I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“Responding to Russia’s Resurgence. Not Quiet on the Eastern Front,” Ivo H. Daalder, Foreign Affairs, 10.16.17: The author, the resident of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, warns that Russia under Vladimir Putin has “embarked on a systematic challenge to the West” and that Washington must prepare a strong response. Putin’s objectives go well beyond Russia’s alleged meddling in the 2016 presidential election. “Putin wants nothing less than to return Russia to the center of global politics by challenging the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War,” the author writes. In order to meet this challenge, the U.S. must maintain and strengthen the transatlantic alliance. “NATO must do more to bolster its deterrence by sending a clear message to the Kremlin that it will not tolerate further Russian aggression or expansionism.” At the same time, the author cautions against going on “a war footing” even if Moscow has done so, arguing that “dialogue and open channels of communication remain essential to avoiding misunderstandings and miscalculations that could escalate into a war no one wants.”

“Force Planning For The Era Of Great Power Competition,” Mark Gunzinger, Bryan Clark, David Johnson, Jesse Sloman, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017: The authors, researchers with the center, recommend that the U.S. Department of Defense, as part of a new National Defense Strategy, adopt force planning constructs (FPC) geared toward countering the changing military strategies of Russia and China. “DOD’s planning scenarios should address long-term competitions with China and Russia that include gray zone operations and other actions in peacetime that are intended to undermine U.S. influence in their regions,” the authors write. This revised strategy should include developing operating concepts for “major Informationized Warfare and New Generation Warfare conflict scenarios.” The authors also recommend creating force postures for forward defense and differentiating pacing threats. The near-term pacing threat for U.S. fixed-wing combat air forces and naval forces should be conflict with China in the Western Pacific; the near-term pacing threat for U.S. land forces should be Russia. The authors note that Russia and China are “incrementally gaining territory and regional influence through slow-motion, low-intensity aggression against their neighbors,” and they have pursued small-scale “gray zone” operations designed to avoid inciting a major U.S. military response. “Relationships between the United States and other great powers can be viewed as long-term competitions in which China and Russia both seek to shape regional and international norms in their favor, in part by undermining U.S. influence in their regions.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Cruising Toward Oblivion: Does the INF Treaty have a Future?” Douglas Barrie, IISS, 10.26.17: The author, a senior fellow for military aerospace at IISS, argues that the U.S. and NATO should try to sustain the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, despite Moscow’s hostility toward the agreement. Moscow has alleged various U.S. breaches of the INF, including with the Aegis Ashore system, while Washington has, in the author’s view, made “the more serious and sustained allegation”: that Moscow has developed, tested and now deployed the so-called SSC-8, “a dual-capable ground-launched cruise missile that is a clear contravention of the INF Treaty.” Despite the acrimony, U.S. and European leaders should try keep the agreement alive, not least because, after the fraying of a number of arms control arrangements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, “the security environment in Europe is arguably at its worst since the early 1980s.” In addition, the INF has removed a class of ground-launched nuclear delivery systems whose re-introduction would be further destabilizing. Were the U.S. to develop a Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and Russia to continue to deny any breach, it would provide Vladimir Putin with a “legitimate” reason to blame the U.S. for the collapse of the INF. To counter Russia’s moves, the U.S. and NATO have a range of conventional systems options, including sea and air-launched cruise missiles, and they could increase their focus on cruise missile defense. The author concludes: “Whilst pursuing such measures, and clearly linking them to the alleged Russian INF breach, the U.S. should also aim to engage talks with Moscow to try to identify whether there is any mutually acceptable approach to sustaining—and perhaps revising—the treaty.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia Wants It Both Ways on Chemical Weapons,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.27.17: The Washington Post’s editorial board argues that Russia cannot continue to be of two minds on the issue of chemical weapons. On Oct. 19 at the Valdai Club Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted that Russia has destroyed the entirety of its Cold War chemical weapons, only to veto the continuing the U.N. investigation into chemical weapons use in Syria five days later. The mandate for the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) expires Nov. 17 and should be renewed, argue the authors. On Oct. 26, a JIM panel declared that the Syrian government was responsible for the April sarin gas attack. The authors argue that if the investigation stalls due to Russia’s veto, no one may be held accountable for the attack. “Mr. Putin often expresses a desire for Russia’s views to be treated with respect, but what kind of respect is due if he favors a besieged dictator who is using chemical weapons?” The authors also note that while boasting at Valdai, Putin forgot some “inconvenient truths,” such as the fact that U.S. money helped to liquidate Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile. “Now comes a choice: to hide another such inconvenient truth and shield those who continue to use chemical weapons; or really to stand up for their elimination.”

Cyber security:

“Russia is Pushing to Control Cyberspace. We Should All Be Worried,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 10.24.17: The author, a veteran columnist, writes that the Kremlin, even as it faces allegations of meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, is engaged in a “worrisome” campaign to rewrite the rules for global cyberspace. The author points to a draft Russian proposal for a new “United Nations Convention on Cooperation in Combating Information Crimes” that includes more than 70 articles concerning, among other things, the collection of Internet traffic by authorities, “codes of conduct” for cyberspace, and “joint investigation” of malicious activity. “The Kremlin’s proposed convention would enhance the ability of Russia and other authoritarian nations to control communication within their countries, and to gain access to communications in other countries, according to several leading U.S. cyber experts,” the author writes. Still, the author notes that many U.S. experts believe that quiet confidence-building discussions with Moscow on cyber-matters could be useful, but that they should stop short of any formal treaty or partnership. “If the events of the past year have taught us anything, it’s that Russia views information as a decisive political weapon and wants to control this potential battle space.”

Elections interference:

“Will Manafort Sing?” Nicholas Kristof, The New York Times, 10.30.17: The author, a columnist for The New York Times, writes that former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort’s indictment may not prove collusion between the Trump team and Russia, but it is a step in that direction. The indictment, and the lengthy prison sentence it could spell, gives special counsel Robert Mueller “leverage to persuade Manafort to testify against others in exchange for leniency.” The case of George Papadopoulos, a former Trump campaign foreign policy adviser who pled guilty to lying to the FBI about a Russia contact, is particularly interesting in that it is a guilty plea regarding collusion. While U.S. President Donald Trump could pardon Manafort, Manafort could then still be prosecuted for state crimes. The author also wonders why Trump would have chosen someone “whose reputation in the political world was less about his political brilliance than about his ties to Russia and Ukraine” for his campaign chair. Although Trump tried to refocus attention on the uranium deal that occurred while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state, the author argues that the attempted parallel “is simply absurd.” The author notes that Trump may now be tempted to engage in riskier behavior regarding North Korea to rally Americans around the flag. Trump could also fire Mueller; however, that move “would trigger a Constitutional crisis” and “set in motion the complete unraveling of his presidency.”

“Why Clinton Camp's Funding of the Trump Dossier Matters. Yet More Evidence That Russia's Original Mission Was to Hobble the Winner of the Presidential Race,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 10.26.17: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, takes note of the revelation that Hillary Clinton’s campaign paid for the so-called Steele dossier—containing salacious and unsubstantiated claims about Donald Trump—and finds that it shows Moscow’s larger goal in interfering in the 2016 election was to undermine the victor, regardless of who it turned out to be. “Rarely have two political candidates been so worthy of each other in terms of cynicism as Clinton and Donald Trump. No wonder Russian President Vladimir Putin, another world-class cynic, dealt himself in,” the author observes. The highly-placed Kremlin sources cited in the Steele dossier would have had little incentive to leak classified information; rather, the author notes, they “had an excellent reason to talk, and especially to provide nonsensical information—such as that Dmitry Peskov, Putin's press secretary, and not anyone in Russia's intelligence community, was the keeper of a top-secret file on Trump.” This dovetails with recent revelations concerning Russia’s alleged influence operation on social media. “Now that the nature of Russian activity on social networks has come to light, it's likelier than ever that the goal of the whole exercise was to sow discord and instability in the U.S. Pushing Russian-generated kompromat on Trump to Clinton would have served that purpose brilliantly.” And this, the author observes, is a time-worn Russian tactic, one Moscow has also employed in Ukraine.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary. 

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“U.S.-Russia Economic Relations. Myths and Realities,” Vadim Grishin, CSIS, 10.24.17: The author, a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS, writes that even without the threat of new and continuing U.S. sanctions on Russia, the country must contend with an economic model that “exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of relations with the West.” The value of U.S.-Russia trade, now about $20 billion, has fallen back to 2005 levels, the author notes, and it’s likely that the new set of sanctions recently signed into law by Donald Trump will further hurt economic relations. But Russia’s existing trade model has long been obsolete, the author notes. “Imports are resource-oriented and reflect constraints of the Russian economic structure while five groups of goods—oil, metals, nuclear fuels, fertilizers, and fish—make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Russia. Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future,” the author writes. Oil, Russia's core export to the U.S. will inevitably decrease in the mid-term under any scenario. Overall U.S. exports to Russia are “unsustainable due to bilateral political tensions, the whims of commodity markets and changing domestic policies, and sanctions and counter-sanctions have created additional barriers, particularly in finance, banking, high-tech, energy and agro-business.” The author foresees three scenarios for future economic ties between Russia and the U.S. given the challenging political environment. One would involve “no peace, no war”: sanctions would be cursory and would cause a relatively slow decline in the economic relationship.” A best case scenario—and least likely, in the author’s view—assumes the realization of structural reforms in Russia in such a way that would adapt Russia's foreign policy to national economic needs and reduce confrontations with the West. The worse-case scenario would involve “the intensive and full-scale execution of current sanction legislation … which could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist policies.” The author concludes by arguing that stronger U.S.-Russia economic ties could help lead to political reconciliation.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Here is What I Saw at the Valdai Club Conference,” Anatol Lieven, The National Interest, 10.30.17: The author, a senior editor at The National Interest, writes that while this year’s Valdai Conference Club featured no major revelations, “it did raise some very interesting questions.” One question of note was on the quality of Western leadership, as the democratic institutions on which the West has built its leadership role “appear to be crumbling.” The conference yielded no news about Russia’s economic reforms; if they are even possible, they will have to wait until Russia’s next president in 2024, a transition that in and of itself will be a test for Russia’s governing system. Regarding Russia’s relations with the West, the conference discussion held nothing new. Europe see’s the “ball in Russia’s court” when it comes to the Ukraine conflict, while Moscow sees it in the West’s. “Putin expressed no optimism about the situation and he noted that the Ukrainian government was probably too weak and internally threatened to make a deal.” Putin made no strong statement regarding the Iran nuclear deal, but it appears that Russia is hoping the deal’s European parties take the lead in supporting it, creating division “in the Western camp, which Russian can observe from the sidelines.” Moscow still wants a cooperative partnership with Berlin “to maintain stability in Europe in accordance with their common interests.” As such, Russia is unlikely to take steps that Germany could perceive as threatening, like putting military pressure on the Baltic States. Putin noted that North Korea should not be backed into a corner, as it is a sovereign state. He also made detailed accusations against Washington for violating nuclear disarmament agreements; “Russian leadership is determined to maintain rough nuclear parity with the United States and respond to whatever it sees as violations of those agreements by the U.S. side.” Particularly noteworthy was the conference on Russian-Western relations, which mostly discussed other topics: “climate change, social inequality, technological change, genetic engineering, globalization, migration and national identity.” The author argues that, like the European elites of 1914 who went to war over geopolitical issues, we are also failing to see that “the real threats” to our world are actually coming from within.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia Has Grand Designs for the International Order,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.26.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russian foreign policy “has come full circle” since the fall of the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years ago, the Kremlin rejected a “superpower posture,” its new national interests unclear. NATO enlargement and conflicts on the periphery of the former Soviet Union quickly taught Russia some unpleasant lessons about its post-Soviet role. This ended Russia’s early favorable attitude toward the West. Moscow realized that nuclear weapons were the best safeguards for its vital interests. Later, following the start of the Ukraine crisis, a core principle of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy came down: “Western integration on terms acceptable to Russia” was no longer on the table. However, re-integration of former Soviet states was also no longer a viable option. “Suddenly, the Russian Federation saw both its Plan A and Plan B foreign policies collapse simultaneously. And there was no Plan C.” Now, the author argues, Moscow’s “new grand design” is beginning to show itself. Russia’s location in Eurasia gives it a 360 degree view of its vast neighborhood, along with a geopolitical powerhouse as a direct neighbor on either side, China to the east and the EU to the west. Moscow’s new foreign policy looks to maximize connectivity with as many partners as possible, while still keeping Russian interests foremost. While managing so many different partners will be difficult, it is not impossible; however, it will also require the establishment of “a new normal” between Russia and Europe.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“How Ukraine's Elites Are Holding the Line. The Vested Interests That Have Run Ukraine Throughout Its Independence are Winning as Russia and the West Continue Their Tug-Of-War,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 10.24.17: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that Ukraine may be entering a new “muddling-through” phase. The latest Ukraine report by Chatham House argues that Ukraine could muddle through under “normal conditions—i.e. an absence of war” and survive; however, in the present circumstances, “it will need greater political, patriotic and military resolve to stand even a chance.” Signs that Kiev is trying to “muddle-through” include: a watered down pension reform; a soft push on introducing a free market in land due to uncertain benefits; and the failure of privatization attempts due to little investor interest. “The fight on corruption has always been a token enterprise.” Additionally, Ukraine’s political elite is “strikingly unpopular,” and its poverty level remains higher than it was before 2014. The author argues that Ukraine’s political elite has “done far better than the country itself.”

“Partners for Life: Europe’s Unanswered ‘Eastern Question,’” Andrew Wilson, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10.27.17: The author, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, writes that the fifth summit of the Eastern Partnership could help transform Europe’s east. Created in 2008, the group has evolved with the geopolitical changes in the area, but “still falls short of a transformative program that would properly serve both the EU and reform-minded forces in partnership states.” While Russia’s resurgence and the rise of populism in Europe have halted long-term EU expansion plans, downgrading the Eastern Partnership would harm Europe’s overall security. Reforms in Ukraine, the largest and most prominent country of the partnership, need to consider the various “forces at work” within the country. The author recommends that the EU “stay on course” with the Eastern Partnership, frontloading beneficial policies and communicating the merits of those policies to the area more effectively.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“The Instability Game: Easing Tensions Between Russia and the West in Moldova,” Andrey Devyatkov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.26.17: The author, a foreign policy expert, writes that Moldova’s usual “political tug-of-war” has intensified due to next year’s parliamentary elections. Moldova is caught between Europe and the “Russian world,” and bears the historical markers of that location. Where some Moldovans see their Soviet past as a golden age, others see it as an era of repression. Today, “fear-mongering dominates the information sphere. This allows the country’s elite to legitimize the corrupt, oligarchic political system and to secure patronage from foreign powers.” The author argues that these geopolitical divisions are artificial, swapped out as needed depending on the circumstance. While “the fragile regional status quo” appears to be undisturbed for now, these divides could be exacerbated by international actors. The author recommends that the EU and Russia work to promote competition in Moldovan politics, or risk manipulation by the country’s politicians.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool,” Clifford Krauss, The New York Times, 10.29.17: The author, an energy reporter for the newspaper, writes that Russia is increasingly “wielding oil as a geopolitical tool,” but that this strategy poses risks given the political instability in some of the regions where it is investing, particularly in Venezuela. Through the state oil giant Rosneft, Russia is targeting regions where the U.S. has fallen out of favor or “power is up for grabs.” These efforts are also driven out of necessity, the author notes, “as American and European sanctions have forced Rosneft to find new partners and investments elsewhere.” In Venezuela, Russia is effectively taking China’s place as Venezuela’s principal banker. While the growing relationship between Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who faces fierce political opposition and an economic crisis, could expand Russia’s influence in America’s backyard, there are a host of risks. “Venezuela’s oil fields are aging and in disrepair. Oil service companies have been withdrawing after years of partial payments for their work,” the author notes. “Should there be a default and the Maduro government collapses, Russia and Rosneft could be left holding bad loans that a new government might not want to pay.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.