This Week’s Highlights

• A RAND report “suggests that there are serious grounds for concern about the stability of both the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China rivalries. While certain contextual factors, such as mutual strategic vulnerability, will remain buffers of conflict, many of the warning signs for instability are clearly visible, and the future seems likely to be even more volatile.”
• “There is an aim underlying Moscow’s moves, to be sure,” writes Kadri Liik of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “But usually it’s not straightforwardly about the West. Rather, it’s about adjusting to a world now shaped primarily by the competition between America and China. To avoid being caught between the two, Russia hopes to build regional leverage ... to enhance its bargaining power for the uncertain future,” according to Liik.
• Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, writes in his take on President Vladimir Putin's recent speech, “What is disconcerting about the president's speech is the return to strictly Western-centrism ... It is clear that Russia cannot abandon the agenda of the past 30 years, too much is connected with it. The main thing is not to drown in it once again,” according to Lukyanov. “After all, regardless of what happens in Europe, it will remain a strategic periphery. And for Russia's international posture it will be not decisive, but auxiliary.”
• “It is 20 years since I published a paper which formally grouped together the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China and coined the term ‘BRICS’ to describe them,” writes former U.K. Treasury Minister Jim O’Neill. “China is the only BRIC country to have surpassed its growth projections. … Countries such as Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Vietnam should seek to emulate Seoul’s economic success for their own societies.”
• “[There] is a vicious circle: the regime likely will not create resources to advance the country’s [Russia’s] economic development other than rents,” write Carnegie Moscow Center’s Andrei Kolesnikov and Levada Center director Denis Volkov. “The gradual dwindling of these revenue streams and the reduction of opportunities to redistribute national wealth through state channels, along with the oppressed state of small and medium-sized businesses and civil society, all promise very serious problems for the future generations that will live beyond the ten to fifteen years remaining in the expected lifetimes of Russia’s Putin-led elites.”

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries,” Michael J. Mazarr, Samuel Charap, Abigail Casey, Irina A. Chindea, Christian Curriden, Alyssa Demus, Bryan Frederick, Arthur Chan, John P. Godges and Eugene Han, RAND, November 2021. The authors of the report write:

• “The consensus inside and outside the U.S. government is that the international system is headed for a renewed era of intense and sometimes bitter competition among leading states. The objective of this research was to assess the emerging strategic competitions between the United States and both China and Russia, examine the approaches most likely to preserve long-term stability in these competitions and draw implications for Army capabilities and posture.”
• “The [authors’] assessment suggests that there are serious grounds for concern about the stability of both the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China rivalries. While certain contextual factors, such as mutual strategic vulnerability, will remain buffers of conflict, many of the warning signs for instability are clearly visible, and the future seems likely to be even more volatile.”
• “Key Findings … Stable rivalries are defined by two key characteristics: the mutual acceptance of a shared status quo and a resilient equilibrium to absorb shocks and weather discontinuities. … Historical and theoretical analysis suggests that stability is a function of the conditions that underlie the stability of a rivalry … The vast majority of the key factors that were assessed for this report are driving both the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia rivalries toward instability rather than stability. … The sole stabilizing factors at the moment relate to the mutual possession of deterring military power and the potentially devastating consequences of any conflict. … The United States could seek to stabilize one or more of these rivalries if it chose.”
• “[Selected] Recommendations … Consider the unintended effects of military capability decisions. The deterrent effect of capability decisions is only half of the equation. When making decisions about posture or capability development, the United States should also consider their effects on stability. … Take seriously the need to develop formal and informal rules of the road. … Shape the international system to magnify its constraining effects. … Seek opportunities for mutual transparency, notification and arms control.”

“No, Putin Isn’t Trying to Bring Down the West,” Kadri Liik, The New York Times, 11.23.21. The author, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “There is an aim underlying Moscow’s moves, to be sure. But usually it’s not straightforwardly about the West. Rather, it’s about adjusting to a world now shaped primarily by the competition between America and China. To avoid being caught between the two, Russia hopes to build regional leverage … to enhance its bargaining power for the uncertain future. (The West can still get stung, of course.)”

• “But the misreading goes both ways: Russia also ascribes outdated motives to the West. And the biggest misconceptions are reserved for the European Union. Strikingly, Moscow’s foreign policy establishment seems to have mostly concluded that the bloc tried to proactively use the anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny as its agent to wreck Russia’s political system. The charge, of course, is wrong.”
• “The view of the United States is less distorted [than the EU’s] at the moment ... But this [U.S.-Russian] relationship is not free from misinterpretation, either. The most dangerous one revolves, once again, around Ukraine.”
• “Some in Moscow fear that the United States might establish what amounts to a military base in Ukraine or encourage Ukraine to retake the Russian-occupied areas of the Donbass by military force. … Others hope that Mr. Biden, needing Russia to contain China, will help Russia get its way in Ukraine—either by pressuring President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to allow Moscow a say over the country’s future decision-making or, better yet, by declaring NATO’s door officially closed to countries like Ukraine. … These hopes and fears, equally outlandish, surely lie behind Russia’s current troop movements along Ukraine’s border.”
• “If both sides can look at each other with sober eyes, some limited cooperation and effective messaging would be possible. The alternative doesn’t bear thinking about.”

“NATO Expansion Is a Bugbear for Both Russia and the West,” Fyodor Lukyanov, The Moscow Times/Kommersant, 11.26.21. The author, chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, writes:

• “Russia's relations with the West have come to a head. NATO expansion, which Putin brought up again in a recent speech, is a well-known issue for Russia. What is not often mentioned is that this is also an issue for the bloc.”
• “According to Vladimir Putin, tension creates opportunities — these are the lessons learned from the Cold War.  The question is whether this will work today. We have reached a point where the long-standing controversy over NATO enlargement must somehow be resolved.  Resolution will come from either by reaffirming the right to expand, or recognizing that the logic of ‘everyone has the right to enter the alliance,’ the idea on which post 1991 NATO expansion was based, is no longer valid. Both options carry many risks.”
• “What is disconcerting about the president's speech is the return to strictly Western-centrism. Non-western components were listed most likely for the sake of order, as even China is linked to the West by trying to destabilize it.”
• “It is clear that Russia cannot abandon the agenda of the past 30 years, too much is connected with it. The main thing is not to drown in it once again. After all, regardless of what happens in Europe, it will remain a strategic periphery.  And for Russia's international posture it will be not decisive, but auxiliary.”

“Can Cold War History Prevent U.S.-Chinese Calamity?” Li Chen and Odd Arne Westad, Foreign Affairs, 11.29.21. The authors, an associate professor at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China and the Elihu Professor of History and Global Affairs at Yale University, write:

• “In an intense rivalry, local conflicts can easily become entangled with great-power interests—as happened in, among other flashpoints, Berlin, Cuba, Korea, and the Middle East during the Cold War. It took adept crisis management, by diplomats, military officers, and political leaders, to ensure that none of these confrontations led to global war. Such crisis management relied on a number of steps by both sides, starting with the pursuit of limited and flexible objective.”
• “In such crisis situations, communication was especially important: with emotions running high and high-level meetings off the table, there must be effective lines of communications to reduce the risk of miscalculation and identify shared crisis-management objectives.”
• “During the Cold War, the potential for incremental improvement in great-power relations was often neglected in favor of the pursuit of fundamental changes. Given the intense ideological conflict and sharp regional confrontations, such neglect was understandable. Yet it meant many lost opportunities, in areas from joint research and people-to-people exchanges to agreements on non-intervention in certain regions.”
• “However inexact the Cold War analogy, policymakers today have a great deal to learn from this history—and from the historians who know it best. Unfortunately, in both the United States and China, historians of international affairs interact with analysts and political leaders less frequently than they did a generation ago. Given the likelihood that relations between China and the United States are going to get worse before they can get better, it will take all the accumulated knowledge of the past to avert worst-case scenarios and find a way forward together.”

“Russia proved it can shoot down a satellite. Does this make space less secure?” James J. Cameron, The Washington Post, 11.23.21. The author, a postdoctoral fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, writes:

• “Russia tested a ground-based missile last week, destroying a defunct but still-orbiting Soviet satellite, Kosmos-1408. China, the United States and India have conducted similar operations in the past, but this was the first time that Russia undertook a live intercept of this kind.”
• “Russia's test underlines the risks that antisatellite weapons pose to space security. An armaments race in space could lead to further deterioration of relations between major space powers such as the United States, Russia, India and China. During a crisis or conflict, attacks on adversary satellites that provide warning of a missile attack could be highly escalatory, potentially provoking fears of a surprise nuclear strike.”
• “However, the angry exchanges that this test has provoked suggest that the major space powers may not be prepared to tackle the long-standing obstacles in regulating the arms competition in this domain.”
• “Existing arms control agreements like the 1967 Outer Space Treaty do not cover antisatellite weapons. Washington, Moscow and others have been exploring the possibility of controlling this type of weapon for over 40 years, so far without significant progress. The United States dismissed previous proposals, while Russia recently objected to the United Kingdom's attempts to begin a U.N.-based process to regulate what countries can do in space. Differences over what to limit — and how — are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.”
• “For now, it appears that space will remain an important domain for the burgeoning arms competition between the major powers.”

“Biden Explores Talks as China Builds Arsenal,” David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, The New York Times, 11.28.21. The authors, senior writers for the news outlet, write:

• “For the first time, the United States is trying to nudge China's leadership into a conversation about its nuclear capability. U.S. officials, describing the American strategy, say Mr. Biden and his top aides plan to move slowly—focusing the talks first on avoiding accidental conflict, then on each nation's nuclear strategy and the related instability that could come from attacks in cyberspace and outer space. Finally—maybe years from now—the two nations could begin discussing arms control, perhaps a treaty or something politically less complex, such as an agreement on common norms of behavior.”
• “Earlier this month the Pentagon concluded that the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal may triple by 2030, to upward of 1,000 warheads. But the administration's concern is not just the number of weapons—it is the new technology, and particularly how Chinese nuclear strategists are thinking about nontraditional arms.”
• “Inside the White House and the Pentagon, there is no unanimity ... Biden has long been wary of assessments that could be intended to drive up the Pentagon's budget—and certainly American defense contractors, their executive offices jammed with former senior military officers, have a vested interest in describing a new threat that could lead to billions of dollars in new investments. But even some skeptics agree that the Chinese hypersonic test, along with antisatellite technologies that could blind American early-warning and command-and-control systems, suggest a major rethinking of American nuclear strategy and plans is overdue.”
• “On Capitol Hill, the conversation so far is largely about matching the Chinese investment, rather than rethinking the nature of the arms race. 'I'm very concerned,' Rose Gottemoeller, an arms control official in several administrations who now teaches at Stanford University, said … 'What's worrying me is the automaticity of the actions—of more nuclear weapons and more missile defenses without thinking if there's a smarter way.'”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“A congressional proposal reveals the Kremlin’s Achilles’ heel,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 11.24.21. The author, a Russian opposition politician, writes:

• “Rarely has a congressional resolution jolted the halls of power in Moscow as did House Resolution 806, a bipartisan initiative introduced last week. In a two-page draft referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Steve Cohen … and Rep. Joe Wilson … offer the ‘sense of the House of Representatives’ that recent constitutional amendments in Russia waiving President Vladimir Putin’s term limits were ‘illegitimate.’ The text further stipulates that any attempt by Putin to remain in power after the end of his final term in 2024 ‘shall warrant nonrecognition on the part of the United States.’
• “For a globally integrated kleptocracy, the prospect of international nonrecognition presents an existential threat in the way it couldn’t for insular autocracies such as Lukashenko’s. The nervous reaction in Moscow betrayed the sense of insecurity the Kremlin usually hides behind an assertive facade. In effect, the Cohen-Wilson resolution revealed the Putin regime’s Achilles’ heel for all to see.”
• “It goes without saying that the fate of Russia can, and should, be decided only by Russians themselves. Despite a devastating crackdown on civil society, the signs of public discontent with Putin’s two-decade rule—from his collapsing poll numbers to large-scale street protests to electoral defeats—are becoming difficult to hide. The rubberstamp election in 2024 intended by Putin to extend his rule yet again could end up backfiring on him, as happened to other autocrats in the post-Soviet neighborhood.”
• “The very least the world’s democracies can do is refuse to help Putin with his unlawful power grab. House Resolution 806 is an important step in this direction.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Twenty years on, the BRICS have disappointed,” Jim O'Neill, The Financial Times, 11.29.21. The author, a former U.K. Treasury Minister, writes:

• “It is 20 years since I published a paper which formally grouped together the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China and coined the term ‘BRICS’ to describe them.” 
• “China is the only BRIC country to have surpassed its growth projections, and India is not too far off from meeting its estimates. But due to dismal second decades, neither Brazil nor Russia have seen their nominal U.S. dollar shares of GDP grow any bigger than they were back in 2001. The great challenge of how these countries successfully transition towards a higher income status for the whole of society remains unsolved.”
• “South Korea continues to be the sole shining example for those nations which genuinely aspire to that goal. … Countries such as Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Vietnam should seek to emulate Seoul’s economic success for their own societies. That will end up making their people wealthier and probably happier, while also promoting greater equality around the world.”

“The Coming Deluge: Russia’s Looming Lost Decade of Unpaid Bills and Economic Stagnation,” Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.24.21. The authors, the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and the director of the Levada Center, write:

• “With all the problems facing the Russian economy, many are wondering how the government will respond. As Moscow finally wakes up to the reality of climate change, the prevailing attitude among members of the ruling class appears to be that there is enough oil and gas to keep the state coffers full, buy voters’ loyalty and control civil society and the media for as long as the country’s current leaders are in power (until 2036, when President Vladimir Putin may at last have to step down). What comes after that does not concern them.”
• “To project Russia’s likely development trajectory over the next ten to fifteen years, the authors asked twenty-three economists and business leaders to identify the biggest challenges for Russia, when they will materialize, what the consequences may be and whether they can be overcome under the current political system. Many of the challenges and potential crises these experts discussed are intertwined.”
• “Most of the key challenges facing the Russian political system are related to the lack of economic growth. One of the factors inhibiting that growth is the state’s excessive interference in the economy and indeed all other aspects of life, creating an overcentralized and ineffective administrative state. This overcentralization, coupled with constraints on the media and other outlets for freedom of speech, means that the Russian authorities get little feedback and consequently have at best a blurry picture of what life is really like for average Russians. The country’s economic risks are also exacerbated by unaddressed environmental challenges and the lack of steps being taken to address them.”
• “[There] is a vicious circle: the regime likely will not create resources to advance the country’s economic development other than rents. The gradual dwindling of these revenue streams and the reduction of opportunities to redistribute national wealth through state channels, along with the oppressed state of small and medium-sized businesses and civil society, all promise very serious problems for the future generations.”

“Putin Tries to Erase History of Gulag Atrocities,” Valerie Hopkins, The New York Times, 11.22.21. The author, a correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Mr. Putin has set his sights on rewriting the memory of one of the most painful times in Russia's turbulent history: the era of the gulag, when millions of Russians toiled and died, mostly in the first half of the 20th century. Russian prosecutors are moving to liquidate the archive and human rights center of Memorial International, the country's most prominent human rights organization, which is dedicated to the remembrance of those who were persecuted by the Soviet Union's often-brutal regime.”
• “Activists and dissidents consider the threat to Memorial a watershed moment for independent thinkers in Russia—a sobering example of the government's determination to silence its critics and sanitize the narrative surrounding the Soviet Union, which Mr. Putin views as a heady era of Russian influence and power.”
• “If prosecutors succeed in forcing Memorial to close, it would set a grim precedent for the dozens of other entities and individuals the Russian justice ministry has labeled foreign agents.”
• “'As a last resort, we will start from scratch,' Memorial's executive director, Yelena Zhemkova, said at a recent news conference. 'We will find money again, we will find premises again, we will adapt again.' It will also exhibit its collection of Gulag artifacts again, she said.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,” Alex Vershinin, War on the Rocks, 11.23.21. The author, commissioned as a second lieutenant, branched armor, in 2002, writes:

• “Moscow might want to undermine security in the Baltic states or Poland, for instance, but could the Russian government successfully carry out a large-scale invasion of those countries? If recent wargames are any indication, then the answer is a resounding yes — and it could do so pretty easily.”
• “The Russian army will be hard-pressed to conduct a ground offensive of more than 90 miles beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union without a logistics pause. For NATO, it means it can worry less about a major Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland and a greater focus on exploiting Russian logistic challenges by drawing Russian forces further away from their supply depots and targeting chokepoints in the Russian logistic infrastructure and logistic force in general. It also means that Russia is more likely to seize small parts of enemy territory under its logistically sustainable range of 90 miles rather than a major invasion as part of a fait accompli strategy.”
• “From the Russian perspective, it does not appear that they are building their logistic forces with fait accompli or blitzkrieg across Poland in mind. Instead, the Russian government has built an ideal army for their strategy of ‘Active Defense.’ The Russian government has built armed forces highly capable of fighting on home soil or near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, they are not capable of a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.”
• “Deciphering Russia’s intentions right now is increasingly difficult. It’s military buildup on the border with Ukraine could be preparation for an invasion or it could be yet another round of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, thinking through Russia’s military logistics capabilities could give NATO some insights into what Moscow might be planning to do next — and what the Western alliance might do to protect its interests.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Approach to Afghanistan Following the Taliban Takeover,” Ekaterina Stepanova, PONARS Eurasia, 11.22.21. The author, lead researcher and head of the Peace and Conflict Studies at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, writes:

• “On the positive side, Russia’s influence in Central Asia has visibly increased since mid-2021 in both diplomatic and security terms due to developments in Afghanistan. This influence and outreach are not confined to the CSTO alone, as demonstrated by Moscow’s rapprochement with Tashkent on the Afghan issue. In fact, non-CSTO Uzbekistan’s position on Afghanistan and the Taliban appeared to be closer to Russia’s than that of Moscow’s CSTO ally Tajikistan. However, this time, Russia’s influence in the region has increased neither in contrast to nor at the expense of, Central Asian states’ passiveness, inaction, or declining roles. On the contrary, most Central Asian states also stepped up their diplomatic and security activity and raised their own regional and, in the cases of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, broader international profiles. This speaks to a mutual win-win situation for Russia and Central Asia.”
• “As for any wider, longer-term impact that the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan may have on the spread of fundamentalist influences and forms of Islam in Central Asia, the scale of that impact is yet to be seen, but the overall concern is valid. However, this potential challenge is hardly one for Russia to address or solve, even in view of its role as the main security provider in the region. This fundamental challenge can only be reduced or neutralized by the Central Asian states’ own policy and developmental choices and priorities, religious policies, and evolving socio-political systems.”

“What Russia Really Wants in the Balkans,” Vesna Pusic, Foreign Policy, 11.23.21. The author, former first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign and European affairs of Croatia, writes:

• “There is no doubt that Russia is the main disruptor in the Balkans, using its local pawns to implement that policy. Its objectives, however, most likely transcend the region. In the past 13 years, Russia has intervened militarily in both Georgia and Ukraine and has brought Belarus back into its fold by supporting the country’s internationally isolated dictator, Aleksandr Lukashenko. These are the countries that Russia sees as being in its sphere of interest and directly pertinent to its security. Keeping them in a permanent state of latent or low-intensity conflict interferes with many other Russian interests, such as having its new gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 certified by Germany. These are the major issues on which Russia needs to come to some kind of understanding with the West.”
• “In this longer game, Balkan disruptors are merely bargaining chips rather than players. Eventually, Russian and EU leaders will have to sit down and discuss the security situation in Europe. The only question is whether that will happen before or after the destruction of a democratic European future for the Western Balkan states.”
• “Reestablishing communication with Moscow would not in any way mean approving of Russia’s policies. But without communication there is no chance of finding diplomatic solutions; the alternative is more of the current brinkmanship, with weak states permanently hovering between state capture by their own local Russian-supported autocrats and total failure.”

Ukraine:

“Why There Won’t Be a People’s Republic of Left-Bank Ukraine Just Yet,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 11.23.21. The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “Evidence of recently resumed movements of Russian troops in the vicinity of Russia’s border with Ukraine (as well as farther afield) have reignited the debate about Kremlin intentions to order another military intervention on its neighbor’s territory, with some Western Russia watchers warning that a Russian invasion could be ‘imminent.’”
• “While I agree with the proposition that Putin cares about the impact of major foreign policy decisions on his legacy, I disagree with the idea that Putin would let emotions prevail in a decision about sending troops to Ukraine. In fact, my research on Putin’s past choices about possible military interventions indicates that his decisions to send troops to foreign countries have been rational rather than emotional, shaped by a confluence of three conditions.”
• “First, Putin had to be directly motivated by a clear, acute threat to one or more of Russia’s vital national interests as he and his team see them … Second, he had to have a reasonable hope that military intervention would succeed in warding off this threat. Third, he had either to have run out of non-military (i.e., less costly) options of responding to the threat or to lack the time needed to exercise such options due to the threat’s urgency.”
• “In the case of Ukraine, Condition 1—the perception of an acute threat—already exists, in my view, while Condition 2 seems to be materializing and only Condition 3 is absent for now. … It will be the results of Putin’s upcoming negotiations with Biden—whom the Kremlin views as Ukraine’s ‘overlord,’ making all major decisions for his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskiy—that play a key role in determining whether the Russian leader feels that his non-military options have been exhausted.”
• “Should, however, Putin’s meetings with Biden either get cancelled or fail to produce progress toward attaining these two objectives, then Putin may indeed conclude that he has exhausted the non-military options vis-à-vis Ukraine and that use of force is necessary to defend Russia’s interest in a neutral Ukraine. Given the timing of Putin’s planned meetings with Biden, it is likely that Putin will not finalize his decision on sending troops into Ukraine until next year.”

“War Between Russia and Ukraine: A Basic Scenario?” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 11.25.21. The author, the Valdai Club program director, writes:

• “Concern is growing in the Western media over Russian military activity in the southwestern theatre. There are opinions that Russia is preparing a military campaign against Ukraine. The supposed goal is to break the deadlock of the Minsk Agreements, to impose further coexistence conditions on Kyiv and its Western partners, to prevent the U.S. and NATO from ‘developing’ the territory of Ukraine for military purposes, and also to reformat the country’s political system and its state structure. … However, it is still premature to consider such a development as a baseline scenario.”
• “Several circumstances speak in favor of the military scenario outlined by foreign commentators. The first is the recent experience of the Russian armed forces and the political consequences of their use. … The second circumstance is that the international political consequences for Russia which resulted from the military campaigns were relatively insufficient. … The third circumstance is that Russia is not ready to bear with the existing status quo in relations with Ukraine.”
• “[However] the costs of a possible war far outweigh the benefits. The war is fraught with significant risks to the economy, political stability and Russian foreign policy. It fails to solve key security problems, while it creates many new ones.”
• “From the point of view of the balance of benefits and losses, neither side is interested in a real war. Therefore, it is hardly worth considering the war scenario as a likely one. However, history knows many examples when rational calculations have failed to put an end to escalation. There is only the hope that this isn’t the case here.”

“An opportunity with Germany,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 11.27.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “[There is an] opportunity for the Biden administration to pursue common goals with the new German government, to be headed by Chancellor-elect Olaf Scholz, which will take office soon, after 16 years of Angela Merkel's leadership. The incoming coalition, freshly fortified Tuesday by an agreement among its three constituent political parties, represents both continuity and change. Mr. Scholz served as Ms. Merkel's finance minister during the past four years, when his party, the Social Democrats, was part of a governing coalition with her Christian Democratic Union. Change comes in the form of two new coalition partners, the fiscally conservative Free Democrats and the environmentalist Greens.”
• “The foreign ministry will be under the control of Green Party co-leader Annalena Baerbock, a sharp critic of Beijing's human rights record—and of Ms. Merkel's cooperative dealings with Beijing, a huge market for German exports.”
• “Ms. Baerbock and her party have also opposed the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, through which Russian energy supplies are scheduled to flow to Germany. Unfortunately, the coalition is unlikely to scuttle the nearly finished project, which Ms. Merkel and Mr. Scholz supported, despite the leverage it gives the Putin regime over Germany—and Europe. Nord Stream 2 hurts Ukraine's economy because it diverts gas from pipelines through that country. This could not be happening at a worse time for the government in Kyiv, which has already lost Crimea to Russia - and on whose borders Russian troops are assembling. The Biden administration decided not to sanction the pipeline earlier this year, swallowing concerns about Russia's intentions for the sake of better relations with Berlin. For the Washington-Berlin partnership, shoring up Ukraine while deterring Russia should be the first order of business.”

“The U.S. Approach to Ukraine’s Border War Isn’t Working. Here’s What Biden Should Do Instead,” Samuel Charap, Politico, 11.19.21. The author, a senior political scientist at the RAND corporation, writes:

• “The threats against Ukraine implicit in Russia’s troop buildup are morally reprehensible and contrary to Moscow’s international commitments. But to avoid a war, persuading Kyiv to make the first move might be our best hope.”
• “If Ukraine took visible steps on Minsk that it has thus far refused to take, that would put the onus on Moscow to deescalate, pull its forces back from the border and return to the negotiating table. For Putin, the use of force is not an end in itself; if he can get some of what he wants without war, he likely will take it. If Russia does not pull back following Ukraine’s concessions, there would at least be a stronger Western consensus in support of Kyiv against Moscow — and the concessions themselves could be undone.”
• “If coercing Russia into backing down were feasible, such unsavory compromises would not be necessary. But it’s not, and they are. Russia has demonstrated that it is prepared to go to extreme lengths in Ukraine — way farther than the United States or the EU. Without a willingness to push the Ukrainians to play ball on Minsk, the current policy of threatening consequences to Moscow and bolstering support for Kyiv may be insufficient to stop a war. Biden may also have to push Ukraine to take some painful steps toward compromise in order to save it from calamity.”

“Connecting Ukraine to Europe’s Electricity Grid,” Lukas Feldhaus, Kirsten Westphal and Georg Zachmann, SWP, November 2021. The authors, an analyst at Berlin Economics, a senior associate at SWP and a senior fellow at Bruegel, respectively, write:

• “The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism will constrain free trade of electricity and increase the price of electricity imports. There is also the threat of tensions with Belarus and Russia. In the worst-case scenario, the competition over electricity integration could lead to a confrontation between electricity blocs. This is why Germany should act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine.”
• “The following points will require a political decision:”
  • “First, whether the connection is to be realized only via B2B or whether the EU wants to implement real synchronization [of Ukraine’s grid with that of EU] via alternating current (AC) lines.”
  • “Second, when – in 2023, 2026 or later – coupling or synchronization should take place. A gradual sequencing in different phases could also be considered.
  • “Third, which grid connections specifically are to be put into operation. For example, Ukraine’s neighbors might agree in principle to synchronization but might not want a direct/powerful electricity connection to their national grids.”
  • “Fourth, the role of the existing and future electricity mix for cross-border trade with the EU. Currently, nuclear and coal-derived power dominate but Ukraine has great potential for renewable energy.”
• “In each case, unequivocal decisions are needed to establish a transparent political process. A clear sequence would make it possible to identify milestones in the process (in terms of time and quality), for checking whether conditions have been met. If synchronization is poorly prepared technically, economically and politically, and if no-one takes political responsibility, this could lead to nasty surprises for both sides.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“The West Should Be Ready to Coerce Belarus,” Henrik Larsen and Sten Rynning, The National Interest, 11.23.21. The authors, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and a professor of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark, write:

• “Two conditions offer themselves for Western diplomacy [with regards to Belarus]. … First, Russia is clearly the key guarantor of the survival of the Lukashenko regime … The price Russia will ask for support at this critical moment will be both closer military and political integration. … Second, the Lukashenko regime may have reached a threshold of pain in terms of sanctions. Its escalation of the crisis with the West certainly suggests that … the cumulative effect of Western sanctions and isolation is significant.”
• “The West should confront the fact that Belarus is weaponizing Western moral commitments to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. It should consider several steps here. … The first is to support the securitization of borders. … Moreover, the West should launch an all-out diplomatic campaign within the U.N. system to highlight the risks posed by such weaponization to the general right to protection enjoyed by refugees and asylum seekers.”
• “Finally, the West should stimulate debate on what such sanctions could be … to goad the U.N. system into thinking concretely about Belarus’ predatory behavior and its consequences. … The West should also be ready to stop the flow of international funds to Belarus.”
• “The West should signal its readiness to consider an ultimate threat, namely, to pull its international recognition of the Lukashenko regime. Such a sanction would rob Belarus of considerable political and economic gains and, critically, weaken President Lukashenko’s argument that he is the ultimate guarantor of Belarusian independence vis-à-vis both the West and Russia.”

“Why Little Lithuania Is Taking On Mighty China,” Denis Kishinevsky, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.29.21. The author, a Lithuanian journalist, writes:

• “Just a few years ago, it would have been hard to imagine that one of the most fiercely anti-Chinese countries in the world would turn out to be little Lithuania, yet in the last year its relationship with China has deteriorated more than that of any other country in Europe. Vilnius has slammed Beijing for its treatment of the Uyghurs, for its repression of protests in Hong Kong, and for trying to use investment in infrastructure to strengthen its influence on the European market. The tension culminated this month in Vilnius allowing Taiwan to open a representative office there.”
• “Various explanations have been put forward for this drastic turn against China in Lithuanian foreign policy, from a mission to uphold democratic values around the world to the desire to keep up with the latest trends in Washington. Indeed, both of these motivations play a role in the Lithuanian leadership’s actions. Yet just as important is Lithuania’s traditional fear of Russia. Paradoxically, Vilnius now considers criticism of Beijing to be one of the most effective forms of defense against Moscow.”
• “For now, neither the economic nor the political risks appear big enough to force Vilnius to abandon its anti-Chinese policy. The course it has embarked upon fits in with the Lithuanian leadership’s vision of their country’s role in international relations. It combines the politics of values, anti-communism, the quest to keep Washington’s attention on the region, and the desire to grow beyond the narrow niche of Russia’s eternal critic. Finally, the United States is prepared to support Lithuania in its endeavors: the Baltic state could help to nudge older EU countries toward more anti-Chinese positions, as well as serve as an acid test to see how far Beijing is prepared to go in response to harsh criticism and cozying up to Taiwan.”

“Ready for war at any time in southern Armenia,” Neil Hauer, bne IntelliNews, 11.17.21. The author, a journalist and analyst, writes:

• “Forming a narrow wedge thrusting toward the Iranian border, Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik is bordered by Azerbaijan on two sides: the exclave of Nakhchivan to the west, and the mainland to the east.”
• “The latter was never a problem before—the First Karabakh War (1991-94) saw Armenian forces capture the Azerbaijani provinces that lay to Syunik’s east, holding them as a depopulated buffer zone for nearly three decades. During and after last year’s war, however, those regions returned to Azerbaijani control—and with them, Azerbaijani soldiers who have sought to make life along Syunik’s borders as difficult as possible.”
• “Problems began in earnest this May, when Azerbaijani troops advanced across the newly relevant border as the snows melted and occupied Armenian territory around a lake known as Sev Lich, about 15 kilometers northeast of Sisian. In other areas, Azerbaijan blockaded roads whose paths crossed the haphazard Soviet-drawn border, and Azeri servicemen seized cattle from shepherds whose herds wandered too near the boundary.”
• “Then, last week, fighting erupted. Using artillery and armored vehicles, Azerbaijani troops launched an assault across the border on November 16, just 10 km north of Sisian. Heavy fighting ensued that left dozens of casualties and prisoners in the worst clash since last year’s war.”
• “‘We hosted about 100 refugees from Artsakh last year,’ says Basentsi Azoyan … ‘There was one man among them last year who kept saying, ‘they won’t stop with [Karabakh]. If they beat us, they’ll come for Syunik.’ Maybe he was onto something.’”