Russia Analytical Report, May 18-26, 2020

This Week’s Highlights

  • Many analysts focused on Washington’s Open Skies treaty withdrawal as a sign of worsening relations with Russia, but Washington Post columnist David Ignatius sees hope in U.S.-Russia relations. At a time of increasing rhetorical confrontation with China, Ignatius writes, the United States is expanding its engagement with Moscow on arms control, humanitarian assistance to Russia for COVID-19 and other issues of mutual concern.
  • Unlike INF or START, Open Skies has never been a major pillar of arms control. There are several conclusions that other countries should draw from this, writes Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin. One is that the 50-year-old arms control regime that helped keep the Cold War cold is beyond repair and people who continue to care about global stability and security need to begin discussing ways of moving toward a new global strategic regime. In addition, the strategic field has extended way beyond nuclear weapons, which used to be the prime object of arms control.
  • American officials believe that if they renew the New START Treaty too quickly, or for too long, China will feel no pressure to join, according to The Economist. The problem, however, is that neither China nor Russia is keen on trilateral talks. All three countries could begin discussing the risks that arise from emerging technologies, from cyber-attacks on nuclear command-and-control networks to the use of artificial intelligence in early-warning systems.
  • For several months now, there have been predictions that the new coronavirus pandemic would cause problems between Russia and China, writes Ivan Zuenko, a research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Center for Asia Pacific Studies. However, Zuenko argues it’s clear that this will not seriously impact relations. The anti-Chinese rhetoric issuing forth from Washington, along with the collapse of oil prices and growing dependence of Russia on Chinese consumption, are far more effective in bringing the two countries closer together than any COVID-19-related unpleasantness at the border is in driving them apart.
  • When Ukraine’s comedian-turned-presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskiy swept the election a year ago, he vowed to uproot corruption, jail the country’s top crooks, stop Russia’s war against Ukraine and attract billions of dollars in foreign direct investment, writes former Kyiv Post business editor Ilya Timtchenko, A year after Zelenskiy’s inauguration, none of these grand promises are even close to being fulfilled—and many Ukrainians are losing patience. Brookings’ Steven Pifer writes that Zelenskiy should consider how the approval ratings of his predecessors Yushchenko and Poroshenko plummeted when they failed to meet the reform expectations that brought them to the presidency. Zelenskiy still has time to justify the high hopes generated in spring 2019; if, however, his election turns out to be just another false start, Pifer writes, he will most likely become another one-term Ukrainian president.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

  • No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“The Dark Arts of Disinformation Through a Historical Lens,” Arthur Martirosyan, Russia Matters, 05.20.20: In this book review of Thomas Rid’s “Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare,” the author, a senior consultant with CMPartners, writes:

  • “In his pioneering analysis of modern disinformation warfare from a historical perspective, Dr. Thomas Rid posits from the outset that ‘only by taking careful and accurate measure of the fantastic past of disinformation can we comprehend the present, and fix the future.’”
  • “‘Active Measures’ offers over a dozen case studies, organized chronologically, of operations run by disinformation warriors in the past hundred years. … If previously narratives were scattered throughout the memoirs of spymasters, the accounts of Soviet, Russian, Eastern bloc intelligence defectors and archival documents, now students of psychological warfare can find the outstanding cases in one volume, making it a ‘must-read,’ in my view.”
  • “It is in the last pages that he makes the most compelling arguments for why history matters. Sometimes it repeats itself. Take the 1950s highly professional and effective CIA operation LC-Cassock, for example. It was a forgeries factory aimed at East Germany, an echo of a now more farcical and sloppy version—the Internet Research Agency (IRA) in St. Petersburg, also known as the ‘troll factory.’”
  • “Yet the most important merit of the book is in nudging the reader to think what’s next in this conflict. As a specialist in conflict management, I inferred … that there are essentially three options: 1. do nothing; 2. retaliate in an eye-for-an-eye replay of Cold War-era active measures; or 3. negotiate a new arrangement and set of rules. … But for the third option to materialize, it starts with understanding Russia today. … Putin’s defensive-aggressive Russia is less interested in running the world than in ensuring that other powers cannot or dare not attempt to thwart it. What’s missing now, therefore, is the political will of skilled leaders with realist mindsets to negotiate the norms and redlines in relations between the U.S. and its allies on one side, and Russia on the other.”

Impact of the pandemic:

“Putin Speaks, Officials Shrug and Doctors Are Caught in the Middle,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 05.25.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

  • “Assailed by critics as an absentee leader at the start of the coronavirus crisis in Russia, President Vladimir V. Putin re-emerged with a splash on state television last month to show that he cared and was taking charge. He promised cash bonuses of up to $1,100 a month for each doctor, nurse and other ‘'front line' health worker involved in fighting the virus.”
  • “But for an all-powerful leader whose every word must be taken as a command, Mr. Putin has had a surprisingly hard time making his voice heard. More than a month after he spoke, the money has yet to materialize for many. Instead, some doctors have received visits from police investigators and prosecutors demanding to know why they complained publicly about not getting their bonuses.”
  • “A promise meant to showcase Mr. Putin's proudest achievement—the revitalization of the Russian state after the chaos of the 1990s—has sunk into a swamp of recrimination, security service intimidation and bureaucratic buck-passing.”
  • “The pandemic has … disrupted the centerpiece of the Kremlin's political program for the year, forcing the cancellation of an April referendum on constitutional changes that would allow Mr. Putin to brush aside term limits and stay in power until 2036. But, with the recent lifting of a nationwide lockdown order—despite a steady rise in the number of infections—the Kremlin is expected to push ahead with its vote on the Constitution as early as June.”
  • “Opening the door for him to stay in power indefinitely, Kremlin critics say, would only entrench the dysfunctions of a system that for 20 years has paid lip service to the stated goals of a single man but often confounded them instead.”

“The Pandemic Shows That Putin Is Not a Strong Leader,” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 05.20.20: The author, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, writes:

  • “The reality is that Putin has failed to build an efficient state in the service of Russian people over the past 20 years. He has put tremendous resources into modernizing Russia's nuclear weapons, intelligence capabilities, conventional and police forces and Olympic facilities, but invested far less into roads, schools or hospitals, especially outside of Moscow. COVID-19 is now exposing these lapses in state-building.”
  • “Putin also personally has not stepped forward during this crisis. He has been absent for days at a time, deferring to governors to make their own decisions.”
  • “Russians are noticing. … [P]olls show that Putin's approval rating has fallen to its lowest level—59 percent in April 2020—since he rose to power in 1999. The same month, only 27 percent of Russians said they trusted Putin to solve important issues.”
  • “COVID-19 has exposed the myth of Russia as a strong state and Putin as a strong leader. Without free and fair elections to allow peaceful, orderly expression of citizen attitudes about Russia's ineffective response to the virus, only two other options are available—regime change or greater repression. While neglecting hospitals, roads and schools, Putin has increased the state's capacity in one area: control through coercion. Tragically, therefore, that option is most likely.”

“In the Post-Pandemic World, Big Brother Will Be Watching,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 05.19.20: The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

  • “As infection rates decline and effective treatments become available, many countries will gradually relax most of the restrictions that are now in place. Some of the leaders who assumed emergency powers during the crisis may relinquish them. But get ready for the new normal: Political opportunism and fear of a new pandemic will lead many governments to leave some of their newly acquired powers in place. Expect to have your temperature taken or throat swabbed when you travel, and get used to having your phone observed, your picture taken and your location tracked in many countries—with the use of that information not always restricted to matters of public health. In the post-coronavirus world, Big Brother will be watching.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“How COVID-19 Might Affect US Nuclear Weapons and Planning,” Steven Pifer, The National Interest/Brookings Institution, 05.18.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

  • “For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for its security and that of its allies … The principal driving factor behind the size of U.S. nuclear forces comes from Russian nuclear forces and doctrine. Diverse and effective U.S. nuclear forces that can deter a Russian nuclear attack should suffice to deter a nuclear attack by any third country.”
  • “The most likely scenario for nuclear use between the United States and Russia is a regional conflict fought at the conventional level in which one side begins to lose and decides to escalate by employing a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons, seeking to reverse battlefield losses and signal the strength of its resolve.”
  • “If the United States and its allies have sufficiently robust conventional forces, they can prevail in a regional conflict at the conventional level and push any decision about first use of nuclear weapons onto the other side (Russia, or perhaps China or North Korea depending on the scenario). The other side would have to weigh carefully the likelihood that its first use of nuclear weapons would trigger a nuclear response, opening the decidedly grim prospect of further nuclear escalation and of things spinning out of control.”
  • “This is why the opportunity costs of nuclear weapons programs matter. If those programs strip too much funding from conventional forces, they weaken the ability of the United States and its allies to prevail in a conventional conflict … and increase the possibility that the United States might have to employ nuclear weapons to avert defeat.”
  • “All things being equal, it is smarter and more efficient to choose to make decisions to curtail or delay major programs rather than to continue them until the money runs out and forces program termination. As it examines the administration’s proposed fiscal year 2021 defense budget, Congress should carefully consider the trade-offs and press the Pentagon to articulate how it weighed the trade-offs between nuclear and conventional forces.”

“Germany’s Future Participation in Nuclear Sharing – a Challenge for NATO?” Justyna Gotkowska, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 05.26.20: The author, coordinator for the Regional Security Program at the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw, writes:

  • “Earlier this month, a heated debate about Germany’s future participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing program kicked off. It began with an interview that Rolf Mützenich, the chairman of Germany’s Social Democratic (SPD) party parliamentary group, gave to the Tagesspiegel daily, where he advocated for a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany and an end to Germany’s participation in the NATO nuclear sharing program, calling it a relic of the Cold War.”
  • “At the same time, he did not, however, challenge the need for NATO’s nuclear deterrence and for the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe. Germany, he claimed, would continue to actively shape NATO’s policy in the Nuclear Planning Group after withdrawing from the program. Mützenich was backed by the leaders of the SPD, Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans, but opposed by the SPD representatives responsible for foreign and security policy in the German government as well as Foreign Minister and SPD member Heiko Maas.”
  • “Germany’s withdrawal might lead to similar reactions from other European allies participating in the nuclear sharing arrangements, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, whose societies are equally opposed to nuclear weapons.”
  • “The end of NATO’s nuclear sharing program would end the risk and responsibility sharing between the U.S. and its European allies in nuclear deterrence, deepen U.S.–European and intra-European rifts over security policy and decrease the level of nuclear deterrence in Europe.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Arms control:

“US Withdrawal From Open Skies Bolsters Case for New Strategic Regime,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.22.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

  • “[The Trump] administration has no interest in continuing with strategic arms control. It prefers to operate from a position of superior strength. Indeed, in Trump’s view, this is the only acceptable posture for the United States in a hypercompetitive world. Abolishing limits on what the United States can do militarily would greatly increase the country’s leverage. … There are several conclusions that other countries, starting with Russia, should draw from this.”
  • “One is that the 50-year-old arms control regime that helped keep the Cold War cold is beyond repair and is fast becoming history. … Another conclusion is that for Trump, only one foreign country really matters: China. … Thirdly, the strategic field has extended way beyond nuclear weapons … Numbers are no longer the issue; it is capabilities, which are much more difficult to control. It is time, therefore, to start exploring how to integrate all these factors into new-age strategic thinking.”
  • “Finally, people who continue to care about global stability and security in the by now generally forgotten military sense will have to put their heads together, across borders, to begin discussing ways of moving toward a new global strategic regime. It would have to be comprehensive, including all the major military players and all the relevant technologies; it would have to rest on nuclear deterrence which would have to be properly safeguarded through a system of communications lines and networks and transparency mechanisms; and it would need to rely on a strategic culture of restraint—for a country’s own sake and safety.”
  • “Open Skies will not disappear completely, however. Over thirty countries have pledged to keep adhering to the treaty, including Russia, America’s NATO allies and Eastern European states. … Keeping the skies over Europe open is a useful thing, but the main task now is to start preparing for a new strategic world.”

“Russia Flouts Another Treaty. So We’re Leaving It,” Tim Morrison, New York Times, 05.21.20: The author, a former senior director on the National Security Council leading U.S. arms control policy, writes:

  • “Arms control treaties can be a powerful national security tool. But too often arms control proponents—those who seek to control weapons by agreement—get confused: Is arms control a means to a national security end or the end itself?”
  • “President Trump has never been afraid to step back, evaluate what the United States and its allies gain from an agreement and how a potential adversary benefits from it, and decide what’s in the best interest of the security of the American people.”
  • “Mr. Trump, whose administration I served in, said on [May 21] that the United States will initiate the process to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. Signed in 1992 by 34 nations including Russia, the treaty sought to increase international stability by allowing signatory nations to conduct surveillance flights over one another’s territories to observe military installations and other sites using specific, agreed-upon sensor technology.”
  • “As it stands now, the Open Skies Treaty has not only outlived its usefulness but has also become a tool for an adversary to threaten U.S. national security. The president would be right to withdraw. He should also recommit to our allies to achieve the mutual security benefit gained by working against Mr. Putin’s aggression.”

“The Open Skies Treaty and Prospects for European Confidence-Building Measures,” Sarah Martin and Nick Reynolds, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 05.22.20: The authors, a former a research assistant at the Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and a research analyst at RUSI, write:

  • “If the Open Skies treaty collapses, … some confidence- and security-building measures look set to remain in place for the foreseeable future.”
  • “The Vienna Document—the last of the European security troika—has so far avoided any serious calls for withdrawal from its signatories, though as with the Open Skies Treaty, it is in serious need of reform. The provisions of the Vienna Document, which place limitations on snap exercises and detail the thresholds for notifying other states of military exercises, are outdated. Currently, notification thresholds apply to exercises involving 9,000 personnel, 250 main battle tanks, 500 armored combat vehicles or 250 self-propelled artillery/multiple launch rocket system platforms.”
  • “Perhaps the worst consequence of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty will be to further reinforce the narrative that the U.S. no longer cares about multilateral security cooperation. And that is bad enough.”

“Three’s a Crowd. Donald Trump Wants China to Join a Nuclear-Weapons Pact,” The Economist, 05.23.20: The Economist writes:

  • “American officials believe that if they renew the [New START] treaty too quickly, or for too long, China will feel no pressure to join. But neither America nor Russia wants to slash its arsenal to China’s level. That would leave the improbable idea of an unequal treaty—a phrase that in China recalls the reviled pacts that the country was forced to sign with colonial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries.”
  • “In a recent report by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg … experts from America, Russia and China … suggest ways of breaking the impasse. Mr. Zhao … says a three-way deal could start with a cap on intermediate-range missiles, where China’s advantage in land-based rockets is offset by America’s edge in air-launched ones. Or it could cover all delivery systems … with a reach longer than 500km. All three countries possess these in roughly equal numbers, unlike warheads, of which America and Russia have many more.”
  • “One incentive for China to agree to negotiate is the risk that, if it does not, New START will unravel. … There may also be diplomatic dividends for China should it enter talks. … The problem, however, is that neither China nor Russia is keen on trilateral talks. … Many experts think a more realistic approach would be for America and China to begin exploratory talks by themselves.”
  • “All three countries could begin discussing the risks that arise from emerging technologies … Rose Gottemoeller, a former American official, says America could invite China to a mock New START inspection to show how verification works. Or the two countries could agree to notify one another of missile tests, as America and Russia have done for decades. But it will be a long road. … China’s tradition of military secrecy is “deeply rooted”. Opening up will require trust. What little there is between China and America is being threatened by the pandemic.”

“Trump Administration Discussed Conducting First US Nuclear Test in Decades,” John Hudson and Paul Sonne, The Washington Post, 05.22.20: The authors, national security reporters for the news outlet, write:

  • “The Trump administration has discussed whether to conduct the first U.S. nuclear test explosion since 1992 in a move that would have far-reaching consequences for relations with other nuclear powers and reverse a decades-long moratorium on such actions, said a senior administration official and two former officials familiar with the deliberations.”
  • “The matter came up at a meeting of senior officials representing the top national security agencies May 15, following accusations from administration officials that Russia and China are conducting low-yield nuclear tests—an assertion that has not been substantiated by publicly available evidence and that both countries have denied.”
  • “A senior administration official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the sensitive nuclear discussions, said that demonstrating to Moscow and Beijing that the United States could ‘rapid test’ could prove useful from a negotiating standpoint as Washington seeks a trilateral deal to regulate the arsenals of the biggest nuclear powers.”
  • “The meeting did not conclude with any agreement to conduct a test, but a senior administration official said the proposal is ‘very much an ongoing conversation.’ Another person familiar with the meeting, however, said a decision was ultimately made to take other measures in response to threats posed by Russia and China and avoid a resumption of testing.”

Counter-terrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security:

  • No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“Flynn and the Presumption of Guilt,” Bret Stephens, New York Times, 05.22.20: The author, an opinion columnist for the news outlet, writes:

  • “If Flynn had been prosecuted, judged and sentenced according to his own moral arithmetic, he'd be behind bars today. Fortunately he isn't, because sleazy behavior isn't the same as criminal conduct.”
  • “By now, every thoughtful observer should have learned two things from the experience of the Trump administration. The first is that few things in politics are as despicable as efforts to use the power of the state to criminalize a political opponent. That's why Trump's efforts to bully a foreign ally into digging up dirt on his domestic opponent was so reprehensible. That's why Trump deserved his impeachment.”
  • “The second is that civil liberties matter, never more so than when a government seeks to prosecute the people it dislikes by hiding exculpatory evidence, using deceptive methods, relying on outdated laws or threatening them with financial or familial ruin.”
  • “Yet as Bloomberg columnist Eli Lake lays out in painstaking detail in an essay for Commentary magazine, this is what happened to Flynn. This has been obscured by the fact he twice pleaded guilty to a crime he likely did not commit, as part of an investigation into a conspiracy that the Mueller investigation could not prove. It's obscured because some of the sensational reporting about him that once appeared solid later turned out to be dubious.”
  • “Liberals used to have a healthy distrust of prosecutorial power, just as they had a healthy belief in the presumption of innocence. … [T]hey've been reminded of the political folly of abandoning the second belief. It may not be long before they learn a similar lesson about the folly of abandoning the first.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russia Sees OPEC+ Taking a Wait-and-See Approach on Deeper Cuts,” Ilya Arkhipov and Dina Khrennikova, Bloomberg, 05.26.20: The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write:

  • “Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries need to analyze the global oil market before deciding on any potential changes in their output-cuts agreement, the Kremlin said two weeks ahead of the alliance’s next meeting. ‘It’s obvious that the countries will look at how the situation is developing,’ Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for President Vladimir Putin, told reporters when asked if Russia sees any need for deeper OPEC+ cuts in response to the global oil glut. The agreement has a strictly defined timeline and Russia will be a responsible participant, he said.”
  • “OPEC+, which agreed to cut production until April 2022 in an effort to balance the market following the onslaught of the coronavirus pandemic, is set to hold a video conference on June 9-10 to discuss the impact on the deal that kicked off this month. The production cuts are scheduled to taper off from July and the group could use next month’s meeting to decide on future output policy.”
  • “The agreement to slash supply has paid off so far. Saudi Arabia has agreed to cut deeper than its share, and there have been forced shut-ins by producers from outside the group, such as the U.S. This has raised some questions about whether Russia, the de-facto leader of the OPEC+ alliance with the Saudis, will follow Riyadh’s lead. Benchmark Brent crude has surged more than 40 percent this month as the curbs coincide with a pick-up in global demand with many countries easing their virus lockdowns. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said on [May 25] that global supply and demand could balance in June or July, ending weeks of a massive oversupply.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Are We Seeing a Tactical Tilt Toward Russia?” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 05.21.20: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes:

  • “The Trump administration sent a characteristic mixed message on arms control this week: It announced a plan to quit the Open Skies agreement with Russia, even as it proclaimed its eagerness for a wider arms-control process that would include both Russia and China.”
  • “Many analysts focused on the treaty withdrawal as a sign of worsening relations with Russia, but I think there's something more complex at work, and more hopeful for U.S.-Russia relations. At a time of increasing rhetorical confrontation with China, the United States is expanding its engagement with Moscow on arms control, humanitarian assistance to Russia for COVID-19 and other issues of mutual concern.”
  • “U.S. and Russian officials have been setting the table in recent weeks for more serious talks. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed areas of possible cooperation last week in an unpublicized phone call. That followed a May 6 phone call between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who discussed ‘next steps on arms control’ and issues of ‘mutual concern.’

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin and the 'Distinct Russian Civilization'” Ilya Klishin, The Moscow Times, 05.25.20The author, former digital director of the New York-based Russian-language RTVI channel, writes:

  • “In the closing days of May 2020, at the peak of the coronacrisis and political uncertainty, state-controlled TV decided … to air an interview with Vladimir Putin that was filmed back in September 2019. … It records Putin as saying, ‘Russia is not just a country, but a distinct civilization thanks its rich traditions, multiethnic character and numerous cultures and faiths.’ For this reason, he argues, Russia must develop modern technologies that will enable this civilization to achieve breakthroughs.”
  • “From a tactical viewpoint, arguments about a ‘distinct Russian civilization’ and certain high technologies that are soon to appear fit in perfectly with the narrative the authorities have invented for talking about the coronavirus. … Why are there abnormally few coronavirus deaths in Russia? Because this is a special civilization. … Why did Russia hold off on providing financial assistance to its citizens, and later give only a pittance … ? Because this is a special civilization.”
  • “The problem is not whether this belief even holds water. It doesn’t. For example, if to speak of the great Slavic civilization, Russia has had a falling out with just about every Slavic peoples that, as recently as the 19th century, still loved this country … As for Russian Orthodox civilization, in only the last 20 years, Russia has gone to war either directly or indirectly against two Orthodox countries—Georgia and Ukraine.”
  • “Russia needs to undergo a national discussion so that it can articulate the deep-seated complexes it has harbored for hundreds of years. But this will happen only after Putin. In this sense, it is a good thing that Putinism is linked to the idea of Russia as a ‘distinct civilization’: maybe the two will one day pass into obscurity together.”

Defense and aerospace:

  • No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • No significant developments

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Russia-China Partnership Proves Immune to Coronavirus,” Ivan Zuenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.25.20: The author, a research fellow at Center for Asia Pacific Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch, writes:

  • “Despite the natural desire of Western analysts to see the [pandemic] situation … as evidence of the impending collapse of the Sino-Russian quasi-alliance, it’s clear that this will not seriously impact relations.”
  • “Firstly, the anti-Chinese rhetoric issuing forth from Washington, along with the collapse of oil prices and growing dependence of Russia on Chinese consumption, are far more effective in bringing the two countries closer together than any unpleasantness at the border is in driving them apart.”
  • “Secondly, there is no manifestation of xenophobia in the border zone, either against Chinese people in Russia’s Far East, or against Russians in northeast China.”
  • “The benefits at the current time of continuing to cooperate are obvious to both Russia and China. This friendship of convenience will continue…. The crisis caused by the pandemic will be a painful blow to the economy along the border, but the more painful consequences will result not from halting transborder connections, but from the global recession and fall in prices for energy commodities.”

“The US Doesn't Need a New Cold War,” Robert Zoellick, Wall Street Journal, 05.19.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes:

  • “The New Cold Warriors can't contain China given its ties throughout the world; other countries won't join us. Nor can the U.S. break the regime, though the Communist Party's flaws could open cracks within its own society … The U.S. and its partners face a staggering set of challenges. We need to find medical solutions to COVID-19 … America also needs a strong recovery, which will require a growing global economy, including China.”
  • “The U.S. needs to offer allies and the world an attractive approach, which must include working with China on mutual interests.”
  • “While the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is understandably viewed with optimism in some quarters given its potential to deliver … economic development, it is viewed with considerable anxiety by others because of the implications of some countries not being able to meet their debt obligations … China will gain geopolitically from the BRI and in doing so transform the current core–periphery relationship from the West to East … A number of economic and geostrategic factors are likely to facilitate this.”
  • “First, China can sustain losses that would be anathema to any private Western company and its shareholders … Second, the West is unclear and does not have an active strategy to counter China’s dominant role in the BRI … Third, as China exercises its soft power via BRI projects it simultaneously extends its geographical sphere of influence and increasingly establishes the strategic foundations for the deployment of hard power.”
  • “Short of falling into the unthinkable consequences of the Thucydides Trap, it is difficult to see any change in the direction of that transfer of power from West to East in the 21st century. Irrespective of the economic outcomes, the BRI is currently proving to be a geostrategic masterstroke for China.”

“The Kremlin’s Disinformation Playbook Goes to Beijing,” Jessica Brandt and Torrey Taussig, Brookings Institution, 05.19.20The authors, the head of policy and research at the Alliance for Securing Democracy and a research director in the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard’s Belfer Center, write:  

  • “The information space has long served as a platform for authoritarian influence and interference. Moscow is often at the forefront of this challenge, using social media trolls, government officials and state-friendly news outlets to spread conspiracy theories and obscure the distinction between fact and fiction.”
  • “China has benefitted from Russia’s brazen disinformation campaigns in the West while itself deploying more subtle information manipulation strategies. But that might be changing. Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, China has carried out a striking disinformation campaign of its own that borrows a few pages from the Kremlin’s playbook.”
  • “According to U.S. officials, Chinese agents are creating fake social media accounts akin to Russia-backed trolls to push out false messages that are designed to create chaos in the United States.”
  • “In promoting its conspiracy theories, China exploits Russia’s propaganda apparatus. RT and Sputnik, pro-Kremlin media outlets, are among the top five most-retweeted non-Chinese news outlets by China’s state-funded media.”
  • “While China’s overt assertiveness in this space might be new, its long-term goals are not. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long employed disinformation, censorship, and monitoring tools to suppress criticism at home and press on democracy’s inherent weaknesses abroad.”

Ukraine:

“Which Way Will Ukraine Swing?” Ilya Timtchenko, Foreign Policy, 05.20.20The author, freelance writer and former business editor at the Kyiv Post, writes:

  • “When Ukraine’s comedian-turned-presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskiy swept the election a year ago, he vowed to uproot corruption, jail the country’s top crooks, stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, and attract billions of dollars in foreign direct investment. A year after his May 20, 2019, inauguration, none of these grand promises are even close to being fulfilled—and many Ukrainians are losing patience.”
  • “If [Zelenskiy] cannot meet his campaign promises as well as offer a clear and committed Western-oriented reform agenda, Zelenskiy may lose the international partners Ukraine desperately needs to avoid falling back into Russia’s arms.”
  • “An even bigger concern for Western governments arose as Zelensky’s government dragged its feet over reforms promised to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). … The IMF, worried about PrivatBank being returned back to its tainted former owners, conditioned a new $5.5 billion financial package issued in December 2019 to a bill that would prevent the return of PrivatBank to its previous owners…. Some have been quick to credit Zelenskiy for the victory; in reality, the bill should have passed long ago given that his party controls both branches of government.”
  • “Zelenskiy promised to bring peace to Ukraine and end the war, which is why he swiftly agreed to meet with Russia during the so-called Normandy Four summit in Paris in December 2019. During this meeting, Russia scored a number of victories, including a favorable gas deal, a prisoner exchange, and stronger control in territories it occupies in Ukraine. Zelenskiy’s political appointments throughout his first year have added to the doubt over his commitments to broker peace with Russia without capitulating to the Kremlin.”
  • “The new government appointments send equally unclear messages regarding Ukraine’s future ties to NATO … Recent comments from the new defense minister, Andriy Taran, have raised concerns over its commitment. … Western leaders should be concerned about the potential for Ukraine to backslide into Russia’s embrace.”

“Zelenskiy’s First Year: New Beginning or False Dawn?” Steven Pifer, Atlantic Council's UkraineAlert/Brookings Institution, 05.20.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

  • “Volodymyr Zelenskiy became independent Ukraine’s sixth president on May 20, 2019, bringing renewed hopes for dramatic change that would enable Ukraine to realize its full potential, despite the conflict with Russia.  One year later, however, it is not clear whether his presidency will prove transformational or just another false start.”
  • “On the plus side, Zelenskiy personally appears honest and has not profited from his office, something that cannot be said about his predecessors. The nature of his relationship with oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy … posed a major question mark last summer. Zelenskiy now seems to have answered that by breaking dramatically with Kolomoiskiy over newly-passed banking legislation.”
  • “Other actions in spring 2020 have raised questions about Zelenskiy’s commitment to reform. He fired Honcharuk [from the post of prime minister] and reshuffled much of the cabinet in early March, just six months after the initial appointment of the government. … The new cabinet lacks the reform credentials of its predecessor, and members of the old guard have returned to positions of power.”
  • “Security sector reform … has gone nowhere. … Little has been done with the judicial branch, where corrupt judges have a reputation for selling decisions.”
  • “Zelenskiy should consider how the approval ratings of his predecessors Yushchenko and Poroshenko plummeted when they failed to meet the reform expectations that brought them to the presidency. He still has time to justify the high hopes generated in spring 2019. If, however, his election turns out to be just another false start, he will most likely become another one-term Ukrainian president.”

“I Expected War. I Didn't Expect Trump's Impeachment or a Pandemic,” Volodymyr Zelenskiy, New York Times, 05.20.20The author, the president of Ukraine, writes:

  • “Remember President Trump's impeachment? After chasing higher ratings for most of my life in the entertainment business, it took only one phone call to become truly world famous. The impeachment story was not comfortable for me. It took American and international attention away from the issues that mattered most to Ukraine and turned our country into a story about President Trump.”
  • “The other major challenge of my presidency is one that I inherited: For six years, the part of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine has been occupied by Russian-backed illegal armed groups. … That all may sound like ancient history because in March, I was forced to face yet another major crisis, though one that I share with every other leader in the world: the coronavirus pandemic.”
  • “But it's not all doom and gloom. The silver lining that gives me hope amid all of these crises has been the same thing: international cooperation. It has been and will continue to be the way forward. … Ukraine remains a good partner and friend of the United States. We received the military assistance we needed to continue to ensure our country's independence.”
  • “When it comes to the war in eastern Ukraine, my administration understands that diplomacy and dialogue are the only options. I made it an early priority to resume meetings between the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia to discuss peace. … Still, the war in Ukraine undermines the security and stability of Europe, and we will need further help from our allies to end it.”
  • “The road to recovery is long. The war in Donbass is not yet over. But as I look back at my first year in office and ahead to my second, I have hope. Together, we are going to make the world—and Ukraine—a better place.”

“Ukraine's Citizens Worry About COVID-19. And They Still Have to Worry About the War,” Henry E. Hale, Volodymyr Kulyk, Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse, The Washington Post, 05.22.20The authors of the article write:

  • “[T]he Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) included a series of our questions in their April 22-24 telephone ‘omnibus’ tracking survey of a nationally representative sample of 2,024 adult residents of Ukraine.”
  • “We first confirm the pandemic indeed strikes fear among Ukrainians. Our results indicate most people in the country (57 percent) are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ afraid of contracting the new coronavirus. But a substantial 17 percent are ‘not too afraid’ and 23 percent ‘completely unafraid.’ … Only 31 percent of the population would combat the virus regardless of economic cost. That said, just 19 percent would prioritize the economy over fighting COVID-19.”
  • “More Ukrainians (26 percent) would prioritize security and territorial integrity over anti-pandemic measures, with only 20 percent believing security and territorial concerns should not limit the battle with the coronavirus at all.”
  • “People who would place national security and territorial integrity over public health are often also those who reject compromise with Russia as a path to settling the conflict in the Donbass. They are also, on average, slightly less likely to be potential voters for President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.”
  • “In a country like Ukraine where a sizable minority of hawks do not trust the current president, some of these people may disregard or even rebel against the leadership's anti-pandemic measures if they start to fear the virus issue is being used to force a compromise peace solution they view as worse than the disease. The possibility just described creates incentives for aggressors like Russia not to ease up.”

“The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine,” Duncan Allan, Chatham House, 05.22.20. The author, an associate fellow at Chatham House, writes:

  • “The Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015, which sought to end Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine, rest on two irreconcilable interpretations of Ukraine’s sovereignty—what could be called the ‘Minsk conundrum’: is Ukraine sovereign, as Ukrainians insist, or should its sovereignty be limited, as Russia demands?”
  • “Western views on how to implement the Minsk agreements are imprecise and inconsistent. One prevalent view is that implementation means finding a mid-point between the Russian and Ukrainian positions. However, attempts to do so have failed—heaping pressure on Ukraine, risking political instability in Kyiv, and not leading to any discernible change in Russian policy. Instead of trying to resolve an unresolvable contradiction, Western policymakers should acknowledge the starkness of the Minsk conundrum.”
  • “An alternative approach would make the defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty the unambiguous premise of Western policy. It would view the Minsk and Normandy processes mainly as conflict management tools. In line with the priority attached to upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, Western governments would meanwhile maintain support for long-term political and economic reform in Ukraine, using the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement as the anchor.”
  • “This approach would also encourage the authorities in Kyiv to engage more inclusively with those living in occupied Donbass. Yet it would proceed from the assumption that the region should not be legally reincorporated into Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Finally, this approach would logically entail a lengthy stand-off with Russia over Ukraine—a prospect that many decision-makers in the West would find troubling and unnerving.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

  • No significant developments.