I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Inside Kerry’s race to stop the siege of Aleppo,” Josh Rogin, The Washington Post, 11.27.16: The author, a commentator on national security and foreign policy, reports that outgoing U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is engaged in a low-profile, “furious if implausible diplomatic effort to strike a deal with Russia to end the siege of Aleppo. … The strategy is to narrow the focus of the negotiations to cover Aleppo only, and to broaden the format to include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and, at times, Iran. The deal would be an agreement by the Syrian opposition to separate from members of the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat Fatah al-Sham… In exchange, the Assad regime and Russia would end the siege and allow aid to flow.” Despite several meetings between U.S. and Russian diplomats in Geneva, “there are already multiple roadblocks,” including disagreement on the number of fighters in Aleppo and on President Bashar al-Assad’s post-cease-fire role, as well as skepticism in Washington about Russia’s intentions. Moreover, “why would Moscow cut a deal with Kerry when Vladimir Putin can wait two months and cut one with [President-elect Donald] Trump, who campaigned on a promise to work with Russia” and “has spoken with Putin twice since the election about cooperation in the Middle East”? The author lauds Kerry’s effort and concludes that a U.S.-Russia a Trump deal with Moscow and “the Assad-friendly opposition” would “be a pyrrhic victory at best,” as it would not stop the fighting or humanitarian crisis and, “even worse,” would align the U.S. with “those committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, alienating most Syrians for a generation and driving them into the arms of extremists, all for a false peace.”

“Putin as Bismarck: Ehud Barak on West’s Russia Blind Spots, the Middle East and More,” Russia Matters, 11.28.16: Israel’s former prime minister and defense minister gives a far-ranging interview on his views about everything from America’s missed opportunities in Syria to the West’s misreading of Russia. He also discusses Russia’s role in Syria, saying: “The Russians are not in a love affair with Assad personally; I know this from the very top level there. They focus on their interests. They have invested 40 years in this dynasty, even during Soviet times, with the father [Hafez al-Assad], and they simply understand something that is objectively true: They cannot afford for Assad to experience, as a Russian client, what Mubarak experienced as an American client—that the moment someone is against him, in this case his own people, he is removed. They have a lot to lose: They have two bases; they have a presence there; they have prestige. Prestige is something of value in the Middle East.”

“The Middle East has some questions for Donald Trump,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 11.22.16: The author, a Post columnist, writes about a forum, which he attended, of “prominent foreign ministers and policy experts” who gathered in Abu Dhabi on the weekend of Nov. 18-20 to explore the U.S. presidential election’s implications for the Middle East. Attendees “included representatives from nearly every Arab country, as well as the United States, Europe, Russia, China and the United Nations.” The Iran nuclear deal, which President-elect Trump has criticized harshly, was a major topic of discussion and “there was near-unanimity … that Trump should accept the agreement as a done deal and focus instead on curbing Iran’s aggressive behavior in the region. This consensus included even officials who had been among the agreement’s strident critics.” The “second big, overarching issue” was “Trump’s willingness to consider allying with Russia in Syria.” Here, despite earlier backing of the Syrian opposition by many of the Arab officials in attendance, support seems to have swung to Russia’s corner (because “in the Middle East, political support tends to go with a winner, and Russia looks like the strong player in Syria these days”). “Representatives of the Syrian opposition spoke movingly of the human cost of Russia’s intervention and argued that the fall of Aleppo would mean permanent war.” Russian speakers, meanwhile, voiced relief that Trump’s victory had moved Syria “a step back” from the “abyss” and “kinetic collision” likely in Syria under his rival, Hillary Clinton. Several speakers explored the possibility that “a new U.S.-Russian dialogue—which would draw in Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the other Middle East players—[could] stabilize this region and calm its fratricidal sectarian wars. … But experts warn against ‘Yalta II’—a new Russian-American attempt to designate ‘spheres of influence’ that would carve up the region.”

“Russia adjusts Syria plan as Obama’s term nears end,” Maxim Suchkov, Al-Monitor, 11.21.16: The author, an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council and a columnist for Al-Monitor's Russia Pulse, argues that “neither Moscow nor Washington is really expecting a breakthrough until the new U.S. administration takes office.” Moreover, despite general Russian enthusiasm about Donald Trump’s presidential victory, Vladimir “Putin himself signaled a more cautious stance,” saying recently: “We all know there’s a big difference—in all countries—between campaign promises and real policies.” Taken together, this suggests that Moscow is keeping a close eye on “possible systemic factors that would limit Trump’s desire to ‘normalize ties’ with Russia,” particularly in Congress where the House has passed a “new sanctions package on Syria” and the Senate has discussed “potential ‘anti-Russian legislation.’” These initiatives are viewed by Russian decision makers as, on one hand, “an attempt to narrow corridors of opportunity for ‘Trump’s foreign policy experiments,’ and on the other as an intent to set certain ‘red lines’ for Trump in how far he can go in his ‘deals’ with the Kremlin.” In the meantime, “Moscow believes it now has the opportunity and time to make critical gains in Syria” (note the airstrikes on Idlib and Homs, as well as the Aleppo offensive), largely in order “to secure a better negotiating position for future talks” on a settlement. Moscow is also pursuing “consultations with Iran and Turkey on strategic aspects of Syrian statehood, such as the country’s integrity. Both Tehran and Ankara favor the idea of a united Syria,” though each for its own reasons. And “it is important for Russia to find itself on the same page with the regional stakeholders on the critical issues” before Syria reaches “postwar diplomatic mode.”

Cyber security:

“Did Russian hackers elect the U.S. president? Don't believe the hype. That an election theoretically could be hacked does not mean that it was,” Ryan C. Maness and Brandon Valeriano, Washington Post, 11.27.16: The authors, both of them academics focusing on security, argue that Russia was unlikely to have “hacked the U.S. presidential election” because “Russian capabilities do not extend that far. Hacking voting precincts would take physical manipulation of machines. Hackers would have to open and physically reprogram each voting machine in each targeted precinct, or swap in malware-infested voting cards to replace the original ones. This would take a legion of Russian spies betting on not getting caught. … The United States is not in a new era of cyberwarfare, as many have suggested. Instead, there are more incidents of the same, traditional disinformation tactics, aided by new methods. The unlimited possibilities of computer network attacks—not the technical realities—are what weigh more heavily in observers.” The authors point out that, “to date, squirrels have caused more attacks and deaths related to critical infrastructure than have cyberattacks. But the hysteria caused by the threat of cyber hacks and election violations has played a role in how Americans view this recent election.” They conclude that “while it is important to protect our democracy and establish systems that will withstand external attacks … now is not the time to blame Russia.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Get Ready for the Most Violent Détente Ever. Trump and Putin want to reset U.S.-Russian relations on the basis of a shared worldview. But that might just increase the chances of a conflict,” Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, Foreign Policy, 11.21.16: The authors, a political scientist and law professor, respectively, write that, after Donald Trump’s pro-Russia stance during his campaign, “there is a facile assumption that détente and peaceful coexistence between the United States and Russia will now be in the offing,” but that assumption “urgently needs to be reassessed.” The conclusion of their piece sums up its main point: “Two proud and thin-skinned leaders [Trump and Putin] with similar worldviews and wielding more unilateral power than it makes sense to confide in any single individual could, after an amiable interlude, all too easily trigger a tit-for-tat spiral of escalating insult and injury that may drag the helplessly watching world toward a catastrophe that no one could possibly intend.” The authors argue that despite some short-term warming of relations—likely involving an easing of sanctions against Russia, a de facto acceptance of the Crimea annexation and greater cooperation against ISIS—the two presidents’ “shared repugnance for liberal internationalism … is no guarantee of cooperation or even peaceful coexistence.” Specifically, they cite three points of tension: (1) Trump’s “populist insurgency … represents the very sort of resentment-fueled instability that frightens Moscow most”; (2) “the U.S. election delivered a fatal blow to the dominant narrative designed to legitimate the Putin regime in the face of Russia’s poor and worsening economic conditions”; and (3) “Putin’s reassertion of Russia’s heft on the international stage has depended on his leading the revolt against American-orchestrated globalization.” The authors further predict that both Trump and Putin will need to demonize the other’s country “to fend off domestic criticism” and explain away failures. “What makes matters worse,” they write, “is that the foundation of mutual understanding that allowed Moscow and Washington to manage nail-biting crises during the Cold War has by now completely eroded.”

See also “Putin as Bismarck: Ehud Barak on West’s Russia Blind Spots, the Middle East and More,” Russia Matters, 11.28.16 in “Syria” section above.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

General developments and “far abroad” countries:

“Vladimir Putin Is Winning the French Election,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 11.21.16: The author, a staff columnist and longtime Russia watcher, argues that “unless the [French] Socialists can pull a rabbit out of a hat, France will get a Putin-friendly president” in next year’s election, scheduled for April 23, 2017. The center-right candidate, Francois Fillon, “has consistently backed Russia in Syria since 2012, saying Moscow could be instrumental in resolving the conflict and refraining from calling for Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's removal until the Islamic State is defeated.” He has also “expressed hope that Europe would soon abolish short-term visas for Russia—something that's not even on the agenda today”—and has “been fervently against economic sanctions against Russia following Putin's Crimean escapade.” Whether Fillon or far-right candidate Marine “Le Pen, who has declared her admiration for Putin, wins the French election, the (EU) sanctions are likely to be doomed—an inglorious end to a hostile measure that has helped Putin mobilize Russians against the West, consolidated his domestic support, did little economic damage beyond forcing Russia's state companies to pay down their debts and, of course, failed to stop the Kremlin from meddling in Ukraine.”

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Can Kiev Overcome Its Dysfunction to Fight Graft?” Dan Peleschuk, Foreign Affairs, 11.24.16: The author, a Kiev-based journalist who covers the former Soviet Union, describes some of the shortcomings of Ukraine’s “new ‘e-declaration’ system, an online database through which public servants are required to openly declare their assets,” which revealed officials’ “suspiciously large bundles of cash, … multiple properties, extravagant watches, … extensive collections of wine and antique art” and even a ticket “for outer-space travel, valued at around $175,000 at the time of purchase.” Although the system “is finally up and running, even its staunchest defenders are urging caution amid high public expectations.” One of the biggest disappointments, according to one anti-corruption activist, “is a loophole in Ukraine’s criminal code that essentially renders assets that may have been illicitly acquired before 2015 legally unactionable.” Moreover, the country’s national anti-corruption bureau can “launch criminal investigations” but “relies on a judicial system that many say is crooked. … Theoretically, there is also nothing that could prevent a judge from simply ignoring the evidence presented by prosecutors.” Activists hope that parliament will consider a bill on creating anticorruption courts by the end of the year. Meanwhile, the author writes, “Prosecuting only a few, while leaving others untouched, would further erode the already low levels of public confidence in reform efforts.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.