Russia Analytical Report, March 8-15, 2021
This Week’s Highlights
- Should Russia be considered a winner in Syria? Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council Andrey Kortunov writes that tactically—yes. Russia’s successful and relatively low-budget military operation quickly made Moscow the principal external actor in Syria. However, Kortunov writes, Moscow has failed to design any exit strategy over the five years of its immediate involvement in the Syrian conflict. The degree of Russia’s influence on the Damascus regime is also an open question, according to Kortunov. Is the dog wagging the tail or is the tail wagging the dog?
- Moscow views the Afghan government as a U.S. puppet that could at any moment fall to an attack by the Taliban, writes Kommersant’s Kirill Krivosheev. For this reason, Moscow does not intend to put all its eggs in one basket, and believes it is essential to maintain relations first and foremost not with Kabul but with unofficial local leaders, especially in the northern provinces that border with the former Soviet republics. This approach, according to Krivosheev, should enable Russia to retain its levers of influence in Afghanistan if the country falls into chaos and the central government collapses.
- In his new book, “The Shadows of Empire,” armed conflict expert Samir Puri points out that “the evolution of Russia was inextricably linked to its expansion, so much so that it is unclear whether Russia created an empire, or the process of imperialism created Russia.”
- Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s populist tendency to bend foreign policy to the requirements of domestic policy stopped Armenia’s new authorities from properly tackling the country’s main foreign policy problem: the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, write Hovhannes Nikoghosyan and Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, faculty at the American University of Armenia. This irresponsible attitude toward Karabakh continued, despite clear signs of problems brewing, with no attempts made to restart peace talks. And still, the authors write, Pashinyan’s government continued to count on its “democratic immunity” in the belief that the world would not allow a war against a democracy.
- With his investigations into senior officials and the film about “Putin’s palace,” Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has presented new proof of the corruption and moral bankruptcy of the country’s leadership, writes Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center, but the passive majority doesn’t want to know, and would prefer to block out unfavorable and compromising information about their country. Mass conformism is one of the safeguards of Putin’s system, like any authoritarian regime, according to Kolesnikov.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- “From March 3-5, the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) brought together three dozen experts of varying viewpoints from government, academia and the nuclear sector for a conference exploring the lingering effects of Fukushima and Chernobyl and the evolution of the nuclear safety, security and governance regimes in their aftermath.”
- “Major takeaways [from the conference included]: 1. Nuclear energy will continue to play a significant role in meeting our society’s energy needs while mitigating climate change. The focus on nuclear energy will come with attending challenges in nuclear safety and security, as well as challenges in nuclear proliferation.”
- “2. Nuclear safety and security are ongoing processes that require constant vigilance and rigor. Systems set up to improve security and safety must be continually reviewed and revised to meet evolving situations. … 3. Nuclear safety and security are global issues. HKS Prof. John P. Holdren pointed out … that a nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere. We must recognize and account for national differences while acknowledging our international obligations on nuclear safety and security. The disaster at Chernobyl happened before the world was truly globalized in the way it is today, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said … Chernobyl was a wake-up call about international cooperation on nuclear safety, and Fukushima underscored the need for transparency.”
- “4. Chernobyl and Fukushima are reminders of the threat posed by low-probability, high-consequence events. At the same time, we must not plan for the same accident to happen again. Unpredictable gaps in safety and security will inevitably emerge. We must creatively utilize new technologies to improve our standards and performance.”
- “5. The total impact of a disaster like Chernobyl or Fukushima is impossible to measure. … These disasters disrupted hundreds of thousands of lives, caused enormous economic and ecological damage and degraded public trust not only in nuclear energy but in government institutions and technologies.”
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/saber rattling:
“Back to Basics on Russia Policy,” Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 03.09.21. The authors, the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program and the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, write:
- “A realistic, ‘back to basics’ approach to the Russia challenge is the best available option, but it will require certain compromises between the two sides of the transatlantic community. … U.S. policymakers will have to accept that the EU’s relationship with Russia is bound to be substantially different from that of the United States and that there will always be a variety of views within the EU about its eastern neighbor. … For their part, European policymakers will have to accept that the relationship with Russia is not going to get better in the foreseeable future.”
- “It will take compromise and accommodation on both sides of the Atlantic to translate even a ‘back to basics’ agenda with Russia into reality. … For the Biden administration, it will be essential to recognize that the United States and Europe have different stakes in their respective relationships with Russia. … For Europe, Russia poses a threat but it is also the biggest neighbor with which there is a long history of ups and downs as well as an important trading partner and target for investments. Managing these different perspectives will be key to a successful transatlantic strategy toward Russia.”
- “It is uncontroversial to leave the door open to substantive, sustained dialogue in virtually all areas of disagreement. This will be essential for managing these disagreements and should not be considered a reward for Russia’s bad behavior. … Still, the quality of the dialogue will be an important indicator of Russia’s sincerity and willingness to manage its differences with the West.”
- “Finally, it is important for Western policymakers to recognize that their record of predicting Russia’s future is poor. The history of the country’s relations with the West inspires more pessimism and caution than optimism and boldness in dealing with it. The long-term nature of the Russia problem demands that Western policymakers approach it with steadfastness, unity and solid risk management.”
“How the United States Can Win in the Arctic,” Robert C. O’Brien and Ryan Tully, The National Interest, 03.08.21. The authors, a former U.S. national security adviser and former senior director for European and Russian Affairs at the National Security Council, write:
- “The era of ‘great-power competition’ has arrived and it is playing out between the United States, Russia, and China in the Arctic. This vital region is not just about strategic sea lanes that are opening due to changes in the region’s climate, it is the home to massive reserves of energy resources, precious metals, and rare earth deposits.”
- “Successful Arctic diplomacy requires multilateral engagement at the Arctic Council where key regional decision-making takes place. Russia plays an important role as a member of the Arctic Council whereas China merely enjoys observer status. In early October 2020, we met with our Russian counterparts in Geneva on a long list of topics. While progress was slow on most issues, when it came to the Arctic, we found common understanding that there were only ‘Arctic nations’ and ‘non-Arctic nations.’ We agreed that while the views of non-Arctic nations such as China might be interesting, only Arctic nations should be at the table when decisions about the region are made. One of our Russian counterparts emphasized the point by dryly remarking that a ‘silkworm cannot survive in the Arctic.’”
- “As melting ice opens new shipping routes and exposes a treasure trove of natural resources, we can expect continued Russian and Chinese military and commercial activity in the Arctic. The United States cannot and should not attempt to exclude countries from the region. We can, however, ensure that our own strategic interests are protected and require other nations to play by the rules of the road established by the Arctic Council to prevent the type of bullying we see in places like the South China Sea. The Biden Administration can achieve this outcome by building upon the investments in our military presence and continuing the diplomatic outreach undertaken by the Trump administration.”
“Predictable Unpredictability? U.S. Arctic Strategy and Ways of Doing Business in the Region,” Katarzyna Zysk, War on the Rocks, 03.11.21. The author, professor of international relations and contemporary history at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo, writes:
- “The U.S. Navy approach toward the Arctic appears to be fraught with contradiction. Its new strategic plan for the region, Blue Arctic: a Strategic Plan for the Arctic, was published in January 2021 and calls for a stronger U.S. footprint and greater influence in the region. … [T]he objective of dynamic force employment is to craft the perception that there is always the possibility that the U.S. Navy could be operating under, on or over the Arctic at any given time, creating an impression of unpredictability. Notably, this approach also collides with the traditional regional view on deterrence and relations with Russia.”
- “Without sustained American naval presence and partnerships in the Arctic, the reasoning goes, peace and prosperity will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China … The western part of the Arctic plays a crucial role in Russia’s military strategy … As a result, Russia’s ability to control and deny access to large parts of the Arctic, as well as to pose a threat to sea-lines of communication in the North Atlantic, has increased, making the regional operational environment much more complex and challenging for U.S. and allied forces. A key issue of contention has also been unilateral Russian control of the Northern Sea Route.”
- “A strengthened American and allied military presence in the Arctic is necessary in the light of the sharp expansion of Russia’s military posture and willingness to use force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. … Russia is the dominant military power in the Arctic. After more than a decade of systematic military modernization and build-up in the region, the asymmetry of power between Russia and other regional stakeholders has deepened further. … Despite its increased presence, the United States is unlikely to deploy enough military power to tip the balance against Russia in the region for the time being.”
- “Released in the last days of the Donald Trump administration, the Arctic strategy may perhaps not last long in terms of specific policy decisions to actually implement it. Nonetheless, many of the strategic objectives and the means to achieve them are longstanding and thus likely to be carried further.”
“Russia’s Climate Problem and Opportunity,” Kristin Wood and Mary McMahon, Cipher Brief, 03.10.21. The authors, a former senior CIA officer and a former CIA analyst for climate change and global energy markets, write:
- “Temperatures in Russia are increasing at more than double the global average, according to scientists, proving that climate change and extreme weather doesn’t just affect U.S. national security … It also affects U.S. allies and adversaries, creating new areas of instability and shifting power dynamics. Russia’s more aggressive presence in the Arctic is a clear sign of the shift ahead.”
- “Russian dominance in the Arctic and its administrative control of traffic in newly passable northern shipping routes could increasingly restrict U.S. ability to freely operate in the area or access the region … [T]he Arctic’s increased navigability has also opened a new, direct route from Russia and China to the United States and Canada, granting new access to North American shores for both commercial shipping and a new front for naval operations. … This risk is compounded by Chinese interests there as well as Beijing pursues a ‘Polar Silk Road’ and strives to stablish itself as an Arctic power despite its physical distance from the region.”
- “Russia seeks to solidify its claims and secure rights to territory there believed to be rich in oil and gas that have historically been locked beneath extensive northern ice. Russia’s Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic expected as of last December that Moscow would invest about $235 billion in the development of the Arctic by 2035. … While Russia’s Arctic maneuverability has been increasing … it has reportedly been testing Arctic-based weapons including hypersonic cruise missiles and nuclear-powered underwater drones.”
- “While the U.S. prepares to deal with the consequences of a warming world under President Biden, the complications from Russia’s strengthened position in the Arctic are front and center priorities. Despite doing so little to prepare for Russia’s own consequences, Putin may see advantages in the broader global destabilization expected if climate change is left unchecked.”
“How the Dead Hand of Imperialism Continues to Influence World Politics,” Fareed Zakaria’s review of Samir Puri’s book “The Shadows of Empire. How Imperial History Shapes Our World,” New York Times, 03.08.21. The reviewer, a political commentator and journalist, writes:
- “We are all in the throes of a hangover, Samir Puri writes, a ‘great imperial hangover.’ He explains in ‘The Shadows of Empire’ that we are living in the ‘first empire-free millennium’ in history and yet the legacy of these empires still powerfully shapes our times. … This juxtaposition—imperial legacies in a postimperial world—is an intriguing idea that proves a clever prism through which to look at the world.”
- “The Russian case is in some ways even easier to make. Puri points out that ‘the evolution of Russia was inextricably linked to its expansion, so much so that it is unclear whether Russia created an empire or the process of imperialism created Russia.’ He dates the start of Russia’s European-facing empire to the kingdom of Kievan Rus, which began in the ninth century in Kyiv, the present-day capital of Ukraine. From those modest beginnings grew an empire that at its height, after the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, spanned 11 time zones and comprised almost 200 million people.”
- “When you consider this history, Vladimir Putin’s remark that the collapse of the Soviet Union was ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’ makes sense, especially if you listen to what he said immediately after: ‘Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself.’ These deep imperial ties with Ukraine help explain why Putin’s brazen annexation of Crimea was broadly popular within Russia.”
- “We enter the postimperial 21st century with an unusual geopolitical dynamic. The two leading powers on the planet, the United States and China, both derive a great deal of their internal legitimacy and purpose from the notion that they are anti-imperial nations. … And yet both countries have informal empires. … How will these two distinctive postimperial superpowers interact in the 21st century? What will be the consequences of the imperial shadows cast in this new, emerging bipolar era?”
“The Declining Market for Secrets. U.S. Spy Agencies Must Adapt to an Open-Source World,” Zachery Tyson Brown and Carmen A. Medina, Foreign Affairs, 03.09.21. The authors, a national security fellow at the Truman National Security Project and former deputy director of intelligence at the CIA, write:
- “Since the end of the Cold War, that closed intelligence architecture has increasingly become an impediment to the timely communication of information. In an era of abundant data, rapid change and novel threats to American interests, the frictionless communication of ideas and facts is arguably more important than protecting the tools used to gather them. Today’s national security leaders—inundated with potentially useful information yet compelled to work within a system that restricts its flow—are often driven to seek more convenient sources elsewhere.”
- “While the agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community were built to dominate a world of secrets, we believe their future success will depend on their ability to effectively operate out in the open.”
- “The information revolution has seeded a growing ecosystem of open-source intelligence services. Firms such as Recorded Future, DigitalGlobe, and McKinsey offer not only intelligence-like products, such as news aggregation and data analytics, but also such services as on-demand overhead satellite imagery and long-term strategic forecasting that were previously the purview of governments alone. Some organizations, such as Bellingcat, have blurred the line between journalism and intelligence by pioneering open-source techniques that exploit social media, commercial imagery and gray literature. … Nonetheless, the intelligence community still works under a flawed assumption of exclusivity.”
- “The U.S. intelligence community should not stop collecting and keeping secrets altogether. Intelligence professionals will always remain in the business of finding out what foreign leaders are saying behind closed doors, for example, or assessing an enemy before a battlefield encounter. But the United States should place less emphasis on hard intelligence and realign its limited resources accordingly. As intelligence users become satisfied with the insight and context that a more open platform can provide, collection managers will be able to shift their focus, concentrating on those really difficult problems that only exquisite intelligence collection capabilities can address.”
“China's rise is exactly the kind of threat NATO exists to stop; The alliance has been adrift for years. Countering China would give it focus,” Sara Bjerg Moller, The Washington Post, 03.12.21. The author, an assistant professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, writes:
- “Regrettably, as with Russia, Europe is divided over how to deal with China. Many European allies are wary of picking sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and its Asian rival. Some, like Germany, even appear outright resentful at the suggestion that they must choose. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed last year to conclude the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment—even though the incoming U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had strongly signaled that Europe should wait till Biden's inauguration.”
- “China's rise is indisputably the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. It would be strange for an alliance as potent as NATO to ignore the challenge. A Europe that continues to downplay the danger posed by China's growing influence in the North Atlantic area could lead Xi to succeed where Trump and Putin failed: He could splinter the alliance. International organizations like NATO move slowly, and it will take time to lay the groundwork for tackling the security implications of China's ascendance. By beginning that shift now, the alliance may avoid a greater challenge later.”
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant developments.
Missile defense:
“Killing the ABM Treaty: A Retrospective,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 03.08.21. The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:
- “Bush’s responses to the 9/11 attacks were misguided, disproportionate and punishing. The United States has little to show for the blood and treasure lost by waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. … Relations with Russia that began on a positive note turned quite negative, especially after NATO’s rapid expansion, followed by Bush’s stated intention to bring Georgia and Ukraine into the fold.”
- “To this list we must add Bush’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty … U.S. and Russian deployed warhead totals haven’t diminished greatly since the time Bush left office. Nor has the ostensible purpose of Bush’s treaty withdrawal been achieved: Two decades later, the United States still has not begun to field effective national defenses against ballistic missile attack.”
- “Two decades after Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the arms control enterprise is in poor shape. Indications of its demise preceded Bush’s decisions and accelerated markedly afterward. While the presumed benefits of Bush’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty haven’t materialized, the costs continue to mount.”
- “To those who continue to assert that success is just around the corner, the advance of hypervelocity/glide vehicle technology provides additional rebuttal. Russian and Chinese missiles will get through, no matter how much the Congress spends on missile defenses. The interceptors that show the most promise against the far lesser threat from North Korea are upgrades of theater missile defenses that date back to the Clinton administration. These upgrades could have been permitted under the ABM Treaty had Bush chosen to amend rather than discard it.”
- “Getting the arms control enterprise back on track will require a major re-think. It will also require a re-evaluation of the feasibility and cost effectiveness of different missile defense architectures. Effective national missile defenses against major powers are no more achievable today than they were in decades past. The acceptance of this reality could enable the revival of arms control.”
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant developments.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
“Syria: In the Middle of a Long Cycle,” Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council. 03.15.21. The author, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, writes:
- “Who are the winners and losers in the ten-year-long military confrontation? … The primary loser is Syria itself. … About half a million dead. Over seven million refugees and displaced persons. The economy and the basic infrastructure almost totally destroyed. … The West is a loser, too. The attempts to effect a regime change in Damascus and maintain the liberal democratic sentiments amongst the Syrian opposition have proven equally unsuccessful.”
- “Should Russia be considered a winner? Tactically—yes. … As far as we can see, though, Moscow has failed to design any exit strategy over the five years of its immediate involvement in the Syrian conflict. … Could Turkey be the principal beneficiary? Establishing buffer zones in Idlib and in Syria’s northern provinces is Erdogan’s unquestionable achievement. Yet to what degree is Ankara really in control of the situation in Idlib? … Iran has a strategic long-term presence in Syria and, during the war, this has been elevated to a whole new level. … Yet, no Iranian presence in Syria will change the obvious fact that the latter remains a mostly Sunni state where the Shiite Iran will have essentially restricted opportunities.”
- “The past ten years have not brought Syria the long-awaited peace. What should we expect from the next ten years? … First, given the impasses in Idlib and the Kurdish north-east … Syria’s territorial integrity will hardly be restored. … Second, the seven million refugees and displaced persons will not all return. … Third, no large-scale Syrian reconstruction plan worth USD 100–200 billion will be implemented. … Fourth, the Assad regime will continue to demonstrate survival miracles against the backdrop of mounting economic problems, new sanctions and a continuing power struggle in Damascus itself.”
- “Syria has two goals for the near future. … The minimum goal is to prevent further escalation of the conflict, more casualties and greater destruction of the country. … The maximum goal is to motivate Damascus to initiate careful reforms, even if they remain purely economic so far…followed by controlled political liberalization or at least by consistent countering of particularly egregious outrages committed by Syria’s security forces.”
“The Failure of the Syrian Revolution; After 10 years of civil war, the rebellion against Bashar al-Assad's ruthless regime couldn't bridge the nation's divides or rally serious help from the West,” Christian C. Sahner, Wall Street Journal, 03.11.21. The author, an associate professor of Islamic history at the University of Oxford, writes:
- “Looking back to 2011, what has surprised me the most about the course of the conflict has been the utter failure of the Syrian revolution to achieve its original goal of overthrowing and replacing the Assad regime. At the beginning of the war, I was convinced that Mr. Assad would eventually go.”
- “At moments over the past decade, the Syrian regime did face risks to its survival…but these moments passed, and with them the regime's resolve to survive only grew stronger. So did the will of Syria's most powerful international backers, Iran and Russia, who came to Mr. Assad's rescue with soldiers, jet fighters and materiel. Thanks to them, he now controls roughly 70 percent of the country's territory.”
- “Syria's revolutionaries never enjoyed such diplomatic success. They did persuade the U.S. and other important countries to declare that Mr. Assad had to go, but these powers never did much to actually attempt to topple him. In contrast, the Assad regime has benefited from the unflinching support of Iran and Russia in both the military and diplomatic arenas, which proved the key factor in Mr. Assad's survival.”
- “A decade later, what should—or can—be done about Syria? Idlib province and the Kurdish territories in the north remain beyond the regime's reach. But the bitter truth is that, for all intents and purposes, Mr. Assad has won the war, and the Syrian revolution has failed. He has won by devastating his country and butchering his own people, but he has won all the same. At this point, the only thing that one can hope for—and for the U.S. and its partners to urgently work toward—is a political settlement that stabilizes the country and holds out some prospect of curbing the worst excesses of Mr. Assad's regime and its ruthless enablers.”
Cyber security:
“Negotiating a Cybersecurity Pact with Russia,” Tom Robertson, The National Interest, 03.12.21. The author, CEO of Canada’s Continental Currency Exchange, writes:
- “A pact on cyber aggression is lacking in the current roster of U.S.-Russia bilateral agreements, despite having been proposed by Russia in various forms almost yearly since 2008. Russia’s overtures have been declined by both Republican and Democratic administrations for a combination of myopic domestic political reasons and more thoughtful and legitimate strategic national interest reasons.”
- “Now, though, as we approach the end of the Putin era with no succession plan in sight, and as we clean up the halls of governments and boardrooms of corporations following yet another devastating Russian cyberattack (SolarWinds), and, most importantly, as we embark on a new U.S. administration, the time is right to negotiate a cybersecurity agreement.”
- “It should be expected that any cyber deal, particularly a version 1.0, will leave large swaths of governance issues unresolved. This ‘going-in’ view is critical, lest the past two decades of mutual cyber aggression and domain complexity overwhelm the effort. … Second, given the exponential rate at which cyber technology evolves, a cyber treaty’s ability to measure and monitor activity will by necessity be limited to specific and often quite narrow domain characteristics. … Third, and as a consequence of these challenges, early versions of an agreement should favor process over substance.”
- “There is a path forward to a cybersecurity treaty between the United States and Russia. Pitfalls and foggy patches abound, but with a ‘going-in view’ set of first principles that are fair and realistic, with an honest broker third party to assist, prepared with applicable treaty precedence, and with a short list of achievable near-term outcome, a deal has every opportunity to succeed. And we should want a deal to succeed. As the United States moves to re-establish and re-engage on the world’s stage, Russia should loom large on its agenda. The country post-Putin will be fraught with risk. We need practical opportunities to deepen our connections with and positively influence the Russia of the future. A cybersecurity treaty is one such opportunity.”
“Russia’s Pursuit of Internet Sovereignty Backfires, Again,” Andrei Soldatov, The Moscow Times, 03.11.21. The author, a Russian investigative journalist, writes:
- “Wednesday [March 10] was supposed to be a big day for Andrei Lipov, a … Russian top official trusted with the Kremlin’s most sensitive internet initiatives. … By 2019, however, many of the Kremlin initiatives to deal with the unruly internet seemed to have failed, and Lipov came up with the concept of the sovereign internet or the infamous kill switch that could disconnect Russia from the rest of the World Wide Web. On a technical level, the concept required internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment all over the country that would allow authorities to block content and reroute internet traffic by themselves. Lipov’s idea was not to isolate the country completely but to have a tool to isolate regions if they faced a crisis—anything from a natural disaster to protests. The emphasis was on video and live streaming, the service most likely to provoke protests or unrest.”
- “The government had already tried that in Ingushetia, a poor region that was rocked by protests over a land dispute with Chechnya. There it had been done manually … Lipov wanted to build a system that would do the same, but remotely—from Moscow—and directly—playing with the equipment installed by operators but with no operators involved.”
- “On the morning of March 10, Roskomnadzor announced that from that day on the agency would slow the speed of Twitter in Russia. … And then, suddenly, it all went wrong—government websites, including Kremlin.ru, experienced outages.”
- “At 10 am Moscow time, traffic dropped by as much as 24 percent to the Russian state telecoms provider Rostelecom, according to web evaluation data director Kentik. … And then things got even worse. According to Kentik, Roskomnadzor blocked all domains containing t.co—including Microsoft.com and Reddit.com—while attempting to block Twitter's link shortener t.co.”
- “What was intended to be a nationwide test of the sovereign internet, a warning to Western platforms and a reassuring message to Vladimir Putin over his fears about the internet failed on all fronts.”
“Does Coronavirus Herald the Age of Totalitarian Surveillance in Russia and Eurasia?” Nikolai Markotkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.11.21. The author, an expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, writes:
- “The coronavirus pandemic gave governments around the world a convenient opportunity to test out digital control technologies. Fear of the virus virtually neutralized public backlash. Actions that would have been seen as an impermissible violation of privacy before the pandemic were suddenly perceived as a lifeline.”
- “The pandemic gave the Russian government unprecedented capacity for monitoring the lives of its people. It also served as a stress test for the surveillance system in Moscow. … Despite some hiccups, such as extra fines or lines in the metro on the day the electronic passes were introduced, the Moscow authorities had successfully implemented the lockdown overall. The digital control system was tested and improved ‘in combat mode,’ and by the end of the lockdown it was operating without significant problems.”
- “Even if the governments delete the personal information they have collected, they will retain their improved skills of monitoring citizens, which can then be applied for a range of objectives, from fighting crime to monitoring ‘suspect’ individuals or political opponents.”
- “Current technologies are not advanced enough to carry out totalitarian control on a large scale. Digital surveillance cannot stop truly large-scale unrest: it’s the police, not cameras, that actually detain people. However, the existing toolkit is sufficient to monitor and neutralize specific politicians and activists. Individuals might not notice the digital control systems in their cities and countries until they find themselves in their crosshairs.”
- “The pandemic has shifted the balance between privacy and security (interpreted differently in different countries) from the former to the latter. When the shock from the pandemic wears off, post-COVID societies will have to search for new mechanisms to curb the desire of the authorities for total digital control.”
Elections interference:
- No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Why Russia Is Hedging Its Bets in Afghanistan,” Kirill Krivosheev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.15.21. The author, a journalist with Kommersant, writes:
- “Russia’s relationship with Afghanistan is a complex one. … Moscow doesn’t see the current Afghan government as autonomous, and is trying to strike a balance between all the different forces at play in Afghanistan in order to retain its influence if one of those forces collapses.”
- “Despite Kabul’s attempts to adhere to a foreign policy that is independent of the United States on issues such as Crimea … and Iran, … Moscow views the Afghan government as a U.S. puppet that could at any moment fall to an attack by the Taliban.”
- “For this reason, Moscow does not intend to put all its eggs in one basket, and believes it is essential to maintain relations first and foremost not with Kabul but with unofficial local leaders. … On some aspects, the goals of Russia and the United States in Afghanistan align: both countries would like to see the formation of an interim government and an end to the war, after which they can breathe a sigh of relief and move on. … In addition, both the United States and Russia have found themselves having to maneuver between the interests of Kabul and the Taliban.”
- “Still, Moscow and Washington’s subtexts are very different. The United States may be firm with the Afghan government, but it is still its advocate. … Russia, meanwhile, is a player whose goals are ultimately unclear, and in any case change with the situation.”
- “This approach should enable Russia to retain its levers of influence in Afghanistan if the country falls into chaos and the central government collapses. It does, of course, seriously complicate relations with Kabul. … But being located much closer to Afghanistan’s borders than the United States, Russia cannot afford to take the risk of adopting a more one-sided strategy.”
“The Biden administration is willing to take a calculated risk to end our longest war,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 03.12.21. The author, a columnist covering foreign affairs at The Washington Post, writes:
- “President Donald Trump was so eager to pull the plug in Afghanistan that in mid-November, shortly after the election, he impulsively signed an order to withdraw U.S. forces by year's end. Pentagon officials tell me the unpublicized order was quickly reversed, after strenuous protests.”
- “Biden is now rushing to fill the diplomatic vacuum, guided by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Zalmay Khalilzad. … They have crafted an ambitious plan to work with the United Nations, Russia and Turkey to shape a power-sharing interim government and a cease-fire before the May 1 deadline, if possible. … Blinken decided to embrace a much broader cast of peacemakers, rather than continue the United States' solo diplomacy. Major powers like Russia and China might not want the United States to win in Afghanistan, but they didn't want it to lose.”
- “What's ahead is a three-step process to get regional and international buy-in. First, the United Nations is expected to convene a quick meeting of foreign ministers - probably from the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, India and Iran. This group would give its blessing to cease-fire negotiations and political transition talks between the Afghan parties.”
- “Next would be a round of talks in Moscow, starting March 18. … The last round envisaged by Blinken would be meetings in Turkey, perhaps beginning in early April, between Taliban and Kabul government representatives. The goal, Blinken said in his letter, would be to ‘finalize a peace agreement.’ If that transitional framework and cease-fire could be achieved, the United States might begin a slow walk toward the exit.”
- “To end its longest war, the Biden administration is willing to take the calculated risk of including some of its most problematic adversaries—Russia, China and Iran—and to let the mercurial regime in Turkey organize the wedding festival.”
“A long shot for Afghanistan,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 03.11.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:
- “As outlined by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a letter to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, which leaked last weekend, the plan calls for U.N.-sponsored talks among the United States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran about ‘a unified approach to supporting peace in Afghanistan;’ new negotiations hosted by Turkey between the government and the Taliban to ‘finalize a peace agreement;’ and a proposal for a 90-day reduction in violence, which ‘is intended to prevent a Spring Offensive by the Taliban.’”
- “The U.S. envoy to the Afghan talks, Zalmay Khalilzad, has handed both sides a broad outline of a possible peace settlement. It calls for a new ‘peace government’ in which the Kabul government and Taliban would share power while a new constitution is drawn up; there would then be elections for a new administration. Importantly, the U.S. outline calls for freedom of speech and women's rights to be guaranteed in the new constitution, along with Afghans' right to ‘choose their political leaders.’ Taliban agreement to these terms, along with a cease-fire, would be an extraordinary breakthrough, so much so that few observers of the Islamist fundamentalist movement expect it to go along. In recent months, Taliban leaders have appeared to anticipate a swift victory over the government following the promised U.S. departure, and in areas they now control, political and women's rights are all but nonexistent.”
- ‘The Biden administration is right to pressure the Afghan leader to put his country's interests over his own. But it must also be prepared for the all-too-likely possibility that the Taliban will reject the far-reaching compromises it is being asked to make, and instead seek a military victory. In that case, the United States must be prepared to leave its forces in place.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Why Navalny Makes Many Russians Uncomfortable,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.10.21. The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:
- “The opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s near-deadly poisoning, his return to Russia and his subsequent imprisonment have only increased the Russian public’s distrust and disapproval of him, according to a recent poll. The explanation couldn’t be more banal: it’s a case of shooting the messenger.”
- “With his investigations into senior officials and the film about ‘Putin’s palace,’ Navalny has presented new proof of the corruption and moral bankruptcy of the country’s leadership. But the passive majority doesn’t want to know, and would prefer to block out unfavorable and compromising information about their country. This was also the case with the Malaysia Airlines passenger jet shot down over Ukraine in 2014 (just 2 percent of Russians polled believed that Russia was responsible), and the 2018 poisoning of the Skripals (only 3 percent blamed Russian intelligence agencies). Now it’s repeating itself with Navalny: 55 percent of those polled were not inclined to believe that he had been deliberately poisoned.”
- “Mass conformism is one of the safeguards of Putin’s system, like any authoritarian regime. Anyone who doesn’t show demonstrative unity is marginalized—or, following the protests earlier this year, even criminalized.”
- “The fact is that Russians have gotten used to the circumstances and rules of an authoritarian political regime. When actually faced with liberalization, they could discover quite quickly that they are perfectly capable of making use of democratic instruments. But for that to happen, the initiative needs to come from above, like under Mikhail Gorbachev. For now, public opinion is mainly that of a distrustful observer. Navalny is pushing the conformists out of their comfort zone, and since they are completely unprepared to join civil society, they don’t like that.”
“The brutal third act of Vladimir Putin,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 03.11.21. The author, Moscow bureau chief at the Financial Times, writes:
- “Western sanctions imposed after the 2014 annexation of Crimea have handicapped Russia’s economy and made it harder for many of the country’s biggest businesses to expand. … At the same time, Putin has increased protection for his regime by ramping up spending on police and security forces.”
- “The challenge to Putin is that Navalny has not just tapped into the restlessness of a generation of young Russians: he also represents them. At 44, he is a quarter of a century younger than Putin and his most senior lieutenants. As the president ages, his regime is ageing with him.”
- “The law has even been changed to work around Putin’s reliance on the timeworn and trusted. In January, he submitted a bill that nullifies the existing rule forcing federal bureaucrats to retire at 65 years old. Anyone appointed directly by the president can work until their death. And increasing numbers of those closest to him are drawn from the siloviki, with almost all the liberals appointed prior to 2014 now pushed from the Kremlin’s corridors.”
- “’The siloviki cannot but fulfil their function. Otherwise there will be questions about their effectiveness,’ says Alexey Chesnakov, a political analyst who advises the Kremlin and who was deputy head of Putin’s domestic policy department from 2001 to 2008. ‘Non-systemists sometimes act too bluntly and the security officials have no choice—they must act as the law dictates to them. And the law gives them enormous powers.’”
- “Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s chief of staff, says FBK will organize more protests in the spring, and few doubt that September’s elections will provide another flashpoint for uprisings, especially if United Russia vastly outperforms its low poll ratings and opposition candidates are blocked from the ballot. Putin’s police will be waiting.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant developments.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“The Time To Be By Yourself,” Fyodor A. Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 03.15.21. The author, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and research director of the Valdai Discussion Club, writes:
- “It has become customary to talk about ‘Russia’s loneliness’ in the international arena. Further deterioration of relations with the West, confusion in neighboring countries, and the lack of obvious dynamics on the Asian track—all this seems to bear out the thesis of Russia’s loneliness. But how should this be evaluated now? The experience of great powers clearly shows that ‘loneliness,’ that is, pursuance of solely one’s own interests and reliance primarily on one’s own resources is the norm.”
- “Great powers can build a coalition or allied relations if the situation so requires and for as long as this may be necessary. Some countries did this more often, some (like the United States or China) almost never did. The second half of the 20th century, and especially the first two decades of the 21st century have taught us that institutional interaction and community expansion are the natural way of global political development. However, this period is just a brief moment and an exception in the history of international relations. Upon the end of the liberal order, the world is going back to the historical norm. The experience of institutions will not sink into oblivion, and they will not disappear overnight, but the direction of changes has already been determined.”
- “So, regarding ‘loneliness’ as a problem of Russian politics as a whole would not make sense; we can only talk about opportunities or lack thereof in specific areas or on certain tracks—most importantly, opportunities for continuing internal development and ensuring the country’s sustainability in the ‘world of the previous norm.’ However this is not a task for foreign policy to tackle, although it can certainly help solve it. But the ability to put things in order at home becomes a determining factor for the future of foreign policy.”
China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?
- No significant developments.
Ukraine:
“Ukraine's president again comes under U.S. pressure—this time, for good reason,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 03.13.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:
- “Mr. Zelensky … retreated, firing reformers in his cabinet and the central bank president, and stalling on judicial reforms and action against oligarchs. In particular, Mr. Zelensky waffled on taking on Ihor Kolomoisky, the tycoon whose television network propelled him to the presidency.”
- “The backsliding has caused the International Monetary Fund to withhold disbursements on a $5 billion loan deal, without which Ukraine may be unable to make debt payments later this year. It has also troubled Kyiv's supporters in the United States.”
- ‘Mr. Biden was a strong supporter of Ukraine's independence as vice president, visiting the country and demanding the dismissal of a corrupt state prosecutor. The new administration is renewing that pro-reform policy: In a phone call to Mr. Zelensky's foreign minister last month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken ‘highlighted the importance of Ukraine maintaining progress on fighting corruption and implementing rule of law and economic reforms,’ according to an official statement. Last week, the administration followed up by sanctioning Mr. Kolomoisky on grounds of corruption, sending an unmistakable message about its expectations.”
- “Mr. Zelensky should press for judicial reforms, restore independence to the central bank and rule out any move to weaken the National Anti-Corruption Bureau. He should break unequivocally with Mr. Kolomoisky and support criminal charges against him. Having survived a U.S. president who sought to corrupt him, Mr. Zelensky now has the opportunity to forge a partnership with Mr. Biden that could decisively advance Ukraine's attempt to break free from Russia and join the democratic West. He should seize on it.”
“Seven Years After: Reflections on Russia’s Annexation of Crimea,” Eugene Chausovsky, The National Interest, 03.10.21. The author, a non-resident fellow with the Newlines Institute, writes:
- “As I reflect on … events in Kiev and Crimea, I am left with a few main lessons from my experiences there. … The first is that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was actually predictable. Weeks before Russia took control of the peninsula, I had been told by both officials and regular people within Crimea that the peninsula’s separation from Ukraine and absorption into Russia was a distinct possibility.”
- “Another lesson from Ukraine, and one that has application to all conflicts around the world, is the importance of understanding different perceptions and biases among conflicting parties. To the protesters in Kiev and to many in the West, Euromaidan was a democratic revolution against a corrupt and illegitimate government. To Russia and many in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Euromaidan was an illegal and Western-organized coup d’état. Visiting Kiev and Crimea was like traveling between two different worlds, and I could only begin to get a clearer picture of the Ukrainian conflict—and more importantly to anticipate its trajectory—once I had talked to people from all sides of the political spectrum.”
- “A final lesson from Crimea, and perhaps the most obvious, is that the world is extremely interconnected. What started as a small protest movement in Kiev spread rapidly, first to Crimea, then to Eastern Ukraine, then throughout the world. The Ukrainian conflict in part fueled Russia’s entrance into the Syrian conflict a year later, and Moscow’s standoff with the West was a major factor in Russian hacking and meddling in the U.S. elections in 2016. We are still dealing with the ripple effects of these events years later, making Russia’s annexation of Crimea worthy of reflection in more ways than one.”
Belarus:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Post–Revolution and War, Armenia Must Find a Geopolitical Balance,” Hovhannes Nikoghosyan and Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.09.21. Nikoghosyan, an adjunct lecturer at the American University of Armenia, and Ter-Matevosyan, associate professor and chair of the Political Science and International Affairs Program of the American University of Armenia, write:
- “Armenian diplomacy will depend far more on external factors from now on. … The shattering events Armenia has undergone in the last two years … couldn’t fail to impact on the country’s foreign policy.”
- “Once elected prime minister, the impulsive Pashinyan … tried … to bend foreign policy to the requirements of domestic policy, [which] stopped Armenia’s new authorities from properly tackling the country’s main foreign policy problem: the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. … This irresponsible attitude toward Karabakh continued, despite clear signs of problems brewing, with no attempts made to restart peace talks. … Following its defeat in the forty-four-day Karabakh war with Azerbaijan, Armenian diplomacy … was practically paralyzed.”
- “Armenian diplomacy has lost the ambitiousness that had marked it since the 2018 revolution, and will depend far more on external factors from now on. A multi-vector foreign policy will remain in Armenia’s national interests, but now that will be easier said than done.”
- “The Biden administration has already announced its readiness to more actively support democracy in the post-Soviet space. It’s not yet clear how substantial U.S. support will be, but Pashinyan is counting on it. … A no less important question is how far Russia is prepared to support Pashinyan’s government. For now, it looks like the current regime is still the most convenient partner for Moscow to work with on implementing all the terms of the Karabakh ceasefire agreement, which the Kremlin helped to broker. But it won’t stay that way forever.”
- “Pashinyan’s primary concern right now in his foreign policy decisions is how they will impact on his popularity at home. … The current extent of the standoff between Russia and the West leaves a weakened Armenia with even fewer opportunities to achieve a balancing act than it had before the 2018 revolution.”