4 Ideas to Explore

1. Keith Kellogg, Donald Trump’s pick for the envoy for the Ukraine war, has argued that America should continue to arm Ukraine, but only if Ukraine agrees to engage in peace talks with Russia.  This follows from a recent AFPI research report in which the retired general and AFPI’s Fred Fleitz explored how to bring the “Russia-Ukraine war to a close”: “We tell the Ukrainians, ‘You’ve got to come to the table, and if you don’t come to the table, support from the United States will dry up… And you tell Putin, ‘He’s got to come to the table and if you don’t come to the table, then we’ll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field,’” Kellogg said of his and Fleitz’s peace proposal, which he presented to Trump in June.¹ Moscow sees Kellogg as likely to follow in the footsteps of Trump’s previous Ukraine envoy Kurt Volker, who is widely unpopular in Russia, according to Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst cited in WP. Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldier and journalist Oleksii Yarmolenko has expressed doubts about Kellogg’s plan: “[Kellogg’s] tool is blackmail with military aid, on both sides. But whether it will work—I don’t believe it yet,” he wrote, according to Meduza. The announcement of Trump’s selection of Kellogg has prompted Politico.eu to run an article with a headline that said “7 weeks until Trump: Russia and Ukraine fight for advantage before peace talks are imposed,” as if it were describing U.S.-led diplomatic and military interventions in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It is highly doubtful, however, that the U.S. can impose peace talks on Ukraine and Russia in January the same way Washington and its allies did in former Yugoslavia, especially in the case of a nuclear-armed Russia, whose forces are advancing in Ukraine (see the next highlight) and which has proved its ability to withstand economic pressure from the West.
2. Ukraine is struggling to recruit new soldiers as desertions from combat units rise and it continues to yield territory to advancing Russian units, according to FT’s Isobel Koshiw. More Ukrainian soldiers have deserted in the first 10 months of this year than in the previous two years of the war, with prosecutors opening 60,000 cases in January-October against deserters, Koshiw reports. Meanwhile, Russia has captured 2,700 square kilometers in 2024, compared with just 465 square kilometers last year, according to ISW estimates cited in the FT article. ISW itself assesses that the Russian forces gained 222 square miles (574 square kilometers) last month alone. In addition to draft-dodging and desertion, the Ukrainian authorities’ efforts to adequately reinforce personnel in its combat units, which are outmanned by Russia in ways that contribute to Russia’s territorial advances in Ukraine, is the authorities’ unwillingness to lower the conscription age to 18 even though the average age of a Ukrainian soldier hit 43 one year ago. The older conscripts tend to have greater health problems, prompting one frontline Ukrainian battalion commander to recently complain that “At times it feels like I’m managing a day-care center rather than a combat unit.” 
3. Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine isn’t a blueprint for weapons use. Rather its primary value is manipulation, according to Nicole Grajewski of CEIP. The newly amended “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” follows a “pattern common among nuclear powers in creating ambiguity around nuclear use conditions, a long-standing feature of nuclear deterrence.” However, “what distinguishes Russia’s approach is its repeated nuclear saber-rattling and efforts to sow transatlantic divisions through intimidation,” the former Belfer Center fellow writes. The past week has seen Vladimir Putin follow up his signing of the basic principles on Nov. 19 with some more saber-rattling. When describing Russia’s purportedly new MRBM “Oreshnik” to fellow CSTO leaders, Putin claimed the missile can turn targets into dust. “When used in a concentrated, massive strike—using several Oreshnik missiles simultaneously—the resulting impact is comparable in power to that of a nuclear weapon,” he claimed. While at the CSTO summit in Kazakhstan on Nov. 28, Putin was also conveniently asked by a TASS reporter to comment on alleged suggestions by Western politicians to give “nuclear weapons back to Kyiv.” “In this case we will use all—and I want to stress it—all weapons Russia has, all of them. We will not let this happen,” said Putin, reaffirming how far behind he has left the image of himself as a “foreign policy moderate” that he had cultivated until 2022. Russian officials have made such threats before, even though neither the original version of its deterrence principles nor the amended one lists transfer of nuclear weapons (by itself) from one country to another among what this declaratory documents describes as “Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.”
4. Grim analytical assessments of Russia’s economic present and future have exploded over the past week in the Western press in the wake of the ruble’s recent weakening, which was partially triggered by U.S. sanctions on Russia’s key bank, Gazprombank. “Russian economy in freefall,” declared U.K. newspaper Express’ Alycia McNamara on Nov. 27. She was followed by Arthur Sullivan of Deutsche Welle, who claimed on Nov. 28 that “Russia [is] in panic as U.S. sanctions trigger ruble collapse.” “Russia’s war economy shows new cracks after the ruble plunges,” said the headline on a Nov. 29 analysis by WSJ’s Georgi Kantchev and Chelsey Dulaney. “The war in Ukraine is straining Russia’s economy” and “Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort,” the Economist warmed on Nov. 28 and Dec. 1, respectively. Not all of this week’s doom-and-gloom was seen as consequential for Russia’s external policies, however. Writing in NYT on Dec. 2, journalist Anatoly Kurmanaev observed that while the Russian economy is experiencing a slowdown, “the economic strains are still far from provoking the kind of crisis that might compel Mr. Putin to curtail his ambitions in Ukraine.” SWP economist Janis Kluge concurs, writing in his recent commentary that “While the economic difficulties are likely to dampen optimism among the population and force the government to make political trade-offs, Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine will not be directly affected.” It should be noted that the slowdown is not exactly news, and it has been predicted by the IMF and World Bank, among others.² Nor is the weakening of the Russian ruble all bad news. The cheaper Russian currency increases the price of imports into Russia, but it also generates greater ruble income for the budget from activities such as exports of oil, gas and other commodities. And, while inflation runs high, wages continue to outstrip upticks in prices, and real wages in Russia grew nearly 18% since the start of the war, according to Kurmanaev’s article. That said, one should treat the Russian government’s data with a pinch of salt, as FT’s Tony Barber reminds us, citing the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics’ report on the Russian government’s manipulation of data.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Russia, Targeting Ukraine’s Grid, Moves to Cut Off Its Nuclear Plants,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 11,29.24.

• Russia hit critical electricity transmission facilities linked to nuclear power plants during its latest assault on Ukraine’s power grid on Nov. 28, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported. It was the third such attack in roughly as many months, heightening concerns among experts about the potential for a nuclear disaster.
• The agency said that the Russian strikes had hit electrical substations crucial for Ukraine’s three operational nuclear plants to transmit and receive power. While no direct damage to reactors was reported, all of them reduced output as a precautionary measure and one was disconnected from the grid.
• “Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is extremely fragile and vulnerable, putting nuclear safety at great risk,” Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the agency, the I.A.E.A., said in a statement released on Nov. 28.
• Russia’s strategy of destroying substations connected to nuclear power plants is newer and appears intended to collapse Ukraine’s last major power generation capacity, experts say. The attacks against the substations began in late August, the I.A.E.A. reported.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Russia-Ukraine Standoff Over POWs Leaves Thousands Stuck in 'Gray Zone'; Kyiv says Russia is using the prisoners to put pressure on President Volodymyr Zelensky,” Matthew Luxmoore, WSJ, 11.29.24.

• For much of the 2½ years that Ukrainian soldier Artem Vyshniak has been held by Russia, his mother, Tetiana, has sat in protest for 10 hours a day outside a Ukrainian government building with the wives and mothers of other captive Ukrainian troops. In another part of Ukraine, Senior Sgt. Sergei Galkin has spent that time languishing in a detention center for Russian prisoners of war, the only still-captive member of an eight-person unit that crossed into Ukraine in the first days of the invasion. "I'm stuck in the gray zone," the 37-year-old father of two said, sitting in an ill-fitting blue prison uniform in one of the facility's spartan dormitories. "You live each day waiting for some answer to come." 
• The limbo that Galkin and Vyshniak find themselves in is the result of a protracted standoff between the two countries over the fate of their soldiers as the war grinds through its third year. Russia holds an estimated 8,000 Ukrainian soldiers, while Ukraine is believed to have up to 5,000 Russians waiting to be returned to their homeland. The countries don't release official figures.
• For the Russians, staying captive in Ukraine might be safer than returning. POWs who go home in swaps are questioned by Russia's security services, their past statements scrutinized. Dozens have publicly denounced Putin's government in interviews with popular Ukrainian bloggers, who push them to take a side in videos that go viral online.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine's Missing Medical Mobilization," Gil Barndollar and David Plaster, FP, 11.29.24.
• "As Russia Advances in Ukraine, a Cop Has to Flee City After City," Andrew E. Kramer, NYT, 11.26.24.  

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Russian Military Manpower After Two and a Half Years of War in Ukraine," Yury E. Fedorov, IFRI, 11.25.24.

• In addition to a military victory in Ukraine, the Russian leadership is planning to build up sizable troop formations for a possible conflict with NATO in the Baltic region and the Kola Peninsula. In particular, current plans aim for the military manpower to grow by about 350,000, reaching a total of 1.5 million soldiers and commanders. In the context of the current conflict in Ukraine, this cannot be accomplished without a new wave of mass mobilization. 
• The irrecoverable personnel losses per month of about 30,000 soldiers in 2024 are about equivalent to the influx of contract soldiers and volunteers, constituting the combat-capable core of the Russian military manpower over the same period. In turn, the implementation of this new wave of mobilization is being postponed due to the Kremlin’s concerns about potentially negative domestic political consequences, as well as the lack of command personnel and weapons for new units. 
• By and large, the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more the Russian military machine deteriorates. Consequently, by providing Ukraine with the necessary assistance to continue the war, the West is weakening Russia’s military potential and increasing the time required for it to recover its armed forces after the war. Yet, the pressure of the war on Ukrainian society and its political system may cause a political crisis with unpredictable domestic and international outcomes.

“Ukraine struggles to recruit new soldiers as desertions rise,” Isobel Koshiw, FT, 12.01.24.

• More Ukrainian soldiers have deserted in the first 10 months of this year than in the previous two years of the war, highlighting Kyiv’s struggle to replenish its frontline ranks as Russia captures more territory in eastern Ukraine.
• In a standout case in late October, hundreds of infantry serving in Ukraine’s 123 Brigade abandoned their positions in the eastern town of Vuhledar. They returned to their homes in the Mykolayiv region where some staged a rare public protest, demanding more weapons and training.
• Ukrainian prosecutors opened 60,000 cases between January and October this year against soldiers for abandoning their positions, almost twice as many as they initiated in 2022 and 2023 combined. If convicted, the men face prison sentences of up to 12 years.
• Men of military age are barred from leaving Ukraine, but some have taken the opportunity of being sent to overseas training camps in allied countries to desert while abroad. About 12 abscond on average each month from military training in Poland, said a Polish security official. 
• Vadym Ivchenko, an MP on the parliamentary defense committee, said that around 20 per cent of deserters come back. One brigade said they received several hundred responses after introducing a chatbot through which deserters could return to service.
• The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank, calculated that Russia captured 2,700 sq km in 2024, compared with just 465 sq km last year. 
• Ukraine’s authorities are seeking to recruit approximately 160,000 more men in the next three months. But conscription officers have gained a bad reputation in Ukraine, after several were filmed beating and dragging off men, and with military medical commissions approving questionable exemptions in exchange for bribes.
• A US official said Washington wanted Kyiv to lower the recruitment age to 18. “The simple truth is that Ukraine is not currently mobilizing or training enough soldiers to replace their battlefield losses while keeping pace with Russia’s growing military,” the official said last week.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “How Ukraine uses cheap AI-guided drones to deadly effect against Russia,” The Economist, 12.02.24.
• "Ukraine’s River of Anguish," Oleksandr Chubko, Mauricio Lima, and Carlotta Gall, NYT, 11.29.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

"It Is Not Too Late: A Case for Long-Range Strikes Against Russia," Douglas Lute, CFR, 11.26.24.

• With two months remaining [Biden’s presidency], the oft-repeated line that there is no silver bullet for Biden to dramatically change the momentum of the war rings true—with one potential exception: a campaign of long-range strikes to isolate the Russian army occupying Ukraine.
• Providing Ukraine significant quantity of long-range, precision-strike systems and permitting their use on military targets inside Russian can still make a significant difference. 
•  Long-range strikes into Russia open several opportunities for Ukraine. The operational objective of a long-range strike campaign would be to isolate the Russian occupying army by attacking its low-quality force dependent on rail resupply while avoiding the strength of the dug-in Russian defenses along the frontline. Russia cannot mitigate its vulnerabilities in the near term. Degrading Russian logistics will take on an amplified significance as winter weather sets in and much of the infrastructure of the occupied territory has been destroyed. Isolation from logistics can lead to additional degradation of the Russian forces, potentially including desertions, revolts against leaders, and even a collapse of military forces, making continued occupation untenable. Of course, a potential Russian army collapse would severely challenge the Kremlin politically and serve to dramatically shift the momentum in favor of Ukraine, setting the stage for meaningful negotiations.
• The Biden administration could set this campaign in motion now and the Trump administration could use it—or even the threat of it—to pursue the president-elect’s election campaign promise to end the war. 
• If the United States took the lead, other long-range missile systems from France and the United Kingdom that have been provided to Ukraine could contribute to the campaign. Germany, too, could be persuaded to join the effort by providing Ukraine its Taurus missile system.
• Early concerns about potential Russian escalation if U.S. systems strike inside Russia are now less compelling given the experience of the past three years. 
• In sum, there is no silver bullet, no single military capability to ensure a positive outcome for Ukraine. War is not that simple. It is also true that war requires adaptation. There are viable campaign adaptations that could still change the momentum in Ukraine’s favor, even in the next two months, moving it away from a war of attrition that ultimately favors Russia and placing Ukraine in a position of greater strength when meaningful negotiations become a possibility. It is not too late to do the right thing and give Ukraine what it needs.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“China Is Studying Russia's Sanctions Evasion to Prepare for Taiwan Conflict,” Georgi Kantchev and Lingling Wei, WSJ, 12.01.24.

• China has been supporting Russia's economy since the start of the Ukraine war by buying its oil while supplying it with everything from microelectronics to washing machines. Meanwhile, Beijing has been getting its own strategic benefit: a real-world case study in how to circumvent Western sanctions.
• An interagency group, set up by China in the months following the full-scale invasion, has studied the impact of sanctions and produced reports regularly for the country's leadership, according to people familiar with the matter. The goal is to draw lessons about how to mitigate them, particularly in case a conflict over Taiwan prompts the U.S. and its allies to impose similar penalties on China, the people said. As part of the effort, Chinese officials periodically visit Moscow to meet with the Russian Central Bank, the Finance Ministry and other agencies involved in countering sanctions, the people said.
• The Chinese study effort, which hasn't previously been reported, is emblematic of the new age of economic warfare unleashed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, where the lines between economic policy and geopolitical strategy are increasingly blurred. That trend is only likely to be amplified by Donald Trump's second presidential term, where he plans to turbocharge the use of tariffs as a tool for negotiation and coercion.
• Moscow owes much of its economic durability to its oil exports and its cooperation with Beijing, as the leaders of both countries seek to challenge the U.S.-led world order. The group that was established shows how deep that collaboration has been, and that Beijing's support hasn't entirely been a one-way street with Moscow as the beneficiary.
• One area of particular concern for China is its more than $3.3 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, the world's largest. The moves by the U.S. and its allies to freeze Russian assets abroad following the Ukraine invasion prompted Beijing to more actively look for ways to diversify its stockpile away from dollar-denominated assets, such as U.S. Treasury bonds.

“Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort,” The Economist, 12.01.24.

• At first glance, it did not look that different from other sanctions. On November 21st America’s Treasury Department imposed new restrictions on more than four dozen Russian banks, including Gazprombank, the financial arm of the giant state gas firm....After December 20th, when the measures take full effect, European buyers of Russian gas will be forced to find workarounds involving either third-party banks or currencies other than the dollar, which will take time.
• America’s announcement came at a bad moment for the Russian economy, meaning that foreign-exchange markets were quick to respond. The prospect of new restrictions on access to hard currency sent the ruble down by 10% against the dollar to a low of 115 on November 27th, before the central bank inspired a modest rally by using its reserves to buy rubles. Even after this rally, the ruble is still down by 8% against the dollar over the past month and by more than 15% in the year so far. Russia’s currency is at its weakest since immediately after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The government is putting a brave face on the news. Speaking in Kazakhstan on November 28th, Vladimir Putin told reporters that “there are certainly no grounds for panic.”
• For foreign-exchange traders, such denials are usually a sign that something is wrong. Indeed, the latest fall in the ruble’s value makes the job of Russia’s central bank much more difficult. Wartime spending has used up spare capacity in the economy, driving down unemployment to just 2.4%. The government’s latest budget, unveiled in September, will raise defense and security spending by another 25% next year, to around 8% of Russia’s GDP, a post-cold-war high. Annual inflation is running at more than 8%.
• In this context, a weaker ruble is a doubled-edged sword. A lower level against the dollar increases the ruble value of oil exports, helping plug the government’s widening deficit. Yet it also pushes up the price of imported goods—something that matters for both consumers and the government’s war effort. 
• The combination of a declining currency and a ballooning budget deficit has led to talk of a hard landing for the Russian economy in 2025. After two years of strong growth, which has confounded many analysts’ gloomy predictions, the pace of expansion will slow sharply. The economic bill for the war is at last coming due. It could be a big one. 

See more commentaries on the state of the Russian economy in the section on “Domestic politics, economy and energy” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“America First, Russia, & Ukraine,” Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, AFPI, 04.11.24.

• Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine was an avoidable crisis that, due to the Biden Administration’s incompetent policies and rejection of the America First approach to national security, has entangled America in an endless war.
• The Biden Administration’s risk-averse pattern in the armament of Ukraine coupled with a failure in diplomacy with Russia has prolonged the war in Ukraine, which now finds itself in a war of attrition with Russia.
• Bringing the Russia-Ukraine war to a close will require strong, America First leadership to deliver a peace deal and immediately end the hostilities between the two warring parties.
  • What we should not continue to do is to send arms to a stalemate that Ukraine will eventually find difficult to win… This should start with a formal U.S. policy to bring the war to a conclusion. Specifically, it would mean a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.
  • To convince Putin to join peace talks, President Biden and other NATO leaders should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.
  • Ukraine would not be asked to relinquish the goal of regaining all its territory, but it would agree to use diplomacy, not force, with the understanding that this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office. Until that happens, the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine. We also call for placing levies on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.
• By enabling Ukraine to negotiate from a position of strength while also communicating to Russia the consequences if it fails to abide by future peace talk conditions, the United States could implement a negotiated end-state with terms aligned with U.S. and Ukrainian interests. Part of this negotiated end-state should include provisions in which we establish a long-term security architecture for Ukraine’s defense that focuses on bilateral security defense. Including this in a Russia-Ukraine peace deal offers a path toward long-term peace in the region and a means of preventing future hostilities between the two nations. 
• Regrettably, we see no prospect that the Biden Administration will do anything to end the Ukraine War and may implement policies to make the conflict worse. 
• Nevertheless, the above are a few creative ideas for an America First approach to end the war and allow Ukraine to rebuild. President Donald Trump also has a strategy to end the war that he has not fully revealed. We are hopeful there will be a new president in January 2025 to implement these American First ideas to end this devastating conflict. 
• The Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people will have trouble accepting a negotiated peace that does not give them back all of their territory or, at least for now, hold Russia responsible for the carnage it inflicted on Ukraine. Their supporters will also. But as Donald Trump said at the CNN town hall in 2023, “I want everyone to stop dying.” That’s our view, too. It is a good first step.

“How does Trump envoy Keith Kellogg want to end the Russia-Ukraine war?,” Sarah Shamim, al Jazeera, 11.28.24.

• Who is Keith Kellogg? Kellogg, 80, is a retired lieutenant general. He was the chief of staff for the White House National Security Council during Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021. He was also the national security adviser to Mike Pence, who was Trump’s vice president at the time. Kellogg is a Vietnam War veteran and he was also sent to Iraq to work in the transitional government after the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003.
• In April this year, Kellogg co-authored a strategy paper, with former U.S. government official Fred Fleitz, saying that the U.S. should negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine.
  • The paper blames President Joe Biden’s administration for the continuing Ukraine war. Specifically, it faults the U.S. decision to arm Ukraine and the failure of diplomacy with Russia. It additionally accuses Biden of promoting a proxy war with Russia, through Ukraine. 
  • Kellogg’s article argues—echoing Trump in many ways—that “a strong and decisive president who stood up to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “would have prevented Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There is no evidence to suggest that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was based on his assessment of Biden as weak, as Kellogg and Fleitz suggest.
  • Kellogg’s plan argues for a formal U.S. policy to end the war, seeking a “ceasefire and negotiated settlement.” Under this plan:
• The U.S. would continue to arm Ukraine to allow it to defend itself against Russia. However, future U.S. military aid would be contingent on Ukraine participating in peace talks with Russia.
• In order to convince Putin to join peace talks, NATO leaders should offer to hold off on Ukraine’s NATO membership application.
• Additionally, Russia could be offered some sanctions relief, contingent on it signing a peace agreement with Ukraine.
• It also calls for charging levies on Russian energy sales to use for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

“How to make a success of peace talks with Vladimir Putin,” The Economist, 11.28.24.

• What... should a deal aim for? Restoring the borders of 1991 is a pipe dream. Morally and legally, all that land belongs to Ukraine, but it does not have the soldiers, arms or ammunition to recapture it. Instead, the aim should be to create the conditions for Ukraine to thrive in the territory it now controls.
• For that it will require stability and reconstruction, both of which depend on being safe from Russian aggression. That is why at the heart of the talks will be how to devise a credible and durable framework for Ukrainian security.
• The Economist has argued that the best way of protecting Ukraine would be for it to join NATO. Membership would help prevent it from becoming unstable, embittered and vulnerable to co-option by Mr. Putin in pursuit of his ultimate aim, which is to destabilize and dominate Europe. It would also bring Europe’s largest, most innovative and battle-hardened army and defense industry into the alliance—something that Mr. Trump might welcome, because NATO would then need fewer American troops.
• To signal to Mr. Putin that they were serious, European countries would need to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. That would involve massive aid for rebuilding the country and weapons, as well as progress in EU accession talks. To signal to Mr. Putin that they would fight back if he attacked, they would need to dramatically increase their own defense spending and overhaul their arms industries. Mr. Trump, who has long urged bigger European defense budgets, ought to welcome such an outcome.
• A ceasefire would present two competing visions of Ukraine’s future. Mr. Putin’s calculation is that he will win from a deal because Ukraine will rot, Russia will re-arm and the West will lose interest. But imagine that, with Western backing, Ukraine used the lull to rebuild its economy, refresh its politics and deter Russia from aggression. The task is to ensure that this vision prevails over its grim alternative. 

“How will Donald Trump handle the war in Ukraine?” The Economist, 11.27.24.

• Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank in Washington, who served in the White House under Mr. Trump, argues that the isolationist wing of the Republican Party is ascendant. Mr. Trump may look for an easy deal through a combination of “carrots for Russia and sticks for Ukraine”: the offer to lift sanctions on Russia and the threat to cut off weapons to Ukraine. If Ukraine collapses, says Mr. Ciaramella, Mr. Trump will simply blame Mr. Biden.
• Ukrainian collapse is not inevitable, though Russian advances are likely to accelerate in the coming weeks. Mr. Biden’s administration is hastening arms deliveries during its final weeks in office, spending the last of the funds authorized by Congress and rushing whatever it can to the front. It has eased rules restricting the use of certain missiles against targets in Russia and is transferring landmines to hamper Russia’s advance. Weapons will continue to flow well into next year, unless Mr. Trump halts shipments. Senior Biden administration officials argue Ukrainian stocks of artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles and other munitions are healthier than they have been for a long time.
• More out of hope than conviction, America’s allies express confidence that Mr. Trump will not sell out Ukraine. Many of Ukraine’s top officials welcomed Mr. Trump’s election. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has floated special access for American firms to Ukraine’s deposits of rare minerals as a quid pro quo that may appeal to the transactional Mr. Trump. Admiral Rob Bauer, the head of NATO’s military committee, speaking at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada in late November, declared, “I cannot imagine it’s in the interest of the United States that Putin comes out of any possible peace negotiations as the winner.” A European foreign minister refused to entertain the idea that Ukraine would be abandoned. “It would be such a shock that it’s not going to happen.”

“A table for five: What to expect from each player at Ukraine peace talks,” Rose Gottemoeller, BAS, 12.02.24.

• The negotiating dynamics are changing, and the tricky business of crafting a win-win-win solution is upon us. Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and Russia each must come away from the negotiations with something of value—regarding security, economics, and the oh-so-important political coin, saving face.
• Before talking about what the solution might look like, let us be clear about who will be the major players—at the negotiating table and behind the scenes.
  • Ukraine
  • Russia
  • NATO
  • EU
  • US under Trump... Trump could—and should—demand concessions from Putin. If cleverly crafted, concessions won’t be impossible for the Russian president to accept. Three come to mind:
    • First, even if Ukraine’s territorial reality changes, the United States should propose language for a cease-fire agreement similar to that used to describe West Germany’s status after World War.
    • Second, rather than accepting that Ukraine’s NATO “irreversible” membership be put off indefinitely, the United States should propose that NATO accession will be worked out over an indefinite period.
    • Third, the United States can say, as a condition for coming to the table, that Russia must be ready to rejoin talks on nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
• Win-win-win solution. 
  • Although Putin may not like dropping his conditionality over US aid to Ukraine, he has an equal interest in doing “something nice” for Trump. Resuming nuclear talks could be one such thing, costing Putin little domestic capital while returning him to the world stage, side by side with the US president.
  • As for Trump, a peace agreement in Ukraine and a new nuclear agreement with Russia would cement his reputation as the ultimate dealmaker—indeed, as the ultimate peacemaker. By pocketing two big deals, Trump would achieve goals that have eluded the Biden administration.
  • These are only three ideas of what might be asked of Putin during negotiations that could lead to a win-win situation.
  • However, Putin will certainly come to the negotiating table with his own objectives. Most important, Ukrainian President Zelensky, whose countrymen have been fighting so valiantly for their freedom and independence since February 2022, will have the most necessary asks at the negotiating table. The future of Ukraine is at stake, and Ukraine will need to see a positive future coming out of the negotiations. For all the parties involved, that means shifting away from a winner-take-all zero-sum game toward the search for a truly balanced outcome—a win-win-win solution.
  • A successful outcome is possible, but President Trump will want to make sure that he does not come out as the loser during negotiations with Putin over Ukraine. Putin will be ready to make some concessions, carefully crafted to save face—his, Trump’s, and Zelensky’s, too. Nobody needs to emerge from this war having suffered a crushing defeat.

"Staying Power: Securing Peace While Balancing European Interests," Marie Dumoulin and Camille Grand, ECFR, 11.28.24.

• The conflict in Ukraine is at a tipping point. US president-elect Donald Trump plans to settle the war “in 24 hours”, but he doesn’t have a clear plan, and success hinges on both sides being ready to compromise – unlikely at this stage. Ukraine’s stance on the war’s outcome has shifted, now prioritizing diplomacy as a way to end the war.  However, this would require the resources to achieve significant military successes or, at a minimum, hold out on the battlefield. The Kremlin, for its part, is still striving for full and complete victory. It aims to seize even more Ukrainian territory than it currently controls while feigning openness to negotiations that hinge on Ukraine’s abandonment of its sovereignty and recognition of Russia’s annexations.
• EU member states appear paralyzed at the prospect of a rushed peace negotiation over Ukraine and an end of US military assistance. ... There are three fundamental and interconnected questions that Europeans need to answer, preferably jointly:
  1. What are the key European security interests in a post-Ukraine war Europe?
  2.  How can a peace settlement guarantee Ukraine’s lasting security, stability, and ability to defend itself?... Three proposed models could provide sufficient reassurance for Kyiv, either separately or in combination:
• The ‘porcupine’ model.
• The ‘Korean model.
• The ‘West German model.

3. How can European leaders make sure that Ukraine will be in a good negotiating position?

• These are not easy questions, and they may trigger a difficult conversation among Europeans. But this discussion is more necessary than ever, as the public in some European member states is starting to question the necessity of assistance to Ukraine, and some political forces are pushing a defeatist narrative about peace. To truly achieve peace, Europeans must redefine their strategic interests beyond simply ending war and focus on strengthening collective security for the long term. Moving from the ethical narrative to a strategic one will bolster the argument for continuing to support Ukraine, paving the way for a just and sustainable peace. European governments and institutions must accept that there’s no returning to business as usual with Russia. The future relationship will be, at best, marked by distrust and competition, and might well involve enduring tensions and direct or indirect confrontation. A Russia that emerges victorious over Ukraine would usher in an unpredictable era of strategic instability in Europe.

"Ukraine, Peace and the Forgotten Security Organization," Peter Jones CMG, RUSI, 11.29.24.

• Ukraine and its partners need to think hard about how to make any future agreements stick when the earlier Minsk Agreements have failed. It may have been impossible for the OSCE to deliver the level of monitoring and assurance asked of it in 2014–15, and it is sensible to ask whether the organization could cope with a potentially even larger remit in the future. The answer would lie in part in a significantly increased investment of both political will and practical resourcing.
• The OSCE’s most important role so far could be as part of peace arrangements for Ukraine. Indeed, for the OSCE to have much future relevance anywhere, it needs to be part of the solution there.
• Stabilizing an eventual peace for Ukraine may prove to be as big a challenge as ending the war. But it is right to try.

“Ukraine’s Dmytro Kuleba: ‘If it continues like this, we will lose the war,’” Gideon Rachman, FT, 11.29.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views

• [Kuleba said] “We Ukrainians are lucky that Joe Biden was the president of the United States in 2022 because if it was someone else, things would have gone much worse for us. Joe Biden has a place for Ukraine in his heart. But his mind was shaped in the cold war logic . . . You do not talk about Nato membership for Ukraine with him. Do not talk about nukes to him. Because these are the things that trigger him.” Preoccupied by the dangers of a nuclear war — fears that Putin is still playing on — the Biden administration has slow-walked the provision of offensive weapons to Ukraine.
• If Biden was a mixed blessing for Ukraine, what about Donald Trump? Is Kuleba anxious? “I’m not anxious at all, because it’s not something that I can change.” ... “First, separate what Trump says and what people around him say,” he advises. “Musk, Trump’s son — they can say whatever they want. But if you look at what Trump has been saying, he is basically making only two points. First, I will fix it. And second, Zelenskyy is the greatest salesman in the world.” Then he says something that surprises me: “Both Zelenskyy and Putin will have the same strategy. They see Trump as an opportunity.”
• “There was no peace settlement to be had in 2022 . . . I’ve heard this argument everywhere, in Africa, in Asia and even in America. They say, ‘But you were close to peace, and the bloody west did not allow you to do it, because the west wants you to fight until the last Ukrainian.’”....The Russian peace proposals were, in his view, completely unserious. “They even had one provision that all Ukrainian heavy armor had to be placed in warehouses and these warehouses should remain under the control of the Russian forces . . . So the plan was clear. Neutralize Ukraine, stay where they are in Ukraine, demilitarize Ukraine. And then make the final shot.”
• Kuleba thinks that Nato is no longer the cast-iron guarantee that it once was. “The trust of European allies in Nato is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In reality it is based on one sentence — ‘the United States will defend every inch of the territory of our allies.’ And this sentence belongs to Biden. What if you have a president who says he’s not going to defend every inch of your territory? . . . If Trump says anything like that, the Nato shield is gone and Putin will feel free to do whatever he wants.”
• If Europeans are slow to understand the reality of the Russian threat, what about the rest of the world? One of Kuleba’s unenviable tasks as foreign minister was to travel around the “global south”, trying to make the case for his country.... African leaders were particularly concerned about that. Some of them literally were afraid that Russia will stage a coup or kill them if they openly support us . . . And then there was always another elephant in the room — China. Because Africa is Chinese territory with very few exceptions.”

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 11.27.24. Clues from Russian Views

• No matter what the adversary does to escalate the situation, it will never make us renounce efforts to achieve the special military operation’s goals. To paraphrase President Vladimir Putin, we are ready to face any developments but would prefer to address issues and resolve disputes by peaceful means. In Ukraine’s case, this deals with addressing the root causes of the conflict, which include the emergence of entrenched security threats for Russia along its western borders, including NATO’s eastward expansion, as well as recurrent and system-wide violations by the Kiev regime of the rights of Russians and people identifying as Russians in terms of their cultural affiliation and the Orthodox faith. A political settlement must include the demilitarization and de-Nazification, while also ensuring the unaligned, neutral, non-nuclear status for the territories controlled by the Kiev regime. Of course, any agreements will hinge upon recognizing the political and territorial reality as per the Constitution of Russia.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Trump's new Ukraine adviser urged peace deal without NATO membership or restored borders,” Sareen Habeshian, Axios, 11.27.24.
• “Ukraine deserves a chance for peace and stability,” Boston Globe, 11.29.24.
• “The Pitfalls for Europe of a Trump-Putin Deal on Ukraine,” Fredrik Wesslau, FP, 11.28.24.
• “‘Putin only understands force’: Former U.S. special envoy for Ukraine negotiations Kurt Volker on how Trump could seek to end the war," Eilish Hart, Meduza, 11.27.24.
• “The Price of a Bad Peace,” Anastasia Edel, FP, 11.27.24. 
• “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks at Ambassadorial Round Table Discussion, ‘Ukraine crisis: Global information space,’” Russian Foreign Ministry, 11.29.24. Clues from Russian Views 

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Speech by Sir Richard Moore, Chief of SIS,” Gov.UK, 11.29.24.³

• As early as 1912, the first Chief of MI6, Mansfield Cumming, made his first ever visit to a foreign partner, by coming to France to meet the Deuxième Bureau, to compare insights on German capabilities and intentions. He began a tradition which our Services have honored through two World Wars, one Cold War, and countless crises, including those that we face today in Ukraine and the Middle East.
• In 37 years in the intelligence profession, I have never seen the world in a more dangerous state. And the impact on Europe – our shared European home – could hardly be more serious. The menace of terrorism has not gone away: after retreating in Syria and Iran, Islamic State is again expanding its reach, inflicting deadly attacks in both Iran and Russia. The Taliban, the hosts of Al Qaida, once again rule Afghanistan. And we have yet to have a full reckoning with the radicalizing impact of the fighting and terrible loss of innocent life in the Middle East, after the horrors of October 7.
• We must navigate the rise of an increasingly assertive China which sometimes competes with our interests and whose values often do not align with our own.
• we again have a war on European soil. Nicolas [Lerner, le Directeur Générale de la sécurité extérieure] and I are in no doubt about what is at stake in Ukraine: if Putin is allowed to succeed in reducing Ukraine to a vassal state, he will not stop there. Our security – British, French, European and transatlantic – will be jeopardized. The cost of supporting Ukraine is well known, but the cost of not doing so would be infinitely higher. If Putin succeeds, China would weigh the implications, North Korea would be emboldened, and Iran would become yet more dangerous.
• We have recently uncovered a staggeringly reckless campaign of Russian sabotage in Europe, even as Putin and his acolytes resort to nuclear saber-rattling, to sow fear about the consequences of aiding Ukraine, and challenge Western resolve in so doing. Such activity and rhetoric is dangerous and beyond irresponsible. We have no doubt that our Ukrainian friends have the will to win.
• As our two leaders affirmed in Paris, France and Britain are united and unflinching in our determination to support Ukraine, for as long as it takes, to defeat Russia’s war of aggression, and protect European security and the international order. Together Europe and North America have many times Russia’s GDP and defense budget. 75 years after its foundation, we have a larger and stronger NATO than when Putin invaded Ukraine.
• Putin...is jeopardizing Russia’s future, pouring vast sums into his military machine and squandering tens of thousands of lives – Russian and now North Korean – in his catastrophic conflict. Putin has made Russia demands to Tehran, Beijing and Pyongyang. I do not doubt the transactional consequence of that arrangement and the succor it brings to Russia. But it is a transaction: there is no real trust or respect, its roots are shallow. There are limits to the partnership.
• Russia should avoid the classic error of the authoritarian state, which confuses the splendidly irreverent clash and thunder of democracy, with weakness and irresolution.

“Do Autocrats Need a Foreign Enemy? Evidence from Fortress Russia,” Henry E. Hale and Adam C. Lenton, International Security, 07.01.24.

• It is often claimed that autocracies need foreign enemies to stir up senses of threat and craft belligerent foreign policy stances to bolster their regimes’ popularity at home. Autocrats can gain domestic support through international hostilities by presenting themselves as defending their country against external aggressors and perhaps even by creating enemies that do not already exist. But is a bellicose foreign policy stance really beneficial for autocrats?
• To [answer this question], we study Putin’s own rhetoric, analyze public opinion data (including a survey experiment), and examine relevant events over the nearly two-and-a-half decades that Putin has been in power in Russia. The findings qualify conventional thinking about links between foreign threats, bellicosity, and authoritarian popular support. 
• On the one hand, we confirm that Putin gains popularity from perceptions that the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are a menace to Russian interests. On the other hand, we show that through December 2021, Russians believed that Putin was responding to this threat with prudence, cooperation, and even a relatively pro-Western stance rather than with hostility and aggression. 
• Moreover, we detect no evidence that Putin drew support primarily from people preferring a generally anti-Western policy orientation ... When anti-Americanism and Putin’s support appear to rise and fall in sync, we find other factors influencing both at the same time, such as the Crimea annexation, bilateral summits, and even international sporting events. In other words, before 2022, Russians consistently saw Putin as a foreign policy moderate who was responding to broad public concern about the West and NATO expansion.
• This evidence suggests a modified understanding of how autocrats like Putin use foreign affairs for domestic purposes. Our perspective reconciles the idea that “autocrats need a foreign enemy” with research identifying competence in providing stability and economic prosperity as common sources of authoritarian leaders’ appeal. These two potential sources of authoritarian appeal are in tension with each other: international animosities can put stability and prosperity at risk. 
• What we show, however, is that autocrats do not necessarily have to choose. Instead, they sometimes try to covertly stoke hostilities while overtly appearing to be moderate and cooperative pursuers of stability and prosperity. What our findings indicate above all is that this invasion marks a shift in rather than a continuation of Putin’s long-standing domestic legitimation. Crucially, Russia’s 2022 attack was more a luxury than a necessity from Putin’s domestic politics perspective, a desired action that he appears to have thought he could afford rather than a move needed to sustain popularity or to stay on brand.

"The United States and the 'Axis' of Its Enemies: Myths vs. Reality," Eugene Rumer, CEIP, 11.25.24.

• Since launching its all-out assault on Ukraine, Russia has drawn closer to China, Iran, and North Korea. But have they really formed an “axis?” Their interests have aligned but not merged. It makes little sense and can be even counterproductive to treat these four countries, each guided by its own vision, as a unified coalition.
• The relationship between the United States and the would-be “axis” countries is too burdened with hostility and far gone down the path of confrontation for there to be a meaningful conversation about fixes or solutions. It is a problem to be managed by U.S. foreign policy rather than solved.
• Trying to manage, let alone fix a problem, based on a false or misleading understanding about its nature would violate the “do no harm” ideal of foreign policy. Trying to address the challenge of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as an “axis” would more likely than not aggravate the challenges they pose to U.S. interests and possibly create a self-fulfilling prophecy by driving these countries closer together. 
  • The first task therefore is to recognize that the United States is facing four distinct challenges that are different and unique, have their own origins, and will not succumb to one size fits all solutions. 
  • The second task in dealing with these countries is to review the record of U.S. policy toward them and to assess whether these approaches have worked, have produced positive results, and/or are worth pursuing in the future. 
• This approach—of differentiation rather than aggregation—and cold-blooded focus on top U.S. priorities and interests does not guarantee success. In June 2021, President Joe Biden put aside his reservations about Putin, whom he had called a “killer,” and met with him to tackle key issues on the bilateral agenda. The meeting did not produce lasting results, and Putin launched his war against Ukraine anyway. But a one-size-fits-all policy that makes no effort to understand the motivations, interests, and perceptions of our adversaries and aims to bring a diverse group of countries with vastly different strategic cultures to the same—lowest—common ideological denominator is a sure recipe for failure.

“How Western Elites Believed in the ‘End of History’ and Missed the Security Forces’ Revenge in Russia. A Big Conversation with Political Scientist Maria Snegovaya,” Republic, 12.01.24.^ 

• Putin has started five wars during his time in power … About one war every five to five and a half years. This is the war in Chechnya, in Georgia, two in Ukraine and in Syria. This is a record among current world leaders. It is obvious that such dynamics are not directly related to NATO expansion, and the Kremlin is trying to establish its control, at least in the countries of the post-Soviet region.⁴
• I believe that, in essence, the same Cold War continues today. It is not even Cold War 2.0. Why? Because there has not really been a change of elites in Russia. Putin and his closest henchmen are people who began their careers in the Soviet political and administrative system. They see the world in a similar way to how Soviet leaders saw it in their time: the West is the enemy, expansion is strength, we have spheres of influence, we must hold on to them by any means, maintain political influence over our neighbors. If we lose them, it will be a victory for the enemy West. Such a worldview leaves no room for compromise. And this leads to the only way out: Russia must be contained.
• Of course, the West has made mistakes in relation to Russia. Including because the Western world has been proceeding from the principle of the end of history for the last 30 years. The West believed that all countries eventually become liberal democracies. And Russia is moving in the same direction ... This approach turned out to be completely wrong. Why? Because ... there was no real change of elites in Russia, no rethinking of values ​​and worldviews that would create the possibility of moving toward liberal democracy. That is why everything ended very quickly and very tragically. And instead of seeing all this earlier, actively arming themselves and resisting Russian pressure [and] the growing aggressiveness of the Kremlin, the West, on the contrary, tried to integrate Russia more actively, to develop economic ties with it.
• Another mistake is the constant fear of escalation on the part of Russia. In this regard, Putin is very effective at intimidating the West. He constantly shakes his nuclear missiles and says that if you support Ukraine, we will hit you with something terrible. And this works to a certain extent in the perception of the West.
• Ukraine ... is important. It has enough resources, it can resist the Kremlin. And if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, it is obvious that this will not end there. In order to preserve at least some contours of the world order that was formed after the collapse of the USSR, it is necessary to contain Russia in Ukraine, otherwise Putin will go further. In this regard, helping Ukraine today is the cheapest option for the West to contain Russia
• The problem is that there is no topic for negotiations now, since Putin is winning. Trump, as the author of a book on the art of the deal, probably understands that successful deals are not made from a weak position; from a weak position there will be a loss. And Ukraine is not in a strong position now; it is losing territory. And it would be right to first strengthen Ukraine, let it gain an advantage at the front, and only then negotiate from a tougher position.

"Competing Visions of Restraint," Miranda Priebe, John Schuessler, Bryan Rooney and Jasen Castillo, International Security, Fall 2024.

• For more than twenty years, realists, conservatives, and progressives have converged in a big tent to oppose deep engagement. What are the prospects for this camp to affect the direction of U.S. grand strategy in the future? Ultimately, we are uncertain. On the one hand, Russian aggression and China’s growing power could lead some of today’s restrainers to become deep engagers, weakening restraint’s political influence. On the other hand, U.S. fiscal challenges, crises in multiple regions, and a distribution of power shifting away from the United States could make deep engagement appear too risky or costly, potentially drawing more adherents to restraint.
• What we can say is that restraint is likely to remain a pole in the grand strategy debate. Furthermore, restrainers are likely to end more agreement on strategy in Europe and the Middle East than in East Asia.
• The arguments that the United States is fundamentally secure, the pursuit of primacy is self-defeating, or U.S. militarism is ultimately corrosive at home and abroad will keep some commit-ted to restraint in East Asia. While the number of such voices may diminish under some conditions, we expect they will continue to provide a counterpoint to deep engagement at a time of high grand strategic stakes.

“China and North Korea Throw U.S. War Plans out the Window,” Raphael S. Cohen, FP, 12.02.24.

• Call it an “axis of aggressors,” an “unholy alliance,” a new “axis of evil,” or something else altogether—the fact remains that military ties among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are deepening. And this change should upend how the United States and its allies around the world think about and provide for their national security.
• Of course, confronting the combined weight of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a herculean proposition. It will require a larger military and significantly more defense spending. That may be a tough political sell. But the United States today only spends about half as much on defense as a share of GDP as it did during the Cold War.
• Even with increased spending, the United States still won’t be able to go it alone. As much as the United States may preach “America first,” providing for U.S. security and prosperity will be far cheaper and more effective if Washington can draw on the combined strength of its global network of allies and partners.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Back to Bipolarity: How China's Rise Transformed the Balance of Power," Jennifer Lind, International Security, Fall 2024.
• "Psychological Attack: Russia's 2024 offensive could be considered a failure if not for the demoralization of Ukraine and its Western allies," Re: Russia, 11.26.24. 
• "Rutte's NATO Leadership Faces Test as Trump Signals Shift in U.S. Support," Lee Hockstader, WP, 11.26.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

•  No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Missile defense:

"The U.S. Homeland Stands Unguarded," Glen VanHerck and Pete Fesler, WSJ, 11.29.24.

• Beijing and Moscow have deployed weapons that can circumvent current threat warning and defensive systems… The Defense Department hasn’t adequately addressed these new threats. 
  • The Army, by law responsible for ground-based air defense, has a limited ability to defend the District of Columbia and the immediate surrounding area.
  • The Navy dedicates only a few on-call vessels to maritime defense and since 9/11 has offered its support to homeland defense on a handful of occasions, instead focusing on forward deployment.
  • Even the Missile Defense Agency hasn’t stepped up, focusing more on defending Guam and against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea.
  • Today it [USAF] commits only a handful of predominantly Air National Guard fighters to the air defense mission for the entire North American continent. 
• Despite the National Defense Strategy’s declaration that homeland defense is the Pentagon’s top priority, almost no additional resources have been allocated, and none are forthcoming. The focus is on offense and the fight around the world. Today the nation is defended by a small number of professionals equipped with systems largely designed and bought in the 1970s and ’80s, with no defined path to modernization.
• Today, as Russian ultraquiet submarines prowl off American shores and Chinese and Russian bombers and warships conduct joint operations near Alaska, our military is focused elsewhere. Fortress America stands largely unguarded.

Nuclear arms:

"Russia’s Updated Nuclear Doctrine Isn’t a Blueprint for Weapons Use. Its Primary Value Is Manipulation," Nicole Grajewski, CEIP, 11.26.24.

• After months of anticipation, on November 18, the Kremlin unveiled its latest nuclear doctrine, outlining the conditions under which it might resort to nuclear weapons use. 
• The timing:
  • Russia seemed to be framing its conditions for nuclear use to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty months prior to the update’s release. In May, Russia conducted a nonstrategic nuclear weapons exercise in the Southern Military District, explicitly aimed at preparing its forces to “unconditionally ensur[e] the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reinforced this message. 
  • The key changes were first outlined by President Vladimir Putin at a September meeting of the Russian Security Council’s committee on nuclear deterrence. During the meeting, Putin framed the changes as a necessary response to evolving military and political threats posed by NATO and heightened Western military support for Ukraine. He explicitly stated, “The use of nuclear forces is the last resort measure to protect the country’s sovereignty.” He also implied that Russia would integrate Belarus into Russia’s nuclear strategy.
• This [Nov. 18] update [of Russia’s nuclear doctrine] follows a pattern common among nuclear powers in creating ambiguity around nuclear use conditions, a long-standing feature of nuclear deterrence. What distinguishes Russia’s approach is its repeated nuclear saber-rattling and efforts to sow transatlantic divisions through intimidation. Equally concerning is its expansive and fluid interpretation of what constitutes a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The revisions are noteworthy in several key areas. They view sovereignty as encompassing not just state authority but internal regime stability, freedom from external political interference, and more; and they treat territorial integrity with deliberate elasticity by, for example, explicitly including Belarus under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. 
• Through these changes, Russia has created a calculated spectrum of potential nuclear responses that forces adversaries to contemplate the possibility that even actions that fall well short of threatening Russia’s existence as a state could lead to a worst-case scenario.
• Ultimately, the updated doctrine serves primarily as a tool of declaratory policy and signaling—it shapes perceptions without explicitly committing Russia to specific courses of action. In essence, it aims to deter adversaries from testing Russia’s resolve by keeping the potential costs of miscalculation prohibitively high. Moreover, the update aligns with Russia’s efforts to stoke fear in European capitals to fracture the tenuous transatlantic unity over Ukraine. 
• Ultimately, Russia’s actual nuclear employment decisions would likely not involve Putin carefully parsing doctrinal clauses. The doctrine’s primary value lies in its manipulative function—shaping adversary perceptions and calculations rather than providing a precise blueprint for nuclear use.

"What Can Stop the Cycle of Escalation in Ukraine?," Joshua Yaffa, The New Yorker, 11.27.24.

• The decision to allow long-range strikes has seemed to awaken Putin’s fears about escalation. “If this doesn’t stop now,” the Russian defense source said, “then why wouldn’t Western countries deploy military advisers to the battlefield? And, after that, regular troops could be next.” Putin’s would-be red lines have been transgressed so many times since 2022—one

  U.S. weapons system after another, from HIMARS to F-16s, has flowed to the battlefield, without much of a response—that it’s hard to tell what a real red line would actually look like for him. But Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, argued that this time may be different. “It might seem like this decision isn’t so significant: Ukraine doesn’t have so many of these missiles—they don’t change the over-all picture all that much.” But, Stanovaya added, that’s not how things look in Moscow. “For Putin, this really is a strategic turning point,” she said. “With this decision, Ukraine becomes a staging ground for what Putin considers to be NATO strikes against Russian territory.” As he sees it, today Kursk, tomorrow Moscow. “It can be in one year or ten,” Stanovaya told me. “The point is a new paradigm has begun.”

• In response, Putin, rather predictably, used the card that he believes has worked in the past: Russia’s nuclear arsenal… On November 19th, two days after the Biden Administration’s approval of ATACMs became public, the Kremlin announced that Putin had ratified the new doctrine. “The threshold for nuclear weapons use has been lowered, and the number of possible scenarios has increased,” the Russian defense source said. “That should be understood as a very clear statement. As if to underscore that message, on November 21st, Russia launched a next-generation intermediate-range ballistic missile, called Oreshnik,⁵ at Dnipro, a regional capital in southeastern Ukraine. The Oreshnik missile carries multiple warheads, each with its own sub-munitions, and flies at more than ten times the speed of sound—all of which makes it exceedingly difficult to intercept with existing air defenses. Russia does not have many of these missiles, and it is unlikely to ramp up production at a significant scale. (“They got what they wanted,” the Biden Administration official said. “A day of headlines.”) The point, however, was more general: Russia fired a missile designed to carry a nuclear payload against a major population center. “Putin is laying out two scenarios,” Stanovaya said. “One path leads to nuclear war, the other to peace on Russia’s terms.”
• “We need to bring this to a responsible end,” Trump’s incoming national-security adviser, Mike Waltz, said of the war. Waltz spoke of a possible armistice and the need to “get ahead of this escalation ladder, rather than responding to it.”
• “People here were not that alarmed,” the Biden Administration official said of Russia’s launch of the Oreshnik missile. “We gave it a shrug.” Most likely, Putin will again resist escalating further, and instead absorb the new reality and adapt. That logic, however, holds true until it doesn’t. “Putin is sure that nuclear threats and blackmail should shock the West into, as he sees it, a kind of sobriety, a realization they should want entirely different relations with Russia,” Stanovaya said. “That’s his great delusion. This isn’t happening—and it will never happen. So what does he do then?”

“Russia’s Hypersonic Missile Attack on Ukraine Was an Attempt at Blackmail,” Maxim Starchak, CEIP, 11.29.24

• The Kremlin appears convinced that by allowing Ukraine to target Russian territory with long-range missiles, NATO is entering into competition with Moscow. It believes that, like in 1979, it will be able to propose negotiations after engaging in threats and missile escalation.
• But ATACMS and Storm Shadow are a long way from the iconic Cold War-era U.S. Pershing II missiles. Pershing II were nuclear capable and could hit targets over 1,800 kilometers away, while ATACMS and Storm Shadow are conventional missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers. In other words, ATACMS and Storm Shadow are not a critical threat to Russia. NATO is not boosting its nuclear missile capabilities, it’s not taking part in a nuclear arms race, and it’s refusing to play Moscow’s games. Russia’s threats are being left unanswered, meaning the world is still relatively safe from a nuclear apocalypse.

“Speech at a restricted attendance meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council,” Kremlin.ru, 11.28.24. Clues from Russian Views

• The CSTO is a military and political organization. 
• As you know, earlier this month, Western officials announced their decision to authorize the Ukrainian armed forces to launch strikes at Russian territory using long-range high-precision weapons produced in the West. We have repeatedly pointed out that this decision would mean direct involvement of Western countries in the armed conflict, as it is simply impossible to deploy this type of weapons without directly involving the military personnel and the military specialists from the respective NATO countries. As you know, despite our warnings about the dangers of escalating this conflict, strikes were delivered at targets in the Bryansk and Kursk regions with American ATACMS missiles and the British Storm Shadow missiles. I spoke about the consequences of these attacks and the damage we sustained, in my statement on November 21. 
• Without a doubt, we are aware of the number of the relevant weapons systems that are in service of our potential adversaries. We know how many of them are kept in storage facilities. We know their exact location, how many weapons have been supplied to Ukraine, and how many more are planned to be supplied.
• As far as the production of relevant missile systems and relevant equipment is concerned, Russia has 10 times more of them than the combined output of all NATO countries. Next year, we will increase the production by another 25 to 30 percent.
• The Oreshnik system, of course, has no equivalents in the world, and I doubt we will see anything comparable in the foreseeable future… The system deploys dozens of homing warheads that strike the target at a velocity of Mach 10, equivalent to approximately three kilometers per second. The temperature of the impact elements reaches 4,000 degrees Celsius—nearing the surface temperature of the sun, which is around 5,500–6,000 degrees. Consequently, everything within the explosion’s epicenter is reduced to fractions, elementary particles, essentially turning to dust. The missile is capable of destroying even heavily fortified structures and those located at significant depths. 
• Military and technical experts note that when used in a concentrated, massive strike—using several Oreshnik missiles simultaneously—the resulting impact is comparable in power to that of a nuclear weapon. However, the Oreshnik is not classified as a weapon of mass destruction. This distinction is due to two key factors: first, as confirmed in the November 21 test, the system demonstrates exceptional precision; second, and most importantly, it operates without a nuclear warhead, meaning no radioactive contamination follows its use. 
• The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Russian Army are currently identifying targets for strikes within Ukraine. These may include military installations, defense industry sites, or decision-making centers in Kyiv. All the more so that the Kyiv regime has repeatedly attempted attacks on critical infrastructure in Russia, including in St. Petersburg and Moscow, with such attempts ongoing. The serial production of the Oreshnik system has commenced. However, the choice of weaponry will ultimately depend on the nature of the designated targets and the level of threats posed to the Russian Federation.

“Answers to media questions. Vladimir Putin answered media questions following his state visit to Kazakhstan and the CSTO summit,” Kremlin.ru, 11.28.24.

• [When asked to comment on the Oreshnik:] Concerning strike capabilities, I have already addressed this. If we deploy multiple such systems simultaneously in a single strike—say, two, three, or four systems—it would be comparable in force to the use of nuclear weapons, albeit they are not nuclear. This is because they are: a) high-precision; b) not equipped with a nuclear explosive device, thus they do not cause environmental contamination. Yet, the force would be comparable. 
• [When asked to comment on alleged suggestions by Western politicians to give “nuclear weapons back to Kiev”:] In this case we will use all—and I want to stress it—all weapons Russia has, all of them. We will not let this happen. This is the first point. Secondly, such statements can only be made by irresponsible individuals who are not accountable for anything and do not feel any burden of responsibility for the destiny of their countries and the entire world. And thirdly, if someone transfers something officially, that will constitute a violation of all assumed commitments regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And we will not let this happen in Ukraine itself, we will be watching every step being taken there. It used to be a very high-tech and industrially developed republic of the Soviet Union. However, everything or nearly everything Soviet Ukraine could take pride in has been lost. Thus it will be next to impossible to do it from scratch. What could be done is something dirty, a dirty bomb by scrambling up nuclear power plants’ waste. But even in this case the response will be absolutely adequate to the threats to the Russian Federation.
• Our stance regarding the Ukraine settlement does not change after the emergence of more and more new weapon systems. We are still ready for: a) a negotiation process, and b) of course, on the terms I presented in my address to the Foreign Ministry leadership in Moscow last June. Nothing has changed.

“Sergei Ryabkov: The West can burn dollars in the fireplace for Ukraine,” TASS, 11.30.24.^ Clues from Russian Views 

• [When commenting on Western supplies of longer-range missiles to Ukraine for strikes against Russia:] The West hears us, but does not want to listen. This is the key problem. We have all the necessary means to counter these strikes. Air defense systems are effective, you see what is happening. We have large-scale countermeasures to reason with our opponents, since they do not understand any other arguments.
• [When asked if it is possible that Russia will resume nuclear tests in response to America’s “escalatory course”:] This question is on the table. And without prejudging anything, I will simply say that the situation is quite complex. 
• Today, the situation is extremely complex and acute. Everything that needs to be said about the scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons on our part has been said by the president and reflected in the updated [Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence]. To say that this kind of danger has receded would be an understatement. Unfortunately, this danger exists. But we will do our utmost to avoid the implementation of this catastrophic scenario. But in this case, not everything depends on us. The key question is how our adversaries will behave, whether they will continue to move in the direction of the scenarios described in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, in the basic principles of state policy [on nuclear deterrence].
• So far, unfortunately, the movement is going in this direction. We must face the truth and acknowledge this, which is what we are doing. I hope that our signals, both verbal and material, are still perceived somewhere, in some corridors of power, in some offices, in some American bunkers, by at least someone, and not just dismissed as some kind of propaganda. This is not propaganda, this is a harsh reality, which they must perceive as such.
• [When asked to comment on Russia’s restrictions on supplies of HEU to the U.S.:] It has long been said that we should stop supplying our adversaries with strategic products.

“Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024,” ISW, 11.29.24.

• There is nothing particularly novel about the capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and U.S. and Ukrainian officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian escalation in the war. Putin's efforts to stress the missile’s technical specifications are part of the larger reflexive control campaign that the Kremlin is currently pursuing, and highlighting its range and payload while comparing its destructive capabilities to that of a meteor is meant to threaten both Ukraine and the West and discourage further Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using Western-provided systems. Even Putin's threat of strikes on "decision-making centers" in Kyiv rings empty—Russian forces regularly strike civilian and critical infrastructure in Kyiv City with drones and nuclear-capable missiles.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky summarized this fact on November 29 in response to Putin's CSTO statements and said that "Putin wants to add thousands more to the thousands of missiles that have already hit Ukraine." Reuters, citing five sources close to U.S. intelligence, reported on November 27 that the November 21 Oreshnik strike has not changed the U.S. intelligence assessment that Russia is unlikely to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, even in retaliation for Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian missile capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.

"‘Using nuclear weapons against Ukraine would be a mistake. The response should target the West immediately,’" Sergei Karaganov, Business Online/Russia in Global Affairs, 11.29.24. Clues from Russian Views (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Naturally, I hope and pray that it will not come to the actual use of nuclear weapons… But to refuse to use nuclear weapons in extreme cases would mean running away from responsibility to the country, humanity and the Almighty. Therefore, now we need to both go up the ladder of nuclear escalation and we need to achieve more decisive, more effective advances on the ground to finally turn the tide in Ukraine and break the will of the West to resist. This is a highly important goal.
• If the threat of a nuclear strike is not real, then we can simply choke in an endless war, which many of our Western partners benefit from… We need to make them [the Western elites] understand that this war could lead to their destruction.
• I am very glad that the Russian leadership, despite many doubts, has introduced changes into the nuclear doctrine. Its parameters indicate that we are lowering the nuclear threshold, spelling out scenarios in which Russia can use these weapons… We must reinforce the declared changes with changes in the deployment of our nuclear forces and, possibly, in the deployment of new types of nuclear systems.
• I believe that this [carrying out a nuclear strike against Ukraine] would be a big mistake… for we would be striking… our own people. This cannot be done… If necessary, in an extreme case, then we need to strike immediately at the source of the threat. And that is the West… The list of… targets should include places where globalist elites gather.
• [When asked “If it comes to a direct clash between Russia and NATO, will it automatically lead to nuclear strikes?”] We need to state this absolutely clearly [that there’d be a nuclear strike in case of a direct clash of Russia and NATO], which we have not done yet.
• Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine meets modern challenges. But it needs to be followed up with concrete military-technical measures, redeployment of nuclear forces, and appropriate exercises.
• Russia faces… gigantic tasks.
  •  The primary task… is a victorious conclusion to the war in Ukraine, which is impossible without our greater reliance on nuclear deterrence… I believe that victory can be achieved in a year and a half.
  • The Russian Federation also has a second task… By increasing the role of nuclear weapons, we achieve not only our national goals of strengthening our own security, but also strengthening international security. We are stopping the world from sliding towards World War III.
  • One of the tasks of our policy during the special operation in Ukraine should be to ensure the fastest and/or least painful possible departure of the United States of America from the position of world hegemon.
  • For Russia, the advent of Trump will usher in changes that may be slightly more positive, because he considers China to be the main threat to the United States.
• Naturally, by leaving the position of a [global] hegemon, America brings chaos to the world… in twenty years, if we avoid a major war, then the world will have a much more stable system, in which there will be four great powers—Russia, India, China and the United States… I hope for the creation of a triple alliance (not a union, of course, but an alliance), which will include China, India and Russia.

Dmitry Trenin in “Stabilizing ‘Basic Principles:’ Moscow Reduces Options for Escalation at the Pre-Nuclear Level,” RIAC, 11.22.24. Clues from Russian Views (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The new edition of the “2024 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” constitutes a response of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation to the challenge generated by the West’s proxy war against Russia.
• It has transpired that the… fear of nuclear weapons, which made it possible to prevent a third world war between the USSR and the USA, has largely dissipated in the years since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, during the Ukrainian crisis, the USA and Western countries demonstrated extremely risky behavior that they did not allow themselves in relation to the USSR. For example, in the 1960s–1980s, it never occurred to Western strategists and statesmen to declare the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia: at that time, it was considered a sign of madness.
• Thus, during the special military operation, Russia needed to strengthen deterrence in order to enhance the effect of intimidation of the enemy and deprive it of illusions about impunity for its actions. The changes made to the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation serve precisely this purpose.
• The updated doctrine of the Russian Federation is designed to break the escalation strategy that our adversaries have been implementing in Ukraine since 2022. If the West's participation in the war is not limited now, a direct clash between NATO countries and Russia is inevitable. This clash could lead to a global catastrophe, which our leadership is trying to prevent. If the enemy does not come to its senses, the next steps of the escalation ladder will be strikes against sensitive targets of states whose weapons are used against Russia. 
• A unique and extremely dangerous situation has developed in Washington. The outgoing administration of President Joe Biden is escalating tensions in the Ukrainian theater of military operations, seeking to "tie" the newly elected President Donald Trump with responsibility for the dangerous policy Biden has pursued towards Russia. Moreover, there are reasonable doubts about the ability of Biden himself. The decisions made in his name are prepared and implemented by people who are not responsible for them. Unfortunately, there is no certainty at this time that this group of people will act rationally and refrain from actions that provoke a direct clash between the United States and Russia. It cannot be ruled out that in the weeks remaining before the transfer of power, Russia will be subject to new strikes by American long-range weapons, and that in this case Moscow will have to act in accordance with the updated nuclear doctrine. It may thus turn out that humanity, six decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, will have to look once again into the abyss.

“Russian deserter reveals war secrets of guarding nuclear base,” Will Vernon, BBC, 11.26.24.

• On the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Anton says the nuclear weapons base he was serving at was put on full combat alert. “Before that, we had only exercises. But on the day the war started, the weapons were fully in place,” says the former officer in the Russian nuclear forces. “We were ready to launch the forces into the sea and air and, in theory, carry out a nuclear strike.”
• Three days after troops poured over Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces had been ordered into a “special mode of combat service”. Anton says that combat alert was in place on day one of the war and claims his unit was “shut inside the base… We weren’t fighting in the war, we were just guarding the nuclear weapons.” The state of alert was cancelled, he adds, after two to three weeks.
• The former officer says life was tightly controlled. “It was my responsibility to ensure the soldiers under me didn’t take any phones on to the nuclear base,” he explains.
• Anton was part of the base’s security unit—a rapid-reaction force that guarded the nuclear weapons. “We had constant training exercises. Our reaction time was two minutes,” he says, with a hint of pride.
• Russian officials say the updated doctrine "effectively eliminates" the possibility of its defeat on the battlefield.
• “There might be some old-fashioned types of weapons in some areas, but the country has an enormous nuclear arsenal, a huge amount of warheads, including constant combat patrol on land, sea and air,” Anton said. Russia’s nuclear weapons were fully operational and battle-ready, he maintained. “The work to maintain the nuclear weapons is carried out constantly, it never stops even for one minute.”
• Shortly after the full-scale war began, Anton said he was given what he describes as a “criminal order”—to hold lectures with his troops using very specific written guidelines. “They said that Ukrainian civilians are combatants and should be destroyed!” he exclaims. “That’s a red line for me—it’s a war crime. I said I won’t spread this propaganda.” Senior officers reprimanded Anton by transferring him to a regular assault brigade in another part of the country. He was told he would be sent to war.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “The Use of Nuclear Weapons No Longer Seems Unthinkable in Russia,” Alexei Levinson, Levada/Russia Post, 12.02.24.
• "A growing nuclear debate: The risk of calling everything a nuclear threat," Chloe Shrager, BAS, 11.28.24.
• "5 Reasons Why Russia is Unlikely to Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine," Important Stories, 11.28.24.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

“What Syria’s Revived Civil War Means for the Region,” Steven A. Cook, CFR, 12.01.24.

• The surprise rebel offensive that has seized Aleppo and threatens other regime-held territories could mark a further weakening of Iran's regional sway but also spur a new cycle of violence and instability. 
• Clearly, the armed opposition to Assad has taken advantage of the fact that Israel has done significant damage to Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah. A greatly weakened Hezbollah and a Russia distracted by its fight in Ukraine make it harder to defend the Assad regime. That does not mean that Hezbollah or the Russians will not help. Both are deeply invested in Syria, but they do not have the forces they had in 2015 and 2016 that were used to crush the insurgency.
• After Aleppo’s fall, Assad’s grip on power seems tenuous. 
• No doubt the battle lines have changed and Syria is an active war zone again. But it is important to be cautious about gauging the prospects for the groups that have taken Aleppo and the countryside near the city of Hama. 
• So far, we know that the rebellion—an amalgam of extremist groups, Turkey-backed fighters, and Kurds (though not necessarily organized Kurdish forces)—has wrested control of Aleppo and is driving toward Hama and other cities. 
• Russia is, of course, fully engaged in its fight in Ukraine, but it does have forces in Syria including warplanes and attack helicopters, military police, and soldiers that are spread across twenty bases. Much of the Russian military support for Assad came in the form of indiscriminate bombing of rebel areas from the air, while Hezbollah supported the regime on the ground. It is possible—indeed likely—that Russia will use the Khmeimim air base in northwestern Syria to do much of the same. Air power alone will not likely be sufficient to beat back the rebels. With government forces unable or unwilling to fight the insurgency and Hezbollah unable to muster the same forces it once did, the Russians find themselves in a difficult situation in Syria. There is no question that Moscow will want to defend its position in Syria, but it is unclear yet whether that includes defending Assad.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Russian Guide to Trump’s Cabinet Picks,” Mary Ilyushina, WP, 11.28.24. 

• Officially, the Kremlin has taken a rather cool, wait-and-see approach to Trump’s victory, weighing whether he would stick to his more conciliatory pre-election campaign rhetoric or be beholden to a largely anti-Russian security establishment. But in state media, there has been close scrutiny and sharp opinions of the picks. The conclusion so far is a mixed bag from the Russian perspective.
  • Tulsi Gabbard, director of national intelligence: Gabbard’s planned appointment as the head of national intelligence elicited the most excitement in Russia, because she has long been regarded as a darling of the propagandist Russian RT network, which amplified her sympathetic takes on Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and Putin.
  • Keith Kellogg, special envoy for Ukraine and Russia: Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst, suggested that Moscow sees Kellogg as likely to follow in the footsteps of Kurt Volker, Trump’s Ukraine envoy during his first term and widely unpopular in Russia. Russian media have highlighted Kellogg’s previous remarks, including his comment that both Hitler and Napoleon struggled to defeat Russia — interpreted as a warning about the difficulties of a ground war against the country. Other analysts have been scrutinizing Kellogg’s peace plan, which calls for a quick cease-fire and negotiated settlement, implying territorial concessions. For Kelloggs’ views on how peace can be attained see the section on negotiations below)
  • Marco Rubio, secretary of state: Zvezda TV, a channel funded by the Defense Ministry, highlighted Rubio’s opposition to continued Ukraine aid, which “made the authorities in Kyiv feel sick to their stomach.” In 2022, Rubio voted in favor of a Ukraine aid package but has since reversed his position, with Russian commentators noting the change in his track record when it comes to the war.Other pundits, however, view Rubio as a hawk with a stance on Russia that is more aggressive than that of the incoming president. News outlets recalled that the senator introduced multiple bills devising punitive measures against Russia, including tougher financial and personal sanctions against members of the government elite, and he called Putin a “thug.” For RM’s compilation of Rubio’s views, see here.
  • Pete Hegseth, defense secretary: An op-ed on the RT state network written by prominent Russian military blogger Ilya Mersh, known as Starshe Eddy, described Hegseth as “an eccentric character” whose grand plan to overhaul the U.S. military from the top down, including by removing “woke” generals and eliminating the Pentagon’s diversity efforts, will probably drown in “administrative frictions.”
  • John Ratcliffe, CIA director: “According to Donald Trump, it was Ratcliffe who exposed Hillary Clinton’s lie that Russia interfered in the 2016 election,” read a summary on [Russian TV propagandist] Solovyov’s Telegram channel. The post also focused on Ratcliffe repeatedly sounding the alarm about China being the chief U.S. adversary in the long run.
  • Scott Bessent, treasury secretary: Russian business outlets warned that Trump’s choice of hedge fund manager Scott Bessent for Treasury would fall in line with what Moscow has traditionally seen since the annexation of Crimea in 2014—sanctions upon sanctions. Pro-Kremlin commentators noted that Bessent used to work for billionaire businessman George Soros, a central figure in Russia-promoted conspiracy theories that claim the businessman and his associates secretly control the U.S. government.

“Is America the Next Soviet Union?,” Harold James, Project Syndicate, 11.28.24.

• In July 2020… I wrote a worried commentary titled “Late Soviet America…” Though the country had an enormous pool of talent and energy, the political system was dysfunctional. The two main parties selected their candidates undemocratically (since the primary process had mostly atrophied), and large-scale stimulus checks appeared to have become the preferred method of gaining political popularity.
• The Soviet collapse transpired in two stages, with an immobile gerontocracy giving way to a misconceived attempt at radical, disruptive reform… Today, especially in Russia, many analysts are applying this analysis of Soviet decay to the U.S.. Prominent figures compare Trump to Gorbachev, whose reforms shattered the USSR. While Trump is much older than Gorbachev was, he too is an insider who casts himself as an outsider, as someone who will break the system.
• Like any successful political movement, Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) prevailed by building a coalition… Not surprisingly, this coalition is already showing signs of strain. The most obvious issue is that many of Trump’s proposed remedies will inevitably lead to inflation—the same problem that sunk President Joe Biden. New and higher tariffs will immediately increase the cost of living, and any serious attempt to round up and deport 11 million undocumented immigrants will create havoc and new labor shortages in agriculture, construction, and crucial distribution centers.
• Equally, slashing the bureaucracy in the way that Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy envision—through the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)—would put large numbers of Americans out on the street. (These displaced workers are unlikely to rush into low-paying agricultural work.) Thus, while the brighter future remains only a vague promise, the looming costs and pain are readily apparent.
• Those speaking for Silicon Valley also dream of unleashing artificial intelligence to boost productivity, and hence the earnings of lower-skilled workers. The idea is not preposterous on its face. There is empirical evidence that AI has precipitated at least the former boost in call centers. Productivity gains in other areas, such as health care and eldercare, are clearly possible. But neither this revolutionary “accelerationist” philosophy nor its potential applications have been tested at scale. 
• On a more optimistic note, US disengagement, by itself, cannot provoke a Great Depression-level global trade collapse, since America accounts for only 13.5% of the world’s imports… Trump’s policy agenda, if enacted, will inevitably sow the seeds of a new wave of discontent, protest, and conspiracy theorizing… The same description applies to the post-Soviet experience in the closing years of the twentieth century. Abrupt, rapid change only led to disruption, with all those harmed by it joining the next cohort of the alienated. A similar dynamic appears to be taking hold in the U.S. Today’s Russia certainly hopes so.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Why Do Russian Emigrants Vote for Trump?" Daria Dimke and Irina Meyer-Olimpieva, Russia.Post, 11.29.24.
• “Don't Let Trump Drive You Into Internal Exile,” Miriam Elder, NYT, 11.25.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s Economy Is Slowing, Opening Fissures Over Policy. The slowdown is worrying for the Kremlin but not serious enough to significantly hobble its war effort,” Anatoly Kurmanaev, NYT, 12.02.24.

• The wartime economy that Russia spurred into overdrive is slowing, causing tensions among the country’s economic elites as the war with Ukraine approaches its fourth year. Many Russian civilian industries have stopped growing, and some had even gone into decline by October, according to the latest official data. The country’s currency, the ruble, dropped to its weakest level in two years last week, and businesses say they are struggling to get new loans or get paid by clients.
• The central bank sharply raised the country’s benchmark interest rate in October to 21 percent, the highest since the end of the Soviet Union, in an attempt to dampen inflation. Last month, the central bank also lowered its forecast for Russia’s economic growth next year to 0.5 to 1.5%, compared with 3.5 to 4% this year. 
• The slowdown comes even as the government continues to pump record amounts of money into the economy to finance the war. The combination of rising prices and falling economic activity has led some economists and officials to warn that the Russian economy is moving toward stagflation, a quagmire where prices rise quickly without growth.
• Civilian companies are particularly feeling the pinch… The immediate casualty of the recent downturn could become Russia’s central bank, arguably the last state entity in the country that has operated somewhat independently from the Kremlin.
  • “Because of the actions of the central bank, the Russian economy is practically facing the threat of stagflation,” the organization, called the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting, wrote in a November report.
  • Another attack came from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, which said that 36% of its members had reported being unable to collect payments from clients in the third quarter of this year, up 14 percentage points from a year ago.
• New American sanctions on Russian banks in November have contributed to a large decline in the value of the ruble. The ruble fell to 109 against the dollar on Friday, its weakest rate since March 2022.
• Still, the data suggests that the economic strains are still far from provoking the kind of crisis that might compel Mr. Putin to curtail his ambitions in Ukraine… economists say the Russian economy will not collapse in the foreseeable future.
  • Wages continue outstripping inflation, raising the standard of living of ordinary Russians and denting the impact of the slowdown on the population, according to the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe, or CASE, a Cyprus-based group of opposition Russian economists.
  • Real wages in Russia grew nearly 18% since the start of the war, reversing a seven-year decline, the economists said in a recent report.
  • Inflation, although stubborn, remains in the single digits, and the Kremlin maintains ample means to finance the war, the CASE economists said. 

“Russia’s economy flatters to deceive,” Tony Barber, FT, 11.30.24.

• On Russia’s economic resilience… there are a multitude of differing views.
  • At one end of the spectrum, William Pomeranz wrote a blog in September for the Washington-based Wilson Center contending that the economy is in deep trouble. He went so far as to suggest: “Putin and the Russian state are sitting on top of a social explosion.”
  • At the other end, consider this article by Nicholas Larsen for International Banker magazine. Although he acknowledged some pressures on the economy, he wrote: 
    • The world’s largest country by area has thus far defied widespread expectations that U.S.- and EU-led sanctions would expose key vulnerabilities in the Russian economy… A 3.6% growth rate in GDP in 2023, for instance, positioned Russia as one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies outside of India and China, while the first six months of this year saw it extend those gains with growth for the first and second quarters recorded at 5.4% and 4.1%, respectively.
      • In the west, a persistent problem has been that international financial institutions, private sector economists, news media and other commentators often cite official Russian statistics when they discuss the economy. Far too infrequently do they tackle the question of whether these statistics are deliberately misleading.
• In a… comprehensive report, issued in September, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economic calculated that GDP, far from growing by the official figure of 3.6 per cent in 2023, may actually have been negative.
• So, what do we know with any certainty about the Russian economy?
  • In the first place, the central bank’s tight monetary policy is clearly intended to offset inflationary pressures driven by higher state spending, above all on the war.
  • Secondly, we know that the vast increase in military expenditure is squeezing the Russian budget, even including areas related to the war effort.
  • Thirdly, there are pressures on the non-military side of Russia’s economy.
  • Fourthly, the war effort and sanctions are disrupting Russia’s transport system.
  • Lastly, Russian firms are finding it hard to recruit enough workers.

" The Russian Economy at a Turning Point. As the War Boom Ends, the Kremlin Faces Growing Economic Risks," Janis Kluge, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 11.26.24.

• On 21 Nov. 2024, the Russian State Duma adopted the federal budget for next year. Military spending is set to increase sig­nificantly: the defense budget will rise by one quarter to 13.5 trillion rubles, which, at the current exchange rate, is equivalent to 130 billion euros. Given that Russia is wag­ing a war against Ukraine, this sum might seem rather small. However, the purchasing power of military spending in Russia must be taken into account. Translated into Ger­man prices, Russia’s defense budget amounts to some 350 billion euros.
• Russia’s total military spending will be somewhere between 7%  and 8% of gross domestic product (GDP), simi­lar to the 2024 level, which was a record in Russian post-Soviet history. In 2021, the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, military spending was just 3.6 per cent of GDP.
• The significant increase in demand for weapons and other goods needed at the front in Ukraine has triggered a strong economic upturn in many Russian regions… The enormous war expenditures have led to a sharp increase in aggregate demand. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimates that the fiscal impulse for the period 2022–24 totaled 10% of Russia’s annual GDP. The result has been high GDP growth rates: in 2023, the Russian economy grew 3.6%, largely owing to the creation of 2 million new jobs, most of which were in the defense industry and the army.
• However, this growth model has reached its limits. 
  • Unemployment is at a historical low of 2.3% and there is an acute labor shortage. 
  • The Russian Central Bank still expects the economy to grow around 3.5–4% this year; but most of that growth will be due to the statistical base effect (meaning that last year’s dynamics are reflected, not the current situation). In fact, the Russian economy has barely grown since early 2024. 
  • And in September of this year, leading indicators such as the S&P Purchasing Managers’ Index were already signaling a contraction in Russian manu­facturing—for the first time since 2022.
  • The higher wages have led to optimism about the economy among the Russian population. Consumer spending is on the rise. But prices are rising, too: in October 2024, seasonally adjusted core inflation was 9.7% annualized.
• While the economic difficulties are likely to dampen optimism among the population and force the government to make political trade-offs, Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine will not be directly affected. More important in this respect is the success of recruitment campaigns and the capacity of the Russian military-industrial complex. 
• The extent to which the economic slowdown becomes a problem for Russia also depends on the price of oil next year… the slowing economy makes Russia more vulnerable to further sanc­tions. 

“Russia’s War Economy Shows New Cracks After the Ruble Plunges,” Georgi Kantchev and Chelsey Dulaney, WSJ, 11.29.24.

• The Russian economy, surprisingly resilient through two-plus years of war and sanctions, has suddenly begun to show serious strains.
  • The catalyst for the change in economic fortunes was a decision by the Biden administration to ratchet up sanctions on Russia's Gazprombank, the last major unsanctioned bank that Moscow uses to pay soldiers and process trade transactions, as well as more than 50 other financial institutions. Gazprombank had been carved out of previous rounds of sanctions to allow allies in Europe to pay Russia for critical supplies of energy. It was a vital conduit for inflows of hard currency in exchange for Russia's exports.
    • The new sanction measures could gum up Russia's already constrained trade routes with other countries, Russian officials and analysts say.
    • In targeting Gazprombank, a state-controlled lender that began as an energy banking hub but has in recent years grown in importance in other cross-border payments, Washington is trying to stifle one of the last major links to the Western financial system.
• The ruble fell to a 32-month-low this week, and remained near its weakest point since the days after Moscow invaded Ukraine, according to LSEG data, trading for about 108 rubles to the dollar. The free fall was stopped after Russia's central bank intervened in currency markets late Wednesday. The bank said it would stop buying foreign currency for the rest of the year, which it does when the government has an oil-and-gas surplus, a move that should help alleviate a critical shortage of hard currency available to businesses and consumers.
• Military spending hit a post-Soviet high this year and is planned to rise to more than $120 billion next year, making up over 30% of total spending for the year. But the stimulus has had dangerous side effects. Most notably, inflation is running at more than twice the central bank's target. The bank has jacked up interest rates to 21% this year, which has done little so far to cool the overheating economy. A record labor shortage, as working-age men go to the front, has further fueled inflation. IMF predicts Russia’s consumer prices to grow by 7.4% in 2024. 
• Putin said Thursday that "the situation is under control and there are certainly no grounds for panic." Economy Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said that concerns about how the sanctions were affecting Russia's foreign trade were behind the ruble slump. "It is obvious that adaptation to the new anti-Russian sanctions will be required, including in terms of changing banking mechanisms and channels for currency inflows to the Russian market," he said on Friday. It remains unclear whether the strains, which the Russian economy is showing, according to the authors, will prevent the Russian economy from growing. As of Nov. 29, 2024, the IMF estimates Russia will experience a real GDP growth of 3.6% in 2024 and 1.3% in 2025.

“The war in Ukraine is straining Russia’s economy and society,” The Economist, 11.28.24.

• A recent study by the Public Sociology Laboratory, an independent research group, gives a sense of the alienation ordinary Russians feel about the war. It examined three provincial towns, each in a different region: Buryatia in eastern Russia, Ural in the center and Krasnodar in the south. Over several weeks ethnographers conducted interviews and observed everyday life, providing first-hand reporting on the mood in Mr. Putin’s political heartland.
• The study found that Russians in such places are neither indoctrinated militarists nor passive automatons, as is often assumed. Instead they appear to be equally alienated from the state, from jingoistic patriots and from pro-Western exiles. 
• People largely pretend the war is not happening. “Had it not been for the periodic news of someone’s death and for the funerals, people would not remember that there is a war going on,” says [one resident.]
• At the same time, the economic boom sparked by lavish government spending on the war and wage growth owing to a manpower shortage is beginning to run out of steam. Next year the central bank is forecasting GDP growth of between 0.5% and 1.5%, well below this year’s 3% and last year’s 3.5%. The official inflation rate, meanwhile, is 9.5%, even though the central bank has raised its main interest rate to 21%. 
• Worse is to come. Oleg Vyugin, a former deputy head of the central bank, explains that, to pay for the war without cutting other spending, the government scrapped a rule that had obliged it to stash in its rainy-day fund all its extra income when the oil price rose above $45 a barrel. Instead, it began spending its savings. But the fund is dwindling fast, so the government has had to raise corporate- and personal-income taxes from next year. 
• None of this is about to bring the economy to its knees, but neither is it sustainable indefinitely. Mr. Vyugin argues that the government faces a choice between cutting back military spending, which would induce a recession, or spurring inflation yet higher by continuing to spend lavishly, which would necessitate even harsher medicine later. 
• [Putin’s] attempt to conquer Ukraine has had a devastating effect on Russia’s population. The number of people in Russia—roughly 144m—was shrinking even before the war, as was the workforce, of around 75m. 
• Another indication of the social dislocation brought about by the war is the rise in serious crime. Russia’s Interior Ministry says offences including murder, rape, grievous bodily harm, sabotage, property violations and interethnic violence are at their highest in at least 15 years. Convicts who have been released from prison to join the war and return home as “heroes” may be partly responsible. Verstka, an independent Russian news organization, reckons that at least 242 Russians have been killed by soldiers returning from Ukraine and another 227 seriously injured.
• The upheaval within Russia is not yet as severe at that initiated by the Bolshevik revolution. But Mr. Putin is correct to argue that he has set Russia on a dramatically different path. 

"Why Did the Russian Ruble Plunge?" Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.30.24.

• The Russian currency this [past] week collapsed: in just two days, the ruble lost 10% of its value against both the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan. Since its summer highs, it’s down almost 25%. 
• The ruble’s crash this week sent it back to a value against the U.S. dollar that had not been seen since the panic of March 2022 that followed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the short term, the crash was driven by a toxic combination of recent U.S. sanctions, and a lack of liquidity. However, there are also structural issues that date back to the start of the war, and the first Western economic sanctions.
• The truth is that, for Russia, devaluation is bad news. The bottom line is that a 10% fall in the exchange rate generates up to 0.6 percentage points of inflation. Even for the budget, a cheap ruble is only useful in the short term. As early as next year Russia will have to spend more on indexation, as well as providing additional subsidies for business. While the Russian economy depends on imports and Western sanctions remain in place, the ruble can only weaken. 

For more commentary/analysis that is relevant for this section, see

"Russia May Soon Have to Choose Between Guns and Butter," Chris Anstey, Bloomberg, 11.30.24.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Inside the effort to market Russia and Putin to Africans,” Rachel Chason, WP, 12.01.24.

• There is an opaque network of groups in Africa that Western officials and analysts say the Kremlin uses to boost Russia's image—and tarnish that of Western countries—as it seeks to restore its influence in Africa. The U.S. State Department this year accused African Initiative's partner organization, based in Moscow, of seeking to undermine U.S.-funded public health projects across Africa, which the group has denied.
• Especially after the escalation of Russia's war in Ukraine, Africa has grown more important for the Kremlin, as it has become increasingly isolated and strapped for resources, said Joe Siegle, research director at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
• Russia has exploited and often stoked anti-colonial sentiment, particularly in France's former colonies in West Africa, where anti-Western grievances have contributed to recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The junta leaders in those countries have booted Western soldiers and embraced working with Russian military personnel to confront rising violence by Islamist militants.
• At the same time, a constellation of efforts like African Initiative have emerged, including media sites such as African Stream and La Perspective Sahélienne that target African audiences with a mix of pro-Russian and Pan-Africanist narratives. African journalists have been invited on "war tours" of occupied Ukraine, and opportunities for African students in Russia have ramped up.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Deconstructing Russia’s Anti-Colonial Posturing in the Global South," Mikhail Komin, ECFR, 11.27.24.
• “Merkel’s memoir reveals her blind spots on Russia,” Sylvie Kauffmann, FT, 11.28.24.
• “Angela Merkel sets out to restore her reputation," The Economist, 11.26.24. 
• "Angela Merkel makes her case in ‘Freedom,’" Liana Fix, WP, 11.29.24.
• "She Was the Most Powerful Woman in the World. And She Isn’t Ready to Say Sorry," Katrin Bennhold, NYT, 11.26.24. 
• “Freedom by Angela Merkel—a paean to a bygone halcyon age,” Guy Chazan, FT. 11.26.24.

Ukraine:

“What Does Ukraine Expect From Trump’s Victory?” Konstantin Skorkin, CEIP, 12.02.24.

• At least on the surface, Trump’s victory should be bad news for Kyiv. 
  • The president-elect has said repeatedly he wants to end the war, without showing much interest in Kyiv’s opinion. He has objected to the amount of U.S. aid sent to Ukraine, which he considers excessive. 
  • Furthermore, Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have had a complex political relationship: it was communication between the two men that led to a 2019 effort to impeach Trump during his first term for attempting to force Kyiv to investigate his rival presidential candidate Joe Biden.
  • Initial news about Trump’s appointments suggests the U.S. leader will be surrounded by men and women who are already on bad terms with Kyiv. 
    • U.S. vice president-elect J.D. Vance is known to be skeptical of Zelensky, as is the increasingly influential billionaire Elon Musk. In 2022, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine accused the current candidate to be director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, of working for Russia. 
  • There is a widespread belief that Trump will cut U.S. aid to Ukraine and attempt to impose a peace settlement that will be unfavorable to Kyiv. And given Trump’s skepticism about NATO, it’s also going to be much harder for Ukraine to pursue its ambition of joining the Western military alliance.
• However, all this does not mean that despair reigns in Kyiv. 
  • Many Ukrainians remember a different Trump: his first presidency saw the White House sign off on the first deliveries of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, as well as a direct confrontation between U.S. and Russian forces (albeit, Russian mercenaries fighting in Syria).
  • Some optimists in Kyiv believe that any Trump peace initiative will fall apart when it comes up against Kremlin intransigence. 
• Another consequence of Trump’s election has been to reinvigorate the Ukrainian opposition—particularly supporters of ex-president Petro Poroshenko, who believe Zelensky is in a lose-lose position. Zelensky’s former political allies-turned-foes have also spied an opportunity. The uncertainty gives them a chance to attack the president and raise their public profiles. Ex-presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych, for example, has said Trump will “demolish” Zelensky. 
• At the same time, Trump’s victory has sparked anxiety among ordinary Ukrainians. The president-elect has never been widely admired: toward the end of his previous term in office in 2019, 30% of Ukrainians had a favorable view of him. In comparison, 64% of Ukrainians were positive about Biden in 2021, and 89% said they trusted Biden amid the full-scale Russian invasion the following year.
• Trump’s presidency could end up being a major shock for Ukraine. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians have gotten used to the support of the West—even if aid is not always sufficient or timely. Now, Trump’s egotistical pragmatism will come to the fore, and he will reassert what he sees as U.S. interests. Trump will only support Ukraine if it’s a part of a foreign policy that aligns with his principle of “America first.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin's Ukraine Obsession Began 20 Years Ago with the Orange Revolution," Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council, 11.25.24.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“What's happening in Georgia, and why are thousands protesting?” Kelly Kasulis Cho, WP, 12.02.24.

• Tens of thousands of protesters in Georgia have overtaken the capital city's historic Rustaveli Avenue in recent days, waving the national flag, tossing fireworks and clashing with police in tense demonstrations against the ruling party's decision to suspend talks to join the European Union. The decision, seen by the opposition as yet another sign of the ruling party cowing to Russian influence, comes months after the Georgian Parliament passed a "foreign agent law" that critics say mirrors a Russian law used to suppress independent journalism and watchdog groups as well as target dissidents.
• The United States has sided with Tbilisi's protesters, with State Department spokesman Matthew Miller saying on Saturday that the ruling party has "made Georgia more vulnerable to the Kremlin" and that "the United States condemns the excessive use of force by police against Georgians seeking to exercise their rights to assembly and expression."
• Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and its constitution includes a provision to ensure that the country fully integrates into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia has also laid the groundwork for meeting the criteria for E.U. membership for nearly a decade, if not longer.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Why Central Asia Should Be on Donald Trump’s National Security Agenda," Margarita Assenova, NI, 11.24.24.
• "Tajikistan’s Afghan Conundrum," Bruce Pannier, FPRI, 11.25.24.
• "Russian Emigres in Georgia Spark Tensions Ahead of Election," WP, 11.29.24.
• "Moscow’s Demands Have Toppled Yet Another Leader in Abkhazia," Olesya Vartanyan, Carnegie Politika, 11.28.24.
• “Article by Vladimir Putin in the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper, Russia—Kazakhstan: a Forward-Looking Alliance Demanded by Life,” Kremlin.ru, 11.27.24.

Footnotes

1. These remarks were not included into the body of the digest. They can be accessed on Politico’s and Reuters’  websites.
2. As of Nov. 29, 2024, the IMF estimates Russia will experience a real GDP growth of 3.6% in 2024 and 1.3% in 2025.
3. While in Paris, Sir Richard Moore, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, discussed the U.K.-France intelligence relationship and the 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale
4. In 2009, an independent fact-finding mission set up by the European Union found that the war in Georgia was initiated by “a sustained Georgian artillery attack” that was not “justifiable under international law” but that “much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defense, according to NYT.
5. For an explainer of what the Oreshnik is, see: "Russia's 'Oreshnik' Missile: A New Challenge for NATO," Robyn Dixon, WP, 11.30.24.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Mariam Zuhaib.