Russia Analytical Report, Oct. 15-22, 2018
This Week’s Highlights:
- The Center for the National Interest’s George Beebe wonders what lessons a modern-day Machiavelli might glean from the assassination scandals surrounding Russia and Saudi Arabia. Machiavelli in 2018, Beebe writes, would not object to state-sponsored assassination in principle, but would find that the high likelihood of exposure and the blowback following it are too high a price to pay, making gratuitous political killing not just a crime, but a mistake.
- The United States will get the blame for killing the INF treaty if it withdraws, Brookings senior fellow Steven Pifer argues. Even if the Pentagon were to build a missile to match Russia’s treaty-violating weapon, there is nowhere to put it, according to Pifer. An intermediate-range missile based in the U.S. can’t reach Russia, and it’s unlikely that NATO, Japan or South Korea would deploy it, Pifer writes.
- Russia’s emphasis on dual-capable weapons may be intended to strengthen deterrence, but it undermines it in practice, Olga Oliker, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS, writes. Rather than deterring the U.S., Oliker argues, this ambiguity has led U.S. policymakers to interpret Russian posturing and rhetoric as a lowered bar for the use of nuclear weapons in any kind of conflict.
- Nicolai N. Petro, a professor of political science, writes that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s push to dismantle the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church may or may not win him extra points at the March 2019 poll, but it has already exacerbated frictions with Russia, re-opened old confessional wounds in Ukraine and now threatens to divide Orthodox Christians worldwide. Jeffrey Mankoff, deputy director of CSIS’s Russia and Eurasia Program, notes that the decision by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople restores to Kiev jurisdiction over the canonical territories it controlled before 1686—some of which happen to be in modern-day Belarus and Lithuania.
- Russia’s trade, travel and exchanges with China may be up, but Russians are overwhelmingly still oriented toward Europe and the United States in their most basic cultural and historical narratives, Matthew Rojansky, director of the Kennan Institute, writes. These deeply felt links with Western civilization are an opening for Russia to re-engage with the Western-led international system, Rojansky argues.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
“Armed and Dangerous. When Dictators Get the Bomb,” Scott D. Sagan, Foreign Affairs, 10.15.18.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
“The Trump Administration Is Preparing a Major Mistake on the INF Treaty,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 10.19.18: The author, a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, writes: “Press reports indicate that National Security Adviser John Bolton wants the United States to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and that he will inform the Russians of this when he visits Moscow Oct. 22-23. … Russia’s failure to correct the violation gives justifiable grounds for leaving the treaty. But is it the smart thing to do now? … [T]he United States will get the blame for killing the treaty. … [T]he United States currently has no missile that it could quickly deploy to match the Russians. Even if the Pentagon were to build the missile, however, a big question remains: Where could the United States put it? An intermediate-range missile based in the United States cannot reach Russia … And it is unlikely that the United States could persuade NATO, Japan or South Korea to deploy it. … Washington should press allies in Europe and Asia to have leaders raise the need to correct the Russian violation directly with President Vladimir Putin. … [T]he U.S. military should take treaty-compliant steps now to offset the Russian violation. … [And] the intelligence community should prepare a presentation … regarding the Russian violation. … The INF Treaty likely has entered its final days. That’s unfortunate. The Trump administration should make one last push, with the help of allies, to get Moscow back into compliance. And, if that fails, it should have ready a presentation that will win the inevitable fight over who killed the treaty.”
“Trump's Withdrawal From Nuclear Treaty Hurts US Allies,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 10.22.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “President Donald Trump's decision to ditch the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia has clear advantages for both Trump and … Vladimir Putin. It is, however, a problem for countries in the middle—and for what remains of a treaty-based global order. … By the time Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev unexpectedly agreed to the trade-off ... the Soviet economy was faltering and Gorbachev was intent on ending the arms race with the U.S. ... The Soviet leadership was [also] spooked by the Pershing II missiles the U.S. had deployed in Germany … At the same time, anti-American sentiment rose in Europe … When he signed the treaty, … Reagan was both getting rid of the SS-20 threat and trying to assuage the European allies' uneasiness at being targets. … Trump's pullout from the treaty allows him to say he's doing what's best for the U.S. and its allies and forcefully countering the Russian cheating. It's politically useful for Trump to be tough on Russia, and if tearing up the INF treaty leads to a new arms race, Russia is the clear underdog. … Putin also benefits. … Russia no longer needs to hide its work on shorter-range missiles or their deployment, and it can describe it as a response to U.S. disrespect for fundamental international frameworks. … The real losers here are the countries that will be caught in the middle. … If European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are asked to deploy U.S. weapons aimed at Russia, this may cause new ruptures within the alliance … In Asia, too, U.S. allies may wonder about the advisability of challenging China … As things stand, countries caught in the middle see yet another reason to consider Trump as much of a loose cannon as Putin.”
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary.
Cyber security:
- No significant commentary.
Elections interference:
- No significant commentary.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Can a US-Russia Conflict Be Contained?” Matthew Rojansky, European Leadership Network, 10.17.18: The author, director of the Kennan Institute, writes: “The atmosphere surrounding Russia-U.S. ties even has attributes of a 1950’s-style Red Scare on one side and a Stalinist hunt for foreign agents and saboteurs on the other. … In this reflexive hostility, Putin does not fully represent his 145 million Russian citizens. Trade, travel and exchanges with China may be up, but Russians are overwhelmingly still oriented toward Europe and the United States in their most basic cultural and historical narratives. These deeply felt links with Western civilization are an opening for Russia to re-engage with the Western-led international system … Consider a handful of such opportunities, which might offer a way forward. Firstly … Trump was … right to call for renewed arms control negotiations to put a stop to the current arms race. … Secondly … opportunities to engage the private sector and technical experts from both countries in solving shared problems have been too often overlooked. For example, Russian and U.S. negotiators have so far tip-toed around vital but difficult topics like setting rules for interstate cyber conflict, countering the rise of radicalization via cyberspace and increasing transparency and accountability around advanced biotechnology. … The window for getting U.S.-Russia relations back on track is closing before our eyes, and missing it may be the definitive end to the relative peace and prosperity of the post-Cold War era.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Machiavellian Lessons From the Saudi and Russian Assassination Debacles. Gratuitous political killing is not just a crime—it is a mistake,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 10.20.18: The author, director of the Center for the National Interest’s intelligence program, writes: “Whether or not Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the chemical attack on Sergey Skripal or Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman sent a hit-squad to assassinate Jamal Khashoggi, these rulers clearly share [Niccolo] Machiavelli’s view of politics … But the world has changed in other ways … that have profound implications for today’s “princes” … What advice might a twenty-first century Machiavellian derive from the headline-grabbing assassination debacles surrounding Russia and Saudi Arabia? … [T]he modern Machiavellian would not reject the concept of state-sponsored assassination in principle. … Nonetheless, covert operations in the age of sophisticated surveillance systems and social media are much harder to pull off … [Additionally,] public tolerance for killing civilians is lower than in the past … When such operations are exposed, denying them and making counter-accusations only exacerbates your problems. … Finally, in a globalized business and information environment, tactical operations can have damaging strategic implications. … Even in the twenty-first century, there are times when assassinations will be deemed necessary for acquiring and preserving power and safeguarding security. The price to pay for such operations has grown steeper and less avoidable, however. … {T]he Machiavelli of 2018 might say gratuitous political killing is worse than a crime—it is a mistake.”
“Between a Cold War Ally and an Indo-Pacific Partner: India’s US-Russia Balancing Act,” Tanvi Madan, War on the Rocks, 10.16.18: The author, director of The India Project and at the Brookings Institution, writes: “It feels like déjà vu all over again. Reports of an Indian arms deal with Russia. Concerns in the United States about said deal, with threats about punitive measures and warnings about implications for U.S.-India relations. Voices in India insisting that the government go through with the deal and not succumb to American pressure. … The deal in question is India’s contract to purchase five Russian S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile systems … The punitive measures would result from the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). … American policymakers … should recognize that the India-Russia relationship already has limits. Publicly trying to force Delhi to limit that partnership … might have the unintended consequence of hampering the U.S.-India relationship instead. … The United States should not make the mistake it did during the Cold War. Its heavy-handed approach then is partly responsible for India’s defense dependence on Russia today. … The objective for the United States and India is … to get past their differences on Russia to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific. This will require defusing the CAATSA issue by striking a deal. It will also mean ensuring that similar obstacles do not arise in the future by better assessing and discussing how planned actions vis-à-vis Russia will affect their other interests ahead of time—and not after the fact.”
“Living in a Crumbling World,” Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov and Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Discussion Club, October 2018: The authors, directors at the Valdai Discussion Club, write: “On the one hand, the international situation today has nothing in common with the world of 1918. Humanity has learned to avoid major wars and their attendant horrors. On the other hand, the current situation in the world paradoxically resembles that of a century ago. The rise of nationalism … and the resurgence of an aggressive form of economic behavior in the spirit of neo-mercantilism invariably calls to mind the atmosphere that prevailed in Europe and the world at the beginning of the last century. … The disbelief in the possibility of a major war prompts leaders to take peace for granted and to engage in frivolous and risk-laden behaviors. At the same time, this makes it less likely that they will repeat the scenario … in which leaders used world war as a way to cut the Gordian Knot of irreconcilable animosities. The present world, therefore, will not collapse as the European world did during the first half of the 20th century. Instead, it will slowly but surely crumble and deform as peoples and states push and pull it to satisfy their own interests.”
China:
“The Faultline in US Politics Caused by Russia and China,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 10.18.18: The author, the Washington columnist and commentator for the news outlet, writes: “America’s two chief rivals, Russia and China, are gnawing at the soul of American politics. Each country is reviled by one party—China by Donald Trump’s Republicans; Russia by the Democrats. Both parties are driven by domestic one-upmanship. The Democrats believe Mr. Trump colluded with Russia to win the presidency. Mr. Trump claims China tried to hack the 2016 election in Hillary Clinton’s favor. … The upshot is that the U.S. is losing its grip on the national interest. This poses a deep problem for America’s allies—and a windfall for its rivals. … America is sleep walking into a world of radical geopolitical uncertainty. It urgently needs a doctrine. Mr. Trump has one thing right. China, more than Russia, poses a bigger strategic threat. But he is clueless about how to deal with it. Instead of seeking consensus on how to navigate a multipolar world, U.S. politics uses China and Russia as punch bags to settle domestic scores.”
“Why a US-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control,” Caitlin Talmadge, Foreign Affairs, 10.15.18.
Ukraine:
“Russian-Ukrainian Church Turmoil Driven by Political Ambitions,” Nicolai N. Petro, Russia Matters, 10.19.18: The author, a professor of political science, writes: “Petro Poroshenko has set himself the ambitious task of dismantling the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church … His initiative may or may not win him extra points at the March 2019 poll, but it has already exacerbated frictions with Russia, re-opened old confessional wounds in Ukraine and now threatens to divide Orthodox Christians worldwide. … [W]hat does the ecumenical patriarch [Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople who de facto delegitimized the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is closely tied to its Russian counterpart] gain from this alliance? … [A] chance to prove his relevance to the Orthodox world. … Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that ‘Russia will defend the interests of the Orthodox’ in Ukraine if developments there ‘take the course of illegal activities.’ While Peskov insisted that such a defense would be diplomatic and political in nature, such language has made Ukrainians understandably nervous … The key political problem for Kiev … will be what to do if violence erupts during attempts to transfer church property … Poroshenko and the patriarchs have unleashed a process that will add considerably to the overall messiness of Ukrainian politics, and leave much bitterness in people’s hearts, long after the politicians and patriarchs are gone.”
“The Orthodox Schism in the Shadow of Empire,” Jeffrey Mankoff, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10.19.18: The author, deputy director and senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes: “On Oct. 15, the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow announced that that it was breaking communion with the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarchate, which had earlier announced that it would recognize the autocephaly (independence) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church … For Ukraine, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I’s decision is an important step toward asserting an identity independent of Russia … The annulment restores to Kiev jurisdiction over the canonical territories it controlled before 1686—some of which happen to be in modern-day Belarus and Lithuania.”
“Here's What's Really Going on With the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Russia,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 10.21.18: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes: “For President Vladimir Putin, major defections from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate would represent one of the clearest rejections of his view that Ukrainian and Russians form a single people and civilization … On the other hand, if President Poroshenko’s government begins to use administrative pressures to compel priests and parishes to break their ecclesiastical ties to Moscow, this could prove politically destabilizing both in Ukraine and complicate its relations with the West.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Russian Pensions and the Risk of War,” Leon Aron, Wall Street Journal, 10.17.18: The author, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, writes: “In the streets of more than 80 Russian cities, thousands of men and women have turned out for antigovernment rallies in the past few months. The demonstrators are protesting Mr. Putin's pension law … For millions of Russians, an extra five years of work is a hard blow. At $592 a month, the average Russian salary is puny. That's why Russia today can have near-full employment, while 14% of the population, or 20 million Russians, are in poverty, as per official statistics. … Life expectancy for Russian men is under 67, not even two full years past the new, higher-than-ever retirement age. Many men fear they'll literally be worked to death. … The protests exposed a fissure in what might be called Mr. Putin's contract with the Russian people: You stay out of politics and I'll give you stability. … Mr. Putin's approval ratings … have been steadily sliding, from 79% in May, before the reform was announced, to 67% in September. … Mr. Putin has been riding the tiger of patriotic fervor, but the beast is difficult to dismount and it demands fresh meat … [A]s pension reform threatens Mr. Putin's support, it might be feeding time again. The obvious targets for engineering another Crimea or Ukraine are Narva and Latgale, the heavily Russian-speaking enclaves in Estonia and Latvia, respectively.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.
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