3 Ideas to Explore

1. Harvard University’s Graham Allison, writing in The National Interest, argues that Donald Trump’s recent nuclear testing remarks are best viewed as a reminder of his determination to ensure the U.S. will continue to maintain the most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world, not, as sensational headlines suggest, a harbinger of imminent nuclear detonations. Allison emphasizes that “Trump speaks in hyperbole—his unique combination of fact, fiction and fantasy.” Allison argues that “despite his often imprecise rhetoric, Trump has a better understanding of nuclear perils than any other political leader on the national or international stage today. As he has frequently asserted, he really believes that ‘nuclear weapons are the biggest problem we have.’” With this in mind, Allison invokes Peter Thiel’s 2016 advice to “take Trump seriously but not literally,” arguing that “when listening to the president talk about nuclear issues, and even more when reading shrill claims about his words in the press, take Trump seriously—but not literally.” Nevertheless, Trump’s rhetoric on nuclear testing is concerning according to nuclear arms analysts such as Daniel Salisbury of IISS, Steven Pifer of CISAC and Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie of CSIS. Salisbury warns that even talk of renewed testing could “trigger other nuclear-armed states to return to the practice,” while Pifer argues explosive tests are “unnecessary and unwise.” In addition to these Western experts, Russia’s Alexei Arbatov has also weighed in on the subject, asserting that, as a U.S. president, Trump must “understand that, alongside the moratorium on explosive tests, all nuclear states regularly test their delivery systems (of course, without nuclear warheads) to ensure reliability and demonstrate capabilities of new systems.” In addition to these nuclear arms experts, the Financial Times’ editors have also commented on the debate, concluding that renewed U.S. tests would “demolish one of the few remaining pillars of U.S.-Russian arms control” and potentially accelerate a new arms race.¹
2. Roger Boyes of The Times makes the provocative claim that Ukraine is unlikely to survive as an independent state through the spring, as Western support deteriorates and Russian pressure intensifies. Boyes notes in his column for this U.K. newspaper that as winter approaches, financial aid and willpower from the West are “drying up,” allowing Russia to focus on breaking through Ukraine’s eastern defensive “fortress belt.” With Moscow mobilizing 350,000 additional troops and honing drone warfare capabilities, he warns that Russian forces could soon exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities, destroy infrastructure and demoralize the population. “In what might turn out to be the last 150 days of war, the real emerging costs ... will ... be measured ... in the cityscapes of both Russia and Ukraine, full of men with wooden legs and empty sleeves, jobless, listening to speeches by revanchists, hooked perhaps on tranquilizers, hating their leaders. I wish it were not the case but it's what the numbers tell us. There are no winter miracles in eastern Europe. Prepare for the peace; it won't be pretty,” he concludes.
3. “Will Latest US Sanctions Force Putin to Moderate Aims in Ukraine?” RM asked in its review of Western and Russian experts’ analyses of the impact of the U.S. sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. Even before these sanctions, Trump had been insisting that the Russian "economy is going to collapse.” The Oct. 22 announcement of sanctions, which are intended to block all U.S.-linked property and transactions of these Russian energy giants and their subsidiaries, led quite a few commentators to make similar predictions. “Russia’s economy is beginning to buckle,” Melissa Lawford, U.S. economics writer at the U.K.’s The Telegraph, stated in her Oct. 26 piece, which assessed the impact of the U.S. sanctions on Russian oil exports, which Kyiv believes could cost Moscow $50 billion annually. “Western sanctions have frozen hundreds of billions of dollars in assets and crippled imports of technology and machinery,” The Daily Beast reported in an Oct. 25 article entitled “Putin’s System Begins to Collapse as Russians Finally Dare to Confront Him.” “Could U.S. Sanctions Finally Cripple Russia’s War Economy?” Oilprice asked in the headline it put on an Oct. 23 republished RFE/RL piece on the sanctions. Al Jazeera asked a similar question, wondering “Will Trump’s Sanctions Truly Cripple Russia’s Economy?” Indeed, will they? Quite a few analysts whose opinions we have reviewed while researching the piece believe it is unlikely that the new sanctions will cripple Russia’s economy. These experts include Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser at the Russian Central Bank and now an analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, and Sergey Vakulenko of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Thus, quite a few are skeptical that the latest sanctions will make Vladimir Putin moderate his aims vis-à-vis Ukraine. More sceptics also include Thomas Graham of CFR and Clayton Seigle of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

 “War is blasting Ukraine’s border city of Kharkiv but boosting Lviv: A tale of two Ukrainian cities,” The Economist, 11.03.25.

• The article highlights, “Kharkiv, once an industrial powerhouse and Ukraine’s second city, is struggling,” while “Lviv is profiting as people, business and investment move to the center and west of the country.”
• The authors note, “Ukraine’s population has been shrinking for decades, but Lviv has grown to a million inhabitants since 2022, thanks largely to the influx of 150,000 people from Kharkiv and other eastern areas.”
• “Some 280 companies have relocated to Lviv province, including 60 from Kharkiv. A major industrial park and a new university have opened, and the EU plans to help make Lviv a railway hub,” they add.
• In contrast, “the center of Kharkiv is much quieter,” and because of “frequent drone and missile attacks, most education is online. Only half the old number of students are believed to remain.”
• The Economist reports, “Before the full-scale invasion, Kharkiv was home to about 1.6m people. Nataliya Zubar estimates it is now between 1.2m and 1.3m,” with much of the city’s middle class having left for safer regions.
• “The share of the country’s IT workers who live in Kharkiv fell from 14% in 2021 to 4% last year. In Lviv it rose from 14% to 18%,” the article observes.
• The authors conclude, “Redeveloping cities such as Kharkiv will require the government to offer tax breaks and other incentives graduated by risk. But much of the country’s east could become a rust belt, perpetually threatened by war.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:²

“I hate to say it, but Kyiv won’t last till spring,” Roger Boyes, The Times, 11.07.25. 

• “As winter approaches it looks increasingly likely to be Volodymyr Zelensky's last stand. The money to keep Ukraine armed, healthy and warm is drying up. The western will to support the war is evaporating. The defense of an independent Kyiv has slipped down the hierarchy of strategic emergencies.”
• “This winter will see a more concentrated Russian assault on Ukraine's so-called fortress belt on its eastern front. If these defensive lines start to fall, then the way would be clear for Russian troops to move into central Ukraine. Moscow's mobilization target for 2025 allows for 350,000 soldiers, signed up on time-limited contracts; many of them are in training. The plan seems to be to open up the east a few hundred Russians have already been seen in Ukraine-held Pokrovsk spotting and killing drone operators who could slow the advance and then prepare for a surge into the Ukrainian heartland in the spring.”
• “To the Russians the calculation is clear: use their newly enhanced expertise in drone warfare to make this a winter from hell for the Ukrainians; destroy energy infrastructure, railway stations, housing estates, in the hope of turning the people against the Zelensky government, nudging him into a disadvantageous settlement and a broken, polarized state. That might, from Putin's point of view, mask Russia's losses maybe 150,000 fatalities for the gain of a sliver of Ukrainian territory.”
• “In what might turn out to be the last 150 days of war the real emerging costs, however, will not be measured in billions of euros lost but in the cityscapes of both Russia and Ukraine, full of men with wooden legs and empty sleeves, jobless, listening to speeches by revanchists, hooked perhaps on tranquillizers, hating their leaders. I wish it were not the case but it's what the numbers tell us. There are no winter miracles in eastern Europe. Prepare for the peace; it won't be pretty. Russia will aim to make it a winter from hell for the Ukrainians.”

Interview with Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi: “Russia pours 150K troops into latest drive to overrun Ukraine in Donetsk: 'Really a tense situation',” Caitlin Doornbos, NY Post, 11.10.25.

• “Pokrovsk, a city formerly home to around 60,000 in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, is ground zero for Russia’s latest offensive in Moscow’s nearly three-year-old invasion of its neighbor. Despite the Kremlin’s forces using every trick to try to break through Ukrainian defenses, Kyiv is grimly holding on to the logistically important town, armed forces of Ukraine commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi exclusively told The Post Sunday. ‘The situation on the front line is really a tense one, where the enemy is carrying out a strategic offensive operation,’ he said. ‘They’ve collected most of the forces, creating domination in an attempt to breach our defense line … to capture the area.’”
• “Despite Russian state TV and social media propagandists insisting that Pokrovsk has fallen and Ukrainians are trapped, Syrskyi says the opposite is the case following a September counterattack that cost the invaders ‘about 13,000’ casualties and allowed Ukrainian forces to clear more than 165 square miles... Undeterred, Moscow has sent roughly 150,000 troops — out of the roughly 700,000 on Ukrainian territory — in the direction of Pokrovsk, with powerful mechanized groups and four marine brigades committed to the push.”
• “Russia’s goal is to encircle Pokrovsk and neighboring towns from north, south and east, choking off supply lines and squeezing out any remaining civilians in its latest gambit to capture all of Donetsk, the commander explained. “
• “Our task is to see that their level of mobilizing people would be equal or less than the number of losses they sustain,” Syrskyi said.
• “The Ukrainians have spent months building fortifications around residential townships to blunt the effectiveness of heavy machinery like tanks. ‘There’s a difference between having to defend yourself in the open field or an urban structure,’ Syrskyi said. ‘Our urban areas are able to hold off huge masses of enemy troops... It’s really a challenging one,’ the commander admitted. ‘There are ongoing battles and fights raging on. There are fast maneuvers carried out by the enemy all the time.’”
• “First of all, it is necessary to destroy the sites from where drones are being sent and command centers,” said Syrskyi.
• “We need missiles of different types, different ranges … powerful aerial defenses,” he said. “This is the highest priority for us.”

“Ukraine’s valiant defense of Pokrovsk is nearing its end,” The Economist, 11.06.25. 

• The Economist reports, “Twenty-one months after it began, Vladimir Putin’s assault on the small Donbas city of Pokrovsk … is nearing its end. A bloody surge in late October made the situation in the city and in Myrhnohrad, a satellite town, irretrievable for the Ukrainians.”
• A Ukrainian special forces officer states, “It looks like we will lose some of our units,” as Russia has achieved “vertical dominance” over key high buildings in northern Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian commander “Michael” describes Russian tactics: “Sometimes it’s one to six, one to eight, one to ten, they keep throwing bodies at it. Clausewitz would be shocked if he saw some of the ratios.”
• The article notes, “Ukraine has deployed a record number of drone squads to the sector, but is struggling against a better-resourced enemy. Elite formations such as Rubikon, reporting directly to the defense ministry in Moscow, dominate the skies.”
• An intelligence source warns, “Russia has gained a sense of courage. It is time for everyone—at home and in the West—to stop messing around.”

“A Harrowing Escape From the Drone-Infested Hellscape of Ukraine’s Front Lines,” C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 11.05.25. 

• Chivers writes, “Both Russia and Ukraine operate remotely piloted mini-aircraft that watch over the battlefield with cameras and pursue targets on sight. Some drop bomblets. Others sweep low with explosive charges to strike quarry kamikaze-style.”
• According to Chivers, “The rise of drones over Ukraine has utterly upended such ideals. A wounded soldier’s wait to reach a doctor now often stretches to times reminiscent of the worst of World War I.”
• The article details, “Aleksandr inched toward the trees. He crawled as quickly as he could, but one-legged locomotion is slow. Sweating in summer darkness, oozing blood, he covered little ground.”
• Chivers notes, “In Ukraine, the ongoing U.G.V. rollout followed a national pivot to inexpensive drones that started with quadcopters in 2022. Ukrainian ground-drone manufacturers are now a rapidly expanding sector, and unlike the land drones of yesteryear, many of their latest models work reliably and well.”
• He recounts, “Almost 99 hours had passed since he fell wounded. He was alert — a welcome sign. The prognosis was good. He had survived.”
• Chivers concludes, “That evening, Aleksandr called his mother from a hospital in Kharkiv. This time he offered a partial truth: He’d broken his leg, he said. Nadiia appeared the next morning. ‘I promised you I would remain alive,’ he said, hugging her back. ‘And I did.’”

“Ukraine’s Pokrovsk Is Falling. Don’t Make It a Defeat,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 11.06.25. 

• Champion writes, “Pokrovsk’s capture would have significant political and symbolic importance for both sides… Vladimir Putin needs this win as he heads into winter, to sustain his narrative of victory and suppress any sense that the gains in Ukraine aren’t worth the cost.”
• He observes, “For Russia, this has already been a disappointing year, gaining less new territory despite growing battlefield advantages, and at a time when the economy is showing signs of strain at home.”
• According to Champion, “the Kremlin’s propaganda… The change of administration in the US, while highly beneficial to Moscow, has not turned out as badly as it might have done. It’s vital Putin is not allowed to use a win in Pokrovsk to succeed – on the second try – in persuading Donald Trump that the best deal Ukraine can get is surrender.”
• He warns, “This is not just about Ukraine. Putin already considers himself at war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and… is preparing for more war. He’s preparing for a military that will make them a far greater threat to NATO than in 2022.”
• Champion concludes, “Better yet would be to give Kyiv enough help now to ensure Putin reaches the limits of what his military can achieve in front of Ukraine’s fortress belt, instead of at some later point, further West.” 

“How the Failed Budapest Summit Has Affected and Will Affect the Front Line in Ukraine,” Nikolay Mitrokhin, Russia Post, 11.07.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Mitrokhin writes, “Trump sought personally to implement the agreements reached at the Anchorage meeting and freeze hostilities along the existing front line, since – as he unexpectedly discovered – Zelensky and Putin hate each other so much that they cannot agree on anything. Or, as Trump has realized, Putin has no intention of stopping until fully taking at least Donetsk Region, which Ukraine is not prepared to surrender without a fight.”
• He notes, “Trump’s initiative to hold a meeting in Budapest, though initially supported by Russia, had fallen through by October 21… The underlying reason was the same: Moscow’s unwillingness to stop the war.”
• Mitrokhin reports, “The failure of the negotiations resulted in Trump imposing sanctions on Russia’s largest oil producers – Rosneft and Lukoil – on October 22. This should significantly reduce Russian fiscal revenues, at least in the medium term (Trump specified six months as the length of the sanctions on October 23).”
• He observes, “On October 26, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov briefed Putin on the situation at the front… Overall, of the 10 points in Gerasimov’s briefing concerning the front, two correspond to reality, one is partially true, another is impossible to verify and six points – or 60% of the information – are pure falsehoods.”
• Mitrokhin explains, “By November 3, Russian troops were already in control of at least 80% of Pokrovsk… The Russian army has managed to send at least a hundred soldiers in small groups into the western and central parts of the town, effectively cutting off access to the main roads westward and hunting down small groups of Ukrainian troops, including drone operators, who form the backbone of Ukraine’s defense.”

“A Town With Men in Hiding, in a Nation Desperate for Soldiers,” Maria Varenikova, New York Times, 11.10.25. 

• Varenikova writes, “Ukraine faces the twin challenges of not having enough troops and men avoiding military service. Many men of draft age… play a cat-and-mouse game with conscription officers or just hunker down at home.”
• She reports, “Nowhere is this more extreme than Vylkove, a Danube River fishing town where draft-age men have all but vanished, either hiding at home or trying to escape across the border to Romania or Moldova.”
• Varenikova notes, “Unique geography, proximity to borders, and distrust toward any government due to a history of shifting national loyalties make enthusiasm for the war unusually low in this region.”
• She observes, “At least 70 men have drowned or died trying to escape Ukraine, while others are caught, and border guard patrols and roadblocks heighten the sense of entrapment.”
• She explains, “With so many men absent, women have taken over traditionally male jobs and now dominate many sectors in Vylkove—including fishing, once an all-male occupation.”
• Varenikova adds, “Prosecutors say they have opened 290,000 cases for desertion or absence without leave, while nationwide troop shortages have created dangerous gaps on the front lines.”
• She concludes, “The demographic and social fabric of Vylkove has been transformed—‘It’s women everywhere,’ the mayor says—while the men left behind live in hiding, and the whole town faces an uncertain future.”

“The Brains Behind Ukraine’s Pink Flamingo Cruise Missile,” Jillian Kay Melchior, Wall Street Journal, 11.07.25. 

• Melchior writes, “Iryna Terekh, 33, is chief technical officer and the public face of Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense company. She and her team developed the Flamingo, a long-range cruise missile that President Volodymyr Zelensky has called ‘our most successful missile.’”
• She explains that after a personal ordeal escaping Russian occupation, Terekh “felt compelled to do something for Ukraine,” eventually pivoting from architecture to weapons design. “It’s really not rocket science,” Ms. Terekh quips. “Humanity already knows how to make explosives and rockets.”
• Melchior notes, “Unlike with donated Western weapons, Ukraine faces no external restraints on how it uses homemade munitions. Ms. Terekh says the Flamingo can hit a target more than 1,800 miles away with a payload of more than 2,500 pounds. That’s a longer range and a heavier payload than the U.S. Tomahawk.”
• The article highlights, “Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign against Russian targets is gaining momentum, and the targets are ‘related either to the Russian war economy or Russian war machinery,’ says Yuriy Sak, a former adviser to Ukraine’s Defense and Strategic Industries ministries.”
• Melchior concludes, “As Kyiv creates compounding dilemmas for Russia, it strengthens its leverage for peace talks. Ukrainian defense companies like hers have improved their country’s hand.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukrainian Special Forces Are at War with Russian SAMs," Maya Carlin, The National Interest, 11.09.25.
• "Can Ukraine Still Win the War with Russia?" Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 11.08.25.
• "Ukraine Is Running Out of Tanks," Brandon J. Weichert, The National Interest, 11.04.25.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Hitting Putin Where It Hurts,” Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, 11.06.25. 

• The editorial states, “Vladimir Putin’s military has long enjoyed a sanctuary in its war on Ukraine, as the West has restrained Kyiv from using donated missiles to strike inside Russia. That taboo is now being lifted, and Ukraine is putting more energy and ammunitions targets at risk inside Russia.”
• The authors note, “Russian oil exports finance Mr. Putin’s war, and President Volodymyr Zelensky makes a good point when he says Ukrainian strikes on energy targets are ‘long-range sanctions.’”
• They report, “In the last half of October Ukraine carried out 15 strikes on Russian energy facilities in 15 days… This year Ukraine has made nearly 160 successful attacks against Russian energy targets, says Vasyl Malyuk, the head of Ukraine’s Security Service.”
• The editorial explains, “Western intelligence helps with targeting. But U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles could threaten Russia’s Alabuga factory that produces Shahed drones, as well as missile factories.”
• The piece concludes, “Kyiv is forcing Mr. Putin to make uncomfortable choices about which military and energy targets to protect. That pressure is what’s needed to force the Russian dictator to the negotiating table.”

“Ukraine’s New U.S. Ambassador Previews Her Pragmatic Approach to Washington,” Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 11.04.25. 

• Skove reports that Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s new ambassador to the U.S., says her job is defined by wartime pragmatism: “The most stressful thing is that when I wake up in the morning, I see that it’s already lunchtime in Kyiv.”
• Stefanishyna describes Trump’s approach as unpredictable but credits him for making Ukraine “a key issue,” noting: “It was not always the situation that we had the president of the United States making ending the war in Ukraine a key issue.”
• Reflecting on a tense October meeting in which Trump pressed Zelensky to accept Russia’s terms, Stefanishyna calls it “intense” but ultimately “very good” because Trump endorsed a cease-fire along the current battle lines and canceled his meeting with Putin.
• According to Stefanishyna, Trump’s foreign policy is more transactional, and Ukraine adapts by seeking to offer things the U.S. wants, such as critical minerals and drone technology.
• She argues, “In the last three weeks, we had a very intensive discussion on energy—procurement of gas supporting Ukraine [and] backing up Ukraine’s needs in terms of equipment to restore after the missile attacks.”
• Skove notes that Stefanishyna praises both the new U.S. weapons transfer system and sanctions against Russian oil companies, but says, “There’s definitely room for enhancing” sanctions, including targeting more Russian companies and individuals.
• Stefanishyna stresses her independence from U.S. politics: “I am Ukrainian, right? I’m not a Democrat or Republican.”

“A Complacent Pentagon Needs to Learn From Ukraine,” Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 11.07.25. 

• Caryl writes, “Kyiv’s pioneers in naval drones have enabled it to destroy one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and drive Russian ships out of their home port in Sevastopol.”
• He explains, “Ukraine was the heartland of the Soviet Union’s defense industry (including missile development), which created a rich legacy of engineering and scientific know-how that Kyiv still draws on today.”
• Caryl notes, “Most recently, the Ukrainians have also been integrating artificial intelligence into the targeting systems of their aerial drones; one recent report suggests that 90 percent of their drones will incorporate AI by the end of this year.”
• The author observes, “The Europeans get it. The British, Germans, and Swedes are plowing billions into Ukraine’s defense industry ... investing in air defense systems, cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and Ukraine’s Bohdana self-propelled howitzer—not only to help Kyiv hold off the Russian invaders but also bolster their own defenses as they desperately try to ramp up their own forces to deter the growing threat from Moscow.”
• Caryl concludes, “The United States should help Ukraine, not least because Ukraine can help in return. How long will Americans need to figure that out?”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Volodymyr Zelenskyy: why should I be afraid of Donald Trump?,” Luke Harding, The Guardian, 11.09.25.
• "Europe Must Find Its Own Way in Ukraine," Zaki Laïdi, Project Syndicate, 11.07.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

See this link for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Exiled Russians hit by EU sanctions," Peter Mironenko, The Bell, 11.04.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with RIA Novosti," Russian Foreign Ministry, 11.09.25. 

• [Asked: President of Russia Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian Federation is prepared to continue adhering to the restrictions established by New START for one additional year, starting February 5, 2026. Has there been any response from the United States? Did Moscow propose a meeting with Washington to discuss the post-New START period? If so, at what level? ] “The constructive initiative put forward by President Vladimir Putin in the post-New START context speaks for itself. It contains no hidden agenda and is perfectly clear for understanding. Its practical implementation would not require any special additional efforts. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to hold in-depth discussions on this proposal. The only thing required is reciprocity from the United States: we will voluntarily adhere to the restrictions only if, and precisely for as long as, the other side does the same. Naturally, should the Americans have any questions, they are free to raise them with us... We are ready for any development of events, while hoping for a positive outcome.”
• [Asked: What is currently the main stumbling block in the negotiations with the United States on a settlement around Ukraine? Where is Russia ready to make concessions and where is it not?] “The understandings on Ukraine reached during the Russia-United States summit in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15 were based on the conditions for a fair and lasting settlement that President Vladimir Putin outlined back in June 2024 during his meeting with the leadership of our Ministry. We also took into account the proposals transmitted shortly before the Anchorage meeting by US Presidential Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. At that time, the American side assured us that it would be able to ensure that Vladimir Zelensky would not obstruct the achievement of peace. Apparently, certain difficulties have arisen in this regard. Moreover, as we understand, Brussels and London are attempting to persuade Washington to abandon its intention to resolve the crisis through political and diplomatic means and to fully engage in efforts to exert military pressure on Russia; in other words, to finally join the ‘party of war.’ ... We are currently awaiting confirmation from the United States that the Anchorage agreements remain in effect.”
• “No one disputes the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or the choice made by the residents of Crimea, Donbass, and Novorossiya, who made their historic decision to reunite with their homeland through the referendums in 2014 and 2022. We likewise do not forget the need to eliminate the root causes of the conflict, which we have repeatedly highlighted.”
• “The confiscation of our gold and foreign currency reserves will not save the united Europe’s protégés in Kyiv. … Russia will respond to any predatory actions appropriately, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, our national interests, and the need to compensate for the damage caused to us. We hope that Brussels and other Western capitals will still come to their senses and abandon this ill-advised venture.”
• [When asked: Has the US administration informed you of its readiness to recognize Crimea de jure as Russian territory as part of the peace plan?] “For obvious reasons, we do not disclose the details of our discussions with the American side on the Ukrainian issue. However, when clearly fabricated stories appear in the media, we naturally provide clarifications. The discussion covers a broad range of issues and is by no means confined to a single topic, although some journalists and analysts attempt to portray it as such, which is fundamentally incorrect....the issue of who the peninsula belongs to is resolved for us.”
• [When asked: What about your meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio? When and where might it be held?] “From our perspective, it is important that this dialogue should not be limited solely to embassy-related issues. We consider it essential to address broader questions, including the restoration of direct flights and the return of Russian diplomatic property ... Secretary of State Marco Rubio and I share an understanding that maintaining regular communication is essential, both for discussing the Ukrainian issue and for advancing the broader bilateral agenda. We remain in contact by telephone and are prepared to hold in-person meetings whenever necessary.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump's New World Order,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 11.04.25. 

• Mead writes, “In his hyperactive second term, Mr. Trump doesn't merely walk and chew gum at the same time. He dances on tightropes while juggling chainsaws.”
• He observes, “The Trump administration has ramped up its standoff with Venezuela, aiming for regime change, with significant military assets deployed in the region.”
• According to Mead, “Trump has kept himself at the center of world events by unleashing a blizzard of activity that throws his opponents off balance and helps mask failures with a flood of successes and headlines.”
• The author argues, “Despite the chaos, there is a certain logic to Trump’s approach; he truly believes U.S. power and trust have eroded due to decades of elite failure, and he aims to rebuild both.”
• Mead notes, “Trump considers Venezuela a test case for his base, tying action there to issues like drugs and migration, but also sees it as part of a wider contest with Russia, China, and Iran.”
• He highlights, “Venezuela’s vast oil reserves make control of the country geopolitically significant, potentially shifting the global balance of power and weakening adversaries’ leverage.”
• Mead concludes, “Those who think Trump is an isolationist should watch his actions—this is a president determined to reshape the world, not retreat from it.”

“The long game: How Europe can outlast Russia’s war of attrition,” Anton Barbashin, ECFR, 11.05.25.

• Barbashin writes, “Nearly 10 months in, prospects for a settlement remain remote as Trump continues to sit on the fence. The U.S. president has not dropped out from negotiations entirely and still supplies Ukraine with weapons—now sold, not given—and intelligence, but balked at providing Tomahawk missiles.”
• He notes, “The Kremlin’s core demands remain unaltered: a binding ban on Ukraine ever joining NATO; Ukrainian military withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; Ukraine’s demilitarization; and Russian veto rights over any post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. In short, Kyiv’s de facto capitulation and a fundamental reconfiguration of the Ukrainian state.”
• According to Barbashin, “Putin bets on the long-term erosion of European unity and support for Ukraine, and that the U.S. role—in Europe and worldwide—will shrink. The Russian leader articulated this vision in his recent Valdai Club address.”
• He argues, “The EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to brace for a conflict that could last an additional 2–4 years and formulate a five-year plan. It should commit roughly €100 billion annually to Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction, and make these financial, military and security commitments plainly visible.”
• Barbashin states, “A transparent roadmap would blunt Moscow’s subversive tactics and make internal manipulation futile. There are still creative ways to work with Russian frozen assets to help lighten the burden.”
• He concludes, “Stopping this meddling would require a unilateral EU retreat—ceding Ukraine and validating Putin’s gains. The viable alternative is a resolute commitment to a five-year agenda, predicated on the EU’s ability to outlast Putin’s regime and secure Ukraine’s sovereignty.”
• Barbashin emphasizes, “The prolonged confrontation with Russia is inevitable; tackling it with a long-term plan and sufficient resources is the only sensible course.”

“Racing Against Time: Realizing a True Defense Industrial Enterprise,” Gen. (ret.) CQ Brown, Jr., War on the Rocks, 11.05.25. 

• Brown emphasizes, “The United States still faces the same munitions constraints, now with the added pressure of conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.”
• He reflects, “The fluctuating numbers may not seem like a big deal among all the moving parts associated with delivering a defense budget. However, in my engagement with industry as service chief and chairman, I was often told that inconsistency made it difficult to control costs and maintain a quality workforce. Even when efforts are authorized and funds are approved, continuing resolutions delay their release.”
• Brown writes, “From my decades of service, I realize this is all easier said than done. But any steps taken to increase flexibility, consistency, and streamlining will be a plus for warfighters.”
• Referring to Ukraine’s demands, Brown asserts, “The Patriot system, which already relies on multiple primes and sub-vendors across radar, interceptors, and rocket motors, provides a clear opportunity to prove that synchronization across program offices and industry partners can translate directly into faster capability delivery.”
• The article stresses, “Acceleration depends upon collaboration and must become muscle memory. The nation needs a shared roadmap that sets priorities, aligns incentives, and measures progress in months, not years.”

“Europe-Russia: Balance of Power Review,” Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Paul Maurice, Dimitri Minic, Élie Tenenbaum (eds. Thomas Gomart), IFRI, 11.04.25.  

• Eyl-Mazzega et al. write, “European countries can no longer avoid the ‘Russian question,’ as Russia has chosen war. They have the necessary potential… to face Russia by 2030, provided they demonstrate the political will to do so.”
• They note, “Russia has maintained macroeconomic stability but now faces damaging stagflation, investing almost exclusively in the war effort. Europe weathered the energy decoupling by maintaining unity and improving geoeconomic integration.”
• The authors observe, “Russia remains bogged down in a costly war of attrition in Ukraine, relying on mass and firepower on land. However, Europe retains the advantage in air, naval, space, and cyber domains.”
• Eyl-Mazzega et al. stress, “Russian decision-making is concentrated around Putin, with human losses disproportionately affecting poorer regions. Europe remains committed to global openness, and public support for Ukraine endures as a question of societal model.”
• They explain, “Russia relies on military support from North Korea and Iran, and diplomatic backing from China. Western sanctions have isolated Russia, yet its anti-Western discourse still resonates in the ‘Global South.’”
• Eyl-Mazzega et al. conclude, “The war has strengthened EU-NATO ties with the accession of Sweden and Finland. Prospects for NATO and EU enlargement are now seen as powerful levers for transforming the European continent.”

“Germany's gruff defense minister aims to make his country 'war-ready',” Aaron Wiener, Washington Post, 11.09.25. 

• Wiener writes, “Boris Pistorius, the German defense minister, is a social democrat in a government led by conservatives, and the man now responsible for revamping and expanding the armed forces in a country that has been allergic to militarization for 80 years… He was widely criticized by the left flank of his own party for saying Germany needed to become 'kriegstüchtig'—war-ready.”
• He observes, “Russia's aggression and President Donald Trump's demands that Europe take responsibility for its own security have led to a remarkable shift in public perception of the continent's needs. But the precarious position of Germany—where the military remains small, weak and underprepared—raises doubts about Pistorius's ability to muster the political will and broad national support to impose fundamental change.”
• Wiener notes, “Pistorius set to work bolstering Germany's defense capabilities. It was time, he said, for Germany to become 'the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe.' Pistorius was a forceful supporter of Ukraine—too forceful, according to the left wing of his party. His approval ratings soared as Germans rallied around a military buildup in the face of Russian aggression.”
• He adds, “For all the stir over Pistorius's ‘war readiness’ comment, however, by all accounts, the German military is nowhere close—lacking not only soldiers but also the weapons, equipment and expertise to fight a war. Germany's heavy industry is beginning to shift toward defense production, but it's not clear that it can retool sufficiently or quickly enough.”
• Wiener concludes, “As one of the few German politicians with positive favorability, Pistorius has been floated as a future candidate for chancellor, potentially in the scheduled 2029 election—or sooner, if the governing coalition collapses…  But these aren't normal times: The AfD is surging, the mainstream parties are doing all they can to keep the far right out of power and the SPD is struggling to find its constituency amid divisions that Pistorius has helped expose.”

“The Tipping Point: An Emerging Model of European Security with Ukraine and without Russia,” Céline Marangé and Susan Stewart, SWP, 11.06.25. 

• Marangé and Stewart argue, “Ukraine’s and Russia’s visions of European security are fundamentally incompatible. Ukraine seeks integration with Western structures, while Russia aims to undermine and control.”
• They note, “A vast majority of European actors see Russia as a serious threat to European security and democracy. Europe’s main external focus will be on deterring and defending itself from Russia in at least the medium term.”
• The authors observe, “NATO and the EU are seen as the principal pillars of European security, with a strong consensus on the need to strengthen both and keep the U.S. involved.”
• Marangé and Stewart explain, “A broad consensus has emerged around consolidating a ‘European pillar of NATO,’ while the EU has quickly become a recognized and influential security actor.”
• They highlight, “Flexible formats like the ‘Nordic-Baltic 8’ and ‘Coalition of the Willing’ are gaining traction, allowing more agile security cooperation.”
• Marangé and Stewart conclude, “There is broad agreement on Ukraine’s integration into both the EU and NATO, but the degree and tempo of European commitment will determine Ukraine’s place in the emerging security order.”

“European Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare: Active Measures in Russia‘s Confrontation with Europe,” Mario Baumann and Katri Pynnöniemi, DGAP, 2025.

• Baumann and Pynnöniemi write, “Conventionally inferior, Russia is playing in the ‘gray zone’ to undermine public support for Ukraine and unity in the EU and NATO.”
• They note, “Russian military thinkers see non-military and indirect military means as fundamental to achieving strategic objectives. So-called active measures, such as disinformation campaigns, sabotage, or cyber threats, are inherent to Russia’s understanding of war.”
• The authors explain, “Throughout the escalation cycle, Russian active measures serve to prepare the battlefield, complement direct military force, and secure Russia’s strategic interests.”
• They argue, “European responses remain defensive and reactive, struggling to address the uncertainty Russia sows. A proactive approach requires insights into Russian military thinking, improved information sharing, and minimizing the gray zone.”
• Baumann and Pynnöniemi stress, “Europeans should embrace a degree of uncertainty and develop their capacity for innovation and improvisation, notably via swift decision-making, societal resilience, and a more assertive approach.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

•  “The Post-Cold War Era Is Over. What Should We Call This New One?” Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 11.10.25.
• “Trump's incoherent foreign policy defies explanation,” Max Boot, Washington Post, 11.10.25.
• “Collective Seapower: NATO’s New Maritime Strategy,” Emma Salisbury, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11.08.25.
• "European Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare: Active Measures in Russia‘s Confrontation with Europe," Mario Baumann and Katri Pynnöniemi, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 11.05.25.
• “Putin’s archrival [Mikhail Khodorkovsky] warns Europe: Brace for Cold War II whatever happens in Ukraine,” Eva Hartog, Politico, 11.07.25. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Multivector Policy of Russia and China in the Middle East: ‘Vertical’ Limitations,” Adlan Margoev, Russian International Affairs Council, 11.07.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Margoev writes, “Russia and China have built an extensive network of strategic partnerships with Middle Eastern states, pursuing a multivector political course in the region. However, such horizontal expansion is accompanied by ‘vertical’ limitations, since relations do not deepen to the level of formal alliances.”
• He argues, “Strategic partnerships for both powers do not mean alliances and mutual defense commitments, but instead denote sturdier relations with regional actors, mainly in the economic sphere.”
• Margoev notes, “Russia and China develop trade ties with any willing partner, including circumventing American and European sanctions.”
• He emphasizes, “In times of acute crisis, Russia and China only provide military-technical assistance to partners on a commercial basis—and only if the partner can manage the situation independently; otherwise, they distance themselves.”
• According to Margoev, “Regional partners often expect Moscow and Beijing to offer support during a conflict with the U.S. and its allies, but such expectations do not match the true nature of these relationships.”
• He recommends, “By publicly clarifying the difference between alliance and strategic partnership, Russia and China could correct inflated expectations and stress that multipolarity does not mean the creation of blocs.”
• Margoev concludes, “Clear communication will prevent partner disappointment, like that shown by Iran over unmet expectations during its conflict with Israel and the U.S. in June 2025.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Xi and Putin Got Trump’s Number,” Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer, Stay Tuned, 11.07.25.

Missile defense:

“America’s plans for a Golden Dome are dangerously obscure,” The Economist, 11.06.25. 

• The Economist notes, “It has been almost a year since President Donald Trump signed an executive order promising to build what he then called an Iron Dome for America… The project, whose name has been gaudified to Golden Dome, is not as outlandish as it sounds. Missile threats are multiplying.”
• The article explains, “What is known about the Golden Dome? It includes many things that already exist, such as anti-missile interceptors in Alaska and California, as well as Patriot batteries similar to the ones protecting Ukraine today.”
• The authors add, “The most important [new bit] is the commitment to build space-based interceptors (SBIs), which are small missiles carried aboard satellites in low-Earth orbit… [to] destroy a missile as it is taking off.”
• They warn, “The problem with Mr. Trump’s plan is that it is still unclear what Golden Dome is supposed to do… The answers to these questions matter greatly. Experts calculate that a smallish Golden Dome… might cost just over $250bn over 20 years… But a full-fat version with tens of thousands of SBIs in orbit… could run to $3.6trn, a vast sum that would cannibalize America’s armed forces.”
• The Economist concludes, “Mr. Trump is right to shore up America’s defenses. But he should resist the temptation to gold-plate the Golden Dome.”

Nuclear arms:

“How to Understand Donald Trump’s Nuclear Testing Remarks: President Trump’s statements about nuclear testing affirm his determination to ensure that the United States maintains the most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world,” Graham Allison, The National Interest, 11.07.25.

• Graham Allison wrote, “Last week, President Trump announced that “because of other countries[’] testing programs,” he had “instructed the Department of War to begin testing our nuclear weapons on an equal basis.’ In the days that followed, headlines shouted: ‘mushroom clouds on the horizon,’ ‘Trump doubles down on Nuclear Tests,’ and ‘U.S. nuclear weapons tests can forever scar a nation.’ Amid the hype, many in the media struggled to decipher what the president could have in mind.”
• “Critics make a living taking his words and imagining the worst. However, when interpreting President Trump’s statements, one should begin with Peter Thiel’s insight. As Thiel put it way back in 2016: ‘…the media is always taking Trump literally. It never takes him seriously, but it always takes him literally… I think a lot of voters who vote for Trump take Trump seriously but not literally.’ Trump speaks in hyperbole—his unique combination of fact, fiction, and fantasy,” according to Allison.
• Allison asks, “So, how should we understand Trump’s recent threat to resume nuclear testing? How seriously should we take press claims that the United States is on the verge of exploding nuclear weapons—something that has not been done since 1992 and would violate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that it championed, which has constrained Russia, China, and others from detonating nuclear weapons? My answer is: not much.”
• “Informed observers know that there are many ways countries ‘test nuclear weapons’ to ensure that they have a credible deterrent. Test launches of missiles, like the one the United States carried out at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California this week, ensure that our delivery systems remain reliable, ready, and accurate. As part of our Stockpile Stewardship Program, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) carries out tests, experiments, and simulations weekly to ensure our nuclear warheads work as intended should they be needed. Furthermore, tests go far beyond our missiles and warheads. The United States also regularly tests its nuclear command and control systems. For example, last April, when the Air Force carried out a test of its airborne nuclear command and control system, it ensured that the United States has a reliable second-strike capability.”
• “Unlike the alarmists who have been the loudest voices touting President Trump’s tweet, when asked about this issue, the professionals in charge of managing our nuclear weapons have been reassuring. At his confirmation hearing last week, President Trump’s nominee to become the future STRATCOM commander—the individual responsible for America’s nuclear arsenal—was asked about the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. Vice Admiral Richard Correll, who is currently the Deputy STRATCOM commander, responded crisply: ‘I have absolute confidence that those systems will perform wherever we need them to perform.’ Similarly, when asked about the possibility of resuming nuclear testing last Sunday, President Trump’s Secretary of Energy Chris Wright asserted, ‘the tests we’re talking about right now are system tests. These are not nuclear explosions.’”
• “President Trump’s comment has excited interest in some parts of the U.S. government and expert community about the possibility that he could authorize ‘super-critical tests.’ The official position of former administrations has been that these are prohibited by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, because the terms of the treaty are somewhat ambiguous on this point, Russia and China have both interpreted it in a manner that has allowed them to conduct super-critical tests—and they have done so,” Allison notes. “This may have been what President Trump was referring to in an interview with 60 Minutes last week, when he said, ‘They test way underground where people don’t know exactly what’s happening with the test. You feel a little bit of vibration. They test and we don’t test.’ Advocates of nuclear testing argue that engaging in equivalent tests could provide new, valuable information on the effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal,” Allison explains.
• “Despite his often imprecise rhetoric, Trump has a better understanding of nuclear perils than any other political leader on the national or international stage today. As he has frequently asserted, he really believes that ‘nuclear weapons are the biggest problem we have.’ With this in mind, my advice is: when listening to the president talk about nuclear issues, and even more when reading shrill claims about his words in the press, take Trump seriously—but not literally.”

“A return to nuclear testing in an unstable age?” Daniel Salisbury, IISS, 11.05.25. 

• Salisbury writes, “President Trump has suggested that the U.S. will return to nuclear testing ‘on an equal basis’… This has raised real concerns that the U.S. will return to nuclear test explosions, potentially triggering other nuclear-armed states to return to the practice.”
• He notes, “Only North Korea has tested nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century… The U.S. has not tested since Congress passed a law to suspend testing for a year in 1992, and Moscow has not conducted an explosive test since 1990, a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
• Salisbury states, “Both the Burevestnik and Poseidon [Russian nuclear systems] were tested in the days leading up to Trump’s statement. It is likely that these tests triggered Trump’s statement about the U.S. resumption of testing, suggesting that Trump’s ‘equal basis’ alludes to testing of these nuclear delivery systems.”
• He adds, “The U.S. is unlikely to resume full-scale underground explosive tests of nuclear weapons… Maintaining a test moratorium helps the U.S., which already has access to more nuclear weapons data than Russia and China combined.”
• Salisbury concludes, “Recent years have seen the emergence of a more dangerous nuclear age… an increase in tests of nuclear-delivery systems would be destabilizing, helping to perpetuate emerging arms-race dynamics between the U.S., Russia and China.”

“Resumed U.S. Nuclear Testing? Unnecessary and Unwise,” Steven Pifer, CISAC, 11.03.25.

• Pifer writes, “Explosive testing of U.S. nuclear warheads is unnecessary. The long-running Stockpile Stewardship Program ensures that warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are safe, secure and effective without the need for explosive testing.”
• He argues, “Resumed testing would be unwise. Potential adversaries… would use U.S. testing as the excuse to conduct their own tests, seizing the opportunity to erode the American lead in nuclear weapons knowledge.”
• Pifer notes, “Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov told the press on Oct. 30 that, if the United States resumed testing, Russia ‘will respond in kind.’ Resumed nuclear explosive testing could be of particular interest to China, which has… embarked on a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal.”
• He explains, “With the exception of North Korea, the world’s nuclear weapon states have observed a de facto moratorium on nuclear tests since 1998. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) reinforced the moratorium by banning all nuclear weapons tests or explosions.”
• Pifer concludes, “Hopefully, wiser heads in the administration will explain to Mr. Trump that the United States does not… need to conduct a nuclear explosive test and that doing so would almost certainly trigger a spate of nuclear testing by potential adversary states. That would undermine U.S. security as others gained more knowledge about nuclear weapons effects.”

“Russia’s Latest Nuclear Saber-Rattling: Nuclear Testing?” Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie, CSIS, 11.05.25. 

• Williams and MacKenzie write, “In a Nov. 5 meeting of the Security Council of Russia, President Vladimir Putin directed his military and political leaders to ‘submit coordinated proposals on the possible first steps focusing on preparations for nuclear weapons tests.’”
• They note, “Putin made clear that Russia would not resume nuclear testing unless the United States did so first, saying, ‘Russia has always strictly adhered to its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and we do not plan to abandon these obligations… if the United States or any other state party… was to conduct such tests, Russia would be under obligation to take reciprocal measures.’”
• The authors explain, “Several of Putin’s deputies expressed uncertainty about the meaning of Trump’s statements on nuclear testing. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, for example, acknowledged the ‘absence of an official explanation from the American side’ but maintained that the General Staff’s analysis ‘indicates Washington’s intent to prepare for and conduct such tests.’”
• Williams and MacKenzie add, “Russia has also been accused of conducting supercritical tests in violation of the zero-yield standard… Compliance reports by the U.S. Department of State continue to raise concerns about Russian low-yield testing and a lack of transparency at the Novaya Zemlya test site.”
• They conclude, “Putin’s comments suggested Russia would only return to explosive testing if the United States tested first… The opacity of comments on both sides raises the risks of misperception and preemptive testing or testing preparations.”

“The new nuclear arms race,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 11.05.25.

•  “Donald Trump’s statement last week that the U.S. would resume testing nuclear weapons ‘on an equal basis’ with Russia and China wrongfooted his own officials as much as it did Beijing and Moscow.”
• “Restarting warhead tests would break a three-decade moratorium by the major nuclear powers. Coming after Russia’s Vladimir Putin bragged of two new weapons delivery systems, it bolstered concerns that the world is sliding into a new nuclear arms race—when much of the cold war-era arms control architecture has collapsed.”
• “Whatever the truth, a return to U.S. warhead testing would be a highly retrograde step. It would provide cover to do likewise not just for Russia and China but other nuclear states keen to upgrade their weapons.”
• “It would also demolish one of the few remaining pillars of U.S.-Russian arms control.”
• “Whatever Trump’s justifiable frustrations with Putin in his efforts to end the Ukraine war and regardless of China’s position today, the U.S. president ought to engage with Moscow on extending New Start as a step towards rebuilding arms control.”

“The nuclear arms race is back,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 11.09.25. 

• Rachman writes, “It was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that returned the nuclear threat to the center of world politics. From the start, Putin used nuclear saber-rattling to warn off the west.”
• He notes, “Shortly afterwards Donald Trump announced that he had decided to renew U.S. testing of nuclear weapons—potentially ending a moratorium that has lasted more than 30 years.”
• Rachman highlights, “China has more than doubled its stockpile of nuclear weapons to around 600—and its arsenal looks set to double again over the next decade. All the nine nuclear-armed states… are currently modernizing and often expanding their nuclear arsenals.”
• He cautions, “The attack by nuclear-armed Russia on non-nuclear Ukraine… has put the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons on to the agenda of states that fear the removal of the American security umbrella.”
• Rachman concludes, “A lot could depend on the outcome of the Ukraine war. Over the course of the last three years, Putin’s nuclear blackmail has become less effective. Ukraine is now encouraged to strike targets deep inside Russia using western intelligence and missiles, which was an absolute taboo in 2022.”

“What Does Trump Think Nuclear Testing Is?” Decker Eveleth, Foreign Policy, 11.04.25.

• Eveleth writes, “What Trump means by this is unclear at best, and he has now been contradicted by the U.S. energy secretary, leaving the waters even murkier. While some have assumed that this constitutes a direct order to resume explosive testing of nuclear devices, stating that the United States would be testing on an ‘equal basis’ suggests this is more about testing delivery systems, or conducting very-low yield supercritical tests of materials and subcomponents, not warheads themselves.”
• The author notes, “Small scale supercritical tests also generate less information than full-scale warhead tests… and require specialized facilities that the United States has not invested in, and conducting them may also take years of investment.”
• According to Eveleth, “Trump’s announcement also came as Russia tested two of its next-generation nuclear delivery systems… Trump may want the United States to begin flight testing nuclear systems at a rate that matches that of tests in China and Russia.”
• He cautions, “A resumption of nuclear testing could also produce serious diplomatic consequences as public opinion in allied countries sours… This would have serious consequences for the network of alliances that the United States has built to deter Russia and China.”
• Eveleth concludes, “None of the United States’ options—from the resumption of nuclear testing to increases in flight testing—are ones that can produce short-term results… Whatever Trump meant by his statement, the course that follows could be significant and dangerous.”

“Putin's nuclear threats require a careful response,” Serhii Plokhy, Washington Post, 11.06.25. 

• Plokhy writes, “President Donald Trump responded by announcing the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing…  One thing, however, is quite clear: The nuclear arms race, nuclear blackmail and nuclear brinkmanship are all back in a way not seen since the end of the Cold War.”
• He argues, “Kennedy ended Khrushchev's Cuban adventure and broader nuclear blackmail by standing firm—while also taking less confrontational steps to resolve the crisis… Once Kennedy demonstrated his resolve to stand up to Khrushchev and remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba, the nuclear threats and blackmail emanating from Moscow stopped.”
• Plokhy observes, “The world survived the Cold War and the first nuclear arms race not only by building up nuclear arsenals…  but also by establishing a balance of fear—a precarious psychological equilibrium sustained by mutual deterrence.”
• He warns, “With last week's pronouncements, the nuclear arms race has reached a new, dangerous level. It is more important today than at any point in the previous 30 plus years to relearn the lessons of the first nuclear age.”
• Plokhy concludes, “Putin's nuclear threats require a response—but one that prudently weighs both the risks and the potential benefits on the path of avoiding nuclear confrontation.”

“Presenting awards to developers of the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon unmanned submersible. On National Unity Day, the President held a ceremony at the Kremlin to present state decorations to the designers of the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon unmanned submersible,” Kremlin.ru, 11.04.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Well-deserved state decorations will be awarded to the designers of the Burevestnik strategic unlimited-range cruise missile with a nuclear engine and to the designers of the Poseidon unmanned submersible… It will be no exaggeration to say that the result you have achieved is of historic importance for our nation and for ensuring our security and strategic parity for decades to come—in fact, for the rest of the 21st century.”
• “Burevestnik has surpassed all other known missiles in the world in terms of range. It also boasts high precision, achieved steadily within a pre-calculated timeframe. I believe foreign specialists were able to learn about these characteristics first-hand since during the testing of Burevestnik on Oct. 21, a NATO reconnaissance vessel was continuously present in the trial zone. We did not interfere with its operation. They were allowed to watch.”
• “I want to highlight the unique mode of powerful ultra-small nuclear reactors in this missile. Their launch takes seconds, whereas regular reactors take hours or even a whole day. On the basis of such power systems, we are already developing a new generation of weapons.”
• “Moreover, we have launched the development of next-generation nuclear-powered cruise missiles. Their speed will be more than three times the speed of sound. Subsequently, they will become hypersonic. We have recently discussed this project with some of our colleagues present here in this hall.” The Poseidon project was also closely linked to the creation of Burevestnik. They rely on what can largely be described as unique and complementary technology and innovation.”
• “Of course, Poseidon’s developers had their own specific tasks for operating a submarine system. I am referring to using cutting-edge materials, nodes and components that a device of this kind needs to enable it to be faster and go deeper, up to 1,000 meters. As for the speed, it is several times faster compared to all the latest above-water vessels.”
• “Of course, we have also succeeded in developing other super-complex systems similar to Burevestnik and Poseidon, which demonstrates that research institutions, universities and schools, manufacturers and the economy as a whole have immense potential and opportunities in today’s world.”
• [Using these technologies we can build] small nuclear reactors for powering the Arctic zone and exploring near and deeper space, including powering the spacecraft we are developing right now for delivering heavy payloads. This could also be used in the future for the base on the Moon too. By operating based on new principles and algorithms, the Poseidon project can facilitate efforts to improve unmanned devices, while also helping develop shipbuilding, navigation systems and unmanned navigation, including in the Arctic, while exploring the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, and along other routes.”
• “Our country poses no threat to anyone. Russia, like all other nuclear powers, is building its nuclear capabilities and its strategic potential. Everything we have just discussed is routine work that was announced long ago.”
• “All our plans for creating advanced weapons systems, upgrading our defense industry, and equipping the Russian Army and Navy with the latest weaponry and technology are being implemented. I am referring to the development and deployment of the latest Avangard strategic missile system. We have developed and deployed the Oreshnik medium-range missile system and have begun serial production. We have equipped our intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles with modern systems to counter anti-ballistic missile defenses. This year, we will put the Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile system through combat trials, and next year, deploy it on combat duty.”

“Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council. Vladimir Putin held an operational meeting with permanent members of the Security Council at the Kremlin,”³ Kremlin.ru, 11.05.25. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian Views.

• [When asked by Duma speaker Volodin: … bearing in mind that two years ago you said on your part that if the U.S. returns to nuclear weapons tests, Russia has every right to do the same, could you please clarify what steps and actions will be taken on our side regarding this issue, which is of great concern to almost every deputy? Given how urgent this is—especially since the President of the United States himself has commented on it.] Putin said: “Yes, indeed, this is a serious issue. Let’s hear from our colleagues. I give the floor to Minister of Defense Andrei Removich [Belousov]. Please, go ahead.”
• Defense Minister Belousov: “We must certainly be guided not only by the statements and remarks of politicians or American officials, but above all by the actions of the United States of America. And these actions clearly indicate Washington is actively accumulating strategic offensive weapons.”
  • “First, the White House has consistently withdrawn from treaties that had existed for many years to reduce and limit weapons. In 2002—from the ABM Treaty, in 2019—from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, in 2020—from the Open Skies Treaty. Therefore, the possible rejection by the U.S. of the moratorium on nuclear testing may become a quite logical next step in Washington’s destruction of the global strategic stability system.”
  • “Second, the U.S. is rapidly modernizing its strategic offensive weapons. Work is underway to create a new intercontinental ballistic missile, “Sentinel,” with a new nuclear warhead. Its range will be 13,000 kilometers. Work is in progress on the advanced strategic nuclear submarine “Columbia” to replace the “Ohio” class. A new heavy bomber, the B-21 “Raider,” is in development. A nuclear-tipped cruise missile is also being developed, and so on. Plans include recommissioning 56 launchers on 14 “Ohio”-class submarines—I want to emphasize, actually bringing them back into service, fully loaded with Trident II ballistic missiles. Preparations are underway for backfitting 30 B-52H strategic bombers to carry nuclear weapons again.”
  • “Third, the Americans have begun implementing the “Golden Dome” program providing for both missile interception and pre-launch strikes against Russian and Chinese missiles.”
  • “Fourth, by the end of this year, the U.S. Army is to deploy the new “Dark Eagle” medium-range missile complex with hypersonic missiles, a range of 5,500 km. In future, this will be deployed in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The flight time from Germany, where this missile system is to be stationed, to targets in central Russia will be about six or seven minutes.”
  • “Fifth, Washington regularly conducts strategic offensive force exercises. The latest, “Global Thunder 2025,” focused—let me underscore—on practicing preemptive nuclear missile strikes against Russian territory, and took place in October this year.”
    • Overall, this is a comprehensive set of measures, including possible plans by the U.S. to conduct nuclear tests, all of which greatly increase the level of military danger for Russia. Hence, we must keep our nuclear potential ready to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary in any situation, and act adequately in response to Washington's moves to guarantee our country’s security. Given the above, I consider it advisable that preparations for full-scale nuclear weapons tests begin immediately. The Central Testing Range on Novaya Zemlya has the readiness to ensure that such tests could be carried out in the shortest time possible.”
• Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov: “The fact that the American side is not providing official clarification on President Trump’s statement about the resumption of nuclear tests does not give us grounds to assume that the United States will not soon begin preparations and then conduct nuclear weapons testing. The Americans may continue to avoid giving official explanations, but that doesn't change anything: if we don’t take appropriate measures now, time and opportunity for timely response to U.S. actions may be lost, since preparation for nuclear tests takes from several months to several years, depending on the type. We are aware of statements by a number of high-ranking U.S. officials about resuming U.S. nuclear testing, and analyzing these statements shows Washington is in fact preparing to conduct tests.”
• Director of Foreign Intelligence Service Naryshkin: “Our diplomats inquired what exactly was meant in the statement regarding instructions the U.S. President supposedly gave the Pentagon to immediately proceed to nuclear weapons testing, and asked the National Security Council and State Department for clarification. Both the White House and the State Department representatives evaded substantive responses and said they'd report the information “up the chain” and would contact the Russian side if they considered it necessary to offer explanations on the points raised by our diplomats.”
• Secretary of the Security Council Shoigu: “From analyzing all these remarks [by Trump and his ministers], it is not entirely clear to us what the U.S. will do next regarding conducting—or not conducting—nuclear weapons tests.”
• FSB director Bortnikov: “Vladimir Vladimirovich, this is certainly a very complex, difficult situation. I agree that we must take it very seriously, but there are many questions before a definite decision is made, in my view. Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich, I’d like to request time for us to thoroughly investigate everything and to prepare relevant proposals.”
• Putin: “I’ve taken note of your comments and opinions, and I’d like to say that Russia has always strictly adhered to and continues to adhere to its commitments under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and we have no plans to walk away from those obligations. At the same time, back in my 2023 Address to the Federal Assembly, I said that if the United States or other treaty signatories conduct such tests, then Russia must respond accordingly and take appropriate measures. In this context, I instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, special services, and relevant civilian agencies to do everything to gather additional information on this issue, analyze it within the Security Council, and submit coordinated proposals regarding the possible start of preparations for nuclear weapons testing.”

“Academic Arbatov: Nuclear Weapons Have Sharply Returned to Great Power Relations,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. 

• [When asked to comment on Trump’s nuclear test directive:] "It seems to me that Trump himself did not fully understand what he was talking about. He has a very vague idea about nuclear weapons, treaties, and doctrines. First, Trump said he had ordered the Pentagon to resume nuclear testing. In reality, the U.S. hasn’t tested nuclear weapons for 33 years, though these tests and all work with nuclear warheads are actually handled by the Department of Energy, not the Pentagon. Secondly, he noted that the U.S. does not test, while China and Russia do. This is simply not true…  Thirdly, Trump said: 'We will test on an equal basis.' So most likely, he lumps together under 'nuclear testing' everything from missile test launches and other delivery systems to so-called live nuclear tests involving explosions. For an ordinary person, these may all seem the same. But a U.S. president, who is accompanied everywhere by the 'nuclear football' for delivering nuclear strike orders, who approves all nuclear weapons programs and sanctions nuclear force exercises and deployments, is not an ordinary person. He is required to understand that, alongside the moratorium on explosive tests, all nuclear states regularly test their delivery systems (of course, without nuclear warheads) to ensure reliability and demonstrate capabilities of new systems.”
• “Trump’s abrupt statement on Oct. 29, in his usual style, created uncertainty and a spike in global tensions, resistance from Congress, fierce debates among global experts, panic among allies, and even contradictions within his own administration.”
• “Whether it’s possible to destroy the world 150 or 300 times is just another of Trump’s rhetorical improvisations. But ignoring the number, which is completely arbitrary, the president is essentially correct here, though the idea itself is hardly original.”
• “Trying to scare Beijing with a resumption of nuclear tests is counterproductive—if anything, it will only accelerate the development of China’s nuclear arsenal, not push them toward negotiations to limit it with the U.S.”
• [When asked: Can 'Burevestnik' and 'Poseidon' be considered Moscow’s trump cards in negotiations with Washington?] “In a certain sense, yes, because back in 2021, when talks began between the two powers about a new strategic arms treaty (which were halted after the start of the [special military operation]), the Americans designated these latest systems, alongside tactical nuclear weapons, as priorities. It would be an exaggeration to say they’re very frightened, but they do not understand the exact purpose of these new Russian weapons or their potential impact on the strategic balance or control systems. And what is unclear causes concern. So ‘Burevestnik’ and ‘Poseidon’ can indeed serve as bargaining chips.”
• [When asked about the Golden Dome:] “This missile defense system is still ‘a bird in the sky,’ or rather, in space. No one knows whether the ‘Golden Dome’ will work out or not. There are competent skeptical assessments about this… To intercept even a few ballistic missiles, you would need over 900 such devices in space, not to mention their effective interception capabilities. And if there are not just a few missiles, but several hundred, the monumental scale of the task becomes clear. Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ couldn’t manage it, so whether Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ can is a big question… As for ‘Poseidon,’ it was initially conceived as a counter to 'Star Wars,' as was the Russian hypersonic glide vehicle ‘Avangard.’ Undoubtedly, ‘Poseidon’ and ‘Burevestnik’ can overcome any space-based missile defense system because you can’t target an underwater vehicle from space, nor knock out a low-flying, zigzagging cruise missile.”
• [When asked: Trump also said that an American nuclear submarine is currently off Russia’s coast. Where might it be?] “In theory, it could be in the Barents or Kara Seas. But why? U.S. strategic nuclear submarines never approach any shores. They are equipped with Trident-2 missiles with intercontinental range of 8–10,000 kilometers. The U.S. has 12 such submarines in combat-ready status (with two usually under overhaul), of which 6–7 are on patrol in the Pacific and Atlantic at any given time. They sail where it is safest while remaining within reach of their assigned targets. There’s no need for them to move closer and put themselves at risk from our fleet. I’d say this is another of Trump's nuclear fantasies.”
• [When asked: How do you assess the reaction of Russian leadership during the Nov. 5 Security Council meeting to Trump’s nuclear test statement?] “Judging by everything, they took it quite seriously. I don’t know whether that pleased or upset Trump. Defense Minister Belousov, Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, and leaders of other respected agencies said that not just words but also actions by the U.S. significantly increase the military threat level to Russia.”
• “Having returned to power for the second time, Trump has mentioned this several times, for some reason calling nuclear disarmament ‘denuclearization.’ But this is not a fantasy, it’s more of a pious wish. However, a head of state ought to operate with practical measures, not wishes. Trump has been in power for almost a year now, and there have been no positive shifts. For example, in September, Putin proposed mutually agreeing for a year or more not to exceed the START-3 treaty limits, which expires next February. Trump responded very ambiguously, saying literally that it seemed like a good idea to him. But nothing has happened since. There’s no sign of any movement.”
• [When asked: Is it correct to say that Moscow and Washington are currently threatening each other with nuclear weapons?] “I would not use such strong language. Although Trump does not hold back in his expressions and says things previous U.S. presidents wouldn't have allowed themselves to say. Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons have come squarely back into great power relations, and military doctrines now give greater prominence to their use. If compliance with START-3 is not renewed, if nuclear tests resume and the ban treaty collapses, not only will the Non-Proliferation Treaty unravel, but so will all the remaining agreements and norms in this area. Soon, there won’t be 9, but 15–20 nuclear-armed states, nuclear conflicts will begin, this weapon will end up with terrorists, and global nuclear chaos will ensue. In terms of reducing the nuclear threat, we are rolling back several decades. It is time to halt this destructive process and urgently begin restoring the system of nuclear arms limitation.”

"The ‘Zapad’ exercise and how Lukashenko learned to love the bomb," Rosa-Hernández and Eveleth, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 11.06.25. 

• Rosa-Hernández and Eveleth write, “Zapad-25 was the first major Russian military exercise since Moscow’s nuclear sharing arrangement with Belarus, prompting heightened expectations about visible nuclear maneuvers on Belarusian soil.”
• They note, “While Belarusian officials repeatedly suggested the exercise would showcase new nuclear capabilities, the drills themselves focused largely on conventional operations, with little evidence of nuclear activities shown to the public.”
• The authors explain, “Belarusian Defense Minister Khrenin and other officials used nuclear rhetoric to highlight perceived regional threats—chiefly Poland’s military buildup—framing Russian nuclear deployments as defensive, even as Russia remained ambiguous about the exercise’s nuclear dimension.”
• According to Rosa-Hernández and Eveleth, “Although dual-capable missile systems like Iskander-M featured in the exercise, the lack of explicit nuclear signaling and limited transparency about nuclear planning mark a departure from earlier, more provocative public messaging.”
• They observe, “Lukashenko’s government invited NATO observers and emphasized transparency, balancing a desire for Russian security guarantees with efforts to project Belarusian independence—even striking a deal with the U.S. to release political prisoners for sanctions relief.”
• They stress, “Despite the diplomatic outreach, Belarus’s autonomy is significantly constrained: any use of nuclear weapons remains under Russian control, and Belarusian forces would fall under joint command in a crisis.”
• Rosa-Hernández and Eveleth conclude, “Zapad-25 revealed the limits of Belarus’s room for maneuver. While Russian nuclear deployments provide Lukashenko with leverage against both domestic and foreign pressures, they also entangle Belarus’s fate ever more tightly to Moscow’s strategic priorities.”

“Nuclear Capital Inflation: Has the World Stopped Fearing Putin and His ‘Bomb’?” Andrey Okun, Republic, 11.04.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. 

• Okun writes, “Putin has repeatedly used nuclear weapons as a tool of intimidation, but after three years of threats and warnings of ‘stunning consequences,’ his arsenal of deterrence is devalued: nuclear blackmail no longer paralyzes decision-makers in the West, and new ‘Burevestniks’ and ‘Poseidons’ provoke only irony and boredom.”
• He notes, “Putin’s nuclear rhetoric bought Russia time, slowing the West’s provision of lethal weapons or long-range arms to Ukraine, but this strategy eventually lost its power as Russia faced defeats and the West ramped up both sanctions and weapons deliveries.”
• Okun explains, “By autumn 2024, Western leaders were prepared to allow Ukraine to use American and British missiles for strikes deep into Russia—a shift that prompted Putin to speak more openly about nuclear weapons and sign a modified nuclear doctrine allowing nuclear use in response to conventional attacks threatening Russian sovereignty.”
• He observes, “However, each new threat from the Kremlin failed to generate the paralyzing fear seen earlier in the war: ‘Kremlin’s threats no longer alter decisions in Washington or European capitals, as Western leaders are increasingly skeptical of Putin’s willingness to escalate to nuclear use.’”
• Okun concludes, “U.S. President Donald Trump, on his way to meet Xi Jinping, announced the resumption of American nuclear testing in response to Russian nuclear posturing—marking the first time the American president dared respond directly, inviting Putin into a new arms race.”

“Putin’s Nuclear Threats Don’t Work on Trump. Here’s Why,” Brendan Cole, Newsweek, 11.09.25. 

• Cole reports, “Donald Trump does not fear the nuclear threats that Russian President Vladimir Putin has made during his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, historian and author Serhii Plokhy has told Newsweek.”
• Plokhy is quoted: “I don't see Trump being afraid of Russia or Russia using nuclear weapons, and the fear of nuclear Russia, that was the biggest driving force of the Biden administration.”
• Cole writes, “This fear of Putin’s ‘red lines’ caused U.S delays in giving Ukraine the weapons it called for, Washington’s former ambassador to Russia, John J. Sullivan told Newsweek last year.”
• Plokhy adds, “No one now talks about so-called Putin's red lines… That was the constant theme of President Biden's administration.”
• Cole explains, “Ambiguous rhetoric from the Kremlin and more overt threats from its TV propagandists stoked fears about Russia breaking the nuclear taboo in Ukraine, although analysts had often dismissed the idea that nuclear weapons offer a significant battlefield advantage.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Russia’s Nuclear-Powered Burevestnik Missile: Implications for Missile Defense," Patrycja Bazylczyk and Hannah Freeman, CSIS, 11.04.25.
• “Vladimir Putin’s endless nuclear threats are a sign of Russian weakness,” Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council, 11.06.25. 

Counterterrorism:

“Terrorist Organizations and Conservative Islamic Influencers are Capitalizing on Sinophobia in Central Asia,” Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, RUSI, 11.04.25.

• Jardine and Lemon write, “China’s repression of its Muslim citizens acts as a lightning rod for criticism of the country and its influence campaign in Central Asia.”
• The authors observe, “Jihadist groups and conservative clerics are stoking up Sinophobia, using Beijing’s treatment of Uyghurs and securitized posture to radicalize and recruit.”
• They note, “In Afghanistan, ISKP propaganda contrasts Taliban-China meetings with images of Muslim repression, while other IS groups have explicitly threatened Beijing with violence.”
• According to the analysis, “Beijing’s domestic and regional security policies have become a central target in extremist propaganda, which now frequently depicts China as the ‘enemy of Islam.’”
• Jardine and Lemon highlight, “Anti-China sentiment has penetrated broader Islamist discourse, with influential clerics and movements like Hizb ut-Tahrir framing China’s presence as colonial exploitation of Muslim lands.”
• They emphasize, “China’s hardline approach has made it a more prominent target for radical narratives, even as its direct risk from terrorist attacks remains limited for now.”
• The authors conclude, “Beijing’s repressive policies risk not only local backlash but a broader ideological confrontation, potentially eroding its reputation across the Muslim world.”

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia’s U-turn in Syria,” Ruslan Suleymanov, Russia Post, 11.05.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Suleymanov writes, “The fall of Assad in late 2024 was a personal defeat for Putin, who had supported the Assad regime for years, both diplomatically and militarily. Now, those whom the Kremlin yesterday labeled ‘terrorists’ are sitting across the table negotiating on behalf of Syria.”
• He observes, “Moscow has accepted that Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a terrorist group officially prohibited in Russia, has essentially come to power in Syria,” and notes Russia’s quick narrative shift: “Russian propaganda stopped calling HTS ‘terrorists’—they became the ‘armed opposition.’”
• Suleymanov highlights, “The Kremlin has granted Assad political asylum but did not appeal to his legitimacy as president, as it had for Ukraine’s Yanukovych in 2014.”
• He explains, “For Putin, meeting with the new Syrian leader, who is already recognized by most countries in the region, is a chance to buttress his image and demonstrate that Russia, unlike Iran, has not lost in Syria with Assad’s defeat.”
• According to Suleymanov, “The new Syrian authorities are interested in deploying Russian military patrols in certain regions… In exchange, Moscow can keep its two military bases: the naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim air base in Latakia.”
• He notes, “This presence serves as a counterweight to Israel, Turkey, and the U.S. in the region, maintaining Moscow’s influence in the Middle East.”
• Suleymanov concludes, “All in all, the Russian authorities are doing their best to hide Assad… while the new regime in Damascus focuses on basic governance and economic challenges.”

Cyber security/AI: 

“If You Can’t Beat Them, Steal: Russia’s AI Strategy,” Elena Grossfeld, KCSI Insights, 11.03.25. 

• Grossfeld writes, “Due to U.S. sanctions Russia, by contrast, is encountering critical AI deficits. While European nations can access advanced chips from the U.S. and Taiwan, Russia must rely on domestic production that lags 13-fold behind China and 33-fold behind the U.S..”
• She explains, “As Russia still struggles to produce nails and continues to operate machinery received as reparations from Germany eight decades ago, developing cutting-edge AI domestically remains a fantasy.”
• The author observes, “Evidence of this dependency emerged in 2024 when cybersecurity researchers discovered that APT28… was relying on API calls to a Chinese-developed LLM… for real-time malware command generation.”
• Grossfeld states, “Russian operations leverage publicly available LLMs to generate content at scale, creating personas, crafting narratives in multiple languages, and flooding social media platforms with manufactured commentary.”
• She adds, “Russian intelligence weaponizes generative AI in cyber operations, integrating generative AI directly into malware for command-and-control functions—malware queries LLMs in real-time to request tailored instructions.”
• According to Grossfeld, “Russian cybercriminals, often co-opted into working for intelligence agencies in exchange for protection, actively participate in AI-enabled operations, freely sharing jailbroken LLMs like FraudGPT and WormGPT.”
• She concludes, “Sanctions can deny Russia the ability to innovate, but cannot prevent exploitation of openly available systems. As generative AI capabilities advance, Russia will continue replicating this asymmetric approach across domains, consistently lagging in innovation while leading in weaponization.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Slow Death of Russian Oil: Why Ukraine’s Campaign Against Moscow’s Energy Sector Is Working,” Tatiana Mitrova and Sergey Vakulenko, Foreign Affairs, 11.05.25.

• Mitrova and Vakulenko write, “By late October, Ukrainian drones had hit more than half of Russia’s 38 major refineries at least once. As a result, Russia went from processing about 5.4 million barrels of oil per day in July to processing roughly 5 million barrels per day in September.”
  • The authors explain, “Despite the serious damage they are causing, the attacks are unlikely to change Moscow’s resolve in the near term. For the time being… the Russian refining sector still has enough resilience, because of both its substantial surplus capacity… and its ability to repair damaged units quickly.”
  • Mitrova and Vakulenko argue, “The real damage caused by Ukraine’s campaign is cumulative and institutional, not physical. Even as it strives to preserve short-term stability, Russia is presiding over the acceleration of long-term decline.”
  • They note, “No single strike will kill the system, but a sustained, up-tempo campaign increases the likelihood of cascading failures, longer repairs, and compounding losses of capacity.”
  • Mitrova and Vakulenko conclude, “Russia’s refineries are most likely to wear out under the weight of repeated shocks and institutional sclerosis—a quiet but telling metaphor for Russia’s war economy itself.”

“US sanctions on Russia will not work unless Trump steps up enforcement,” Sergey Vakulenko, Financial Times, 11.11.25. 

• Vakulenko writes, “After four years of full-scale sanctions, Russia has demonstrated remarkable adaptation, with a large ecosystem of financial service providers and shipping companies enabling foreign trade, and substantial de-dollarisation.”
• He observes, “Almost 80% of Russian oil production is now sanctioned, yet global markets barely reacted — markets had already priced in Russia’s ability to maintain oil exports.”
• Vakulenko explains, “US sanctions are less effective today because Russia and its major buyers (China, India, Turkey) have developed channels to evade restrictions, including using the renminbi and crypto stablecoins for settlements.”
• He notes, “The massive expansion in sanctions has overwhelmed US enforcement agencies, and bureaucratic setbacks — including government shutdowns — have further weakened the efficacy of new measures.”
• Vakulenko cautions, “The threat of sanctions once changed behavior, but their impact is now delayed and limited when deployed against a ‘sanctions-seasoned opponent’ like Russia.”
• He concludes, “For Putin to believe new sanctions will matter, enforcement must be far tougher; otherwise, Moscow will view the measures as more of the same — and keep finding workarounds.”

“Cutting Off The Tail Piece By Piece: As a result of Trump's new sanctions, oil and gas exports may decline by more than 25% in 2026, and the budget could lose more than 1 trillion rubles,” Re:Russia, 10.31.25. 

• According to the authors, “Trump’s new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil mark a turning point, returning to traditional U.S. sanctions logic after an experiment with tariffs.”
• The analysis explains, “The policy follows the logic of ‘cutting off the tail piece by piece,’ aiming for gradual reduction of Russian oil exports rather than a sudden market shock.”
• The authors note, “More than 2 million barrels per day of Russian oil exports—about 30% of the total—are now threatened by sanctions, especially sales to India and Turkey.”
• The report highlights, “India appears ready to reduce Russian oil imports in exchange for more favorable terms in a trade deal with the United States, while Turkey is under U.S. pressure to at least partly comply.”
• The analysis projects, “If current trends continue, Russian oil and gas export revenues may fall by 15–30% in 2026, translating into a budget loss of 1–1.2 trillion rubles.”
• The authors emphasize, “Trump’s measures signal a pragmatic shift toward limited but realistic goals, as even Biden’s administration feared destabilizing global markets by hitting the largest Russian companies too sharply.”
• According to the analysts, “Actual losses for Russia will depend on how credible the threat of secondary sanctions is for market participants and how consistent the White House policy remains.”

“Energy reckoning: How Europe can use U.S. sanctions to cut Moscow’s oil ties,” Szymon Kardaś and Vessela Tcherneva, ECFR, 11.05.25.

• Kardaś and Tcherneva write, “On 22nd October, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Rosneft, LUKoil and their subsidiaries to the Specially Designated Nationals list.”
• The authors note, “This added pressure is expected to reduce oil and petroleum revenues, which are historically the backbone of Russia’s budget.”
• According to the analysis, “U.S. sanctions could lead to LUKoil suspending supplies of its crude oil to refineries in Slovakia and Hungary—whose president, Viktor Orban, is looking to convince Trump to grant him a U.S. exemption as well. However, this seems unlikely.”
• Kardaś and Tcherneva explain, “If OFAC greenlights LUKoil’s transfer of assets to Gunvor, it suggests that Trump does not really intend to apply pressure on Moscow at all.”
• They argue, “European countries holding Russian energy assets should treat U.S. sanctions on LUKoil and Rosneft as a legal and political opening to pursue expropriation.”
• The commentary cautions, “The proposed sale of LUKoil’s EU assets to Gunvor poses a serious risk of sanctions evasion. Despite formal separation from Russia, Gunvor’s historical role in trading Russian oil and its informal Kremlin ties raise concerns about continued Russian influence.”
• The authors conclude, “The EU should actively encourage member states to assume control of the Russian assets and firmly oppose Hungary’s efforts to seek exemptions from U.S. sanctions on LUKoil supplies.”

“Ukraine’s best defence against Putin’s energy war is more attacks on Russia’s oil refining sector,” John Lough, Chatham House, 11.10.25. 

• Lough writes, “Russia has intensified attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, launching frequent mass drone and missile strikes to cause hardship, undermine morale and win the war before winter.”
• He notes, “Ukraine is responding with increasingly frequent drone and missile attacks on Russia’s oil industry—including refineries, fuel depots, and major logistical hubs—hitting more than 50% of Russia’s 38 major refineries.”
• Lough observes, “So far, Ukrainian deep strikes have disabled an estimated 10–15% of Russian refining capacity, leading to fuel shortages and price spikes in some Russian regions, creating domestic pressure on the Kremlin.”
• He explains, “Despite Russia’s advantages in firepower, expanded drone and missile production, and ability to quickly repair damage, sustained Ukrainian attacks could force Moscow to intervene more in the economy, raise the cost of war, and pressure the Kremlin toward an energy ceasefire.”
• Lough points out, “A Trump-brokered 30-day moratorium on energy strikes in March 2025 quickly failed, but Ukraine’s new strike capabilities make a more durable ‘energy ceasefire’ conceivable.”
• He concludes, “With Russia deliberately targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure before winter and no imminent arrival of additional Patriot missile systems, Kyiv’s best hope for deterring Moscow’s energy war is to accelerate successful attacks on Russia’s oil sector.”

“The Nord Stream Investigation That's Splintering Europe Over Ukraine,” Bojan Pancevski, Wall Street Journal, 11.10.25. 

• Pancevski reports, “German detectives have spent three years building their case” on the Nord Stream pipeline bombings, with the investigation now “threatening to splinter support for Ukraine, the country they hold responsible.”
• He writes, “Poland already has refused to extradite one of the suspects to stand trial in Germany. It instead views him a hero for destroying a vital source of revenue for Russian President Vladimir Putin's war machine.”
• Pancevski notes, “German police, prosecutors and other people familiar with the intricacies of the case instead developed what they said is a clear picture of how an elite Ukrainian military unit carried out the attacks under the direct supervision of Ukraine's then-supreme commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy.”
• He explains, “His extradition could be a mixed blessing. Any legal hearing appears certain to further strain relations between Ukraine and Germany, Kyiv's largest financial backer and the supplier of some of its most sought-after military hardware, especially air-defense systems.”
• Pancevski concludes, “Still, senior officials have suggested, the diplomatic fallout of the bombings might have been easier for Germany to navigate if the detectives hadn't so effectively built a case against Ukraine.”

“Will Latest U.S. Sanctions Force Putin to Moderate Aims in Ukraine?” RM Staff, Russia Matters, 11.07.25.

• “Even before the U.S. sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, President Donald Trump was insisting that the Russian ‘economy is going to collapse.’ The Oct. 22 announcement of the sanctions, which are intended to block all U.S.-linked property and transactions of these Russian energy giants and their subsidiaries, led quite a few commentators to make similar predictions.”
• “[W]hen the Oct. 22 sanctions come into force on Nov. 21, three-quarters of Russian oil exports will be coming from companies under new U.S. sanctions, according to an Oct. 23 article in Kommersant by Olga Semenov and Olga Mordyushenko. Moreover, as Georgi Kantchev and Laurence Norman write in the Wall Street Journal: ‘The new sanctions bring Washington and Europe into alignment in their pressure on Moscow for the first time since the start of the Trump administration.’”
• “Not all analysts whose opinions we have reviewed while researching this piece believe the sanctions will cripple Russia’s economy. Moreover, quite a few believe there will be no crippling effect on that economy, with some pointing to Russia’s previous successful experience in dodging energy and other sanctions. Thus, quite a few are skeptical that the latest sanctions will make Vladimir Putin moderate his aims vis-à-vis Ukraine.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Lukoil’s sanctions deal collapses: What does it mean?" Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.08.25.

Climate change:

“Global Climate Policy Is Broken: Fixating on Emissions Won’t Decarbonize the World’s Economy,” Jessica F. Green, Foreign Affairs, 11.07.25. 

• Green notes, “This year’s COP host, Brazil, is one of the world’s largest oil producers… The previous two hosts, Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates, are petrostates… Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has again ordered the United States, the world’s second-largest carbon emitter, to withdraw from the Paris agreement.”
• She writes, “In the decade since the Paris agreement, countries have made some progress… But this progress is still rather thin and is stalling in some areas,” adding that Russia’s war in Ukraine and ramped-up oil production complicate the global climate response.
• Green states, “The Europeans are investing in the development of air defense systems, cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and Ukraine’s Bohdana self-propelled howitzer… not only to help Kyiv hold off the Russian invaders but also bolster their own defenses as they desperately try to ramp up their own forces to deter the growing threat from Moscow.”
• She observes, “Kyiv’s pioneering naval drones have enabled it to destroy one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and drive Russian ships out of their home port in Sevastopol.”
• Green concludes, “Europeans… understand perfectly well that investing in what has become Europe’s crucible of military innovation will not only help Kyiv to hold off the Russian invaders but also bolster their own defenses as they desperately try to ramp up their own forces to deter the growing threat from Moscow.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Fathers and Grandfathers: A genealogical study of Russian power,” Vitaly Soldatskikh et al, Proyekt, 11.10.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Proyekt researchers open with proposition that “We [population of Russia] are passed down as inheritance” by Russian officials.
• They write, “76% of Russia’s top state officials have relatives also employed in government or in businesses tied to the state—a staggering proportion indicating widespread nepotism among the political elite.
• They note, “The nepotism rate varies by institution, reaching 86% in the Federation Council, 84% in the State Duma, 74% in the Kremlin, 74% among security officials and judges, 69% among governors, and 61% in the government.
• Proyekt explains, “Governing dynasties are common: every second official in the study has more than two relatives also involved in state or state-linked administration, with 25 families boasting 10 or more such members.”
• The researchers list high-profile dynasties, including the families of Ramzan Kadyrov (96 relatives in state-related roles), Vladimir Putin (27), and other top officials such as Arsen Kanokov, Sergei Chemezov, and Alexei Likhachev
• • Proyekt finds, “Siloviki now make up at least 29% of Russia’s ruling elite, an increase over the past two decades. Over half (58%) of officials are heirs to Soviet-era bureaucratic dynasties or held senior posts in the USSR.
• They observe, “Women make up only 15% of top officials but are proportionally represented in nepotistic practices, comprising 13% of the study’s nepotism sample.”
• Proyekt notes, “Less than 1% of the surveyed officials have relatives who have served in the war in Ukraine, indicating a significant social gap between the ruling elite and the wider population.”

“Rise, Ye Branded by the Curse! Miserable Life as an Asset,” Vladislav Inozemtsev, The Moscow Times, 11.05.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Inozemtsev writes, “Since the start of the ‘special military operation,’ at least 220,000 Russians have died at the front—with the true figure likely much higher—and some claim these losses significantly damage the Russian economy and society. I doubt this; the bulk of Putin’s mercenary army from 2022–2025 consists of people practically unneeded by the Russian economy.”
• He observes, “The Russian army today is increasingly made up of people of pre-retirement age or those rejected by the labor market. Service in the Russian army has become the domain of those who see no other way to earn a living or any prospects in Russian reality.”
• Inozemtsev adds, “Official recruitment guidelines have targeted economically insolvent people, including the bankrupt, unemployed, those with debts, and those from Russia’s most depressed regions—people not engaged in economically useful activities.”
• He notes, “Another crucial source of recruits is prisons and correctional colonies: since 2021, the male prison population has shrunk by 30–40% (200–250,000 people), with thousands sent to war in exchange for canceled criminal cases.”
• Inozemtsev argues, “A large share of those fighting now are people cut off from useful economic or social participation—beset by unemployment, criminal records, or disease—and their loss won’t negatively affect Russia’s economy or society.”
• He concludes, “The system introduced in 2022, which I call ‘deathonomics,’ lets Russians turn their miserable lives into valuable financial assets; it is, in cynical but realistic economic terms, the most effective use for many of these men that today’s Russia can find. But after the war, Russia faces the lasting social and moral catastrophe of reintegrating these outcasts, which may haunt the country as colonialism haunts the West.”

“In Russia, Bookstores Offer a Shrinking Refuge as Censorship Tightens,” Ivan Nechepurenko and Nanna Heitmann, New York Times, 11.05.25. 

• Nechepurenko and Heitmann write, “Podpisniye Izdaniya… developed a distinct identity and cachet as a refuge of ideas in an increasingly tightly controlled Russia.”
• According to the authors, “This year, especially, the government turned its sights on books,” with staff at progressive publishers arrested and fines levied on bookstores for selling works deemed to have “traces of propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations.”
• They note, “Publishers have faced a difficult dilemma: either stop offering books the Kremlin dislikes, clandestinely cut the risky parts or openly redact them to show readers that something was censored,” and that open redactions “was a political demonstration.”
• “In coffee shops, people are openly reading ‘Summer in a Pioneer Tie,’ a lyrical novel about two male teenagers discovering their sexuality… But people continue to find ways to buy it online,” they observe.
• The authors explain, “Russian law technically does not prohibit the sale of books by ‘foreign agents.’ But since September, many stores have stopped selling them because the law now prohibits such individuals from engaging in ‘educational activities,’ which can include publishing.”
• Yelena Neshcheret, bookstore manager, says, “We now have the entire array of uncensored literature, which is now being retroactively regulated.”
• Nechepurenko and Heitmann conclude, “The book becomes an artifact of the era,” quoting a publisher who said that redacting text “was the more honest choice than simply cutting out paragraphs as if they had never existed.”

“Gay Russians Find Place to Be Themselves on Other Side of the World,” Emma Bubola, Daniel Politi and Sarah Pabst, New York Times, 11.10.25. 

• Bubola, Politi, and Pabst write, “Argentina has emerged as a surprisingly prominent, if geographically distant, haven for L.G.B.T.Q. Russians escaping President Vladimir V. Putin's escalating anti-gay crackdown.”
• They explain, “Mr. Putin has in recent years pursued an increasingly harsh crackdown on L.G.B.T.Q. rights in a campaign of oppression that has accelerated since the start of the war in Ukraine in Feb. 2022. In 2023, the Russian Supreme Court designated the ‘international L.G.B.T.Q. movement’ as an ‘extremist organization.’”
• The authors report, “The latest wave [to Argentina] started after the war against Ukraine, with Argentina's government recording over 120,000 Russian arrivals since 2022. The group included many pregnant Russian women hoping to secure a better future and a passport with fewer restrictions for their children… but less noticed was the parallel, quieter wave of gay and transgender Russians seeking political asylum.”
• They describe one couple’s experience: “Ms. Sokolova, the dog trainer, said she loved when doctors at the reproductive clinic where she was undergoing I.V.F. treatment asked her why she did not come with her wife, Antonina Lysikova, 37.”
• The article concludes, “No matter how integrated into Argentine society many Russians felt, they were still haunted by the idea that they had to travel thousands of miles from home to enjoy basic rights… ‘Russia doesn’t want us.’”

 “The West has lost its soul–Russia intends to keep its own,” Pavel Malyutin and Sergey Karaganov, RIAC/RT, 11.06.25. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Karaganov and Malyutin write, “Russia is not merely a nation but a civilizational state—a vast, multi-ethnic, nuclear-armed civilization occupying a continental landmass.”
• They note, “For Russia — a vast, multi-ethnic, nuclear-armed civilization occupying a continental landmass — Western-style democracy is neither viable nor desirable. Russia has always blended strong leadership with organic forms of popular participation.”
• The authors argue, “As we did when Pushkin debated tsars yet served his country, when scientists challenged ideology yet built nuclear shields and spacecraft, Russia must balance firmness with intellectual liberty.”
• They stress, “Only a strong state can defend freedom in a world of war, sanctions, global instability, technological and civilizational competition… we are a people who defend peace through strength, who liberated others and never surrendered our soul.”
• Karaganov and Malyutin assert, “Russia’s dream rests on civilizational sovereignty, moral revival, and leadership democracy—but it is our enduring nuclear deterrent and historic resilience that anchor our independent course in a hostile multipolar order.”
• They conclude, “Russia again stands at the threshold of a great historical cycle: a civilization that survived invasion, revolution, war, and collapse does not crumble; we renew—and with our nuclear, spiritual, and intellectual strength, we will lead with dignity and confidence.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "It's getting a bit colder…  but there's nothing to give the economy a boost," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 11.04.25.
• "Is Russia’s labor market cooling?" Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.05.25.
• “Motherland—a plea for a feminist revolution in Russia,” Ivan Krastev’s Review of Julia Ioffe’s book, Financial Times, 11.03.25.
• "How to read Putin," Nikolay Alexandrov, The Moscow Times, 11.07.25.
• "Russians obediently shy away from 'foreign agents,'" Sergey Shelin, The Moscow Times, 11.07.25.

Defense and aerospace:

See this link for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Voyennaya Priyomka TV program on the occasion of Rosoboronexport company’s 25th anniversary, Moscow, 11.09.25.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“What’s Up With Lavrov?” in “Bulletin 19 (171) 2025,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik, 11.10.25.

• R.Politik observes, “A narrative about Lavrov’s ‘failure’ in [the Ukraine] negotiations [with the U.S.] was amplified on Russian social media—possibly by factions loyal to Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s special representative for international economic cooperation, who has tense personal relations with Lavrov.”
• According to R.Politik, “Speculation about replacing Lavrov predates these events and arises in part from elite fatigue with his record tenure, but only Putin can decide on any foreign minister change; there is no current sign of presidential dissatisfaction.”
• They explain, “US irritation has grown with Lavrov’s inflexible style, but he merely transmits Putin’s stance, not his own; leaks in Western media reflecting dissatisfaction likely signal US strategy rather than an actual shift in Lavrov's standing.”
• R.Politik concludes, “Absent evidence of a genuine rift with Putin, and with Lavrov’s recent public absences explained by health issues, the anti-Lavrov campaign has little bearing on his real status as Russia’s top diplomat.”⁴

“Why Germany Is Still Divided When It Comes to Russia,” Christopher F. Schuetze, New York Times, 11.07.25.

• Schuetze writes, “Many East Germans are more sympathetic toward Moscow than their western compatriots, reflecting decades of Soviet ties and disillusionment since reunification.”
• He notes, “While most West Germans have condemned Russia’s invasion and have been broadly supportive of helping arm Ukraine, many in East Germany have a more nuanced view of the conflict and are cautious about backing Ukraine or imposing sanctions on Russia.”
• According to Schuetze, “Polls show East Germans are less likely to favor military aid or NATO membership for Ukraine and are more likely to believe that Kyiv should give up land for peace with Russia.”
• He observes, “The East German view is part of a varied landscape of opinion toward Moscow in the states that were once part of the Soviet empire. Poland and the Baltic States are, for instance, much more hostile to Moscow… while Hungary has been sympathetic.”
• Schuetze concludes, “Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sympathies in the east for Russia remained strong… The reaction from neighbors and museum patrons was clear: ‘We want you to take that flag down.’”

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Kazakhstan's curious journey to the Abraham Accords,” Ishaan Tharoor, Washington Post, 11.10.25. 

• Tharoor writes, “Kazakhstan would be the latest state to join the Abraham Accords… Why was Kazakhstan doing this now? What did it mean to be making ‘peace’ with Israel when you’re already diplomatic partners? Was resource-rich Kazakhstan going to play a more substantive role in support of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation?”
• He notes, “Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, gave its name to a political process launched in 2017 by Russia, Turkey and Iran to find a solution to Syria’s civil war. More recently, the city has been floated as a site where Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could meet for face-to-face talks.”
• Tharoor explains, “Kazakhstan's entry into the pact appears to be more about courting Trump with a symbolic gesture than forging Middle East peace…  The main goal: diversify geopolitical dependencies away from Russia.”
• He observes, “Analysts see more pronounced tensions between Astana and Moscow, stoked, in part, by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. There's speculation that Russian operatives are trying to stir unrest in Kazakhstan's majority-ethnic Russian north, and nationalist Russian media have accused the Kazakh government of ‘Russophobia.’ In an echo of his revanchist rhetoric about Ukraine, Putin has in the past questioned the validity of Kazakh statehood.”
• Tharoor concludes, “Even in just going to the White House, you are signaling to the Kremlin you have independent agency… ‘Joining the Abraham Accords is a smart pragmatic step to get positive attention from Washington.’”

“Can Turkey Cut the Gordian Knot in the Caucasus?” Anna Ohanyan, Carnegie Endowment, 11.10.25. 

• Ohanyan writes, “Turkey stands at a decisive moment to shape lasting stability in the South Caucasus after Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed a peace agreement that opens new paths for regional connectivity. However, Ankara’s alignment with Baku and reliance on nationalist approaches constrain its ability to act as a credible regional peacemaker.”
• She notes, “Turkey’s foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has become bilateral, transactional, and personalized, limiting its economic and political reach. By tying its potential rapprochement with Armenia to the peace process with Azerbaijan, Ankara has increased Baku’s hold over the South Caucasus at its own expense.”
• Ohanyan observes, “The Washington summit produced an agreement to reopen regional transportation routes, grounded in respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the one hand, it enables connectivity between Azerbaijan’s mainland and Nakhchivan via Armenia’s southern border route, dubbed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP); on the other, the agreement enhances Armenia’s international and domestic connectivity through Azerbaijan.”
• She argues, “For Turkey to cut the Gordian knot in the South Caucasus, it would need to shift from partisan patron to peacemaker—denying Aliyev veto power over Ankara’s regional policies by delinking Turkey’s relations with Armenia from the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.”
• Ohanyan concludes, “Turkey’s uneven commitment to norms, limited institutional initiative, and reactive diplomacy threaten to marginalize its role in shaping the post-conflict regional order in the South Caucasus. By fully embracing its status as a middle power—grounded in norms, institutions, and connectivity—Turkey could realize its strategic potential as a Eurasian bridge between East and West.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ten Years of C5+1: U.S.–Central Asia Minerals Cooperation," Gracelin Baskaran and Kamal Aubakirov, CSIS, 11.04.25.
• "Deals, Not Declarations: America’s New Central Asia Strategy," Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, The National Interest, 11.06.25.
• “Trump Seeks to Counter Russia, China in Their Own Backyard,” Alexandra Sharp, Foreign Policy, 11.06.25. 

Footnotes

1. For RM’s compilation of U.S. and Russian comments on the subject of nuclear tests since Trump’s Oct. 29 announcements on the subject, see this link.
2. On the 1,355th day of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the battlefield register read like a ledger of attrition and strategic recalibration: modest territorial gains for Moscow in the Zaporizhzhia region, ferocious jockeying for ground around Pokrovsk in the Donetsk front and a renewed emphasis by both sides on targeting the critical energy infrastructure that will determine civilian endurance through a harsh winter. (Eastern Herald, 11.11.25)
3. Attendees: Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Federation Council Chairwoman Valentina Matvienko, State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Anton Vaino, Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu, Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin, Special Presidential Representative for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport Sergey Ivanov, Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin, Director of the National Guard Viktor Zolotov and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov.
4. After having skipped a crucial session of Vladimir Putin’s Security Council on nuclear testing on Nov. 5, Sergei Lavrov reappeared in the Russian media space on Nov. 9 with two interviews published on the same day (Nov. 9).

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukraine's 24th Mechanised Brigade via AP.