Russia Analytical Report, May 5-12, 2025
4 Ideas to Explore
- Last week, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping reaffirmed the mutual support between Russia and China in media statements released during celebrations in Moscow of the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. The two leaders signed a joint statement, and Putin asserted that “the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China are built on the unshakable principles of equality, mutual support and assistance, as well as the unbreakable friendship between the two states and two nations. I want to emphasize that Mr. Xi Jinping and I personally control all aspects of Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike.” Xi added that “as a positively stabilizing and proactive factor of the international community, China and Russia should stand unwaveringly side by side, resolutely uphold the U.N.-centered system of international relations and the world order based on international law and continuously promote equitable and orderly multilateralism around the world. It is vital to remain the engines of global governance in the spirit of mutual support.” The core pillar of the U.N. Charter is Article 2(4), which specifies that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Given that as of 1992, Ukraine was an internationally recognized sovereign state, this renders Xi’s insistence that Russia and China remain committed to upholding the principals of “a U.N.-centered system” contradictory at best.*
- “[European countries] are hitting the dual problem of having to rearm themselves and supply Ukraine, and industrial capacity isn’t big enough to do both,” according to Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, The New York Times reports. Savill further said Europe could backfill most of what the United States had provided in weapons to Ukraine, “in the medium- to long-term, if it has the will, and I’m not sure it has the will.” As for the short term: “No. Not in the short term,” Mr. Savill said.
- “Because the Kremlin has avoided defining what “victory” means, the majority of [Russians] will likely perceive a peace deal as meeting Putin's minimal demands and therefore fit the bill. In other words, Russian troops do not necessarily have to move much farther West for Moscow to claim a win," argues Andrei Kolesnikov in Foreign Affairs. He adds that this has not been enough to move the Russian president to a true ceasefire, however, because "by dragging out negotiations with Trump, he [Putin] is hedging: on the one hand, ending the hot phase of the conflict will create destabilizing shifts in the economy and society; on the other hand, the growing public assumption that peace is coming must be satisfied sooner or later. For now, [Putin] has no solution and is stalling."
- The foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine jointly argue in a New York Times op-ed that “Russia’s war of aggression has shattered the post-World War II security architecture and the international system based on the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords. Its conclusion will form the foundation for a new architecture.” The ministers then “offer the lessons from World War II that must be taken into account if we want to create an enduring peace in Ukraine, rather than a pause before the next potentially disastrous global conflict.”
- “Appeasing the aggressor leads to more aggression, not peace.”
- “Spheres of influence never bring peace and stability. They bring oppression.”
- “A lack of accountability breeds future atrocities.”
- “Historical manipulation must be corrected.”
- “As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine has said, ‘Freedom must be armed better than tyranny.’” Unfortunately, the history of WWII supports all but one of the ministers’ lessons: spheres of influence do bring peace and stability, but only at the cost of oppression—as did the 1945 Yalta Conference, which left Stalin’s USSR in effective control of each of these ministers’ countries. These countries arguably paid a large part of the price for the avoidance of World War III.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- “The impact of North Korea’s ammunition supply to Russia is hard to fully appreciate,” the author writes. “At the strategic level, it is apparent that the renegade country has contributed significantly to Russia’s overall ammunition expenditure, likely helping Russia to keep fighting and sustaining its advances. The timings of deliveries also indicate that they have been key enablers of Russia’s offensives.”
- “Looking ahead, the available evidence suggests that both Russian and North Korean factories are working to churn out more rounds than ever, with new production lines established and their legacy factories operating at maximum capacity. There will likely be some emphasis on replenishing stockpiles, but it stands to reason that many of the rounds the two states produce will be used in Ukraine,” according to the author.
- “Overall, North Korean ammunition has kept Russia in the war, and arguably helped change its trajectory. If the supply increases and can be sustained for months on end, Ukrainian casualties will climb and Russia’s will fall. More territory will be taken, and Ukraine’s position will become ever more tenuous,” the author concludes.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “‘Right now [the battlefield] is not about new technology,’ Yakovenko [Oleksandr Yakovenko, chief executive of one of Ukraine’s largest drone manufacturers] told the Financial Times in his headquarters in the Black Sea port of Odesa. ‘It’s about how to adapt to new strategies.’ … Yakovenko is also under no illusions about the shape-shifting Russian threat. ‘We tend to innovate first. But when we create something new they quickly come up with a response.’”
- “For 2025, he predicts an increased use of land drones: ‘It will be the year of robots with wheels. They will be used to evacuate people from the front, and if we need to send supplies to the front we don’t need to risk sending people.’”
- “But while Ukraine still has the edge over Russia at innovating, he cautioned that when it came to production, Moscow had proved more efficient. ‘Russia goes step by step. If it continues [like this] for two years it will be impossible [for us] to go on defending.’”
“A glimpse inside Putin’s secret arms empire,” The Economist, 05.08.25. (Infographics)
- “General Chris Cavoli, NATO’s top commander, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia was replacing troops, tanks and munitions ‘at an unprecedented pace,” the authors write. “To understand the scale of Russia’s defense-industrial expansion, The Economist consulted a Western company which uses artificial intelligence to sift through data from a variety of mostly commercially available sources. This shows how the number of electronic devices, such as mobile phones, present at an industrial site has changed over time.”
- “[The Economist has reported several] signs of Russia’s hyperactive defense industry. The Economist has also seen a range of other indicators. In Biysk, for instance, home to an important plant that produces oleum, which is used in explosives, and a center of military research, average daily traffic between dormitory areas and districts with chemical plants rose 19% in 2023. “Dwell time”—how long people remain in one place—rose by 32% during periods associated with second and third working shifts. Strava, an app which logs exercise, showed new clusters of running and cycling in areas near those plants, a sign that new workers had arrived in the area—which might also explain why housing rental costs grew by 21% a year.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military aid to Ukraine:
- “The so-called coalition of the willing of European nations backing Ukraine has struggled to get materiel to its battlefields in the time since Mr. Trump made clear that Europe needed to shoulder more of the load for Ukraine’s security and its own,” the author writes.
- Yehor Chernev, the deputy chair of the Ukrainian parliament’s committee on national security, defense and intelligence “said Ukrainian forces were running low on long-range missiles, artillery and, above all, ballistic air-defense systems — the majority of which are manufactured in the United States, according to an analysis by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. By summer, military aid approved under the Biden administration will run out, and Mr. Trump appears reluctant to renew it,” according to the author.
- “‘They [European countries] are hitting the dual problem of having to rearm themselves and supply Ukraine, and industrial capacity isn’t big enough to do both,’ said Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, an analytical group affiliated with the British military. He said Europe could backfill most of what the United States had provided in weapons to Ukraine, ‘in the medium- to long-term, if it has the will, and I’m not sure it has the will.’ And for now?’ “No. Not in the short term,’ Mr. Savill said.”
- “Friday [May 8] marks another grim milestone for Ukraine — the 120th day since the last new aid package was announced on Jan. 8, outstripping the length of Mr. Johnson’s devastating hold [on Ukraine aid in late 2023- early 2024],” the author writes. “At the Pentagon there is silence. In contrast, during the Biden administration there were press briefings just days or weeks apart announcing arms shipments worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars each.”
- “[S]o far there is no indication additional aid packages for Kyiv are forthcoming from the United States. As a result, Ukraine has had to rely more on European allies as well as building up its own defense industry,” the author writes.
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “Trump might have struck out on his Day One pledge, but the US president does have leverage. He appears to have finally recognized that economic pressures could force Putin to do a deal on Ukraine that works. ‘I think Russia, with the price of oil right now, oil has gone down, we are in a good position to settle, they want to settle. Ukraine wants to settle,’ Trump said in the Oval Office on May 5,” the author writes.
- “Oil is key to degrading Russia’s war machine… The unwillingness of the Biden administration to aggressively sanction Russian oil—due to concerns it would cause gasoline prices to spike—undermined its efforts to bleed Putin of the resources to wage war. Now that oil prices have come down, Trump has plenty of wiggle room to hit Russia where it hurts by blacklisting more oil tankers and producers without causing a painful jump in energy prices in the West,” according to the author.
- “The power of sanctions is clear: At every turn in the negotiations, Putin has demanded that they be lifted. Without stiffer sanctions, Putin may think his military can sustain the war,” the author writes.
- “Short of punishing sanctions on Russian oil that bankrupt the Kremlin’s war machine, Putin will continue to work with China, North Korea and Iran (the ‘axis of upheaval’) to wreak havoc on the rules-based order,” the author warns. “How bad could it get? Germany’s leading military historian, University of Potsdam professor Sönke Neitzel, has warned that a bad deal for Ukraine—one that frees up Russian resources—could make this ‘the last summer of peace’ for the rest of Europe. ‘Putin is going to test us,’ Neitzel told Deutsche Welle last month. ‘We should prepare.’”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
“Russia’s False Euphoria,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Foreign Affairs, 05.09.25.
- "Since Russia began its 'special operation' in Ukraine in 2022, however, the annual holiday [Victory Day] has taken on more contemporary meaning. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has aggressively promoted the idea that the conflict next door is a continuation of the Great Patriotic War against the West,” the author writes.
- With Trump in the White House, "[m]any Russians now view the United States as a pragmatic partner and expect that the war will be settled through direct negotiations between Moscow and Washington,” according to the author. "As the Russian public sees it, although there will have to be agreements with Ukraine, the most important goal is to find common ground with Trump.”
- "Yet for anyone paying attention, peace remains elusive,” the author writes. “And since Trump and Putin have talked up the idea, the Russian leader will have to begin portraying what has been accomplished so far as a victory. Because the Kremlin has avoided defining what 'victory' means, the majority of the population will likely perceive a peace deal as meeting Putin's minimal demands and therefore fit the bill. In other words, Russian troops do not necessarily have to move much farther West for Moscow to claim a win."
- "By dragging out negotiations with Trump, he [Putin] is hedging: on the one hand, ending the hot phase of the conflict will create destabilizing shifts in the economy and society; on the other hand, the growing public assumption that peace is coming must be satisfied sooner or later. For now, he has no solution and is stalling."
“Why Peace Talks Fail in Ukraine?” Samuel Charap and Sergey Radcheko, Foreign Affairs, 05.08.25.
- “With talks once again underway after a three-year hiatus, it is a good time to review the lessons of Istanbul and assess what can be learned from that process for the present diplomatic effort. Of course, much has changed in the intervening period, so the Istanbul framework itself is unlikely to be the starting point for the current talks. But that attempt offers broader lessons that can inform today’s negotiations,” the authors write.
- “The 2022 negotiations serve as a reminder that Putin and Zelensky are capable of entertaining significant concessions. Both men have gained a reputation for maximalism in the past three years. But Istanbul showed that they could be open to the kind of politically risky compromises necessary for peace,” according to the author.
“This is the view from Kyiv,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 05.09.25.
- “Ukrainians know that peace talk is in the air. President Donald Trump is pressing for a ceasefire, and nearly everyone I met here hopes he succeeds. But hope is not a strategy, as they say. Many officials told me bluntly that they expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to keep attacking — and the brutal conflict to go on,” the author writes.
- “‘The war will continue until Putin accepts that Ukraine has a right to exist,’ said former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba. Current debate about negotiations and the reality of war on the ground, he added, ‘are as far apart as Earth and Mars.’”
- “Even if Trump cuts off U.S. military and intelligence assistance, Ukrainian officials say they will keep fighting. A senior official explained: ‘We are not losing. Russia is not winning. We are not under the threat of total collapse.’”
- “Officials said they’re ready to explore a compromise—a two-track approach that imposes a ceasefire on all fronts, as Kyiv wants—and also a discussion of long-term ‘root’ problems, as Moscow demands. ‘In six weeks, we will understand if we are going for another round of war, with or without the U.S., or to a peace scenario,’ one of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s political advisers told our group.”
- “Donald Trump’s effort to secure peace in Ukraine is reaching a decisive moment with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskiy challenging Vladimir Putin to engage in talks this week. Following a weekend of hectic diplomacy, Zelenskiy said he will travel to Istanbul on May 15 where Putin has proposed direct negotiations between the two countries,” the authors write. “But the fragile process is surrounded by doubts and unresolved disputes—Zelenskiy and his European allies have insisted that Russia begins a 30-day ceasefire Monday and have threatened a dramatic increase in sanctions if Putin refuses. They say that the US would join that effort although Trump himself has been more guarded in his public comments and Putin has ignored their demands.”
- “While Russia is open to dialogue on ending its war in Ukraine, it is ‘resistant to any kinds of pressure,’ Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told CNN on Saturday. Putin’s maximalist demands for ending the war have been starting to rankle Trump, who had promised and failed to deliver peace within the first 100 days of his second term in office,” the authors write.
- “Putin told reporters in the Kremlin that the talks should deal with the root causes of the conflict in Ukraine and establish a lasting peace. Moscow plans to enter the talks ‘without any preconditions,’ he added. ‘We do not rule out that during these negotiations it will be possible to agree on some new truces,’ he said.” After three years of war and multiple speeches it increasingly appears that by “root causes” Putin means that the war was forced on Russia because Ukraine sought to secure its sovereignty and independence (by for example, joining NATO, a respected and, by Russia, feared security alliance) from Putin’s escalating efforts to annex all of Ukraine, erase its national identity, and administer it as a satellite of Russia.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“Would Vladimir Putin attack NATO?” The Economist, 05.08.25.
- “Some argue that Russia is bound to attack [NATO]. ‘It’s a question of when they will start the next war,’ argued Kaja Kallas last year, when she was Estonia’s prime minister,” the authors write. “Others are skeptical that Russian ambitions range much beyond the Dnieper river. … Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s envoy for peace talks with Russia, when asked whether Russia intended to ‘march across Europe,’ responded simply: ‘100% not.’”
- “Intelligence analysts frame threats in terms of two variables: intent and capability. There is no specific intelligence at present that suggests Russia intends to attack NATO. But intentions are fluid,” the authors write.
- “[F]or Mr. Putin, war may be less about external threats than about prolonging and trying to legitimize his reign. In his 25 years in power, he has waged five wars. Each began with his popularity sagging; each ended with his authority enhanced,” the authors argue.
- “One camp … argues that the threat from Russia, though real, is more manageable than commonly thought. The new formations, such as the 44th Army Corps destined for the Finnish border, are ‘Potemkin units,’ says John Foreman, who served as Britain’s defense attaché in Kyiv and Moscow,” according to the authors.
- “Another school of thought retorts that Russia’s ability to wage war depends very much on the sort of war being waged. ‘In the medium term, Russia is unlikely to be able to build up the capabilities needed for a large-scale conventional war against NATO,’ acknowledges Lithuania’s defense intelligence agency. ‘However, Russia may develop military capabilities sufficient to launch a limited military action against one or several NATO countries.’”
- The authors write that, according to Swedish intelligence, a “‘limited armed attack’ against a Baltic state or NATO ships is entirely possible.” “‘Such action could seem disadvantageous from a Swedish perspective,’ explain the spies, ‘but it is important to emphasize that the Russian leadership makes decisions based on its own logic and assessment,’” the authors write.
“What Putin wants—and how Europe should thwart him,” The Economist, 05.08.25.
- “Today, as Mr. Putin targets what he absurdly claims is another ‘Nazi’ government in Ukraine, it signals how Russia stands resolutely against the West. That should worry all of Europe,” the authors write. “Russian tactics are crude and costly, but a sudden small incursion into a NATO member would force NATO to choose whether to take back lost ground and risk nuclear war.”
- “Defense against Russia begins in Ukraine. The more Mr. Putin is denied success there, the less likely he is to attack NATO,” the authors argue. “[B]acking Ukraine is not enough to make the entire continent safe and Mr. Trump is unlikely to offer much help, so Europe must do more. That means working harder to defend itself, shoring up its unity and laying the foundations for a post-Putin Russia.”
- “Europe has the wealth and industrial power to withstand Mr. Putin. It has the potential to find an accommodation with his successor. As Russian soldiers strut through Red Square, the question is whether Europe can overcome its divisions in order to save Ukraine and protect itself,” the authors write.
- “Just like the great wars in the past, Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine starting on Feb. 24, 2022, divided the 21st century into before and after,” write the foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine. “Russia’s war of aggression has shattered the post-World War II security architecture and the international system based on the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords. Its conclusion will form the foundation for a new architecture. We offer the lessons from World War II that must be taken into account if we want to create an enduring peace in Ukraine, rather than a pause before the next potentially disastrous global conflict.”
- “Appeasing the aggressor leads to more aggression, not peace.”
- “Spheres of influence never bring peace and stability. They bring oppression.”
- “A lack of accountability breeds future atrocities.”
- “Historical manipulation must be corrected.”
- “As President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ‘Freedom must be armed better than tyranny.’”
“Chinese President Xi Jinping: ‘Lessons from the past for the sake of the future,’” Xi Jinping, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 05.07.25. Machine-translated.
- “It is important to steadfastly defend the historical memory and truth about World War II,” the Chinese leader writes for this Russian newspaper. “Attempts to distort the historical facts about World War II and deny its results, discredit the historical feats of China and the Soviet Union are doomed to failure!” “This year marks the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's liberation from Japanese occupation. Taiwan's return to China is an important part of the outcome of World War II and the post-war world order. … No matter how the situation in Taiwan changes, no matter what attempts at interference are made from outside, the complete reunification of China remains an irreversible historical trend,” the author argues.
- “Firmly supporting each other on issues concerning the core interests and major concerns of the two countries is a constant for China and Russia. We highly appreciate that the Russian side has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the ‘one China’ principle and recognizes Taiwan as an inalienable part of it,” the author writes. “China and Russia are significant powers that make constructive contributions to maintaining global strategic stability and improving global governance. Sino-Russian relations have a clear historical logic, a powerful internal driver, and a rich cultural root. They are not directed against third parties and are not subject to their influence. Both sides should jointly resist any attempts to sow discord in the friendship and mutual trust between China and Russia.”
- “The optics of the visit [Xi’s visit to Moscow] could undermine China’s efforts to repair its relationship with Europe to try to offset the pain of its punishing trade war with the United States,” the authors warn. “‘Xi’s presence in Moscow, alongside Putin, will serve as a stark reminder to Europe of just how close this relationship has become, and the threat that it could one day pose to NATO’s eastern flank,’ said Noah Barkin, a senior adviser at Rhodium Group and a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Berlin.”
“What Trump Fails to Understand About Putin,” Barton Swaim, Wall Street Journal, 05.07.25.
- “Mr. Trump understands cutthroat opportunism, but not honor-based savagery. The people advising him—notably the real estate investor Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance—seem to take Mr. Putin for a crafty Western-style pol angling for pecuniary and political advantage. That is precisely what he isn’t,” the author writes. “America need only send weapons, not men, to Ukraine. If we can’t manage that, we will deserve the scorn of our grandchildren,” he writes.
"Why Is the Estonian Border So Quiet?" Jillian Kay Melchior, Wall Street Journal, 05.06.25.
- “Estonia is working hard to ensure that it has the means to surveil ‘100% of the whole border, every meter and centimeter,’ according to Egert Belitsev, director general of Estonia's Police and Border Guard Board.”
- “The Estonians appreciate that Ukrainians have pinned down the Russian troops once stationed ominously across the border from them. But peace in Ukraine would free up those troops, heightening Russia's threat to NATO.”
“The Resurgence of Europe,” Arancha Gonzales Laya, Foreign Affairs, 05.12.25.
- "Facing the deterioration of a long-standing transatlantic partnership and a continued war on its eastern front, Europe is at a critical moment,” the author writes.
- "At a dinner in Munich … with members of the U.S. Congress, the mood was so somber among European participants that a U.S. representative quickly offered that Trump 'would not be the Neville Chamberlain of Ukraine,'” the author writes. “But as one eastern European minister at the dinner put it, the Russians were looking to get through negotiation what they couldn't obtain on the battlefield: limiting the sovereignty of Ukraine to decide its future."
- "Europeans also plan to support the implementation of a potential peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. While waiting for negotiations to progress, much of which will depend on Trump, Europeans can begin the much-needed conversation about an inconvenient reality: the EU needs to rethink the institutional arrangements that make up its security architecture—to ensure it that is not subject to the risks posed by a U.S.-dominated NATO,” according to the author. "Ukraine's defense industry will also be more integrated into the EU's technological and industrial defense base, and the single European market, granting Kyiv treatment very similar to that of a member state."
- “The Trump administration does not want Europe to succeed. It will try to weaken the continent through a mix of external coercion and predatory policies: claiming it needs to control Greenland for its national security, seeking rapprochement with Russia at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, weakening NATO’s deterrence, and arm-twisting on trade. And it will embolden anti-European forces within the EU. Officials across European capitals have received this message loud and clear,” the author writes.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “Behold, the artful dealmaker Trump working his magic on Putin,” George F. Will, Washington Post, 05.07.25.“What if Trump wants to get to “yes” but Putin wants to get to Kyiv?” the author asks.
- "We Are Still Fighting World War II: The Unsettled Legacy of the Conflict That Shaped Today’s Politics," Antony Beevor, Foreign Affairs, 05.07.25.
- “The Post-World War II System Was Always Fragile,” Julian E. Zelizer, Foreign Policy, 05.12.25.
- “Why Poland Wants All of Europe to Do More to Defend Itself,” Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 05.07.25.
- “Merz Brings Germany Back to the Table,” Sophia Besch and Liana Fix, Foreign Policy, 05.07.25.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- On the subject of ‘global strategic stability’ and military alliances, Russia and China emphasize the importance of maintaining global strategic stability, criticizing actions that threaten international security, such as expanding military alliances and deploying advanced weapon systems near other nuclear states. They specifically criticize the U.S. “Golden (Iron) Dome” missile defense program, stating that it “means a complete and ultimate rejection to recognize the existence of the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms.” They warn that these actions “directly undermine global strategic stability, spurring an arms race and increasing conflict potential.”
- Both countries advocate for the principle of equal, indivisible security, denouncing the use of space for military purposes. They call for “a legally binding instrument based on the Russian-Chinese draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” and criticize the militarization of space by nuclear-weapon states, stating: “The two Sides oppose the attempts of individual countries to use outer space for armed confrontation.”
- Both Russia and China strongly oppose “nuclear sharing” arrangements and extended nuclear deterrence strategies, arguing these escalate tensions and increase the risk of nuclear conflict. They condemn “the further development of schemes and means of so-called ‘nuclear sharing’ and ‘extended nuclear deterrence’” as a provocative action that “has high potential to provoke a regional and global arms race.”
- The two sides reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other arms control frameworks. They criticize AUKUS (U.S.-UK-Australia) for destabilizing the South Pacific region, stating that it “undermine[s] strategic stability and provoke[s] an arms race in the region.” They pledge to continue “enhanc[ing] the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability.”
“Media statements by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping,” Kremlin.ru, 05.09.25.
- President of Russia Vladimir Putin:
- “As always, our talks with President of the People’s Republic of China took place in a warm, friendly and constructive atmosphere. It was a substantive and productive discussion. Mr. Xi Jinping’s current visit is timed to coincide with the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Tomorrow, we and many other foreign leaders will take part in the anniversary events and attend the Victory Parade. The President of China and I have also agreed that we will meet in Beijing in September to celebrate another anniversary, 80 years since the end of World War II, and to pay tribute to the Soviet and Chinese troops who fought together against the Japanese militarism.”
- “The comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China are built on the unshakable principles of equality, mutual support and assistance, as well as the unbreakable friendship between the two states and two nations. I want to emphasize that Mr. Xi Jinping and I personally control all aspects of Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike.”
- President of China Xi Jinping:
- “I am delighted to visit Moscow once again during this festive season full of emotions and the joys of Victory. We have signed the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening the Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation in the New Era to Commemorate the 80th Anniversary of the Soviet Union’s Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the People of China’s Victory over Japanese Aggression, and the Establishment of the United Nations.”
- “Eighty years ago, in the face of ferocious militarism and Nazism, the armies and peoples of China and Russia fought side by side, selflessly and with great courage. Together, they wrote a glorious chapter in human history—a legacy of heroism that will never fade. The deep bond between our peoples was forged in the fire of war and sealed in blood, laying a firm foundation for the ever-rising trajectory of our bilateral ties.”
- “It is imperative that we remain the defenders of a world order in the spirit of equality and justice. China and Russia, as the main theatres of war in World War II, made a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazism, and thus laid the cornerstone of the post-war world order.”
- “As a positively stabilizing and proactive factor of the international community, China and Russia should stand unwaveringly side by side, resolutely uphold the UN-centered system of international relations and the world order based on international law and continuously promote equitable and orderly multilateralism around the world. It is vital to remain the engines of global governance in the spirit of mutual support.” Students of the history of WWII will note the conspicuous lack of reference to the critical role played by the United States both in the defeat of Imperial Japan (of which China had a relatively tiny part) and Nazi Germany. In addition, the core pillar of the U.N. Charter is Article 2(4), which specifies that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Given that as of 1992, Ukraine was an internationally recognized state, this renders President Xi’s insistence that Russia and China remain committed to upholding the principals of “a U.N.-centered system” contradictory at best.
- “For both China and Russia, this [Ukraine] war-induced investment in their decades-long relationship has paid off massively — even if Moscow has had to accept deeper dependence on its neighbor and Beijing has had to stomach worsening ties with Europe. But now Xi and Putin could reap even greater profits. With Trump enthusiastically shattering the remains of the US-led order, they are unlikely to remain bystanders,” according to the author.
- “First, Beijing and Moscow have learnt a great deal about how to inoculate themselves against Washington’s weaponization of its technological and financial dominance,” according to the author.
- “Second, Xi and Putin have said for more than a decade that the western brand of democracy is far from perfect,” according to the author.
- “Finally, Trump’s hollowing out of US bureaucracies, including the state and defense departments and the intelligence community, along with the alienation of key US allies, could weaken China’s and Russia’s arch-nemesis beyond repair at a time when their own military and intelligence machines are being rapidly beefed up,” according to the author.
“A ‘Reverse Kissinger’? Not While Xi and Putin Are Around,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 05.09.25.
- “Splitting rivals is a time-honored strategic tradition. But as Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s trip to Moscow this week affirms, the Sino-Russian relationship won’t be broken anytime soon,” the author writes. “During his first term, Trump saw reconciliation with Russia as a way of isolating China. Some geopolitical dreams die hard. The view, in parts of Trump’s second administration, is that Moscow and Beijing have been forced together by the war in Ukraine. Ending that war, and mending ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, could slow the Sino-Russian convergence—and perhaps even make Moscow a partner in containing Beijing.”
- “[H]owever, the strategic unity of the world’s leading revisionist states is profound. Moscow and Beijing are trying to create a radically different international order—one in which American power is battered, American alliances are broken, and autocracy reigns because democracy’s global dominance has been shattered,” according to the author. “Both know, moreover, that they cannot defeat the US if they are simultaneously trying to defeat each other. China and Russia, says Xi, must fight ‘back to back’ against their common foes. Putin, for his part, might appreciate an easing of American hostility—but he won’t trade Russia’s vital alliance for a fragile bargain with a fickle US.”
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Nuclear arms:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Counterterrorism:
- Teen terrorism is rising in Europe, with youths as young as 13 radicalized online and plotting attacks linked to Islamist or far-right ideologies, according to this article in WSJ. Social media, AI-driven content, and global conflicts like the Gaza war fuel radicalization. One striking case is Abdul Kerim Gadaev, a 19-year-old Chechen refugee in Belgium, who was arrested with three minors for plotting an attack inspired by the 2015 Bataclan massacre. Gadaev, alienated after his father's deportation, was drawn into extremist circles via TikTok and encrypted apps. Authorities are overwhelmed, as radicalized teens increasingly act alone, making early detection and prevention difficult, according to the article.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Cyber security/AI:
“Biased AI Models Are Increasing Political Polarization,” Sinan Ulgen, Foreign Policy, 05.12.25.
- Recent research from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “has broken new ground by examining how LLMs could shape the learning of international relations—especially when models trained in different countries on varying datasets end up producing alternative versions of truth,” the author writes.
- “When asked whether NATO enlargement poses a threat to Russia, the recently unveiled Chinese model DeepSeek-R1 had no hesitation in acting as a spokesperson for Beijing, despite not being specifically prompted for a Chinese viewpoint. … When prompted in English, [Alibaba’s] Qwen gave a more balanced account; when prompted in Chinese, it effectively switched identities and reflected the official Chinese viewpoint,” according to the author.
- “On the war in Ukraine, Grok—the large language model from X, formerly Twitter—stated clearly that ‘Russia’s concerns over Ukraine, while understandable from its perspective, do not provide a legitimate basis for its aggressive actions,’” the author writes.
- “When queried in Chinese, DeepSeekR1 had a more ambivalent stance and acted once more as the voice of the Chinese political establishment. … When queried in English, the same model shed its Chinese identity and responded that ‘[w]hile Russia’s concerns about NATO and regional influence are part of its strategic calculus, they do not legitimize its violations of international law or territorial aggression,’” according to the author.
- “Russian disinformation doesn’t always work. Out of 135 Kremlin-aligned propaganda posts analyzed in a new report, 134 more or less fell flat with social media users, getting liked and reshared mostly by a network of bots,” the author and researcher write. “But one went big—and with artificial intelligence making disinformation cheaper to produce, experts say that single success probably makes the whole campaign a win in the eyes of its shadowy, likely Russian funders.”
- “The campaign of propaganda posts is called Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka. … researchers at the nonprofit Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) examined the content of those posts, their aims and how they spread. ISD found that the network, which is presumed but not confirmed to be backed by the Russian government, pivots from one hot news topic to the next with the aim of influencing the discourse unfolding on social media. Its messaging focused on a familiar Russian objective: ‘weakening NATO countries’ support for Ukraine and disrupting their domestic politics,’” the authors write.
- The ISD report also shows that Russian disinformation can be a “numbers game,” and AI “is tilting that game in the trolls’ favor.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Climate change:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Key Takeaways from Biden’s BBC Interview,” Anthony Zurcher, BBC, 05.07.25.
- “Biden described the Trump administration's suggestion that Ukraine give up territory as part of a peace deal with Russia as ‘modern-day appeasement’—a reference to European allies that allowed Adolf Hitler to annex Czechoslovakia in the 1930s in an ill-fated attempt to prevent a continent-wide conflict. ‘I just don't understand how people think that if we allow a dictator, a thug, to decide he's going to take significant portions of land that aren't his, that that's going to satisfy him. I don't quite understand,’ Biden said of Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
- “Biden also said that if the US allowed a peace deal that favored Russia, Putin's neighbors would be under economic, military and political pressure to accommodate Moscow's will in other ways. In his view, the promise of American support to European allies becomes less believable and less of a deterrent.”
- “The former president described the thought of NATO breaking apart as a ‘grave concern.’ Already, he warned, US allies were doubting American leadership. ‘I think it would change the modern history of the world if that occurs,’ he said. ‘We are not the essential nation, but we are the only nation in position to have the capacity to bring people together to lead the world.’”
“How Trump Could Reset With Russia,” Edward Lucas, Foreign Policy, 05.09.25.
- “The dream of a U.S.-Russian rapprochement is never far from Trump’s thoughts. … Trump’s fondness for Putin may reflect admiration of the Russian leader’s strongman style. … But the attraction also stems from self-interest,” the author writes.
- “One shared irritation is NATO,” the author argues. “Trump does not need to withdraw the United States from NATO. He just needs to let it wither. He can send no further aid to Ukraine, and he can stop sending U.S. troops to stiffen NATO’s presence in Poland and the Baltic states. He can decide not to replace U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, when he steps down this summer. He can furl the nuclear umbrella with a simple public statement that it will be used only in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland.”
- “Perhaps most importantly, all attempted U.S.-Russian resets since the 1990s have ended in failure, with varying degrees of damage to U.S. allies before reality dawned,” the author reminds us. “It is not clear why a Trump-Putin version should be any different. In the end, Russia’s national interests are antithetical to those of the United States. In particular, any attempt to do a ‘reverse Nixon’ and woo Russia away from China looks impossible,” the author argues. “In the end, Trump’s unfathomable personality holds the key to his future relations with Putin. A full-scale love-in with the strongman in the Kremlin may be unlikely. But for erstwhile U.S. allies in Europe, the fact that it is even conceivable is alarming.”
“Trump’s Russia Strategy Is All Carrots, No Stick,” John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 05.07.25.
- “U.S. President Donald Trump reentered the White House in January hoping to achieve a quick peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. More than 100 days into his second term, Trump is still pushing for an agreement—and he’s beginning to concede that ending the war in Ukraine is no easy task,” the author writes. “‘Maybe it’s not possible,’ Trump said of a Ukraine-Russia peace deal during an interview with Meet the Press that aired Sunday [May 4]. But in an indication of Trump’s reluctance to give up just yet, the president added, ‘I think we have a very good chance of doing it.’”
- “Despite promising to end the fighting within 24 hours of taking office, Trump was always unlikely to see a deal reached quickly given the complex array of factors swirling around the war, former U.S. officials and experts say. And unless he’s willing to ramp up pressure on Moscow, the U.S. president is poised to continue falling short in this ambitious diplomatic endeavor,” according to the author.
- “‘The Russians have no reason at this point to actually negotiate with faith because their aim is the political control of Ukraine, and they still don’t see a clear counterforce for that,’ John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, told Foreign Policy. Trump has put ‘pressure on the victim’ to make concessions and ‘no pressure on the aggressor,’ Herbst said.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “Our duty is to defend the honor of the Red Army soldiers and commanders, and the heroism of fighters of different ethnic backgrounds who will forever remain Russian soldiers in world history. Russia has been and will continue to be an indestructible obstacle to Nazism, Russophobia and anti-Semitism, and will stand in the way of the violence perpetrated by the champions of these aggressive and destructive ideas. Truth and justice are on our side. The whole of Russia, our society and all people support the participants in the special military operation. We are proud of their courage and spirit, and their steely determination that has always brought us victory.”
- “Friends, nearly 80 percent of the world’s population were drawn into the fiery orbit of World War II. The complete defeat of Nazi Germany, militarist Japan and their satellites around the world was achieved through the combined efforts of the Allied Nations. … We will never forget that the opening of the Second Front in Europe, which took place after the decisive battles in the territory of the Soviet Union, hastened Victory. We highly appreciate the contribution made to our common struggle by the Allied armies, members of the Resistance, the courageous people of China, and all those who fought for a peaceful future.”
- “We will always rely on our unity in battle and in peaceful endeavors, in striving for strategic goals and tackling problems for the benefit of Russia and its greatness and prosperity. Glory to the victorious nation!” Note that in this speech Putin gives grudging credit to “Allied Nations” in the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany, downgrading the importance of a “second front” to simply hastening “Victory.” It’s worth underlining that Putin’s assessment is both generous by the standards of his recent speeches on “Nazis” and WWII,1 and, taking nothing away from the heroism and skill of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain, accurate in terms of the relative contribution of the Soviet Union and “Allied Nations” to victory against Nazi Germany.
- “The case of Russia’s domestic discourse around the U.S. in the Trump era illustrates two interrelated dilemmas of modern authoritarian information control,” the author writes.
- “First, the stronger the narrative, the harder it is to rewrite. Most Russians have been slow to respond to the shift in Kremlin-backed messaging and continue to view the U.S. in a highly negative light.”
- “Second, the Kremlin’s biggest challenge is not to control the narrative for the people in the middle but to rein in a volatile ideological base that it once empowered and that continues advocating maximalist war aims. Ex-Wagner mercenaries, voenkory, former combatants, and hardline ultranationalists remain fiercely committed to the idea of total victory and are deeply suspicious of any rhetoric suggesting compromise. With massive Telegram followings, these actors have demonstrated the ability to fracture Kremlin-aligned consensus, challenge official narratives, and mobilize outrage whenever they sense ideological backtracking.”
- “The Kremlin may still command the stage, but the actors it has created are no longer passive. They are politicized, mobilized, and, at times, unpredictable—a reality that complicates Russia’s war strategy,” according to the author.
- “In the quarter-century for which Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia, he and his entourage have created a power vertical,” the author writes. “But the number of new or vacant positions gradually decreased, and the distribution system hit a ceiling. That situation was exacerbated by the war with Ukraine, which has taken up all of the president’s focus, causing Putin to distance himself from his role of arbiter among the elites,” according to the author.
- “Accordingly, the players have become proactive, trying to expand the scope of their authority and establish horizontal connections with each other. Such connections give the elites the chance to survive beyond the post-Putin era, but at the same time, they undermine the foundations of Putinism,” the author writes.
- “The practice of horizontal ties and dialogue is bringing forward the dawn of post-Putin Russia. It blurs the contours of the vertical, providing opportunities for elite groups to resolve issues among themselves, without resorting to presidential arbitration,” the author writes. “Finally, it is becoming a school for the creation of coalitions: of political battles and opposing processes away from the public eye. Ultimately, horizontals are paving the way for a transition of power, because the elites are coming to understand that it is entirely possible to live without Putin.”
- “The nationwide feat during the Great Patriotic War was not a one-time outburst of fanatics blinded by ideology. It was a manifestation of the true patriotism of the Soviet people and the result of consistent and purposeful patriotic education of the citizens of our common Motherland,” the author writes. “Victory would have been impossible without the unity of the government and society, without the people's faith in the ideals they were defending, and without spirituality.”
- “The war [in Ukraine] has transformed the perception of military service in Russia, which was long considered a refuge for the uneducated, unskilled and otherwise unemployable. Serving in the army now provides such a social lift that Russian celebrities travel to occupied parts of Ukraine to post photographs of themselves as evidence that they are helping the war effort, or to mend reputations tarnished by public scandal.”
- “This elevation of Russia’s veterans aims to raise the prestige of military service and encourage more people to enlist. It also reflects Putin’s desire to head off any trouble from returning servicemen, many of whom might be traumatized by their experiences at the front. Some who have fought in Ukraine have committed violent crimes upon their return home.”
- “Since Russia invaded Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin and his government have been waging a parallel struggle to capture the minds of Russia’s next generation and raise loyal fighters for the future wars that he believes he needs to restore Russia’s imperial greatness,” the author writes. “At schools, libraries and youth clubs across Russia, the militarization of education is now on full display.”
- “Much of what has been revived harks back to the Soviet Union. The Youth Army and Putin’s new youth movement, ‘Movement of the First,’ is a reincarnation of the Komsomol. The new war camps, meanwhile, remind grandparents of their days in DOSAAF, a paramilitary sports organization in the Soviet Union,” the author writes.
- “They also showed how, far from readying Russia for peace, the Kremlin is rapidly and successfully pursuing a long-term strategy of preparing its society to fight new wars of expansionism to return the country to what it casts as its glorious Soviet past,” according to the author.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "How Putin Transformed Russia," Chloe Hadavas, Foreign Policy, 05.04.25.
- “With Acts of Subversion, Some Russians Fight Propaganda in Schools,” Natalya Vasilyeva, New York Times, 05.06.25.
- “Russia’s Military Show of Strength Masks Economic and Diplomatic Cracks,” Anatoly Kurmanaev, New York Times, 05.08.25.
- “On Red Square, Putin Enlists Russian Pride for His War in Ukraine,” Anatoly Kurmanaev, New York Times, 05.09.25.
- “Special Episode: Victory Day in Russia, with Arkady Ostrovsky,” Alexander Gabuev and Arkady Ostrovsky, Carnegie Russia and Eurasia Center, 05.08.25. Podcast.
Defense and aerospace:
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Ukraine:
- “The overall reason not to place faith in the deal is because it is subordinate to the US’s ambition to have rapprochement with Russia,” according to the author.
- “If Russia is allowed to continue unopposed – untroubled by Western support, or lack thereof – then almost everything is at risk. It would mean risks to wider European security, global trade (including sanctions relief), fundamental legal principles – perhaps even the fate of Taiwan and the ability to meet climate change goals,” the author writes.
- Despite the reverence for Ukraine's war dead, they, too, have become an income stream for corrupt officials,” the authors write. “Some funeral homes pay officials to win large contracts for transporting or burying dead troops, according to officials with knowledge of the transactions. Funeral homes overcharge councils for soldiers' headstones and coffins and split the difference with officials, police say.”
- “In Poltava, a city in eastern Ukraine, local government official Serhii Nechyporenko needed someone to help transport some of the dead from near the front lines to be buried in their home region. He turned to funeral director Alexander Burgardt. Prosecutors say that at a meeting at a city cemetery, the two men thrashed out their deal: Burgardt would get the contract for bringing corpses back from the morgue, and Nechyporenko, then deputy head of funeral services, would receive a share of the fees Burgardt received. Later that month, they met again at the same cemetery, where Burgardt handed Nechyporenko his cut, prosecutors say,” according to the authors.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Footnotes
- In media remarks prior to the May 9 victory parade in Moscow, for example, and in the presence of China’s President Xi Jinping, Putin entirely excluded ‘Allied Nations’ from credit for the defeat of Nazi Germany. See “Media statements by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping,” Kremlin.ru, 05.09.25.
The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.
*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.
Slider photo by Stefan Rousseau/Pool Photo via AP.
Russia Analytical Report