5 Ideas to Explore

1. “Modern Russian-Chinese relations represent a more advanced form of interstate interaction compared to the military-political alliances of the Cold War,” according to the “Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Partnerships and Strategic Interaction” signed by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping during their talks on May 16 in Beijing. Speaking one day after visiting China alongside Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the existence of a discussion among members of Russia’s relatively influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) on whether Moscow and Beijing could enter into a “‘real alliance’ in our time, which will meet the interests of Russia.” “We can and should have a special conversation on this topic. We are ready to debate and discuss the ideas expressed in publications and aimed at building a real alliance with the PRC,” Lavrov told the annual meeting of the Russian equivalent of the CFR in Moscow on May 18. Despite the growing strength of Russian-Chinese ties, “many in the West ... want to believe that their alliance is an aberration,” even though “never in its entire history has it [Russia] been so entwined with China,” according to Alexander Gabuev of CEIP. Disrupting “the Russian-Chinese axis today would probably require ... difficult policy shifts—on Taiwan again, or on Ukraine,” according to FT’s Gideon Rachman.
2. Xi Jinping has felt growing unease as ties between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un have grown more intimate, “diplomats and other officials with knowledge of the matter” claimed when interviewed by WSJ. Russia and North Korea kept Beijing in the dark about what they discussed when Putin and Kim met for a rare summit in 2023, leading Chinese diplomats to ask their Western counterparts what was agreed between the duo, according to people familiar with the matter interviewed by WSJ. Among other things, Beijing worries that Russia might help North Korea build up its nuclear capabilities, the people told WSJ.
3. The U.S. and its allies need to follow four rules to “sustain stable and strong deterrence” vis-à-vis Russia, according to Stanford’s Rose Gottemoeller. “The first rule should be to maintain discipline about using terms such as ‘strategic defeat’ [of Russia], so as not to pander to claims that it is Washington and its allies that are posing an existential threat,” she writes in FP. “The second rule should be to sustain the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the reliability of its command and control systems.” “Third, Washington should be pursuing with assurance the mutual predictability that comes from controlling and limiting nuclear weapons at the negotiating table,” according to Gottemoeller, and “[f]inally and most importantly, the United States and its allies must sustain steady progress in military assistance to Ukraine.”
4. Russia’s summer offensive can still be blunted if “Ukraine’s allies engage now to replenish Ukrainian munitions stockpiles, help to establish a robust training pipeline and make the necessary industrial investments,” according to Jack Watling of RUSI. Russia now has about 510,000 troops in the fight, which is sufficient to “launch attacks along the full length of the front line, keeping Ukrainian forces constantly off,” according to a RUSI analysis cited by NYT, which asks whether the current size of Ukraine’s fighting force is “enough to halt Russia’s momentum.” To turn this dynamic around, Ukraine “must not only replace losses in its existing units, but also raise enough units to manage their rotation on and off the line,” Watling wrote in RUSI.
5. There are at least two reasons why Putin will be able to maintain war spending for a relatively long time, even if that “results in stagnating or falling real incomes,” according to Sergey Vakulenko of CEIP. “Firstly, standards of living would still remain relatively high: certainly, they have a long way to fall until they reach what they were in the Soviet period, not to mention the destitution of the early 1990s,” he writes in CEIP. “Secondly, growing repression, the embrace of an avowedly militant and nationalistic state ideology, and attacks on free speech have helped the authorities keep a lid on dissent at home,” he writes. While confident that most common Russians won’t protest a long war, Putin is also taking pains to “ward off threats from Russia's elite by elevating their offspring or their allies and letting them compete for second-tier power,” according to WSJ’s analysis of the recent cabinet reshuffle, which led to the elevation of “princelings” such as Dmitry Patrushev and Boris Kovalchuk.

NB: The next Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, May 28 due to the U.S. Memorial Day holiday.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Behind Putin Visit, Unease in Beijing Over His Potential Next Stop: North Korea,” Timothy W. Martin, Ann M. Simmons and Lingling Wei, WSJ, 05.19.24. 

• In the days leading up to Vladimir Putin's just-finished visit to China, speculation rippled through diplomatic circles that the Russian leader planned to tack on a trip to North Korea—a possibility that irritated Beijing, according to diplomats and other officials with knowledge of the matter.
• Chinese leader Xi Jinping has felt growing unease as ties between Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un—two of his most important but also most volatile international partners—have grown more intimate, the diplomats and officials said. A combined visit to China and North Korea by Putin could also have reinforced Western fears of a trilateral authoritarian axis, leaving Beijing diplomatically more isolated, they said.
• To China's relief, Putin didn't head to Pyongyang straight from the northern Chinese city of Harbin, just some 460 miles away from the North Korean capital. On Saturday, Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Russia's state news agency, TASS, that arrangements for a visit by the Kremlin leader to North Korea are progressing well. "Preparations for the visit are under way," Peskov said. He didn't announce a date for the planned trip.
• Russia and North Korea have kept Beijing in the dark about what was discussed when Putin and Kim met for a rare summit in the fall, leading Chinese diplomats to ask their Western counterparts about what was agreed between the duo, according to people familiar with the matter. Beijing worries that Russia might help China's erratic neighbor build up its nuclear capabilities, the people said.
• For Moscow, what Pyongyang can provide beyond the war in Ukraine is limited, and strengthening the bilateral relationship with Beijing for economic support will be much more valuable to Putin, said John Everard, a former U.K. ambassador to North Korea and Belarus. "North Korea is not a priority for Putin," Everard said. "North Korea is just having a wild fling with Russia."

“The Coming North Korean Crisis. And How Washington Can Prevent It,” Sue Mi Terry, FA, 05.16.24. 

• The real nature of any forthcoming North Korean crisis is difficult to predict. At a minimum, Pyongyang will likely carry out nonlethal provocations—such as cyberattacks on government, defense, telecommunications, and financial institutions. It could also test the Hwasong-18, its solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in hope of improving its reliability. And North Korea could explode a tactical nuclear weapon: a small nuclear weapon designed for the battlefield.  But North Korea could also go beyond saber-rattling and launch an actual, if limited, military attack against South Korea, akin to when it sank a South Korean naval vessel and shelled the island of Yeonpyeong in 2010.  Such a strike could quickly spin out of control. Current South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is an avowed hawk and has promised to respond forcefully to any North Korean attack. 
• There is no indication that Kim is gearing up for all-out war. The regime is not mobilizing troops or equipment, there is no increase in activity at its military bases, and South Korean officials have not detected a significant buildup near the border. But Kim’s rhetoric does suggest a smaller attack could be forthcoming. And if he does resolve to strike, it will be hard to stop him. Both China and Russia are now much more closely aligned with Pyongyang than with Western governments, and so they are unlikely to force him to back off. In fact, in late March, China abstained from—and Russia vetoed—a motion to extend the UN Panel of Experts, an independent body that monitors North Korea’s compliance with nuclear sanctions. Zhao Leji, one of China’s top officials, recently met with Kim in Pyongyang to increase trust and cooperation. Kim met with Putin in September 2023, and ever since, Pyongyang has welcomed a steady flow of Russian delegations—including a March visit from Sergei Naryshkin, the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. According to The Korea Herald, Naryshkin “deeply discussed practical issues for further boosting cooperation” with his North Korean counterpart.
• The North Korean–Russian partnership is, ultimately, one of convenience. But practical partnerships can still be powerful, and the Moscow-Pyongyang entente is no exception. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a convergence of political needs and material interests that has prompted North Korea to ship weapons to Russia en masse. North Korea, meanwhile, is receiving more economic and technological assistance from Russia. Moscow, for example, appears to have aided Pyongyang with its military satellite program. Russia could soon offer North Korea assistance with space launch vehicles—assistance that would help North Korea develop better ICBMs. 
  • For Kim, the biggest prize would be the transfer of sensitive, cutting-edge Russian military technology and advanced weaponry. He particularly wants help building solid-fuel missiles and reentry vehicles, which would advance North Korea’s nuclear program. 
  • Russia could also assist North Korea with its nuclear submarine and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles—areas in which Russia has significant experience.
• Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing may seem weak compared to North Korea’s burgeoning connection to Russia. But China remains North Korea’s most valuable ally, and the two states are increasingly united by their enmity toward Washington. China is also now cooperating more with Russia, suggesting that Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang are creating a dangerous, if informal, tripartite pact. 
• So far, Biden and his aides have largely ignored the Korean Peninsula—and understandably so. With wars raging in Ukraine and Gaza and tensions rising with China and Iran, the administration has had little bandwidth to focus on Kim’s antics. But North Korea is one of only three countries, along with China and Russia, that could plausibly launch a nuclear strike against the continental United States, and it menaces two major U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, as well. And so the administration has little choice but to focus on the peninsula.
• Now, in fact, is the time to double down. If Biden wants to prevent North Korea from acting out, he needs to first provide the government with new incentives to talk—and that means new restrictions Washington can use as carrots. Biden, in other words, needs to take North Korean policy off autopilot and launch a proactive effort to deter Pyongyang. Otherwise, he risks encouraging an already emboldened Kim to stage a major provocation.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Raisi’s final trip put the spotlight on a key relationship in the Caucasus region,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 05.20.24.

• When he met his Iranian counterpart on Sunday, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan told him that the day would “go down as a beautiful and bright chapter in the history of Iran-Azerbaijan relations.” It would be one of the last meetings President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran had before he died.
• That Mr. Raisi perished in a helicopter crash on his way back from a rare meeting with the president of Azerbaijan, Iran’s neighbor to the north, highlights the fragile geopolitical dynamics in Caucasus region that could be unsettled by his death.
• Sunday’s meeting was the high point of an effort by both countries to patch up their relationship, which had been strained by an attack on the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tehran last year and by Azerbaijan’s increasingly close ties to Israel, Iran’s archenemy.
• Azerbaijan’s relationship with Iran has been tense for years. Azerbaijan’s military victory over Armenia in 2020, and its closer ties to both Turkey and Israel, redrew the geopolitical map of the Caucasus, a volatile region where the interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran have long come into conflict. And early last year, Azerbaijan closed its embassy in Tehran after the deadly attack that Mr. Aliyev called a terrorist act. But both sides have since tried to repair the relationship, and Azerbaijani officials have said they would not allow Israel to use their territory or airspace in the event of a war between Israel and Iran.
• There are also economic incentives for the rapprochement. A railway project running partly through Azerbaijan will link Russia to Iranian seaports, out of reach of Western sanctions. Last fall, Azerbaijan and Iran jointly broke ground on a bridge that would connect the main part of Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan. And when Mr. Raisi and Mr. Aliyev met on Sunday, at the border between the two countries, they were inaugurating a jointly built hydroelectric dam on the Aras River. “Some may not like our meetings and our joint successes,” Mr. Raisi told Mr. Aliyev on Sunday, according to the Azerbaijani president’s office. “The main thing is that we have implemented together what is good for our countries, states and peoples.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant developments.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages,” Jack Watling, RUSI, 05.14.24. 

• Russia has now started the early phases of its anticipated summer offensive with renewed attacks on Kharkiv. Over the past few days, Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border, occupying a number of villages. Ukraine has spent several months fortifying Kharkiv, but storming the city is not how Russia intends to fight. The Russian target this summer is the Ukrainian army, and against this target it has started to compound its advantages.
• If Ukraine’s allies engage now to replenish Ukrainian munitions stockpiles, help to establish a robust training pipeline, and make the necessary industrial investments, then Russia’s summer offensive can be blunted. In the medium term, however, turning the present dynamic around is up to Ukraine and cannot be resolved by its international partners. Unless the AFU expands in size then it will continue to be overstretched. The AFU must not only replace losses in its existing units, but also raise enough units to manage their rotation on and off the line. 
• There is, nonetheless, an area where the support of Ukraine’s partners is critical. If Ukrainian forces lack enough key enablers – artillery, air defenses, electronic warfare complexes, and engineering vehicles - then the brigades that own the limited assets available will be fixed on the front. They cannot rotate away with their equipment. 
• The outlook in Ukraine is bleak. However, if Ukraine’s allies engage now to replenish Ukrainian munitions stockpiles, help to establish a robust training pipeline, and make the industrial investments to sustain the effort, then Russia’s summer offensive can be blunted, and Ukraine will receive the breathing space it needs to regain the initiative.

“Russians Poured Over Ukraine’s Border. There Was Little to Stop Them,” Michael Schwirtz, Jeffrey Gettleman, Maria Varenikova and Constant Méheut, NYT, 05.18.24. 

• The stunning incursion into the Kharkiv Region lays bare the challenges facing Ukraine’s weary and thinly stretched forces as Russia ramps up its summer offensive. The Russian troops pouring over the border enjoyed a huge advantage in artillery shells and employed air power, including fighter jets and heavy glide bombs, to disastrous effect, unhindered by depleted Ukrainian air defenses.
• Once over the border, the Russian soldiers easily pushed past fortifications — like trenches, land mines and tank barriers — some of which, Ukrainian troops said, were insufficient or sloppily constructed. But the biggest challenge for Ukrainian forces is people. Ground down over more than two years of war, Ukraine’s military is struggling to come up with enough soldiers to effectively defend the 600-mile front line, even as Russian forces have swelled with thousands of newly mobilized troops.
• As of Saturday, nearly 10,000 residents of the Kharkiv Region had fled the fighting, according to the regional governor, and residents reported that whole villages had been wiped out. As Russian troops advance, there are fears that for the first time in nearly two years, they could come within artillery range of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city.
• For months, Russia has been building up troops along Ukraine’s northern border, with 50,000 deployed in the area around the Kharkiv and Sumy Regions, according to Kostiantyn Mashovets, a Ukrainian military analyst. .... Ukraine’s top officials appeared to be taking the danger seriously, with President Volodymyr Zelenksy making a highly choreographed visit to the fortifications around Kharkiv on April 9.
• Those preparations did little to blunt the Russian attack. 
  • Part of the problem lies with restrictions on the use of sophisticated American weaponry. Though Ukrainian forces could see the buildup on the border, a White House prohibition on using high-precision American weapons, like HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, against targets on Russian territory prevented Ukraine from attacking them.
  • Then there is the disadvantage Ukraine has operated under since the beginning of the war: They are facing a much bigger country with a sizable manpower advantage and a large arsenal of weapons that is constantly replenished by a defense industry operating with a record budget.
  • Some Ukrainian officials said that fortifying areas close to the border was nearly impossible because of Russian shelling. But, they added, stronger defensive lines, constructed farther from the frontier, have so far held up under the Russian assault
• Once the Russians opened their attack, some points along the Ukrainian lines buckled and troops fled amid the heavy bombardments, said Denys Yaroslavsky, a lieutenant with the 57th Brigade. “There are many more questions for those who were responsible for building fortifications on the first line, those who were supposed to mine it and strengthen it,” he said.
• Russia now has about 510,000 troops in the fight, according to an analysis published this week by Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank. Those numbers are sufficient to launch attacks along the full length of the front line, keeping Ukrainian forces constantly off balance as they struggle to respond to multiple incursions.
• New weaponry set to arrive as part of the Biden administration’s $61 billion arms package, including artillery shells and air defense ammunition, should help alleviate some of the strain on Ukraine’s forces, as should a new mobilization drive by Ukraine’s government, which lowered the age of conscription to 25. The question now, as the summer fighting season begins in earnest, is whether it will be enough to halt Russia’s momentum.

“Russia Has Opened Up a New Front. What Comes Next?” Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, NYT, 05.16.24. 

• Last week, the Russian military opened a new front in its invasion of Ukraine. Launching an offensive into the Kharkiv region, Russian forces quickly advanced several kilometers, managing to reoccupy several villages that were liberated during Ukraine's successful offensive in September 2022. They have not yet reached the main line of defenses east of the city, which are held by brigades better equipped and more experienced than those closer to the border. But the situation is serious.
• By threatening Ukraine's second most populous city, Russia hopes to pin Ukrainian resources in the region, exposing the front elsewhere. Ukraine's immediate priority is to stabilize the front line and prevent a major Russian breakthrough, which it may be able to do. 
• Russia's aim is not to take Kharkiv, but to menace it by advancing toward the city and threatening it with artillery. While Russia lacks the forces to assault the city itself, the operation is designed to create a dilemma. Ukrainian forces are already stretched relatively thin; by drawing Ukraine's reserves and better units to the defense of Kharkiv, the Russian attack weakens other parts of the front line. Russia remains focused on occupying the remainder of the Donetsk region in the east, looking to seize key transit hubs and population centers.
• Ukraine's counteroffensive last summer culminated primarily because of attrition among its infantry, and it has struggled to replace those losses ever since. ... To be clear, Ukraine is not out of men. The situation is the consequence of policy choices, a rickety mobilization system and many months of political intransigence before the recent passing of a series of mobilization laws. ... Lacking sufficient forces and with a deficit of ammunition, Ukraine's military responds to Russian breakthroughs by moving its best brigades and elite units around the front. 
• In contrast, Russia managed to address its manpower problems last year and now recruits approximately 30,000 contract servicemen a month. Many of these recruits are hardly ideal soldiers and are also in their 40s. But this physical advantage -- combined with artillery, drones and glide bomb strikes -- has given Russia a quantitative edge.
• The future hinges on what the West -- which plays a significant role in training, intelligence and other forms of support -- and Ukraine can make of it.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Biden’s Catch-22 in Ukraine,” Raphael S. Cohen, FP, 05.17.24. 

• Ukraine still has some strategic room to maneuver, but it will need to fight differently if it hopes to reverse this slow decline.
  • First, Ukraine will need to strike deeper inside Russia proper
  • Ukraine will also need some kind of air-power capability if it wants to succeed in a ground counteroffensive at some point in the future and evict Russian forces from its country. 
  • Finally, Ukraine will need to take more operational risk if and when it launches a counteroffensive. 
• Ukraine and its Western backers will also need to change their overall approach. Ukraine can no longer afford to simply wait the Russians out, refrain from striking military and logistical targets inside Russia, and hope that the artillery duels in eastern Ukraine will eventually turn in their favor. It will, instead, need to go on the offensive—and that involves some degree of escalation risk. That’s an easier sell for Ukraine, given that its very existence is on the line.
• For the Biden administration, though, accepting such risk will mean abandoning a pillar of its strategy for the past two years, choosing a single path, and accepting the potentially escalatory consequences that might follow. That’s a tough choice. Not choosing, however, may be even riskier.

“Will Biden Now Step Up on Ukraine?” Editorial Board, WSJ, 05.16.24. 

• Vladimir Putin's military is back on the offensive in Ukraine, producing another round of ugly battlefield scenes. Yet President Biden's strategy, even after a cash infusion from Congress, looks like a plan for Ukraine to lose as slowly as possible
• The Russians are making gains in Ukraine outside Kharkiv, albeit slowly and with no regard for the lives of their own soldiers. .... Ukraine has few to no options to strike back, and that's a product of Mr. Biden's policy. The President has precluded Ukraine from using American weapons to hit sovereign Russian territory. The practical effect of this is to offer the Russian military a safe haven. 
• The Biden Administration is touting its weapons packages since Congress passed new aid funding last month, including artillery and air defense ammo. Ukraine needs the rounds for the front lines and air-defense munitions to protect its military and civilian infrastructure from Russian missiles. But more air defenses aren't a strategy for Ukraine to prevail, or even improve its leverage at an eventual negotiating table with Mr. Putin. It's a plan for Ukrainian defeat on the installment plan, which would be a failure for Mr. Biden -- and the United States.
• Mr. Biden will have to lift his embargo on Ukraine striking inside Russia. That will also mean providing the precision long-range missiles, in sufficient quantities, that can turn back the Russian advances and put Russian forces in Crimea at risk.
• Mr. Putin is doubling down on his war aims and turning for help everywhere from Iran to North Korea. Mr. Xi's involvement underscores that the war is about a consolidating anti-American axis, not merely Ukraine. Congress granted Mr. Biden his military aid request. If his limits on Ukraine now lead to a Russian victory, he won't be able to roll out his usual routine of blaming MAGA Republicans. Americans will know where the buck stops.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“G7 warms to plan for Trump-proofing Ukraine aid,” Paola Tamma, Henry Foy and James Politi, FT, 05.20.24.

• Washington’s G7 allies are warming to a US plan to rush tens of billions of dollars in funding to Ukraine before Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House. Under the plan, set to be discussed at a June summit, Kyiv would receive money upfront from a G7 loan. The loan would be backed by future profits generated from about $350bn of Russian assets that have been immobilized in the west in response to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Some G7 members have been reluctant to endorse the plan but their sentiments have shifted after a diplomatic push by the US, according to eight western officials. Washington’s plan would raise about $50bn to be disbursed to Ukraine as early as this summer, US officials have said. US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen described the move as a “key topic” for this week’s gathering of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors in Stresa, Italy.
• The more reluctant G7 members have warmed to the plan as a way to ensure long-term funding for Kyiv if Joe Biden loses this year’s presidential election to Trump, who has opposed US aid to Ukraine. It could be “done before November so, even if Trump wins, the money has already been deployed”, said one person involved in the discussions.

“Russia shows resilience. There is more to do for Ukraine,” Editorial Board, WP, 05.18.24.

• Russia has proven resilient, economically and militarily. Now, President Vladimir Putin is preparing for a long war, while Ukraine is struggling to rebound from a debilitating six-month pause in U.S. arms deliveries. The United States, and its allies, need to engage in their own fresh thinking about how best to help Ukraine fight back.
  • Mr. Putin's resurgence was on display last week as he met with China's leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing. 
  • Yet another sign of Russia's resilience was the launch of a recent offensive drive in the north near Kharkiv, taking Ukrainian forces off guard. 
  • At home, Mr. Putin has long since stamped out the rebellion by the Wagner Group's Yevgeniy Prigozhin and crushed all civil antiwar dissent; he has imposed total information control, consolidating one-man rule to a greater extent than any Russian dictator since Stalin. And he is trying to build a sustainable war economy. 
  • Also significant was the May 6 Russian announcement of a military exercise simulating use of tactical nuclear weapons. Although Mr. Putin had previously threatened vaguely to use nuclear weapons, this marked an official exercise. /
• All is not going swimmingly for Mr. Putin. Russian casualties have been enormous, estimated at nearly 900 killed and wounded every day. Also, Russia's natural gas company Gazprom — source of 10 percent of Moscow's revenue — suffered a massive $6.9 billion loss for 2023, its first in two decades. 
• Still, Western sanctions have failed to collapse Russia's economy. ...More needs to be done to strengthen those sanctions and deny Mr. Putin the resources to carry on the war. An international working group at Stanford University has just published smart recommendations: a further package of oil, gas and metal sanctions, an across-the-board tariff on remaining imports from Russia, as well as stronger enforcement of existing sanctions. It also calls for using Russia's frozen assets to support Ukraine. 

“Action Plan 3.0 Strengthening Sanctions Against the Russian Federation,” The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, Freeman Spogli Institute, 05.14.24.

• The implementation of existing sanctions needs to be more effective, and more sanctions with tougher, longer-term economic implications for Russia should be imposed to help end this war. Specifically, the sanctions coalitions should:
  • Confiscate Frozen Russian Assets Abroad 
  • Impose New Sanctions on Russian Exports 
  • Introduce Import Tariffs on All Remaining Russian Exports
  • Tighten Financial Sanctions 
  • Impose More Sanctions on Russian Companies 
  • Impose More Personal Sanctions
  • Prevent Lawyers from Enabling Sanctions Evasion
  • Designate Russia as a Sponsor of Terrorism 
  • Stop Western Companies Doing Business with Russia
  • Strengthen Enforcement of Existing Sanctions
  • Expand Secondary Sanctions
• We propose packages of measures to fulfill two critical strategic tasks: 
  • Decrease Putin’s resources for funding his war. A package of sanctions puts the Russian economy, budget, and currency on the defensive. We propose an ambitious but feasible further package of oil, gas, and metal sanctions, backed by an across-the-board tariff on remaining imports from Russia, as well as stronger enforcement of existing sanctions. Effective implementation of such a package would push Russia into an external deficit and a wide fiscal deficit, which Russia would struggle to finance, undermining the currency and economy, and weakening Russia’s ability to continue its invasion of Ukraine. 
  • Contain Russia. As in the Cold War, the West needs to implement restrictions that economically and financially contain an expansionist and revisionist Russia. This should include a CoCom-style body to manage trade with Russia, systematic sanctions on critical Russian sectors, including energy, finance, and metals, and a ban, with limited exemptions 45 subject to special approval, on Western companies operating in Russia or providing services to Russian persons.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Victory in Ukraine Starts with Addressing Five Strategic Problems,” Benjamin Jensen and Elizabeth Hoffman, CSIS, 05.15.24. 

• The most recent U.S. national security supplemental package to Ukraine, passed in April 2024, mandates the administration under President Joe Biden produce a strategy for continued U.S. support of Ukraine against Russian aggression. The strategy must “help Ukraine end the conflict as a democratic, independent, and sovereign country capable of deterring and defending its territory.” 
• For Ukraine, the ideal end state appears clear: (1) restore its sovereign territory (i.e., the 1991 borders), (2) rebuild the country in a manner that promotes deeper Western integration, and (3) hold Russia accountable for war crimes. Regardless of whether or not U.S. policymakers agree with this end state, it should serve as the foundation for any U.S. strategy. 
• The transatlantic alliance has a unique opportunity to develop a long-term strategy for supporting Ukraine and containing Russia. As analysts who have spent time in Ukraine supporting efforts linked to ongoing hostilities, the authors see five core strategic problems that must be addressed as part of the new theory of victory the Biden administration produces in response to the directive in the national security supplemental: (1) integrating Ukraine into the European economic and transatlantic security order, (2) degrading Russia’s continued ability to bypass sanctions and access capital, (3) combating the resilience of Russian disinformation campaigns, (4) rethinking the arsenal of democracy, and (5) sustaining and strengthening Ukraine’s economy and democracy.
• The need for a U.S. strategy is urgent as Ukrainians are preparing for an anticipated Russian offensive this summer. The threat Putin’s despotic regime poses to the West has already crystallized in the string of recent arrests of Russian agents plotting violent acts of sabotage across Western Europe. The reality of the situation is that Ukraine will need further financial support beyond the most recent supplemental for continued defense and reconstruction activities. The strategy should be candid in this assessment while making clear the alternative—sending U.S. troops to Europe if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine—would be far more costly in blood and treasure. A one-time Ukraine skeptic, House speaker Mike Johnson stated: “To put it bluntly, I would rather send bullets to Ukraine than American boys.”
• Although the Biden administration is charged with writing the strategy, this is a task the administration and Congress must own jointly.  ...The administration undoubtedly needs a strategy to communicate why supporting Ukraine is in the national security interest of the United States. 
• Ukraine requires more than U.S. financial and military assistance; it requires political leadership and courage. If Ukraine is to win the war against Russia, the most recent assistance package cannot be the last that Congress passes.

“What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine?” Thomas Graham, CFR, 05.16.24.

• From the outset, Putin has embedded his issues regarding Ukraine in the larger question of NATO’s role in Europe. ...What unsettled Putin was the ever-closer military and security cooperation between Ukraine and individual NATO members, especially the United States, which included more frequent and complex joint exercises in and around Ukraine. 
• Putin’s concerns about NATO overlapped with the two goals he identified as essential to Russia’s security when he launched the “special military operation”: the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. 
• Meanwhile, Putin has said little about his territorial ambitions. ... In any event, the main lines of advance during the invasion have suggested Putin had far greater territorial ambitions. Arguably, the thrust toward Kyiv could be construed as part of an operation to “denazify” Ukraine by seizing the capital and overthrowing the government, which Putin had branded as neo-Nazi. But the march on Kharkiv in the east, the drive to create a land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, and the thrust toward Odesa all looked like part of an ambitious plan to control all of Ukraine east of the Dnipro River, which bifurcates the country, or the territory of what was once known as Novorossiya, roughly the land Catherine the Great had seized from Turkey in the mid-eighteenth century. If successful, Russia would have then fully controlled the Sea of Azov and the entire north shore of the Black Sea, turning a rump Ukraine into a landlocked country.
• Putin believes that he can still achieve all the goals he has set for his military operation. His confidence is only growing with Russia’s recent gains on the battlefield near Kharkiv, which are shifting momentum in his favor. Nevertheless, ultimate success is far from certain. Ukraine’s ties with NATO are growing stronger. Zelenskyy’s government has survived, as has Ukraine as an independent state. What little progress Russia has made on the battlefield has come at horrific cost in men and armaments. But Putin is not prepared to relent in the effort to achieve his goals. It is the task of Ukraine and the West to ensure that he does not succeed.

“Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov at the XXXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, May 18, 2024,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 05.18.24.^ Clues from Russian Views

• The West, led by the United States, is not abandoning its officially proclaimed—including at the doctrinal level—goal of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia. Moreover, a defeat that is not just military. The very existence of our country is perceived by many of the most aggressive Russophobes as a threat to the global dominance of the “golden billion” led by Washington.
• A policy has been adopted to restore the strength and combat readiness of the armies of European states, and transfer the military-industrial complexes of NATO countries to wartime mode. Work has begun, still conceptual, on the contours of the formation of a European military alliance with a nuclear component.
• When it comes to anti-Russian rhetoric, we see particular zeal among our European neighbors. Everyone has heard the statements of E. Macron, D. Cameron, J. Borrell and others about the inevitable “war with Russia.” I remember how D.V. Trenin, who is present here, wrote in one of his articles that Europe as a partner is not relevant for us for at least one generation. I couldn't agree more. We experience this almost every day in practice. It must be admitted that many facts speak in favor of such a forecast, and not only according to our feelings. We consider this forecast to be correct.
• We will continue to use diplomatic means to create conditions for the West to abandon hostile policies and to help achieve the stated goals of the special military operation [in Ukraine]. Our diplomacy will have this as its top priority.
• As President V.V. Putin said, we remain open to dialogue with the West, including on issues of security and strategic stability. But not from a position of strength or exclusivity, rather only on equal terms, with respect for each other’s interests. Moreover, [we are open] to dialogue on the entirety of the problems that exist in today’s world in the field of strategic stability, and the military-political landscape in general.
• The West, the Americans in particular, often like to take one aspect out of the whole complex of problems of strategic stability and say that Russia refuses [to engage on that topic], therefore our country is not constructive. This was the case when for a long time it was their desire to visit our nuclear facilities again while maintaining hostility, which is completely contrary to the principles on which the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty was based, which mutual inspections were part of.
• Despite all the severity and “media intensity” of manifestations of confrontation with the West, Russia does not limit its external relations in one direction. Otherwise we would not be a great power. In the current situation, God himself ordered us to develop cooperation with the Global Majority.
• Just the day before, President Vladimir Putin visited China. This is his first foreign visit since his re-election. Negotiations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and meetings with other representatives of the Chinese leadership confirmed that our relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction are superior in quality to traditional interstate alliances of the previous era and continue to play a key role in maintaining international security and balanced global development.
• I read the materials that some members of the SVOP are preparing, including discussions about what a “real alliance” is in our time, which will meet the interests of Russia. We can and should have a special conversation on this topic. We are ready to debate and discuss the ideas expressed in publications and aimed at building a real alliance with the PRC. The assessment given by our leaders is that the relationship is so close and friendly that its quality surpasses the classical alliances of the past. It fully reflects the essence of the ties that exist between Russia and the PRC and are strengthening in almost all areas.
• When the West persists in imposing V.A. Zelenskyy’s “formula” and at the same time increases the supply of longer-range weapons to the Kyiv regime, we clearly read this as a signal that the West is not ready for a serious conversation. This means that they made a choice in favor of a showdown on the battlefield. We are ready for this. 
• Chinese President Xi Jinping’s intiative on global security was discussed during our visit to China at meetings both as part of delegations, and at meetings in narrow format, and in one-on-one conversations between leaders. We see great reason for the practical promotion of the idea of ​​ensuring global security to begin with the formation of the foundations of Eurasian security without any Euro-Atlantic “touch.”

“A crushing blow for Israel and a massive gamble by the ICC,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 05.20.24. 

• The decision by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to apply for arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant is a huge setback for Israel.
• President Joe Biden will be reluctant to go down the sanctions route. The US is not a party to the ICC. But it does claim to be a supporter of the “rules-based international order” — and has welcomed the ICC indictment of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. Biden also knows that many in the Democratic party are strongly opposed to Israel’s actions in Gaza — and have even accused the country of genocide. As a result, the US president has every incentive to equivocate, while hoping that Congress does not present him with a bill demanding sanctions against the ICC — which he might have to veto.
• The ICC unavoidably operates in a political context. It has indicted Putin, with little prospect of bringing him to trial. If Netanyahu is also able to brush aside an indictment, the court risks looking increasingly impotent and irrelevant.

“Putting the Cold War on the Couch. A new psychological analysis of Soviet leaders fundamentally alters 20th-century global history,” Casey Michel, FP, 05.19.24.

• For nearly a half-century, there was a single factor, a single raison d’être, at the heart of the entire Soviet project. But it wasn’t fanning communist revolution or even spreading Marxist Leninism itself. Rather, it was—as Sergey Radchenko argues in “To Run the World,” his new, more than 600-page doorstopper on the Soviet leaders’ views during the Cold War—something far simpler, and far more universal: prestige.
• That is, instead of pursuing anti-capitalist ends or even pro-communist alliances, Soviet leadership found itself propelled primarily by the pursuit of status and stature, from late Stalinism all the way through Mikhail Gorbachev’s final days.
• It’s a bold reformulation of the entire Soviet standoff, and one that would be nearly unrecognizable to most of those who lived through the Cold War. But Radchenko, a history professor at Johns Hopkins University specializing in Sino-Soviet history, at least recognizes the stakes of such a reformulation.
• If anything, elevating that search for prestige points the way to a far more interesting book, buried underneath Radchenko’s granular psychoanalysis. As Radchenko aptly frames, the Cold War was never one thing, catapulting one bloc against another. It was never even something you could properly boil down to capitalism versus communism. Rather, as Radchenko outlines, it’s perhaps better understood as capitalism versus communisms, with regimes such as Beijing and even Havana charting their own courses, refracting Soviet designs to pursue their own paths—and undercutting Soviet demands for prestige, and for recognition of status, in the process.
  • For another review of this book, see: “To Run the World — Moscow’s quest for power and parity with the US,” Edward Luce, FT, 05.19.24.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Road to Washington: General Christopher Cavoli on the NATO Summit," Atlantic Council, 05.17.24. (video)
• “Russia is using the Soviet playbook in the Global South to challenge the West – and it is working,” Natalie Sabanadze, Chatham House, 05.16.24. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Why growing China-Russia military ties worry the west,” Kathrin Hille and Max Seddon, FT, 05.18.24. 

• For two years, Chinese backing for Russia’s war in Ukraine has been western governments’ biggest concern about the two countries’ burgeoning relationship. But two weeks ago, US officials raised alarm over their co-operation in another key security theatre: the seas around Taiwan.  “We see them, China and Russia, for the first time exercising together in relation to Taiwan,” Avril Haines, director of national intelligence, told US lawmakers. “[We are] recognizing that this is a place where China definitely wants Russia to be working with them, and we see no reason why they wouldn’t.” The US has had to adapt to closer co-operation between the Chinese and Russian militaries, Jeffrey Kruse, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the same Senate hearing.
• Their comments reflect how deep the military relationship has become under Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Military ties have developed to span closer joint exercises and co-operation on missile defense. And while Russia and China do not have a mutual defense treaty, as the US does with its allies, analysts believe that does not preclude military co-operation with significant global impact.
  • “They don’t have to physically fight together to be effective in the warfighting sense,” Oriana Skylar Mastro, a professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, said in a study on Russian-Chinese military alignment published last month.
• The joint training that Russian and Chinese forces have been conducting for almost 20 years has significantly deepened since 2018. They participate in each other’s national strategic drills and conduct regular naval exercises and strategic bomber patrols together.
  • Russia might “take supportive military actions in co-ordination with China’s Taiwan operations”, Yoji Koda, a former commander of Japan’s Self Defense Fleet, said in a chapter of an upcoming book. Japan should be prepared to contain the Russian fleet in the Sea of Japan by blocking strategic straits, he added.
  • The clearest evidence for a Taiwan connection can be found in joint drills such as Northern Interaction 2023, air and naval exercises built on Russia’s sobering experience in Ukraine, where its Black Sea fleet was hit by Ukrainian coastal defense missiles.
• Alexey Muraviev, a professor of national security and strategic studies at Curtin University in Perth, argued that Russia and China were well on the way towards building the communications structures needed for fighting side by side.
• According to China’s defense ministry, the two navies use a dedicated joint command and control system in combined exercises. Last year, Chinese and Russian admirals started commanding naval drills together aboard a PLA Navy destroyer. They have also switched from using Russian as the language of co-ordination to real-time communication through interpreters on ships on both sides.
• Many western analysts believe the two militaries still have only rudimentary interoperability and argue their joint exercises do not reflect plans to fight together.  But even if that assessment is accurate, Russian support could give the PLA a crucial advantage in a potential conflict with the US.
  • The most critical factor could be Russian technology transfer for a missile defense early warning system, confirmed by Putin himself in 2019. 
  • If Moscow and Beijing integrate their missile defense systems, sensors on northern Russian territory could give China earlier warning of US intercontinental ballistic missiles, which have to traverse that territory to hit China, said Mastro at Stanford.
• Russia would probably not fight alongside China but take a similar stance to Beijing’s on Ukraine, offering political support as well as economic and military resources to help it withstand US pressure, Andrea Kendall-Taylor said.

“The West Doesn't Grasp How Much Russia Has Changed,” Alexander Gabuev, NYT, 05.17.24. Clues from Russian Views

• Many in the West ... want to believe that their [RF-PRC] alliance is an aberration, driven by Mr. Putin's emotional anti-Americanism and his toxic fixation on Ukraine. Once Mr. Putin and his dark obsessions are out of the picture, the thinking goes, Moscow will seek to rebuild ties with the West -- not least because the bonds between Russia and China are shallow, while the country has centuries of economic and cultural dependence on Europe.
• This wishful view, however appealing, overlooks the transformation of Russia's economy and society. Never since the fall of the Soviet Union has Russia been so distant from Europe, and never in its entire history has it been so entwined with China. The truth is that after two years of war in Ukraine and painful Western sanctions, it's not just Mr. Putin who needs China -- Russia does, too.
• China has emerged as Russia's single most important partner, providing a lifeline not only for Mr. Putin's war machine but also for the entire embattled economy. ... This economic dependence is filtering into everyday life. ... These shifts are tectonic. Even in czarist times, Russia shipped its commodities to Europe and relied on imports from the West of manufactured goods. Russia's oligarchs, blacklisted by most Western countries, have had to adapt to the new reality. Last month, the businessman Vladimir Potanin, whose fortune is estimated at $23.7 billion, announced that his copper and nickel empire would reorient toward China, including by moving production facilities into the country. 
• From the economy, education follows. Members of the Russian elite are scrambling to find Mandarin tutors for their kids, and some of my Russian contacts are thinking about sending their children to universities in Hong Kong or mainland China now that Western universities are much harder to reach. 
• This reorientation from West to East is also visible among the middle class, most notably in travel. 
• Intellectuals are turning toward China, too. Russian scientists are beginning to work with and for Chinese companies, especially in fields such as space exploration, artificial intelligence and biotech. 
• In his dystopian novel ''Day of the Oprichnik,'' Vladimir Sorokin describes a deeply anti-Western Russia of 2028 that survives on Chinese technology while cosplaying the medieval brutality of Ivan the Terrible's era. With every passing day, this unsettling and foresighted novel -- published in 2006 as a warning to Russia about the direction of travel under Mr. Putin -- reads more and more like the news.

“The relationship between Xi and Putin is built to last,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 05.20.24.

• For all the similarities in their world views, Russia and China are in very different geopolitical situations. Putin has turned Russia into a pariah state in the west. China, by contrast, remains one of the largest trading partners of both America and Europe.
• That difference makes Russia willing to take risks that the Chinese may regard as reckless. On a recent trip to Beijing, some Chinese analysts told me they were uneasy about the increasing closeness of the military relationship between Russia and North Korea. One concern was that — in exchange for North Korean artillery shells — the Russians were unwisely sharing advanced military technology with the Kim regime in Pyongyang.
• Over the longer-term, the Kremlin must also be anxious about Russia’s increasing dependence on China — and about the growing power imbalance between the two nations. The Russians are well aware that hundreds of thousands of kilometers of territory were ceded to them by China during the 19th century. But recent Chinese maps have shown some Russian cities with their old Chinese names — a cartographical shift that will certainly have been noticed in Moscow.
• However, all these tensions remain largely below the surface. That is a vital difference with the situation in 1971-72, when the Sino-Soviet split was fairly open — presenting Nixon and Kissinger with a clear opportunity to woo China. Taking that opportunity in the 1970s required the US to make significant concessions to the Chinese world view, above all on Taiwan. A second western effort to disrupt the Russian-Chinese axis today would probably require even more difficult policy shifts — on Taiwan again, or on Ukraine. There is very little appetite in Washington to make any such move. At least, not so far.

“Xi Jinping is subtler than Vladimir Putin—yet equally disruptive,” The Economist, 05.16.24. 

• Mr. Xi’s challenge to the world is more subtle than that posed by the warmongering Mr. Putin. Yet it is still a problem. He craves a might-makes-right order, letting China do as it pleases. 
• When it comes to Russia, China’s leader has already gone quite far. Mr. Xi ignores Western pleas that he tone down his support for Mr. Putin, viewing Russia as an indispensable partner in his campaign to dismantle the American-led order. ... Of most concern are Chinese components and machinery flowing to Russian arms manufacturers. 
• On the other side of the world, it is the risk of a conflict caused by China that worries America and its allies. The South China Sea is larger than the Mediterranean, but increasingly difficult to cross without encountering Chinese coastguard vessels doing dangerous things. 
• By design, China’s actions in Europe, Asia and elsewhere often lie between war and peace. A forceful response risks seeming like an over-reaction. Doing nothing, though, means ceding incremental gains to China. 
  • So the first task is for Western countries to expose China’s actions for what they are: a glimpse of the world order that Chinese leaders seek, in which no country cares, or dares, to challenge their power. 
  •  America must [also]stand by its allies, not as an act of charity, but because they are a superpower asset that China lacks. Relentless Chinese and Russian attempts to divide alliances, from NATO to America’s defense network in Asia, are a backhanded compliment. Autocrats respect strength, and there is strength in numbers.
  • Last, the West needs to exploit the fact that Mr. Xi’s country has a stake in stability. China’s leader is not about to abandon Mr. Putin. But unlike his Russian friend, he does not gain from chaos. … The best way to temper Mr. Xi’s aggression and grey-zone bullying is to show that it comes with costs. 

“Full text of Xinhua's interview with Putin,” Xinhua, 05.15.24. Clues from Russian Views

• This unprecedented level of strategic partnership between our countries determined my choice of China as the first state to be visited after the official inauguration as the president of the Russian Federation.
• Today, Russia-China relations have reached the highest level ever, and despite the difficult global situation continue to get stronger. This year is special for our countries. October 1 marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The country is approaching this significant historical date with outstanding achievements, which we welcome as old, reliable and time-tested friends.
• It is important that Russia-China ties as they are today, are free from the influence of either ideology or political trends. Their multidimensional development is an informed strategic choice based on the wide convergence of core national interests, profound mutual trust, strong public support and sincere friendship between the peoples of the two countries. I am talking about our joint efforts to strengthen the sovereignty, protect the territorial integrity and security of our countries. In a broader sense, we are working to contribute to the development and prosperity of Russia and China by enhancing equal, mutually beneficial economic and humanitarian cooperation, and strengthen foreign policy coordination in the interests of building a just multipolar world order. All this is the key to a future success of our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era.
• Trade and economic relations between our countries are developing at a fast pace, showing strong immunity to external challenges and crises. Over the past five years, we have doubled the Russia-China turnover: it reached US$227.8 billion last year, against US$111 billion in 2019. More than 90% of settlements between our companies are made in national currencies. 
• Russia and China have been inextricably linked for centuries, both by an extensive common border and by close cultural and people-to-people ties. 
• There are about 90,000 students and schoolchildren who study Chinese in our country. Tours of Chinese performing companies and exhibitions featuring Chinese artists are always a great success. Since the quarantine restrictions were removed, the tourist flow has been growing dynamically. Last year, more than 730,000 Russians visited the PRC.
• My family members are also interested in China, and some of them are learning Chinese.
• One of the main goals of the Russian Chairmanship [of BRICS] is undoubtedly the seamless integration of the BRICS new members. We are actively assisting them in joining the existing network of cooperation mechanisms. ... Countries of the Global South and East, which see BRICS as a platform for their voices to be certainly heard and taken into account, 
• Earth is the cradle of humanity, our common home, and we are all equal as its inhabitants. I am convinced that this view is shared by most people on the planet. However, the countries that affiliate themselves with the so-called "golden billion" do not seem to think so. US-led Western elites refuse to respect civilizational and cultural diversity and reject centuries-old traditional values. Seeking to retain their global dominance, they have usurped the right to tell other nations whom they may, or must not, make friends and cooperate with, and to deny them the right to choose their own development models. They disregard other countries' sovereign interests. They seek to ensure their well-being at the expense of other states, just like in the old days, and resort to neo-colonial methods to that end. Needless to say, neither Russia nor its partners are happy with this state of affairs. 
• The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, which have well established themselves as key pillars of the emerging multipolar world order, can be cited as vivid examples of ... mutually beneficial cooperation. They have come to be reputable and dynamic international platforms whose participants build constructive political, security, economic and cultural and people-to-people interaction. Hence the ever-increasing interest of other states in the work of these associations and the growing number of their participants. Our countries have similar or coinciding positions on key issues on the international agenda. We advocate for the primacy of international law, equal, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security at both the global and regional level with the UN's central coordinating role. We also reject Western attempts to impose an order based on lies and hypocrisy, on some mythical rules of no one knows whose making.
• We commend China's approaches to resolving the crisis in Ukraine. Beijing is well aware of its root causes and global geopolitical significance, which is reflected in its 12-point plan entitled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" published in February 2023. The ideas and proposals contained in the document show the genuine desire of our Chinese friends to help stabilize the situation.
• As for the additional four principles of conflict resolution recently voiced by President Xi Jinping, they seamlessly fit in the above-mentioned plan. Beijing proposes practicable and constructive steps to achieve peace by refraining from pursuing vested interests and constant escalation of tensions, minimizing the negative impact of the conflict on the global economy and the stability of global value chains. The steps build on the idea that we need to forego the "Cold War mentality" and ensure indivisible security and respect for international law and the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelation. They could therefore lay the groundwork for a political and diplomatic process that would take into account Russia's security concerns and contribute to achieving a long-term and sustainable peace.
• Unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor its Western patrons support these initiatives. ... Instead, Western elites are stubbornly working to "punish" Russia, isolate and weaken it, supplying the Kiev authorities with money and arms. They have imposed almost 16,000 unilateral illegitimate sanctions against our country. They are threatening to dismember our country. They are illegally trying to appropriate our foreign assets. They are turning a blind eye to the resurgence of Nazism and to Ukraine-sponsored terrorist attacks in our territory.
• We are seeking a comprehensive, sustainable and just settlement of this conflict through peaceful means. We are open to a dialogue on Ukraine, but such negotiations must take into account the interests of all countries involved in the conflict, including ours. They must also involve a substantive discussion on global stability and security guarantees for Russia's opponents and, naturally, for Russia itself. Needless to say, these must be reliable guarantees. That is where the main problem is, since we are dealing with states whose ruling circles seek to substitute the world order based on international law with an "order based on certain rules," which they keep talking about but which no one has ever seen, no one has agreed to, and which, apparently, tend to change depending on the current political situation and interests of those who invent these rules.
• I am confident that we will implement all the strategic plans we have set. We are willing to work together with our partners worldwide, including China, our good neighbor and trusted friend. 

“Putin’s trip to China may show US threats are wishful thinking,” Alexandra Prokopenko, FT, 05.13.24. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is about to travel to China on his first foreign trip since securing another six years in the Kremlin. One of his main goals will be finding ways to minimize any disruption to the economic lifeline that China has given his embattled regime since the full-blown invasion of Ukraine. 
• In December, the White House threatened to impose sanctions on any bank clearing payments for the Russian war machine. ... Hopes that this will conclusively fix the problem, however, are wishful thinking. Over the past two years, the Russian and Chinese governments have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to US restrictions. Putin’s visit
• Russia and China use local infrastructure for proceeding and clearing transactions. Following sanctions in 2014, Russia established a domestic analogue to Swift, known as the financial messaging system of the Bank of Russia (SPFS), whose use is now mandatory. China operates its own cross-border interbank payment system (Cips), which now includes about 30 Russian banks. 
• But this alone will not shield Chinese banks from sanctions should Washington discover any forbidden transactions. The next step for Moscow and Beijing, therefore, will be the creation of sophisticated infrastructure for clearing the most sensitive payments. 
• By using the Russian economy as a giant sandbox, the Chinese authorities can fine-tune a financial infrastructure that can be used by other nations seeking an antidote to Washington’s weaponization of the greenback.

“Six Reasons for Putin’s Trip to China.,” Andrei Kortunov, Guancha/RIAC, 05.14.24. Clues from Russian Views^ (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• First, a tribute to politeness. In March 2023, after being re-elected as President of the People's Republic of China for a third five-year term, Xi Jinping chose Moscow as the first destination for his foreign trips.
• Second, economic relations. The two leaders plan to compare notes on the current state of bilateral economic relations, which have seen many significant changes since their last meeting in October. 
• Third, global events. ... Humanity has entered another dramatic year, when many tragic events are occurring simultaneously in different parts of the world. On the other hand, this year also opens up a number of opportunities that Russia and China should try not to miss. This is a fundamentally important year for the BRICS association, which doubled the number of its members in 2023 and now must work out cooperation algorithms in a new format.
• Fourth, friction with the West. The leaders of the two countries will certainly not miss the opportunity to talk about the difficult relations of their countries with the West.
• Fifth, the emerging world order. The leaders of the two countries will also likely discuss in Beijing more general issues of the emerging new world order - such as the desired role of the U.N. system in ensuring international security and ways to increase the effectiveness of this organization, the future of strategic stability and various aspects of global and regional governance.
• Sixth, the human dimension. The trip may well lead to some other positive results that do not look very exciting, but, nevertheless, are very important not only for ordinary citizens of Russia and China, but also for the two countries as a whole, because only on them is the social fabric of two-way interaction based. 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “China’s alignment with Putin is uneasy. But its rivalry with the US makes him too useful to abandon,” Yu Jie, Chatham House, 05.13.24. 
• “Xi’s Warm Embrace of Putin in China Is a Defiance of the West,” David Pierson, NYT, 05.18.24. 
• “Is China Stealing Russia’s Thunder in Eastern Europe?”, Dimitar Bechev, CEIP, 05.15.24. 
• “Russian-Chinese relations at the present stage: a view from Moscow,” Yulia Melnikova and Lyubov Nechaeva, RIAC, May 2024. (In Russian.)
• Also see “Nuclear arms” section below.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Russia’s nuclear threats to reach conventional goals in Ukraine mark a new era of brinkmanship,” Rose Gottemoeller, FP, 05.15.24. 

• The United States and Russia agree on one thing in this terrible war: They do not want to risk a nuclear holocaust. Why, then, do the Russians keep claiming that the world is facing one?
  • Part of it is evidently the Kremlin’s effort to derive value from this very brinkmanship. ... This bizarre game of nuclear look-at-me is linked to the Kremlin’s equally bizarre complaint that its act of invading Ukraine has created an existential threat to Russia. 
• Putin and his chief ministers ... continue to go on and on about how the United States and NATO are seeking the strategic defeat of Russia and its demise as a nation. Their motivation is obvious: If its people believe that the country is facing total destruction, they will stay in the fight for the sake of survival.
• With so much loose nuclear talk in the air, the United States and its allies must think hard about how to sustain stable and strong deterrence. In other words, they are going to have to focus on how to talk responsibly to the global public about nuclear weapons. The most important audience in deterrence, of course, are the potential nuclear aggressors.
  • The first rule should be to maintain discipline about using terms such as “strategic defeat,” so as not to pander to claims that it is Washington and its allies that are posing an existential threat. 
  • The second rule should be to sustain the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the reliability of its command and control systems. 
  • Third, Washington should be pursuing with assurance the mutual predictability that comes from controlling and limiting nuclear weapons at the negotiating table. 
  • Finally and most importantly, the United States and its allies must sustain steady progress in military assistance to Ukraine. 

“Holding one’s nerve in the face of Russian nuclear threats,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 05.08.24. 

• Russia has again raised the prospect of nuclear war with regard to Ukraine. On May 6, the Russian Defense Ministry announced an exercise near Ukraine involving the possible use of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. 
• So, how worried should we be? A bit perhaps, but not too much.
  • As Lawrence Freedman has noted, the actual use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be inconsistent with Russian nuclear doctrine and with what Putin himself has said. 
  • Russian officials also must consider that the use of a nuclear weapon, against any target, would open a Pandora’s box full of unpredictable but potentially very significant consequences. 
• Putin does not want a nuclear war. He does want Ukraine and the West to believe that he is prepared to risk one in order to undermine their resolve and determination. Of course, it can be unnerving when a nuclear state rattles its nuclear saber, particularly against a peaceful neighbor it has invaded. But Ukraine and the West can choose to keep their nerve.

“Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on deepening relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, entering a new era, in the context of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries,” Kremlin.ru, 05.16.24. (Signed by Putin and Xi during Putin’s visit to China) Clues from Russian Views 

• The Parties note that modern Russian-Chinese relations represent a more advanced form of interstate interaction compared to the military-political alliances of the Cold War, are not bloc or confrontational in nature, and are not directed against third countries. ... The Parties express their readiness to continue to deepen their comprehensive strategic cooperation.
• Moscow and Beijing will further deepen trust and cooperation in the military field, expand the scope of joint exercises and combat training, regularly conduct joint sea and air patrols, increase coordination and cooperation on a bilateral basis and within multilateral formats, constantly improve the capabilities and level of joint response to challenges and threats.
• The Parties note with concern that the current state of affairs in the field of international security is characterized by increasing conflict at the regional and global levels, general instability, as well as increased strategic risks as a result of the aggravation of interstate contradictions, including between nuclear powers.
  • Reaffirming commitment to the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Arms Race dated Jan. 3, 2022, and, first and foremost, that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should never be fought. The Parties once again call on all countries participating in this document to follow its provisions in practice.
  • The Parties advocate that nuclear powers stand guard over global strategic stability, observe the principle of equal and indivisible security, and do not encroach on each other’s vital interests - in particular, through the expansion of military alliances and coalitions and the creation of military bridgeheads close to the borders of other nuclear powers, especially with the advanced deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as other military-strategic infrastructure.
  • The priority task of preventing direct military confrontation between nuclear powers must be solved comprehensively with an emphasis on eliminating the root causes of the fundamental contradictions between them in the field of security.
  • The Parties reaffirm their serious concern about the U.S. attempts to upset the strategic balance to secure a decisive military advantage for itself. This is primarily due to the U.S. activities in creating a global missile defense system and deploying its elements in various regions of the world and in space.
• The Parties ... intend to increase interaction and tighten coordination in order to counter Washington’s destructive and hostile course towards the so-called “dual containment” of our countries.
• The Parties oppose attempts by individual countries to use outer space for the purposes of armed confrontation.
• The Parties are committed to the goal of building a world free of chemical weapons and are deeply concerned about the politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
• The Parties intend to deepen cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, showing ‘zero tolerance’ to the ‘three forces of evil,’ including the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan.
• The Parties attach great importance to the issues of artificial intelligence (AI) and intend to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the field of development, security and regulation of artificial intelligence.
• The Parties are taking measures to combat climate change.
• The Russian Side welcomes the readiness of the Chinese Side to play a constructive role in the issue of political and diplomatic settlement of the Ukrainian crisis. The Parties note the need to stop any steps that contribute to prolongation of hostilities and further escalation of the conflict, call for preventing its transition into an uncontrollable phase, and emphasize the importance of dialogue as the optimal form of resolving the Ukrainian crisis. The Parties proceed from the fact that for a sustainable settlement of the Ukrainian crisis it is necessary to eliminate its primary cause.

“Geopolitical paradigm shifts and coping with psychopaths: An Interview with Professor Sergei A. Karaganov,” Tariq Marzbaan and Nora Hoppe, Al Mayadeen,¹ 05.09.24. Clues from Russian Views

• Many of the Western elites no longer have a sense of history and have lost their sense of self-preservation. I call this condition “strategic parasitism”. The same goes for a good part of the Western population, who became complacent about peace, which was largely guaranteed to them by nuclear deterrence – something they do not understand. In addition, the intellectual level of most elites has fallen sharply due to the changes in moral standards and to the deterioration of their system of higher education – especially in Europe. So there are very few indeed who understand these issues.
• The situation is somewhat better in the United States, which seems to have preserved at least the remnants of a strategically-minded political class, but they are obviously not the ones running the show. However, some are still close to power and sometimes they can influence those in power. In any case, the state of affairs there is quite troubling. Just an example: both President Biden and his Secretary of State Blinken recently declared that global warming is as bad as or worse than nuclear war. I was quite shocked. This is pretty insane.
• The American Deep State is not only grounded in the United States... an extension of it can also be found in Europe. It is comprised of what could be called "the global imperialist liberal class" that aims to serve "common interests". But the Europeans are even worse than the Americans here because they are openly sacrificing the interests of their nations. They are quite obviously traitors to their motherlands… And that’s why they covered up such crimes as provoking the war in Ukraine, the blowing up of the Nord Stream… that’s why they are even willing to risk providing long-range weapons to Ukraine. (Interestingly enough, Americans are not openly providing such long-range weapons, because they understand that this could lead to escalation, even nuclear escalation.) So the Americans are simply sacrificing the Europeans. They have already been using Ukraine as cannon fodder… and it looks like they are preparing to use their European allies as cannon fodder, as well.
• We are observing these developments with great concern, and realize that we unfortunately have almost no reasonable partners in Europe. We are thus preparing for the worst-case scenario. Nevertheless, we hope that by intensifying our practice of nuclear deterrence we can sober up some people in Europe and in the United States. If this does not succeed, the numerous crises plaguing the world will end up escalating into a Third World War.
• The West is now in a state of desperation. To instill some common sense in them, we need the restoration of a "healthy fear" – that is, we need to restore the validity of nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, I see no other way at this juncture.

“Nuclear brinkmanship in Putin’s war: Upping the ante,” Pavel Baev, Brookings, 05.14.24. 

• As long as the situation in the Donbas remains favorable for Russian forces, Putin’s persistent references to nuclear war will continue to be treated as a tired bluff and the exercises will hardly make any difference.
• A sequence of possible tactical setbacks signifying the loss of strategic initiative could compel the Kremlin to prove that there is some real substance behind its nuclear rhetoric. Even small territorial gains by the Ukrainian forces combined with the threat posed by the expected delivery of several new squadrons of F-16 fighters and steadily increasing Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia may raise the specter of looming defeat for the Kremlin. 
• Ordering a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be an extreme error, which can only be caused by some extraordinary confluence of external misfortunes and domestic turmoil. Russia’s leader has a range of less risky options, including the determination that the long war of attrition in Ukraine requires a more thorough preparation of the strategic arsenal by resuming nuclear testing. This breach of legal obligations and international norms is certain to damage Russia’s prestige; nevertheless, Karaganov and other “patriotic” pundits are advocating this step up the escalation ladder as a means of restoring the potency of the fear factor. Conducting an underground explosion at the Novaya Zemlya test site would require significant investment and construction, and no signs of such preparations have been detected so far. The detonation of a nuclear munition in space is another feasible option, and Russia’s veto of a draft U.N. Security Council resolution prepared by the United States and Japan aimed at reinforcing the ban on military activities in space established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 may be an indication of such intent.
• Proactive diplomacy is essential but not sufficient for preventing such Russian nuclear moves, and every crossing of Putin’s presumed “red lines” (of which many are already erased) needs to be combined with a convincing demonstration of Western resolve to deliver a set of further countermeasures. The strategy of deterrence remains, as Rose Gottemoeller insightfully reminds, a “mind game,” and the task of deciphering Putin’s risk calculus can never be accomplished with certainty. He is prone to misinterpreting U.S. messaging, and the channels of communication with his lieutenants are far from reliable. Yet the Kremlin remains attentive to signals coming from Beijing, so engaging with China on the theme of the war in Ukraine is crucially important for the United States and all allies. It is typically assumed that China would not accept the prospect of Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, but a recent article by the leading Chinese Russia scholar Feng Yujun (unanimously ignored by Russian commentators) indicates that this is not necessarily the case.
• NATO’s commitment to supporting Ukraine is set to be strengthened at the Washington summit in July. This resolve is reinforced by the allocation of new resources. The fact that Putin’s regime is responding to all this with increasingly operatic and irresponsible nuclear bluster in a rapidly evolving crisis requires strong nerves and strategic courage from Ukraine and its Western supporters.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "The extreme nature of nuclear deterrence," Ward Wilson and Paul Ingram, EN, 05.16.24. 

Counterterrorism:

“A New Recruiting Ground for ISIS. Why Jihadism Is Thriving in Tajikistan,” Marlene Laruelle, FA, 05.14.24. 

• In March, terrorists affiliated with Islamic State Khorasan, also known as ISIS-K, attacked Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, killing 145 people and wounding several hundred. The authorities swiftly arrested 12 young men, all of whom were from Tajikistan, the most southern and poorest republic of the former Soviet Union. 
• Tajikistan’s economy is moribund, and the combination of a low growth rate and a youthful population has created an immense diaspora: at least a quarter of Tajikistan’s working-age men live abroad. The country they left behind is repressive, with a government as hostile to many forms of Islam as it is to any signs of dissent. Socioeconomic and political factors have combined to make young Tajik men uniquely susceptible to radicalization. Russia’s intelligence services are currently overstretched by the war in Ukraine and the need for continued action at home. 
• As the fastest-growing jihadi group in Russia, ISIS-K now dominates the local jihadi scene. In January, it announced a new global campaign “against Jews, Christians, and Shiites,” and it aims to recruit desperate young people to fight for the movement. Tajikistan will continue to be a cradle for jihadi recruitment—and Islamist militancy emanating from Central Asia will continue to threaten Russia, Turkey, and the West—until governments find a way to address its root causes.

“Building Resilience: Strategies for Countering Terrorism in Central Asia,” Pravesh Kumar Gupta, Valdai Club, 05.16.24. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Central Asia has been facing challenges related to terrorism and extremism, which are directly attributed to its secular outlook and progress toward modernization. Radical forces have been attempting to destabilize the region for many years. Extremist ideas, often disseminated through online platforms, target vulnerable communities and worsen tensions, ultimately posing a threat to regional stability. The rise of religious extremism, particularly in the form of Islamist movements, is a persistent challenge in the region. 
• The Islamic State’s Khurasan Province (ISKP) has drastically expanded its propaganda apparatus in recent months, releasing a steady flow of online print, audio, and video content. It is pushing to build support, fundraise, and recruit in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This outreach campaign runs through ISKP’s Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production, which has formed Uzbek and Tajik language wings. Youth radicalization in Central Asia is another critical issue. ISKP primarily uses the Telegram messaging application to build its web of discussion channels, supporting propaganda creators, and its recruitment and fundraising operatives. In order to appeal to Central Asians, ISKP has ramped up its criticisms and threats toward regional governments.
• However, the region's challenges are not singular in nature; they are influenced by global trends. Changes in the global order, such as shifts in power and geopolitical realignments, have exerted significant pressure on the region. Furthermore, the rise of competition among great powers and the complexities of transnational threats, such as terrorism and organized crime, further intensify these challenges. Simultaneously, Central Asia's unique security and developmental landscape are shaped by its particular features, including historical legacies, ethno-cultural diversity and geopolitical significance.
• Russia's role as a security partner in Central Asia cannot be underestimated. Moscow has assisted in maintaining stability and security in the region, both bilaterally and at the institutional level. Cooperation with Central Asian nations has been critical in addressing the non-traditional threats posed by terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations. They have a shared understanding of the challenges and necessary instruments to combat these threats. … The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) plays a crucial role in ensuring regional security and stability.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“File Not Found: Russia Is Hacking Evidence of Its War Crimes,” Rhiannon Neilsen, War on the Rocks, 05.14.24. 

• Russian hackers from the Federal Security Services and Main Intelligence Directorate are reportedly targeting the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office, the entity responsible for documenting war crimes committed by Russian combatants on Ukrainian soil. At the same time, the International Criminal Court declared that it had been hacked, having “detected anomalous activity” in its systems. The hackers’ aim? To obtain — even delete — evidence of war crimes and help Russians arrested in Ukraine to “avoid prosecution and move them back to Russia.” 
• Russia’s breach of the digital depositories of war crime evidence highlights two new, troubling realities of 21st-century wars.
  •  First, it is widely recognized that perpetrators are using cyberspace and social media to organize, fund, execute, and celebrate their atrocities. 
  • Second, war crime trials are already fraught with complexity, accusations of victors’ justice, legal exasperation, perfunctory showmanship, abortive reconciliation, and issues regarding postwar stability. Cyber operations that contaminate evidence are yet another hurdle in the broader pursuit of justice — and they will continue after the bullets stop flying.
• The fight for justice is as important as the fight with tanks, drones, and bombs. In light of Russia’s hacks, three responses are urgently required.
  • First, to the best extent possible, the United States and its allies should raise awareness regarding Russia’s attempts to interfere with Ukraine’s and the International Criminal Court’s databases. 
  • Second, social media corporations need to improve how they balance deleting graphic content and archiving evidence. 
  • Third, as part of its defensive war, Ukraine should continue to proactively prevent Russian hackers from breaching its digital databases via what the United States would regard as cyber-enabled “persistent engagement,” “defending forward,” and “integrated deterrence.” 
• “Winning” a war in the 21st-century will not look the same if post-conflict justice processes are sullied with suspicion and war crimes perpetrators can evade prosecution. As Yurii Shchyhol, the head of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine put it: “You need to understand that the cyber war will not end even after Ukraine wins on the battlefield.” Given this, the United States, Ukraine, and its allies need to be prepared to defend against malicious cyber attacks after atrocities.

“Contested connectivity: cyber threats in the Asia-Pacific,” Julia Voo, IISS, 05.15.24.

• Asia-Pacific countries are facing increasing numbers of state-backed hacking operations serving geopolitical and economic purposes. They are also getting better at conducting them. Domestic and foreign-policy ambitions are manifesting in the information space, where state-linked actors are contesting state adversaries, political opponents and world views both overtly, through activities such as defacement (hacking a target website and replacing its content with the hackers’ own message), and covertly, via disinformation operations. 
• While basic cyber best practice is still out of reach for the least cyber-capable states, a couple of regional states could be considered amongst the most cyber capable globally. Forging a greater range of international partnerships between governments and industry is likely to boost the region’s resilience in cyberspace. Political will and geopolitical alignments will likely shape how that unfolds.
• Cyber threats do not occur in a vacuum, nor are they restricted to sovereign boundaries. Allied states are increasing their efforts to enhance cyber resilience with partners. … In the Asia-Pacific, Japan has taken a leading role to develop cyber resilience across the region – including with non-traditional partners – to counterbalance threats from China, North Korea and Russia.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Gazprom’s Declining Fortunes Spell Trouble for Moscow,” Agathe Demarais, FP, 05.15.24.

• At the end of 2022, Dmitry Medvedev—Russia’s former prime minister and the current deputy chairman of its Security Council—offered his predictions for the coming year. He warned that Europeans would suffer badly from Russia’s decision to curb natural gas exports to the European Union, suggesting that gas prices would jump to $5,000 per thousand cubic meters in 2023—around 50 times their prewar average. ... It turns out that Medvedev might want to polish his crystal ball: Last year, European gas prices averaged a mere one-tenth of his number. And just this month, Gazprom posted a massive $6.8 billion loss for 2023, the first since 1999.
• Gazprom’s losses demonstrate the extent to which the Kremlin’s decision to turn off the gas tap to Europe in 2022 has backfired. In 2023, European Union imports of Russian gas were at their lowest level since the early 1970s, with Russian supplies making up only 8 percent of EU gas imports, down from 40 percent in 2021. This has translated into vertiginous losses for Gazprom, with the firm’s revenues from foreign sales plunging by two-thirds in 2023.
• As if this was not enough, a closer look at Gazprom’s newly released financials suggests that the worst may be yet to come, with three telltale signs that 2024 could be even more difficult than 2023.
  • First, Gazprom’s accounts receivable—a measure of money due to be paid by customers—are in free fall, suggesting that the firm’s revenue inflow is drying up.
  • Second, accounts payable shot up by around 50 percent in 2023, hinting that Gazprom is struggling to pay its own bills to various suppliers. 
  • Finally, short-term borrowing nearly doubled last year as Russian state-owned banks were enlisted to support the former gas giant.
• Whereas these figures come from Gazprom’s English-language financials, the company’s latest Russian-language update yields two additional surprises—both of which show that the firm’s situation has worsened even further since the beginning of the year.
  • First, short-term borrowing during the first three months of 2024 roughly doubled compared to the previous quarter. If Russian state-owned banks continue to cover Gazprom’s losses, the Russian financial sector could soon find itself in trouble. 
  •  Second, Gazprom’s losses were almost five times greater in the first quarter of 2024 than in the same period of 2023, hinting that the firm may post an even bigger loss this year than it did in 2023.
• Data from the International Energy Agency confirms the extent of the Kremlin’s miscalculation when it turned off the gas tap to Europe: The agency predicts that Russia’s share of global gas exports will fall to 15 percent by 2030—down from 30 percent before Moscow’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia Has the Resources for a Long War in Ukraine,” Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 05.16.24.

• How long will the Russian economy be able to sustain the war in Ukraine? By most traditional measures, the economy is in surprisingly good shape. However, these metrics may be deceitful when analyzing the true nature of Russia’s wartime economy and the challenges that Russian President Vladimir Putin and his successors will face going forward.
• Of course, Russian officials and propagandists alike love to boast that Russia’s GDP growth is stronger than that of many European countries. What they leave out is the fact that the contours of the Russian economy are increasingly dominated by highly unusual trade relationships with the rest of the world following the imposition of unprecedented economic sanctions, restricted capital flows, and strong state involvement. Russia is undergoing a major restructuring of its economy and experiencing significant changes in wealth and income distribution patterns among population groups.
• It is potentially misleading to rely mainly on traditional measures of macroeconomic success—such as inflation, interest rates, and GDP growth—as indicators of what is going on in Russia today. In market economies, the authorities influence economic actors by sending them signals: both rhetorical and through actions (like raising interest rates). Officials are judged on their decisionmaking by businesses and the broader population. Using the signals from the authorities, outside observers can assess the economic situation in any given country.
• None of that is fully applicable to modern Russia. Of course, Russia does not have a planne economy like the Soviet Union, nor even the so-called goulash socialism of some Central European states from the 1950s through the 1980s. At the same time, today it would be wrong to speak of Russia as having a free-market economy. The system in place is dirigisme: active state involvement in all economic processes.
• The Russian authorities are extremely unlikely to choose to cut military spending in order to maintain previous levels of domestic consumption. The economy is destined to become more and more militarized, even if that results in stagnating or falling real incomes. Still, this is unlikely to cause real problems for the regime. 
  • Firstly, standards of living would still remain relatively high: certainly, they have a long way to fall until they reach what they were in the Soviet period, not to mention the destitution of the early 1990s. 
  • Secondly, growing repression, the embrace of an avowedly militant and nationalistic state ideology, and attacks on free speech have helped the authorities keep a lid on dissent at home. 
    • In other words, Russia will be able to maintain military spending for a relatively long time, just like other pariah countries. This is bad news for Ukraine, ordinary Russian citizens, people living in neighboring countries, and the overall global security environment.
  • To be sure, the developments of 2022–2024 have created a whole host of problems for whoever succeeds Putin as Russian leader. Demilitarizing the economy will be a demanding process. Some specialized production capacity will be rendered useless. Many people will need to find new jobs or change careers. And all of this will be in addition to the difficulties of reintegrating Russia into the world economy and the costs associated with normalizing relations with Ukraine and the West. The economic shock of an end to the war over the near to medium term will not be as serious as the one that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it still will be extremely painful.   

“Putin’s Reshuffle Is About Optimization, Not Change,” Tatiana Stanovaya, CEIP, 05.15.24. Clues from Russian Views

• Vladimir Putin’s first staffing decision after his formal inauguration for a fifth presidential term was to re-appoint Mikhail Mishustin as prime minister (Russia’s constitution obliges the government to resign ahead of a presidential inauguration). Indeed, most ministers were returned to their former positions. But Putin generated some surprise by offering the post of defense minister to Andrei Belousov, an economist and former deputy prime minister. The incumbent defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, was moved to head up the Security Council, replacing the powerful Nikolai Patrushev.
• Substituting Shoigu with Belousov was the pivotal change—all the other appointments were simply to find roles for those displaced as a result. The shakeup has allowed Putin to kill two birds with one stone: he has gotten rid of the unpopular Shoigu, and given Belousov the task of optimizing the war effort.
• It would be going too far, however, to characterize Belousov’s promotion as a stratospheric rise. It’s less proof of Putin’s trust than a reflection of how he was marginalized in the previous cabinet. He’s not the first economic technocrat to have been promoted since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Dmitry Patrushev (son of the former Security Council head) was made agriculture minister; Finance Minister Anton Siluanov’s star has risen as a result of the exodus of Western businesses; and former trade and industry minister Denis Manturov was made a deputy prime minister. But until now, Belousov was peripheral. His statist economic approach did not fit the anti-crisis model of economic management that has been adopted in wartime.
• The replacement of [Nikolai] Patrushev with Shoigu [as the secretary of Putin’s security council] was an even more puzzling decision. ...It’s important to be clear that this is undoubtedly a demotion and not a promotion for Shoigu. Heading the Security Council does not come with a lot of bureaucratic heft, as it has a small staff, no law enforcement powers, and cannot initiate legislation. Its influence depends on who is in charge.
• [Patruhsev’s] long service means he almost doesn’t need a position. His ideological influence and foreign policy importance are guaranteed whatever formal post he holds. Taken as a whole, Putin’s reshuffle seems designed to achieve optimization. All his decisions suggest he is happy with the current configuration of power, and will continue to make changes to the government’s lineup only in order to maximize its effectiveness. He’s not interested in change. 

For more analysis of the reshuffles in the defense and security agencies see the section on defense below.

“As Putin Girds for Protracted War, a New Russian Elite Emerges: Meet the Princelings; Reshuffle at start of president's fifth term promoted offspring of his closest associates, ultraloyalists,” Georgi Kantchev, WSJ, 05.18.24. 

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has promoted a new crop of officials, some with blood ties to his existing inner circle, as he assembles a next generation of lieutenants committed both to his war in Ukraine and the Kremlin's wider ideological conflict with the West.  The ascension of the so-called princelings—including the sons of two of his closest confidants, and his former bodyguard who claims to have saved the president from a brown bear attack—is designed to gird the increasingly autocratic and war-driven system for the long haul.
  • As Putin was inaugurated for his fifth term as Russian president earlier this month, the subsequent reshuffle rewarded family ties and longstanding associates. Those who landed promotions include Dmitry Patrushev, whose father, Nikolai Patrushev, put in motion the assassination of Wagner's mutinous leader last year, and Boris Kovalchuk, the son of the man described by the U.S. Treasury Department as Putin's banker.
• The Byzantine power structure governing Russia's political elite is notoriously opaque, even to seasoned Kremlinologists. But the latest reshuffle is emblematic of the highly personalized and dynastic power structure Putin has crafted over his more than two-decade rule, observers say.
• Putin also replaced his longtime ally Sergei Shoigu at the top of the Defense Ministry with Andrei Belousov, a macroeconomist, a maneuver that underlines the shift in the Kremlin's mindset. 
  • "Putin's appointments show that he is ready to wage war for a long time, but he understands that you need to be more equipped in terms of resources and how to manage them," said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter-turned-government critic.
  • Putin's reorganization is also designed to ward off threats from Russia's elite by elevating their offspring or their allies and letting them compete for second-tier power. The president would then be able to assume his preferred role as arbiter and cement his superiority, analysts say. "It's a matter of survival of the elite clans, and therefore it's a race of loyalties," said Andrei Kolesnikov, Moscow-based senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

“The New Moral Resistance to Putin. Relearning a Soviet-Era Art Amid Repression and War,” Andrei Kolesnikov, FA, 05.17.24. Clues from Russian Views 

• As both the Soviet dissident era and the evolution of Putin’s Kremlin make clear, Russia’s entire modern history can be understood as swinging between cycles of de-Stalinization and re-Stalinization. It is no accident that the only places it made sense for Russians to light candles in Navalny’s honor were sites commemorating victims of earlier political repression. 
  • This is why the Putin regime deemed it so crucial to destroy and annihilate Memorial, the organization dedicated to documenting Soviet and specifically Stalin-era crimes and commemorating their victims. 
  • This is also why Putin has found it necessary to rewrite history and destroy the memory of the state’s misdeeds. Putinists are not the heirs of the Great Victory of 1945—the Soviet people’s, not Stalin’s, triumph over Hitler in World War II—that they claim to be. They are the heirs of Stalin’s Great Terror of 1938 and of his ruthless crackdown on “rootless cosmopolitans” from the late 1940s to the early 1950s.
• Ordinary Russians today—that is, not civil society, but the masses who are afraid to think and to take responsibility for their country—do not care. They continue sitting in traffic and in restaurants, talking about anything except politics, mumbling to themselves the excuses for the inexcusable that they heard on television or read in the pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. This is the same general public that, in its bewilderment and fear, accepted the necessity for the “special operation” in Ukraine in 2022 and who believed that Navalny’s 2020 poisoning was staged, or perhaps a provocation by Western special services. This is what the Kremlin has been counting on: the total and all-consuming indifference of the man in the street.
• There are, however, people in this apathetic crowd who are burning up on the inside with shame at what has happened to their beloved country, at the impenetrable indifference and docility of the others. These are the people who carried candles for Navalny, candles that have become the last weapons of civilized human beings. Sakharov and Navalny were very different people who lived in very different times. And they were punished by the regime in very different ways. But each became in his own era a moral authority for the thinking part of Russian society. And they have helped ensure that public opinion, however eviscerated, continues to exist, despite all attempts by the regime to gobble it up.

Defense and aerospace:

“Putin’s cabinet reshuffle: The quartermaster takes over,” Angela Stent, Brookings, 05.17.24.

• Ever since Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny last June, speculation about how long Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu would stay in power has grown. Shoigu has been the minister of defense since 2012 … [T]he recent arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, a close confidant of Shoigu, also known to be notoriously corrupt, signaled that Shoigu’s position as defense minister could be in jeopardy. Shoigu’s dismissal is the most consequential of the recent cabinet reshuffles. He will become the secretary of the Russian Security Council, replacing Nikolai Patrushev, who has served in this position since 2008.
• Patrushev has been named an aide to Putin responsible for overseeing shipbuilding. His son, Dmitry Patrushev, has been promoted to deputy prime minister for agriculture. It is important to remember that, in the Putin system, official titles are much less important than one’s relationship with Putin. Nikolai will no doubt retain his close ties to Putin. And Shoigu is likely to be a less influential head of the Security Council than Patrushev was.
• The new minister of defense, Andrei Belousov, is, at first glance, a surprising choice. An economist by training, he has held several previous positions as an economic official, including briefly as acting prime minister. … His appointment confirms that Russia is now on a war economy footing, corruption within the military remains rife, and there have been rising conflicts between the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex.
  • Belousov will, in effect, act as the quartermaster. … He will oversee the integration of the war economy with the rest of the economy to ensure the flow of weaponry and materiel. He will not make the key military decisions. These will continue to be made by Putin, Gerasimov, and others in the military.
• Putin’s main concern as the war with Ukraine continues is for military spending to be under control. And he realized that he needed a competent economic decisionmaker to accomplish that. 
• These personnel moves represent a reshuffling of a deck of cards that Putin has meticulously played over his 25 years in the Kremlin. Their message is that Putin intends to win the war with Ukraine with the help of a more efficient military and a sound economy.

“Putin’s Defense Shake-Up Is a Danger for Ukraine,” Serge Schmemann, NYT, 05.15.24.

• With Vladimir Putin’s revival of Soviet-style centralized and secretive rule, the old art of Kremlinology is making a comeback. It’s not quite the same as when the lineup atop Lenin’s mausoleum on May Day was scrutinized for signs of who was on the way up or down, but Putin’s abrupt replacement of the long-serving Sergei Shoigu as defense minister last Sunday was still a distinct blast from that dismal past.
• Technically, Shoigu was kicked upstairs, to head up the national security council. Putin is not given to publicly punishing loyal courtiers, and Shoigu was about as loyal as they come, even going fishing and hunting with the boss. Still, Kremlin-watchers have long expected his ouster, given the sloppiness of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the widespread corruption in the military-industrial complex, and Shoigu’s reported unpopularity with the generals. 
• So, very briefly, here are the questions and speculation now keeping Kremlinologists busy:
  • Shoigu’s replacement at the Defense Ministry is Andrei Belousov, a senior Kremlin economist. That he is not a military man is not surprising; neither was Shoigu, a former construction foreman, nor his two predecessors. Military matters are handled by the generals of the General Staff; the defense minister looks after the military-industrial base. The thinking is that Belousov’s task will be to manage the rapid growth in Russia’s military spending and to clean up the corruption that is siphoning off huge amounts of the money earmarked for the Ukraine war.
  • How long Shoigu will be allowed to survive remains an open question. One of his top deputies, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on bribery charges in April. One of Ivanov’s nicknames was “Shoigu’s wallet.” And on Tuesday morning, government investigators announced that a senior general on the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Yuri Kuznetsov, had been detained on suspicion of “large-scale” bribe-taking.
• On balance, the musical chairs point to a major overhaul of the military as Russia moves toward what is basically a war economy. Russia is making incremental but steady advances in Ukraine, albeit at an astounding cost in casualties and armaments. Putin’s plan is to press on at any cost, squeezing Ukraine and its ever more reluctant Western backers, and keeping China on board as a major supplier. None of that bodes well for Ukraine.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Shoigu’s Removal and the Instability of Putin’s Regime,” Giangiuseppe Pili and Fabrizio Minniti, RUSI, 05.14.24. 
• “Putin’s military makeover: What to expect from Russia’s new defence minister,” Kirill Shamiev, ECFR, 05.14.24. 
• “The Man at the Center Of Russia's War Effort,” Paul Sonne, NYT, 05.19.24.
• Also see section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Egypt-Russia Relations: Drivers and Dimensions of a Stable Partnership,” Nourhan ElSheikh, The Russia Program, 05.13.24.

• Egypt is inaugurating a new era in its contemporary history, aiming to make a developmental and strategic leap. In this regard, Cairo needs to develop many regional and international partnerships, among the most important of which is the strategic one with Russia. The two countries have succeeded in establishing cooperation in various fields on the basis of a solid base of mutual interests. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a critical test for that partnership. Despite the pressure on Egypt since the outbreak of the conflict to halt cooperation with Russia and join Western sanctions, Cairo, like most of the Global South, has maintained balance in its relations between the West and Russia. That has not been entirely to the liking of Russia, but it has helped ensure the stability of the partnership between the two countries, which is undergirded by three main pillars.
  • Political relations
    • There is harmony in visions and positions between the two countries regarding regional and international issues. This is clearly reflected in their voting at the United Nations. Nevertheless, Egypt has supported all UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia and demanding its withdrawal from Ukraine … given Cairo’s commitment to the principle of territorial integrity.
    • Historically, Russia has been an important military partner for Egypt since the Soviet period … Moscow has showed readiness to provide Egypt with the most modern fighters for air defense, as well as missiles, naval weapons and other systems, besides reviving Egypt’s own defense industry.
  • Economic and technical cooperation
    • Russia is an important source of modern technology, especially in the energy sector. Through cooperation with Russia, Egypt’s first nuclear power station is being built in El Dabaa.
    • Space is another promising area of the Egypt-Russia partnership.
    • A third dimension … is the developing of Egyptian industrial infrastructure. … Focused on the automobile, aircraft, electronics and computer industries, it will enhance Egypt's role as a gateway to African and Middle Eastern markets.
  • Cultural relations
    • During the Sochi summit on Oct. 17, 2018, the Egyptian and Russian presidents declared 2020 as the “year of human and cultural interaction between Egypt and Russia.” There are many cultural bridges linking the two countries, the most important of which are religious ties, cultural centers, Egyptian scholars in Russia and Russian tourists in Egypt.

Ukraine:

“Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidential term expires on May 20. What does that mean for his country?” The Economist, 05.16.24.

• Holding an election when enemies are occupying your territory or raining bombs on it, and when huge numbers of your citizens are away fighting, is tricky. Not holding one is tricky in a different way, opening those in power to the charge of illegitimacy. That is the bind that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, finds himself in, as his five-year term expires on May 20th. He cannot hold elections now, but he must prepare to hold them eventually.
  • Ukraine’s constitution is confusing. Article 103 states that the president is elected for a five-year term; but Article 108 says that he or she exercises power until a new president is inaugurated. 
  • Russian propagandists will crow that Mr. Zelensky is “illegitimate” after May 20th, tactfully ignoring the pantomime of Vladimir Putin’s re-election earlier this year.²
• In principle holding elections would buttress the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government, improve accountability and ensure that the country’s liberal character is preserved. But holding them now is impractical. The Russians are pressing on. ... But still, Mr. Zelensky needs to address rather than evade the questions raised by the end of his formal presidential term. He should acknowledge that he needs eventually to hold an election, and lay out plans for how one might be organized. 

“‘We Are Allied, but We Are Not Aligned,’ Josep Borrell, Europe’s outgoing foreign-policy chief, on the U.S., China, Ukraine and Gaza,” Rishi Iyengar, FP, 05.16.24.

• The war has had consequences. One is the fact that today Ukraine is being granted the status of [EU] candidate state in a record time. For sure, without the war and without the very challenging situation in which Ukraine is, this would have taken much more time, if ever.  But it shows a political will of supporting this country, because the strongest security commitment that we can offer to Ukraine without being a military alliance—which we are not—is membership. We can supply arms to fight the war, and the financial support that we do more than the U.S. You add up the total amount of money that we have been providing to Ukraine, it’s about 96 billion [euros] already paid, which is more than the U.S. Certainly they are more concentrated on the military side than us, that is not the negligible sum, but the most important thing that we can offer to Ukraine is membership. 
• Ukraine has to fight two battles at the same time—the battle of rejecting the Russian aggression, which is something that has to be done in the battlefield, and the battle of reforms that they have to do in order to fulfill all the conditions to become a member. And they have to do it at the same time because accession is a merit-based process—in order to become a member, you have to fulfill certain conditions. If we consider you a candidate, it means that we believe that you could fulfill these conditions, and we will support them in order to do it.
• I don’t see Russia stopping the war. They will continue pushing, and we have to continue supporting Ukraine. And this six-month delay will not come without consequences on the front line.
• It’s clear that [while] we have been very united in front of Russia and its aggressions in Ukraine, we haven’t been united in our position with respect to the war in Gaza. ... many people around the world complain that what Israel is doing in Gaza, we would not accept Russia doing in Ukraine. This creates the accusation of double standards, and we have to be very careful because we can lose our credibility. That’s why we put pressure on Israel not to continue doing the military operation the way they have been doing, understanding very well their reaction to the terrorist attacks. For me, one horror doesn’t justify another, and what’s happening in Gaza is a horror.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“An ominous stand-off in Georgia,” Editorial Board, FT, 05.13.24. 

• Tbilisi in 2024 has disquieting echoes of Kyiv in 2014. In the Ukrainian capital a decade ago, thousands took to the streets after a Russia-leaning president pulled out of signing an integration accord with the EU. Georgia’s capital today is witnessing mass protests against a law, proposed by a government under the sway of a Moscow-linked oligarch, that would clamp down on opposition — and derail the country’s hopes of joining the EU. After protesters and riot police massed on Monday, Georgia’s parliament is set to adopt the law at a final reading as early as Tuesday.
• This is no minor disturbance in a faraway land. Georgia was the first ex-Soviet republic, in 2003, to mount a pro-democracy “colored” revolution, and to feel the wrath of Vladimir Putin through an invasion five years later. Russian troops have occupied about 20 per cent of Georgian territory ever since. Mikheil Saakashvili, whose early reformist rule later curdled into soft repression and cronyism, was beaten in 2012 elections by an umbrella coalition, Georgian Dream, financed by Bidzina Ivanishvili — who made billions in business in post-Soviet Russia.
• The situation is a test of EU diplomacy. Given Georgia’s halting progress over the past decade, Brussels must not hesitate to send a clear message to the ruling party and suspend the country’s EU candidacy if the law passes. It should also signal to Georgia’s oligarchic puppet master that he could face sanctions on his wealth if there is a bloody crackdown on protesters.
• But the EU also owes it to pro-European Georgians, who have risked their safety to display their fury over what their government is doing, to make clear that the path to membership remains open if the law is removed and there is real progress on reforms. Western countries should also do all they can to maintain links with Georgian civil society and opposition. The country’s post-Soviet history has seen repeated cycles of progress on democracy, followed by partial retreat. Georgians’ hopes must be kept alive that the cycle can be broken.

“The Cost of Russia’s Friendship With Azerbaijan,” Kirill Krivosheev, CEIP, 05.07.24.

• Azerbaijan has managed to achieve something thought to be impossible in the post-Soviet space: the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers ahead of time, and seemingly without angering Moscow. In fact, even as peacekeepers were leaving the long-disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh that was seized by Baku following a one-day war with Armenia in 2023, Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev was visiting Moscow. Neither Russian officials nor Russian propaganda outlets have accused Baku of pushing Russia out of the South Caucasus. Instead, they blame Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for recognizing Azerbaijan’s 1991 borders and placing too much trust in Brussels and Washington. 
• Nevertheless, the warm rhetoric between Baku and Moscow does not mean that they are now close allies. It likely indicates the Kremlin has realized the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved, and that it does not want to jeopardize relations with Azerbaijan.
• Azerbaijan has shown that, with a certain combination of military and diplomatic effort, it is possible to both resolve a territorial conflict in defiance of Moscow, and eject the Russian military.... The withdrawal represents the final failure of Russia’s model for a solution to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which envisaged peacekeepers staying there more or less permanently.
• One of the main reasons Moscow was unable—or unwilling—to extract something from Baku in exchange for the withdrawal of its peacekeepers was that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent international isolation has significantly reduced Moscow’s leverage. It is now less willing to risk jeopardizing relations with its neighbors.
  • For example, Russian exports of oil and gas through Azerbaijan rose significantly after Russia lost access to much of the European market following the invasion of Ukraine. 
  • Azerbaijan has also become an irreplaceable partner for Russia when it comes to transporting goods to and from Iran and the ports of the Persian Gulf. 

“The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Eurasian Economic Union,” Irina Busygina, PONARS, 05.17.24. 

• Can it be argued that Russia’s war against Ukraine and massive Western sanctions against Russia have weakened Russia’s economic and political position within post-Soviet Eurasia, thereby jeopardizing The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)’s ability to operate as an established actor in international relations and to expand its list of partners? I believe that such a claim can be made, but it would be too general. It would be more accurate to say that Russia’s economic and political position within the EAEU have changed as a result of both external circumstances and smaller member states reconsidering the risks and costs of membership, as well as the prospects of this organization.
• In 2014–2015, Moscow’s ability to convince smaller nations to join the Eurasian Economic Union using a mixture of concessions and pressures was an advantage. The Union was created based on bilateral arrangements dominated by Russia. With the outbreak of war, this advantage has become a liability: Built as it is on Russian dominance, the EAEU construction is starting to crack. Moreover, the EAEU does not exist in a vacuum, and tensions between Russia and post-Soviet countries within other common organizations have had spillover effects for the Union.

“India and Russia in Central Asia: Opening the doors of perception,” Ivan Shchedrov, ORF, 05.18.24.

• In recent years, we witnessed an augmented political engagement in Central Asia’s political process by India, driven by the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan in 2021. The increased interest is evidenced by the India-Central Asia Dialogue and the recently conducted First India-Central Asia Summit in 2022. The second meeting is anticipated to be held this year.
• Russia perceives the region as a natural sphere of influence. The Concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation of 2023 highlighted the strategic role and importance of CA states, especially in the context of regional integration and collective security—the CIS was proclaimed to be of paramount importance for security, stability, and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. … In light of the prevailing geopolitical dynamics, it can be asserted that the partnership between India and Russia will be focused on several tracks—a) engagement in SCO; b). development of INSTC; c). collaboration in digital development and energy partnership; d) engagement in Afghanistan-related issues. Nevertheless, today’s cooperation between India and Russia in Central Asia can be called “high-echelon” as it concentrates only on engagement within multilateral structures while leaving out joint economic projects.
• Russia views India’s burgeoning role in Eurasia with optimism, both politically and economically. Despite reservations surrounding India's QUAD participation, Russia acknowledged India as a crucial partner within the SCO and a significant player in the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The deepening political ties between India and Central Asian nations are mostly unnoticed by Russian political elites, while the expert community allocates relatively scant attention to India's Central Asian stance. This is attributed to India's modest trade and economic clout and a narrow pool of Russian specialists on India. Nonetheless, India's potential to fortify its trade and economic foothold in both Russian and Central Asian region is recognized. Should this materialize, it could ignite discussions on India's role as a favorable alternative to Chinese economic expansion, albeit the scale and the pattern will be determined by several factors.

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Georgia’s Foreign Agent Law Could Presage a Geopolitical Realignment,” Emil Avdaliani, CEIP, 05.17.24. 

Footnotes

1. This media outlet is viewed as generally associated with the views of the Iranian leadership.
2. Putin’s most recent remarks on this issue can be found in a transcript of his press conference in China on May 17.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Kremlin.ru shared under a Creative Commons 4.0 license.