5 Ideas to Explore

1. Russia is now targeting Ukraine’s natural gas capacity, threatening a severe crisis as millions of homes lose heat this winter, according to Jack Watling writing in Foreign Affairs. “This winter could be pivotal. Russia is producing more missiles than ever before, while Ukraine’s damaged energy grid is already unable to power the entire country. Even central Kyiv is without power for hours every day,” Watling warns. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio underlined this problem in a press conference on Nov. 12: “The challenge is that Ukraine’s energy grid has been diminished each year, so each year they start at a lower baseline than the year before… I think in Kyiv, for example, upwards of 50 to 60% of the day is spent without electrical power… that’s clearly part of Russia’s strategy, is to try to collapse morale within Ukraine and the will to fight.” Watling notes that “heating currently works, but temperatures are falling, and Ukraine must prepare for significant disruption to utilities through the cold months. If Russia is able to accelerate its gains—perhaps through the combination of the hollowing of Ukraine’s defensive lines and the depopulation of major centers near the front—it could set a course to coerce Ukraine into submission in 2026.” However, Watling writes, “If Ukraine can combine with Western powers to apply real pressure on Russia’s economy and energy infrastructure, a cease-fire could be achievable by the end of next year.” Watling concludes by asserting, “Ukraine still has the capacity to buy the time for pressure on Russia to succeed. But it cannot resist indefinitely.”
2. Ukraine’s big advantage in the use of drones to defend itself faces a new threat: an elite and well-funded Russian drone operator hunting unit code named Rubikon, according to Charles Clover and Fabrice Deprez in Financial Times. “After about two years of striking Russian units with near impunity, Ukraine’s scrappy, innovative drone pilots have become the hunted,” Clover and Deprez write. “Using sophisticated tools and its own fleet of hunter drones, the team [Rubikon] has been locating, tracking and killing Ukrainian operators before they can launch,” according to the authors. Rubikon “is our main problem,” said Artem Kariakin, a Ukrainian serviceman near embattled Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region. “Rubikon has about 5,000 people and vast financial resources, said Rob Lee of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute,” according to FT. “Ukraine’s small, semi-autonomous units were highly effective in causing chaos when Russia had no advanced drone operation of its own. But Moscow has made a huge effort to absorb the lessons Ukraine has learned,” Bob Tollast, a RUSI research fellow, said. “Now, Kyiv must counter Rubikon’s highly organized strategy by developing a clear, centralized battle plan of its own,” Tollast said, according to FT.
3. The fall of Pokrovsk appears imminent, yet Re:Russia asks: Is its capture—Russia’s only major military victory since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024—a sign of Russia’s strength or its weakness? “The Russian army is close to successfully completing a strategic maneuver to capture Pokrovsk. As anticipated, the decisive push came in late autumn. Over the past year, by stretching the Ukrainian Armed Forces across multiple sectors of the front, the Russian command has pursued a dual strategy: encirclement of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad urban agglomeration on the one hand, and the use of infiltration tactics within the urban environment on the other,” the authors write. “The likely capture of Pokrovsk will be the Kremlin’s biggest military success since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024. Overall, the Russian army has spent just over a year and a half attempting to take Pokrovsk, the first attempt being in March 2024,” according to the authors, who then ask if the fall of Pokrovsk, which has taken Russian forces eighteen months of effort, should be interpreted “as evidence of the Russian army’s strength, or of its weakness?” The authors note that “Volodymyr Zelenskyy fears that the loss of the city will strengthen the argument that Kyiv should concede the remaining territory of the Donbas to Moscow in exchange for a ceasefire. … Trump and Orbán appear inclined to interpret it in Moscow’s favor. If so, in the coming weeks Zelenskyy will likely face intense pressure.” However, the authors also note that “for Vladimir Putin the capture of Pokrovsk may also serve as a convenient moment to announce a pause in military operations on a perceived wave of 'success' rather than in a situation where two years of fighting in Donbas have led nowhere. Yet one way or another, the likelihood that the capture of Pokrovsk will prove to be the last major operation of this war, at least in its current phase, is quite high.”
4. The world could quickly shift from nine nuclear powers to as many as eighteen, speculates Russian nuclear analyst Andrei Kokoshin of RIAC. “The ‘Golden Dome’ is an extremely complex technical project with huge budget costs. Even with SpaceX’s radical launch cost reductions, it would require major spending, especially for the information component,” Kokoshin argues. “The logic of [of Russia’s] ‘asymmetric response’ [to a U.S. missile defense program] remains. The ‘Golden Dome’ mostly repeats the logic of SDI, and even SDI repeated earlier American projects. Periodically, such plans arise in the U.S., appealing to a segment of the population not well-versed in the realities of strategic nuclear balance—and the ‘nuclear age’ in general. It's odd that a populist like Trump pushed it only recently,” Kokoshin said. He added, “There’s a common view [that] all the data needed to build an atomic bomb is online. But that is just an urban legend. Creating nuclear weapons still requires complex, subtle technology, vast investment, and a high scientific-technical base built over years. Most world states lack the full range of capability. But there are non-nuclear states with highly developed science, industry and nuclear power, such as Japan and South Korea. If they made the political decision, they could acquire nuclear weapons quickly,” according to the author. Kokoshin concludes: “When asked, ‘If judging only by technical and economic factors, how many mid-level powers could build nuclear weapons now?’ I haven't researched this lately, but I think clearly more than five, but fewer than 10.”
5. Ukraine’s latest corruption scandal has come perilously close to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inner circle and now threatens his continued leadership, European support and Ukraine’s war effort, according to Fabrice Deprez of Financial Times. According to Deprez, “The scandal has destabilized Zelenskyy’s inner circle, forcing the president to demand resignations from top ministers and impose sanctions on close associate Timur Mindich, identified as a ‘co-organizer’ of the alleged scheme, and that some $100mn of illicit funds passed through his office.” Civil society and opposition parties urge systemic reform but stop short of demanding Zelenskyy’s resignation, citing the risks of political crisis during war. The main threat to Zelenskyy’s legitimacy comes largely from his campaign promise in 2019 to fight corruption, writes Andrew E. Kramer in The New York Times. Kramer reports that the new “corruption investigation has reached Zelenskyy’s inner circle, threatening his carefully cultivated reputation as an anti-corruption reformer and damaging his support at home and abroad.” Beyond the threat to Zelenskyy’s legitimacy, Ukraine’s European allies have been clearly dismayed by the allegations, as Ellen Francis reports in Washington Post: “A corruption scandal engulfing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is casting an ominous shadow over plans by European nations to send Ukraine a big influx of money and over Kyiv’s bid to join the European Union.” Francis cites a social media post by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, a vocal critic: “A wartime mafia network with countless ties to President Zelenskyy has been exposed. This is the chaos into which the Brusselian elite want to pour European taxpayers’ money.” Orban has gone further, according to Alexandra Sharp in Foreign Policy, who notes that “the scandal is being seized on by Kremlin-aligned figures such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who argues it’s proof that EU aid for Ukraine is being stolen, fueling external calls to halt support for Kyiv.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Russia Tried to Cut Ukraine’s Lights. Now It’s Aiming for the Heat,” Constant Méheut and Olha Konovalova, New York Times, 11.15.25. 

• Méheut and Konovalova report that after years of attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, Russia has expanded its strikes to target gas infrastructure—threatening the main source of heating for 80 percent of Ukrainian households just as winter approaches.
• In the first half of 2025, Russian drones and missiles destroyed up to 60 percent of Ukraine’s gas production capacity, forcing Naftogaz to scramble for imports and repairs, and raising concerns that millions could face cold homes without alternatives to centralized gas-powered heating.
• Naftogaz’s CEO warned that Ukraine needs to import at least 4.4 billion cubic meters of gas at a cost of $2 billion to make it through the winter, and called on citizens to conserve; meanwhile, European and U.S. support has helped secure most, but not all, of the required funding.
• Officials and residents describe a growing sense of urgency as Russia targets not only underground gas storage but also compressor stations and pipelines essential to distributing stored gas; major cities relying on Soviet-era centralized heating systems are particularly vulnerable.
• Coping with the threat, Ukrainian families—accustomed to power cuts and making do with little—now face the new reality of potential gas shortages, while fears mount that where “Russia failed to break Ukraine by plunging it into darkness, it may yet succeed by plunging it into cold.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine’s Hardest Winter: With the Donbas in Peril, Europe Must Pressure Russia Now,” Jack Watling, Foreign Affairs, 11.11.25.

• Watling warns, “This winter could be pivotal. Russia is producing more missiles than ever before, while Ukraine’s damaged energy grid is already unable to power the entire country. Even central Kyiv is without power for hours every day. Heating currently works, but temperatures are falling, and Ukraine must prepare for significant disruption to utilities through the cold months. If Russia is able to accelerate its gains—perhaps through the combination of the hollowing of Ukraine’s defensive lines and the depopulation of major centers near the front—it could set a course to coerce Ukraine into submission in 2026.”
• “But that is hardly a foregone conclusion. If Ukraine can combine with Western powers to apply real pressure on Russia’s economy and energy infrastructure, a cease-fire could be achievable by the end of next year. Stalled by a bolstered Ukrainian training system and facing collapsing export revenues as Ukraine continues to damage its oil refineries and shipping infrastructure, Russia may finally see that it is approaching the end of the runway without sufficient lift,” Watling writes.
• He concludes by asserting, “Washington must recognize that a cease-fire will not come to pass with symbolic gestures and concessions to Moscow. Changing the Kremlin’s understanding of its prospects will require sustained pressure and discipline. Personal understandings among leaders cannot achieve this. For Europe, as well, rhetorical bellicosity must now be matched with precise policy. Ukraine still has the capacity to buy the time for pressure on Russia to succeed. But it cannot resist indefinitely.”

“The Pokrovsk Dilemma: Experts believe the city is practically lost; the question is whether this can be considered a success for the Russian offensive,” Re:Russia, 11.07.25.

• “The Russian army is close to successfully completing a strategic maneuver to capture Pokrovsk. As anticipated, the decisive push came in late autumn. Over the past year, by stretching the Ukrainian Armed Forces across multiple sectors of the front, the Russian command has pursued a dual strategy: encirclement of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad urban agglomeration on the one hand, and the use of infiltration tactics within the urban environment on the other.”
• “The Ukrainian forces could theoretically continue to counter infiltration by clearing territory, but the threat of encirclement makes such a strategy extremely risky. Most analysts advise Kyiv to accept the loss of the city and withdraw its troops. It is possible this is already underway.”
• “The likely capture of Pokrovsk will be the Kremlin’s biggest military success since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024. Overall, the Russian army has spent just over a year and a half attempting to take Pokrovsk, the first attempt being in March 2024.”
• “The key question today remains how to interpret the fall of Pokrovsk after eighteen months of Moscow’s military effort – as evidence of the Russian army’s strength, or of its weakness? Volodymyr Zelensky fears that the loss of the city will strengthen the argument that Kyiv should concede the remaining territory of the Donbas to Moscow in exchange for a ceasefire.  This is the question that will dominate the political battle in the coming weeks. Yet one way or another, the likelihood that the capture of Pokrovsk will prove to be the last major operation of this war, at least in its current phase, is quite high.”
• “The central question is how to interpret the results of the campaign: does the capture of the city after a year and a half of effort indicate Russia’s strength or its weakness? Trump and Orbán appear inclined to interpret it in Moscow’s favor. If so, in the coming weeks Zelensky will likely face intense pressure. On the other hand, for Vladimir Putin the capture of Pokrovsk may also serve as a convenient moment to announce a pause in military operations on a perceived wave of 'success' rather than in a situation where two years of fighting in Donbas have led nowhere. One way or another, the likelihood that the capture of Pokrovsk will become the last major operation of this war, at least in its current phase, is quite high. “

“Ukraine Draft Evasions Drain a Town of Its Men,” Maria Varenikova and Oksana Parafeniuk, The New York Times, 11.12.25.  

• Varenikova and Parafeniuk report, “Of the nearly 8,000 residents of Vylkove when the full-scale war began, only about 5,000 remain — though with so many people hiding, estimates are tricky.”
• Beyond border guards, “the service estimates that, nationwide, at least 70 men have drowned or died in the woods and marshes while trying to escape Ukraine.”
• According to prosecutors, “they have opened 290,000 cases for desertion or for being absent without leave.”
• Town mayor Matviy Ivanov said, “‘It’s women everywhere’ in town now. ‘They enjoy it, they’ve taken over every sector, and now they’re in charge.’”
• As one male resident explained, “About half the remaining men of draft age do not leave their houses at all.”

“What the Looming Fall of a Ukrainian City [Pokrovsk] Says About Putin's War,” Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 11.11.25.  

• William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at Rand, said, “Trump is trying to solve a problem, but Putin, as we’ve been told, consults Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible and Catherine the Great for his vision…He thinks in terms of empire.”
• Ruslan Pukhov, founder of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said, “Putin is carrying out this war out of principle, to cancel the outcome of the Cold War and return Russia to its acknowledged position as a great power.”
• President Zelensky warned, “Why does Putin need the administrative borders of the Donbas?... He doesn’t care about the Donbas at all… who says he won’t go further in a few years? Who can guarantee that?... That’s why security guarantees have always been our number one priority.”
• Samuel Charap, senior political analyst at Rand, stated, “Issues are not fundamentally about taking territory. You need to have some sort of principled agreement on these big picture issues.”
• Grove notes, “In recent weeks, the pace of peace talks has increasingly frustrated Trump. In a meeting with Zelensky last month, he refused to look at maps the Ukrainian leader brought with him. Meanwhile, a growing rupture with Putin has triggered a public exchange of veiled threats over each country’s nuclear arsenal.”

“Mearsheimer: Russia Is Winning a War of Attrition in Ukraine,” Javier Villamor, European Conservative, 11.12.25. 

• Mearsheimer argues, “Russia is winning a war of attrition. It has more men, more artillery, and greater industrial capacity,” and claims Kyiv cannot resist indefinitely as Western fatigue mounts.
• He describes the invasion as a “preventive war,” not an “imperial Russian offensive,” stating that “Russia entered with between 100,000 and 190,000 soldiers—an insufficient force to conquer a country the size of Ukraine.”
• Mearsheimer sees the most likely future as “an ugly victory for Moscow, consolidating between 20 and 40% of Ukrainian territory, while the rest of the country becomes a failed state dependent on Europe.”
• He warns, “tensions between Russia and Europe will not end with a ceasefire,” listing future flashpoints including the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova and the Black Sea.

 “The elite Russian unit hunting Ukraine’s drone warriors,” Charles Clover and Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 11.13.25.

• “After about two years of striking Russian units with near impunity, Ukraine’s scrappy, innovative drone pilots have become the hunted. Their tormentor is a dynamic new Russian unit known as Rubikon. Using sophisticated tools and its own fleet of hunter drones, the team has been locating, tracking and killing Ukrainian operators before they can launch.”
• Rubikon “is our main problem,” said Artem Kariakin, a Ukrainian serviceman near Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, a key town on the frontline that appears to be on the verge of falling after a year-long fight.”
• “Rubikon has about 5,000 people and vast financial resources, said Rob Lee of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute.”
• “Drones can give a “decisive advantage” to defenders by making the battlefield transparent, said Bob Tollast, a RUSI research fellow. Ukraine’s small, semi-autonomous units were highly effective in causing chaos when Russia had no advanced drone operation of its own. But Moscow has made a huge effort to absorb the lessons Ukraine has learned, Tollast said. Now, Kyiv must counter Rubikon’s highly organized strategy by developing a clear, centralized battle plan of its own, he added.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“The U.S. can help Ukraine beat Russia without escalating the war,” Ron Wahid, The Washington Post, 11.13.25.  

• Ron Wahid writes, “‘Operation Spider Web,’ in which Ukraine’s spy services unleashed a swarm of drones smuggled in on trucks, disabled an estimated 34 percent of Russia’s bomber strike force while they were still on the ground.”
• Wahid notes, “The Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missile…offers a strike range of approximately 280 miles. Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles also reach over 300 miles and are designed to penetrate heavily fortified targets.”
• Wahid observes, “Recent sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies were a welcome first step…The Trump administration’s move to block the Swiss commodity trader Gunvor from acquiring the assets of Russian oil company Lukoil, as well as Bulgaria’s decision to seize a Russian-owned refinery, have sent shock waves through Moscow’s energy industry.”
• According to Wahid, “the focus should be on delivering weapons that are immediately deployable, alongside ramped up economic pressure, to push Moscow to agree to a negotiated end to the hostilities without getting trapped in an escalatory spiral.”
• Wahid concludes, “Ukraine does not need every advanced system imaginable; it needs support that is strategically decisive. The right mix of calculated military aid, targeted sanctions and coordinated diplomacy can secure Ukraine’s position without triggering uncontrolled escalation.”

“Positive developments for Ukraine in a time of challenge,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 11.13.25.

• Pifer observes that while “Ukraine faces steep challenges,” several new factors “could strengthen Kyiv’s hand” despite Russian army attacks and strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this fall.
• He notes, “The Russian army occupies some 19% of Ukraine’s territory. However, that compares to 17% in late 2023.” In two years, “the Russian military has gained just 2% of Ukraine, in a war that has cost the Russians horribly.”
• Pifer highlights, “The U.K. Ministry of Defense puts the number of Russian casualties since the major invasion began in February 2022 at about 1.1 million, with more than 350,000 in 2025 alone. Other estimates suggest that Russia has suffered as many as 1.4 million casualties.”
• He writes that the Trump administration “finally imposed a major new penalty on Russia, sanctioning the country’s two largest oil producers and exporters, Rosneft and Lukoil… Many refineries in India… paused their purchases of Russian oil.”
• “The European Union appears to be closing on a plan to make use of frozen Russian Central Bank assets to assist Ukraine…reparation loans backed by 140 billion euros (about $162 billion) from the frozen Russian assets.” This could fund Ukraine’s military for “two to three years.”
• “Ukraine’s growing capability to strike military targets and war-supporting industry deep inside of Russia” has “reduced [Russian] refinery capacity by 10% to 17% (other estimates go as high as 30% or 38%).” These attacks have “driven up the price of gasoline and caused rationing in some Russian cities.”
• Pifer concludes, “These developments could go some way to disabusing Putin of his apparent belief that he can achieve his objectives on the battlefield,” especially if “a faltering economy and continuing high casualties turn the Russian public against the war.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On,” Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 11.11.25.  

• Keith Johnson reports, “Big buyers of Russian oil, especially in Asia, are forsaking Urals crude, and major Russian oil companies such as Rosneft and especially Lukoil are under pressure worldwide as the specter of U.S. secondary sanctions chokes their business and prospects.”
• Johnson notes, “Russia’s economy is already shaky (interest rates are in the double digits, inflation is still a bugbear, and what economic growth there is is fueled by rampant and unsustainable defense spending), and its earnings from fossil fuel exports were already at their lowest point in September since the war began. Now things are going to get dire.”
• Johnson reports, “Two-thirds of the Russian oil that was headed to India now seems without a destination; only a Rosneft-run refinery really seems keen on buying the stuff.”
• According to Edward Fishman of Columbia University, “The benefit of stopping the oil trade is that you are hitting the Russian military-industrial complex at its source.”
• Johnson concludes, “The ultimate goal of U.S. and Western sanctions is to crimp Russia’s ability to fund its war on Ukraine and thus to make peace talks possible.”

“The Kremlin Has Weaponized Western Financial Checks to Punish Russian Dissidents,” Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Politika, 11.13.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Prokopenko reports, “The Kremlin has mastered and scaled up a new form of repression against its domestic opponents… using Rosfinmonitoring… to label people ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists,’ making normal financial life impossible for tens of thousands of people.”
• “Being blacklisted not only means that all that person’s assets in Russia are frozen, it also triggers a chain reaction in the Western financial system…Banks start demanding additional documents for basic transactions, or they simply close the accounts.”
• She notes, “The information is automatically passed on to specialized companies…for KYC/AML (know your customer/anti-money laundering) systems used by banks and other financial institutions around the world. The process is 95–99 percent automated.”
• “Standard procedure is then to freeze transactions and request additional documents. Sometimes a person is able to clear their name, but more often than not, the bank chooses to terminate its dealings with the client. The industry’s guiding principle is ‘better safe than sorry.’”
• By the end of 2024, Russia’s list of “terrorists and extremists” contained over 20,000 names, “growing by 250–300 people per month.” Every tenth person “designated a ‘terrorist’ by Russian law enforcement is a minor.”
• Prokopenko warns, “In the Western financial system, everyone on a terror list looks equally risky, whether they are a Russian political prisoner or an ISIS fighter.”
• She concludes, “The lack of mechanisms for assessing the politicization of national terrorist lists is a global problem… it’s hard to imagine another such convenient tool of political repression that allows authorities to remain within the international legal framework while simultaneously creating enormous problems for their political opponents, no matter where they are in the world.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Former MI6 chief Richard Moore: Britain must regain the ‘power of example,’” Roula Khalaf, Financial Times, 13.11.25.

• Richard Moore states: “I fundamentally assess that Putin is not interested in negotiations. There are no negotiations, not real negotiations. He’s attempting to play us.”
• Moore sees two Putins: “One is the cold-eyed realist… The other Putin is ideological and has 'a deeply wired feeling that Ukraine doesn’t have the right to exist.' This Putin invaded Ukraine and his objective…is not to bargain over slices of territory but to dominate.”
• He urges maximum pressure: “The only way to confront the ideological Putin is to pile so much pressure on him that he is forced to choose between fulfilling his legacy project in Ukraine and holding on to power. That’s why Moore argues that Ukraine should have the right to strike deep into Russia, and that more economic pressure should be brought to bear on the Putin regime.”
• Moore says Ukraine and allies face a “very, very winnable contest... It’s particularly important that we don’t snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.”
• Reflecting on MI6’s role, Moore adds that public warnings about Russia’s plans before the full-scale invasion were an “intelligence triumph, even if Russian tanks soon rolled into eastern Ukraine.”

“Ex-MI6 Chief Richard Moore: Spying Is an ‘Arms Race,’” Mishal Husain, Bloomberg, 11.14. 25. 

• Richard Moore describes today’s security climate as “extraordinarily contested,” citing that “the way in which relationships have broken down between leading powers—particularly following Russian behavior in Ukraine… means that some of the tramlines we were used to… are not really there.”
• On Russia, Moore says: “Putin has no intention of doing a deal, that this is not an issue for him purely of territory, this is about dominating and turning Ukraine into something that looks rather like its neighbor, Belarus.”
• He emphasizes that ending the war under current conditions is unlikely, stating, “[Putin] is not ready to do a deal. For me, the answer… is he needs to be put under more pressure so he is prepared to do a deal,” and calls for more battlefield and domestic pressure against Moscow.
• Moore notes that “Putin has become increasingly dependent on Chinese support,” detailing China’s assistance through dual-use goods and components for Russian shells and missiles, as well as support from Iran and North Korea.
• The former MI6 chief warns that “it’s so, so important that we don’t lose this contest of wills,” as both Putin and China’s Xi Jinping are watching Ukraine closely: “There’s a real danger that if he sees us being weak on Ukraine, then he will draw conclusions… on Taiwan.”

“Putin Will Never Compromise on Ukraine,” Casey Michel, Foreign Policy, 11.11.25.

• Casey Michel writes, “Putin will never come to that conclusion. There is no amount of arms, matériel, or support that the West can give Ukraine that will dissuade Putin from his ultimate vision of reunifying Kyiv and Moscow and of seizing Ukrainian sovereignty for his own.”
• Michel notes, “Even grave military setbacks, economic decline, and international humiliation have not changed Putin’s mind; he rejected recent U.S. proposals at the Alaska summit, demanding the West address so-called ‘root causes’—chiefly, Ukraine’s independence and Western alignment.”
• According to Michel, “The entire war has been, as one analyst said, a ‘strategic nightmare’ for Putin. Yet, even with all of this, the Russian dictator has not wavered from his ultimate, maximalist designs.”
• Michel argues, “Since there is no ‘off-ramp’ for Putin in this war—since he is willing to bear any cost for ultimate success—the West must shift its strategy. Washington and its allies must give up the idea that there is some ultimate cost that would force Putin to retreat.”
• Michel concludes, “It’s time to put to bed the idea that Putin can be persuaded and recognize that he must simply be outlasted.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Why Trump’s Ukraine Peace Efforts Keep Failing,” Thomas Wright, The Atlantic, November 2025.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously: How His Second Term Is Reshaping America and the World,” Peter D. Feaver, Foreign Affairs, 11.12.25.  

• Peter D. Feaver notes, “the messaging from Trump’s second campaign… promised an end to the distractions in Gaza and Ukraine in order to, as Vice President JD Vance stated, ‘focus on the real issue of China.’”
• Feaver writes, “Trump has bypassed congressional oversight on arms sales to the Middle East and security aid to Ukraine, even when those benefits were appropriated by Congress.”
• According to Feaver, "Trump boasts stunning levels of popularity, with over 90% approval among Republicans… what matters most is loyalty to Trump’s agenda,” including ambiguous Ukraine policy shifts.
• Feaver concludes, “Trump’s siphoning of American global power could usher in a new geopolitical order—one in which great powers that are hostile, or at best indifferent, to U.S. interests would hold sway in vast spheres of influence… prospects for geopolitical fracture and great-power war would intensify.”

“Trump wants Europe to defend itself but that's proving tough to do,” Ellen Francis and Beatriz Ríos, The Washington Post, 11.12.25.

• European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius told The Washington Post, “In defense, we are very individual and for us to come together and to start to do something, it’s a challenge. It will not come very quickly, but we need to see that picture.”
• Francis and Ríos report, “The 100-billion-euro ($116 billion) plan for a European fighter plane that could provide an alternative to the American F-35 is mired in industrial infighting, testing the promise of unity as companies jockey to profit from the manufacturing.”
• Kubilius said, “Manufacturing of equipment is ‘totally fragmented,’ countries are used to ‘working by themselves’ and the E.U. has had ‘very limited to no influence.’ You cannot just write a decree that tomorrow everybody should go together.”
• According to Spanish defense executive José Vicente de los Mozos, “There needs to be a balance between the European Union’s vision and country requirements. …but each country wants to keep their sovereignty.”
• German central bank chief Joachim Nagel stated, “There are large gaps between aspiration and reality… whether European states are prepared to relinquish competencies in such a sensitive area as defense in order to achieve more together.”

“Deep Precision Strike: Europe’s Quest for Long-range Missile Capabilities,” IISS, 11.13.25.

• The report notes, “a number of European states are now looking to buy or develop strike systems designed to hold an adversary’s forces at risk at long range, known as ‘deep precision strike’ (DPS) capabilities,” following the end of INF Treaty constraints and Russia’s aggression.
• ELSA—the European Long-Range Strike Approach—is described as “an initiative by select NATO members aimed at determining the defense requirements for, and supporting the joint development of, conventionally armed DPS capabilities and enabling technologies.”
• France has “perhaps the most clearly publicly articulated vision for its DPS portfolio,” seeing it as essential for both deterrence and war fighting, “enabling the suppression of enemy air defenses and the engagement of fixed and mobile high-value and time-sensitive targets.”
• While all six ELSA partners (France, Germany, Poland, UK, Italy, Sweden) “generally agree on the strategic purpose” of DPS, the report finds “considerable variation in each nation’s technological starting point, their defense-industrial approaches… and the motivations behind their ambitions.”
• The document highlights trade-offs: “Collectively, while DPS is operationally symbiotic with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense, they compete for the same budgets… limited budgets will require ELSA members to decide on the types of weapons they wish to field.”
• The study warns, “The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an obstacle to European cooperation on DPS-range systems,” while also noting that “significant questions remain… [including] how Russia will respond to European DPS plans.”

“America’s Quasi Alliances: How Washington Should Manage Its Most Complicated Relationships,” Rebecca Lissner, Foreign Affairs, 11.14.25, 

• Lissner observes that both Trump and Biden struggled to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, despite Trump’s campaign pledges; instead, both conflicts exposed the dilemmas the U.S. faces in managing its “quasi allies” like Ukraine and Israel.
• “Quasi allies”—nations with significant U.S. military or financial support but no formal defense treaty—occupy a confusing status that enables Washington to project power while maintaining ambiguity about security guarantees; this ambiguity, Lissner explains, weakens deterrence but accommodates divergent interests.
• In Ukraine, Washington’s hope of shaping battlefield decisions and postwar aims was often stymied by Kyiv’s domestic pressures and higher risk tolerance, especially on issues like lowering the draft age and the use of advanced weapons; U.S. delayed provision of ATACMS missiles exemplified this difficult push-pull.
• With Israel, the U.S. consistently wrestled with how and whether to condition military aid as Netanyahu pursued controversial policies in Gaza and vis-à-vis Iran, with the Trump and Biden administrations taking sharply different tacks on using pressure to influence Israeli actions.
• Lissner concludes that “threading the needle” with quasi allies requires clear communication, credible leverage, and policy alignment while managing inevitable disagreements—lessons she sees as vital for future U.S. policy toward other quasi allies such as Taiwan.

“The scramble for Europe is just beginning,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 11.17.25.

• Rachman notes that “with war raging in Ukraine and fears growing about a broader Russian threat to Europe,” EU leaders were reluctant to retaliate against Trump’s tariffs, fearing it would “reduce [U.S.] security commitment to Europe.”
• Russia is portrayed as one of the key “outside players,” shaping outcomes well beyond Ukraine: “The brutal war in Sudan… has key outside players… fueling the conflict… [including] Russia.”
• “In Mali, first Russia and now jihadist forces seem to be filling the vacuum” left by the decline of French and Western influence in West Africa.
• “In the western Balkans… the influence of Russia, Turkey and China is growing,” challenging the EU’s unity and ability to integrate the region.
• Rachman warns European unity “over Ukraine… could begin to break down as parties more sympathetic to Moscow win elections in EU countries,” highlighting Russia’s continued ability to exploit divisions in Europe’s security and political order.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Russia and China in the Gray Zone,” Ariane Tabatabai, Lawfare, 11.14.25. 

• Tabatabai writes, “Russia’s gray-zone campaign against NATO allies bears more than a passing resemblance to Beijing’s incremental pressure on Taiwan,” as both powers use coercive tactics that push the envelope of international norms without triggering open conflict.
• Recently, “Russia has engaged in unsafe and coercive tactics against NATO member states at levels European officials have described as ‘unprecedented’ since the Cold War,” with airspace incursions across Poland, Estonia, Denmark, and Norway and stepped-up drone operations inspired by lessons from the war in Ukraine.
• “Russia is likely attempting to test the resolve of NATO allies… demonstrate its own resolve… push the envelope as much as possible to identify NATO’s trigger points… [and] identify the strengths and gaps in NATO allies’ doctrines, capabilities, and interoperability.”
• Tabatabai notes, “Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been deepening their cooperation in a number of areas… The enhanced cooperation between Beijing and Moscow extends into the gray zone and includes sharing lessons learned.”
• She concludes, “as both countries continue to enhance their capabilities to compete with the United States and its allies and partners in the gray zone, America, NATO, and Indo-Pacific powers… should also improve their own,” urging a deterrence strategy designed for the gray zone to counter both Russian and Chinese operations.

Missile defense:

•  No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Russia and the U.S. put nuclear testing back on the table. Is time running out for arms control?” Georgia Cole, Chatham House, 11.11.25.  

• According to the author, “The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) places binding limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems by the world’s two largest nuclear powers. It is due to expire in February 2026, risking the removal of the final guardrail restraining the size and visibility of their arsenals—and increasing the risk of a new nuclear arms race.”
• As Georgia Cole noted, “Moscow’s announcement has been widely interpreted in the West as evidence of rapid Russian nuclear modernization and has caused alarm among policymakers and media outlets. Moscow has further stated that these new weapons are difficult to detect and capable of evading missile defenses.”
• Cole writes, “After Russia’s announcement, President Trump instructed the State Department to restart U.S. nuclear testing ‘on an equal basis’ to other countries.”
  Cole argues, “These developments threaten to collapse the three-decade long moratorium on nuclear tests.”
• According to Cole, “If New START expires without even a symbolic extension, the consequences could be significant. The absence of mutually agreed constraints could fuel an arms race in which Russia and the U.S. expand deployed nuclear arsenals, undermining strategic stability.”
• Cole states, “This would weaken the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the main international treaty governing nuclear weapons. Many states already view nuclear weapons states as backsliding on their disarmament obligations. Abandoning the last bilateral nuclear arms control framework would reinforce that perception.”
• Georgia Cole concludes, “What is needed now is not an ambitious new treaty framework, but a focused effort to preserve the minimum conditions needed for future progress.”

“The Nuclear-Arms Race Is Now a Three-Way Contest,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 11.16.25. 

Russia-Related Insights:

• Trofimov reports that “Russia is developing a variety of new-generation systems aimed at American cities,” including testing a nuclear-powered missile and deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus, as Putin uses “nuclear saber-rattling to throttle American support for Ukraine.”
• While the U.S. and Russia “are still abiding by some arms-controls limits, such as the New Start treaty that expires in February,” Russia has been conducting publicized demonstrations of new weapons like the Burevestnik missile and the Poseidon underwater nuclear drone.
• “Putin’s pronouncements have to be answered. When the war in Ukraine started in 2022, there was a huge disbalance of fear, with Putin using those nuclear threats, veiled and not so veiled, and the West was pretty much paralyzed,” says Serhii Plokhy, highlighting Russia’s use of nuclear threats as strategic communication.
• Despite all the hype, “Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon wonder-weapons aren’t fully operational, and have more psychological rather than military utility,” according to missile expert Fabian Hoffmann, who calls them “a Russian waste of money, in essence.”
• Trofimov concludes that Russia continues to rely on “the fear factor” and nuclear brinkmanship to compensate for weaknesses in conventional forces, while China pursues a more focused nuclear build-up and the U.S. reassesses its own strategic posture.

"Deterrence, Compellence, or Credibility Fatigue? Russian Nuclear Threats in the War on Ukraine," Polina Sinovets and Muhammed Ali Alkiş, Journal of Post-Soviet Studies, 2025.

• Sinovets and Alkış write, “Throughout Russia’s war on Ukraine, Moscow actively used nuclear signaling for coercive purposes,” combining both deterrence and compellence strategies.
• On deterring the West, they argue that “President Putin’s deterrence message to keep other powers out of the war was heard by the main opponent, the United States,” leading Washington to state emphatically it would not send troops to Ukraine.
• Nonetheless, the authors note, “Russia failed to deter Ukraine, which continued military operations such as strikes on the Crimean Bridge, recapturing territories, and launching drone attacks on Moscow.”
• They observe, “Fear of nuclear escalation, vocalized by the U.S. president, delayed Western arms supplies to Ukraine for 6–9 months,” allowing Russia time to adapt its military strategy and depriving Ukraine of early battlefield advantages.
• European states, “particularly the United Kingdom and France, recognized the limited credibility of Russia’s threats,” prompting new Western arms deliveries like ATACMS from the U.S., and French consideration of troop deployments.
• Yet, “Ukraine managed to receive only limited permission from the United States and allies to target Russian territory with their missiles,” while countries like Germany withheld certain weapons out of escalation fears.
• The authors conclude, “Russia’s deterrence succeeded in preventing Western military interference, with credibility and escalation as key tools,” though compellence gradually lost effectiveness as the war continued.

“Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Threats Are Getting Old,” Thomas Kent, The National Interest, 11.04.25.

• Kent writes that Putin’s nuclear threats, once effective at deterring Western support for Ukraine, are now losing their power as the West grows increasingly skeptical of Moscow’s brinksmanship.
• He notes that President Trump dismissed Putin’s latest saber-rattling, targeting Russian oil companies with sanctions and discussing new U.S. intelligence support for Ukrainian strikes inside Russia, all while refusing to be swayed by nuclear posturing.
• Putin’s warnings about using nuclear weapons had early impact—Biden and other European leaders cited them as reasons for caution, particularly in the delay delivering ATACMS missiles to Ukraine—but such rhetoric has become routine and less influential.
• According to former Ukrainian intelligence officials, much of Russia’s nuclear signaling was a deliberate disinformation campaign to sway Western risk calculations and policy, successfully stalling U.S. military assistance at key moments.
• Kent concludes that while Putin will likely continue this nuclear rhetoric, Western leaders now appear committed to act on the basis of real situational analysis rather than intimidation, with countries like Sweden joining NATO and Germany expanding its defense capabilities despite Russian threats.

“The Secret Prehistory of Drones,” Interview with Andrei Kokoshin, MK.ru/RIAC, 11.12.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “One could have foreseen that modern war would be a war of drones maybe 10–12, or maybe 15 years ago, but no earlier… in the 1990s, the technologies that would later make mass drone use possible had not yet become visible. This includes compact control means, more efficient and reliable engines, batteries, and a range of materials.”
• “Today, many experts are questioning the future of tanks and all armored fighting vehicles, especially with respect to “drone warfare.” Looking back at the role of drones in modern military affairs, I think one turning point was the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Drones were highly effective, especially at the tactical level, for pinpoint strikes and drastically improving situational awareness. From then on, drones merited the closest attention—this was a case where a relatively small, local war gave very broad lessons. ”
• “Constant work is needed on AI verification and validation to ensure trusted systems. Basically, we cannot rule out that we stand on the threshold of real (universal) strong AI. There is no guarantee it will resemble human intelligence. What might result if something appears that even scientists and experts cannot understand, with a logic totally alien to human logic? ”
• “The militarization of space has largely already happened. ”
• “The “Golden Dome” is an extremely complex technical project with huge budget costs. Even with SpaceX’s radical launch cost reductions, it would require major spending, especially for the information component. ”
• “The logic of [of Russia’s] “asymmetric response” [to a U.S. missile defense program] remains. The “Golden Dome” mostly repeats the logic of SDI, and even SDI repeated earlier American projects. Periodically, such plans arise in the U.S., appealing to a segment of the population not well-versed in the realities of strategic nuclear balance—and the “nuclear age” in general. It's odd that a populist like Trump pushed it only recently. ”
• “Based on my experience in medium- and long-term forecasting, I can say the probability of new nuclear powers emerging has always existed and always will… Politically and militarily, the manageability of world politics decreases as the number of nuclear powers increases.”
• “Great efforts must be made to ensure this new polycentric world order does not also become a world of growing “nuclear multipolarity.”
• “There’s a common view: all the data needed to build an atomic bomb is online. But that is just an urban legend. Creating nuclear weapons still requires complex, subtle technology, vast investment, and a high scientific-technical base built over years. Most world states lack the full range of capability. But there are non-nuclear states with highly developed science, industry, and nuclear power, such as Japan and South Korea. If they made the political decision, they could acquire nuclear weapons quickly.”
• [When asked: “If judging only by technical and economic factors, how many mid-level powers could build nuclear weapons now?”I haven't researched this lately, but I think clearly more than five, but fewer than ten.”

“If a major war breaks out, Europe will simply cease to exist” [interview with Sergei Karaganov to Éva Péli] Multipolar, 11.14.25.[1] Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. 

• “The risk of nuclear war is high and continues to grow. It's probably as high as it was at the end of the 1950s—except for the Cuban Missile Crisis, as we call it, when we stood at the brink. Why? There are several reasons for this escalation. First, the shift in the balance of power: the fastest power shift in human history, with new powers rising and old ones losing ground. Second, the loss of basic understanding: the loss of moral bearings in international relations, and the lack of a moral basis for action. Third, the backlash of the West: the desperate counterattack of the West, which is losing its 500-year dominance that allowed it to become wealthy at the expense of the rest of the world. Fourth, the degradation of the elite: the enormous intellectual and moral decline of the elites, especially in the West. Therefore, I am very concerned.”
• “We need to overcome strategic parasitism, which has developed in recent years and has reached the European population above all. They have lost their fear of war, especially of nuclear war. Ironically, this very fear was a stabilizing factor over the past 70 years… It is not necessarily direct violence that is required, but the restoration of the fear of war, including the revival of the fear of nuclear war. This is a key element to bring Europe back to its geopolitical responsibilities.”
• “The use of nuclear weapons is a grave moral sin. The myth of uncontrollable escalation—which I myself contributed to, in part, to prevent wars—is really just a legend. A nuclear war can be won, but God forbid it should ever start! If absolutely necessary, the nuclear arsenal can be used, but aside from the risk of uncontrolled escalation, the use of nuclear weapons in itself is a serious moral wrong, and I sincerely hope they are never used.”
• [When asked: “How do you assess this, and what could a possible response look like, so as not to expand the war beyond Ukraine’s borders?” What seemed radical a few years ago—the need for preemptive strikes or even nuclear retaliation—is now the prevailing opinion. My earlier statements, which caused discomfort, now reflect a broad consensus: by my estimate, up to 90% of the population and 95% of the military-political elite share this view. Let me repeat: the use of nuclear weapons remains a most serious moral decision and a great sin. But if an extreme situation arises, the purpose of such a step is to bring madmen to their senses and force the enemy to stop escalation. I am convinced that Russian society would fully and unreservedly support such strategic decisions if really necessary. Moreover, I face criticism from citizens every day. They accuse me of a lack of persistence and consistency: despite my public statements that use of the nuclear arsenal is necessary, I have supposedly failed to persuade the leadership to do so. Let me stress: I do not want our leadership to use it.”
• “My task is to separate Russia completely from this Western plague—be it militarily, politically, or morally.”
• [When asked how the Russian-Ukrainian war would end] “Part of the territory formerly known as Ukraine will become part of the Russian Federation. On the remaining territory, an absolutely de-Nazified, demilitarized zone must be established… In the end, a small part of Ukraine will become part of Russia, while the rest will serve as a buffer zone—a security cushion that separates the ascending Russia from the warring and inevitably collapsing Europe.”
• “We will maneuver and play while the Americans' attempts to undermine Russia will fail.”
• “A major war cannot be non-nuclear. The idea that a large-scale conflict in Europe could remain conventional is, if you’ll excuse me, idiotic. What does a nuclear war in Europe mean? It means most European countries will become deserts. They will simply cease to exist. It is beyond even the most rudimentary common sense what those who talk about war against nuclear Russia are about to unleash. They are condemning their own peoples to destruction. Unfortunately, the European leadership has not only lost its historical memory but even the basic, physical sense of fear.”
• “I assume there will no longer be a European security order. Should there even be need for such a structure—which I doubt—it will necessarily have a joint Eurasian character. Regarding the narrow European framework, it is mandatory to create a fully demilitarized zone for the remaining territory of Ukraine, ideally with a no-fly zone. Military activity in Russia’s border regions must be reduced, and reciprocal de-escalation is required. As for our Finnish neighbors: it is in our interest that they be eliminated in case of war.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia’s Enduring Grip on Syria,” Kelly Kassis, RUSI, 11.11.25.  

• Kelly Kassis writes, “Sharaa pledged to honor all past agreements and signaled intent to deepen bilateral ties. These include Russia’s military bases at Hmeimim and Tartus, as well as the continuation of energy and reconstruction contracts awarded under Assad’s regime, many underpinned by Syria’s coercive debt obligations to Moscow.”
• According to Kassis, “In 2017, it [Russia] secured cost-free operational control over the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base for 49 years, gaining a platform for power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean and logistical support for operations in Africa.”
• Kassis notes, “It was revealed that 70% of revenue from phosphate production goes to the Russian firm, with only 30% allocated to the Syrian state-owned Gecopham—raising concerns that other agreements are structured on similarly exploitative terms.”
• Kassis observes, “Russia’s immediate priority is to maintain its military bases in Syria, as fully replacing them in the short term remains unfeasible. Attempts to establish alternative naval access in Libya and Port Sudan have stalled amid political instability, legal uncertainties and logistical hurdles.”
• According to Kassis, “This configuration would reinforce an asymmetric balance of power in which Sharaa’s authority would be contingent on Moscow.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “From Terrorist to President,” The Long Game Podcast (Jake Sullivan & Jon Finer), Nov 14, 2025.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Nord Stream Investigation That’s Splintering Europe Over Ukraine,” Bojan Pancevski, Wall Street Journal, 11.10.25. Expanded summary.

• “For three years, a crack team of detectives gathered each weekday morning around a whiteboard at the German Federal Police headquarters in Potsdam, near Berlin. Now their investigation into who was behind the greatest act of sabotage in modern history—the bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines—is threatening to splinter support for Ukraine, the country they hold responsible.”
  • “Poland already has refused to extradite one of the suspects to stand trial in Germany. It instead views him a hero for destroying a vital source of revenue for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has long questioned Germany’s dependence on Russian energy, ridiculed the investigation. The problem isn’t that the pipeline was blown up, he said. The “problem is that it was built.”
    • “At home, the opposition AfD party has seized on public anger with how the bombings cemented high energy prices with no relief in sight. It is now campaigning to cut aid to Kyiv, a vital plank in the West’s support for Ukraine.”
  • “Another extradition case, this time involving a Ukrainian suspect in Italy, is expected to be resolved in the coming weeks and threatens to place Kyiv’s role under further public scrutiny.”
• “As vast amounts of methane fizzed into the Baltic [when NS was blown up], the single largest man-made release of greenhouse gas on record, some U.S. and German officials accused Russia of engineering the blasts. The Kremlin claimed that the U.S. and U.K. were behind the attack. German police, prosecutors and other people familiar with the intricacies of the case instead developed what they said is a clear picture of how an elite Ukrainian military unit carried out the attacks under the direct supervision of Ukraine’s then-supreme commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy.”
• “The slow process of piecing the plot together began shortly after the explosions in the Baltic. By tracking boat rental companies, phones and license plates, the Potsdam team laid the groundwork for German authorities to issue arrest warrants for three soldiers from the special Ukrainian military unit and four veteran deep-sea divers, people familiar with the case said. The saboteurs’ goal was to cut both Russia’s oil revenues and its economic ties with Germany, they said. Decisive evidence came from a grainy black-and-white photo taken by a German speed trap. It showed the face of a Ukrainian deep-sea diver, whom police identified by using a commercially available face-recognition software.”
• “It turns out not everyone appreciated their efforts. The Ukrainian diver the team traced to Poland was subsequently taken to Ukraine in a black BMW with diplomatic plates, driven by the Ukrainian military attaché in Warsaw.”
• “The commander of the sabotage unit, meanwhile, was found in Italy after an exhaustive hunt… They [investigators] identified him as Serhii K., a 46-year-old veteran of Ukraine’s SBU security service. He had joined a special-forces unit on the first day of the Russian invasion and commanded an air-defense detachment during the Battle of Kyiv in the early weeks of the war… Italy’s Carabinieri police force arrested him after he checked in to a bungalow resort in the medieval town of San Clemente.
• “By December, Italian judges are expected to decide whether to extradite the Ukrainian to Germany… His extradition could be a mixed blessing. Any legal hearing appears certain to further strain relations between Ukraine and Germany, Kyiv’s largest financial backer and the supplier of some of its most sought-after military hardware, especially air-defense systems.
• “Still, senior officials have suggested, the diplomatic fallout of the bombings might have been easier for Germany to navigate if the detectives hadn’t so effectively built a case against Ukraine.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“How the Kremlin Lost Trump,” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 11.14.25. 

• Baunov describes the collapse of the Budapest summit as “an inevitable result of the Russian system of artificially creating foreign policy crises in order to achieve a desired outcome.”
• After Lavrov briefed U.S. Secretary of State Rubio on Russia’s conditions for peace, “Trump and Putin were threatening each other with new weapons and nuclear tests,” and the summit was canceled as Moscow’s demands proved incompatible with U.S. expectations.
• Baunov notes Russian diplomacy under wartime pressure often aims “to put Western interlocutors in their place, express indignation, threaten, and invent offensive names,” resulting in “frank comments on Ukraine” from Lavrov that a ceasefire would mean “a vast portion of Ukraine remains under Nazi rule.”
• The Kremlin’s tactic, writes Baunov, is a “dialectic of preemptive response,” in which Russia portrays its aggressive initiatives as reactions to Western hostility: “America, [Defense Minister] Belousov explained, is aggressively rearming and testing new systems… In response to Trump’s provocative statements, Russia has long been prepared for its own nuclear tests.”
• Moscow blamed Washington for the diplomatic breakdown, but Baunov observes that “the people who really manipulated Trump were not the Europeans, but the Russian negotiators in Alaska—led by Putin himself,” who tried to “convince the U.S. president… that a long-term peace… would be far better” but concealed their real aims.
• When Trump responded with new sanctions and ordered U.S. nuclear tests, Russia escalated, announcing successful tests of a “nuclear-powered wonder weapon,” but soon retreated to emphasize a willingness to adhere to New START restrictions and a possible test moratorium.
• Baunov concludes that “diplomacy focused on the domestic consumption of a belligerent leader is not fit for purpose,” as the Kremlin’s crisis-creation strategy cannot achieve lasting results: “When negotiations are required to achieve a military result, their failure and the collapse of the entire system into the logic of force are entirely expected, since they themselves are rooted in it.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“‘Economy Without an Engine’: How the Russian Economy Has Developed since Independence and What Lies Ahead,” Abel Aganbegyan, RBC/Russia.Post, 11.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• Aganbegyan contends that Russia has built “a socioeconomic system without an engine”—lacking “the capital market and competitive environment that drive growth in a market economy,” which has led to global stagnation.
• “From 1991 to 2025, Russia’s GDP grew only a third,” Aganbegyan notes, the lowest rate among major economies and “comparable only to Japan’s”; meanwhile, “China’s GDP and India’s GDP have ballooned thirteenfold and ninefold.”
• He argues, “The public sector, which produces roughly 70% of output, dominates the economy and remains less efficient than private business”; labor productivity is “a third or fourth of what it is in leading economies.”
• “Venture capital and a startup ecosystem are virtually nonexistent” in Russia, he observes. “Since 2020, not a single unicorn has appeared in Russia, while Russian entrepreneurs have created dozens of such firms abroad.”
• To overcome stagnation, Aganbegyan calls for “emergency measures through 2030,” including a “three- to fivefold” increase in investment lending and state-backed loans at “3–5% annual rates” to fuel industry, infrastructure, and tech.
• His priorities for investment: “industrial modernization, technology development, infrastructure, and housing construction”—with a goal to double the housing stock and add up to “2 percentage points to GDP.”
• Looking ahead, Aganbegyan is cautiously optimistic: “If the proposed reforms are pushed through and this potential is fully tapped, the ‘engine’ of the economy might finally be restarted, setting Russia on a trajectory of outstripping growth.”

“Re:Russia Repression Index: The level of state repression in 2025 shows an even sharper increase than was observed at the beginning of the war,” Re:Russia, 11.10.25.

• The Re:Russia Repression Index “shows that the sharp rise in repression after the start of the full-scale invasion, when the number of convictions under the ‘repressive basket’ increased by 35%, was followed by a period of relative stabilization in 2023 and early 2024,” but by mid-2024, “a new sharp increase in convictions began.”
• By the first half of 2025, the number of convictions under politically sensitive articles “increased by 80% compared with the first half of 2024,” with imprisonment sentences leaping to “an astonishing 67%.”
• “While the number of cases under the explicitly ‘political’ articles increased by around 70%… the number of convictions under the ‘heavy’ articles of the grey zone (terrorism, espionage, sabotage) doubled, increasing 2.1 times.”
• The profile of repression now extends well beyond “activists and the liberal milieu in the major cities,” targeting a “much broader social reach,” with a key feature being the “random distribution across different social groups outside the ‘liberal ghetto.’”
• The review concludes, “the extension of a ‘Stalinist pattern’ of repression, whose defining features are very long prison terms and a relatively ‘random’ distribution…can now be clearly tracked in Russia’s evolving pattern of state repression.”

“Russia’s Oligarchs Must Walk a Wartime Tightrope to Keep Their Fortunes,” Arnold Khachaturov, Carnegie Politika, 11.12.25.

• Khachaturov writes, “the war against Ukraine has been a cold shower for Russia’s billionaires,” as they have lost access to Western assets and now face the Kremlin’s demand to “support the war and cut ties with ‘unfriendly countries,’” or risk losing “their freedom, their assets, or both.”
• He notes, “The number of Russian billionaires who have openly condemned their country’s invasion of Ukraine can be counted on one hand,” with Oleg Tinkov being “by far the most uncompromising example,” selling his business, leaving Russia, and renouncing citizenship.
• Experience shows businessmen “don’t necessarily need to vocally condemn the war for the authorities to take an interest in their assets,” as even those living abroad and silent—like Yuri Shefler and Denis Shtengelov—have lost businesses in the Kremlin’s nationalization drive.
• Khachaturov observes, “a few major businessmen have managed to reside in the West while retaining a significant portion of their wealth,” but this requires not supporting Ukraine, having “no influential enemies,” and selling Russian assets to local owners.
• He highlights the awkward position of billionaires: “Many try to sit on the fence by making pacifist statements while their companies aid the Russian military,” citing Oleg Deripaska, who calls for peace while his businesses make armored vehicles.
• Amid this climate, “the overwhelming majority of Russia’s billionaires have chosen a strategy of silence. The maximum demonstration of loyalty… is sending humanitarian aid to the front or to affected Russian regions—preferably on the quiet.”
• Khachaturov concludes, “wartime survival strategies may vary, but together they increasingly signal an end to Russia’s oligarchs: something Putin has sought ever since he began his reign a quarter of a century ago,” as fortunes are redistributed to the state or loyal insiders.

“What Russian Activists Do When They Can’t Criticize Putin,” Nataliya Vasilyeva, New York Times, 11.17.25. 

• Vasilyeva reports that as the Kremlin escalates repression, opposition-minded Russians who remain in the country “are trying to keep politically active in whatever causes they can, whether that’s recycling, clean air or parking,” since “the room for politics in Russia has shrunk a lot, but some opportunities are still there.”
• After the invasion of Ukraine, “people who spoke out about civilian deaths… were thrown into prison,” while even low-level acts like street musicians performing “banned” songs or election observers monitoring votes have resulted in jail terms.
• Opposition figures like Boris Nadezhdin and Yulia Galyamina have adapted by organizing petitions on “seemingly innocuous subjects” or coaching local activism, with Nadezhdin stating, “My job is to show that we are here and our voices should be heard.”
• Some former national activists, such as Nikolai Lyaskin, have shifted to non-political topics, saying, “I would love to be able to say what I want, but right now, I can only talk about recycling and landfills—and I will be doing that,” because “we have to do what is not banned… to stay collectively sane.”
• Despite increased risks, low-level activism “helps many Russians channel their grievances and feel at least some ‘political agency,’” according to researchers, but arrests of even cautious liberals like Yabloko’s Maxim Kruglov show the Kremlin now targets any perceived threat, even from the most careful critics.

“In Putin’s Russia, Even Lawyers Aren’t Safe,” Anna Conkling, Foreign Policy, 11.10.25.  

• According to OVD-Info, “in 2024, 22 human rights defenders in Russia faced politically motivated criminal charges,” and “the total instances of imprisonment in 2024 increased by 25% compared to 2023, while the number of people taken to pretrial detention increased by 185%.”
• Conkling reports, “as of Dec. 9, 2024, 2,976 people in Russia and the annexed Ukrainian cities of Crimea and Sevastopol faced prosecution for political reasons, while 1,407 people were detained or incarcerated for political reasons at that time.”
• Human rights lawyer Alexander warns, “the very concept of attorney-client privilege has disappeared.”
• Conkling notes, “One of the most common criminal charges…against critics, including lawyers, is spreading ‘false information’ about the Russian military” and cites cases where lawyers were imprisoned for anti-war speech or legal defense.
• Stanislav, a human rights lawyer in St. Petersburg, states, “Now, I think twice before sharing any information about my cases with whomever, and I updated instructions to my close circle in case of my arrest.”

“The lost dreams of a better Russia—voices from the perestroika generation,” Quentin Peel, Financial Times, 11.13.25.  

• Quentin Peel writes, “Three new books by Russian critics of Putin—children at the time of perestroika—seek to analyze what happened, why he has become the most powerful Russian dictator since Joseph Stalin, and whether pro-democracy protests have a chance of bringing change. Their stories are not encouraging.”
• According to Mikhail Zygar in *The Dark Side of the Earth*, “The Soviet Union fell when belief in communism ran dry…Thirty years ago, many Russians lost faith in anything at all.”
• Jana Bakunina reflects in The Good Russian: “To Putin and his followers, ‘good’ means sending troops to Ukraine… ‘Good’ is interfering with elections in the West… ‘Good’ is instilling fear as a way to gain respect.”
• Maria Alyokhina writes in Political Girl: “‘Abandon Russia’ is the expression for it now. Two words that don’t fit in my head, tear at my heart, make my body clench in a corner: Abandon Russia.”
• Peel notes, “Putin calls it ‘a natural and necessary self-cleansing of society [that] will only strengthen our country.’ He could scarcely be further from the truth. The ones who are leaving are the Good Russians.”

Defense and aerospace:

• “How strong is the Russian army?” Inside Defense, The Economist (host: Shashank Joshi, guest: Former British defense attaché to Moscow and Kyiv John Foreman), 11.11.25. Podcast.
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“What Putin Owes Venezuela,” Simon Shuster, Nancy A. Youssef, Gisela Salim-Peyer, The Atlantic, 11.12.25.  

• Shuster, Youssef, and Salim-Peyer write that despite Maduro’s boastful rhetoric about the Venezuela–Russia partnership, Kremlin officials have made clear there is no obligation to defend Venezuela militarily if the U.S. escalates its campaign.
• The toll of the Ukraine war has diminished Russia’s capacity to assist allies abroad; as Armenian, Syrian, and Iranian leaders recently discovered, Moscow’s willingness and ability to intervene is limited by the demands and depletions from fighting in Ukraine.
• Although Russia supplies military hardware and investment to Venezuela—including a potential October shipment of advanced Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E air defense systems—analysts caution that Russia is unlikely to sacrifice resources critical to its own security or the continuation of its war effort.
• The authors note that Russian support for Caracas might involve supplying drones or electronic warfare equipment if U.S. forces threatened Venezuela, but Moscow’s main focus remains homeland defense, and further support appears uncertain.
• They conclude that, for all of Maduro’s public affection for Putin and the history of arms deals, Venezuela may find itself alone if a direct confrontation with the U.S. looms, just as previous Russian clients have been left to fend for themselves.

“Jihadism and Russia: a toxic mix in the Sahel,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 11.16.25.

• The editorial board writes, “In France’s place came Russian mercenaries promising protection for the junta and defeat of a dogged Islamist insurgency,” but “the Russians have brought neither peace nor stability” to Mali.
• “Russian mercenaries, initially with Wagner and now with its replacement Africa Corps, have been linked with human rights abuses. In Mali, Russians have shown scant appetite for countering the Bamako siege and more for protecting gold mines.”
• The editors warn that Sahelian countries risk “swapping one kind of imperialism for another,” as Russian intervention replaces French influence amid growing instability.
• With Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger severing ties with France, the UN, and the U.S., “Russian involvement has coincided with increasing isolation of these regimes” and growing regional insecurity.
• The FT board observes that “one area where [Europe] might profitably engage is by finding online strategies to counter the kind of Russian disinformation that has channeled youth frustration into anti-western, pro-military sentiment.”

Energoatom corruption scandal in Ukraine:

“Bags of cash and a gold toilet: the corruption crisis engulfing Zelenskyy’s government,” Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 11.13.25. 

• Deprez reports that law enforcement uncovered lavish evidence—including bags of cash and a golden toilet—while investigating a $100 million kickback scheme by senior officials tied to defense contracts for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
• The scandal has destabilized Zelenskyy’s inner circle, forcing the president to demand resignations from top ministers and impose sanctions on close associate Timur Mindich, identified as a “co-organizer” who ran a “laundry room” to launder illicit funds… He controlled the work of the so-called ‘laundry room’, where criminally-obtained funds were laundered,” Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (Nabu) said. Mindich could not immediately be reached for comment.
• Despite the swerve in Zelenskyy’s approach, his response has been criticized as hesitant, while politicians are braced for further revelations that could further harm close allies of the man leading Ukraine through its brutal conflict with Russia.
• He controlled the work of the so-called ‘laundry room’, where criminally-obtained funds were laundered,” Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (Nabu) said. Mindich could not immediately be reached for comment.
• The anti-corruption agencies NABU and SAPO demonstrated institutional resilience, but activists warn their independence remains fragile, as law enforcement loyal to Zelenskyy has tried to pressure and detain anti-corruption detectives.
• Civil society and opposition parties urge systemic reform but stop short of demanding Zelenskyy’s resignation, citing the risks of political crisis during war; analysts warn further revelations could bring even greater instability to Ukraine’s leadership.

“Zelenskyy's Image Is Stained as Corruption Inquiry Shakes Inner Circle,” Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 11.15.25. 

• Kramer reports that a sweeping corruption investigation has reached Zelenskyy’s inner circle, threatening his carefully cultivated reputation as an anti-corruption reformer and damaging his support at home and abroad.
• Ukrainian investigators allege a criminal scheme led by Zelenskyy’s longtime business partner Timur Mindich laundered $100 million from the state nuclear power company, prompting the president to call for the resignation of two ministers and back sanctions on Mindich.
• Despite repeated statements in support of law enforcement, Zelenskyy faces mounting criticism for attempts earlier this year to limit the independence of anti-corruption agencies investigating the case, a move he reversed only under mass protest.
• Critics argue Zelenskyy now presides over a small, closed circle of power and accuse him of tolerating undue influence by figures like Mindich, undermining his earlier promises to sweep away oligarchic politics.
• The president’s response—condemning the alleged fraud and breaking ties with implicated officials—has been seen as reactive, coming only after a steady drip of revelations from Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau.
• While not directly implicated, Zelenskyy’s image has suffered from the association, especially as the allegations hit at a time of national hardship when Ukrainians endure rolling blackouts and economic distress amid war.
• Opposition parties and foreign partners are watching Zelenskyy’s handling of the scandal closely, with Germany’s foreign minister calling for a “decisive fight against corruption” as questions grow about the durability of Western support for his government.

“Corruption scandal in Ukraine stokes E.U. unease over aid,” Ellen Francis, Washington Post, 11.15.25. 

• Francis writes, “A corruption scandal engulfing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is casting an ominous shadow over plans by European nations to send Ukraine a big influx of money and over Kyiv’s bid to join the European Union.”
• The scandal “involv[es] kickbacks at Ukraine’s state nuclear power company and implicating a close friend and former business partner of Zelenskyy’s,” which has “revived concerns about European money being siphoned off by graft instead of helping Kyiv defend against Russia’s invasion.”
• German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said after calling Zelenskyy, “We expect Ukraine to press ahead with anti-corruption measures and reforms in its own country.”
• Guillaume Mercier, a spokesman for the European Commission, stated the E.U. is “closely watching the probe in Kyiv” and that Ukraine must “safeguard its independent anti-corruption agencies” and “ensure the integrity of all energy-related financial support.”
• The article notes, “Over the summer, Zelenskyy’s office tried and failed to effectively neuter those watchdogs, triggering mass protests in Ukraine and rare public condemnation from Brussels. He eventually backed down from his efforts to curtail the independence of the agencies.”
• After the scandal broke, Zelenskyy “requested the resignation” of Energy Minister Svitlana Grynchuk and Justice Minister German Galushchenko, while Tmyur Mindich, “the president’s former business partner who was implicated as a central figure in the scheme, has fled the country.”
• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, a vocal critic, commented on social media: “A wartime mafia network with countless ties to President Zelenskyy has been exposed. This is the chaos into which the Brusselian elite want to pour European taxpayers’ money.”

“Major Corruption Scandal Undermines Ukraine’s War Effort,” Alexandra Sharp, Foreign Policy, 11.13.25. 

• Sharp reports that an independent investigation uncovered a sweeping corruption scheme involving Ukrainian politicians and elites receiving kickbacks from contractors protecting energy infrastructure, resulting in five arrests and seven more suspects.
• The scandal allegedly involves as much as $100 million in embezzled funds, with President Zelenskyy calling for the resignation of his justice and energy ministers and sanctioning close associates, including longtime friend Timur Mindich, said to be the scheme’s ringleader.
• Analysts warn the scandal could hamper Kyiv’s ability to defend against Russian airstrikes and severely undermine both domestic unity and support from international allies, especially as Ukraine faces a critical winter of expected attacks.
• Zelenskyy’s handling of the probe is under scrutiny amid earlier attempts to curb anti-corruption agencies’ independence, which led to mass protests and criticism from the EU, despite a recent European Commission report noting Ukraine’s “limited progress” on graft.
• The scandal is being seized on by Kremlin-aligned figures such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who argues it’s proof that EU aid for Ukraine is being stolen, fueling external calls to halt support for Kyiv.

Other Ukraine-related commentary:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Russia is winning the battle for influence in Georgia against the E.U.,” Mary Ilyushina, The Washington Post, 11.11.25.  

• The European Commission reported, “The Georgian authorities have imposed repressive measures against civil society, media representatives and opposition leaders that severely undermine democratic processes and effectively abolish civic participation and the system of checks and balances.”
• Georgia’s president Salome Zourabichvili wrote, “‘Russian handbook at work: new accusations leveled by the General Prosecutor against almost all opposition leaders—sabotage, plotting to topple the government, serving foreign interests—carrying sentences of up to 11 years.’”
• Tinatin Akhvlediani of the Center for European Policy Studies observes, “They are targeting the idea of Georgia being independent and moving toward European integration…  Anyone who suggests the contrary or that the country is not part of the Russian sphere of influence ‘is being simply targeted.’”
• Shalva Papuashvili, a senior Georgian Dream member, stated that opposition parties pose “a real threat to the constitutional order.”
• Akhvlediani concludes, “This is called state capture, as in Georgia we basically have a one-party parliament and this is not a democracy.”

“As the U.S. eases sanctions on Belarus, is it time for the EU to rethink its approach?” Natalya Kovaleva, Chatham House, 11.13.25.

• Kovaleva reports that on Nov. 4 , the U.S. eased sanctions on Belarus—including measures targeting the national airline and the presidential aircraft—in response to the selective release of political prisoners.
• The author warns, “To think that recent amnesties of political prisoners are acts of genuine goodwill by the Belarusian regime would be a grave misconception”; many freed individuals were forcibly exiled or deported.
• Lukashenka’s move to re-engage with the U.S. is seen as an attempt to restore trade, gain legitimacy, and increase leverage with Moscow, but Kovaleva notes Belarus remains deeply reliant on Russian economic and security support.
• While the Trump administration’s negotiations have led to the release of hundreds of prisoners, over 1,200 remain behind bars and discussions continue in the EU about toughening sanctions in response to recent provocations.
• The author argues that the EU’s approach of total isolation risks “strategic short-sightedness,” and limited engagement focused on humanitarian and civil society issues could help Brussels remain connected with the Belarusian people.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Minsk in Moscow’s grip: How Russia subjugated Belarus without annexation,” Hanna Liubakova, Atlantic Council, 11.13.25. 

Footnotes

1. Also see a recent profile of Karaganov: “The Men Behind Vladimir Putin’s Forever War,” Adam Dixon, The National Interest, 11.11.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: A damaged power plant is seen after Russia's recent missile and drone attacks, in an undisclosed location in Ukraine, Thursday, Nov. 13, 2025. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)