I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

NATO-Russia relations:

“Is NATO Getting Too Big to Succeed?” Charles Kupchan, New York Times, 05.26.17: The author, a professor of international affairs, writes that cooperation between U.S. President Donald Trump and Moscow to stop NATO’s continued expansion would actually be a good thing. He argues that NATO’s practice of anchoring new democracies to the Atlantic community by absorbing them into NATO has backfired, such as Russian interference in Ukraine and Georgia when those countries made moves to join NATO. The author calls NATO’s steady march east “a recipe for a strategic train wreck” and suggests the Balkans as a “natural strategic boundary” for the alliance. This limitation would also help maintain the integrity of alliance’s commitment to defense. Countries too close to Russia are too difficult to defend, making them an unrealistic commitment for NATO. This would put Georgia, Ukraine and others in a “strategic gray zone,” but the prospect of a NATO membership “only fuels false hopes” and incites Russian interference. However, strings would be attached to NATO’s non-expansion: Moscow would need to reciprocate the gesture by ending the conflict in Ukraine, resolving other “frozen conflicts” and de-escalating tensions with NATO.

“Growing Threats to the US at Sea; With Russia and China Expanding Their Naval Capabilities, What Can the US Do to Prepare?” James Stavridis, Wall Street Journal, 06.02.17: The author, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, writes that the era of U.S. naval dominance is coming to a close as both Russian and Chinese navies expand in size and capability. While Russia’s navy is small, it has made wise technological investments. The Russian navy will expand by 100 new ships by 2020, comparable to “the best of the U.S. fleet.” Russia has gained an important naval base in Crimea, and has also moved from its nearby waters into the North Atlantic, along the coasts of the U.S. and into the Arctic. Confrontation in the seas is growing increasingly likely as Russian ships and planes “play an unprofessional high-speed game of ‘chicken’” with U.S. counterparts. The Chinese, on the other hand, are building their naval power up from scratch, “developing a kind of hybrid war at sea.” In response to these intended challenges to U.S. naval power, the author recommends that U.S. maritime strategy focus on sea control and power projection. He advises more ships, more work with allies and more funding for technology. The U.S. should also not forget “that our ultimate strategic nuclear deterrent is based at sea in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles on stealthy submarines.” The oceans are an important resource, but they are also a geopolitical fulcrum.

Missile defense:

“Missile Defense Can’t Save Us from North Korea,” Kingston Reif, War on the Rocks, 05.29.17: The author, the director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, writes that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are the most urgent nuclear nonproliferation threat. North Korea has enough fissile material for approximate 10 warheads to date, and projections indicate 100 warheads by 2020. Existing U.S. missile defense has only limited to fair capabilities to protect the U.S. against missile attacks; limited gains for a long-standing irritant to U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations. The author advises waiting on new homeland interceptors “until a new ground-based midcourse defense kill vehicle” currently under development tests successfully “under realistic conditions.” He further advises that future deployments be schedule-driven, based on maturity of technology and successful testing under realistic conditions. The author also urges discipline in shoring up capabilities in East Asia. Future U.S. missile defense capability expansion also needs to take into consideration Russia and China. None of the three parties currently appear to take the others’ concerns seriously enough to deter arms racing. The author advises that the U.S. provide reassurance of its “limited purpose” defenses, along with discussion between the three parties on the possibility for destabilization being created. “The United States must use the full range of diplomatic, economic, and security tools at its disposal to reduce the threat posed by North Korea pursuant to the goal of phased denuclearization, beginning with a negotiated freeze on nuclear and missile testing.”

Cyber security:

“Russia’s Efforts to ‘Destabilise Western Democracy’ Increase Cyber Insecurity. Country Replaces China as Most Feared State-Sponsored Attacker,” Michael Imeson, Financial Times, 05.24.17: The author, a reporter for the Financial Times, writes that Russia’s alleged hacking into French President Emmanuel Macron’s party did not come as a surprise. As China has scaled back its corporate espionage efforts, Russia has replaced it as “the most feared state-sponsored cyber attacker.” Experts note that the U.S. has been able to obtain a commitment from Chinese leaders that China will step back from intellectual property theft. At the same time, numerous cyberattacks can be connected back to Russia. Groups such as APT 28 and APT 29 conduct attacks targeting Europe, the U.S. and former Soviet republics. Early version of APT 28’s signature malware feature “Russian language artifacts,” and over 89% of malware samples attributed to APT 28 “were compiled during the hours of the Moscow and St Petersburg working day.”

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“What the Russian Revolution Can Teach Us About Trump,” Ivan Krastev, New York Times, 05.31.17: The author, a political scientist, writes that contemporary writing on the Russian revolution could help make sense of the Trump administration’s Russia scandals. These writings increasingly shift the narrative of revolution from a rising of the masses to the product of a German plot. Similarly, if U.S. President Donald Trump’s election is the result of a Russian plot, understanding German motives in 1917 might shed light on Russian motives in 2016. This analogy suggests Russia’s intervention was inspired by a preference for Donald Trump and a hatred of Hillary Clinton. The author notes that stressing “ideological or other links” between Moscow and Trump is misleading. Just as Germany and Lenin saw each other as means to achieve their ends, “something similar is probably true” for Trump. However, collusion between Trump’s campaign and Moscow does not mean that “the new administration will be friendly to Russian or controlled by it.” The perception of Russian interference makes cooperation between Washington and Moscow less likely, lest Washington appear too soft on Russia. The author advises U.S. Democrats to let go of “their impeachment dreams.” Exposing Trump’s Russia connection will not “delegitimize the president,” as Lenin’s circumspect path to power “was not enough to diminish him or the revolution in the eyes of his supporters.” Just as 1917 inspired a wave of revolution across Europe that harmed Germany, so too might today’s wave of populism backfire on Russia’s current regime. The author notes Moscow’s foolishness in “believing that revolutions can be a reliable ally in achieving geopolitical results,” and that Washington should be aware that its current revolution is “first and foremost homemade.”

“What Does Russia Think About All This? ‘Washington Has Gone Crazy.’” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 06.01.17: The author, a foreign-affairs columnist for the Washington Post, writes that Russian officials and analysts are both flattered by the perception of Russia as a powerful threat and amazed that the U.S. is so preoccupied with the 2016 election hacking scandal. While this is “the official line,” regime critics have also echoed the sentiment. For most, heads are still spinning from the U.S. and Russia’s “sudden reversal of fortunes.” The author quotes one Kremlin official as feeling a mix of disgust and sympathy for the U.S. Either way, experts argue, Russian President Vladimir Putin wins. Russian meddling would show Russian might, while Russia’s abstinence from interference would show Russian innocence. “What surprises Russians is how quickly the U.S.-led order has been coming apart since the election of Donald Trump.” One former Russian government official sees Trump’s election “as a ‘paradigm shift’” and a time for payback, noting that a Clinton victory would have been cause to put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert. The author calls Russian media coverage of events in the U.S. as “sardonic.” Trump is to Russians “a familiar sort of political figure,” not unlike Boris Yeltsin. For Moscow, Trump’s victory most importantly meant the defeat of Clinton, who championed the very policies Russia sees “as a mortal threat.”

“We May Owe Our Lives to a Back Channel With Russia,” Evan Thomas, The Washington Post, 06.04.17: The author, a journalist and historian, writes that “Jared Kushner is not the first member of a presidential family to try to open a back channel with the Kremlin.” During the Kennedy administration, that role fell to Robert Kennedy, who met with Soviet intelligence agent Georgi Bolshakov a number of times. Their meetings highlight “the shortcomings and dangers” of such informal high-level diplomacy, but also its merits in crisis. In the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was this back channel that helped create first steps towards resolution. The author notes that back channels have the potential for creating chaos, but they can also lead to peace. For example, U.S. President Richard Nixon’s opening to China was made possible through Henry Kissinger’s back channel to China, and Kissinger also ran another back channel to the Kremlin. The author notes that “it would be interesting to know to what extent Kissinger is advising Kushner.”

“Trump's Allies, Convicted of High Crimes Without a Trial Maybe Flynn Committed Treason. But So Far No One Has Presented Any Evidence, Just Innuendo. That's Not Justice,” Eli Lake, Bloomberg, 05.26.17: The author, a columnist for the paper, writes that the possibility of Michael Flynn’s treason needs to be treated with more caution by the press. If there is evidence of treason, it has not been presented, and the charge of treason is a harsh one. This is possible thanks to “some very dirty business from the national security state.” The first of this two-pronged approach are “the whispers” from anonymous officials about intercepted conversations and the like. The second, “more insidious,” part is innuendo, such as ominous remarks by officials that do not outright call Flynn a spy, but make that idea clear. In normal cases, the U.S. government collects evidence before the public knows what the government “might be seeking evidence about.” While Flynn has committed legal violations, there is no evidence at present for treasonous violations. “And yet our elites have already convicted a decorated general of being a bumbling traitor. What if they're wrong?”

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Foreign Policy Price of Trump’s Russia Scandal,” Robert E. Hunter, LobeLog, 05.23.17: The author, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, writes that today’s “hysteria” in Washington has no rival. The nation’s political drama will come with collateral damage, most notably to U.S. foreign policy. The author argues that this political climate will harm the U.S. ability to “do what is necessary to promote its interests regarding Russia and related security interests.” The Russia scandal has “taken flight” partly due to Trump’s desire to approach Russia in a new but “as-yet-unspecified” way, as well as the “tide of emotional resistance” to Russia’s reemergence from economic tumult and its demands to be taken seriously again. The additional complexities of the U.S.-Russia relationship also serve a purpose in American politics. One is deflecting attention from Hillary Clinton’s “inept presidential campaign,” and the other is to transfer hatred of the foreign other into “a cudgel with which to beat Trump.” The author notes that putting off ways to reengage with Moscow while the U.S. deals with its domestic politics is not a good option, as Western security is at stake. The scandal also fuels the notion that things with Russia may have been different if it weren’t for Russia and Putin’s actions. The author notes that Russian policies hostile to the West were not adopted “out of the blue.” Previous administrations had too many people who believed that a “Russian once put down was to be kept down.” While neither Russian aggression in Europe nor interference in the U.S. election are to be excused, the Trump-Russia scandal is keeping the U.S. from exploring the possibility of any kind of reset. The author calls Trump’s desire for a new relationship with Russia a “valuable instinct.” However, it “is now being buried beneath the fundamental debate about his presidency, which is feeding so much of the Russia scandal, in major part for U.S. domestic political reasons.”

“Early Moves by Trump Akin to Some by Kennedys,” Larry Tye, The Boston Globe, 05.29.17: The author behind “Bobby Kennedy: The Making of a Liberal Icon” writes that the Kennedy White House, not the Nixon White House, is perhaps most comparable to the Trump White House. Parallels include the “penchant for naming close relatives” to high-level government posts, an obsession with a specific enemy or two (North Korea and ISIS for Trump, Cuba for the Kennedys) and the creation of a back channel to the Kremlin via a White House family member. The author notes that the Kennedys’ behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis offers a lesson for Trump. Russian response to the U.S. in Cuba was precipitated by U.S. aggression in the area. For President John F. Kennedy, his brother was the best conduit for messages between the U.S. president and his Russian counterpart, which “worked brilliantly until the Missile Crisis in 1962.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Fanning the Flames in Macedonia,” Maxim Samorukov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.31.17: The author, deputy editor of Carnegie.ru, writes that Macedonia is “an excellent example of how the international community responds when a country on the outskirts of Europe comes to the brink of civil war.” It also involves several hot topics, including Russian interference. The current conflict as covered by international media is a familiar one: Russian-backed, ethnic-majority authoritarian regime oppresses ethnic-minority democratic opposition. However, the reason behind the current crisis does not fit this narrative. Rather, the crisis centers on EU promises of a European future for Macedonia that have not been fulfilled. Macedonia complied with the Ohrid Agreement sixteen years ago, but the promised accession to the EU in return has not taken place. Crises similar to this are taking place elsewhere in the Western Balkans. As the EU has no solution, Washington will again have to step in.

China:

“Donald Trump’s Plan to Play Russia Against China Is a Fool’s Errand,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.24.17: The author, a senior associate and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that “the Trump administration is trying to borrow a page from Henry Kissinger’s template of ‘triangular diplomacy’ for managing relations with Russia and China.” However, a grand bargain with the U.S. on China is unlikely to sway Putin for several reasons. Russia is well aware of the costs of “an adverse relationship with China.” In 2014, Russia also conducted its first inter-agency study on the risks of a partnership with Beijing. The study’s findings dispelled many of the Kremlin’s worries. These include that Russia and China have more in common than they do with the U.S. While Russia is aware of the asymmetry of its relationship with China, this appears to have been accepted. Washington’s “missteps on Russia” and Trump’s “naïve embrace of Xi after the Mar-a-Lago summit” allow China to keep its position in “the beneficial corner of the triangle.”

“The Silk Road to Nowhere,” Alexander Gabuev, Moscow Carnegie Center, 05.24.17: The author, a senior associate and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that China’s Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in May did not show the success of China’s Silk Road revival like it was meant to do. This is due largely to “a lack of performance criteria.” The Belt and Road Initiative is also not doing anything that China has not already been doing for years: building infrastructure in other countries, running fiber-optic and pipeline networks across Eurasia and financing various projects. China’s reasons for investing in the project including largely economic reasons as well as the geopolitical motivation of land routes for cargo shipments to avoid tensions in the South China Sea. Beijing is now being more cautious about its investments due to a recent reassessment of bad debt levels. The author notes that Russia should not “shy away from” Chinese investment, but it will need to “improve its investment climate” in order to compete for Chinese trade and money.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine's Government Is Failing to Unite Ukrainians,” Nicolai N. Petro and Josh Cohen, The National Interest, 05.30.17: The authors, a professor of peace and nonviolence and a former USAID project officer, write that new Ukrainian sanctions on Russia will impact “nearly every Ukrainian internet user.” This “virtual wall around Ukraine” is creating fears that the cultural affinity of most eastern Ukrainians for Russia may come under attack as disloyal. “Comments such as those by Ukraine’s minister of culture, Yevhen Nyshchuk, who called eastern Ukrainians the products of ‘inadequate genetics’ and a ‘failure of consciousness’” heighten those fears. The authors argue that government assaults on the religious, cultural and ethnic identities of southern and eastern Ukrainians, not Russian propaganda, help maintain the belief that the Maidan revolt in 2014 was an illegal military coup d’etat. These Ukrainians see the sanctions on Russia as sanctions against them. Other legislation in the works to amend current language law bolsters this perception. With Russian as prevalent as it is in Ukraine, “the government is sending a clear message of exclusion rather than inclusion” with these legislative attempts. While stoking domestic tensions may seem counterproductive, there are short-term political benefits to encouraging hatred of Russia, including international support and funding, shifting attention away from unpopular economic reforms and upholding “the dominance of the nationalist agenda.” The authors urge the “an inclusive civic culture” respecting Ukraine’s bicultural identity in order to prevent fractures “along ethno-religious lines.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Belarus: With Friends Like These. . .,” Eugene Rumer, Bogdan Belei, Carnegie Endowment, 05.21.17: The authors, the director and senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program and a junior fellow in the program, write that Russia’s grip on its “near abroad” is less certain than many suppose. Belarus, for example, has been considered both Moscow’s closest ally and its most frustrating partner. The country’s 2016 military doctrine suggests that both NATO and Russia pose a threat to Belarus. As a result, Belarus is moving to increase transparency and maintain ties with the EU and NATO. Any conflict between Russia and NATO would place Belarus at the center as a strategic point for both sides. Belarusian actions since 2014 suggest that Russia should not count on Belarus’ allegiance as a given. Belarus also stands to lose most heavily in any Russia-NATO conflict. The authors note that ambiguity appears to be Minsk’s “only logical course of actions.” For the West, this means accepting Minsk’s ties to Moscow and recognizing that any changes in Belarus could be slow and halting.

“US Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three,” Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment, 05.31.17: The authors, the director of and fellows in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program, write that recent geopolitical changes around the world “call for sustained U.S. engagement” in the South Caucasus to advance U.S. interests there. While U.S. involvement in the region has had some positive impacts, some initiatives have underestimated the region’s challenges and insufficient resources. These are factors U.S. policy will have to contend with, including “Russia’s dominant position and its opposition to U.S. engagement there.” To succeed, the U.S. will need to strike a careful balance between its commitments and resources and appreciate its limits. The authors suggest guiding principles for sustainable policy: prioritizing conflict prevention, caution in promoting U.S. values, modest expectation, making room for the EU and realism regarding energy potential.  

“Georgia at Twenty-Five: In a Difficult Spot,” Paul Stronski, Alexandra Vreeman, Carnegie Endowment, 05.25.17: The authors, fellows in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program, write that Georgia’s democratization is “truly impressive.” It has held several “relatively clean national elections,” has a vocal civil society and a free media. It has become a tourist destination for many across Eurasia, and while its “lack of territorial integrity remains a painful reminder of its past,” Georgia’s democratic development has flourished. However, this does not mean that challenges do not persist, both in terms of democratic progress and economic growth. A tense security relationship with Moscow and working with the West as it becomes increasingly distracted makes progress even more complicated.  

III. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Test for Russia Is Not the 2018 Election But What Follows,” Alexey Makarkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.25.17: The author, a political analyst, writes that the challenge facing Russia in 2018 will be “the mismatch between the public’s expectations and the decisions that the regime will inevitably have to make after the election.” Russians expect their economic prospects to at not get worse, and perhaps even improve; however, the economic growth of the mid-2000s is a distant memory. Economic measures that are likely to take place in the latter half of 2018 include raising the retirement age, as well as increases in tax rates and thus prices, a cost businesses will attempt to shift onto consumers. Other matters may also come to the fore following the election. This includes a threat to Putin’s recent tsar-like image, as both the elite and the public undergo “gradual demobilization.” Political risks may also increase after 2018 as difficult socioeconomic choices that the regime will have to make will possibly “prompt the public to lay blame not only on the boyars but also on the tsar.”

Defense:

“The Wars of the Future: Russian Defense Ministry's New Modernization Plan,” Michael Kofman, The Moscow Times, 06.04.17: The author, a senior research scientist with the Center for Naval Analyses, writes that Russia’s delayed State Armament Program is due to be finalized by September, determining “the weapons and systems they will fight with into the 2030s.” The budget was settled between the Ministries of Finance and Defense at 17 trillion rubles. While the program’s actual inclusions are still being decided, shifts in priority will be clear. While the 2011-2017 years were dedicated to modernizing the Soviet military, now Russian leadership is looking to new systems, “the technology of the future.” The space program will be addressed, as will an upgrade to Russia’s strategic rocket forces. Russian forces in the south, west and the Arctic “are likely to see the greatest investments.” A greater portion of this program will be devoted to the army. The air force will see the “relaunch of the Soviet-designed Tu-160 strategic bombers,” while Russia’s navy will receive new ships and submarines. As Russia “seems to have remembered” that it is mostly a Eurasian land power, this new “state armament plan will offer a glimpse of the types of conflicts and operations Russia is planning for in 2020s and beyond.”