I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“U.S. response to Russian treaty violation plays into Moscow’s hands,” Steven Pifer, The Hill, 11.15.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that developing a new intermediate-range missile as a response to Russia’s alleged violation of the INF Treaty “would be a waste of money and play into Moscow’s hands.” Making such a missile operational would cost many times more than the $58 million that the Pentagon is likely to receive, and would take far too long to feel like “a timely answer to Russia’s current violation.” (Besides, such a missile even if fielded “would not concern the Kremlin unless deployed within range of Russia,” which is highly unlikely.) Most important, if the U.S. pursues a course steering it away from the treaty, Moscow would win out: It would “continue to maintain its innocence, citing the lack of evidence, and point to U.S. actions” as responsible for the treaty’s demise. Instead, Pifer, a retired Foreign Service officer, recommends that the U.S. military “deploy existing conventional air- and sea-based cruise missiles to Europe and nearby waters,” while U.S. diplomats work with NATO allies to put diplomatic pressure on Moscow. The Russian missile, after all, cannot reach the U.S., but can hit countries in Europe.

“We can cut back our nuclear arsenal,” William J. Perry and James E. Cartwright, The Washington Post, 11.16.17: The authors, a former secretary of defense and a four-star general, argue that the U.S. would be safer if it spends much less than the earmarked $1.7 trillion over the next three decades to replace its nuclear arsenal. They support “building an appropriate number of new nuclear-armed submarines as the most survivable leg of the deterrent,” as well as “an appropriate number of new stealth bombers.” There is no need for “a new generation of nuclear-armed cruise missiles,” in part because there is too high a risk “that a conventionally armed cruise missile might be mistaken for one with a nuclear warhead.” Moreover, “according to the CBO, canceling this weapon would save $30 billion.” Canceling plans to replace U.S. ground-based ICBMs would save $149 billion more. Cutting back the existing plans for replacing America’s nuclear arsenal would likewise “help avoid a new arms race with Russia that neither side should want.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Were those Russian social media ads powerful enough to influence us? Let's look at the evidence: Research can tell us these three important things about propaganda—and its limits,” Babak Bahador, The Washington Post, 10.14.17: The author, a research professor at the School of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University, considers whether the Russian-funded social media ads aimed at manipulating the 2016 U.S. election and dividing Americans were effective. He cites three scholarly findings important for answering this question: (1) “We are not passive dupes” (besides, if 150 million users exposed to the Russian ads sounds like a big number, consider that between 2015 and 2017 Americans saw trillions of posts on Facebook alone); (2) how credible people consider a source really shapes their perception of the information on offer; (3) “the media follow politics and thus confine their news frames to those found in their existing political environment.”

“The lure of the Russian smoking gun,” Philip Bump, The Washington Post, 11.14.17: The author, a New York-based national correspondent, scrutinizes BuzzFeed’s recent story headlined "Secret Finding: 60 Russian Payments 'To Finance Election Campaign of 2016.'" He points out that a crucial detail was not mentioned until the seventh paragraph, namely that Russia had its own parliamentary elections about six weeks after the payments were wired from Moscow to its Russian embassies and consular offices (and hence needed to provide voting opportunities for Russian nationals living abroad). “A lot of people are eager for any new bread crumbs that seem as though they might lead to clear proof of Trump's collusion,” Bump writes. “And that, in turn, means stories that might serve as those bread crumbs tend to see a lot of traffic for the news outlets that write them.”

“Did Putin get taken for a ride?” Fred Hiatt, The Washington Post, 11.20.17: The author, who is the newspaper’s editorial page editor, casts doubt on the view that Russia’s meddling in the U.S. election in favor of Donald Trump has backfired. Instead, he speculates on Russia’s broader goals, all three of which seem to have come closer to being achieved: (1) to diminish global U.S. leadership; (2) to undermine faith in democracy; (3) to turn Americans against each other. That said, the author acknowledges that “Putin is exploiting fissures and tensions that already existed, not creating them.” He recommends that Americans “buttress our democratic institutions, reject bigotry and reach out to dreamers.”

“The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses-II,” Alina Polyakova, Markos Kounalakis, Antonis Klapsis, Luigi Sergio Germani, Jacopo Iacoboni, Francisco de Borja Lasheras and Nicolás de Pedro, Atlantic Council, November 2017: This report tries to trace the extent of Russian political penetration in Europe’s southern flank: Greece, Italy and Spain—where a “volatile socio-economic climate … has proven to be fertile ground for Russian overtures.” The authors argue that “the Kremlin has actively stepped into this opening by providing political and media support to pro-Russian forces, leveraging historical, religious and cultural ties and cultivating (either directly or through proxies) a network of pro-Moscow civil society organizations to promote Russia’s goal of weakening the EU and NATO.” They focus on parties like the leftist Spanish Podemos, the nationalist Northern League, the populist 5 Star Movement in Italy and the governing Syriza party in Greece, as well as the Orthodox Church.  

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Latest US-Russian Effort on Syria: Good for Preventing Accidents, So-So for Everything Else,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 11.15.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, takes a pessimistic view of the “one concrete result to emerge from presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin’s informal meetings on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Vietnam,” namely the Nov. 11 U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on Syria. The document is vague (most likely by design), reflecting “the still considerable divergences between Washington and Moscow over Syria's future.” These differences include everything from Assad’s fate to whom to consider “associates” of the Islamic State. In conclusion the author writes: “The statement is important because it recognizes the crucial task of preventing any sort of clash between Moscow and Washington in Syria. It sends a clear message to the military establishments of both countries to take the steps necessary to avoid any accidents. But for those who argue that the Da Nang statement heralds an imminent shift in the trajectory of U.S.-Russia relations, I cannot share that optimistic appraisal of the situation.”

“Emulate Russian Realism,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 11.13.17: The author, a CIA veteran and senior fellow at Georgetown University, suggests that foreign-policy practitioners should learn from Russia’s diplomacy in the Middle East: “That diplomacy is not based primarily on taking sides. … Instead, Russian policy features a willingness to engage with every significant player, on each side of the region’s multiple conflicts.” This, Pillar argues, is a realist approach that allows the Kremlin to engage “with just about everyone,” thus maximizing its ability to pursue Russia’s “own interests wherever and whenever there is an opportunity to do so. “The overall lesson for Donald Trump about foreign policy and diplomacy,” the author concludes, “is: Do as Vladimir Putin does, not as he says.”

“When Russians stopped believing in the Western media. Journalist Oleg Kashin says American journalism has lost his compatriots' faith,” Oleg Kashin, Republic/Meduza, 10.13.17: The author—a widely published columnist known for surviving a near fatal assault in 2010 believed to have been motivated by his reporting—bemoans the state of American media coverage of Russia, which he argues is full of exaggeration, hysteria and inaccuracy. The launching pad for the author’s critique are reports that businesses close to the Kremlin, and specifically a businessman named Yuri Milner, were buying up shares in Facebook and Twitter. The problem, the author writes, isn’t that it’s “rather difficult to call Yuri Milner a businessman who’s ‘close to the Kremlin’”; the main problem is the credibility of his accusers. “Those writing that the Kremlin acted through him are the same outlets and individuals that have already demonstrated convincingly that anything they publish about Russia is, as a general rule, total garbage. The image of Putin’s Russia constructed by Western and, above all, American media outlets over the past 18 months shocks even the most anti-Putin reader in Russia.” The author points to the way a host of Russian figures have been portrayed in the U.S. press: “'Moscow suburban power broker’ Natalia Veselnitskaya playing the part of Putin’s agent, Dr. Rodchenkov’s tales of test tubes for doped urine, singer Emin Agalarov acting in the Kremlin’s interests, and Russian ads on social media—bought for pennies compared to the millions spent by the Clinton and Trump campaigns—that supposedly influenced American voters.” In this context, the allegations against Milner have become a joke, the author writes, “where there’s no need to refute or dispute anything, and the only thing Russians can do is laugh.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The cautionary tale of the Bolshevik revolution,” Niall Ferguson, Boston Globe, 11.13.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, uses the 100-year anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution to draw a link between the West’s indulgence of that radical group and what he argues is a contemporary counterpart: Islamists. “What concerns me today is the entirely familiar response we see to a different but equally dangerous threat. Ask yourself how effectively we in the West have responded to the rise of militant Islam since the Iranian Revolution unleashed its Shia variant and since 9/11 revealed the even more aggressive character of Sunni Islamism,” the author writes. As examples of Western acquiescence, the author points to “the millions of dollars that have found their way from the Gulf to radical mosques and Islamic centers in the West”; supporters of “multiculturalism who brand any opponent of jihad an ‘Islamophobe’”;  bankers who “fall over themselves to offer ‘sharia-compliant’ loans and bonds”; and “fellow travelers—the leftists who line up with the Muslim Brotherhood to castigate the state of Israel at every opportunity.” The author concludes: “A century ago it was the West's great blunder to think it would not matter if Lenin and his confederates took over the Russian Empire. Incredible as it may seem, I believe we are capable of repeating that catastrophic error.” (We invite anyone interested in this topic to read RM's earlier paper on parallels between the Bolsheviks and Islamic State.)

China:

“The Meaning of Sharp Power. How Authoritarian States Project Influence,” Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, Foreign Affairs, 11.16.17: The authors, officers at the National Endowment for Democracy, argue that efforts by Russia and China to spread their message abroad should be regarded not as “soft power” but “sharp power”—they seek to “pierce, penetrate or perforate the political and information environments in the targeted countries.” The authors reject the notion that Moscow and Beijing simply want to “share alternative ideas” or “broaden the debate,” as the “editorial leadership at the Russian and Chinese state information outlets suggest about themselves.” Rather than advancing an agenda or principles, these governments are interested in “distraction and manipulation.” The authors single out Russia for their harshest critique. “The rulers of Russia, a less wealthy and powerful state [than China], seem content to propagate the idea that their kleptocratic regime—whose paramount leader is rapidly approaching two decades in power—is a normal member of the international community and that its actions and statements are no less valid than those of democracies.” Such efforts by the Russian and Chinese governments should be unmasked, the authors write, since state-directed projects are often disguised as “the work of commercial media or grassroots associations.” To counter the threat, democracies must also “on the one hand, inoculate themselves against malign authoritarian influence that corrodes democratic institutions and standards and, on the other, take a far more assertive posture on behalf of their own principles.”

“Why Russia and China's Navies Are Drilling Together More Than Ever,” Lyle J. Goldstein, The National Interest, 11.16.17: The author, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that the growing cooperation between the Russian and Chinese navies should be regarded with concern by Western leaders, especially as they contemplate a NATO-like structure in the “Indo-Pacific.” Russia and China have carried out joint naval exercises in the Pacific twice a year since 2015, and in July the PLA Navy visited the Baltic Sea, deploying one of its newest and most capable surface combatants for its first-ever joint military exercise in the sensitive waters. All of this harks back to the “Golden Era” of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s, when naval matters were high on the alliance’s agenda, the author observes. While the latest Russian-Chinese maneuvers do not signal a return to those days, they should concern Western strategists. “There is little doubt that Beijing and Moscow could substantially increase the size and scope of these exercises, insofar as the current iterations evince a substantial hint of restraint, and do not seem intended to alter the delicate regional strategic balance—perhaps especially in light of existing tensions on the nearby Korean Peninsula. But that reasonably benign disposition could, of course, change quickly.” And if Western leaders seek to create a NATO-like structure in the Pacific, the author notes, “there will likely be serious consequences and countermoves, including very substantially intensified Russia-China military cooperation.”

Ukraine:

“Here Is How America Can Bring Peace to Ukraine,” Doug Bandow, The National Interest, 11.13.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, argues that the threat Russia poses to Europe is overblown and that some reassurances about NATO expansion might make Moscow more amenable to a U.S. proposal to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. “Only a Europe that has become hopelessly dependent on America could seem so vulnerable to a declining power like Russia,” the author observes, noting that Europe has “some twelve times the economic strength, three times the population and two times the military outlays of Russia.” Taking note of the Trump administration’s reported plans for a 20,000-man peacekeeping force for the Donbass, the author writes that it would have a better chance of success if Washington addressed Russia’s larger security concerns. “NATO still is formally committed to including Ukraine and Georgia,” the author writes. “The United States and its allies should indicate that they have no intention to further expand the alliance.” This will assure Moscow that Western powers will not, in the unlikely event of Russian aggression, send troops and arms “into what once was the heart of the Soviet Union.”

“Why Trump should arm Ukraine,” Steven Pifer and John Herbst, Brookings Institution, 11.17.17: The authors, former U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine, argue the president should back lethal military aid to Kiev as a way to “impose more costs” on Moscow if it continues or escalates its backing of separatists in the country’s east. The rationale for providing lethal military assistance remains the same since the idea was first considered by U.S. officials in 2015, the authors write. Ukraine "seeks to bolster its defensive capabilities—that is, to be able to impose more costs on any Russian attack and thereby deter the Russians from a new offensive. ... [T]hat will increase the prospect that the Kremlin will adopt a different course, one that could lead to a peaceful settlement.” In addition, providing lethal military assistance would carry symbolic weight, the authors maintain: “It would also send a strong signal to Moscow that the United States will firmly back Ukraine against Russian aggression.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Alisher Usmanov: Uzbekistan’s Oligarch of Choice,” Rafael Sattarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.16.17: The author, a political analyst who studied in Tashkent, writes that the Uzbek president’s embrace of a Russian oligarch signals a growing willingness to work with wealthy capitalists outside government circles. In addition, the ties between President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the oligarch, Alisher Usmanov, who was born in Uzbekistan, could help the president solidify his power in his struggle against the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) and its chief, Rustam Inoyatov.  Mirziyoyev and Usmanov share business, security, political and family interests; Usmanov’s nephew Babur was once married to Mirziyoyev’s niece. Mirziyoyev’s embrace of Usmanov, the author observes, marks another departure from his predecessor’s Uzbekistan, where oligarchs were not welcome. “Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan or Ukraine, [former President Islam] Karimov’s Uzbekistan never developed oligarch-based capitalism. Instead, Uzbek capitalism revolved around government officials.” Usmanov is just the latest example of greater visibility for a foreign oligarchic group tightly connected to the Uzbek leadership through business or blood. Not that this represents a positive development, in the author’s view. “Any belief that oligarchs will help modernize Uzbekistan is naïve. They will simply assume the power once wielded by the SNB.”

“Russia and the West’s South Caucasus Dilemma,” Sergei Markedonov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.14.17: The author, an associate professor at Russian State University for the Humanities, argues that tensions in the South Caucasus can be reduced if Russia and Georgia can identify and pursue common interests and not treat their dispute as another front line in the conflict between Moscow and the West. The most that can be expected today from the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not their complete resolution, the author observes, but a decline in their dependence on external factors and on the generally negative relations between Russia and the West. “Russia and Georgia must have their own agenda that is separate from the existing unresolved disputes. This agenda could include promoting security in the North Caucasus or containing the threat of jihadi extremism. In addition, although Tbilisi does not advertise this, it is clearly interested in reducing its dependence on Ankara and Baku.” Destabilizing events in the Middle East force South Caucasus nations to be more pragmatic about Moscow’s actions and to not necessarily expect assistance from NATO; such aid does not always come, as evidenced by the events of August 2008. The author closes on a hopeful note, writing that “despite the ceaseless confrontation, Russia and the West are not inciting discord in the South Caucasus, and they are withholding their ‘final arguments’ until the last, which allows for some cautious optimism.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Growing With Borrowed Money. Sustaining even this small level of growth without structural change will be a challenge,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 11.14.17: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, observes that modest GDP growth in Russia underscores the need for structural economic reform in the country. Russia’s gross domestic product increased 1.8 percent year on year in the quarter that ended in September, according to Russia's official statistics agency. This is lower than Bloomberg's consensus forecast of 1.9 percent and slower than the 2.5 percent increase in the previous three months. While the price of oil jumped 20 percent during the quarter, economic statistics won't reflect the related growth until the fourth quarter. Much of the growth in the Russian economy, the author notes, was driven by consumer spending and borrowing. “After suffering through three tough years—during which time oil tanked and the ruble devalued sharply—they are buying things again. Unfortunately, most of the things Russians are buying aren't made in Russia.” The country needs a wider range of economic engines to spur stronger and more consistent growth, the author concludes. “Sustaining even this small level of growth for another six years without structural change will be a challenge.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.