5 Ideas to Explore

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded Ukraine hand over full control of the eastern Donetsk region as a condition for ending the war, during a 2-hour call with his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump on Oct. 16,according to two senior officials cited by Michael Birnbaum of the Washington Post.¹ Birnbaum also reported that Putin indicated willingness to abandon claims on portions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for Donetsk, a small concession compared to earlier demands, which some White House officials viewed as progress. Trump did not publicly comment on Putin’s demand, but in a high-tension meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky on Oct. 17, the U.S. leader urged his Ukrainian counterpart to accept Putin’s terms, reportedly warning him that Putin had vowed to “destroy” Ukraine if Zelensky did not agree to his terms, according to Christopher Miller, Max Seddon, Henry Foy, and Amy Mackinnon of the Financial Times. At one point Trump—who was “cursing all the time” tossed aside maps of the front line Zelensky—who refuses to yield more territory without fight—brought to the meeting. Asked after the meeting whether was concerned that Putin was stringing him along, Trump said he was not concerned, according to AP and WP’s Birnbaum. “I’ve been played all my life by the best of them, and I came out really well,” he said, adding it was “all right” if it took a little time. “But I think that I’m pretty good at this stuff,” he added. Trump’s acknowledgement of being played indicates that he has clearly arrived at a more realistic assessment of Putin who had repeatedly heaped praise on Trump and Trump’s views.
2. If Trump’s recent repeated claims that he is considering supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles to Zelenskyy were meant to reignite Putin’s interest in substantive discussions of a Russian-Ukrainian peace deal, then he can congratulate himself. The Russian leader not only scrambled to talk to his U.S. counterpart one day before the latter was to host Zelenskyy on Oct. 17, but he also agreed to a U.S.-Russian summit to be hosted by Viktor Orban in two weeks. As for Zelenskyy’s hopes to convince Trump to permit supplies of these U.S.-made long-range cruise missiles during their meeting, they appeared to be all but dead in the water even before the bilateral. Trump appeared noncommittal about providing Tomahawks on Oct. 16, according to the Kyiv Independent. Trump then reaffirmed his recent cooling toward the idea of supplying these cruise missiles to Kyiv when hosting Zelenskyy on Oct. 17. “Tomahawks are very dangerous weapons,” Trump said. “Hopefully, we will be able to end the war without thinking about Tomahawks,” he said, according to FT. Meanwhile, George Beebeof Responsible Statecraft has warned that supplying Tomahawks to Ukraine risks repeating failed pressure tactics and ignores Russia’s fundamental security concerns, making compromise less likely. In contrast, The Wall Street Journal editorial board argues that sending Tomahawks would deter Russian aggression and show American resolve. Marc Thiessen of the Washington Post also supports sending Tomahawks to impose crushing costs on Russia, asserting it would push Putin to negotiate and that fears of escalation are overblown. Meanwhile, Sam Skove in Foreign Policy contends that Ukraine’s most pressing battlefield need is more drones, not long-range Tomahawk missiles.
3. In his latest essay Thomas Graham explains why, in his view, containment is inadequate to the current Russian challenge. The structural conditions that underpinned containment’s success no longer exist: the world is no longer bipolar, Russia no longer lies at the center of U.S. policy, and the U.S. model is no longer obviously superior to the alternatives, Graham explains. Graham argues that the United States should seek to harness Russian power and ambition to U.S. purpose rather than to defeat Russia. To attain these goals, Graham proposes a policy of “competitive coexistence,” grounded in “five principles,” including that the U.S. “must accept Russia as it is,” “accept that Russia has legitimate national interests,” “recognize that Russian weakness can prove as dangerous as Russian strength,” “harness Russian power and ambition… to American purposes,” and “engage third parties… where Russia and the United States are not the dominant powers.”
4. The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus demonstrates both change and continuity in Russian thinking on escalation management, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Decker Eveleth, and Paul Schwartz argue in their CNA report. They find that joint military exercises, force deployments, and readiness demonstrations, which have been carried out as part of this deployment, are consistent with Russia’s pre-2022 war doctrine. At the same time, the authors highlight a key departure: placing nuclear weapons in Belarus marks a “marked departure” from Russia’s pre-war posture as it had long opposed NATO nuclear sharing, and now treats “attacks on Belarus [as] attacks on Russia itself. “They argue this forward deployment “alters the balance in Eastern Europe”—giving Russia “very little reaction time if [these weapons] are launched preemptively,” and increasing the likelihood of escalatory responses and NSNW demonstrations in future crises. Rosa-Hernandez, Eveleth, and Schwartz conclude that “Russia is embracing new forms of escalation management not seen since the Cold War,” and that “US and NATO strategists… should immediately take the implications… into consideration” and closely monitor evolving Russian doctrine.
5. A Polish judge ordered the release of Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a 45-year-old Ukrainian accused of involvement in the Sept. 2022 Nord Stream sabotage, arguing that Ukraine was justified to order the sabotage the pipeline, Karolina Jeznach and Bojan Pancevski reported in Wall Street Journal. Judge Dariusz Lubowski ruled that the evidence presented by German authorities was insufficient. He said the attack on the pipeline was a legitimate operation considering that it was undertaken in wartime as Ukraine sought to defend itself against Russia. "The act of blowing up [the Nord Stream pipeline] is an act of sabotage, but not during the times of war and if it is the property of an aggressor," Judge Lubowski said, according to WSJ. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk did not disagree with the judge on whether the destruction of Nord Stream 2 was justified. Tusk was quoted by WSJ as saying that “The problem with North Stream 2 is not that it was blown up. The problem is that it was built.” German prosecutors maintain the attack was criminal, alleging Zhuravlev, a deep-sea diver, helped plant explosives. A German investigator called the ruling “shameful.” Another suspect’s extradition from Italy was delayed after procedural errors.

U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant developments.
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Russia's latest big Ukraine offensive gains next to nothing, again," The Economist, 10.17.25.

• The Economist writes, “In May, Russia launched an enormous offensive aimed at breaking Ukrainian lines… however, our calculations suggest it has seized just 0.4% of Ukrainian land.”
• “Russian forces have achieved no major objectives, with key cities such as Pokrovsk holding the invaders at bay… despite relentless attacks…the offensive has come at an enormous cost: our meta-estimate suggests over 100,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war this year,” according to The Economist.
• Their analysis finds, “By October 13th, total Russian casualties had risen by almost 60%, to 984,000–1,438,000, including 190,000–480,000 dead,” with “no commensurate gain in territory.”
• “No large city has changed hands… at the pace of the past 30 days, seizing what remains of the four regions Mr. Putin already claims… would take until June 2030. (For Russia to occupy all of Ukraine would require a further 103 years),” The Economist observes.
• The Economist notes, “Even if the true [Ukrainian] number is twice the tally, the figures would imply a ratio this year of roughly five Russian soldiers killed for every Ukrainian,” and “manpower may soon become a more serious constraint for Russia than for Ukraine.”
• On equipment, “Oryx… has confirmed the loss of 12,541 Russian tanks and armored fighting vehicles; 2,674 artillery and missile systems; 166 aircraft; and 164 helicopters… All these numbers are lower bounds,” The Economist reports.
• They conclude, “If Western backing for Ukraine holds, the war may well grind on at enormous cost… But Russia’s ability to fight on at today’s pace may also be coming to an end. And if Mr. Putin pushes on regardless… a sudden collapse may become more likely in the Russian war economy than in Ukraine’s defensive lines.”

"Ukraine’s most prestigious military units are run like businesses"—The Economist, 10.14.25.

• The Economist reports that Ukraine’s famous military corps—Azov, the Third Assault, and Khartiia—“are examples of Ukraine’s extraordinary capacity for self-organization, and of how business skills can be applied to the armed forces.”
• Originally small local units, they expanded rapidly “relying mostly on their own recruitment drives and fundraising,” and now each boasts over 20,000 men, taking on “full-scale corps” status.
• Vsevolod Kozhemyako, founder of Khartiia and owner of a major agribusiness, says these units avoid “using people like animals. Our men are involved in planning, they understand what they’re doing, they’re part of the mission 100%.” Promotions are handled by professional HR departments, not through “drinking buddies.”
• Commanders are judged with business-like “key performance indicators—‘price per kill’ and ‘cost per frontline day’”—and Kozhemyako’s next project is “the introduction of enterprise resource planning software.”
• Branding and marketing are central. “Employing sizeable marketing and creative teams, they are hyperactive on YouTube and across social media.” Campaigns range from “Top Gun” style to “jokiness” and reassurance, reflecting the changing mood of war. The Third Assault’s media chief boasts, “Applications topped 200 per day.”
• Support for wounded soldiers and families is robust: “They met me off the bus, they found the best hospital for me and the best prosthetic, and they’re on the phone 24/7,” says one Azov lieutenant.
• The corps’ advertising, “very much like political ads,” now emphasizes military service “as a way of life,” with billboards urging recruits to “Grow in Khartiia,” or showing soldiers “cuddle babies and throw sticks for dogs, tagline ‘We’re Here to Live.’”
• With “cult status among the public,” these units could “become launchpads for post-war political careers.” The Economist concludes: “It is surely no accident.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Savage drone warfare engulfs Ukraine’s front line," The Economist, 10.19.25.
• "War in The Air: Russia strikes back at Ukrainian infrastructure, with high costs for both Ukraine and Europe," Re: Russia, 10.13.25.
• "Russia bleeds troops for microscopic frontline gains,” Veronika Melkozerova, Politico, 10.13.25.

Military aid to Ukraine 

"Trump risks going full Biden by giving Tomahawks to Ukraine," George Beebe, Responsible Statecraft, 10.16.25.

• George Beebe writes, “A much more important question has been all but ignored: What is this increased pressure on Russia intended to achieve?” suggesting the short answer—forcing Russia to negotiate—“obscures the fact that Russia has already been negotiating with the United States over what it regards as the root causes of the war.”
• Beebe recounts that “the Russians claim that at the Alaska summit, Trump and President Putin reached significant understandings...Putin showed flexibility by dropping Russia’s insistence on Ukrainian withdrawal from Kherson and Zaporizhia, and… Russia was ready to address ways to ensure Ukraine’s security.”
• He argues that “two possibilities come to mind, each rooted in crossed signals,” the first being U.S.-Europe insistence on a “European ‘reassurance force’” in Ukraine, when “for the Russians, there is an important distinction between a neutral peacekeeping operation...and a deterrence force aimed at countering the Russian military.”
• Beebe says another crossed signal “very likely involved the question of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations,” where “Putin may well have indicated a willingness to negotiate… even to meet with Zelenskyy,” but the “important question of sequencing was not addressed.”
• Beebe describes it as “profound irony” that Trump now considers a “Biden strategy of maximizing pressure on Russia to force Moscow’s capitulation, an approach he had heretofore consistently criticized,” and warns “that approach failed because it was based on a fundamentally flawed assumption.”
• He writes, “Putin has always viewed this war as a security imperative, designed to prevent the NATO alliance from ensconcing its forces in Ukraine and threatening Russia’s heartland. He will not end the invasion until he at a minimum achieves Russia’s key security objectives.”
• Beebe concludes, “The path toward a compromise that addresses core Russian concerns while still ensuring Ukraine has an effective, Western-aided self-defense capability is still open, at least for now… The result could be a framework agreement that—not unlike the Gaza deal—still requires further negotiation but puts the war in Ukraine on a clear path toward a stable settlement.”

"Trump's Gaza Lessons for Ukraine," Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 10.16.25.

• The Wall Street Journal argues that President Trump restored U.S. deterrence “against adversaries in the Middle East, Russia and China,” and “mission accomplished against Iran and its proxies.”
• “Maximum pressure on adversaries…it worked” in Gaza, the Journal claims, but raises “the mystery” of why Trump “has for so long refused to show the same strength toward Mr. Putin.”
• The editorial criticizes “unilateral concessions—listening sympathetically to the Russian dictator’s catalogue of imperialist grievances—which hasn’t worked,” according to the Wall Street Journal.
• It stresses that “the U.S. will be weaker and more ensnared…if its ally loses the fight,” adding that the consequences go well beyond Ukraine and would hurt any U.S. bargaining with Xi Jinping.
• Trump, the editorial observes, “has been considering long-range weapons for Ukraine,” and quoted Trump: “Look, if this war is not gonna get settled I may send them Tomahawks.”
• Tomahawks would allow Ukraine to strike deep in Russia, showing “Putin that he won’t have a homeland sanctuary,” and would signal to Europe to supply their own long-range missiles, according to the Wall Street Journal.
• The Journal notes some in Trump’s camp, including “isolationists” in the White House and Pentagon, say Ukraine is losing, but argues “Kyiv is holding the line despite the combined arms and support of Russia, China, and Iran.”
• It criticizes the Biden administration for its slowness to arm Ukraine, calling out the delay with MiG jets and the F-16 program as examples of missed opportunities, according to the Wall Street Journal.
• Warnings about escalation (citing Iran and now Ukraine) are called overblown; “the bigger risk of war is from inaction,” and “sometimes Tomahawks are a force for peace,” according to the Wall Street Journal.

"Putin bluffed Biden. It won't work on Trump," Marc A. Thiessen, Washington Post, 10.17.25.

• Marc A. Thiessen writes, “President Donald Trump struck a Middle East deal by following a simple strategy: Do the opposite of what Joe Biden did. The same approach will help him bring peace to Ukraine.”
• Thiessen argues Trump succeeded where Biden failed by replacing “‘withhold, restrain and appease’ with a one of ‘arm, unleash and obliterate,’” and by giving Israel the weaponry and freedom to carry out decisive offensives.
• He states, “Trump did not persuade Hamas to accept his peace plan. He used a combination of military, financial and diplomatic pressure to corner Hamas, leaving it with no choice but to release the hostages and agree to disarm.”
• Thiessen claims, “That is precisely the road map Trump should follow to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his war on Ukraine… Trump should sell Ukraine Tomahawk cruise missiles that will allow Kyiv to strike deep into Russia.”
• He dismisses Putin’s escalation warnings, writing, “Putin claims giving Ukraine cruise missiles would be a ‘new stage of escalation.’ That’s absurd. Putin has fired more 2,400 cruise missiles into Ukraine,” while “giving Ukraine the ability to respond with Tomahawks would not be escalation. It would be a proportional response to Putin's escalation.”
• Thiessen insists Tomahawks would “be a game changer that could inflict economic and military devastation on Russia and give Putin no choice but to sue for peace,” suggesting Ukraine could “take out the massive Alabuga drone factory,” air bases, the Kerch-Strait bridge, and “Russia’s oil and natural gas production facilities.”
• He concludes, “In the Middle East, Trump brokered peace by reversing Biden’s feckless policies and imposing devastating costs in Iran and its terrorist proxy Hamas. He can do the same in Ukraine with one simple step: Send the Tomahawks to Ukraine.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

•  "Trump Says He May Give Tomahawks to Ukraine. Is He Bluffing?" Luke Broadwater, Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 10.14.25.
• "Ukraine Needs More Drones," Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 10.16.25.
• "Ukraine’s poorly timed heave in Washington,” Jamie Dettmer, Politico, 10.20.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"On Russian assets, Europe fights with one hand tied behind its back," Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 10.19.25.

• Sandbu writes that the EU’s proposed “reparation loan” to Ukraine, funded using cash from sanctioned Russian assets via Euroclear, is “full of contradictions”—most notably, “the proposal does not actually touch Russia’s assets… only an EU private financial institution (Euroclear) that will be strong-armed here.”
• He warns, “any new burden will fall only on European taxpayers. If Russia never pays reparations, the EU forgives Ukraine’s loan but still has to shoulder its own obligation.”
• “There is no good financial reason beyond accounting,” Sandbu argues, suggesting leaders use the scheme “to show Russia that Europe stands behind Ukraine,” but warning “the contortions show Putin that Europeans are finding it ever harder to pay up.”
• Sandbu points out the plan “sets a financial clock ticking alongside the uncertainty on the battlefield,” as “even €140 billion does not last that long… so the plan sets a financial clock ticking.”
• He concludes, “by raising the direct financial cost of its usual timidity in the future, Europe may just be buying itself a seat at the table.”

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Putin demanded Ukraine surrender key territory in call with Trump,” Michael Birnbaum, Washington Post, 10.19.25.

• Birnbaum reported that “Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call this past week [October 16] with President Donald Trump demanded that Kyiv surrender full control of Donetsk, a strategically vital region in eastern Ukraine, as a condition for ending the war, said two senior officials familiar with the conversation.”
• “Trump has not publicly commented on Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk… Trump did not endorse the Russian request in his public statement Friday after a high-stakes West Wing meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He plans to meet Putin in Hungary in the coming weeks to continue discussions about how to end the war.”
• “It is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL! Enough blood has been shed, with property lines being defined by War and Guts. They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” Trump wrote on social media Friday after the meeting with Zelenskyy.
• “In the call between Trump and Putin, the Russian leader suggested he would be willing surrender parts of two other regions of Ukraine he has partly conquered, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, in exchange for full control of Donetsk, the officials said. That is slightly less of a sweeping territorial claim than he made in August at a summit between Trump and Putin in Anchorage. Some White House officials portrayed that as progress, according to one of the two senior officials, who was briefed on the Putin call.”
• “Ukrainians had hoped to walk out of the Friday meeting with long-range Tomahawk missiles but exited empty-handed.”
• “The officials said that Trump envoy Steve Witkoff pressed the Ukrainian delegation about handing over Donetsk during the meeting Friday, noting that the region is mostly Russian-speaking, a frequent Kremlin talking point that Ukrainian and European officials view as sympathetic to Russia’s demands.”
• Asked Friday whether Putin was trying to buy more time, Trump said he was not concerned. “I’ve been played all my life by the best of them, and I came out really well,” he said, adding it was “all right” if it took a little time. “But I think that I’m pretty good at this stuff.” This statement by Trump represents a clearly more realistic assessment of Putin by Trump.

"Donald Trump urged Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accept Putin’s terms or be ‘destroyed’ by Russia," Christopher Miller, Max Seddon, Henry Foy, Amy Mackinnon, Financial Times, 10.19.25.

• Miller, Seddon, Foy, and Mackinnon report that in a “volatile” White House meeting, Trump “urged Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accept Russia’s terms for ending its war… warning that Vladimir Putin had said he would ‘destroy’ Ukraine if it did not agree.”
• They report that the Oct. 17 meeting between the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents descended many times into a “shouting match,” with Trump “cursing all the time,” people familiar with the matter said. They added that the U.S. president tossed aside maps of the front line in Ukraine, insisted Zelenskyy surrender the entire Donbas region to Putin, and repeatedly echoed talking points the Russian leader had made in their call a day earlier.
• According to one official, Trump insisted Zelenskyy surrender “the entire Donbas region” to Putin, echoing Kremlin talking points and telling Zelenskyy, “If [Putin] wants it, he will destroy you.”
• The meeting dashed European hopes Trump might increase support for Kyiv, as he declined to provide Tomahawk missiles and repeated Putin’s arguments, later saying Russia’s economy is “doing great.”
• Putin’s new offer, according to the FT, would have Ukraine “surrender the parts of the eastern Donbas region under its control in exchange for some small areas of the two southern front-line regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia,” a deal Ukrainian officials called a “non-starter.”
• “Trump told Fox News on Sunday that he was confident about securing an end to the conflict, and added that Putin was “going to take something, he’s won certain property”… Putin made a new offer to Trump on Thursday under which Ukraine would surrender the parts of the eastern Donbas region under its control in exchange for some small areas of the two southern front-line regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.”
  • “The Russian proposal marks a small concession from that made during Putin’s last meeting with Trump in Alaska in August, where he said he would agree to freeze the line of contact elsewhere on the front line if Ukraine surrendered the Donbas.”

"Trump is not chickening out. His Tomahawk diplomacy made Putin blink." Editorial Board, Washington Post, 10.18.25.

• The WP Editorial Board writes, "Tomahawk missiles were the talk of Washington this week… But Trump seemed to back off on Thursday after a two-and-a-half-hour phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin."
• They note, "Trump critics assumed the worst… This misunderstands both Trump’s tactics and what kind of peace agreement he is trying to hammer out."
• "Indeed, these threats had a clear effect: Putin initiated Thursday’s call. And Trump said afterward that he raised the specter of the missiles: 'I did actually say, "Would you mind if I gave a couple thousand Tomahawks to your opposition?" He didn't like the idea.'"
• According to the Editorial Board, "The Tomahawks are a means of amplifying a pressure campaign that is well underway. Ukraine’s recent string of successful strikes deep inside Russian territory relied on homegrown drones and missiles but would not have been so effective without significant help from the United States."
• They argue, "The idea that Trump is easily swayed by Putin, let alone manipulated or controlled by him, does not hold water. New reporting… suggests Putin badly misplayed his hand at their Alaska meeting… Trump 'raised his voice several times' and threatened to walk out."
• "The point of all this pressure is not to deliver a knockout blow to Russia but to force Putin to the negotiating table to hammer out a deal… The outlines of a final agreement remain the same as they were two months ago: The war would freeze more or less along current battle lines, with Russia retaining de facto control over its ill-gotten gains while Ukraine receives robust security guarantees from the West."
• They conclude, "Meanwhile, the Tomahawks remain an option… Trump tends to talk sweetly ahead of high-stakes summits… Yet America’s leverage over Russia remains—and Trump’s willingness to use that power has been underestimated before."

"Putin Woos Trump With Honeyed Words," Nataliya Vasilyeva and Anton Troianovski, New York Times, 10.18.25.

• Vasilyeva and Troianovski report that after Thursday’s phone call with President Vladimir V. Putin, President Trump “appeared to express doubts about supplying Ukraine with more powerful weapons,” as the Kremlin “had initiated the call… a telling acknowledgment of a Russian priority as important as any battlefield in Ukraine: appeasing Mr. Trump.”
• They write, “Mr. Putin has invested dozens of hours into flattering Mr. Trump, dangling the prospect of Russian-American business deals and sending the message that Russia is open to talks to end its invasion.”
• “The tactic has helped Mr. Putin head off repeated deadlines and sanction threats by the American president without curtailing Russia’s war effort,” note Vasilyeva and Troianovski.
• They recount, “In June… Mr. Putin called Mr. Trump to wish him a happy birthday; Mr. Trump said Mr. Putin had acted ‘very nicely,’ and the sanctions never appeared.”
• According to the Kremlin, Putin’s first thought in the latest call “was to congratulate Trump on such a success” after the Gaza cease-fire and before Zelenskyy’s White House visit.
• Vasilyeva and Troianovski note, “Thursday’s call… was Mr. Putin’s eighth phone conversation with the American leader this year. He has held five hours long, in-person meetings with Mr. [Steve] Witkoff,” Trump’s envoy.
• They quote Alexander Gabuev: “Putin hasn’t wasted any time in learning how to massage Trump’s ego,” arguing that even a short pause in U.S. aid to Ukraine “is already a good investment” for the Kremlin as the Budapest summit is prepared.

"Trump keeps getting played by Putin. Will Budapest be different?" Max Boot, Washington Post, 10.20.25. In fact, Trump acknowledged that Putin might be "playing for time," but said he thinks he's serious about getting a deal, Axios reported. "I've been played all my life by the best of them, and I came out really well," Trump said, referring to the idea Putin might be bluffing. This statement by Trump represents a clearly more realistic assessment of Putin by Trump.

• Boot argues that “Trump keeps getting played by Putin,” noting that after threatening to send Tomahawks to Ukraine, Trump backed down following a call with Putin and now plans “another meeting in Budapest.”
• He observes that Trump often “echoes Kremlin talking points,” and in his meeting with Zelenskyy “urged the Ukrainian president to accept Putin’s terms or risk destruction,” mirroring “Putin’s own narrative.”
• Boot says, “Putin’s tactics are working: He flatters Trump, dangles the prospect of deals, and drags out negotiations while continuing to pummel Ukraine on the battlefield.”
• He warns that Trump’s unpredictability and “appetite for face-to-face summits may give Putin more leverage than he’d have with a coherent U.S. strategy.” Boot concludes, “Unless Trump fundamentally changes course, Budapest may be just another episode in which Putin walks away with what he wants—at Ukraine’s expense.”

“How Vladimir Putin’s history rant in Alaska nudged Donald Trump closer to Ukraine," Christopher Miller, Henry Foy, Max Seddon, Amy Mackinnon, Financial Times, 10.17.25.

• Miller, Foy, Seddon, and Mackinnon report that at the Alaska summit Trump was “willing to recognize Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and push Ukraine to pull back from some frontline positions in the Donbas,” but Putin rejected the deal, demanding regime change in Kyiv and an end to Western backing for Ukraine.
• They note that Trump’s offer “was a non-starter” for Putin, who insisted on Ukraine’s capitulation and then delivered “a rambling historical discursion;” Trump grew exasperated, “raised his voice several times,” threatened to walk out, and ultimately “cut the meeting short and cancelled a planned lunch.”
• The FT writes that, following the Alaska meeting, “Trump’s administration has allowed European allies to purchase arms from U.S. stockpiles for Ukraine, helped guide strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, and has threatened Putin with selling Kyiv long-range missiles able to hit Moscow.”
• They note the U.S. shift is “incomplete—Washington has yet to act on its threats to sanction Russia’s energy exports—perhaps to keep space for Trump as a potential peace broker. But the thrust of policy has gone in one direction: compelling Putin to return to the negotiating table.”
• A senior European official tells the FT, “With Trump it is a constant game of tug of war… you help get him to a place where he sees that Putin is a problem, and then he shifts back towards Putin’s position. So you have to talk again. It’s like that, over and over.”

"Russia's Weakness Is Trump's Opportunity," Rahm Emanuel, Wall Street Journal, 10.17.25.

• Rahm Emanuel argues, “Mr. Putin is more vulnerable today than at any point in his three decades on the global stage,” and says Trump’s reluctance to exploit this weakness raises the question whether it’s “his sixth sense for using leverage [that] is failing him, or some strange fondness for the Russian president's strongman persona.”
• Emanuel writes that, despite Trump’s claim that Zelenskyy “doesn’t have the cards,” “from nearly every angle and measure, it’s Russia whose hand is weak.”
• He asserts, “About a million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded,” calling the Red Army “enfeebled,” and notes, “Moscow depends on North Korean soldiers, Arab mercenaries and Iranian technology—not exactly the quality of a global superpower.”
• Emanuel contends Russia’s military intelligence “entirely misjudged Ukraine’s ability to defend itself,” and says “the Wagner Group’s strength as a power in Africa [is] now in shambles,” adding the aborted mutiny showed “its potential to threaten the Russian government.”
• He claims, “Nearly four years in, a nation many times its neighbor’s size has little to show for enormous blood and treasure lost,” recalling that “Putin purportedly thought his troops would parade through Kyiv only a few days after attacking Ukraine.”
• Emanuel argues that Russia’s “shrinking role… in the global market further weakens Russia’s economy and position in the world,” and “Mr. Putin is Mr. Xi’s junior partner” despite boasting of a “no limits” alliance with China.
• He concludes that while “the U.S. has limited its use of sanctions, weapon transfers and other retaliations,” actually “Mr. Putin is on the short end of a bad bet—a reality that Mr. Trump should easily perceive and use to America’s ultimate advantage,” and asks whether Trump “will use his political leverage and capital to take the bold action necessary to make himself truly deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize.”

"An uncertain resolution to Russia-U.S. brinksmanship," David Ignatius, Washington Post, 10.17.25.

• David Ignatius writes, “This week’s Russian-U.S. brinksmanship over Ukraine wasn’t the Cuban missile crisis, but it was a significant moment of superpower saber-rattling.”
• Ignatius notes, “President Donald Trump has been considering sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine—a move that Russian officials suggested would risk nuclear war—but he stepped back Thursday and… announced that the two would meet in Budapest soon ‘to see if we can bring this ‘inglorious’ War… to an end.’”
• “Ukrainian officials, who had hoped that Trump would squeeze Putin harder, doubt that the Russian leader is ready to make concessions,” Ignatius reports, adding that “an earlier summit in Alaska produced nothing for Ukraine but more Russian attacks.”
• “The White House strategy is to send Secretary of State Marco Rubio to meet with Russian officials next week to discuss the agenda for the Budapest summit,” and Trump’s hand could be strengthened “if… Congress next week passes a Russia sanctions bill drafted by Sen. Lindsey Graham,” Ignatius writes.
• “I would prefer that Germany provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles, which can also strike deep targets,” defense executive Ron Wahid tells Ignatius, adding that the West also could pursue “a no-fly zone enforced by a coalition” and “actions to disrupt or eliminate Russia’s ‘shadow fleet.’”
• “Ukrainian officials argue that Putin doesn’t want peace in Ukraine but victory—and they worry that Trump’s conciliatory call with Putin will encourage a bad deal.” Ukraine’s ambassador warns that Russia “once again chose missiles over dialogue… The only effective response is pressure—through tougher sanctions, reinforced air defense, and the supply of long-range capabilities,” Ignatius reports.
• Ignatius concludes, “Trump has demonstrated two things in his first nine months: He yearns to be a peacemaker, and he’s ready to use the weapons of war to get what he wants. I hope Trump realizes he won’t get to peace in Budapest without raising the cost for Putin of continuing this ruinous conflict.”

"Europe on the Back Foot as Trump Flips the Script on Ukraine," Suzanne Lynch, Bloomberg, 10.20.25.

• Lynch writes that “the EU is once again coming face to face with its own geopolitical limitations” as “the U.S. president flipped the script again, suggesting last night that Ukraine should surrender territory to Russia.”
• She reports that Zelenskyy left Washington “empty-handed,” after Trump “declin[ed] to deliver weapons like Tomahawk cruise missiles,” leaving European leaders “scrambling to come up with some deliverables for Ukraine.”
• Lynch notes the EU’s “plan to use immobilized Russian assets still hasn’t been approved by Belgium,” and new sanctions are being blocked by “Hungary and Slovakia… pushed to the leaders’ level later this week.”
• She says Trump’s planned summit with Putin in Hungary has “particularly unnerved European capitals,” with officials balking at “the idea of the Russian leader getting red-carpet treatment on its terrain,” and Zelenskyy noting Orban’s track record of blocking Ukraine aid.
• Lynch concludes, “the rest of Europe is forced to watch from the sidelines” as Hungary’s Orban (who will skip the summit) and Slovakia’s Fico prepare for “one of the most important summits since the start of the Ukraine war.”

"Europeans rush to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s defense after tense Donald Trump meeting," Alice Hancock, Andy Bounds, Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 10.20.25.

• Hancock, Bounds, and Miller report that “European governments have rallied behind Volodymyr Zelenskyy and are rushing to secure a deal on the use of Russia’s frozen assets after the Ukrainian leader was pressured by Donald Trump to accept Vladimir Putin’s demands.”
• They note EU leaders are aiming for agreement at Thursday’s Brussels summit on “using immobilised Russian assets for a €140 billion loan to Ukraine,” with EU officials optimistic the Commission will be able to propose a plan soon.
• The article quotes Dutch foreign minister David van Weel: “The EU should put Ukraine in a strong starting position by providing military assistance, by looking at how we can use the financial assets… to give them some kind of financial alleviation in order for them to have the best cards at the table.”
• Though Belgium holds most of Russia’s frozen assets, it wants guarantees that other states will share the risk if legal challenges from Moscow succeed; the Kremlin, for its part, condemned the move as “the unlawful seizure of Russian property… or, to put it simply, theft.”
• After Trump refused to supply Tomahawk missiles, Zelenskyy told European reporters, “such weapons aren’t held only by the United States,” and briefed EU leaders, saying “the Europeans will have a unified position with Ukraine—and that’s very important.”

"Ukraine Faces Talks Without the Leverage of Tomahawks," Constant Méheut, New York Times, 10.19.25.

• Méheut reports, “President Trump backed off selling Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv, opting instead for talks with Russia. Still, Ukraine's negotiating position has strengthened since the summer.”
• He notes, “Mr. Zelenskyy sat in front of Mr. Trump on Friday, the American leader's shift was apparent. ‘Hopefully, we'll be able to get the war over without thinking about Tomahawks,’ Mr. Trump told him. Mr. Putin, he added, ‘wants to make a deal.’”
• Oleksandr Merezhko, Ukrainian parliament foreign affairs chairman, said, “Mr. Trump fell again for Putin’s old trick,” reflecting fears that “efforts to rally the mercurial American president to their side [are] being repeatedly undercut by Russia dangling the promise of more peace talks.”
• Harry Nedelcu, an analyst, argues, “The weapons do not necessarily have to be deployed in order to be effective and to get Putin to react. So, clearly, the pressure is working.” Nedelcu also notes that a pause for talks “may offer Ukraine a temporary reprieve from Russian air attacks.”
• Méheut reports a positive sign: “the International Atomic Energy Agency announced…both sides had agreed to a local cease-fire near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant…to allow repairs to damaged power lines that supply the facility.”
• He writes, “Analysts say that if a new round of talks gets underway, Ukraine is in a relatively stronger position that in previous negotiation attempts. …Russia's limited advances on the battlefield have helped Ukrainian officials talk Mr. Trump out of his initial belief that Russia was bound to win the war.”
• Méheut concludes, “After the White House meeting, Mr. Zelenskyy…appeared frustrated at losing the leverage of the Tomahawks,” later adding, “Asked if he was more optimistic or pessimistic about eventually getting the Tomahawks, Mr. Zelenskyy responded, ‘I'm realistic.’”

"Trump’s Mideast Playbook Is Prime for Ukraine," Garry Kasparov, Wall Street Journal, 10.17.25.

• Kasparov writes that Trump’s “hostage triumph in Jerusalem” shows that in the Middle East “he was the bully we needed,” and urges, “Don’t drop the strongman shtick. Apply the same lesson of force to the bigger war raging: Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.”
• He argues Trump’s approach “so far—berating Ukraine while flattering Russia—has had the opposite effect,” convincing Putin he can prolong the war with nightly attacks in hopes of breaking Ukraine’s will.
• Kasparov contends, “The only way [the war] ends is with Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat,” and that “the U.S. can hasten that end by giving Ukraine the ability to bring the war deep inside Russia.”
• He calls for “long-range strikes” to hit Russian “key infrastructure, starving the Russian war machine of revenue and removing Mr. Putin's ability to shield the Russian people from the consequences of war.”
• Kasparov concludes, “Ukrainian victory doesn’t mean troops marching on Moscow. It means crushing intruders and destroying the virus of Russian imperialism that has destabilized the world for a generation. This would be peacemaking on a world-changing scale—worthy of a prize.”

"Peace in Exchange for Territory? Only a third of Russians surveyed are willing to return occupied territories to Ukraine in order to end the war"—Re: Russia, 10.10.25.

• The share of Russians willing to support Putin ending the war “as early as this week has reached a new high of 80%,” according to Re: Russia.
• However, only 33% would agree to return occupied territories to Ukraine to achieve peace, while 58% oppose and 41% “definitely oppose” such a move; among those aged 18–24, a majority (53%) would return territory, but this support drops sharply in older age groups, according to Re: Russia.
• Public opinion is fractured: 10–13% are “ardent supporters of continuing the war”; 15–20% are “loyal supporters” who would follow Putin if he chose peace; 30% “seek peace but are unwilling to give up occupied territories”; and another 30% “would agree to return territory for the sake of ending hostilities,” according to Re: Russia.
• “The goal of seizing the remaining parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia… does not appear particularly significant to the vast majority of Russians,” according to Re: Russia.
• Despite this, “respondents show little faith in [Putin’s] willingness to retreat; on the contrary, the survey revealed a sharp rise in fears of a new wave of mobilization”—with concern up to 51% from 34% in February, according to Re: Russia.
• ExtremeScan polling summarized by Re: Russia finds that optimism about ending the “special military operation” has sharply declined—down to 24% in September, from a brief Trump-fueled spike to 43%.
• The costs of war are increasingly tangible: 42% now say the war brings “more harm than good” (20% say “more good”), with harm especially felt by younger Russians (51% of 18–29-year-olds) and those whose material circumstances have worsened (57%), according to Re: Russia.
• Daily life is affected: “79% have noticed mobile internet outages,” while 42% cite “shelling or drone attacks.” Petrol shortages are especially acute in the Far East and Southern districts, where up to 27% report problems, according to Re: Russia.
• Despite recognition of the harm and growing pessimism, the share willing to return territory for peace has remained stable so far—but “as the costs of the war increase, this balance may begin to shift.” Attitudes toward the war’s outcomes are “likely to become increasingly negative as Russia’s economy gradually slides into crisis,” according to Re: Russia.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

•  "What Could a Trump Peace Plan in Ukraine Look Like?" Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, CSIS, 10.17.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"How America can tame the Russian bear," Thomas Graham, Engelsberg Ideas, 10.16.25.

• Thomas Graham argues, “No matter how the Russia–Ukraine war ends, Russia is not going to disappear as a major challenge… Even if defeated, it will not break up… Nor would defeat yield a democratic breakthrough—polls consistently show little elite or popular support for Western-style liberal democracy.”
• He states, “With its vast nuclear arsenal, abundant natural resources, and central location in Eurasia, Russia will remain a major player on the global stage—and the only country capable of destroying the United States as a functioning society in 30 minutes.”
• Graham asserts, “Given the destructive power of modern weaponry and the United States’ diminished ability to dominate the global stage… Washington will have no choice but to find a way to coexist with Russia.”
• He contends, “Containment is thus not the answer to the Russian challenge the United States faces today. It posits a world that no longer exists, and it mischaracterizes the challenge. Most importantly, it leaves no room for the United States to creatively manage Russian power and ambitions.”
• Graham proposes a policy of “competitive coexistence,” grounded in “five principles,” including that the U.S. “must accept Russia as it is,” “accept that Russia has legitimate national interests,” “recognize that Russian weakness can prove as dangerous as Russian strength,” “harness Russian power and ambition… to American purposes,” and “engage third parties… where Russia and the United States are not the dominant powers.”
• He concludes, “Victory, in truth, is a chimera, but a better position in an ongoing competition is both possible and desirable—and, ultimately, sufficient for American purposes. Competitive coexistence provides the mindset and framework for a secure and prosperous country in a world the United States can no longer dominate, facing a rival it can no longer vanquish.”

"Russia Won’t Stop Until NATO Acts," The Editorial Board, New York Times, 10.17.25.

• The NYT Editorial Board writes that “Russia has launched a new and dangerous campaign of provocation against NATO,” sending “drones over Poland and Romania and flown fighter jets into Estonia,” and likely orchestrating drone disruptions at airports in Denmark, Belgium, and Germany.
• They argue Vladimir Putin aims “to scare, exhaust and divide Europeans, causing them to question their support for Ukraine and undermine its efforts to repel Russia’s invasion,” and “ultimately, he also wants to make the United States look weak and fragment the NATO alliance.”
• “European leaders should make clear that Russian aggression against NATO countries risks a forceful response… including the shooting down of drones… and potentially of Russian fighter planes,” the Editorial Board insists.
• “Responding wisely to him is vital for Washington and Europe. It is not easy. Striking back hard risks escalating conflict, while doing nothing conveys a weakness that invites future aggression,” writes The Editorial Board.
• “By now, though, the world should know that there are no safe options with Mr. Putin. Ignoring or downplaying his aggressions encourages more of them,” the Editorial Board says, urging NATO not to “hesitate to act.”
• As evidence of resolve, they note Trump “said that NATO planes should shoot down Russian aircraft that enter allied airspace and raised the possibility of new forms of support for Ukraine,” including “allowing Ukraine to get Tomahawk missiles” so it can “strike deeper inside Russia.”
• “Russia’s recent aggression towards NATO shows that Russia’s war in Ukraine is about much more than Ukraine… The only way to contain him is with resolute strength,” the Editorial Board concludes.

"No Cause for Alarm: The Case for a Measured Response to Russian Air Incursions," Jennifer Kavanagh, War on the Rocks, 10.20.25.

• Kavanagh argues that the recent Russian drone and aircraft incursions into NATO airspace are “better interpreted as a continuation of the more concerted hybrid campaign that Moscow has been waging against Europe since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,” rather than the prelude to major war many fear.
• She contends, “NATO already has the weapons systems and protocols in place to respond to breaches…by manned aircraft,” while the true gap is in counter-drone capabilities; thus, “Europe can adequately meet the challenges…by defending from within their own borders and focusing their investment on inexpensive counter-drone technologies.”
• Kavanagh warns that “moves such as establishing a no-fly zone over western Ukraine or participating directly in the defense of Ukraine’s skies could cause the very outcome they seek to avoid…a war with Russia,” and would not be credible or effective deterrents.
• She instead advocates “layered protection,” relying on “passive defenses, such as electronic jamming and hacking,” as well as “inexpensive, mass-produced counter-drone rifles and interceptors” and “mini-lateral coordination among frontline states.”
• Kavanagh concludes, “Europe is right to be concerned about deficiencies in its ability to defend its territory from drones, but the risks of over-reacting to Russian activities…are far greater than that of doing too little. If NATO’s goal is preventing war, a defensive counter-drone posture inside its own territory is surely enough.”

"Trump’s Gaza Deal Belies the Kremlin’s Theory of a New Global Order," Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 10.17.25.

• Baunov writes that Trump’s “ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel…is a net loss for the Russian regime,” as “for two years, the war in Gaza was the perfect distraction from Russia’s war against Ukraine.”
• He argues the deal “undermines the regime’s beloved theory that the world is transitioning from a defective and obsolete international order into chaos… where it’s every country for themselves,” a narrative the Kremlin used to justify its aggression.
• Baunov highlights that Russia has benefited from “global chaos,” supporting forces like the Taliban and the Houthis, and “recruiting thousands of mercenaries on every continent,” but did not actually broker or pressure toward peace in the Middle East.
• The Gaza deal “calls into question the Kremlin’s theory of the world as a ‘creative space for foreign policy,’” since it “came about through traditional means and with traditional mediators”—not regional fragmentation or alternative formats excluding the West.
• Baunov concludes that Trump’s success in forcing a ceasefire “only highlights Putin’s intransigence and his lack of competence and reason as a global player,” making “Putin’s embittered stubbornness… completely destroy the game that Russian strategists have smugly been playing for the last six months.”

"Who pays for NATO?" John Reed, Financial Times, 10.20.25.

• Reed writes that while President Trump claims the U.S. is “paying for close to 100% of NATO,” America actually pays about 16% of NATO’s common budget, with European members—especially those bordering Russia—now spending more relative to their size than the U.S., or soon will.
• He reports, “NATO countries will spend $1.59 trillion on defense in 2025… with the U.S. accounting for more than 60% of all expenditure,” but notes that on a per capita or GDP basis, the U.S. is “less of an outlier.”
• “Since the start of his first term in 2017, the U.S. president has pressured America’s NATO partners to pay more,” with Trump warning, “you don’t pay your bills, you get no protection. It’s very simple,” Reed explains.
• He outlines how Russia’s war on Ukraine has driven a “wake-up call” for NATO and led to a surge in European defense spending, with “several countries, led by Poland, now spend[ing] more for their size than the U.S..”
• Still, Reed observes that even with a new target of 5% of GDP for defense, “experts think…France and the UK especially, will struggle to meet [it] because of their fiscal problems,” and only Spain refuses to sign up to the pledge.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine, Diplomacy, and the Future of Europe" (Dmytro Kuleba), Podcast, Apple Podcasts, 10.18.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.
• “DSR Special Edition: A Conversation with former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” Riley Fessler, DeepState Radio (podcast interview), 10.16.25.
• "Improving U.S. Cooperation with Allies and Partners," Daniel Byman, Alexander Palmer, Audrey Aldisert, Henry H. Carroll, Cynthia R. Cook, Chris H. Park, and Seth G. Jones, CSIS, 10.14.25.
• “Europe Is At War. Putin sees Ukraine as part of a larger struggle with Europe. Europeans should, too,” Michael Kimmage, Foreign Policy, 10.20.25.
• "Europe Is Answering Putin’s Challenge," Shane Harris, The Atlantic, 10.17.25.
• "Russia Abandons a Treaty: Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict," Kelvin S-H Peh, RUSI, 10.17.25.
• "Putin’s ideologue: 'We Russians are at war with Europe. It’s not in Trump’s interest to stop us: he profits by draining you.'" An interview with Sergei Karaganov, Marco Imarisio, Corriere della Sera, 10.17.25. In Italian. [ATI1]
• "How Iran, China, and Russia Would React to a U.S. Return to Bagram Air Base," Fatemeh Aman, National Interest, 10.15.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“When Nuclear Weapons Return to Belarus: Evolving Concepts in Russian Escalation Strategy,” Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Decker Eveleth, Paul Schwartz, CNA, 10.15.25.

• Rosa-Hernandez, Eveleth, and Schwartz write that “the Kremlin has engaged in repeated nuclear saber-rattling” during the Ukraine war, with nuclear threats aimed at deterring the West, but note that these were only “partially successful,” deterring direct intervention but failing to halt Western aid to Kyiv.
• They find the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus shows “both change and continuity” in escalation management, with operationalization measures—joint military exercises, force deployments, and readiness demonstrations—consistent with Russia’s prewar doctrine.
• The authors highlight a key departure: placing nuclear weapons in Belarus marks a “marked departure for Russia,” as it had long opposed NATO nuclear sharing, and now treats “attacks on Belarus [as] attacks on Russia itself.”
• They argue this forward deployment “alters the balance in Eastern Europe”—giving Russia “very little reaction time if [these weapons] are launched preemptively,” and increasing the likelihood of escalatory responses and NSNW demonstrations in future crises.
• Rosa-Hernandez, Eveleth, and Schwartz conclude that “Russia is embracing new forms of escalation management not seen since the Cold War,” and that “U.S. and NATO strategists… should immediately take the implications… into consideration” and closely monitor evolving Russian doctrine.

"Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Put to the Test by the War in Ukraine," Dimitri Minic, IFRI, 10.06.25. [ATI2] 

• Minic writes that since Feb. 24, 2022, “Russia… has adopted aggressive deterrence measures and a resolutely menacing rhetorical stance,” wielding its nuclear arsenal as a central part of its war strategy.
• He analyzes how Russia has paired explicit nuclear threats and doctrinal ambiguity to “dissuade Western military intervention” and “shape the boundaries of external support for Ukraine.”
• Minic finds that Moscow’s nuclear posture aims to “compensate for the limitations of conventional forces” and deter escalation by signaling a high threshold for Western involvement while maintaining plausible pathways to nuclear use.
• The report warns that “constant nuclear signaling from Moscow carries substantial long-term risks,” including the erosion of arms control norms and normalizing the use of nuclear blackmail as a policy tool.
• Minic concludes that Russia’s approach “puts its own deterrent credibility on the line,” exposing both the dangers of miscalculation and the need for Europe and the U.S. to maintain steady, calibrated responses to Russian nuclear threats.

"It’s Time to Stop New START," Matthew Kroenig, Foreign Policy, 10.16.25.

• Matthew Kroenig writes, “Putin’s proposed arms control extension is good for Russia and China, but bad for America.”
• Kroenig insists, “The United States needs to expand its nuclear force to deal with the growing nuclear threat from China, and it should not be constrained by a dated arms control agreement with yesterday’s superpower.”
• He notes, “New START limits Russia’s so-called strategic forces…but leaves Russia’s lower-yield battlefield weapons untouched. This gives Russia a 10-1 advantage over the United States and NATO in nonstrategic nuclear forces.”
• Kroenig asserts, “Russia has cheated on almost every arms control deal it has signed, including New START,” and describes New START as “already on life support.”
• He warns, “for the first time in history, the United States will need to contend with two near-peer nuclear superpowers,” adding the bipartisan commission he joined “unanimously concluded that the United States’ current and planned nuclear forces will be insufficient to deal with this rapidly evolving threat.”
• Kroenig argues, “bilateral arms control with Russia, like a follow-on to New START, no longer makes sense. The United States should not constrain itself in a deal with Russia while its foremost adversary, China, builds up its forces.”
• He concludes, “The primary purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear war, and, given China’s rapid buildup, the United States will soon lack an effective deterrent. … Washington should get on with building the strategic forces that the United States needs to protect itself and its allies.”

"The Russian New START initiative: How can Europeans respond to a poisonous offer?" Julia Berghofer, European Leadership Network, 10.15.25.

• Berghofer writes that Russia’s proposal to extend New START “appears to be a timely and easy fix,” but warns “there are legitimate concerns over the sincerity of Russia’s proposal” and that “the West should not let go of an opportunity to leverage Russian interests.”
• She argues that “no one benefits from an unrestrained arms race,” and compartmentalizing arms control from geopolitical tensions “presents an opportunity,” but points to “serious potential pitfalls”—including Russia’s “politicizing multilateral processes” and failure to return to treaty’s full implementation.
• Berghofer notes, “Russia may seek to dominate the narrative… or simply aim to gain time, as they may not be ready to compete in an arms race with the U.S. at present,” and key issues around verification, compliance, and China’s involvement remain unresolved.
• She observes that a unified European position is unlikely, but argues Europeans must “try their best to influence the process to the extent possible before the U.S. and Russia potentially agree to the extension.”
• Berghofer concludes Europeans should “urge the U.S. to seek clarification,” make unsuspension of New START and resumption of verification key priorities in talks, and “ensure this is not a process that unilaterally benefits Russia, but rather… leads to a solid follow-up agreement with robust verification measures.”

"The Last Ray of a Bygone Era: Why the U.S. has no interest in Putin's nuclear deterrence initiatives and threats," Re: Russia, 10.15.25.

• Re: Russia writes that Washington “showed no interest” in Putin’s late-September offer to extend New START, since “any bilateral limits on strategic arms with Moscow no longer make sense” as “the U.S. nuclear doctrine is reorienting itself towards the task of deterring two or even three nuclear powers simultaneously.”
• The analysis argues “New START also fails to take into account Russia’s substantial stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, while the likelihood of a regional nuclear conflict has increased amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and growing Russian threats towards Europe.”
• Re: Russia asserts that “extending New START holds little value for the United States because Russia’s capacity to modernize and expand its strategic forces is limited by the depletion caused by its prolonged war and the sanctions regime.”
• The article claims Putin’s proposal was “a ‘gesture of goodwill,’ as his press secretary Dmitry Peskov later called the initiative,” but with “no discussion” of restoring inspections or verification and “new conditions for compliance” that Washington would never accept.
• Re: Russia concludes, “Russia is, in essence, a nuclear superpower of the past,” unable “to compete fully in the emerging arms race between the U.S. and China,” and advises that “the strategic conversation” should “be redirected towards Beijing” rather than Moscow.

"Statement by K.V. Vorontsov, Deputy Head of Russia’s Delegation to the UN First Committee," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Vorontsov rejected “unfounded accusations” against Russia, calling on delegations to “review Russia’s previous statements” to the First Committee, which, he claimed, “contain answers to all questions raised.”
• He insisted the current “extremely difficult situation” surrounding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not Russia’s fault, but “the result of successive U.S. administrations’ refusal to ratify the treaty since 1999.”
• Vorontsov stated, “it was unacceptable for Russia to maintain an imbalance with the U.S. regarding CTBT obligations;” Russia’s withdrawal of ratification was intended to “correct this situation” and took effect Nov. 2, 2023.
• He emphasized that Russia “remains a CTBT signatory with all rights and obligations,” is upholding “a moratorium on nuclear tests,” and continues “full participation in the CTBT Preparatory Commission.”
• Vorontsov highlighted Russia’s “commitment to the CTBT,” citing the completion of Russia’s segment of the International Monitoring System (32 facilities) and ongoing efforts to ensure its proper operation.

"How the U.S. and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats," Philippe Dickinson, Ryan Arick, and Natasha Lander Finch, Atlantic Council, 10.15.25.

• “Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
• To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
• Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
• The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
• Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
• The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
• The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "We’re in graver danger than Cuban missile crisis, warns nuclear expert," Ben Spencer (quoting Serhii Plokhy), The Sunday Times, 10.18.25.
• “Lawfare Daily: Serhii Plokhii on the History of the Nuclear Arms Race,” Mykhailo Soldatenko, Serhii Plokhii, Jen Patja, Lawfare Daily, 10.15.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

"The End of Cybersecurity: America's Digital Defenses are Failing—but AI Can Save Them," Jen Easterly, Foreign Affairs, 10.16.25.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Poland Frees Nord Stream Suspect,” Karolina Jeznach and Bojan Pancevski,Wall Street Journal, 10.18.25.

• A Polish court ordered the release of Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a 45-year-old Ukrainian detained on a German warrant alleging involvement in the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, citing insufficient evidence and wartime context.
• Polish Judge Dariusz Lubowski ruled that the evidence presented by German authorities was insufficient. He said the attack on the pipeline was a legitimate operation considering that it was undertaken in wartime as Ukraine sought to defend itself against Russia. "The act of blowing up [the Nord Stream pipeline] is an act of sabotage, but not during the times of war and if it is the property of an aggressor," said Judge Lubowski.
• Polish officials had urged the court to release Zhuravlev. "The problem with North Stream 2 is not that it was blown up," Prime Minister Donald Tusk posted on X before the ruling. "The problem is that it was built."
• German prosecutors have argued that the sabotage was a criminal act. They allege that Zhuravlev, an experienced deep-sea diver, was among a group of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians who used a small sailboat in an operation to plant explosives on the pipelines.
• A senior German investigator called the decision to release Zhuravlev "shameful."
• Lubowski, the judge, appeared to levy criticism on Friday against the German state for both helping build the pipelines and providing gas revenues to Moscow, as well as for investigating the sabotage. "The German nation was from our point of view hostile towards Ukraine as it was co financing the enemy—Russia," the judge said. "We should then be asking rhetorically: Will in the future Germany be chasing Ukrainian military leadership as well?"
• "He is a free man in Poland. He is going back home to his wife and children where he should have been all this time," his attorney, Tymoteusz Paprocki, said after the court hearing. Zhuravlev said he was relieved he could return home.
• German authorities are also seeking to extradite the man who they say was the commander of the pipeline saboteurs… A Bologna court approved his extradition to Germany, but his lawyers appealed to Italy's highest court, which ruled this week that procedural errors had been made and ordered the lower court to reconsider the case.

"Russia’s Oil Earnings May Get Clobbered by OPEC," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 10.16.25.

• Keith Johnson writes that “the biggest threat on the horizon for an already reeling Russian economy may be its former OPEC pals, who in recent months have opened the taps on a flood of new oil production, helping to drive crude prices to a five-month low.”
• Johnson notes, “With even cheaper oil in the cards next year, as many analysts expect, Russia’s discounted grade of oil will bring in even less money than the reduced amounts it brought in this year, putting further pressure on a Russian budget gearing up for its biggest deficit since the war in Ukraine began.”
• He observes, “For eight straight months, OPEC+, an expanded grouping...has increased its oil output targets despite what appears to be soft global demand for oil,” and more OPEC+ oil could soon follow as Iraq resumes exports through Turkey.
• Johnson highlights, “Given that even Russia’s revised budget for next year is predicated on the price of its Urals oil getting more, not less, expensive (to $59 a barrel), it appears that the Kremlin’s optimistic fiscal plans for 2026 are facing a painful reality check.”
• Johnson emphasizes that Russia is “restricted in borrowing, has no foreign money, and they have spent a lot of their savings from the oil fund,” making a projected 3% deficit “a lot” in the Russian context.
• He writes, “Big forecasters such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) expect sluggish growth in demand for oil to be overwhelmed by a surge of new and unneeded supplies,” but OPEC itself sees demand rising, especially in Asia, though market realities suggest otherwise.
• Johnson concludes that, in addition to Western sanctions and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, “an outlook for the Russian economy that was already grim may get a whole lot grimmer next year, with few easy options for the Kremlin to make things better.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "EU seeks to boost powers to board Russian shadow fleet vessels, document shows,” Jacopo Barigazzi, Politico, 10.19.25.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"The Dictator's Legacy: A New Zastoy," Sergey Aleksashenko, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Dmitry Nekrasov, CASE, October 2025. Clues from Russian Views.

• The authors argue that “the past three and a half years appear more as a continuation of trends traceable since 2012 than as a dramatic turning point,” with most key Russian economic processes—like the decline of Western investment, the “pivot to the East,” and the “nationalization of elites”—predating the war, according to The Dictator’s Legacy.
• A spike in growth for 2023–24 was caused by “gigantic fiscal stimulus” from reserves and ruble devaluation but faded as fiscal discipline returned, reverting Russia to stagnation, according to the report.
• Political priorities now override economic goals as “the Kremlin has shifted…from economic development to the preservation of the existing order and the strengthening of its resilience,” the authors write.
• Stagnation and gradual decline in living standards have not provoked protest, and “the ‘dust has settled… as the transformational downturn and the subsequent Keynesian-style recovery… were temporary, not the stagnation to which the Russian economy has returned in 2025,” according to the report.
• The authors see Russia “locked in a narrow corridor, lined with numerous constraints, that keeps the economy from moving beyond its limits in either direction,” and find no basis for either dramatic collapse or strong growth in the years ahead.
• They caution that “although such ‘non-development’ does not contradict the values of an archaic and indoctrinated population, it appears extremely dangerous under current conditions,” noting the cutoff of Western investment and technology and China’s unwillingness to transfer technological know-how to Russia.
• Against the backdrop of U.S.–China “technological revolution,” the odds are “very high” that Russia “will trail global technological trends,” risking a “catastrophic backwardness resembling… the 1980s Soviet Union,” according to the authors.
• The main threat to Putin’s economic system is Putin himself: “in a system where politics takes precedence over economics, mistaken decisions can destroy economic well-being,” according to the report; most other factors have only limited impact.
• The report asserts Western sanctions are unlikely to provoke collapse, and only a naval blockade or incentives for private capital flight might have major effects—both considered highly unlikely by the authors.
• Strategic approaches to Russia should assume that “within the foreseeable future, Putin’s regime will not face serious economic constraints preventing it from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy,” according to The Dictator’s Legacy.
• Although Russia has adapted to sanctions and preserved some economic performance, the report argues this “does not constitute a foundation for long-term economic growth or technological modernization,” and comes at the cost of “a disproportionately large decline in long-term development prospects.”
• The authors warn that while global breakthroughs in “biotechnology, AI, and robotics” loom, “today’s Russia cannot be counted among the leaders or drivers of future change.” The “Chinese door” is Russia’s only access to advanced technology, and “the key to that door is kept in Beijing.”
• In conclusion, the authors foresee economic stagnation becoming Russia’s “new normal… a new zastoy, one that may last for many years to come.”

"The Cracks in Russia’s War Economy: How America and Europe Can Exploit Moscow’s Vulnerabilities," Alexandra Prokopenko, Foreign Affairs, 10.20.25.

• Prokopenko writes, “Russia’s ability to build a strong-enough military to truly challenge NATO over the long run is constrained by mounting fiscal pressures, an overstretched labor market, sanctions that block access to critical technologies, and a defense industry already working at full capacity.”
• She describes Russia’s defense sector as a “patchwork quilt,” noting that “most of the equipment it is now delivering to the Ukrainian front is refurbished, not new, and is often inferior to NATO systems,” with bottlenecks, labor shortages, and a growing dependence on China for crucial imports.
• Prokopenko warns, “Russia’s fiscal indicators are flashing red… oil and gas revenues are declining,” war spending is unsustainable, and “the overheating was unsustainable… today’s deceleration exposes the fragility of a war economy that depends on continuous fiscal stimulus to mask underlying structural weaknesses.”
• She argues the West should not “bank on Russia’s economy simply falling apart,” but that “the structural limits on Russia’s economic growth suggest that its planned military resurgence will be slow, uneven, and costly,” providing “a window of opportunity to hinder its military buildup.”
• Prokopenko concludes, “The paradox of Russia’s war economy is that it is simultaneously strong and brittle. The United States and Europe must act with urgency: pressing their advantages while Russia remains constrained rather than waiting for the Kremlin to get back on its feet.”

"The story of 20th century Russia, with women at the center," Casey Schwartz, Washington Post, 10.19.25.

• Casey Schwartz writes, “In ‘Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia, from Revolution to Autocracy,’ [Julia Ioffe] has taken on something new,” centering “the stories of lesser-known but influential women, rather than famous (and infamous) men.”
• Schwartz notes, “Ioffe’s cast features women who helped define the Soviet Union and women, including those in her own family, whose lives were shaped by Soviet ideology.”
• She observes, “In the Soviet Union, such important roles for women were ‘ordinary, not extraordinary,’ Ioffe said,” describing her grandmother who “was a chemical engineer who directed the lab that supplied potable water to the Kremlin.”
• Schwartz explains, “Ioffe discovered the story of Alexandra Kollontai, an ardent Bolshevik...the first woman in the world to be appointed to a government cabinet,” who “believed that in the great Soviet experiment, women had the chance to live with a completely new value system, in a utopia of sexual freedom and work.”
• Schwartz writes, “What had happened to the radical ideal of the Soviet woman, the one she internalized from her own upbringing, the women who had gone into the workforce as early as 1915, who had fought in World War II, flying fighter planes against the German invasion, who became the ‘extraordinary ordinary’ women like those in her own family?”
• Schwartz highlights that Ioffe “draws an alternative path through the Soviet experiment of the 20th century,” focusing “not primarily [on] Lenin, but… his mistress and confidante, Inessa Armand, and his wife…” and “Stalin’s wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva,” and daughter, Svetlana.
• Schwartz concludes, “With ‘Motherland,’ [Ioffe] has decisively overthrown those old constraints,” bringing to light “a chapter of Russian history most often relegated to the footnotes,” including the sexual violence perpetrated by Beria, and foregrounding the voices and struggles of Russia’s women.²

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"A Repressive Russian Ally Feels a Mysterious Thaw From the U.S," Valerie Hopkins, New York Times, 10.15.25.

• The Trump administration has orchestrated the release of 52 Belarusian political prisoners, sending an envoy to Minsk as part of an “unlikely rapprochement with Belarus,” an autocratic Russian ally, according to the New York Times.
• Political prisoners like Mikola Dziadok were freed via a covert operation led by U.S. official John Coale, who told them, “President Trump sent me to free you all,” according to the New York Times.
• Special envoy Keith Kellogg has said the administration wants Belarus to serve as “a conduit for messages to Russia as Mr. Trump tries to bring peace in Ukraine”; the prisoner releases were “an unexpected side benefit,” according to the New York Times.
• Valerie Hopkins writes that Trump’s “open-arms approach” extends praise to Belarus’s leader Aleksandr Lukashenko, described by Trump as “highly respected” and “powerful,” though Western governments view him as a dictator.
• Analysts say that U.S. concessions such as lifting sanctions on the Belarusian airline are “an easy win” for Lukashenko, and may benefit both Minsk and Moscow by giving Belarus a hedge as Russia’s economy falters, according to the New York Times.
• Hopkins notes that the thaw “presents a quandary” for Belarusian activists, who acknowledge talks are needed to free prisoners but fear U.S. gestures “strengthen” Lukashenko’s rule.
• Some, like analyst Artyom Shraibman, call the releases a “huge humanitarian win” for the U.S., while others, including former labor leader Sergei Antusevich, say the deal “encouraged human trafficking” by exchanging prisoners for “Boeing parts,” according to the New York Times.
• The new policy represents a reversal after years of “deep freeze” due to Belarus’s repression and support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine; since January, U.S. envoys have made several trips to Minsk bearing gifts and overtures, the New York Times reports.
• The U.S. has now “brokered at least three releases of Belarusian political prisoners” (nearly 70 freed), though many prominent figures remain incarcerated and some emerge in poor health, according to the New York Times.
• Belarus still faces criticism for ongoing repression and being “a co-belligerent in a war that Russia itself has said it is waging against the West;” Minsk has “performed every kind of service for Russia in this war except contributing its own troops,” notes analyst Nigel Gould-Davies in the New York Times.
• Lifting sanctions on Belavia could give Russia indirect access to aviation parts, though experts doubt Lukashenko would dare such transfers, according to the New York Times.
• Lukashenko seeks “full normalization of relations” with the U.S. in “politics, economy, trade,” hoping to regain room to maneuver after growing dependent on Russia, and wants to ensure Belarus is not “forgotten” in Ukraine peace talks or sanctions relief, the New York Times reports.
• Lukashenko also wields his country’s geography as leverage—reminding the West that Belarus is “the only thing standing geographically between European countries and Russia,” writes Hopkins.
• Analysts observe that Moscow “will see weakness in U.S. dealings with Belarus,” measuring “how much America is giving away in return for how little,” according to the New York Times.

Footnotes

1. At his Aug. 15 summit with Trump in Alaska, Putin rejected the U.S. offer of sanctions relief for a ceasefire, insisting the war would end only if Ukraine capitulated and ceded more territory in the Donbas, according to Financial Times sources. Putin also insisted that no settlement was possible without addressing “root causes,” according to multiple people briefed on the talks and interviewed by FT.
2. Also see "The Real Housewives of Moscow," Julia Ioffe, New Yorker, 10.19.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Alex Brandon.