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, but increasingly involving a greater Chinese role in regional security.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

•  No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“A nuclear arms race is unavoidable without serious intervention. China, the US and Russia are each investing in highly effective missiles and defense systems,” Laura Grego, Financial Times, 10.27.21. The author, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy at MIT, writes:

• “So why is China building new nuclear delivery systems and modernizing its weapons after decades of retaining a modestly sized arsenal? One core driver is to make clear to an unconvinced United States that it is vulnerable to Chinese nuclear retaliation despite enormous investments in missile defenses. Many of the technologies China is pursuing, including those believed to have been tested this summer, are designed to overwhelm or evade such defenses.” 
• “If this sounds familiar, it should. This dynamic has echoes of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War arms race. Many of the technologies … are even the same. It took years for the United States and Soviet Union to arrive at a shared understanding that unconstrained pursuit of missile defenses was destabilizing the strategic balance. However, having exited the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty designed to halt that race, the U.S. has been developing a defense against intercontinental-range ballistic missiles for the past two decades. China’s new missiles hedge against the possibility that the United States may one day believe its technical advances permit it to strike China first while remaining invulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear attack.”
• “China’s concern is that the pursuit of highly effective defensive systems may reflect the desire of the United States to escape its own nuclear vulnerability, without necessarily giving up the ability to threaten others or doing the hard work needed to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. … This is an arms race that the U.S. and China as well as Russia all seem prepared to participate in.”
• “This one-upmanship will never provide a solution to the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. The only winning move is to step off the track and return to the negotiating table. The parties to the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, including the P5 nuclear weapon states … will meet in January 2022 to take stock of their progress. Diplomacy, for all its certain challenges, is the only path forward.”

“Arms Control as Wedge Strategy: How Arms Limitation Deals Divide Alliances,” Timothy Crawford and Khang Vu, International Security, 10.25.21. The authors, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston College and a Ph.D. candidate at Boston College, write:

• “The United States and Russia have retreated from agreements that formed the framework for post-Cold War arms cuts and strategic stability...the only strategic arms control agreement between the United States and Russia (i.e., the 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [New START]) expires in 2026. The time for building a successor framework for strategic arms control is running out.”
• “Two trends are driving today’s arms control crisis. First, nuclear stability is weakened by new technology: improving missile accuracy, remote sensing, antisubmarine capabilities, and a precision revolution in conventional weapons. Such changes, uncertainty about how they will be used, and competitive pressures to counter them have obsolesced the existing framework of arms control. Second, the political forcefield that sustained the old framework has been altered by China’s rise and the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations.”
• “Although states have used strategic arms control to promote stability, cut costs, or secure a military edge, they have also exploited it to divide opponents... this calculus was a key component of states’ decisions to negotiate the Washington Naval Treaty, the LTBT, and the SALT I... the wedge logic remains relevant today.”
• “In general, wedge strategies arise in any triangular competition in which one state’s strength or survival is endangered by the collusion of two others. In such circumstances, “states seek to reduce the menace to themselves by sowing discord among potential adversaries” because they “gain security as well as bargaining power when [their] main adversaries are themselves divided.”
• “Strategic arms control can continue to play a critical role in U.S. security policy. Though great power competition strains the old frameworks, the United States can use strategic arms control—especially the platform of New START renewal—to create an advantage in the strategic triangle with Russia and China...the United States may also be challenged by other states’ use of arms control to divide opponents. In particular, North Korea’s missile and nuclear developments could prompt a deal to cap its arsenal before it perfects capabilities to attack the U.S. mainland. However, North Korea might demand concessions that would weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Gazprom’s low gas storage levels fuel questions over Russia’s supply to Europe,” David Sheppard, Mehreen Khan and Guy Chazan, Financial Times, 10.27.21. The authors write:

• “Russia’s Gazprom has emptied its gas storage facilities in western Europe to unusually low levels ahead of the winter, adding to fears that Moscow has exacerbated a shortage of supplies that has boosted prices to a record level.”
• “While European storage levels are low, an analysis of European gas industry data shows the largest shortfalls are at sites owned or controlled by … Gazprom, in what critics say increasingly points to an attempt to squeeze European energy supplies.”
• “Data from GIE show that in countries where Gazprom does not own storage facilities, such as in France and Italy, the level of gas in storage has reached near-normal levels for this time of year. Excluding Gazprom-controlled sites, European gas storage is just within the five-year average range, which the industry defines as a position of relatively comfortable supplies. Include Gazprom-controlled facilities, however, and the overall level in Europe is well below, at just above 75 percent compared with 85 to 95 percent in each of the past five years. Gazprom has influence over almost one-third of all gas storage in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.”
• “Gazprom did not respond to requests for comment but has consistently said it has met all of its long-term contracts to customers this year. But critics of Gazprom believe that allowing its storage facilities to decline has amounted to a subtle but highly effective effort to influence European energy prices, which are threatening the economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic.”
• “Politicians in western Europe have been slower to point fingers at Russia than their counterparts in eastern Europe. But in the past two weeks that has started to shift. Annalena Baerbock, the co-chair of the German Green party that is entering coalition talks, last week said Europe should not succumb to ‘blackmail’ from Russia over the approval of Nord Stream 2, adding she believed the surge in prices had been ‘intentionally brought about.’”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“How the Kremlin Learned to Defeat Its Opposition,” Christopher Bort, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.25.21. The author, a visiting scholar with Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Russia’s parliamentary elections last month for the lower house, the Duma, were a show of force by the authorities against the opposition. The Kremlin’s party, United Russia, was expected to win the lion’s share of the seats. But by labeling the opposition ‘extremists,’ designating independent media outlets and their journalists ‘foreign agents’ or ‘undesirable,’ and hampering opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s online activities at every turn—including by forcing the removal of the Smart Voting apps from online stores operated by Apple and Google—the Russian authorities went beyond what was necessary to accomplish their ends.”
• “Putin’s learning curve suggests he will not ease up on the opposition. Navalny, behind bars for the next two years under his current sentence, is under investigation on new charges that could add another decade to his term. It is hard to envision Putin ever letting him remain in Russia a free man. … The opposition is palpably sensing defeat and deflation.”
• “It’s possible that Putin and Kiriyenko are conscious of taking the lesson they learned long ago too far. Kiriyenko, for one, probably is wary of cutting off all avenues of opposition, judging by his promotion of the party, known as New People, which was designed to create an illusion of change. He may envision that New People will co-opt some of the country’s liberal opposition, much as the authorities have co-opted the Communist Party leadership while allowing the party to operate as an opposition platform within tight parameters.”
• “At the first sign that a pseudo-opposition is becoming real, however, expect the Kremlin to act according to Kiriyenko’s recipe: “with toughness and very consistently.” Communist Party elements that are protesting election manipulations are finding this out, as the Russian authorities subject them to harassment.”
• “The Kremlin will go to any lengths to remind them, and any other would-be opposition figures, of the lesson it taught them more than twenty years ago: when the regime’s foot is on their throat, it will not ease up.”

“The absurd 'crime’ of religious worship in Putin’s Russia,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.28.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Judge Alexei Semin in the Trusovsky District Court of Astrakhan in southern Russia ... sentenced three men, Rustam Diarov, Sergei Klikunov and Yevgeny Ivanov, to eight years in prison, and Yevgeny's wife, Olga Ivanova, to 3 1/2 years, on charges of organizing and participating in ‘extremist activities.’ What they did was discuss the Bible and worship as Jehovah's Witnesses, a Christian denomination that is nonviolent, eschews subservience to the state, refuses military service, does not vote and views God as the only true leader.”
• “Since the denomination was outlawed, a Jehovah's Witnesses spokesman says, the Russian authorities have brought 257 criminal cases involving 559 believers; 70 of them are now in prison, 31 are under house arrest and 1,594 homes have been raided.”
• “Mr. Putin's declaration of values was cynical fiction. The reality is that he leads a police state that brutally represses the Jehovah's Witnesses with the entirely false charge of extremism. Mr. Putin's lodestar is not the moral or spiritual conservatism he professes, but rather a kleptocratic authoritarianism that rewards itself and grinds innocent people into oblivion when they dare lift voices in prayer. ‘Monstrous’ indeed.”

“Why we should care about Putin's love life,” Roman Badanin, The Washington Post, 10.27.21. The author, the former chief editor of the investigative news outlet Proekt, is a John S. Knight Senior International Journalism Fellow at Stanford University, writes:

• “When Western newspapers and magazines published the Pandora Papers earlier this month, the Russian state media were happy to report on the revelations about the dubious financial dealings of celebrities and politicians—as long as they involved Russia's enemies (such as the president of Ukraine). But there was one topic that Russian broadcasters scrupulously avoided: the allegations that people in the entourage of Vladimir Putin had channeled tens of millions of dollars to a woman named Svetlana Krivonogikh, alleged to be one of the Russian president's romantic partners—and the mother of one of his children.”
• “To understand why these issues deserve public attention, one need only consider the COVID-19 pandemic. Right now, amid a surge in infections, the death toll among Russians is reaching new highs. Yet our kleptocrats, enabled and encouraged by the Kremlin, continue to enrich themselves even as regular people continue dying in underfunded state hospitals. Consider the Botkin State Clinic, an infectious disease hospital in St. Petersburg, Russia's second-largest city ... even as public facilities such as Botkin were falling apart, Putin's friends and relatives—including his ex-mistress Krivonogikh—our reporting showed, have been busily building multimillion-dollar residential buildings for themselves.”
• “Even after the personal price I've had to pay for my investigations, I will continue to expose Russia's corruption and Putin's clandestine wealth. We must do it for the sake of those Russians who are deprived of access to decent medicine, pensions and other essential services by the kleptocrats who like to keep everything in the family.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Angela Merkel’s Departure Unlikely to Change Germany’s Russia Policy,” Jonas Driedger, The National Interest, 10.30.21. The author, a fellow at School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

• “How will Germany, hitherto the United States’ key ally in its dealings with the Kremlin, behave after the Merkeldämmerung? Concern about a German-Russian rapprochement is seemingly justified. After all, Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, became a personal friend of Vladimir Putin during his tenure.  Fast forward to the 2021 elections: Schröder’s party, the Social Democrats (SPD), carried the plurality of votes. SPD candidate Olaf Scholz will likely be the next chancellor. Scholz worked closely with Schröder as the SPD’s general secretary until 2004.”
• “However, German policy toward Russia is unlikely to change in any major way, notwithstanding Merkel’s departure. This is mainly for five reasons.”
• “First, the next government will be formed by a coalition. This will give sway to status quo parties. ... Scholz could only become chancellor with the combined support of two of the three remaining parties: the Greens, the FDP, or Merkel’s Union. All of these oppose rapprochement [with Russia]. … Second, the Social Democrats themselves are far from being a Kremlin-friendly party nowadays.”
• “Third, German security policy is marked by continuity. Germany continued to oppose Russia even when President Donald Trump attacked NATO and Berlin while seeking favor with Putin. … Fourth, Russia itself seems to expect continuity in German policy. Despite the Russian media campaign and hacking, there is no evidence of any major Russian election interference. … Fifth, ongoing negotiations point towards continuity. Currently, the most likely future ruling coalition consists of the SPD, Greens, and FDP. They recently published the results of their ongoing coalition talks. The paper does not mention Russia once.”
• “Thus, even though Merkel oversaw Germany’s Russia policy for the last sixteen years, her impending departure is unlikely to change Berlin’s approach toward Moscow.”

Ukraine:

“Russian Troop Movements Near Ukraine Border Prompt Concern in U.S., Europe,” Paul Sonne, Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern, The Washington Post, 10.30.21. The authors, WP and independent journalists, write:

• “A renewed buildup of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border has raised concern among some officials in the United States and Europe who are tracking what they consider irregular movements of equipment and personnel on Russia's western flank. The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to discuss the matter publicly, said the troop movements have reignited concerns that arose in April, when the largest buildup of troops by Russia near the Ukrainian border in years sparked an international outcry.”
• “Russian officials from President Vladimir Putin on down have escalated their rhetoric in recent months, attacking Kyiv's Western ties and even questioning its sovereignty. Putin has warned that any expansion of NATO military infrastructure on Ukrainian territory represents a ‘red line’ for Moscow.”
• “What the Russian forces gathering near the Ukrainian border are doing is unclear … ‘The point is: It is not a drill. It doesn't appear to be a training exercise. Something is happening. What is it?’ said Michael Kofman, director of the Russia studies program at the Virginia-based nonprofit analysis group CNA.”
• “According to Kofman, publicly available satellite imagery shows that forces from Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army, normally based in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, didn't return to Siberia after the exercises, and instead linked up with other Russian forces near the Ukrainian border. Kofman also said footage posted online appears to show that Russia's 1st Guards Tank Army … is moving personnel and materiel toward Ukraine.”
• “Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on Thursday [Oct. 28] accused Ukraine of having plans to retake control of the Donbas region by force. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov a day earlier said sales of Turkish drones to Ukraine potentially ‘destabilized’ the situation.”

“Ukraine’s Recent Drone Strike Reignites Tensions in Donbass,” Mark Episkopos, The National Interest, 10.31.21. The author, a national security reporter for the National Interest, writes:

• “Ukraine’s purchase and deployment of Turkish combat drones has reignited the territorial conflict simmering its eastern border, with some warning of the likelihood of further escalation. Kiev is moving forward with plans to procure dozens of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The acquisition is part of a larger defense cooperation venture with Ankara involving the production of Bayraktar drones on Ukrainian soil.”
• “It was revealed earlier this week that a Ukrainian Bayraktar drone destroyed a separatist artillery piece in the Donbass region during its first combat mission.”
• “Ukrainian officials say the strike was not conducted in violation of the Minsk Agreements because the drone allegedly did not cross the officially-delineated ‘Line of Contact’ between government and separatist forces.” 
• “Ukraine’s Bayraktar deployment comes shortly on the heels of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s visit to Kiev earlier this month. ‘I would just point out, no third country has a veto over NATO’s membership decisions,’ replied Austin when asked by a Ukrainian journalist about Russia’s opposition to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. ‘Ukraine has a right to decide its own future foreign policy, and we expect that they will be able to do that without any outside interference.’ Austin’s remarks drew a swift rebuke from the Kremlin.”
• “There are some early signs that the Kremlin’s reaction to these perceived “provocations” could extend beyond harsh words … Michael Kofman …. drew attention to these reported movements. ‘I’d watch the military situation around Ukraine more closely. Things are moving. It doesn’t feel like what happened in March-April,’ he tweeted, referring to the massive buildup and subsequent dispersal of Russian forces on Ukraine’s eastern border earlier this year … ‘Overall, I don’t think you’re seeing a drill or regular training,’ Kofman added.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Why Tajikistan Is Taking a Stand Against the Taliban,” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center/The Moscow Times, 10.26.21. The author, a research consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “In recent weeks, Tajikistan has hit the headlines for its hardline stance on Afghanistan, where the Taliban recently returned to power … [U]nlike its Central Asian neighbors, plus Russia and China, Tajikistan isn’t rushing to establish ties with the new government in Kabul. On the contrary, it has assumed the role of the Taliban’s main adversary, allegedly supporting the remnants of the Afghan opposition forces.”
• “It is too early to say that Tajikistan and Afghanistan are on the brink of war. Despite Rahmon’s harsh rhetoric, he and other high-ranking Tajik officials are acting with extreme caution and avoid direct references to the Taliban, limiting their criticism to the fact that Afghanistan’s new government is not inclusive enough of the country’s ethnic minorities.”
• “Tajikistan has no intention of getting into a direct confrontation with the Taliban. Rather, by taking a few more risks than its neighbors, the Tajik leadership is counting on boosting its popularity both at home and abroad. Dushanbe can afford to take such risks, certain that as a last resort, it can always fall back on the Russian troops that secure the Tajik-Afghan border. Tajikistan also engages in close military cooperation with China.”
• “Assuming that the situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to stabilize in the foreseeable future, it may fuel the Rahmon regime for another few years. At the same time, Dushanbe is cautious enough not to go overboard with its rhetoric, meaning Rahmon will still be able to establish contact with the Taliban if the tension brewing along the Afghan border becomes too dangerous.”

“Deeper US Engagement with Uzbekistan Stymied by Changing US Priorities, Russian Wariness,” Scott Radnitz, Russia Matters, 10.26.21. The author, the Herbert J. Ellison Associate Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, writes:

• “After a long hiatus, Uzbekistan is back on U.S. radar screens following visits by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, a Congressional delegation and various Defense Department officials to Tashkent. These officials have been engaged in discussions about the pressing need for American ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.”
• “Longtime observers of Central Asia can be forgiven for having a sense of déjà vu, as U.S. interest in the region waxes and wanes in response to geopolitical developments. The current moment resembles the period after 9/11, when the U.S. opened military bases in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to support operations in Afghanistan. However, much has changed since the Karshi-Khanabad air base in Uzbekistan was shut down in 2005. Despite its geographic centrality, Uzbekistan is not considered by U.S. policy makers as vital to American interests, and deeper engagement is limited by changing U.S. priorities and Russian wariness.”
• “In the larger scheme, the Biden administration’s Afghan withdrawal was part of a larger effort to extricate the U.S. from the Middle East, in order to realize the ‘pivot’ to Asia … Insofar as Central Asia may fit into this agenda, it would be as part of the military and economic containment of China. Yet although Central Asia has benefited from Chinese investment through the so-called Belt and Road Initiative, U.S. resources to counter China are being most heavily deployed in the Pacific rather than in Central Asia. In the past, Uzbekistan was able to leverage its strategic location and the threat of jihadism to its advantage. But although Afghanistan again looms as a potential exporter of instability, times—and the global balance of power—have changed. Any U.S. reengagement with Uzbekistan, if it occurs, is likely to be short-lived and superficial.”