Russia Analytical Report, May 19-27, 2025

4 Ideas to Explore

  1. Russia’s aerial attacks against Ukraine in the past few days have shattered some of the previous records, according to estimates by ISW that are based on data from the Ukrainian air force.1 In spite of this escalation, “Ukraine still has a fighting chance against drones and cruise missiles. But the outlook against ballistic threats is bleaker,” The Economist writes. The increase in Russian attacks have prompted U.S. President Donald Trump to claim that his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin “has gone absolutely CRAZY.” “I’ve always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that’s proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on May 25.2 According to the DIA’s 2025 assessment, however, Putin’s goals are ultimately “Ukrainian neutrality and a further partition of the Ukrainian state.”   
  2. “Having shuffled commanders and built-up reserves of equipment, Russia is now set to increase the tempo and scale of attacks,” according to Jack Watling’s commentary for RUSI, entitled "Ukraine Prepares for a Russian Summer Offensive.” Watling predicts that Russia’s summer offensive “will likely have a soft launch with a steady increase in the number and scale of assaults across a broadening area around the main axis.” Absent a negotiated settlement or "robust" Western assistance, the war "probably will continue to slowly trend in Russia's favor through 2025," according to the DIA’s 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment. If the pace of Russia’s advance so far this year, as estimated by ISW and DeepState, remains unchanged (which is highly unlikely, as such trends are rarely continuously linear), it would take Russia 140–180 years to capture the remaining 80%+ of Ukrainian territory.
  3. Ukrainians should not bet on some kind of “white swan” event that would “bring peace to Ukraine in the borders of 1991 or 2022,” ex-commander of Ukraine’s armed forces Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi said at a recent forum. Ukraine needs to transform the nature of the current war from that of attrition to one that minimizes the expenditure of Ukraine’s human and economic resources, he said. Given the “huge deficit of human resources and a catastrophic economic situation,” “we can only talk about a high-tech war for survival, where a minimum of human resources, a minimum of economic means are used to achieve maximum benefit,” according to Zaluzhnyi.
  4. “To help mediate an agreement that would end the most violent conflict of our era,” President Trump needs to abandon three illusions he has been harboring, according to David Ignatius. “The first and biggest problem is that Putin has shown no evidence that he wants peace,” Ignatius writes in a Washington Post column. “A second impediment is Trump's notion that Russia represents a potential economic gold mine for the United States,” while “a third misconception is that a crippled Ukraine can be compelled to surrender,” according to Ignatius.

  

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Russia is raining hellfire on Ukraine," The Economist, 05.25.25.

  • “A year ago, for 30 drones to strike Ukraine in a single night was considered exceptional. Now Russia is saturating Ukraine’s air defenses with hundreds of them. On May 25th the Kremlin pummeled the country, with what it called a ‘massive strike’ against Ukrainian cities, featuring 298 drones, probably a record. Russia is using more missiles, too: 69 were fired on the same night.”3
  • “The main challenge facing Ukraine’s air-defense crews is the sheer number now flying at them [Iranian-designed drones]. ...Even if Ukraine manages to stabilize the front lines in the east, the difficulties of protecting the skies will only grow.”
  • “As they continue to dissect the latest Shahed delivery, the engineers say one of their biggest worries is how the Russian drones are now being controlled. The newest models are unfazed by Ukraine’s electronic warfare, they say... Not long ago, most of the drone-hunting was done by mobile crews with cheap machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles and short-range artillery. Now, says Colonel Denys Smazhny, an officer in the air-defense forces, the drones routinely maneuver around these groups.”
  • “Ukraine still has a fighting chance against drones and cruise missiles. But the outlook against ballistic threats is bleaker. Only a handful of countries have systems that can counter such fast and destructive weapons. In the Western world, the American Patriot system has an effective monopoly on the ballistic air-defense business.”

U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on his Truth Social account on 05.25.25:

  • “I’ve always had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY! He is needlessly killing a lot of people, and I’m not just talking about soldiers. Missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever. I’ve always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that’s proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia! Likewise, President Zelenskyy is doing his Country no favors by talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don’t like it, and it better stop. This is a War that would never have started if I were President. This is Zelenskyy’s, Putin’s, and Biden’s War, not ‘Trump’s,’ I am only helping to put out the big and ugly fires, that have been started through Gross Incompetence and Hatred.”4

“2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment," Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse, Defense Intelligence Agency, 05.11.25.

  • “Putin almost certainly is committed to victory in Ukraine, and his objectives remain mostly unchanged since the beginning of the war: Ukrainian neutrality and a further partition of the Ukrainian state. In the absence of a negotiated settlement or, alternatively, robust Western aid, the battlefield outlook probably will continue to slowly trend in Russia’s favor through 2025, though Russian battlefield gains are slowing and continue to come at the expense of high personnel and equipment losses.”
    • “Since the war’s start, Russia has lost at least 10,000 ground combat vehicles, including more than 3,000 tanks, as well as nearly 250 aircraft and helicopters, and more than 10 naval vessels. Russia has experienced more than 700,000 personnel casualties during the war. Russian forces maintain small, incremental progress toward capturing portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.”
  • “While affirming an openness to a negotiated settlement, Russia has remained largely steadfast in its demands for post-conflict Ukrainian neutrality, authority over the size of Ukraine’s armed forces, and a further partitioning of the Ukrainian state. Russia is likely to continue its strategy of attrition, focused on degrading Ukraine’s ability and will to resist through 2025, and allowing Russia to impose its preferred terms in any future negotiated settlement. Although Putin and his military leaders probably would prefer more rapid battlefield gains, Moscow seems comfortable with the current cost of its slow advances, calculating they can steadily drain Ukraine’s resources and will, and outlast the West’s support for Ukraine. The war against Ukraine has proven costly to the Russian military, especially to Russia’s ground forces, which probably have suffered more than 170,000 fatalities since the war began.”
  • “Russia’s conventional capabilities to deter, fight, or militarily compete with NATO are likely to be degraded for at least the next three years as the majority of all combat-capable Russian units are committed to the war in Ukraine... rising defense production costs probably will hamper Russia’s long-term modernization efforts, particularly for producing advanced equipment.”
    “The Russian Navy almost certainly will serve as Russia’s primary tool of global power projection during the next year.”
  • “Russian state and nonstate cyberactors have maintained a high volume of offensive cyberoperations against U.S.-associated target networks. State-sanctioned cyberoperations have seemingly prioritized cyberespionage over cyberattacks, targeting sensitive data and intellectual property”
  • “Russia will prioritize the development and fielding of counterspace systems over the next year, which it believes  will deter Western adversaries reliant on space and enable it to disrupt or destroy Western satellites should deterrence fail. One such system is a satellite capable of carrying a nuclear device.”
  • “Russia is expanding its nuclear forces by adding new capabilities, including nuclear air-to- air missiles and novel nuclear systems. Russia probably maintains a nuclear stockpile of about 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and up to 2,000 non-strategic warheads. Russia is expanding its nuclear posture to Belarus by establishing missile and nuclear-capable aircraft capabilities, renovating a nuclear weapons storage site, and training Belarusian crews to handle tactical nuclear weapons. Throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia has used nuclear-related rhetoric and military exercises to signal its resolve and deter Russia-perceived Western involvement in the conflict. However, Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the conflict unless Russian leadership judged it faced an existential threat to the regime.”
  • “Russia seeks to enhance its force projection by pursuing basing or pre-approved port call agreements worldwide.”

"Trump softens on Putin as Russia’s military edge weakens, officials say," Karen DeYoung, Catherine Belton and Mary Ilyushina, The Washington Post, 05.24.25.

  • “Russia's battlefield strength in Ukraine has started to wane and it could run into serious shortages of manpower and weaponry by next year, even as President Donald Trump retreats from pressure on Moscow to end the war, according to senior U.S. and European officials and military experts.”
  • “Absent a negotiated settlement or ‘robust’ Western assistance, the war ‘probably will continue to slowly trend in Russia's favor through 2025,’ according to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment presented to Congress 10 days ago by the agency's director, Lt. Gen. Jeffrey A. Kruse. But Russian gains ‘are slowing and continue to come at the expense of high personnel and equipment losses.’”
  • “Over the past year, Russia has taken only 0.6 percent of additional Ukrainian territory, at the cost of 1,500 killed or wounded per day, current and former Western officials said.”
  • “The rate of Russia's advance on the ground has been slowed to a near-standstill, in part because of Ukraine's fortification of a 10-mile defensive zone littered with mines and trenches and the use of short-range drones to attack any Russian approach to the front lines, according to Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute in London.”
  • “If no ceasefire is arranged, Russia is likely to use its narrowing window of superiority to intensify attacks over the summer in a bid to break through Ukraine's exhausted ranks, Watling and Barrons said. But it could be Moscow's last opportunity.”
  • “Even if Russia succeeded in gaining more Ukrainian territory, the Kremlin is unlikely to achieve its stated goal of seizing full control of the four regions it illegally annexed in the fall of 2022—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia—according to Dara Massicot, senior research fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.”

"Zaluzhnyi on the 1991 borders: there will be no miracles, the enemy has resources for war," RBC.ua, 05.22.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • “Ukrainians should not bet on some kind of ‘white swan’ event that would ‘bring peace to Ukraine in the borders of 1991 or 2022,’ ex-commander of Ukraine’s armed forces Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi said at a recent public forum in Ukraine. Ukraine needs to transform the nature of the current war from that of attrition to one that minimizes the expenditure of Ukraine’s human and economic resources, he said. Given the ‘huge deficit of human resources and a catastrophic economic situation,’ ‘we can only talk about a high-tech war for survival, where a minimum of human resources, a minimum of economic means are used to achieve maximum benefit,’ according to Zaluzhnyi.”

"‘Expect no miracle’: Ukraine braces for Russia’s summer offensive," Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 05.25.25.

  • “Along Ukraine’s more than 1,000-kilometer frontline, the rhythm of war has settled into a brutal, deadly pattern. Moscow is regrouping ahead of what soldiers and analysts said is the lead-up to a new, big push in the months ahead. Fighting has intensified in recent weeks around Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka, pressuring the strongholds of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and approaching the borders of neighboring Dnipropetrovsk region.”
  • “Aiding the infantry is Russia’s heavy and high-tech weaponry blasting its way through, with glide bombs, missiles and drones — including new models connected via fiber-optic cables that make them immune to electronic jamming. Defenders have been forced to pull back from towns including Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, where the cost of holding ground proved too high.”
  • “Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former top general and current ambassador to the UK, warned a London audience on Thursday not to expect ‘some kind of miracle . . . that will bring peace to Ukraine.’”

"Ukraine Prepares for a Russian Summer Offensive," Jack Watling, RUSI, 05.20.25. 

  • “The rate of Russian advance began to accelerate over the autumn of 2024. Russian advances then stalled as Ukraine adapted to Russian assault tactics and imposed a 15 km deep belt of attrition that prevented Russian troops reaching the line of contact in sufficient numbers to break through. Ukraine has suffered throughout this period from a shortage of troops, with recruitment still below the level needed to maintain the force. But Russia’s ability to inflict casualties on the Armed Forces of Ukraine was not matched by an ability to take ground.”
  • “April and early May of 2025 saw a reduction in the intensity of Russian operations, partly as a result of performative ‘ceasefires’ around Easter and Victory Day, and the redeployment of forces following the collapse of Ukrainian positions in Kursk. Russian recruitment, however, has exceeded Kremlin targets for every month of 2025. Having shuffled commanders and built-up reserves of equipment, Russia is now set to increase the tempo and scale of attacks.”
  • “The word ‘offensive’ conjures up visions of rapid maneuvers by large mechanized units. The Russians lack the force quality to operate in this way. Instead, its summer offensive will likely have a soft launch with a steady increase in the number and scale of assaults across a broadening area around the main axis. Indeed, there are indications this process has already started.”

"Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine," Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows, War on the Rocks, 05.21.25.

  • “Russian forces in Ukraine are suffering casualties at more than 400,000 per year — enough to pack the house at the world’s four largest stadiums. ... Can Russian forces sustain similar losses in its ongoing war in Ukraine and rebuild to fight another day? The likely answer is ‘yes,’ and it speaks to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach toward negotiations to end the war. In refusing to agree to an unconditional ceasefire and skipping the latest peace talks in Turkey, Putin is playing for time — because time appears to be on his side.”
  • “While Russia could run out of quality recruits, force replenishment through 2024 was far more successful than many predicted. In April of that year, NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Gen. Christopher Cavoli observed that ‘Russia is reconstituting that force far faster than our initial estimates suggested. The army is actually now larger — by 15 percent — than it was when it invaded Ukraine.’”
  • “Whether Russia can maintain its ability to reconstitute and even grow its forces as its war in Ukraine progresses remains uncertain. More certain is its advantage over Ukraine in terms of total population, with nearly four times as many people and roughly 18.9 million males aged 20–39 relative to Ukraine’s fewer than five million males of that age. Russia can lose three times as many troops as Ukraine and still suffer less in relative terms.”
  • “By 2035, Russia will have roughly 1.22 to 3.58 million fewer military-aged males than in 2025, according to U.N. Population Division forecasts. However, even their 95 percent lower bound forecast for 2035 leaves a total population of Russian males between the ages of 20 and 44 of 20.1 million — a number that is greater than half of Ukraine’s total population as of 2023.”

"Lessons from the War in Ukraine for Space: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Conflicts," Andrew Radin, Khrystyna Holynska, Cheyenne Tretter and Thomas Van Bibber, RAND Corporation, 05.21.25.

  • “Key space services will likely be disrupted in future conflicts. Cyberattacks, Global Positioning System jamming, and other threats have significantly shaped the war, and the growing sophistication of both Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities only increases the likelihood that the United States and its allies might face similar disruptions in a future conflict.”
  • “The widespread availability of space services increases the transparency of the battlefield. The accessibility of commercial imagery or released national imagery will likely make future large-scale conflicts relatively more visible in open sources and to wider audiences.”
  • “Commercial space services bring value and vulnerability. Ukraine’s ability to leverage Western commercial services enhanced its warfighting and reduced the need to field its own capabilities. Hesitations about SpaceX highlights how reliability concerns make countries cautious about depending on a single commercial provider.”
  • “Future warfare will present unique challenges and opportunities across different space mission areas. For SATCOM, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the potential utility of proliferated SATCOM architectures for enabling terrestrial forces. For PNT, the war in Ukraine has shown how space-provided global navigation satellite systems will very likely face continuing challenges from terrestrial jamming. For ISR, commercial ISR products or those shared by other partners can substitute for national capabilities, but an overdependence on shared capabilities can reduce U.S. partners’ freedom of action.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Can Ukraine Fight Without U.S. Aid? Seven Questions to Ask," Iselin Brady, Daniel Byman, Riley McCabe and Alexander Palmer, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 05.19.25.

  • “A U.S. suspension of military support to Ukraine would be a grievous blow to Kyiv. But would it be fatal? Ukraine’s own resolve has been formidable even after three years of war, and Europe, which already provides tens of billions of euros in financial and military aid, might play a still greater role. This paper argues that a complete U.S. military and intelligence aid cutoff would significantly harm Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia but would not necessarily lead to immediate defeat—and that more limited cutoffs would have more limited effects on Ukraine’s battlefield performance.” 

"Western Businesses Will Not Return to Russia," Thane Gustafson, Project Syndicate, 05.23.25.

  • “It is easy to see why Russia would want to launch a charm offensive aimed at luring back Western businesses and investment. But Westerners are unlikely to respond with anything like the missionary zeal of 30 years ago. The once-empty niches left by the collapse of the Soviet economy have now been filled by Russians, and Western firms – remembering their previous bitter experiences – are pursuing more promising opportunities elsewhere. It is not the same Russia – and not the same West.”

"Make Moscow Pay: The Case for Seizing Russian Assets to Fund Ukraine’s Defense," Wally Adeyemo and David Shimer, Foreign Affairs, 05.21.25.

  • “At this critical moment, the European Union should seize the immobilized Russian sovereign assets that sit in Europe and use those resources to provide Ukraine with a sustainable source of assistance,” the authors write.
  • “The need to seize Russia’s sovereign assets is more urgent now than at any time since the war began,” according to the authors. They argue that “The war in Ukraine is at an inflection point: U.S. support for Kyiv is receding; Moscow is continuing its invasion, with the help of Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran; and Putin is betting that his position will improve with time. European countries can shift these dynamics, provide Ukraine with a lasting source of support, and persuade Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations. U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly argued that Ukraine ‘has no cards’ in peace talks. But with Russia’s sovereign assets, Europe holds a card of its own. Now is the time to play it.”

"Time for a GOP Senate Revolt on Putin," Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 05.27.25.

  • “Mr. Trump and his advisers fancy themselves steely-eyed realists on foreign policy. No ‘neocon’ idealism for them. But on Mr. Putin they are starry-eyed idealists, mouthing ‘peace’ as if they can make it happen by wishing it were so. Mr. Trump's naivete is helping Russia continue the killing as long as Mr. Putin wants.”5
  • “The good news is that the U.S. Senate still has some genuine realists when it comes to Russia. As GOP Sen. Lindsey Graham writes in a letter nearby, he has 82 co-sponsors on a bill that would hit countries that buy Russian oil and gas with tariff sanctions. Energy sales are Mr. Putin's financial lifeline. President Biden refused to apply these so-called secondary sanctions, and Mr. Trump can't make up his mind. ... If Mr. Trump signaled that he supports the Graham-Tom Cotton-Richard Blumenthal sanctions bill, it would sail through the Senate.”

“Lindsey Graham: The U.S. Senate Won't Tolerate Putin's Games; The South Carolina Republican sends a message to Moscow,” Wall Street Journal, 05.27.25.

  • “Peace requires willing partners. While Ukraine has made clear it is ready for such an end, Russia has made more excuses than the market can bear. President Trump has asked Vladimir Putin to provide a term sheet outlining the requirements for a cease-fire, bringing the roadblocks to peace to a head. Depending on how Russia responds, we will know which course to take.”
  • “The Senate is prepared either way. I have coordinated with the White House on the Russia sanctions bill since its inception. The bill would put Russia on a trade island, slapping 500% tariffs on any country that buys Moscow's energy products. The consequences of its barbaric invasion must be made real to those that prop it up.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"Trump’s Ukraine peace push is built on three illusions," David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 05.20.25.

  • “To resolve this conflict, Trump needs to address the obstacles standing in the way of a breakthrough agreement. Putin right now won't even accept a ceasefire.”
    • “The first and biggest problem is that Putin has shown no evidence that he wants peace. He still wants victory, which he described once again after Monday's call with the phrase ‘eliminate the root causes of the crisis.’”
    • “A second impediment is Trump's notion that Russia represents a potential economic gold mine for the United States. Trump said it again Monday with characteristic hyperbole: ‘There is a tremendous opportunity for Russia to create massive amounts of jobs and wealth [when the war ends]. Its potential is UNLIMITED.’”
    • “A third misconception is that a crippled Ukraine can be compelled to surrender. Trump's version of this doom scenario is the phrase ‘you have no cards,’ which he repeats often to President Volodymyr Zelensky. But it turns out that Ukraine has one very powerful card, which is strong support from Europe.”
  • “Trump has a chance to help mediate an agreement that would end the most violent conflict of our era. But if he doesn't find the patience for hard and well-organized bargaining with Putin, Ukraine will have no choice but to fend for itself - leaving a black mark for Trump rather than a badge of honor.”

“The Russia-Ukraine Endgame and the Future of Europe,” Derek Chollet and Lisa Sawyer, JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics, May 2025.

  • “President Zelenskyy will likely be forced to accept a negotiated settlement with Russia sometime this year that freezes the fighting but stops short of a comprehensive peace agreement,” the authors write. “Putin’s losses are also far from sustainable. At its current rate of gain, Russia will control all of Ukraine in about…118 years. So Putin will aim to cut a deal that is favorable to his overall goal to eventually control Kyiv.”
  • “The durability of any settlement will depend on: (1) how satisfied President Putin is with Ukrainian and Western concessions (did he get enough of what he wanted?). … And (2) the strength of the security promises underwriting it (are they sufficient to deter further aggression and allow Ukraine to rebuild with confidence?),” according to the authors. “These are in direct tension; the weaker the security promises, the more concessions Ukraine will have to swallow … or risk a return to fighting.”
  • “Generally, we see 4 possible outcomes, each with parallels to other countries today,” the authors write.
    • Best case – “South Korea.” Odds 15%.
    • Still OK – “Israel.” Odds: 20%.
    • Not great – “Georgia.” Odds: 50%.
    • Worst case – “Belarus.” Odds: 15%.

“To Europe, Our Allies and Partners: ‘We’ll Emerge from the Trump Presidency!,’ Ned Price, 29th Spokesman for The U.S. Department of State,” Faces of Democracy, 05.20.25. (interview)

  • Sven Lilienström, founder of the Faces of Democracy initiative, spoke with Ned Price, former U.S. spokesperson for the U.S. State Department during the Biden administration, and senior advisor to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
  • SL: “What is your assessment of the proposed peace plan for Ukraine? Is it a real opportunity, or just a dictated peace?”
    • NP: “It’s important that we distinguish between a ceasefire and a just and durable peace… If this is nothing more than an imposed ceasefire, it will really undermine these very principles: the idea that big countries cannot and should not bully small countries, that powerful countries can’t redraw borders by force. The idea that might cannot make right or might cannot equate right. If Vladimir Putin is essentially rewarded with a ceasefire which hands over to him all or nearly all of the land that he has attempted to seize and annex, whether since 2022 or 2014, these principles will be undermined and perhaps even destroyed.”
    • “Worse yet, such an outcome will only incentivize people like Vladimir Putin to continue. And this is a threat that goes well beyond Europe. It goes far beyond Putin’s ambitions regarding the Baltics or countries like Moldova or Georgia. It extends into the Indo-Pacific where other dictators and would-be dictators including President Xi are eyeing quite closely Taiwan, disputed maritime features in the South China and the East China seas.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War," Bryan Frederick, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel Charap, Krystyna Marcinek, Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek, et al., RAND Corporation, 05.22.25.

  • “The war’s primary geostrategic effect has been to strengthen the relationship between the United States and its European allies while simultaneously weakening relationships between Europe and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the People’s Republic of China.
  • Russian and Chinese incentives to undermine the transatlantic alliance have increased.
  • U.S. and allied adaptations are necessary to prepare for future large-scale protracted conflicts and preserve extended deterrence.
  • The U.S. defense community may be neglecting the implications of the war in Ukraine for future contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific region, including in Europe.”

"Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War and the Changing Face of Conflict," Bryan Frederick, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel Charap, Krystyna Marcinek, Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek, et al., RAND Corporation, 05.22.25.

  • “Europe’s strategic orientation has shifted. The main effects of the Russian invasion have been to drive a wedge between European nations and Russia (and to some extent, China), while deepening cooperation between the United States and its European allies. If sustained, these effects would likely be the most enduring strategic cost Russia will pay for the war.”
  • “Closer Russian-Chinese cooperation raises concerns for the United States. The prospect of closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in both peacetime subversion efforts and potential wartime collaboration poses strategic concerns for the United States that will bear close observation.”
  • “Closer U.S.-European alignment could help deter conflict in Asia. If sustained, closer alignment with Europe could allow the United States to direct more security resources toward the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, greater alignment on European security could lead to more U.S.-European cooperation on other strategic issues, such as confronting the risk of Chinese aggression against U.S. allies in the Pacific region.”
  • “The war has clarified attitudes among Global South nations. The Global South nations, primarily in Africa, Latin America, and Asia—of which India is the largest—have reacted with ambivalence toward the Russian invasion. In general, their hesitance to join in economic sanctions or restrict trade with Moscow has blunted the full force of Western sanctions and suggests a continued drift away from the U.S.-led order.”
  • “Economic tools have uncertain values as forms of punishment. Western nations have turned to innovative forms of economic punishment to isolate Russia from the global economy. Yet, the utility of these tools is uncertain. Russia has adapted in ways that circumvent restrictions, and China is likely learning from this experience on how to improve its own countermeasures.”
  • “Lessons from Ukraine can apply across theaters and to U.S. defense commitments in Europe. The United States is learning from operations in Ukraine and applying these lessons to the Indo-Pacific region, but less attention has been paid to understanding how these lessons could reshape the U.S. approach to defending allies in other theaters, particularly—and ironically—in Europe. The search for a cost-effective, asymmetrically advantageous means of deterring adversary aggression applies equally across theaters.”

"Will Europe Rebuild or Divide? The Strategic Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War for Europe’s Future," Alexandra T. Evans, Krystyna Marcinek, and Omar Danaf, RAND Corporation, 05.22.25.

  • “The European shift away from engagement with Russia is likely irreversible absent a significant change in Russian leadership, domestic politics, or external behavior.
  • The war has energized Europeans to improve their operational flexibility, but any movement toward strategic autonomy from the United States is likely to be limited.
  • Although the EU has sought a greater defense role, the substantial reforms that would enable Brussels to direct collective military action are unlikely because of national differences and the immaturity of existing proposals.
  • European engagement with Ukraine is generally one-directional and falls short of standards for de facto defense integration.
  • Ukraine’s formal integration through the EU and NATO is unlikely in the near term.”

"Implications of Russia's War on Ukraine for the U.S. and Allied Defense Industrial Bases," Alisa Laufer, Howard J. Shatz, and Omar Danaf, RAND Corporation, 05.22.25.

  • "Transatlantic reforms have been positive but modest."
  • "Key production lines still face challenges."
  • "Sustained funding for U.S. and European DIB modernization and production is essential to overcome persistent constraints on production capacity but is not guaranteed."
  • "DIB growth could create new coordination challenges."
  • "Ongoing investments in Ukraine’s DIB offer promise for a new defense industrial power in Europe”

​"How Can Europe Deter Putin? Revive the ‘Reforger,'" James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 05.21.25.

  • “When I was a junior officer during the Cold War, the biggest North Atlantic Treaty Organization military training exercises — perhaps the largest in history — were annual drills called Exercise Reforger. The goal was to ensure NATO’s ability to deploy troops rapidly to West Germany if war broke out between the alliance and the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact nations. “Reforger” was a loose acronym of “Return of Forces to Germany.””
  • “The massive Cold War military exercise put a stop to Soviet aggression then, and it could do the same with Russia now.”
  • “Above all, like its ancestor Reforger, the new exercise should focus on the swift flow of logistics. Smaller recent exercises have revealed infrastructure problems — particularly with highways, bridges and rail lines — that NATO has been working to remedy, especially in the newer Eastern European members. So much war depends on getting the right troops, transportation and ordnance together at the point of attack. A new Reforger could demonstrate that vital ability — right in front of Vladimir Putin’s nose.”

"Russia builds up military presence along borders with NATO member countries," Leila Fadel interviews Fiona Hill, NPR, 05.20.25.6

  • Leila Fadel (LF): “So what is Russia's President Vladimir Putin signaling to Europe by boosting its military presence along the border of NATO allies like this?”
    • Fiona Hill (FH): “Well, I think the significant thing here, Leila, is that, unfortunately, this is the return of the Russian troops rather than a boost of the troops. The Finns were expecting this. It's the longest border between a NATO country and Russia, the Finnish border. And what happened was when the Russians were building up their forces in Ukraine or on the border with Ukraine in anticipation of their invasion, the Finns noted that they pulled the troops away from that border, and the Finns were extraordinary concerned about what would happen, obviously, if the troops went back again, which is what we've seen.”
    • “And they've been preparing for that eventuality, including through their decision to join NATO in the first instance. We also have the NATO summit coming up in a few weeks, around June 24. And it's very clear from this pattern that Russia always adopts ahead of some big event for the Europeans or for Ukraine—for example, like the peace talks, we had, you know, a huge drone attack on Ukraine—that Russia likes to signal that it's there, that it's ready, that it's in a constant state of vigilance.”
  • LF: “So is it just symbolic then? I mean, why do this when the Russian military has suffered major losses in the war in Ukraine? I mean, does Russia actually have the capacity for a conflict with a NATO member, which would then possibly trigger a fight with its NATO allies?”
    • HILL: “Well, Russia has a lot of capacity for intimidation. We've got all kinds of sabotage operations going on. We've got threats to critical national infrastructure, which we've already seen. It's not just the question of, you know, men on the border, you know, preparing for perspective invasion. There's obviously a deterrence and intimidation element to all of this. It's certainly not symbolic, and it's not performative. But the Russians are using all kinds of different tactics at the moment. But what it is is a signal to Finland and to other vulnerable countries on the border that Russia is there.”
    • “So it's a concern not just for Finland, but also for Norway, as we've already mentioned, the Baltic states… And for countries like Poland that are also in the vicinity.”

"It Matters for America How the Ukraine War Ends," Andrea Kendall-Taylor, The New York Times, 05.21.25.

  • “The Trump administration… faces a choice: It can stand up to the Kremlin now, in Ukraine, or later. But for the United States the cost of waiting will only rise.”
  • “An emboldened Russia would be a more potent partner for China, Iran and North Korea, breathing wind into the sails of an axis of upheaval that has coalesced in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.”
  • “The war in Ukraine may be being fought across an ocean, but if the Trump administration chooses not to invest in resisting Russia now, Americans will pay a greater cost down the line.”

“Sorry, Donald Trump, But Ukraine Is Your War,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 05.23.25.

  • “Ukraine won’t soon be done with a president who wants nothing more than to be done with Ukraine,” the author writes. “Trump took office pledging to end this war within 24 hours. He keeps failing, due to two fundamental and increasingly obvious facts. The first is that he misdiagnosed the problem as Ukrainian intransigence, rather than Putin’s unwillingness to allow that country to survive as a territorially viable, geopolitically independent state. Thus, the second fact: At this stage, there is no compromise to be had.”
  • “Trump has savaged America’s role in Ukraine from the outset… So pivoting, and truly punishing Putin, would mean embracing a cause in which Trump has never believed. It would also mean overcoming Trump’s habit of simply walking away from nasty challenges… he cannot easily solve.”
  • “Yet walking away, this time, won’t get Trump very far… [I]f he disengages from Ukraine, the best-case scenario is a protracted struggle in which Russia remains a hyper-militarized autocracy whose economy is still subject to European sanctions and whose oil refineries periodically explode—not exactly an environment U.S. firms will race to exploit. The worst-case scenario is an erosion of Ukraine’s position that starts slowly, then snowballs, resulting in outright defeat or a murderous peace imposed at the point of a gun.”
  • “The war in that country may end up haunting Trump, no matter how much he insists it’s not his fight.” Brands’ analysis misses a key feature of President Trump’s documented approach to international politics (or person-to-person interaction): the strong should get whatever they want and the weak should submit. Thus, Ukraine’s refusal to submit to a stronger Russia in 2014 and then 2022 constituted a direct violation of this core Trumpian principle.

"NATO Wants a Cordial Summit, but Trump or Zelensky Could Disrupt It," Steven Erlanger, The New York Times, 05.26.25.

  • “The head of NATO wants the alliance's annual summit meeting next month to be short and sweet, European officials and diplomats say, to prevent the kind of open disunity over Ukraine that marred the gathering two years ago. “
  • “Officials suggested that this summit will not include a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, where allies sit with Ukraine as equals, as in previous years. Some indicated that after the dinner on the first evening, NATO leaders will meet for only a few hours the next day, to ratify new spending goals that can help European allies replace the United States over time as the prime guarantor of the continent’s conventional defense. NATO is also planning a parallel defense industry forum, which Mr. Zelensky might attend.”
  • “Ukraine's role in the summit is uncertain, not least because of Mr. Trump's dismissiveness toward President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is also expected to attend. It is not even clear that Mr. Zelensky will be invited to the main opening dinner.”
  • “Michael Kofman, a military and Ukraine expert at the Carnegie Endowment, said that it would be difficult for Europeans to both meet NATO targets for their own defense and support Ukraine indefinitely. “It will require trade-offs,” he said. Trump administration officials appear to care little about precisely how other allies invest their military spending, so long as the total reaches 5% of their annual economic output.”

"America Can’t Afford to Protect Europe from Russia, Doug Bandow, The American Conservative, 05.22.25.

  • “Proposing a security guarantee for non-members wasn’t the first attempt [by Europeans]  in March to make the U.S. foot the bill. A campaign to create a multi-national European peacekeeping force for Ukraine collapsed when Washington refused to provide Article 5 protection for the troops that Europeans proposed to deploy into danger.”
  • “Some European officials have requested “a roadmap” to any American withdrawal to enable them to adjust their defense plans. However, most member governments evidence little urgency in building up their forces, while analysts warn that the allies will need years to prepare for Washington’s exit or even drawdown.”
  • “Russia, supposedly hobbled by sanctions, has been outspending the Western bloc since it invaded Ukraine... According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies:..... In purchasing power parity (PPP), Russian total military expenditure reached $462 bn in 2024, exceeding the total for Europe in USD at market exchange rates (MER).””
  • “Many ...Europeans still hope to play Uncle Sam for Uncle Sucker. However, the American people elected Donald Trump to say no more. It is time for Washington to treat Europeans as friends, adults, and allies, rather than suffer them as clients, dependents, and deadbeats.”

"On the Razor’s Edge," Andrey Kortunov, Izvestia, 05.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “The current situation requires Moscow to carefully calibrate its political line on two strategic planning horizons. In the near future, Russian diplomacy will have to walk a razor's edge — to support Trump's interest in mediating the Russian-Ukrainian settlement without sacrificing its fundamental interests or making unjustified concessions.”
  • “Trump, as far as we can judge, does not respect weak and easily surrendering partners, but he clearly does not intend to mark time indefinitely, waiting for Russia and Ukraine to be ready to conclude the long-awaited “deal.” In order to maintain his constructive involvement, it is necessary to demonstrate, albeit slow, but noticeable and sustainable movement towards a settlement. Of course, the Russian leadership needs a resolution to the security crisis in Europe not to please Donald Trump or anyone else, but the dynamics of the crisis will be of decisive importance in building relations with the Republican administration in the coming months.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare," Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, RAND Corporation, 05.22.25.

  • “The PLA sounds the alarm over weakening deterrence
    • PLA analysts reportedly think that Russian strategists overestimated their ability to deter military escalation using nonmilitary tools of hybrid warfare, resulting in disastrous battlefield outcomes. Given this failure, the PLA may be becoming doubtful that it can prevent U.S.-China competition from rupturing into conflict. As a result, the PLA is redefining hybrid warfare to include the use of nonmilitary tools for enhancing lethality rather than deterring the use of military force.
  • CCP support for Russia is enduring
    • CCP leaders appear to remain strategically and ideologically committed to supporting Russia in opposition to what both countries view as U.S. hegemony. China’s interests in the United States and European Union could limit the scale or nature of this support, but, overall, CCP support for Russia is likely to continue.
  • CCP views U.S. alliances as vulnerable targets
    • CCP analysts insist that U.S. alliances persist because the United States manufactures crises to justify alliances, not because their allies share interests or values. Accordingly, CCP analysts see these alliances as vulnerable and assess that China has opportunities to use disinformation to weaken U.S. alliances.
  • The PLA surmises that protraction will blunt U.S. technology advantages
    • PLA researchers assess that the U.S. defense industrial base cannot sustain a protracted war and that the margin of U.S. technological superiority will diminish as a war continues. They assess that protracting a future conflict could mitigate U.S. technological superiority and that China’s defense mobilization system offers advantages in such a conflict.”

"Reverse Kissinger? No, Double Kissinger," Lyle J. Goldstein, The National Interest, 05.25.25.

  • “Today, many strategists in Washington are talking about Kissinger’s adroit diplomatic maneuver. administration supporters hope Donald Trump can orchestrate a so-called “reverse Kissinger,” wooing Russia away from China… However, this approach has myriad problems, not least in terms of its feasibility over the long run. A sounder strategy would be to embrace a “double Kissinger,” improving relations simultaneously with both Moscow and Beijing.”
  • “If Washington pursues an aggressive strategy of openly seeking to “contain” China, whether through increasing trade barriers, building up its military forces in the western Pacific, or encouraging Taiwan nationalists, Beijing’s reluctance could evaporate. A true China-Russia alliance could emerge in the coming years, one that could threaten U.S. national security in a variety of ways, whether in the space, nuclear, or undersea domains.”
  • “Kissinger’s original intent seems to have been to improve relations almost simultaneously with both China and the USSR. It was hardly coincidental that just three months after Nixon’s famous visit to Beijing, the American president landed in Moscow to talk about arms control and trade with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev… Today, such a “double Kissinger” is once again not just possible but imperative.”
  • “The Trump administration would be wise, even as it works to “reset” diplomacy with Russia, to energize diplomatic efforts to improve relations with China… A “double Kissinger” strategy could help usher in a new, stabler world order.”
  • “Perhaps Trump just has to find his own Kissinger, who understands his goal of lowering global tensions and is capable of “walking and chewing gum” by pursuing a rapprochement with both Moscow and Beijing at the same time.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

"A ‘Golden Dome’ Could Make America Less Safe," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 05.23.25.

  • “New American defenses, even before they become operational, will force adversaries to recalculate their own assumptions and strategies. The Chinese have already said that they are “gravely concerned” about Golden Dome and worry that it will jeopardize “strategic balance and stability.” One of their fears is that the US, feeling secure from retaliation, could blackmail them with nuclear threats to stand down in a conflict over Taiwan.”
  • “None of this means that Golden Dome as a project is a bad idea in 2025. SDI never went live, but Reagan made great use of it as a bargaining chip in his talks with Gorbachev. Trump could do the same with his dome, cajoling Russia and China, and maybe others, into new rounds of arms control that might even win him the Nobel Prize.”

“‘Golden Dome’: Russia's Reaction,” Tayana Stanovaya, Bulletin No. 10 (162) R.Politik, May 2025.

  • “There are three primary concerns for Russia regarding the “Golden Dome” project. Firstly, it risks drawing Russia into a renewed arms race, compelling further investment in the country's strategic forces at a time when resources are already strained by the ongoing war and domestic pressures limit the options for other spending cuts. Secondly, resource constraints could lead to riskier decisions, including accelerated nuclear weapons development. Systems such as Poseidon and Burevestnik remain in the development phase, and the likelihood of technical failure or an accident remains significant. The nuclear-powered Burevestnik, in particular, has drawn international concern and is often described as a “flying Chernobyl”. Thirdly, President Putin’s apparent indifference to Trump’s strategic ambitions may become a point of unease for traditionally anti-American segments of the Russian elite. Although strategic policy is not subject to open political debate and Putin maintains firm control over elite discourse, his perceived reliance on a personal rapport with Trump may provoke irritation within those circles.”

Nuclear arms:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • "How to Lose Friends and Cease Influencing the Middle East: A Masterclass by a Seasoned Geopolitician," Sergey Konyashin, The Moscow Times, 05.25.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
  • “Why did Russia, which had kept the Assad regime afloat for so many years, so quickly lose control over it and the whole of Syria? There are three main reasons.”
    • “First, strategic underestimation. It seems that the Kremlin simply did not believe in the ability of disparate rebel groups to unite, much less enlist the support of the West.”
    • “Second, Russia’s resource overstrain. Due to the protracted conflict with Ukraine and economic sanctions, Moscow simply does not have any military or financial resources left to save an important Middle Eastern outpost.”
    • “Third, Russia’s geopolitical isolation.”
  • “The Syrian strike may push Moscow to further strengthen its alliance with Iran and other similar marginal anti-Western forces.”
  • “For Syrians, Putin’s defeat means hope for a better future, since the overthrow of Moscow’s protégé has clearly opened up the entire Middle East to a chance for a more just peace.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Cyber security/AI: 

"Ukraine’s ‘drone war’ hastens development of autonomous weapons," Rachel Rees, Financial Times, 05.27.25.

  • “Earlier this month, the Ukrainian military claimed to have shot down a Russian fighter jet with missiles fired from an unmanned naval drone. The development was emblematic of a conflict in which the battlefield has become a testing ground for new technologies, including drones and artificial intelligence. And those advances are hastening the day where machines that can kill people operate entirely autonomously.”
  • “The prospect of weapons acting with full autonomy, with no human oversight, has ‘very serious ethical implications,’ Nick Reynolds, a research fellow at British defense think-tank RUSI, acknowledges, with a need for regulation to consider ‘how we mitigate unnecessary harm,’ among other things. He fears, however, that the technology has already advanced beyond such considerations.”
  • “Regulatory debates are yet to fully materialize. In the meantime, AI-enabled drones will continue to be ‘on every major and non-major military power’s agenda,’ says Ned Baker, UK managing director and head of Ukraine operations at Helsing. ‘AI on the battlefield will be easily as important as the advent of gunpowder, advent of machine guns, advent of tanks—but in completely unknown ways as of yet.’”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Energy exports from CIS:

"Why Rehabilitating Russia Would Hurt U.S. Energy," Kaush Arha, The National Interest, 05.23.25.

  • “Russia’s pariah status offers the United States a rare opportunity to seize energy market share in Europe and Asia. Such an opportunity will vanish with appeasement. Making America great by turning it into the world’s energy superpower is a big deal. The hollow praise for “peacemaking”—like the Nobel Prize President Barack Obama received before even entering the arena—pales in comparison. The smart money is on Trump, the businessman.” 

“Tanker War,” Sergei Vakulenko, Bulletin No. 10 (162) R.Politik, May 2025.

  • “The EU—and the West more broadly—has very limited scope to disrupt Russia’s shadow fleet. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), vessels are guaranteed the right of innocent passage even through territorial waters, provided they remain in motion. While such vessels may be subject to inspection, they cannot be detained if their documentation is in order, even if they breach a coastal state’s policy, such as the oil price cap. In such cases, concerns must be addressed to the vessel’s flag state.”
  • “All indications suggest that Europe’s current approach is limited to politely requesting that tankers present documentation for insurance and cargo—though there is no legal obligation for them to do so. If the vessels refuse, the fallback strategy appears to be threatening to report them to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in the hope that OFAC might add them to its sanctions list. Threats of inclusion on the EU’s own sanctions list carry little weight, a fact well understood by all parties involved.””

"Is a Russia-U.S. Deal on Nord Stream Possible?" Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 05.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “Given the existing experience, it would be strange to expect the U.S. to support the resumption of Nord Stream. Even if the U.S. becomes a shareholder in the project and receives profits from gas transit, it will create conditions for its gas to compete with Russian raw materials on the European market. In addition, Ukraine's transit capabilities will be reduced, which can be manipulated both during the conflict and after its completion. The legacy of the past and stubborn facts so far speak against the Russian-American "deal" on Nord Stream.” 

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Fiasco of Transactionalism: How and Why Putin Outmaneuvered Donald Trump,” Kirill Rogov, Re:Russia, 05.21.25.

  • “Following his latest telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump abandoned both the demand for a 30-day ceasefire and the imposition of additional sanctions against Moscow. Instead, he proposed that Putin himself draft a memorandum that would serve as the foundation for a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, thereby absolving himself of all responsibility for its success. The boastful promise to end the war in a single day has turned into a spectacular fiasco.”
  • “One of Trump's central, if not primary, motives over the past year has been his fierce criticism of Joe Biden's Ukraine strategy (and the Europeans who supported it). A peace agreement secured in a day, or even in a hundred days, was meant to serve as proof of the utter failure of that approach, and a definitive triumph for Trump’s brand of transactionalism. Four months of indulging the aggressor, weakened alliances, empty threats, and concessions that yielded no results all now appear as trophies in the pursuit of that imagined success. The outcome, however, has been a resounding victory for the Kremlin’s strategic diplomacy…”
  • [An isolationist theory of the Trump administration’s behavior is that] “the United States should withdraw from all conflicts in which it is defending the interests of others, including Ukraine and the Middle East. Since the attempt to exit the conflict while simultaneously halting the war has failed, Trump, it is argued, should simply abandon support for Ukraine. While isolationists do have a presence within Trump’s inner circle, their strategy is unlikely to be implemented in any consistent way in today’s interconnected world. The space vacated by a U.S. withdrawal would naturally be filled by China, which would gradually absorb the architecture of international alliances and security guarantees.”

“Revisionist, not revolutionary: Where is Donald Trump leading U.S. foreign policy,” Dmitri Trenin, Russia in Global Affairs, May/June 2025. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “Trump’s foreign policy is the most profound revision of American foreign policy in eighty years. Trump is a great-power nationalist who pursues the goal of increasing power and profit, acquiring unilateral advantages. He thinks in terms of a zero-sum game and believes that the whole world has profited from America for too long. But he understands that order depends on the balance of power and collapses if the balance shifts.”
  • “Revision, however, is not a revolution. Trump changes strategies—the ways and methods of achieving goals. The goal itself is modified, but not radically. Instead of the dominance of the liberal-globalist West led by the United States, the hegemony of the United States as the strongest world power, freed from previous curtseys to allies and thus renewed, is being put forward. And the allies, it is assumed, will eventually ‘fit in’ with the course of the leading country.”
  • “For Russia, Donald Trump’s return to the White House is, on the whole, a positive phenomenon, especially if we think not in ideal categories, but taking into account a possible alternative. Yes, he returned to power in order to strengthen the U.S.’s global position. But unlike the liberal globalists who tried to impose their rules on the entire world, including in domestic politics, Trump is a foreign policy realist. He is set on rivalry with other great powers, i.e. on competitive, but still peaceful coexistence, as they used to say, of states with different political systems.” “The arrival of Trump has reduced the threat of World War III—a global nuclear catastrophe, the road to which the Biden administration has been gradually paving the way. Trump has not stopped military support for Kyiv, but has significantly limited the possibilities of escalating the war with the participation of the United States.”
  • “In conditions where the top bureaucracy of the European Union and the elites of the leading EU member states, united in 2022 against Russia, are trying to resist Trump and his team, a certain community of interests is emerging between Moscow and Washington regarding Europe. Like Trump, Russia will benefit from the spread of political realism in Europe. Both Washington and Moscow benefit from the emergence of “more Orbans, good and different”. Looking to the future, one cannot rule out the possibility of a rollback of Washington’s policy from realism to globalism after Trump. In this regard, it makes sense to develop contacts with Vice President Vance as a likely successor to Trump’s course in the event of success in the 2028 elections.”

“John Ratcliffe on Russia and Ukraine,” RM Staff, RM, 05.23.25.

  • “As DNI in late 2021, he also believed that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was likely, emphasizing Putin’s belief that Ukraine’s post-Soviet independence was an ‘invalid divorce’ and that reclaiming it was essential to Russia’s identity and control of regional energy, according to Fox News.”
  • “With Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, Ratcliff returned to a top post in the intelligence community when the Senate approved his nomination as CIA director. During his confirmation hearing, Ratcliffe expressed concern over North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia and warned that the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war continued to devastate the region while heightening the risk of the U.S. being pulled into a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. He has called the nuclear threat “the most serious national security risk we face,” and argued that escalation scenarios—whether through accident, miscalculation or intentional use—must be central to U.S. intelligence assessments.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Military Hangover: Russian economy will have to face a recession to achieve disinflation targets," Re:Russia, 05.22.25.

  • “In the first quarter of 2025, Russia’s GDP fell by approximately 0.5–0.6% relative to the fourth quarter of 2024, adjusted for seasonality (Raiffeisenbank analysts estimate a 0.5% drop, while Bloomberg Economics chief economist for Russia, Alexander Isakov, estimates a 0.6% decline). If the economy contracts again in the second quarter compared to the first, it can be formally declared in recession, unless Rosstat retrospectively revises previous data substantially, as has happened before (Re:Russia: Inflate and Dominate).”
  • “Russia’s economy lacks the potential to sustain current output levels. Declining export revenues will only worsen this scenario. In the face of volatile revenues, the Russian economy has been supported in recent decades by the countercyclical policies of the economic authorities. During periods of high prices, they accumulated reserves, and during periods of falling oil prices, they used them to invest in the economy. However, in 2022–2023, amid war and broad sanctions, the government ramped up fiscal stimulus, building on the export windfall from 2021–2022. This spurred high growth and an overheated economy, triggering an inflationary surge. Now, the situation is reversed: export revenues are falling, government investment capacity is nearly exhausted, and the refinancing rate is already at crisis levels.”

"The 'Donbasisation' of Russia: How Occupation Is Influencing Russia’s Political System," Nikolay Petrov, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 05.22.25. 

  • “After more than three years of full-scale war and occupation, the negative repercussions for Russia’s political system and [administrative] class are evident. The process of “Donbasisation” will continue to lead to a deterioration in the quality of governance and will have an influence on the future development of both the Russian state and society.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Ukraine:

“Measuring the Reach of Russia’s Propaganda in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Elina Treyger, Heather J. Williams and Anthony D'Arrigo, RAND Corporation, 05.23.25.

  • “Although Russian propaganda does spread far and wide, recent research suggests that not all of it is as successful as it might seem,” the authors write. 
    “A recent RAND study examined how some of Russia’s most extremist and most hate-filled narratives have spread on social-media platforms, such as X and Telegram. It identified four such narratives and looked at which audiences these narratives reach and who is spreading them. Researchers reviewed statements from Russian officials, state media, and social media to identify Russian-originating narratives that echo violent extremist tropes to target and denigrate Ukrainians,” according to the authors.
    • Denazification
    • Dehumanization
    • Antisemitism
    • Anti-Western
  • “Using translated keywords that capture these four narratives, researchers identified more than 43 million posts from X and Telegram, involving 3.8 million authors writing in more than 30 languages,” the authors write. However, “the success of pro-Russian narratives is limited.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"The Precarious Power of Azerbaijan: How a Delayed Peace With Armenia Endangers a New Regional Order," Zaur Shiriyev, Foreign Affairs, 05.26.25. 

  • “Azerbaijan faces an important choice. After 36 months of negotiations, it now has a rare opportunity to reach a more lasting peace with Armenia,” according to the author. The author argues that “The longer a settlement is delayed, the more vulnerable the process will become to shifting political currents and external interference. Armenia’s domestic fragility, waning global attention, and renewed Russian interest could derail the positive steps made over the past three years.”
  • “The strategic opening created by Moscow’s distraction in Ukraine will not last indefinitely. If further geopolitical shifts occur without a durable settlement in place, Russia may still find ways to reinsert itself—maybe not to restore its former dominance but to obstruct progress, prolong ambiguity, and make sure its interests are preserved. That outcome would benefit none of those who would be immediately affected by Russia’s presence—not Azerbaijan, not Armenia, and not the broader region,” according to the author.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 

Footnotes

  1. According to ISW, Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike of the war on the night of May 24 to 25. That the May 25  strike was a record one also follows from Financial Times’ May 25 report.
  2. In his latest comments on Truth Social, Trump wrote on May 27: “What Vladimir Putin doesn’t realize is that if it weren’t for me, lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia, and I mean REALLY BAD. He’s playing with fire!”
  3. Ukraine’s air force said on May 25 that Russia had launched 69 ballistic and cruise missiles along with 298 attack drones, adding that about two-thirds of the missiles and nearly all the drones were shot down. The air force spokesman, Yuriy Ihnat, said in an interview that it was the largest bombardment of the war in terms of the number of weapons used. (New York Times, 05.25.25)

  4. On May 25, President Trump expressed renewed frustrations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying the Russian leader was “playing with fire” as peace talks with Ukraine have sputtered, WSJ reported.

  5. “What Vladimir Putin doesn’t realize is that if it weren’t for me, lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia, and I mean REALLY BAD. He’s playing with fire!” Trump wrote on social media.
  6. Trump addressed the potential of new sanctions on Russia on May 25, saying that he is “absolutely” considering them. “He’s killing a lot of people,” Trump said of Putin. “I don’t know what’s wrong with him. What the hell happened to him?” (WSJ, 05.26.25)
  7. Also see: "Fiona Hill: Trump is terrified of Putin, I’ve seen it first hand,’” (interview) Daily Telegraph, 05.27.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka.

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