This Week’s Highlights

• The assumptions that shaped Putin’s deeply immoral decision to invade Ukraine were based on “prewar data” that seemed solid at the time, but that ultimately proved wrong, according to Mark Cancian. “Putin’s decision was rational, though risky, like all judgments to go to war. He gambled and lost, but that did not make him irrational,” Cancian writes.
• Phillips Payson O’Brien and Edward Stringer argue the Russian air force has failed in the Ukraine war and that this “failure is perhaps the most important story of the military conflict.” In contrast, a RAND study has found Russian airpower played a decisive role in reversing the fortunes of the Assad regime in Syria.
• The U.S. is expanding its goals in Ukraine and that's dangerous, according to Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge. “Crippling Russia's military or expelling Russia from Ukraine are significantly ... dangerous aims” because, if Putin “begins to think that his back is against the wall, he may lash out by directly confronting NATO,” they warn.
• Edward Luce senses the mood in Washington shifting “from a tone of caution to one of bragging,” while Mark Davis sees “early stages of Ukraine fatigue” dawning on America.
• When the time for talks on Ukraine comes, the negotiating sides will need to look beyond territory and neutrality, making more trade-offs possible to secure an agreement, according to Jonathan Powell. “That requires a serious discussion with Russia about new security arrangements in Europe,” Powell writes. Gordon Adams concurs, arguing that “only a Europe-wide arrangement will ensure that all of the countries feel genuinely secure.”

• The West should not pursue a Marshall Plan for Ukraine, according to Benn Steil. “Long-term, credible internal and external security is a precondition for a successful Marshall Plan in Ukraine, and that the United States and its allies are incapable of providing it,” according to Steil. Meanwhile, Bhaskar Chakravorti believes the Western efforts to support Ukraine should feature an increase in orders for IT companies. “This may be the first war where sending work to a war zone might make as much sense as sending military assistance,” according to Chakravorti.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“In Ukraine, Justice Is Possible for Wartime Rape Victims. But It Won’t Be Easy,” Charli Carpenter, World Politics Review, 05.06.22. The author, an International Security Program research fellow at the Belfer Center, writes:

• “There are three important reasons to believe that the systemic mass rape allegations in Ukraine are highly likely to be evaluated by U.N. war crimes investigators and prosecuted in war crimes courts.”
  1. “First, while it is unlikely that Russia would try its own soldiers or that the Security Council would be able to set up an ad hoc tribunal, given Russia’s veto power, the ICC has already asserted jurisdiction over today’s conflict, since Ukraine had previously accepted ICC jurisdiction over the earlier conflict in the Donbas.”
  2. “Unlike the conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and Congo, which were civil wars where the state had already collapsed, this conflict includes a Ukrainian state that is operating at strength, with agencies such as the human rights ombudsman’s office focused on providing a secure means for survivors to report crimes.”
  3. “Mass wartime sexual violence fits with the popular imagination about this war as an existential struggle to defend a nation against aggression by another. In important ways, wartime rape serves as a metaphor for the war itself. This makes it more politically acceptable for victims to report violations and also generates political will for trials. One reason the Ukrainian government makes it easier for these particular women to speak out is precisely because these allegations have propaganda value.”
• “Female victims of systematic rape by Russian forces deserve every ounce of justice they can get, and fortunately they may be likelier than any other war-affected population in history to get it. But other, more hidden victims of sexual violence in this and other wars deserve justice, too. Rules and institutions have come a long way in the past few decades, and justice may be in sight for victims of the most systematic crimes. But when it comes to gender-based violence in war, there is much more to be done.”

“Our Hypocrisy on War Crimes,” Fintan O’Toole, New York Review of Books, 05.26.22. The author, a Princeton professor and columnist for The Irish Times, writes:

• “Putin’s great weakness in this linguistic struggle [about the Ukraine war] is the unsubtle absurdity of his claims… But the weakness of the West, and especially of the United States, lies in what ought to be the biggest strength of its case against Putin: the idea of war crimes.”
• “[T]he U.S. has been, for far too long, fatally ambivalent about war crimes. Its own history of moral evasiveness threatens to make the accusation that Putin and his forces have committed them systematically in Ukraine seem more like a useful weapon against an enemy than an assertion of universal principle.” 
• “It is hard to overstate how important it is that the war crimes that have undoubtedly been committed already in Ukraine—and the ones that are grimly certain to be inflicted on innocent people in the coming weeks and months—not be understood as ‘a flexible instrument in the hands of politicians.’”
• “[A] fortnight before the first reports from Bucha, Biden was calling Putin, in unscripted remarks, a ‘war criminal.’ At that point, he in fact seemed a little unsure about the wisdom of making the charge—…civilian casualties from aerial assaults by drones, rockets and bombs are a sore subject in recent U.S. military history. … Biden’s careless use of the term [‘genocide’] is all the more damaging because, however inadvertently, it echoes Putin’s grotesque claim that Ukraine has been committing genocide against Russian speakers in Donbas.”
• “What makes these mistakes by Biden truly detrimental, however, is that the moral standing of the U.S. on war crimes is already so profoundly compromised. The test for anyone insisting on the application of a set of rules is whether they apply those rules to themselves. It matters deeply to the struggle against Putin that the U.S. face its record of having consistently failed to do this. … Russia and the U.S. [b]oth signed the Rome statute [creating the International Criminal Court]… And both then failed to ratify it.”

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“The Biggest Reason Russia’s Military Is Struggling,” Phillips Payson O’Brien and Edward Stringer, Atlantic, 05.09.22. The authors, a professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews and a senior fellow at Policy Exchange, write:

• “The Russian air force’s failure is perhaps the most important, but least discussed, story of the military conflict so far.”
• “The Russian air force continues to suffer from flawed logistics operations and the lack of regular, realistic training. Above all, the autocratic Russian kleptocracy does not trust low-ranking and middle-ranking officers, and so cannot allow the imaginative, flexible decision making that NATO air forces rely upon.”
• “As long as the airspace over the field of battle remains contested, the Ukrainians will be able to improve and expand their use of airpower.”

“Growing evidence of a military disaster on the Donets pierces a pro-Russian bubble,” Anton Troianovski and Marc Santora, NYT, 05.15.22. The authors, Moscow bureau chief and international news editor for the news outlet, write:

• “The destruction wreaked on a Russian battalion as it tried to cross a river in northeastern Ukraine last week is emerging as among the deadliest engagements of the war, with estimates based on publicly available evidence now suggesting that well over 400 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded.”
• “And as the scale of what happened comes into sharper focus, the disaster appears to be breaking through the Kremlin’s tightly controlled information bubble. Perhaps most striking, the Russian battlefield failure is resonating with a stable of pro-Russian war bloggers—some of whom are embedded with troops on the front line—who have reliably posted to the social network Telegram with claims of Russian success and Ukrainian cowardice.”
• “On May 11, the Russian command reportedly sent about 550 troops of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army to cross the Donets River at Bilohorivka, in the eastern Luhansk region, in a bid to encircle Ukrainian forces near Rubizhne. Satellite images reveal that Ukrainian artillery destroyed several Russian pontoon bridges and laid waste to a tight concentration of Russian troops and equipment around the river. The Institute for the Study of War, citing analyses based on the publicly available imagery, indicated that there could have been as many as 485 Russian soldiers killed or wounded and more than 80 pieces of equipment destroyed ... If the estimates that hundreds of soldiers were killed or injured prove accurate, it would be one of the deadliest known engagements of the war.”

“Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part 1,” Naveen Shaaban Abdalla, Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian Gustafson, Dan Lomas and Steven Wagner, War on the Rocks, 05.11.22. The authors of the report write:

• “Historically, intelligence success often came in lockstep with secrecy. More than any other event in the last fifty years, the Russian invasion of Ukraine drives home the degree to which this is no longer true. In his seminal study of intelligence success and failure, Erik Dahl observed that for intelligence to be useful it should be both precise and actionable. As he noted, ‘precise tactical intelligence, and strong policymaker receptivity toward intelligence—are necessary for the prevention of a surprise attack.’”
• “The public awareness of warning intelligence is littered with horror stories of failures of precision, actionability, and receptivity. The current crisis stands apart as a moment when all three of these requirements for effective warning meshed almost seamlessly. The quality and timeliness of the assessments did not, of course, deter Putin’s cloistered siloviki coterie enough to prevent the war. But it did give time to prepare across a range of military and political fronts, to marshal alliances and partnerships, and allowed both Ukraine and the Western powers to go into the current crisis forearmed because they were forewarned.”
• “Another important insight is that it is as important to learn from intelligence success as from failure, juxtaposing and interrogating both in concert. There will be a temptation, in the wake of the current crisis, to take the warning success of the Ukraine invasion for granted because that’s how it ought to work. In fact, the recent warning success warrants just as exhaustive and revelatory a post-mortem as the worst warning failures, in order to glean every single lesson and insight that can help prepare us for the next crisis, even the next war. Because they will come, sooner or later.”

Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:

“To Really Hurt Russia’s Economy, Target Investment and Human Capital, Not Gas,” Seth Gordon Benzell, War on the Rocks, 05.10.22. The author, an assistant professor of management science at Chapman University, writes:

• “So long as the West can’t physically evacuate the projects that it has built in Russia or otherwise render them unavailable, the Russian economy will continue to plug along, and sanctions can only do so much.”
• “The longer the war goes on, the more the Russian government can react to and ameliorate the lack of foreign investment.”
• “Rather than viewing Russians who want to move their money and lives abroad with suspicion (a policy that will inevitably place burdens on the innocent), the West should work to encourage this ongoing drain of Russian money and capital. ... [T]he West should be doing what it can to accelerate the emigration of Russia’s best and brightest. Things are bad for Russia’s economy now, but it would be in even worse shape without the disgruntled but technically sophisticated Muscovites who Putin despises.”

Ukraine-related negotiations:

“A negotiation plan to help Ukraine avoid catastrophe,” Jonathan Powell, FT, 05.11.22. The author, chief executive of the Inter Mediate charity, writes:

• “This is not the time for negotiations in Ukraine. But a window of opportunity will open and we need to be ready when it does.”
• “We need to consider a new structure for the negotiations. This conflict cannot be solved by Ukraine alone, nor should we return to the failed Normandy format, with France and Germany at the table alongside the two protagonists. The U.S. will have to use leverage. Only Washington can provide what Putin wants in terms of security architecture and a seat at the top table.”
• “In the case of Ukraine, we need to enlarge the question beyond territory and neutrality, making more trade-offs possible to secure an agreement. That requires a serious discussion with Russia about new security arrangements in Europe, including a new conventional forces agreement, a new intermediate nuclear force agreement and a new relationship between NATO and Russia.”
• “We need pressure on Putin through military force and sanctions but we also need a way out for him—one that we can accept.”

“We don’t write the rules anymore, and when we try, we make things worse,” Gordon Adams, Responsible Statecraft, 05.14.22. The author, a distinguished fellow at the Quincy Institute, writes:

• “We know this war will end at some point. … So we will be left with option three when the shooting stops—a stalemate. Russia holding Crimea and Mariupol, as well as much of the eastern Donbas region. It’s the same situation we were in before the shooting started—half the country occupied, Russia prepared to make more trouble, the U.S. and NATO funneling more arms to Kyiv and even more fervent dedication to arming up at the borders. Not a recipe for long-term regional stability.”
• “This is the point at which the rules need to change; where the U.S. needs to recognize the need for new rules, new solutions if the region is to have a stable security regime ... Only a Europe-wide arrangement will ensure that all of the countries feel genuinely secure. … The security of all will require a new framework for conventional military forces in Europe. This could build on the framework provided by the now-discarded Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, with new targets limiting conventional forces, especially in border zones.”
• “There would need to be a new agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, restricting Russian deployments within range of its neighbors and possibly including a U.S. pledge to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, something the Russians have sought.”
• “There would need to be new confidence-building measures—inspections, observers, notifications of military deployments and exercises, and information exchanges. … There could be a dispute-resolution process for contested areas like the Donbas, Transnistria, even Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. … Most important, the Europe-wide security arrangement would need a new institution. ... It could be a major renegotiation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.”

“Endless war in Ukraine hurts national and global security,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, WP 05.11.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “As the violence continues, the war fever rises, and we had better be clear about our objectives. A commitment to a long, grinding proxy war with Russia would have severe consequences not only for the Ukrainian people but also for the security interests of the United States and its allies.”
• “Inevitably, the continuing conflict strengthens hawks in both the United States and Russia—and makes any settlement more difficult. To justify the growing costs, each must rouse patriotic fervor and emphasize the stakes. Nuclear arsenals loom in the backdrop. For the decades of the Cold War, Washington and its allies worked to avoid a war with Russia, standing by even as Russia suppressed independence movements in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. So for officials to now comment about permanently weakening Russia is reckless in the extreme.”
• “It is vital to step back from the emotions stirred by war and assess our real security priorities. … Ukraine’s resistance has captured our attention and our sympathy, but its importance might be better calculated in relation to these other matters.”
• “If Russia conquers the whole of Donbas, as now seems Vladimir Putin’s intent, Moscow may well be readier to talk about a settlement. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the United States and NATO would have to decide whether to encourage negotiations. … Any settlement would no doubt demand withdrawal of Russian forces, probably in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality and territorial integrity, recognition of Russia’s control of Crimea, and some kind of federated status for the separatist provinces in Eastern Ukraine. And sanctions would no doubt need to be lifted.”
• “The United States and its allies should make clear now to Zelensky, Russia, China and India—that is, acknowledging the geopolitics of a future security architecture—that we welcome a settlement that preserves the sovereignty of Ukraine but that also ends the war sooner rather than later. That is our real security interest.”

“How Track 2 Diplomacy Might Help Ease Russian-Ukraine Tension,” Sarah Dorr, Jordan Center, 05.13.22. The author, director of professional development at the International Studies Association, writes:

• “Because of the current isolation of Russians across so many sectors, providing spaces for  people to connect in spite of the underlying conflict has become even more critical to conflict resolution. As Oslo showed, unofficial interactions within these spaces can help build and reinforce relationships, and in doing so, form the foundation for future conflict resolution. And when faced with the sort of bloodshed seen in Ukraine, why wouldn’t all tools be tried?”

“At the start, at least, Track 2 approaches, whether in academic, diplomatic or business sectors, will directly encounter discomfort.  But moving through that discomfort perhaps allows for the building of relationships that humanize conflict impacts and may lead to de-escalation and conflict resolution.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Putin’s Invasion Was Immoral but Not Irrational,” Mark F. Cancian, CSIS, 05.10.22. The author, a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program, writes:

• “With the evident failure of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many experts have jumped to explain why Putin’s invasion was doomed to fail. … Evaluating Putin’s decision requires capturing what was known at the time, not what became evident later. Putin’s decision was rational, though risky, like all judgments to go to war. He gambled and lost, but that did not make him irrational.”
• “Here are five key assumptions behind the Russian invasion the proved wrong but were based on solid prewar data.”
  • “Assumption #1: Ukraine was deeply divided and would not provide a unified or effective response.”
  • “Assumption #2: Zelensky was a weak leader.”
  • “Assumption #3: The Russian armed forces were highly effective.”
  • “Assumption #4: The Ukrainian military was weak.”
  • “Assumption #5: The United States and NATO would be slow and limited in supplying weapons to Ukraine.”
• “None of these five assumptions turned out to be valid once the war began. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to look back on Putin’s decision and dismiss it as obviously flawed. ... Even when all these assumptions proved wrong, the war was a near-run thing. … Russia might have succeeded. In the event, Putin failed, but failure was not inevitable.”
• “It is critical to get this right for next time when the stakes might be even higher. Putin or some future Russian leader might make a similar calculation about an invasion of the Baltic states, China about invading Taiwan, North Korea about invading South Korea, or Iran about attacking its neighbors. … Postwar assessments must avoid excuses and take a hard look at why Putin―a smart and successful politician―saw opportunity while outsiders, looking at the same data, expected failure.”

“No Marshall Plan For Ukraine,” Benn Steil, FA, 05.13.22. The author, director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “Ukraine’s remarkable courage and will to resist foreign aggression have earned it enormous respect and admiration around the world. The country will, however, never attract large-scale investment while it remains under the shadow of a hostile Russia, which is willing and able to unleash devastation at a moment’s notice. Whereas the creation of NATO was integral to the success of the Marshall Plan, ending the prospect of Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO is a stated Russian war aim. Unless the United States is willing to escalate all the way to nuclear confrontation with Russia, it will never be able to neutralize the ongoing threat to Ukraine and its economy.”
• “The regrettable but inescapable conclusion is that long-term, credible internal and external security is a precondition for a successful Marshall Plan in Ukraine, and that the United States and its allies are incapable of providing it.”
• “When it comes to making a Marshall Plan, there are simply no substitutes for auspicious geography and donors willing and able to deter or defeat determined opponents. The Marshall countries had both. Ukraine, sadly, has neither.”

“What the CIA thinks: William Burns on the new world disorder,” Edward Luce, FT, 05.13.22. The author, U.S. national editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “So far, U.S. intelligence’s record has been very good. … But finding where Putin’s ultimate red line might lie is a matter of guesswork. It is conceivable that even Putin, who shows few signs of having upgraded the quality of his own intelligence—which has been as bad as Ukraine’s has been good—does not know his own trigger points.”
• “It is hard to escape the impression that Washington’s mood has shifted from a tone of caution to one of bragging. This is the last thing [CIA director William] Burns wants. ‘It is irresponsible,’ he said. ... This is especially true when your nuclear-armed opponent is dropping escalatory hints thick and fast, as Putin and his officials have increasingly been doing. Though Burns says U.S. intelligence has not detected concrete signs that Putin is deploying tactical nuclear weapons, this could change at any moment.”
• “The idea that Russia should have its own sphere of interest, including Ukraine, and a veto over NATO expansion, seems repugnant in the face of Russia’s nakedly imperial land grab. … If Putin wins in Ukraine, the whole of Europe would be destabilized. But things will probably look different once Russia has been forced to acknowledge its military defeat, which seems likely to come to pass eventually. At that point, the U.S. will find itself in an unprecedented situation, where it confronts the world’s two other global military powers that are in an alliance of convenience against it.” 
• “Putin’s invasion has produced two strikingly different reactions around the world. … The west has rarely been more united. … Beyond the west, however, the world has given a collective shrug.”
• “Putin’s misuse of the past may come to look trivial compared with the radical uncertainty that hovers over everyone’s future.”

“The Ukraine Conflict Is Not About American Freedom,” Andrew J. Bacevich, The Nation, May 16/23, 2022 issue. The author, president of the Quincy Institute, writes:

• “Any person with a modicum of decency will hope and pray that Ukraine prevails in this hideous conflict. Yet while Americans should welcome the prospect of Ukrainian victory, the consequences for U.S. policy are unlikely to be cause for celebration.”
• “Most embarrassingly for American policy-makers, the failure of Putin’s ‘special operation’ exposes the overall Russian ‘threat’ as essentially fraudulent. Barring a suicidal nuclear attack, Russia poses no danger whatsoever to the United States. ... Even so, count on Washington to interpret the Russia-Ukraine War as demonstrating the imperative of militant American globalism.”
• “Reclaiming the mantle of military leadership ... is already justifying further increases in Pentagon spending. It may well revive the United States’ post–Cold War penchant for armed intervention. And most significantly, it is likely to provide a rationale for embarking upon a ‘new cold war’ with China.”
• “We have seen this movie before. The most recent version, dating from 9/11, ostensibly marked the end of America’s ‘holiday from history,’ the troops (if not the nation) thereafter marching off to a series of misguided wars. In Kabul in the summer of 2021, that movie reached its dismal conclusion. Now, when the credits have barely finished flickering across the screen, foreign policy insiders, having learned little and remembered even less, are proposing a sequel. Don’t expect them to foot the bill for producing it.”

“The U.S. is expanding its goals in Ukraine. That's dangerous,” Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, WP, 05.11.22. The authors, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati and an associate professor of security studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, write:

• “Crippling Russia's military or expelling Russia from Ukraine are significantly more dangerous aims than preventing the further loss of Ukrainian territory or, through limited offensive operations, gaining some of it back.”
• “Unfortunately, if Russian President Vladimir Putin begins to think that his back is against the wall, he may lash out by directly confronting NATO, intensifying the conventional war in the east, or even using nuclear weapons. … Moreover, building a Ukrainian army capable of the large-scale counteroffensives needed to expel Russia or profoundly degrade its military would almost certainly extend and intensify the war, leading to additional suffering.”
• “Going nuclear would be extremely dangerous for Putin. But if he believes that the West is trying to permanently weaken Russia, will never lift sanctions or even aims to topple his regime (despite repeated denials from Western policymakers), he may become willing to roll the dice. Putin could see escalation as a way to preserve the military as the basis of both his international clout and domestic security.”
• “More prosaically, the longer the war continues, the higher the probability that NATO and Russia will be drawn into direct conflict. … The reality is that neither total victory for Ukraine nor dismemberment of the Russian army is necessary for Western security.”
• “Effectively shaping a negotiated outcome to the war will also require the West to put diplomatic pressure on Kyiv to come to that deal sooner rather than later. This includes demonstrating a willingness to turn off the spigot of military aid if needed. The present tranche should be given time to work its effect, but its ultimate purpose should be to hasten the conclusion of a war that carries awful risks and tragic humanitarian consequences for all involved.”

“Russia’s Coming Great Power Struggle,” Max Bergmann, CSIS, 05.12.22. The author, director of the Europe Program at CSIS, writes:

• “The United States would be ill-advised to underestimate Russia’s resilience as President Obama did in 2014 when he declared Russia simply a ‘regional power.’ Given Russia’s geographic size, military and nuclear capacity, natural resources, and the ingenuity of its people, it is hard for Russia to not be a great power. Not a lot has to go right for Putin to demonstrate Russia’s global clout.”
• “The war in Ukraine could move in Russia’s direction or a possible negotiated settlement may present a path for Moscow to get out from under sanctions. China or other autocratic states in the Middle East or elsewhere may come to Russia’s aid. Russia will also inevitably find new and creative ways to make its influence felt and hit back at the West. Additionally, Russia will expect the impact of sanctions and export controls to fade over time without a concerted effort to monitor, update, and maintain sanctions. Maintaining restrictions will thus require enormous bureaucratic attention and energy, as well as extensive multilateral coordination, not just in 2022 but in the years ahead. Putin will thus bank on the West lacking the focus and energy to maintain the pressure. It is up to the West to prove him wrong.”

“Russia learns a hard lesson about the folly of war,” Gideon Rachman, FT 05.16.22. The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “There is now much talk about the incompetence of the Russian military. But perhaps no special explanation is required for its problems. In modern times, when major powers invade smaller countries they usually end up losing. America failed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq—and also beat humiliating retreats after smaller military interventions in Somalia and Lebanon. The Soviet Union failed in Afghanistan; and Russia is now failing in Ukraine.”
• “As the historian AJP Taylor later concluded: ‘Though the object of being a Great Power is to be able to fight a Great War, the only way of remaining a Great Power is not to fight one.’ That paradox is now being played out in full in Ukraine. Putin presided over a decade-long military build-up and then launched a war to reassert Russia’s status as a great power. Instead, Russia is likely to emerge from the war in Ukraine poorer, weaker and greatly diminished. Putin’s war is not just a crime. It is also a mistake.”

“Vladimir Putin’s Pyrrhic Choices in Ukraine,” Zalmay Khalilzad, NI, 05.15.22. The author, a former U.S. ambassador, writes:

• “If current trends continue, it seems likely that Putin will soon face three stark choices: First, stick with his current approach for the foreseeable future in hopes of eroding Ukrainian morale and resolve over time. And further, hoping that the West will grow tired of supporting Ukraine. … Second, Putin could decide to escalate. … The most serious form of escalation would be a limited nuclear strike aimed against Ukraine, against a NATO country or against the United States. … Third, he can accept a political settlement.”
• “The United States and its allies must seek to deter Russian escalation and, if deterrence fails, prevent it from succeeding. This means continuing to stand with and support Ukraine. ... On deterring the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Washington must indicate that such a step will bring retaliation such as obliterating a Russian formation in the Black Sea or targeting a major Russian land formation in Ukraine.”
• “On the military front, any use of nuclear weapons should result in the provision of weapons to Ukraine that up to this point have been held in abeyance, to include fighter aircraft, along with reconsideration of the establishment of a no-fly zone over government-controlled areas. … On the economic front, the use of nuclear weapons should result in cutting the remaining parts of the Central Bank of Russia from the SWIFT system and a total ban on the import of Russian goods and services including oil and gas.”
• “A less risky option for ending the war is to help Putin come to terms with his military defeat. ... Conversely, in exchange for ending the war and returning to a status quo ante, without Ukraine relinquishing its sovereignty, independence, or territory, Russia would receive international acceptance of its legitimate security concerns, including Ukraine’s already announced commitment not to seek NATO membership, and gradual removal of recently imposed sanctions.”

“We Must Make Sure Russia Finishes This War in a Worse Position Than Before,” Nigel Gould-Davies, NYT, 05.12.22. The author, the senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, writes:

• “The West needs to guarantee that Russia is worse off than it was before the invasion.”
• “At a minimum, Western policy should ensure that Russia gains no new Ukrainian territory and continues to face severe sanctions until it fundamentally changes its policy toward Ukraine ... A bold approach to sanctions would be to start with the assumption that Russia should be completely isolated from access to Western economies, and then carve out necessary exceptions, rather than subtract transactions from the status quo.”
• “The West should also engage the wider international community in support of this agenda of sovereignty and independence from imperialist aggression. This means not only that Congress should pass the $40 billion military support package that President Biden has requested, but also that Europe should follow suit.”
• “Fear of Russian escalation should not constrain the West from taking these steps. ... The argument that ‘Russia will use nuclear weapons unless it is allowed to gain from the war’ does not deter Ukraine from fighting. It should not deter the West from giving it the means to do so.”

“America Must Embrace the Goal of Ukrainian Victory,” Alexander Vindman, FA, 05.11.22. The author, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, writes:

• “Short of direct intervention, the United States can prevent further massacres of Ukrainian civilians and further destruction of the country only by supplying more lethal aid.”
• “Peace in Ukraine must—and will—come only through Kyiv’s victory, not its capitulation.”
• “A long-term Ukrainian victory will ... require both the country’s greater integration into Europe and a monumental international campaign to help rebuild Ukraine, akin to the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II.”
• “This long-term vision for victory will not be realized, however, until security is reestablished and guaranteed in Ukraine. If peace will come only on the heels of a military breakthrough, then the United States has an obligation to help Ukraine win on the battlefield.”

“NATO entry for Finland and Sweden will enhance European security,” Alexander Stubb, FT, 05.11.22. The author, a former prime minister of Finland, writes:

• “Russia’s attack on Ukraine has had many unintended consequences. One of them is that Finland and Sweden will be joining NATO this year. The official path towards membership will begin with an announcement by Sauli Niinisto, the president of Finland, expected on Thursday. Sweden will follow within days. A joint expression of intent to join NATO is expected early next week.”
• “The only thing Putin understands is power. Show any weakness and he will attack, as we have seen in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. On the other side stand some 40 European states that believe in peace, cooperation and democracy. Each one of them has the sovereign right to choose whether they want to join NATO or the EU, or to form alternative forms of partnership with both. Security is not a zero-sum game. I hope that the Russian regime will one day understand this, too. This will allow us to re-establish good relations with Russia. In the meantime, we will help to maximize security in Europe by joining NATO. It is not against anyone, but for us. All of us.”

“Finland’s Big NATO Step; Helsinki wants in, and accepting it would make the alliance stronger,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 05.12.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Expanding any alliance takes planning, but welcoming Finland and Sweden makes good strategic and military sense. Their location in Northern Europe would be critical during a conflict with Russia in the Baltic Sea.”
• “In a better world, NATO wouldn’t need to exist. But Russia’s brutality in Ukraine has exposed as a dangerous fantasy the post-Cold War hope of a Europe at peace for all time. Democracies need to improve and adapt their defenses to deter proliferating threats, and expanding NATO to accept its two northern friends is a prudent step.”

“Ukraine Fatigue Is on the Rise,” Mark Davis, Newsweek, 05.13.22. The author, a radio host, writes:

• “These are the early stages of Ukraine fatigue, and it has ramifications for America, Europe and the world. Our once-rapt attention to Russia's invasion now feels more like a passing daily interest, as news reports continue to offer images of the latest Putin atrocity or the most recent act of spirited Ukrainian resistance.”
• “It's not that we have lost our overall wish for Putin to be thwarted in his designs to absorb Ukraine back into Mother Russia; but as the weeks pass, as inspiring as the Ukrainian resistance has been, more Americans are starting to wonder about the cost and duration of our involvement.”
• “This should be a proper environment for principled debate, but that's been made difficult by hot takes from both sides seeking to insult opponents. The goal of helping Ukraine stave off Russian aggression remains noble. But voters focused on an ailing domestic landscape are primed to run out of patience with repeated entreaties for further billions of taxpayer dollars spent toward a standoff with no end in sight.”

“Is religion the new divide between Russia and the west?” Tony Barber, FT, 05.14.22. The author, Europe editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “The Argentine-born pope spoke out in uncompromising language against the war. Francis said the atrocities in Ukraine, attributed to Russian forces, recalled the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s. He also warned Kirill not to turn into ‘Putin’s altar boy.’”
• “These remarks drew a scolding rebuke from the Moscow patriarchy, underlining that Putin’s war has exposed sharp differences between the Roman Catholic Church and the official Russian branch of Orthodox Christianity.”
• “Under Kirill, the church hierarchy is taking up cudgels on Putin’s behalf and arguing that Russia is defending Orthodox Christianity against a godless, degenerate west. This is more than mere propaganda. For Kirill, it is a sacred cause. For Putin, it is a political project that, he calculates, will gain strength from the long Orthodox tradition of nurturing an obedient patriotic citizenry.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?” David Sacks, FA, 05.16.22. The author, a research fellow at CFR, writes:

• “Given the increasing alignment between Russia and China, the United States cannot rule out that Russia would offer significant assistance to China during a conflict over Taiwan, including arms, energy, food and intelligence. The United States should also assume Russia would seek to distract it from any fight against China by conducting cyberattacks or seeking to destabilize Europe. In their remarkable Feb. 4 joint statement that established a ‘no limits’ friendship, China and Russia reaffirmed ‘their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests,’ and Russia agreed that ‘Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.’ China, which has backed Russia throughout the war in Ukraine, will expect to be repaid during a Taiwan conflict.”
• “The steps that Washington and Taipei should take to bolster deterrence must be carried out carefully, so as to avoid inadvertently sparking the conflict they are seeking to prevent. For starters, any stepped up coordination with Taiwan should be done quietly and kept out of the public eye. The United States and Taiwan should focus on how to increase Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities and eschew symbolism. Privately, the United States should emphasize to China that these moves are consistent with the U.S. one-China policy and are a response to the eroding balance of power in the Taiwan Strait that is caused by China’s military build-up. Publicly, the United States should underscore that it does not support Taiwan independence and its overriding interest is in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”
• “The unfolding war in Ukraine offers important lessons for China, Taiwan and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would fundamentally alter the world arrives.”

“Which Russia-China Relationship Will Emerge After the War?” Marcin Kaczmarski, ISPI, 05.09.22. The author, a lecturer in the School of Social & Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, writes:

• “At this stage, a breakup of the Sino-Russian relationship remains the least plausible option: Moscow cannot afford to lose its main strategic, economic, and political partner, while China benefits from Washington’s preoccupation with the war in Europe. What remains uncertain, however, is what role Beijing envisions for Russia.”
• “One possible scenario is that China may be tempted to capitalize on Russia’s weakness.”
• “A second likely scenario is one whereby the Chinese leadership pursues the current position of supporting Moscow only rhetorically while shying away from any serious economic assistance.”
• “A third, 'wild card' scenario is one with a potential domestic change within Russia that would open up space for a new arrangement between Russia and China. While skeptical voices within the Kremlin have been largely silenced for the last decade, dissatisfaction with the ‘junior partner’ role and fear of Chinese nationalism remain present among the Russian elite. A domestic change would provide an opportunity for the Russian elite to reassess the results of to-date policy and return to the long-held idea of diversifying Moscow’s policy in Asia, going beyond the ‘pivot to China.’”

“The Rise of Sino-Russian Biotech Cooperation,” Svitlana Lebedenko, FPRI, May 2022. The author, a Ph.D. researcher in the department of law at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Italy, writes:

• “After Feb. 24, 2022, Western sanctions and companies fleeing Russia will force Moscow to seek deeper cooperation with China in high-tech sectors. Russian biotech is not a self-sufficient industry and requires international partnerships to develop. But Russia is now limited in who it can partner with. Given the past trajectory of joint innovation partnership, naturally, China is now Russia’s ultimate bet when it comes to biotechnology development. Russian biotech future is in China’s hands. There are not currently signs that China will change its favorable position towards Russia; hence, Sino-Russian innovation partnerships will likely intensify.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Crimea could be Putin’s tipping point in a game of nuclear chicken,” Malcolm Chalmers, FT, 05.15.22. The author, deputy director-general of the Royal United Services Institute think-tank, writes:

• “Some say Putin’s threats of nuclear action are evidence he has lost touch with reality. Yet if the US believes a nuclear threat is credible, it would have to take such a risk seriously. Given the US is at lower risk than Russia from conventional military invasion, the Kremlin might think it holds the advantage in a game of nuclear chicken. A shared fear of this scenario explains why mutual restraint has held up until now.”
• “Another possible trigger would be Ukrainian military advances on the battlefield which threaten Russian territory. ... If there is an escalatory risk, it is more likely to come in territories which Ukraine lost in 2014, and which Kyiv is now committed to liberating.” 
• “A nuclear crisis would make it easier for leaders to make difficult compromises. Provided the war ended and the Black Sea blockade was lifted, Ukraine might leave Crimea to the Russians for now. Putin meanwhile could mitigate the humiliation of a failed invasion by arguing Russia’s strategic arsenal had successfully deterred NATO. This could be enough for both sides to avoid the worst outcome of all.”

“Could Russia Use the Nuclear Option?” Pyotr Topychkanov, MT, 05.16.22. The author, a senior fellow at SIPRI, writes:

• “The threat of a nuclear strike on Ukraine is being hotly discussed in the media and social networks. But there are reasons to be both skeptical and wary of this threat. First of all, in an armed confrontation, threats of nuclear escalation, … play into the hands of the attacker as they keep the defenders and their partners from taking strong measures.”
• “Second, speculation that Russia could commit a nuclear strike is not based on real-world data. In fact, there is even very little verified information in the public domain about what Russia’s goals are in Ukraine and more broadly in its rivalry with the West and how it intends to achieve them.”
• “Russia continues to refer to the fighting in Ukraine as a special military operation. This status does not imply a general mobilization and it signals that, from Russia's perspective, there is no legal basis for the use of nuclear weapons. ... Based on the current situation, there is even less likelihood of Russian nuclear strikes against NATO member states, despite the Russian mass media's rhetoric.”
• “Why would Russia use nuclear weapons as part of a special military operation in Ukraine? With a great stretch of the imagination, there are at least two scenarios that would make sense militarily. The first is to be able to conquer the urban centers and force Kyiv to sign a peace on Russia's terms … In the second scenario, it would be done if the general-purpose forces of Russia, the DNR and LNR are not enough to deter massive counterattacks by Ukrainian forces.”
• “However, if the war goes badly for Russia and the likely possibility that hostilities might move to territories that Russia considers its own, such as Crimea, and that Russia would be completely isolated politically and economically, Moscow will have more serious arguments for at least nuclear blackmail.”

“Potential US responses to the Russian use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” Jeffrey Edmonds, BAS, 05.16.22. The author, a research scientist with CNA, writes:

• “Let us assume Russia has used a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. How do the West and the United States in particular react? ... [W]e can attempt to broadly break down the potential policy areas that cover the gamut of positions open to the United States and NATO, their implications, and their possible consequences.”
  • “Responding in kind.”
  • “Conventional response and escalation.”
  • “Staying the course.”
  • “Push for settlement.”
• “I argue that the two extremes, responding in kind and pushing for a settlement, are unwise given the escalatory risks or potential for establishing destructive and unstable patterns of behavior. The two other options—escalating conventionally against Russia or staying the course—each have their own risks and levels of uncertainty. Except for bending to nuclear coercion, it is difficult to see how Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine does not significantly raise the possibility of a conflict between Russia and NATO.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015 to 2018,” Michael Simpson, Adam R. Grissom, Christopher A. Mouton, John P. Godges and Russell Hanson, RAND, May 2022. The authors of the report write:

• “Russian airpower played a decisive role in reversing the fortunes of the Syrian regime. … Russia's intervention was designed as a limited-liability expeditionary campaign, with a small theater footprint predicated on Russian air and naval power supporting regime ground forces. … The Russian Aerospace Force's (VKS's) employment of airpower was significantly more effective in engagements against the Western-backed opposition than in conflicts against ISIS. In part, this reflected Russia's primary strategic objectives of saving the Assad regime and degrading the opposition.”
• “To sustain Russia's expeditionary capability, the VKS experimented with a distributed basing model. Opening additional air bases enabled the VKS to relieve congestion, scale the deployed force, and operate responsively. … Despite making key adaptations, Russian airpower was not decisive against ISIS. Ultimately, Kurdish forces, supported by U.S. Coalition airpower, propelled the rollback of ISIS in northeastern Syria.”
• “It is unclear how effectively Russia can export its expeditionary capability to other theaters. The geography in Syria was favorable for the VKS's reliance on rotary-wing operations, the conflict was low intensity, and Russian forces rarely encountered adversaries with advanced capabilities.”
• “The VKS's reliance on distributed basing exhibited key gaps, including poor base protection and high attrition, that suggest a limited applicability to different operational contexts. … Russia refined concepts of employment for aircraft and experimented with new capabilities that it will likely apply to future conflicts.”
• “Russia's reluctance to invest in expensive precision-guided munitions, underdeveloped targeting and penetrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and lack of intertheater tanking could be liabilities in future campaigns.”

“The Opportunity in the Ukraine Crisis,” Thomas S. Kaplan and Bernard-Henri, WSJ, 05.15.22. The authors, founders and board members of Justice for Kurds, write:

• “The debacle in Kabul, which likely emboldened the Kremlin, was spectacularly surpassed by Russia’s serial blunders and war crimes in Ukraine. The U.S. was given a historic chance to turn back years of retreat and reassert the leadership that seemed to have been lost forever.”
• “How can the Biden administration turn this gift into one that keeps on giving?  First, continue supplying and supporting Ukraine against Russia. But fashion this new posture into a full doctrine and re-create, for the first time in years, a bipartisan foreign policy committed to enabling those who are willing to bear the burden of fighting for interests and values they share with all Americans.”
• “Begin with the Kurds. ... Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Iraq and the Rojava Kurds in Syria are a case study in the effective implementation of America’s longstanding exhortation that its friends should do more of the actual fighting while the U.S. trains and assists them. ... Americans of all political stripes are rallying around Ukraine, and Mr. Biden is right to call on Congress to pass $40 billion in aid. Americans of all stripes would support the Kurds too if presented the opportunity. It’s up to the president to give them one.”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Japan’s Red Line on Russia,” Alex Kliment, GZERO Media, 05.11.22. The author, senior editor at Eurasia Group’s Signal newsletter, writes:

• “Japan pledged this week to phase out Russian oil ‘in principle’ but offered no clear timetable. And when it comes to Japanese investment in Russian energy projects, Tokyo has an even clearer answer about whether it will pull out: ‘no way.’”
• “The country buys almost 100% of its oil, gas, and coal from abroad, according to the IEA, making it more dependent on energy exports than any other major economy. … [Russia] plays an important role, supplying 11% of Japan’s coal, 8% of its natural gas and 5% of its crude oil.”
• “[W]hile Tokyo seems willing to drop Russian oil imports gradually, there is a bright red line around Japan’s own investment in Russian energy projects. Nowhere is that clearer than 30 miles off the northernmost coast of Japan, on the Russian island of Sakhalin. For nearly 30 years, Japanese firms have held stakes in two major Russian oil and natural gas projects there.”
• “There’s an economic reason that Japanese firms aren’t budging from Russia even as U.S. and European majors head for the exit. At Sakhalin-2, Japan gets virtually all of its liquefied natural gas at agreed-upon long-term prices. Ditching the project would force Tokyo to buy that gas ad hoc on the global spot market, where prices have recently hit record highs.”
• “As Japan sees it, leaving Sakhalin would simply open the way for other, less scrupulous investors to move in while inflicting little economic pain on Russia. China is reportedly already eyeing the Sakhalin stake that Dutch-American energy giant Shell announced it would sell in February.”
• “[F]ar from slashing investment in Russia, Japanese firms are doubling down. The energy giant Mitsui, a Sakhalin investor, said last week it would press ahead with a separate $21 billion Russian LNG project in the Arctic that is scheduled to start producing by next year.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Until Ukraine, Russia Lobbyists Successfully Blunted U.S. Sanctions After Foreign Adventurism,” Nick Cleveland-Stout and Ben Freeman, The Intercept, 05.07.22. The authors, researchers with the Quincy Institute, write:

• “The invasion of Ukraine is not the first time in recent memory that Russian foreign policy has given rise to harsh criticisms in Washington. But it does mark the first time that the Kremlin has been hobbled in its ability to respond through normal D.C. channels—namely, through high-powered K Street lobbyists.”
• “Before its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin poured hefty sums of money into lobbying in Washington, D.C. ... Russia’s high-dollar lobbying approach kicked off in August 2008, when it tried to pacify U.S. responses to Russian aggression following the country’s invasion of Georgia. ... In total, the amount of money reported by firms receiving from Russian interests soared from just over $5 million in 2007, prior to the invasion, to more than $9 million in 2009, an analysis of Foreign Agents Registration Act records shows.”
• “Though the Russian government decided not to directly lobby in Washington [after the annexation of Crimea in 2014], Kremlin-connected firms and government interests facing punitive measures would begin spending millions to win influence.”
• “If history is any indication, Russia’s influence operation will likely attempt to reform itself. With sanctions limiting its legal lobbying operation, it’s possible that Russia will expand its illicit influence operations.”

“From Iraq to Ukraine: A New Perspective on the Russian-Western Confrontation,” Samuel Helfont, War on the Rocks, 05.16.22. The author, an assistant professor of strategy and policy in the Naval War College program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, writes:

• “Pundits and analysts who blame the West for the breakdown in Russian-American relations often point to Western policies in Russia’s near abroad. Yet, expanding the scope to include Iraq suggests that threats to the Russian homeland did not necessarily drive Russian policies. By extension, a few Western policy shifts in Eastern Europe would not have changed the course of history.”
• “Neither was American liberalism necessarily at the heart of the dispute. Russia’s fury with American policies in Iraq were most acute when Washington’s propensity for unilateralism led it to defy liberal principles such as commitment to a rules-based system and international law.”
• “That type of unilateralism was at the heart of Moscow’s disagreement with the United States both in Iraq and in the post-Cold War world more generally. After winning the Cold War, the United States dominated the post-Cold War order. Moscow did not like how decisions were being made, or who was making them. As the case of Iraq shows, the Russians could complain and protest, yet they were not powerful enough to shape events in the manner that they saw fit. In the end, Moscow’s dissatisfaction with its own weakness was and remains a much more fundamental issue than NATO expansion. But addressing it would require more than simply changing a few American policies in Eastern Europe.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Coup in the Kremlin: How Putin and the Security Services Captured the Russian State,” Nina Khrushcheva, FA, 05.10.22. The author, professor of international affairs at the New School, writes:

• “[W]ithin Russia, the events leading up to and following the invasion also marked the completion of a political shift that has been years in the making. They exposed the waning power of the siloviki who dominated the early Putin era—and their replacement by a faceless security-and-control bureaucracy.” 
• “For a decision as consequential as the invasion of a neighboring country, it is remarkable how many organs of the state were out of the loop. Economic institutions were caught by surprise—when Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russian central bank, tried to resign in early March, she was told to just buckle up and deal with the economic fallout. The military didn’t seem to be aware of the entire plan either, and spent months moving tens of thousands of troops around the border without knowing whether they would be asked to attack. Putin’s clandestine operation was even hidden from other clandestine operatives. Leaders of the FSB department responsible for providing the Kremlin with intelligence about Ukraine’s political situation, for instance, didn’t fully believe that an invasion would happen.”
• “The journalist and writer Masha Gessen once dubbed Putin ‘the man without a face.’ Today, however, his is the only face, sitting atop an anonymous security bureaucracy that does his bidding. Another coup, either in the Kremlin corridors or on the streets of Moscow, is not likely. The only group that could conceivably unseat the president is the FSB, which is still technically run by nationalist siloviki who understand that some foreign policy flexibility is necessary for internal development. But such officials are no longer the FSB’s future. The indistinct body of security technocrats now in charge is obsessed with total control, no matter the national or international consequences.” 

“International Society Must Act In The Wake Of Russia’s Failed Opposition,” Robert Orttung,  PONARS, 05.12.22. The author, research professor of international affairs at The George Washington University, writes:

• “The failure to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s accumulation of power made possible his invasion of Ukraine. If Russian society hopes to prevent future tragedies, ordinary citizens need to actively stand up to the authorities in order to prevent the kinds of abuses that Russia is now inflicting on Ukrainian society.”
• “Unfortunately, Russian society has never shown an ability to check the authority of its government, which systematically disregards human rights. In this situation, it is up to the international community to aid Russian society in restraining Kremlin powers.”
• “The United States will have to work with its democratic allies to thwart Russian aggression while ensuring that it does not collapse the way that Germany did in the early part of the twentieth century. The international community will have to be actively involved in attempting to communicate with Moscow to ensure that Russia does not descend into the kind of meltdown that could unleash nuclear Armageddon. At the same time, the West will need to confront the countries that support Russia. The absence of a vocal and vibrant Russian opposition makes all these jobs extraordinarily difficult.”

“Why the Kremlin Treats Its Own Citizens With Contempt, Christopher Bort, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 05.12.22. The author, a visiting scholar with Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia program, writes:

• “President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine epitomizes one of the most enduring features of Russian governance, the one that most sets it apart from liberal democracy: the disregard, if not contempt, that Russia’s rulers display toward their own people. The ruler’s needs, no matter how selfish or capricious, almost always trump any other considerations, including the rights of ordinary individuals. Prior to Russia’s invasion, for instance, the Kremlin’s chain of command appears not to have told Russian soldiers that they were about to enter Ukraine to fight a real war. Afterward, the same chain of command neglected to claim those soldiers’ bodies because acknowledging their deaths might embarrass the Kremlin.”
• “There is a serious case to be made that Russia’s next ruler could be less repressive, less anti-Western, and less backward-looking than Putin. Following the Ukraine debacle, Putin’s legacy is likely to look much less attractive to the Russian elite.”
• “Putin’s departure, whenever it comes, will be the next real opportunity to reset those relations, if not on a good trajectory, at least on a more realistic and potentially less hostile one.”

“Escape From Moscow: The New Russian Exiles—and How They Can Defeat Putin,” Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, FA, 05.13.22. The authors, investigative journalists, write:

• “Russians are fleeing their country in droves. Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan; Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro. In the first two weeks of the war alone, Georgia took in 25,000 Russians, and Armenia was receiving some 6,000 Russians per day. By the end of March, 60,000 Russians had gone to Kazakhstan. And many more have sought refuge in a number of different countries in Eastern Europe.”
• “In part, the current exodus has been encouraged by Putin himself ... In taking this approach, Putin is drawing on a long Russian tradition. In past upheavals—anti-Semitic pogroms under the tsar, the Russian Civil War, World War II and anti-Semitic campaigns during the Soviet era—millions of people were allowed and even encouraged to emigrate.”
• “By funding and supporting Russian media, educational and research projects based in Europe, European governments could help bring liberal ideas and independent reporting about Russia to Russians themselves and help counter the propaganda of the Putin regime. Over time, they could also help give rise to a new narrative about Russia and what the future of the country might be. If Western governments fail to support this sudden wave of exiles, however, they will squander what could be one of their most effective forms of soft power against Russian autocracy.”

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin’s Perilous Imperial Dream. Why Empires and Nativism Don’t Mix” Cristina Florea, FA, 05.10.22. The author, assistant professor of history at Cornell University, writes:

• “Putin has sought to bring the former Soviet world even more firmly under Russia’s thumb. He has also injected Russian imperial identity with new meaning, rejecting the empire’s traditionally pragmatic approach toward its multiethnic population in favor of nativism.”
• “Still, until 2014, and arguably even after that, Putin was generally considered a pragmatic and strategic thinker. His annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine that year began to alter this assessment, indicating a turn away from pragmatic pluralism and toward a nativist vision of empire that elevates ethnic Russians above all others. Putin’s all-out invasion of Ukraine this year was justified in precisely these terms.”
• “Underpinning Putin’s righteous battle for Russians in Ukraine is an organic vision of Russian nationhood defined by blood and cultural and spiritual traits rather than by political contract or choice. It is a vision shared by thinkers such as Gumilev and Dugin as well as the religious philosopher Ivan Ilyn.”
• “Putin contrasts this organic vision of Russia with the Ukrainian nation and state, which in his view are artificial products of politics and mindless emulation ‘of foreign models.’ Thus, while championing Russian nationalism, Putin simultaneously lambasts the nationalism of non-Russians as a ‘disease’ and ‘virus.’”
• “With or without Putin at the helm, Russia would likely have reemerged after 1991 as a revisionist power, just as it did after World War I. But that does not mean that Russia is doomed to be always in conflict with the West or to always expand at the expense of its neighbors. After it was completely defeated in both world wars, Germany—whose militarism and appetite for authoritarianism were once thought incurable—reemerged as an engine of European integration and democracy. Russia might one day undergo a similar transformation. But first it must be completely defeated, along with Putin’s illiberal and nativist vision of empire. And although Ukraine and its allies in the West can help with the former, only Russians can achieve the latter.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks at the 30th Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, MID.Ru, 05.14.22. The Russian foreign minister says:

• “We again have to choose a historical path, like we did in 1917 and 1991. … The choice we have taken is made easier by the fact that the ‘collective West’ has declared a total hybrid war against us.”
• “The situation has many layers. Russia, the United States, China and all others realize that it is being decided today whether the world order will become fair, democratic and polycentric.”
• “The non-Western world is coming to see that the world is becoming increasingly more diverse ... Forging closer ties with the like-minded forces outside of what used to be referred to as the Golden Billion is an absolutely inevitable and mutually driven process. The Russia-China relations are at their all-time high. We are also strengthening our privileged strategic partnerships with India, Algeria and Egypt. We have taken our relations with the Persian Gulf countries to a whole new level. The same applies to our relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as other countries in Asia-Pacific, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America.”
• “We are fully aware of the fact it is at this juncture, which perfectly lends itself to be called a turning point, that the place for Russia and all other countries and forces in the future international architecture will be determined.”

Ukraine:

“A Country With More Military and Tech Power—but Fewer Ukrainians,” Anna Reid, FA, 05.11.22. The author, former Kyiv Correspondent for The Economist, writes:

• “Perhaps one of these things will happen; the Kremlin and the Ukrainian army both have a way of springing surprises. But far likelier is an emerging stalemate toward the end of the year, with the Russian army digging in as the autumn rains start. A new line of contact, taking in some or all of the east and its Black Sea coast, would take hold, as the two sides settled back into semi-frozen conflict.”
• “Assuming a return to long-term frozen conflict, Ukraine’s leaders will be confronted by a particular set of challenges. … For one thing, the country that emerges will have to remain defense oriented. In a press conference on April 5, Zelensky talked about Ukraine becoming ‘a big Israel.’”
• “Even as Ukraine searches for new sources of revenue, it will also face the challenge of spending wisely what it already has ... corruption has been endemic, especially in the public sector, and the problem is unlikely to get better with an influx of postwar aid.”
• “Equally great is the question of whose country the new Ukraine will be. Although it has been little discussed until now, many in Kyiv are concerned that the more than five million Ukrainians who have left the country since February—one of the most rapid exoduses anywhere in the world since the end of the Cold War—will not all return.”
• “With large swaths of Ukraine’s cities damaged or destroyed, a more immediate problem will be fixing the country’s physical infrastructure.”

“Western Companies Can Help Ukraine by Sending Work,” Bhaskar Chakravorti, FP, 05.12.22. The author, dean of global business at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, writes:

• “As many on the outside are wondering how to help beyond sending weapons, sending aid, and sheltering refugees, one critical option is still being overlooked: sending work to Ukrainian companies and contractors in order to take a bite out of the economic collapse. In particular, work from abroad could help Ukraine’s fastest-growing sector before the war—the technology industry—get back on its feet. With the land war now largely restricted to Ukraine’s east, the country’s tech workers are ready to return to work.”
• “While Ukraine’s biggest exports, agricultural products and minerals, are stalled by the Russian occupation or blockade of Black Sea ports, Ukraine’s third-largest export—information technology products and services—has regrouped, thanks to a continued supply of electricity, uninterrupted internet services, and tech workers at safe locations. This industry, which grew 36 percent and employed 285,000 workers in 2021, can be put to work to jump-start an economy now surviving on aid. But to do so, it will need more work from outside Ukraine.”
• “This may be the first war where sending work to a war zone might make as much sense as sending military assistance. If you are running a government agency, leading a business, or otherwise looking for world-class tech services at a time of a global technology worker shortage, there is a solution staring you in the face.”

“Stop Falling for Russia’s Delusions of Perpetual Victory. The best sources on the war are the Ukrainians on the ground,” Mart Kuldkepp, FP, 05.10.22. The author, associate professor of Scandinavian history and politics at University College London, writes:

• “Everyone needs to exercise their critical and moral faculties when thinking and talking about Russia’s war against Ukraine. Exercise source criticism, and trust the voices that have made accurate predictions in the past. But most of all, listen to the people affected by and fighting against this invasion: Ukrainians.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Former Soviet States Are Distancing Themselves From Their Old Imperial Master,” Erica Marat and Johan Engvall, FP, 05.10.22. The authors, an associate professor at the National Defense University’s College of International Affairs and a deputy research director at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, write:

• “To understand the effectiveness of Russian power in the former Soviet space, it is no longer sufficient just to know the Kremlin’s intent. Former Soviet colonies are on the verge of breaking away from the last remaining legacies of Soviet rule. The war in Ukraine points at the need to consider countries formerly occupied by the Soviet regime as entities with their own complex domestic processes despite Russia’s efforts to direct and dominate them.”
• “Many citizens of former Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus now see Russia as a belligerent neighbor engaging in genocidal violence rather than as an historic ally. Time is thus not on the side of Putin’s imperialistic and nationalist crusade to reassert Russia’s exclusive control over its neighboring countries—because Moscow’s neighborhood is no longer a collection of its former colonial subjects.”

“Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia,” Bruce Pannier, FPRI, 05.13.22. The author, a journalist with RFE/RL, writes:

• “If the Taliban cannot stop the violence in northern Afghanistan, or if some group does succeed in launching an attack from Afghan territory on a neighboring Central Asian state or crosses the border into one the countries to carry out terrorist attacks, it is difficult to see how that would not change the Central Asian governments’ policies toward Afghanistan and the Taliban. An uneasy truce is easy to shatter and confidence can be hard to restore, but none of the Central Asian countries want ISK gaining control of areas in north Afghanistan near or on the border. And if the Taliban lose influence with the Central Asian militants allied to them, what would those Central Asian militants do next?”
• “For the sake of Central Asia’s security and hopes for expanded trade south, the best prospect at the moment seems to be support the Taliban and hope they can get a tighter grip on northern Afghanistan.”

 

IV. Quotable

• No significant developments.