6 Ideas to Explore

1. As Donald Trump struggles to fulfill his campaign promise to bring an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, Harvard University Professor Graham Allison urges the U.S. president and his team to review what Dwight D. Eisenhower did facing a similar stalemate seven decades ago. In his 1952 campaign for the White House, Eisenhower pledged to end the war in Korea that had claimed more than 3 million lives. Over the next six months, he actually did it. While Ukraine is not Korea, lessons from the 34^th U.S. president’s success in fulfilling his campaign promise offer clues for Trump, according to Allison. As in Korea when Eisenhower became president, rival Russian and Ukrainian armies are stuck along a line of control that has not moved substantially for years, Allison reminds us in his latest commentary for The National Interest. Most significantly, Eisenhower took the lead himself in a direct, focused effort that required repeatedly overruling South Korea’s leader Syngman Rhee and which left half of Korea under the control of the adversary—but forged a peace or “armistice” with a security framework that made it sustainable and gave South Korea an opportunity to build a new nation. “If Trump can channel Eisenhower, using his authority to hammer out an agreement that neither Zelenskyy nor Putin will like but that will end the killing, prevent another outbreak of war and allow Ukrainians to start rebuilding their country, he will be able to claim that he has achieved the peace ‘deal of the century,’” Allison advises.
2. Serious preparations are now under way for Volodymyr Zelensky to run for reelection as soon as mid-summer, according to The Economist. Government sources told this U.K. weekly that Zelensky has already instructed his team to organize a vote after a full ceasefire, which the Americans believe they could impose by late April. The law requires at least 60 days for campaigning, so the earliest possibility would be early July. “Things will not get any easier for Ukraine’s next president, whoever he may be and whenever he is elected. Mr Trump’s rushed diplomacy¹ could lead to a bad peace agreement and resentment. In time, some Ukrainians may call for a tougher, more militaristic government,” The Economist warns.
3. When the U.S. announced a potential ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea earlier this month, Moscow immediately put forward some extra demands that either constitute a tactic to frustrate negotiations, or represent a symptom of incoherence in Russia’s negotiating strategy, according to The Bell’s contributors Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko. “Moscow’s wish list was not only very odd, it included demands that will be impossible for Washington to deliver,” they wrote in The Bell on March 29. While the removal of sanctions on Russian food and fertilizer exports were highlighted on this wish list, neither of these exports had been sanctioned, according to the duo. The inclusion of the Russian fishing industry among Moscow’s demands was also “extremely odd,” as Russian fish has been entering the U.S. via factories in China, according Kolyandr and Prokopenko.
4. A New York Times investigation has revealed that the United States’ involvement in the Ukraine war was far deeper than previously understood. Here are this newspaper’s five takeaways from the investigation led by its journalist Adam Entous.
   1. A U.S. base in Wiesbaden, Germany, supplied the Ukrainians with the coordinates of Russian forces on their soil.
   2. U.S. intelligence and artillery helped Ukraine quickly turn the tide against the Russian invasion.
   3. The Biden administration kept moving its red lines.
      1. In October 2022, U.S. intelligence overheard Russia’s then Ukraine commander, Gen. Sergei Surovikin, talking about indeed doing something desperate: using tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the Ukrainians from crossing the Dnipro and making a beeline to Crimea. Until that moment, U.S. intelligence agencies had estimated the chance of Russia’s using nuclear weapons in Ukraine at 5 to 10%. Now, they said, if the Russian lines in the south collapsed, the probability was 50%.²
   4. Ultimately, the U.S. military and CIA were allowed to help with strikes into Russia.
   5. Political disagreements in Ukraine contributed to the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive’s collapse.
5. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reoriented the U.S. military to prioritize deterring China while leaving it to Europe to defend itself from potential Russian aggression, according to a secret internal Pentagon guidance memo signed by Hegseth earlier this month. “Hegseth’s guidance acknowledges that the U.S. is unlikely to provide substantial, if any, support to Europe in the case of Russian military advances, noting that Washington intends to push NATO allies to take primary defense of the region,” WP’s Alex Horton and Hannah Natanson reported March 29. The U.S. will support Europe with nuclear deterrence against Russia, and NATO should only count on U.S. forces that are not required for homeland defense or China deterrence missions, according to the two journalists’ description of the memo.
6. There are three goals Europe would like to achieve in the face of potential Russian aggression: credible and effective deterrence against this country; strategic stability; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states, according to Mark Bell of University of Minnesota and Fabian Hoffmann of King’s College London. Given that attainment of all the three goals is not an option, “Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence” even though that would “require abandoning strategic stability,” which is understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon, according to the duo. To implement the duo’s recommended scenario of nonproliferation and credible deterrence, Europe would rely on extended deterrence provided by the U.K. and France, while these two countries would “expand their low-yield, tactical-level nuclear options, and indicate a willingness to use them, including by employing them first.” “London and Paris would need to build up their limited nuclear options and develop doctrines that both outline their realistic use in battlefield missions and detail how to manage escalation,” Bell and Hoffmann argue in their article for FA.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis," Elizabeth Wishnick, FPRI, 03.26.25. 

• Despite a shared anti-Western alignment among Russia, China, and North Korea, several factors work against the formation of a trilateral axis. The fraught history of their collaboration during the Korean War is a key restraining factor. Although a communist bloc subsequently emerged in Northeast Asia, the legacy of the underlying tensions among the three sets limits to current and future trilateral projects. China and Russia today claim that the US is responsible for creating a new Cold War—and in Asia, they point to the formation of US-centered blocs as a primary driver. North Korea, by contrast, finds advantage in a new Cold War environment, putting it at odds with China and Russia, who would incur reputational costs in the Global South by pursuing that line of thinking.
• For Russia, a military partnership with North Korea puts at risk decades of engagement with South Korea and hopes of South Korean investment in the Russian Far East and the Arctic. With North Korean forces now fighting in Kursk, South Korea also has an incentive to provide more substantial military support to Ukraine, though this would likely occur through third countries due to domestic laws prohibiting lethal aid to conflict zones.[  For China, the prospect of Russia enabling North Korean testing and provocative actions on the Korean Peninsula raises the possibility of an arms race in Northeast Asia, a potential nuclear threat to Northeast China, and reduced opportunities to weaken the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. Finally, the most natural form of trilateralism—regional development in the Tumen River area where the three countries share borders—has still proven elusive due to competing regional interests and historical legacies.
• This is not to say that the deepening anti-Western military partnerships between Russia and North Korea and between China and Russia are not sources for serious concern, even though the bilateral relationships may not add up to a full-fledged multilateral alliance. Both partnerships make it possible for Russia to continue its war of aggression in Ukraine and increase instability in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, it is important to track the specific indicators of their development of a trilateral axis to understand the parameters of their joint interactions. We need to look for signs of greater institutionalization, policy coordination, and support by Russian and Chinese elites to determine whether a trilateral axis actually is in the making.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Keeping the Lights On: How Ukraine Can Build a Resilient Energy System (and Why This Matters to the EU)," Caspar Hobhouse, EU Institute for Security Studies, 03.28.25.

• Ukraine's energy systems have suffered significant damage since the full-scale invasion of 2022. As of spring 2024, two thirds of the country’s dispatchable power generation capacity has fallen under occupation, been damaged or destroyed. This has been accompanied by a coordinated destruction of the grid network.
• Ukraine's thermal power stations – primarily coal-fired – have borne the brunt of the attacks. Despite heroic efforts to maintain operations, as of September 2024, the country had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks. Its large nuclear energy sector, which contributes 55% of total generation, has been less affected.
• As of September 2024, the country had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks.
• Ukraine did have some pre-war structural strengths that have helped its resilience. In particular, it had an especially strong transmission system designed to carry roughly 56 GW of electricity, even though the country’s generation capacity was closer to 25 GW. While the transmission system has also suffered damage, the built-in flexibility of its capacity has proven to be a vital source of resilience.
• Ukraine's renewables sector has also shown considerable resilience, despite the seizure of key assets by Russian forces. Renewable energy sources (RES) continue to supply 8.7% of Ukraine's energy, down from 9.4% in 2021. However, this decline is largely due to the occupation of territory rather than the destruction of infrastructure. Over 40% of Ukraine’s pre-2022 RES in solar PV and wind power currently lies in occupied territory.
• The biggest problem is fixed, high-value infrastructure. The crippling of Ukraine's thermal capacity – illustrated by the destruction of the Kurakhivska thermal power plant – demonstrates just how exposed these critical assets are to targeted attacks.
• A decentralized energy network – built around multiple small, localized generation nodes linked together through a meshed grid – offers extensive resilience against Russian attacks.
  • The first reason is attrition.
  • The second is flexibility.
  • The third is speed.
• Looking ahead, the EU should apply the lessons from Ukraine to strengthen its own energy system – building resilience and removing structural vulnerabilities. One critical area is in the power grid: while one interconnector is vulnerable, one hundred smaller connections are resilient.  In an era of growing geopolitical uncertainty, energy security is one thing that can still be actively safeguarded. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine's Sick Children Fight A War Within the War," Lynsey Addario, NYT, 03.26.25.
• "Russia’s Dangerous Facts on Ukraine’s Ground," Michael Albertus and Eugene Finkel, FP, 03.25.25.
• "Deadly Russian Attacks Leave Ukrainians Questioning Point of Ceasefire," Siobhán O'Grady and Serhii Korolchuk, WP, 03.30.25. 

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Key Takeaways From America’s Secret Military Partnership With Ukraine,” Adam Entous, NYT, 03.30.25.

• "A U.S. base in Wiesbaden, Germany, supplied the Ukrainians with the coordinates of Russian forces on their soil."
  • "Each morning, U.S. and Ukrainian military officers set targeting priorities. Task Force Dragon then gave the Ukrainians the coordinates so they could shoot at them."
• "U.S. intelligence and artillery helped Ukraine quickly turn the tide against the Russian invasion. In spring 2022, the Biden administration agreed to send High Mobility Artillery Systems, or HIMARS, which used satellite-guided rockets for strikes up to 50 miles distant. Ultimately, the U.S. military and C.I.A. were allowed to help with strikes into Russia. "
• "The Biden administration kept moving its red lines. From the first, administration officials sought to lay down a red line: America was not fighting Russia; it was helping Ukraine."
• "In October 2022⁴ U.S. intelligence overheard Russia’s Ukraine commander, Gen. Sergei Surovikin, talking about indeed doing something desperate: using tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the Ukrainians from crossing the Dnipro and making a beeline to Crimea. Until that moment, U.S. intelligence agencies had estimated the chance of Russia’s using nuclear weapons in Ukraine at 5 to 10 percent. Now, they said, if the Russian lines in the south collapsed, the probability was 50 percent."
• "Political disagreements in Ukraine contributed to the 2023 counteroffensive’s collapse. The Ukrainian armed forces chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, embraced the plan, whose centerpiece was an assault in the direction of the southern city of Melitopol that would cut off Russian supply lines. But his rival and subordinate, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, had his own plan — to impale Russian forces in the occupied eastern city of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, sided with him and divided up the ammunition and forces between two main fronts instead of one."

"What Rusting Russian Tanks Can Teach Us About the Pete Hegseth Group Chat," David French, NYT, 03.30.25. 

• "The Russian military had spent enormous sums modernizing its forces. It had enjoyed success in a much more limited conflict in Syria. In 2014, it had taken Crimea while hardly firing a shot. The Ukrainian military was supposed to be outmatched and outgunned."
• "What happened? It’s a complicated story, but one lesson is clear: A military and intelligence apparatus organized around pleasing the boss is ripe for catastrophic failure."
• "The difference between the American and Russian militaries is easy to articulate. At its core, the U.S. military is professional. The Russian military is political. That doesn’t mean that the Russian military doesn’t have professional elements; it’s that when push comes to shove, political loyalty is the ultimate value."
• "You can reach the highest heights if you have unwavering loyalty to Putin. If you do not, then you can forfeit your career (and even your life). Traditionally in the American military, politics is irrelevant to your advancement. And if politics does intrude, it’s seen as a grave breach of the military ethos."
• "The path to promotion will run through political subservience as long as Trump and Hegseth are in charge, especially at the highest levels of command. For example, witness Trump bragging that his choice for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wore a MAGA hat and said he “loved” Trump and would “kill” for him — a possibly fictional story that nonetheless illustrates Trump’s priorities perfectly."
• "Before Russia invaded Ukraine, several leading Trumpists developed a strange fascination with the Russian Army... But the illusion of Russian prowess was shattered on those battlefields north of Kyiv. There is much more to military strength than physicality and bravado. Ukraine, the much smaller representative of the so-called woke West, has turned much of Russia’s conventional arsenal into smoking ruins."

Military aid to Ukraine:

"A European Reassurance Force for Ukraine: Options and Challenges," Ben Barry, Jonty Kennon, Douglas Barrie, Nick Childs, James Hackett, Henry Boyd, Jonathan Bentham, Dzaky Naradichiantama, and Michael Tong, IISS, 03.31.25. 

• The UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron recently announced their willingness to create a ‘coalition of the willing’ to safeguard a potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. A ‘reassurance’ or ‘deterrence’ force is a better frame for this discussion than a ‘peacekeeping force’, given that one of its tasks would be to respond to a potential Russian violation of a ceasefire agreement. Therefore, agreed response options in the event of a significant breach of a ceasefire would bolster the deterrent value of any deployment. Consequently, the force deployed would need to be credible to Moscow and the coalition resolved to act decisively in the event of a breach of the ceasefire.
• The composition of such a force remains unclear, though both leaders have said a US ‘backstop’ is needed. This IISS analysis sets out three options for such a reassurance force and challenges that may be posed to their deployment:
  • A small-scale force with a deployed land component of a brigade of about 10,000 troops, supported by a limited air component and naval assets;... A small-scale force, potentially led by France and the UK under the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force construct, could be implemented and sustained most straightforwardly, requiring fewer assets and with fewer troops deployed.
  • A medium-scale force based on a land component of a large division, with about 25,000 troops supported by larger air and maritime components.
  • A large-scale force centered on a corps-sized land component of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops, supported by substantial air and maritime elements ... medium- and large-scale deployments would increase the reassurance and deterrence effect, but deploying the force would take longer.
• In all three options, extra complications would arise should contributing states decide to impose national caveats on their participation, while agreed rules of engagement among all contributing states would also be necessary, as would agreement on acceptable levels of risk.
• Europeans could deploy a reassurance force, but without a US backstop, this would become progressively more difficult the larger the force became. At the same time, there is a clear risk that Russia might challenge the force, including by mounting armed attacks – either conventional, sub-threshold, or both.

“How to Sustain Ukraine Without Costing Americans a Dime," Robert B. Zoellick, WP, 03.25.25. 

• “The United States could strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and therefore to negotiate from a stronger position. Trump does not need to commit the U.S. military. He needs to combine economic means and military supplies.”
• “The United States, the European Union, Britain, Canada, Australia and other friends of Ukraine should transfer over $300 billion of frozen Russian assets to a special fund set up for Ukraine. This sum would sustain Ukraine’s economy and military for years without costing Americans a dime.”
• “Once Ukraine receives Russia’s funds, the United States can provide Kyiv with arms and intelligence without a security guarantee. If Putin wants to waste the lives of Russians and North Koreans against Ukraine’s defenses, let him do so. Russia’s war economy is running short of labor and grinding down; last year, its central bank’s contortions, including soaring interest rates, sparked a fight with Russia’s military-industrial complex. This is absolutely the wrong time to grant Putin relief.”
• “Trump says he wants to be a peacemaker. The historian Tacitus wrote that Rome’s foes understood that its legions “make a desert and call it peace.” The United States should not concede to a Russian peace of Ukraine’s destruction and submission.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Consolidating Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: The Options for Ukraine and the Continent," Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Alina Frolova and Oleksandr Khara, RUSI, 03.24.25.
• "The Perils of 'Russia First'," Alexander Vindman, FA, 03.23.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"How Easily Could Trump Lift U.S. Sanctions on Russia?" Alexander Kolyandr, Carnegie Politika, 03.27.25. Clues from Russian Views

• While all the current U.S. sanctions against Russia were imposed via executive orders issued by the president or a federal ministry, Trump cannot lift them unilaterally, even if he wanted to. While the president is responsible for some aspects of U.S. foreign policy, Congress is in charge of regulating foreign commerce, which means that both branches of government have a say over economic sanctions.
• In the case of Russia, the legal framework for most U.S. sanctions is based on two laws: one passed in 1976; the other in 1977. President Joe Biden’s Executive Order 14024 issued on 15 April 2021 was the framework for the most damaging Russia sanctions, and drew on the 1977 law that gave the president the right to impose restrictions in moments of “national emergency.” Executive Order 14024 also included scope for secondary sanctions, which are used to target foreign individuals and companies doing business with Russian entities. The “national emergency” declaration required for these Biden sanctions must be extended by the president every year (in April)
• A second group of U.S. sanctions on Russia falls under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which codified many Obama-era restrictions by giving them the status of laws (rather than executive orders that are easily rescinded).  The nature of CAATSA means that if Trump wants to get rid of it, he will have to persuade Congress that the act is no longer in the U.S. national security interest.
  • All of this means that there are actually only a few sanctions against Russia that Trump could lift on his own. However, those limitations could also work to his advantage: he can always blame Congress for not being able to give Moscow what it want.
  • From the Kremlin’s point of view, it would be particularly useful to regain access to international capital markets (not least because of the high cost of domestic borrowing).
  • More likely than not, if discussions about sanctions relief do take a more serious turn, then Moscow and Washington will opt to start with baby steps, such as removing sanctions from a few Russian banks and allowing them to open correspondent accounts in the United States.
• Finally, there are also U.S. sanctions against individual Russians.
• Either way, discussions about removing sanctions are likely to be long and complex. Not only is it unclear whether Putin is prepared to step back from his maximalist demands for full sanctions relief, it’s also an open question whether Trump is willing to engage in energy-sapping negotiations and give up on the prospect of solving everything in one fell swoop. 

"Putin Is Stalling and Trump Is Angry. It's Time for 'Maximum Pressure,'" Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 03.31.25. 

• “President Donald Trump said he is "pissed off" at Russian President Vladimir Putin for stalling his efforts to end the war in Ukraine. His frustration boiled over after Putin on Friday demanded President Volodymyr Zelensky's removal and the establishment of a transitional government in Ukraine as a condition of peace.”
• “In 2022, Putin planned for a war that would last weeks but now finds himself in a protracted conflict that is bleeding Russia's human, military and financial capital dry. That gives Trump enormous leverage. If Putin refuses his demands for peace, Trump can unleash an Iran-style maximum pressure campaign on Moscow that would devastate Russia.”
• “Biden's weakness left a massive loophole in U.S. sanctions that allowed Russian oil and gas to be sold on the global market by permitting energy transactions with sanctioned Russian banks to continue. Trump could shut off Putin's economic lifeline by using the same tools he successfully used against Iran during his first term, which dramatically cut Iran's oil sales from roughly 1.9 million barrels per day in 2017 to about 400,000 in 2020.”
• “Trump could also apply a maximum-pressure campaign on the battlefield. During the campaign, Trump promised to increase the flow of U.S. weapons to Ukraine if Putin did not agree to stop the fighting. "I would tell Putin: If you don't make a deal, we're going to give [the Ukrainians] a lot. We're going to give them more than they ever got, if we have to," he told Fox News's Maria Bartiromo. Well, right now, Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire, while Russia is refusing.”
• Putin has gravely miscalculated. If Trump decides the Russian leader is the obstacle to peace and brings down the hammer with economic sanctions and increased military support for Kyiv, Russia will be in a world of hurt.”

“How Europe can hurt Russia’s economy,” Economist, 03.24.25.

• "There are more Western sanctions on Russia than the next six targets combined … America alone has imposed nearly 6,500 penalties since February 2022."
• “If America lifts sanctions it is possible Europe will decide to keep its own in place. Some geopolitical pundits assume that would not matter much. Access to America’s tech, currency and payment networks, they say, is what Russia really wants. But our analysis suggests this is wrong. Without Europe on side, Russia’s trade, access to payment systems and foreign investment would all remain severely limited.”
• “Ending American sanctions could revive the goods trade between the two countries, which shrank by 90% from 2021 to 2024. Even before the invasion, however, such trade was worth a relatively meagre $35bn. Any rebound would be equally modest. By contrast, Russia’s pre-war trade with the EU was worth €258bn ($305bn).”
• “Most of the Russian central bank’s assets are in Europe, and would presumably stay frozen. Most Russian banks would still be cut off from SWIFT, which is based in Belgium. They may also struggle to get dollars if American banks are hesitant to clear payments owing to European sanctions.”
• “Mr. Trump’s officials have yet to talk to the EU about their sanctions plans. “That’s absolutely idiotic,” fumes one confidante to European leaders. To Russia, Europe has always mattered more than America. In Mr. Trump’s parlance, that means Europe has decent cards. Ignored and threatened, it may be tempted to use them.”

"Seizing Russian Assets Isn’t as Easy as It Sounds," Charles Lichfield, FP, 03.28.25. 

• While the momentum appears on the side of the asset-seizers, especially since the disaster between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office, the concerns that stood in the way so far haven’t gone away. In fact, with poor prospects for G-7 coordination under Trump, the causes for caution have become even more concrete and more of an obstacle.
• The risks of setting a bad precedent are not overblown. It is the trust in the legal systems governing G-7 currencies that makes them uniquely suitable for allies and non-allies alike to allocate into their monetary reserves and, for the lucky ones, sovereign wealth funds. And while alternative storage options for such pools of liquidity haven’t successfully been established yet, the proposed move will be a signal to all governments that they need to double down on finding and creating them.
• Europe is at a highly delicate moment. The urgent need to increase defense spending coincides with a global reappraisal of whether Washington can be trusted to act rationally. While European assets are becoming more attractive, complacency would be a mistake.
• Rather than seizing Russian assets and creating a precedent which would put the euro at another disadvantage next to the U.S. dollar, the EU should do everything else in its power, including through more borrowing, to strengthen Ukraine’s position as well as its own.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Sanctions and Resetting U.S.-Russian Relations," Alex Little, NI, 03.29.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“To End the Ukraine War, Trump Should Think Like Ike,” Graham T. Allison, NI, 03.27.25.

• As President Donald Trump struggles to fulfill his campaign promise to bring an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, he and his team should review what another American president did facing a similar challenge seven decades ago. In his 1952 campaign for the White House, Dwight David Eisenhower pledged to end a bloody war that had claimed more than 3 million lives on the Korean Peninsula. Over the next six months, he actually did it… If Trump hopes to match Ike’s record, he has just 121 days left.
• Reflecting on this history, it is difficult not to hear echoes of what has happened in the past three years since Russian president Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. In February 2022, Russian forces launched their attack, advancing rapidly before stalling on the outskirts of its capital Kyiv. Then in a remarkable feat of courage and determination, Ukrainian fighters with arms and ammunition from the United States and Europe unexpectedly pushed the Russians back to retake about half of the land Russia occupied in its initial offensive. By November, eight months into the war, the rival armies found themselves stuck along a line of control that has not moved substantially since. What American military analysts call Russia’s “lava” advance has been seizing roughly 100 square miles of Ukrainian territory a month in the Donbas.
• [During the Korean war, when peace] negotiations dragged on, so too did intense fighting for another year and into election season in the United States. While the Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson essentially supported Truman’s position on Korea, Eisenhower made this a major issue in the campaign. He pledged to use his authority and skills as a military commander to quickly end the war. To make this happen, as soon as the election was over, Ike “went to Korea” to talk directly and candidly with South Korean leader Rhee and his military commanders… At the same time, Eisenhower also employed pressure to win concessions from the North Koreans and Chinese. Finally, recognizing that his objective was not simply to end the war but to achieve a sustainable peace, Eisenhower crafted a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea that included a continuing presence of U.S. troops in a joint U.S.-South Korea command.
• The similarities… are instructive. A new president, determined to be a peacemaker, comes to office unencumbered by the legacy of the war and is thus able to make a sharp turn. That president is less vulnerable to criticism from right-wing critics and thus has more flexibility to make concessions without being accused of being weak on communism or failing to win. On the campaign trail, promises to end a war were a winning message with an American electorate that was tired of the killing and did not care much about the details.
• The key to Eisenhower’s success in fulfilling his promise will also be essential for Trump. Ike took the lead himself in a direct, focused effort to close the deal. If Trump can channel Eisenhower, using his authority to hammer out an agreement that neither Zelenskyy nor Putin will like but that will end the killing, prevent another outbreak of war, and allow Ukrainians to start rebuilding their country, he will be able to claim that he has achieved the peace “deal of the century.”

"Diplomacy Is the Newest Front in the Russia-Ukraine War," Richard Haass, Project Syndicate, 03.31.25.

• To be clear, it is appropriate to offer Russia certain incentives [to observe a ceasefire]. This could include a willingness to resume high-level contacts and restaff embassies, support for limited relaxation of sanctions if specified conditions are met, and to allow Russia to keep its long-term objectives for Ukraine on the table.
• What is not acceptable is to embrace flawed Russian positions, such as its claims to Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and/or Zaporizhzhia based on the results of illegal referenda conducted by Russian occupation forces. It is one thing for Trump’s envoy to the Kremlin, the property-developer-turned-novice-diplomat Steve Witkoff, to characterize Russia’s stance and quite another for him to adopt it as his own.
• More broadly, there is no good reason to introduce final-status considerations at this point. The goal for now should be an open-ended ceasefire agreement, not a permanent peace treaty.
• The goal should be to give Ukraine what it needs to deter and defend against Russian aggression, not to liberate its lands.
• Matters could come to a head by summer, when the pipeline of congressionally-approved arms for Ukraine runs out. The Trump administration will have to decide (if it has not already done so) on the connection between the security relationship with Ukraine and US diplomacy.
• Trump should also keep in mind that abandoning Ukraine would not bring peace. Zelensky, who is more popular than ever at home (thanks in no small part to the infamous Oval Office meeting) would likely opt for no ceasefire or peace treaty rather than one that compromised Ukraine’s core interests... At the same time, Russia would most likely view US separation from Ukraine as an opportunity to press or even escalate militarily. Far from bringing peace, a US military cutoff of Ukraine could actually bring about an escalation in the fighting.

“To Save Ukraine, Trump Needs to Think Bigger,” Robert Legvold, NI, 03.30.25.

• Normalizing U.S.-Russian relations while ending the war in Ukraine, as the Trump administration hopes to do, can be done in one of two ways—well or badly. Done well, the challenge needs to be understood as one with many parts, the parts then carefully integrated, and the approach to them comprehensive and coordinated. A healthy, productive U.S.-Russian relationship, a Europe with guardrails removing the constant threat of war, and a Ukraine safe and sovereign are a single package. Breaking its pieces apart is how to do things badly.
• The [Trump] administration needs a ...strategy...that integrates Ukraine’s security future into Europe’s security future, and both squarely into the process of refashioning the U.S.-Russian relationship. Rather than seeing a thirty-day ceasefire as the gateway to a unilateral U.S. diplomatic effort to engineer a peace settlement, it should be conceived as the necessary condition for launching and sustaining a multilevel set of negotiations addressing the challenge in its full complexity.
• Getting to a ceasefire, preserving it, and launching productive peace negotiations will inevitably be a phased process, which, to work, will require U.S.-EU coordination. The United States and EU will need to calibrate which specific sanctions should be eased to launch the process and, if the process begins, which next to use to move it forward.
• Unless President Donald Trump has in mind setting aside the United States’ long-standing core security concerns and making common cause with Putin’s Russia, normalizing U.S.-Russian relations ... contains a two-sided security challenge.
  • One side involves returning to managing an increasingly complex and dangerous nuclear relationship, complicated by the new China dimension.
  • The other side of the security challenge is the future of European security.
• The Trump administration,...., is right to assume that ending the war in Ukraine must be done in the broader framework of an altered U.S.-Russian relationship. Successfully altering that relationship, however, can only be done by dealing with the European dimension of the relationship’s demise.
• History cannot be rolled back. NATO will not shrink. Instead, because of the war, NATO, with Sweden and Finland added, will emerge militarily more formidable. At the same time, Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO, and Ukrainians know this. These two realities should frame the larger context within which the administration goes about recasting the U.S.-Russia relationship.
• None of this can be done overnight. Some elements, such as reinforcing Ukraine’s defense capabilities, strengthening a European-led NATO, coordinating sanctions policy, and establishing a framework for nuclear arms talks should be pursued early and ambitiously. Steps that move toward larger, longer-term objectives, such as negotiating guardrails enhancing European security; negotiating actual measures constraining the nuclear forces of the United States, Russia, and China; and slowly reestablishing economic relations with Russia can only be small and tentative. Incorporating them into U.S. strategy, however, would, by creating the lodestar for a better long-term outcome, add incentive for the sides to accept a sustainable ceasefire and facilitate the effort to reach a comprehensive peace agreement.
• Integrating all these pieces in a carefully calibrated fashion may be beyond the diplomatic prowess of any U.S. administration. However, the success or failure of the Trump administration’s Russia policy will depend on the extent to which it does—or does not—try.

"Russia’s Odd Ceasefire Demands," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 03.29.25.⁵ Clues from Russian Views

• When the United States ... announced a potential ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, Moscow immediately put forward some extra demands. Moscow’s wish list was not only very odd, it included demands that will be impossible for Washington to deliver. Some speculated Moscow’s position was the result of incompetence—others that it was a deliberate tactic to drag out negotiations, or test what exactly U.S. President Donald Trump was prepared to concede to achieve a peace deal.
• [Russia’s conditions included]
  • State-owned Rosselkhozbank and other financial institutions involved in the food trade (including fish products). Specifically, they should be reconnected to international payments service SWIFT and have the necessary corresponding accounts restored;
  • Companies producing and exporting food and fertilizer, as well as insurance companies working with food and fertilizer cargoes;
  • Russian-flagged ships engaged in food or fertilizer exports, and port services for these vessels;
  • Supplies of agricultural equipment to Russia, including other goods used in the production of food and fertilizer.
    • Even if it wished, the U.S. could not completely fulfil these demands. If the Kremlin understands this fact, then its list is just a stalling tactic to frustrate talks while continuing the war. However, it’s not a given that those who drew up this list understand its impossibility. From a foreign policy perspective, the list makes some sense in terms of efforts to stabilize food prices, and scoring points in the eyes of the “Global South.” Financially, there is also some sense. Getting U.S. sanctions lifted from Rosselkhozbank means it will be possible to trade in U.S. dollars through the bank even if all other countries maintain sanctions. This reduces costs, uncertainty and risks for intermediary banks.
      • But that’s where the logic appears to end. Most importantly, neither food nor fertilizer exports have been sanctioned. The European Union has repeatedly tried to restrict fertilizer exports from Russia, but have been frustrated by concerns about food costs. Russia was one of the world’s leading fertilizer exporters in 2023, selling $4 billion worth to Brazil, $2.6 billion to India, $2.2 billion to the EU, $1.6 billion to the U.S., and $1.3 billion to China. And these numbers are rising: in 2024, supplies of Russian fertilizer to Europe rose 33%.
      • Repeated mentions of the Russian fishing industry in Moscow’s demands were also extremely odd. The U.S. banned fish imports from Russia in March 2022, but defined the country of origin by the place of final processing. Inevitably, that meant Russian fish subsequently began to enter the U.S. via factories in China. Over the same period, Russia has increased fish exports to countries all over the world, including EU nations.
  • Russia’s demands are a sign it would be willing to countenance a step-by-step lifting of sanctions (rather than stubbornly demanding their immediate removal). But they are unfulfillable, and difficult to understand. It’s either a tactic to frustrate negotiations, or a symptom of incoherence in Russia’s negotiating strategy. In any event, it confirms that there is still a long way to go before any Russia will get any major sanctions relief.

"Moscow Has Everything to Gain and Little to Lose From Black Sea Ceasefire," Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Politika, 03.28.25. Clues from Russian Views

• Talks between Moscow and Washington in Saudi Arabia not only did not result in any breakthrough; they appear to have been an overall failure. The concluding statements from the White House and the Kremlin suggest that the parties agreed to a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, but it is unclear how compliance will be monitored. The United States also announced a ceasefire in the Black Sea, but Russia responded by making it clear that the condition for its commencement would be the lifting of certain sanctions: something Washington cannot achieve on its own.
• The agreements do not look like a real prologue to peace. The Kremlin is making it clear that it is first and foremost Trump who needs a quick ceasefire, which means that Putin is in a strong position and can dictate terms. If they are fulfilled, great; if not and the ceasefire breaks down, then it’s hardly critical for Russia. In Putin’s logic, Trump has painted himself into a corner: it’s the U.S. president who has a month to either unveil a ceasefire or find a scapegoat for its failure.
• What really irritates Moscow is not official sanctions, but the fact that Russian exporters are treated as toxic. Despite the official exemptions from the restrictions, Western companies avoid doing business with Russians because it still increases compliance costs and the risk of sanctions
• Even if Moscow’s demands are not met, the situation is still in Russia’s favor. By constantly naming new conditions and dragging out the negotiations, the Kremlin is ensuring that it remains in contact with the United States for as long as possible and retains the attention of the fickle Trump.
• Putin, for his part, [is]  prepared to keep waging war against Ukraine regardless of who won the U.S. presidential election. As far as he is concerned, therefore, Trump needs a ceasefire more than he does. Moscow’s attitude is: if the Americans need it more, let them put in all the effort.

"Russia Plays for Time in Ukraine Ceasefire Talks," The Economist, 03.26.25. 

• As the talks drag on, Russia seeks to convince Mr. Trump to ignore Ukrainian and European concerns and look to a grand bargain. Ukraine, in turn, wants to prove that Russia is negotiating in bad faith, in the hope that Mr. Trump might turn against the Kremlin. In an interview with Newsmax TV on March 25th, Mr. Trump conceded that Mr. Putin may be stalling but seemed unperturbed. “It could be they’re dragging their feet. I’ve done it over the years, you know.” He was confident, though, that both Russia and Ukraine “would like to see it end”.
• American officials hope to clinch a ceasefire within Mr. Trump’s first 100 days in office. The danger is that a rushed agreement will mean forsaking Ukraine and caving in to Russia. As America’s spies put it, Mr. Putin has good reasons to play for time, because “positive battlefield trends allow for some strategic patience.” Mr. Zelensky fears a bad deal would “prompt domestic backlash and future insecurity.”

“Why Ukrainians Won’t Give Up," Valerii Pekar, NI, 03.28.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views

• To understand the Ukrainian position, we must start with the fact that Putin is not fighting for territory, having its own vast territories that are undeveloped and neglected. Russia is fighting to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity, as it did a century ago (Moscow propagandist statements of “the final solution to the Ukrainian question” are too reminiscent of the Nazis). For Ukrainians, surrender does not mean saving lives. Rather, it means losing lives, because there will be more tragedies like Bucha and Mariupol throughout the country. Those remaining Ukrainian men will then be made to storm Central European capitals under the Russian flag. Surrender is not an option for us, because it means not life, but death.
• “All those who demand peace from us ignore that the price of our peace could be higher than the price of our war,” said Kazarin. So, Ukraine must resist, regardless of who our allies are and who are not. According to a recent poll made by Ipsos at the request of The Economist, 74 percent of Ukrainians think the country should continue fighting even if the United States withdraws all support. “We intend to remain alive. Our neighbors want to see us dead. This is not a question that leaves much room for compromise.” This phrase by Golda Meir (born in Kyiv only 0.2 miles from where I was born) is being quoted very often in Ukraine now.

Excerpts from "Vladimir Putin Visited Arkhangelsk Nuclear-Powered Cruiser Submarine," Kremlin.ru, 03.27.25. Clues from Russian Views 

• Overall, we can clearly see what is happening right now [in the war]. Our troops have the strategic initiative along the entire contact line. Only recently, I said that we would squeeze them into a corner, but now we have reason to believe that we are set to finish them off. I think that people in Ukraine need to realize what is going on. Our Armed Forces have been gathering momentum and acting increasingly effectively.
• I should note that earlier today, just before arriving here, I received another report from the Chief of the General Staff. Other units of the Armed Forces have gained significant momentum.
• I would like to state – first and foremost – that, in my view, the newly elected President of the United States sincerely wishes to end this conflict for a number of reasons – I will not list them now, as they are numerous. But in my opinion, this aspiration is genuine.
• We advocate resolving these issues through peaceful means, but with the elimination of the root causes that have led to the current situation. We must undoubtedly ensure Russia’s security from the long-term historical perspective. Any step taken to achieve this objective will be welcomed by us, and we will work with any partners who strive towards this goal. This includes not only the United States but also the People’s Republic of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, all BRICS nations, and many others, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with which we have a signed treaty.
• We are prepared to work with Europe as well, despite their inconsistent behavior and constant attempts to lead us up the garden path.
• How is it possible to conduct negotiations with them? In such situations, international practice follows a well-established path. Within the framework of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, there have been several cases of what is termed external governance or temporary administration. This occurred in East Timor, I believe in 1999, in parts of the former Yugoslavia, and in New Guinea. In short, such precedents exist.
• In principle, it would indeed be possible to discuss, under UN auspices with the United States and even European countries – and certainly with our partners and allies – the possibility of establishing a temporary administration in Ukraine. To what end? To conduct democratic elections, to bring to power a competent government that enjoys public trust, and only then to begin negotiations on a peace treaty and sign legitimate agreements that would be recognized worldwide as consistent and reliable.
• This is just one option; I do not claim that others do not exist. They certainly do. At present, there is no opportunity – and perhaps no possibility – to lay out every detail, as the situation is evolving rapidly. But this remains a viable option, and such precedents exist within UN practice, as I have already noted.
• Ultimately, we advocate for the resolution of all conflicts, including this one, through peaceful means. But not at our expense.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine Has A Trump Strategy," Maksym Skrypchenko, WSJ, 03.26.25.
• "Putin’s Getting the Negotiation He’s Long Wanted From the United States," Serge Schmemann, NYT, 03.27.25.
• "Peace Talks Do Not Mean That Peace is Close," Sergei Shelin, Russia.Post, 03.25.25. Clues from Russian Views
• "Recent US-Russia Talks in Riyadh Yield ‘Minor Diplomatic Victory’ for the Kremlin," Andrei Sizov and Tatiana Rybakova, Russia.Post, 03.31.25. Clues from Russian Views
• "Putin Smells Blood in the Water on US Black Sea Deal," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 03.28.25.
• "Why Trump Wants Ukraine’s Minerals and What’s on Offer," Mark Burton and Kate Sullivan, Bloomberg, 03.24.25. Detailed explainer of the proposed U.S.-Ukrainian mineral deal.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Secret Pentagon memo on China, homeland has Heritage fingerprints,” Alex Horton, Hannah Natanson, WP, 03.30.25.

• "Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reoriented the U.S. military to prioritize deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan and shoring up homeland defense by “assuming risk” in Europe and other parts of the world, according to a secret internal guidance memo that bears the fingerprints of the conservative Heritage Foundation, including some passages that are nearly word-for-word duplications of text published by the think tank last year. The Pentagon will “assume risk in other theaters” given personnel and resource constraints, and pressure allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia to spend more on defense to take on the bulk of the deterrence role against threats from Russia, North Korea and Iran, according to the guidance."
• "Where the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized alliances in countering Russia’s aggression, calling “mutually-beneficial Alliances and allies… our greatest global strategic advantage,” the Hegseth interim guidance says NATO must take on “far greater” burden sharing because the U.S. will be reluctant to provide forces with its priorities focused elsewhere."
• "Hegseth’s guidance acknowledges that the U.S. is unlikely to provide substantial, if any, support to Europe in the case of Russian military advances, noting that Washington intends to push NATO allies to take primary defense of the region. The U.S. will support Europe with nuclear deterrence of Russia, and NATO should only count on U.S. forces not required for homeland defense or China deterrence missions, the document says."
• "A significant increase in Europe sharing its defense burden, the document says, “will also ensure NATO can reliably deter or defeat Russian aggression even if deterrence fails and the United States is already engaged in, or must withhold forces to deter, a primary conflict in another region.”"

“NATO Without America,” Ivo Daalder, FA, 03.28.25.

"Putin’s Theories of Victory," Alexander Gabuev, Alexandra Prokopenko and Tatiana Stanovaya, FA, 03.30.25. Clues from Russian Views

“US Intel Sticks to View of Russia as Adversary Prepared to Pay ‘Very High Price’ to Prevail in Ukraine,” Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 03.27.25.

• The release of WTA-2025 on March 25 answered … [the] question [of how the Trump administration’s World Wide Threat Assessment would treat Russia]. “Russia, China, Iran and North Korea—individually and collectively—are challenging U.S. interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions ... Growing cooperation between and among these adversaries is increasing their fortitude against the United States, the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another and pressure on other global actors to choose sides,” according to the assessment.
• The document, presented by director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA director John Ratcliffe to the Senate’s intelligence committee, also had a section entitled “Adversarial Cooperation,” which opened with the proposition that “cooperation among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea has been ... reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally,” and which described Russia as a “catalyst for the evolving ties” between this quartet.
• “Regardless of how and when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia’s current geopolitical, economic, military and domestic political trends underscore its resilience and enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence and global interests,” the assessment states. “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening U.S. interests globally, though it is also more cautious than Russia, Iran and North Korea,” according to the WTA-2025, which explicitly refers to Russia 112 times, almost double the Biden team’s WTA-2024, which had 78 such references and which also described Russia as an adversary.
• Other nuggets I found in the WTA-2025 include the U.S. intelligence community’s collective view that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin “probably still see the risks of a longer war as less than those of an unsatisfying settlement." For Russia, "positive battlefield trends allow for some strategic patience," while for Ukraine, "conceding territory or neutrality to Russia without substantial security guarantees from the West could prompt domestic backlash and future insecurity,” according to the document.
• “Even though ... Putin will be unable to achieve the total victory he envisioned when initiating the large-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia retains momentum as a grinding war of attrition plays to Russia’s military advantages,” according to the WTA-2025. It predicts that "this grinding war of attrition will lead to a gradual but steady erosion of Kyiv’s position on the battlefield, regardless of any U.S. or allied attempts to impose new and greater costs on Moscow.”

"Why is Vladimir Putin Encouraging Donald Trump’s Greenland Ambitions?" Jacob Heilbrunn, NI, 03.28.25. 

• Speaking in Murmansk on Thursday, Putin, as is his wont, delivered a history lesson. He explained why it made perfect sense for America to covet Greenland. America, he said, had already tried to procure it in 1910. Then it shielded the territory from a Nazi invasion during the Second World War. Putin observed that Trump’s designs “may surprise someone only at first glance, and it is a deep mistake to believe that this is some kind of extravagant talk by the new American administration. Nothing of the sort.” The message is clear: suck it up. Just as Russia has an inherent right to Ukraine, so America is entitled to Greenland.

"Talking About Mistakes, or What the West Can Offer Russia?" Vladislav Inozemtsev, MT, 03.26.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• I believe that the main mistake of the Western world after the end of the Cold War was that its leaders for some reason considered Russia a democracy, and perceived its authorities as reflecting the interests and will of the population. It seemed to them that the country could continue positive changes while remaining outside the clear framework of the Western world.
• This was a complete repetition of the mistake made many decades earlier in relation to Weimar Germany—which was very timely pointed out by Alexander Yanov, who was never heard by the world.
• It was precisely this incompleteness of the project to involve Russia as a society in the Western world, and not at all provoking Russia as a state, that led to what we are seeing today—to war, death and destruction; led to them in exactly the same way as it happened in the 1930s. And the only way out, as I see it, is not in appeasing Putin or developing trade with Russia by recreating Nord Stream, but rather in a direct appeal by European politicians to the Russians with a realistic program of historical reconciliation.

"The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue International Forum," Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 03.27.25. Clues from Russian Views

• Russia is the largest Arctic power. We have consistently advocated for equitable cooperation in the region, encompassing scientific research, biodiversity protection, climate issues, emergencies response, and, of course, the economic and industrial development of the Arctic. We are prepared to collaborate not only with Arctic states but with all who, like us, share responsibility for ensuring a stable and sustainable future for the planet and are capable of adopting balanced decisions for decades to come.
• The role and importance of the Arctic for Russia and for the entire world are obviously growing. Regrettably, the geopolitical competition and fighting for positions in this region are also escalating. Suffice it to say about the plans of the United States to annex Greenland, as everyone is aware. But you know, it can surprise someone only at first glance. It is a profound mistake to treat it as some preposterous talk by the new U.S. administration. Nothing of the sort. In fact, the United States had such plans as far back as 1860s. As early as that, the U.S. administration was considering possible annexation of Greenland and Iceland. However, the idea did not enjoy support in the Congress then.
• Let me remind you, by the way, that by 1868, the purchase of Alaska from Russia was ridiculed in the American press—it was called “madness,” “an ice box” and “President Andrew Johnson’s polar bear garden.” Therefore, the Greenland proposal failed. But that acquisition, I mean the purchase of Alaska, is probably viewed very differently in the United States today, just as President Andrew Johnson’s actions are.
• Thus what is happening today is not really surprising, particularly since this story only began back then, and it went on and on. In 1910, for example, a trilateral land swap deal was negotiated between the United States, Germany and Denmark. As a result, Greenland would have gone to the United States but the deal fell through then. During World War II, the United States stationed military bases in Greenland to protect it from Nazi takeover. After the war, the United States suggested Denmark should sell the island. This was quite recently in terms of world history.
• In short, the United States has serious plans regarding Greenland. These plans have long historical roots, as I have just mentioned, and it is obvious that the United States will continue to consistently advance its geo-strategic, military-political and economic interests in the Arctic.
• The Arctic Zone accounts for over a quarter of the Russian Federation’s territory. Nearly two and a half million our citizens live and work here, making a significant contribution to the nation’s progress. Current estimates indicate that the Arctic generates 7% of Russia’s gross domestic product and approximately 11% of our exports. At the same time, we see enormous potential for the region’s further comprehensive development. A critical priority is strengthening the Arctic’s transport and logistical framework.
• Over the past decade, cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route—spanning from the Kara Gates Strait to the Bering Strait—has substantially increased. In 2014, a mere four million tons of cargo were transported via this corridor. By last year, that figure had risen to nearly 38 million tons—five times the Soviet-era record. We anticipate, with confidence, that volumes will reach 70–100 million tons by 2030.
• What are the priority objectives?
  • First, Russia already operates the world’s biggest icebreaker fleet. We must consolidate our leadership in this sector by building new-generation icebreakers, including nuclear icebreakers. Today, only Russia has them—no other country has a nuclear icebreaker fleet.
  • Second, Russia is a sovereign nation, and as such it needs a merchant fleet of its own in the Arctic, including cargo, search and rescue ships for operating shipments in northern seas, as well as within our internal waters in the Arctic. We must recognize that for now we cannot rely exclusively on our domestic shipbuilding capabilities.
  • Third, Russian shipping companies that transport petroleum products and liquefied natural gas are already successfully operating in the northern seas.
  • Fourth, plans are in place to increase the capacity and turnover of our northern ports through the introduction of innovative and environmentally friendly solutions, including unmanned and automated cargo handling equipment. 

"The U.S., NATO, and Ukraine: The Politics of Strategic Flexibility," Kartik Bommakanti, Observer Research Foundation, 03.29.25. Clues from Indian Views

• As the foregoing history demonstrates, there is one constant—Washington has interpreted its commitments vis-à-vis both ally and non-ally flexibly to influence outcomes that end conflicts. It has preserved its equities even between two adversaries such as India and Pakistan as it is doing with Ukraine and its European NATO partners on the one hand and Russia on the other. Finally, the Trump administration’s conduct on strategic or security issues and more broadly the balance of power does not represent a significant departure from the past.
• European states have been luckier than other treaty states in that Washington underwrote their security under the auspices of NATO and assumed a disproportionate share of the burden for decades, which was never going to endure forever. One lesson is crystal clear, under the Trump administration and very possibly its successors that neither ally or strategic partner (especially India) nor foe can take the U.S. support for granted when it comes to their military security and defense.

"Speech at the Conference ‘Russia and India: Together Toward a New Bilateral Agenda,’" Sergey Ryabkov, RIAC, 03.28.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• We pay great attention to the task of strengthening the special privileged strategic partnership with India. This is our traditional partner, one of the key players on the world stage. Of primary importance for us is working with our closest allies and neighbors, and neighboring countries. The most important place is occupied by a comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction with the PRC. A new chapter in cooperation has opened with the DPRK. Ties with the countries of the Islamic world have become closer. The fabric of interaction with the states of Africa and Latin America is being tightened.
• The countries of the world majority view Russia's actions on the international arena through the prism of restoring historical justice.
• A few words about Russia's relations with the West. They are in deep decline… Europe has plunged deep into an anti-Russian frenzy of militarization and remains in it. With the change of administration, Washington has sent us signals about its readiness for mutually respectful dialogue.
• Conversations took place between V.V. Putin and D. Trump, several meetings and telephone conversations of our representatives at various levels. Such communication has opened a "window of opportunity" to move from frontal confrontation to non-confrontational existence. Russia has never shied away from dialogue, although it has not imposed itself. However, at this stage it is premature to make far-reaching forecasts. The contacts that have taken place are the beginning of a long and difficult process of improving relations, which must be built strictly on a mutual basis with respect for each other's national interests.

"The Middle East's Diplomatic Capital," Karen Elliott House, WSJ, 03.28.25.

• “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prides himself on strong relations with President Trump, but Mr. Trump's second term is posing serious dilemmas for the young Saudi leader, known as MBS.”
  • “Mr. Trump wants low oil prices. Saudi Arabia needs high prices to fund its plan to wean the kingdom off oil.”
  • “Mr. Trump has resumed his maximum-pressure campaign against Iran, undermining the crown prince's efforts to reduce tensions with Tehran.”
  • “Most disruptive is Mr. Trump's proposal to turn Gaza into the "Riviera of the Middle East" by removing 2.2 million Palestinian inhabitants.”
  • “The kingdom's neighborhood is in turmoil.”
• “The Saudi leader is positioned to play a constructive role in the region if Mr. Trump wants to enhance stability there rather than simply make a splash. He's Mr. Trump's favorite Arab leader. Moreover, he has relations with China, Russia and even Iran, with which he restored diplomatic ties in 2023, and now seeks to broker talks between Washington and Tehran. Along with Russia's Vladimir Putin, he has a decisive say over oil production and thus prices that influence the global economy. President Biden's "pariah" has suddenly become President Trump's "peacemaker." Mr. Trump allowed Saudi Arabia to host U.S. talks with Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, he's hinting that MBS will host the first face-to-face talks between Messrs. Trump and Putin on a Ukrainian peace deal. All this helps fulfill the crown prince's determination to position himself and his kingdom as a pivotal global player.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Trump’s New Yalta: Eastern Europe Risks Being on the Wrong Side of the Divide," Vessela Tcherneva and Garvan Walshe, ECFR, 03.26.25.
• "Trump Has Broken the West in Two," Jaroslaw Kuisz and Karolina Wigura, NYT, 03.25.25.
• "The U.S. Is Losing the Contest to Divide the World," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 03.31.25.
• “Trump is liquidating America's reserves of soft power,” Joseph Nye, WP, 03.25.25.
• "Intelligence Analysts Are Still Doing Their Jobs," David Ignatius, WP, 03.28.25.
• "Europe Needs More Than Money to Defend Itself," Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 03.27.25.
• "Europe’s Future in Historical Context," Tony Barber, FT, 03.29.25.
• "What Europe Can Learn From the Baltics," Simon Nixon, FT, 03.29.25.
• "Meloni’s NATO-Light Ukraine Plan Is Worth Trying," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 03.31.25.
• "Two Visions of the Future: A New Global Disorder or the Noose of Nationalism?" Re: Russia, 03.26.25.
• “Globalists’ liberalism is dead, this is what comes after,” Dmitri Trenin, 4th Media, 03.26.25. Clues from Russian Views

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Russia and China Facing the Challenge of Change in the West," Timofei Bordachev, Valdai Club, 03.28.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The most important achievement of China and Russia over the past decades has been their strategic partnership, which has been tested by numerous trials.
• Nowadays, co-operation between the two powers is developing in the context of new trends gaining strength among their main competitors—the Western countries led by the United States. The most important of these trends appears to be an internal split along two lines.
  • Firstly, there is a marked difference between the approach of the new government in the U.S. and its allies in Europe.
  • Secondly, the division of interests within the ruling elites in the West is gaining momentum.
• In the United States, the most economically powerful and well-armed country in the West, there is a tense internal struggle, the outcome of which cannot be predicted yet. Therefore, some observers do not rule out that the forces that prevent any domestic and foreign policy changes may return to power in one form or another. This could also be an important area of political dialogue and expert cooperation between Russia and China. In order to be more prepared for the future, Moscow and Beijing should already assume that a common assessment of challenges is the result of a common view of the most important issues affecting world politics.
• At times, Chinese and Russian observers even disagree on whether European countries can play any constructive role in the world. It seems that Europe should remain at the center of attention of China and Russia and their expert community.
• The U.S. strategy, as we understand it, will be to try to create a rift in the China-Russia relationship.
• There is a need to work on building a more solid basis of mutual understanding between Russia and China at the societal level.
• China and Russia have a shared responsibility to create a common space of development and prosperity in Greater Eurasia. Combining Chinese and Russian strategy in the common Eurasian space is not only an important issue for scientific discussion, but also a practical task; achieving it will affect the future of all the peoples of this vast region. 

"How a New Axis Called CRINK Is Working Against America," Timothy W. Martin, Ming Li, and Roque Ruiz, WSJ, 03.28.25.

• "An axis uniting China, Russia, Iran and North Korea—dubbed CRINK by some Western officials—has emerged from the war in Ukraine, a loose alliance united by a mutual disdain for the U.S.-led world order. That coalition’s cooperation has steadily deepened as the four have exchanged food, oil, arms, diplomatic support and military assistance in a manner designed to remain beyond the reach of Western sanctions. Now, President Trump’s determination to end the war creates a moment of truth for the entente."
• "If he brokers a cease-fire, the bonds between the four could loosen. But a failure to do so—along with greater U.S. pressure on Iran and China—could unintentionally deepen this “common market of autocracies,” says John Park, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, who focuses on Indo-Pacific security and economic statecraft."

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin Gets a Soft Power Win From China’s Russian Grocery Craze," Bloomberg News, Bloomberg, 03.25.25.
• "China Has Already Remade the International System," Michael B. G. Froman, FA, 03.25.25.

Missile defense:

"An Iron Dome for America?" Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings, 03.25.25.

• Trump is right that the technology for missile defense today is much better than before, but his ambitions will need readjustment. An advanced country like China or Russia could deploy countermeasures to fool many types of possible defenses or simply build more offensive nuclear weapons to overwhelm them. Quite apart from the possibility that a huge missile defense deployment could kindle an arms race (recall that Russia used to have five times as many nuclear weapons as the nearly 6,000 it possesses today, and it could build more again), the size and scale of the defense architecture being proposed is daunting.
• Russia has more than 1,000 long-range warheads on its missiles, and soon China will, too. Even though no country has actually tested a real nuclear warhead at the end of a long-range missile flight, countries with the science and technology capacities of Russia and China have ways to simulate the effects of launch and atmospheric reentry. Therefore, for decades, we have wisely assumed that either of those countries could indeed strike American territory—and in the case of Russia, could either saturate any defenses we deployed or use decoys to foil them. Both sides might well overrate the possible effectiveness of enemy defenses while underrating their own, providing grist for an offense-defense arms race. That was the logic that led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which sharply curtailed allowable defenses. The United States withdrew from the treaty in 2002 but interestingly never deployed a defense system that would have violated the treaty’s numerical limits on interceptors.
• Star warriors need not despair: there are many more modest and worthwhile ideas to consider, generally not involving weapons in space. Rob Soofer and his team at the Atlantic Council propose a system that would provide limited defense for key military sites and some cities, deepening the protection that the current California-Alaska system can provide today. Such a system couldn’t handle a massive Russian or Chinese strike but could protect against accidental, unauthorized, or “rogue state” launches or limited strikes intended to coerce the United States into some kind of capitulation without provoking an all-out nuclear response.
• Moreover, with Russia and China increasingly in strategic cahoots and China building up its nuclear arsenal, the United States and its allies will need to think about an appropriate response. Some will advocate a big offensive nuclear weapons buildup. It may be a better investment, however, to think about a limited national missile defense. So, as long as Trump doesn’t take his Iron Dome vision too literally, he may just spark a useful debate about future American territorial defense in the modern age.

Nuclear arms:

"Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma," Mark S. Bell and Fabian R. Hoffmann, FA, 03.31.25.

"Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition," George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida, CEIP, 03.27.25.

• First, some hard truths.
  • The United States, Russia, and China will not revert to no-overkill postures unilaterally. Each would require the other two (at least) to agree to verifiable steps in this direction.
    • Russia’s losses in Ukraine practically guarantee that Moscow will not decrease reliance on nuclear weapons across a range of scenarios.
    • China, after the buildup initiated by Xi, “will likely remain reluctant to enter arms control negotiations if it views such agreements as constraining its efforts to enhance force survivability or limiting its prestige by locking it into an inferior position vis-à-vis the United States and Russia,” as David Logan and Phillip Saunders suggest.
    • For its part, the United States will not consider comprehensively reducing the missions, numbers, and varieties of its nuclear weapons unless and until Russia poses no clear and present threat of aggression against its neighbors, the Chinese government in Beijing has demonstrated it will not seek to impose itself by force on the people of Taiwan, and North Korea and South Korea have established a durable, peaceful modus vivendi.
• [But Washington] should base its policies toward Russia, China, and North Korea on mutual vulnerability; limit preemptive counterforce targeting and homeland missile defenses so as not to threaten the existential deterrents of competitors; consider using nuclear weapons only in situations when no other weapon can destroy the legal target; and reduce the risks of inadvertent escalation.

"Who Is Really ‘Gambling With World War III’?" Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today, April 2025.

• Trump and the leaders of the world’s other eight nuclear-armed states must recognize that for non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ukraine, nuclear weapons and the deterrence strategies of the nuclear-armed states represent a grave threat to their security.
• As explained in a new report issued by states-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, “the nuclear policies of all nuclear-armed states are based on implicit or explicit nuclear threats, which create an aggregated and interconnected set of global and existential risks that undermine the security of states not engaged in this practice. From this perspective, the theory of nuclear deterrence is a highly precarious gamble: one that no human being or Government should be entrusted to make.”
• Trump, Putin, and the other leaders of the nuclear-armed states are gambling with the lives of every person on the planet. To improve humanity's odds of survival, we must demand that they follow through on their obligation under Article VI of the 1968 NPT to engage in good-faith negotiations to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Trump Prompts European Calls for a Homegrown Nuclear Umbrella," Daniel Michaels, Noemie Bisserbe, and Michael R. Gordon, WSJ, 03.24.25.
• "Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force," James Cameron, WoTR, 03.31.25.
• "Good Idea, Iffy Prospects," John Erath, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 03.28.25.
• “From Berlin to Tokyo, the fears of a new nuclear arms race. Washington extended an atomic umbrella over its allies. Now some feel it may be time to seek their own weapons,” Charles Clover, Laura Pitel, Raphael Minder, Leo Lewis, and Christian Davies and Song Jung-a, FT, 03.24.25.

Counterterrorism:

"Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2025," Alexander Palmer, Riley McCabe, Daniel Byman, and Skyeler Jackson, CSIS, 03.28.25.

• Terrorism remains a threat to U.S. citizens, assets, and interests despite the national security community’s decreasing focus on counterterrorism. In 2025, domestic terrorism represents a greater threat to the United States than do international terrorist organizations. Most domestic terrorist attacks in the United States are carried out by lone actors or small groups who believe in a wide range of ideologies, such as white supremacy, partisan extremism, and Salafi-jihadism.
• In the Middle East, the Al Qaeda core, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Islamic State remain committed to conducting attacks against the U.S. homeland as well as U.S. interests, although all three are weaker than they were during their heydays. Israel has degraded Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s capabilities, while the Houthis have become a more active regional threat. Africa remains the most active theater for Salafi-jihadist organizations, but the continent’s groups are mostly tertiary priorities for the United States, with the exception of East Africa’s Al Shabaab.
• There is little reason to believe Russia has either the capability or the will to dismantle a terrorist statelet in the Sahel if one emerges… The main demand on its military forces is the ongoing war in Ukraine, and Moscow already tolerated the total collapse of a much more important partner—Syria’s Assad regime—in 2024.
• If the Trump administration seeks to improve the U.S.-Russia relationship, the two countries might be able to find common ground on reducing the violence associated with the separatist conflict in northern Mali.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Trump and Xi Need a Shared Trust on A.I. Now," Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 03.26.25. 

• "I am hardly naïve about the level of mistrust in U.S.-China relations today—having spent the last week in both capitals—I can attest it is off the charts. So I am fully aware of how absurd it can sound calling on the two of them to trust each other to collaborate on a system of moral reasoning to ensure we get the best and cushion the worst of A.I."
• "But our leaders should take a lesson from how software technology companies used “coopetition” (cooperation between competitors). Apple, Microsoft, Google and Meta all wanted to destroy one another in business, but they eventually realized that if they cooperated on some basic standards, rather than each going its own way, they could massively expand the markets for their otherwise independent products and services."

“Cybersecurity Strategy Scorecard,” Fred Heiding, Alex O’Neill and Lachlan Price, Belfer Center, 03.27.25.

• This report analyzes the national cybersecurity strategies of seven leading powers—Australia, Germany, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to identify best practices and, we hope, inform future policymaking.
• Our results reveal that there is no universal blueprint for national cybersecurity strategy. Indeed, while certain technical best practices apply across the board, the most successful national policy approaches are tailored to the domestic context, that is, to the unique combination of threats, resource constraints, social and political dynamics, and other factors that distinguish each country from its peers.
• We have sought in our analysis to offer concrete recommendations for remediating those gaps and others, particularly improving cybersecurity governance, incentivizing private-sector investment in security, and preparing for emerging threats from AI and quantum technologies.
  • Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States’ strategies stand out for their quality and creativity.
  • Germany, Japan, and South Korea’s strategies outline weaker approaches.
  • Nevertheless, several of the leading documents suffer from major flaws, while the less remarkable strategies still have lessons to offer.
  • Common strengths across the strategies include private sector capacity-building, international partnerships, and critical infrastructure defense.
  • Despite these strengths, several notable gaps persist, particularly in protecting SMEs and vulnerable populations.
  • Future challenges will require that cyber strategies more thoughtfully address accountability, risk quantification, and incentive structures. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "When Machines Go to War," James Holmes, NI, 03.29.25.

Energy exports from CIS:

"How to Punish Russia, Make Money and End the War," Glenn Hubbard and Catherine Wolfram, NYT, 03.27.25.

• "The administration should impose sanctions on any company or individual—in any country—involved in a Russian oil and gas sale. Russia could avoid these so-called secondary sanctions by paying a per shipment fee to the United States Treasury. The payment would be called a Russian Universal Tariff, and it would start low but increase every week that passes without a peace deal."
• "Ships carry most Russian oil and gas to world markets. The secondary sanctions—if Russia does not make the required payments—would fall on all parties to the transaction, including the oil tanker owner, the insurer and the purchaser. Recent evidence confirms that Indian and Chinese entities—whose nations import considerable oil from Russia, and have not imposed their own penalties on the Russian economy over the war in Ukraine—do not want to be caught up in American sanctions, making this idea workable. Another factor in its favor: All such tanker traffic is tracked carefully by commercial parties and by U.S. authorities."
• "By imposing secondary sanctions unless the Russian Universal Tariff is paid, the United States would be taking a cut of the revenues, effectively increasing the discount on Russian oil."
• "While Mr. Trump can adopt this strategy, Congress can strengthen his negotiating position by passing a bill that puts the Russian Universal Tariff in place on its own."
• "Combining secondary sanctions, a strong tool in the U.S. economic kit, with a tariff-like fee could pressure Mr. Putin by threatening his most valuable source of revenues. It would also make it easier for President Trump to deliver on his promise of a lasting peace."

Climate change:

• "Trump’s Climate Change U-turn Is a Russian Victory," Imran Bayoumi, FP, 03.24.25.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Lessons from Russia, Turkey and India for Trump’s America," Gideon Rachman, FT, 03.31.25. 

• "Analysts from places like Turkey and Russia have seen strongman rule established in their own countries and can see similar patterns playing out in Donald Trump’s America. Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center says the “conversations I hear among American liberals now remind me of intellectuals in Moscow just after Putin came to power. There is the same sense of bewilderment and deep concern.”"
• "Gabuev’s advice is that Americans who want to defend democracy and the rule of law need to act fast. Every wrongful detention or ignored court ruling is a “trial balloon.” If there is no effective pushback, would-be authoritarians will go further and faster."
• "The White House has shrewdly started by targeting unpopular groups and non-citizens first—going after alleged Venezuelan gang members or foreign student activists. But illegal deportations are the kind of “trial balloons” Gabuev warns of. If they are not resisted, Trump is likely to move on to new targets."
• "Gabuev says Moscow intellectuals were too slow to move out of their social bubble and listen to the concerns of people in Russia’s provincial towns. The same patterns played out in Turkey and India, where the liberal elites in the cities were derided and targeted by Erdoğan and Modi—and easily caricatured as being obsessed by their own concerns rather than the fate of ordinary citizens."
• "The lesson for the U.S. Democratic party establishment is clear. They might regard politicians such as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez as on the far left of American politics. But if they emerge as the most charismatic leaders of the opposition to Trump, they should be embraced and pushed forward—not rejected."

“We Need the Voice of America Now More Than Ever,” Jeanne Shaheen, FP, 03.26.25.

• On April 24, 1949, U.S. diplomats in Moscow reported something alarming: Soviet authorities were deliberately blocking Russian-language broadcasts from the Voice of America (VOA) radio network. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin saw the broadcasts as such a threat to his regime that he was willing to jam the frequencies with noise to keep Russians from hearing the truth. Despite Soviet efforts, VOA broadcasts still reached the countries in the communist bloc. They countered the spread of lies, became a lifeline for people in totalitarian societies, and served as an inspiration for defectors who escaped. However, on March 14, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order taking VOA off the air for the first time since 1942, handing Russian President Vladimir Putin a victory that Stalin could have only dreamed of.
• Shortly after Trump’s executive order, one of Putin’s biggest mouthpieces, Russian TV presenter Vladimir Solovyov, went on the air and said that Russia is “for peace” in Ukraine and has been “since the beginning.” Putting VOA’s roughly 1,300-person staff on leave left no one on the air to repeat the truth: that it was Putin who invaded Ukraine in 2022, and it was Russian missiles that struck Ukraine last week only hours after Putin agreed to a partial cease-fire proposal with Trump.
• Shuttering VOA and other media outlets under the umbrella of the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) is a win for Putin and dictators around the world. The cuts hit key broadcasters such as Radio Martí in Cuba—a U.S.-funded outlet that the country’s ruling Castro brothers tried to dismantle for decades—as well as other networks in Afghanistan, Belarus, Georgia, and Iran. The Chinese Communist Party celebrated the move, calling Radio Free Asia (RFA)—another U.S.-funded network that faces cuts—a “lie factory.” RFA has done important stories like Beijing’s crackdown on Christianity inside China and the undercounting of COVID-19 deaths in the city of Wuhan in 2020. Without RFA, people living in China, North Korea, and Myanmar will be cut off from fact-based news.
• Elon Musk has claimed that no one listens to Radio Free Europe, another USAGM network, or to VOA, but that is simply not true. Last year, VOA and its affiliated networks had a record audience of 427 million people in more than 100 countries every week. They gave a platform to the most vulnerable women living under Taliban rule. They covered the brutal conditions for Russian conscripts and gave Ukrainians collecting evidence of war crimes hope that someday Putin’s forces will be held accountable.
• VOA broadcasts have been a first line of defense for the United States against the firehose of lies and disinformation spread by dictators like Putin. They are the work of brave journalists who often risk their lives to report the truth from inside brutal regimes. Having the courage to stand up for the truth will only grow more important: A World Economic Forum report last year warned that misinformation and disinformation driven by artificial intelligence will be the top global risk over the next two years..

“Radio Free Europe, Trump and the fight for ‘sharp power’,” Peter Pomerantsev, FT, 03.29.25.

• “As the US retreats from transatlantic security, European countries are scrambling to show that they can take the lead. The focus so far has been on kinetic power: mass industrial military production, artillery supplies and air defense. But that is only part of the challenge. The Kremlin also excels in non-military means of projecting power. We know the “hybrid” toolkit well by now: the troll farms and conspiracy-spewing state media, the fake news sites, hacks, rent-a-mobs, vote-buying and cyber attacks. If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, Europe will become an even greater focal point as the information war assets that have been targeted at the US are repurposed.”
• “Can democracies step up in this space? It has been done historically. In the second world war, the British Political Warfare Executive coordinated the high-minded BBC and much more subversive, often downright scurrilous radio stations and newspapers where disaffected German soldiers and other exiles undermined the hold Hitler had over occupied Europe. RFE/RL transformed into a multimedia service after the cold war, based in Prague and with 1,700 journalists serving 23 countries: from outright dictatorships like Russia, Belarus and Iran to young democracies such as Ukraine, through to countries where democracy is eroding such as Hungary.”
• “On March 15 the US administration announced it was freezing RFE’s funding. Russian propagandists cheered: “This is an awesome decision by Trump!” pronounced Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of the Kremlin’s foreign propaganda arm, RT, and the Rossiya Segodnya news agency. “We couldn’t shut them down, unfortunately, but America did so itself.” The Trump administration has also targeted the work of media aimed at Cuba, Asia and the Middle East, as well as Voice of America—a total of $886mn of (congressionally approved) funding to reach a global audience of more than 350mn each week.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Don't Fall for This Russian Propaganda—Even When It Comes From the U.S.," Fareed Zakaria, WP, 03.28.25.
  • "On GPS: Russian philosopher: ‘Putinism has won in the U.S.,’ Zakaria interviews Alexander Dugin,” Video, 03.30.25.
• "‘He Thinks He and Putin Are Friends:’ John Bolton on How Trump Gets Manipulated," Rachel Bade, Politico, 03.29.25.
• "My Fellow Republicans and President Trump, We Must Stand Up to Putin," Don Bacon, NYT, 03.31.25.
• "How Much Dumber Will This Get?" Hillary Clinton, NYT, 03.28.25.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s war economy fuels rustbelt revival,” Daria Mosolova, FT, 03.30.25.

• "Shops, restaurants and gym chains have opened up in Russia’s most deprived regions, which serve as recruiting pools for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The country’s war economy has also created jobs, increased salaries for factory workers and injected unprecedented sums of money into historically poor towns and cities."
  • "“The war is in a way a big equalizer,” said Janis Kluge, an expert on Russia’s economy with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.  
• "M.Video-Eldorado last year opened 100 shops entering 25 new locations such as Kachkanar, Solikamsk, Volzhsk—all towns with less than 100,000 inhabitants in the central Russian industrial heartland."
• "The central Russian republic of Mari El offers Rbs3mn ($35,600) as starting bonus for new army recruits… “The [army] payouts are gigantic, so those who wouldn’t even think to buy a high-end smartphone before can do it easily now,” said Sergei Polovnikov, the head of Russia’s Content Review, a market analysis group."
• "Payouts for fallen soldiers were another factor driving up household incomes. One widow shared on Instagram that she bought property in Vladivostok with the money she received for the death of her husband. “How much does a life cost?... 12 million rubles,” she wrote—or little more than $140,000."
• "Laura Solanko, of the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition, predicted soldiers will be the first to lose their incomes with the end of Russia’s war, but some shifts in the country’s regional economy will remain. “Regions that benefit from the changes in the geography of foreign trade will not disappear fast,” she said. “As well as those with increased production and military industry enterprises, as Russia will need to re-arm for many years going forward.”

"For Russia's Economy, Peace Poses a Threat," Georgi Kantchev, WSJ, 03.29.25.

• If peace is agreed, any resulting reduction in Russia's military spending would likely leave a crater in the Kremlin's finances that would be tough to fill. At least 40% of its economic growth last year was directly driven by war-related production, not including the spillover effects of increased consumption resulting from higher salaries and war-related payouts, Heli Simola, senior economist at the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies, estimates. Further, payments to families of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine have raised the fortunes of some of the country's poorest areas. Stopping that stimulus would dent domestic consumption, economists say.
• "If the Kremlin wants to avoid an economic collapse, it will have to continue spending at current levels long after the war is over," said Janis Kluge, an expert on Russia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "If military spending were to be cut, it would lead to job losses and general disenchantment in many Russian regions."
• To be sure, the Russian economy would see gains from a conclusion to the war, including the potential lifting of some sanctions, improved trade relations and business confidence. The conflict itself created economic problems. The central bank raised interest rates to record levels to counteract the inflationary pressures of wartime stimulus. Russia also needs to continue pumping money into its defense sector to restore combat capabilities after suffering significant losses in Ukraine. That, some analysts say, could provide an economic soft landing from any conclusion to the war.
• The budgetary focus on military production also means that civilian sectors have been neglected. Combined military and national-security spending accounts for over 40% of budget spending, surpassing expenditure on healthcare, education and social policy combined.

"A New Wave of Property Redistribution Looms in Russia—Favoring the New Elite," Igor Lipsits, MT, 03.31.25.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• A sensation that's difficult and complicated to explain: a Russian court has returned the Ivanovo Heavy Machinery Plant to its private owners, from whom it had previously been confiscated in favor of the state. The plant was wanted by Rostec—and yet it did not receive it. Remarkable. But of course, this is an exception in the system: all other assets nationalized due to “improper” privatization are not being returned anywhere—ports like Murmansk and Vladivostok, the Severoonezhsk Molybdenum Plant, the Rostov Optical-Mechanical Plant, the Klimovsk Cartridge Plant, and many, many other enterprises.
• So now the state has something to sell—and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov is promising a new “large-scale privatization.” Meanwhile, the president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, is humbly asking Vladimir Putin to allow those former owners whose privatized assets were taken by the state to be granted preferential rights to repurchase them at upcoming auctions.
• Time changes many things: new contenders have emerged, eager for a seat at the table of the wealthy. They’re young. After all, it's been 30 years since the original privatization, and a new crop of “loyal servants” now wants to receive a slice of property as a reward for their service to Putin—they want profitable assets. But where can one find property for these “young wolves”? There’s practically no unallocated property left. So the only option is to carry out another redistribution, in favor of the new elite—one that will ensure peace for Putin in the final years of his life and rule, and help guarantee a more or less smooth transfer of power to his successor.

“The making of Vladimir Putin: Gideon Rachman talks to Catherine Belton and Arkady Ostrovsky,” Rachman Review Podcast, FT, 03.27.25.

• “Gideon Rachman (GR): I began the conversation by asking Arkady how he thinks Vladimir Putin will be feeling at this particular moment in history.”
  • “Catherine Belton (CB): Everything that he hoped for really does appear to be falling into place. … But I still think we’re in for one last test, because right now, of course, it does look like everything’s going Putin’s way. … Is Trump really going to follow completely and realign Washington with Moscow, or are there some risks still if Putin doesn’t agree to a peace plan and wants to continue his war?”
• “AO: I think war has been, in a way, the foundation of Putinism. … After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, it’s only between ’89 to ’94 to the beginning of the Chechen war, then the second Chechen war in ’99, then the war in Georgia in 2008, then the first Ukraine, then Syria and now, this. Actually, war is a constant thing.”
• “CB: I think it [invading Ukraine] was something that he always meant to do, unfortunately. And you hear this even when he gave his first ever public interview in 1992. I think he considered it even then his mission to be part of something that would restore the empire.”
• “AO: I think there is affinity [between Trump and Putin]. In many ways, Russia and America always had affinity on many levels. No two countries are more alike in some ways. … Well, in terms of the sort of emergence not from an ethnic idea but from the idea of superpower, the idea of exceptionalism, you know, the space . . . Territorial expansion. … But I think that Trump, there is affinity there because both men hate the idea of liberal Europe. Both despise decadence.”

"Putin’s Imperial Mission Destroys Freedom in Russia," Tony Barber, FT, 03.27.25.

• "In [Putin’s] eyes, liberalization at home—as under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin—went hand in hand with the loss of empire and degradation of Moscow’s standing in the world. Conversely, domestic repression gives him a free hand to pursue mastery over Ukraine and even a restored sphere of influence in eastern Europe."
• "Victory in the war would therefore delay the next turn in the cycle of Russian history, according to which repression and at least partial freedom follow each other like changes in the seasons. Vladimir Lenin’s Red Terror gave way to the New Economic Policy. Then came Stalin, and after him the thaw under Nikita Khrushchev. Conditions tightened under Leonid Brezhnev and his successors, but Gorbachev and Yeltsin changed all that. Now we have Putin."
• "Is it conceivable that the next Kremlin leader will form part of this pattern, liberalizing at home while pursuing a less bellicose foreign policy? To a large extent, the answer depends on the war’s outcome. If Putin’s successor inherits control of Ukraine with an expanded area of influence in Europe, and wants to keep it that way, then the turn of the cycle towards domestic reform may be delayed even longer. The lesson of Russia’s past, and of Putin’s rule, is that an imperial mentality is incompatible with freedom for the Russian people."

"‘There Won’t Be Any Post-War Period,’" Meduza, 03.28.25.

• The Putin administration is discussing ways to “normalize” life in Russia in the event of a ceasefire with Ukraine, Verstka Media reported on Friday, citing Kremlin and state media sources. Proposed measures range from removing certain people from the Justice Ministry’s “foreign agents” blacklist to bringing back Ivan Urgant, Russia’s leading late-night talk show host before the full-scale invasion. However, not all of Verstka’s sources agreed that these proposals are serious; some expressed doubt that the Kremlin wants “normalization” or that Russia can ever return to its pre-war reality.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin’s Approach to Authoritarianism Is Changing," Dan Storyev, FP, 03.24.25. 

Defense and aerospace:

"How Will Russia Reconstitute Its Military After the Ukraine Conflict?" Michelle Grisé, Mark Cozad, Anna M. Dowd, John Kennedy, Marta Kepe, Clara de Lataillade, Krystyna Marcinek, and David Woodworth, RAND, 03.27.25.

• While the ultimate resolution of the war in Ukraine is still uncertain, the way in which the conflict ends will inform the lessons that Russia learns from the conflict and, by extension, the decisions that Russia makes about reconstituting its military.
• Many economic and demographic factors will play an influential role in shaping the reconstitution process, as will Russia’s relationships with its key partners, including China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea.
• The consensus is that Russia will continue to emphasize mass, conscription, mobilization, and nuclear capabilities in its military. However, four alternative pathways to reconstitution merit consideration because Russia will likely implement a hybrid approach, and changes in military culture would have an enormous impact not just on the military but also on national security decision making after the Ukraine conflict.
• Although the speed of reconstitution is a key variable for U.S. and allied planners, this research focuses instead on the nature of the reconstituted Russian military. RAND researchers explore factors shaping Russia’s decisions about how it will reconstitute its forces to suit the Kremlin’s future military objectives, particularly with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
• A partially reconstituted Russian military will still pose a significant—and potentially more unpredictable—threat to U.S. and Western interests in the European theater, complicating U.S. and allied planning efforts.

"Disassembling the Russian War Machine: Key Players and Nodes," Pavlo Shkurenko, Lucas Risinger, Olena Bilousova, and Elina Ribakova, KSE Institute, 03.19.25. 

• Russia’s Military Industry and Capacity. Russia’s MIC has transformed over the past 20 years following its post-Soviet collapse, but still faces modernization challenges. Despite consolidation under large, vertically integrated conglomerates like Rostec, redundancies and inefficiencies remain. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, military spending has surged, with funding coming from the federal budget, regional budgets, bank loans, and arrears to the state. However, sanctions, labor shortages, rising costs, and collapsing arms exports are straining the sector. To sustain the war effort, Russia is refurbishing old equipment, ramping up domestic production, and securing limited imports. Cooperation with North Korea and Iran has become critical, particularly for artillery shells and military technology.
• Key Players in Russia’s MIC. A new bottom-up analysis of Russia’s military-industrial complex reveals a highly concentrated and state-controlled sector based on a database of over 5,500 companies, including a demand side, with over 800 active army entities and bases, and a supply side comprised of military industry companies. The top ten corporate MIC groups, all closely linked to the government, hold 52% of total assets, reinforcing the dominance of legacy firms. Of the 4,322 active MIC companies, 54%—controlling 76% of assets—were registered before 2010. Many firms are expanding production to sustain Russia’s war against Ukraine, with KTRV and Almaz-Antey supplying weapons, while Roscosmos and Rosatom develop nuclear and conventional military systems. Despite three years of full-scale invasion, many MIC enterprises remain unsanctioned. While procurement data stays opaque, several illustrative procurement cases point to capacity expansion.
• Key Nodes of Russia’s Military Industry. A new analysis identifies 113 key military industry clusters that drive 82% of cargo traffic and 92% of procurement contracts, highlighting the sector’s reliance on integrated supply chains. The study examines these clusters across multiple dimensions: sectoral, legal, geospatial, and product, with data points on financials, supplier contracts, and cargo flows integrated into one dynamic dataset. A product-based analysis covers 264 entities across 26 categories, revealing links between  manufacturing, research, and component production. Cargo flow analysis refines the findings, revealing supply chain dependencies and restructuring while tracking material shipments. This highlights how logistics and procurement strategies adapt to align with military priorities.
• The China Connection: Links and Dependencies. China remains a key enabler of Russia’s military-industrial complex, providing high-tech electronics and industrial tools despite Western sanctions. Since 2022, bilateral trade has surged, with Russia’s imports from China reaching $115 billion in 2024—72% higher than pre-war levels. In 2023, China and Hong Kong accounted for 76% of battlefield-related deliveries to Russia, while 90% of all restricted high-tech imports were facilitated through China. These supplies reach Russia in three ways: through direct Chinese substitutes for Western goods, production by Western companies in China, and transshipment via Chinese intermediaries. This partnership remains vital for Russia’s ability to sustain and develop its military capabilities despite ongoing sanctions. In a number of key component categories, China now operates as a near-exclusive supplier for the Russian market.
• Easing sanctions would give Russia’s war machine a much needed reprieve at a time when its structural pressures intensify, resulting in a threat to European security and global stability. It is crucial to maintain pressure, exposing the weaknesses of its MIC, which already suffers from inefficiency, corruption, and lack of modernization.

Excerpts from "Vladimir Putin Visited Arkhangelsk Nuclear-Powered Cruiser Submarine," Kremlin.ru, 03.27.25. Clues from Russian Views

• We saw another submarine of this kind today and took part in its launch. It is quite similar, while adding the capability to carry and launch the Zircon missiles, which is something we can be proud of. After all, to some extent, the Zircon missiles can be viewed as strategic weapons.
• Considering how effective, precise and fast this weapon is, it can certainly be considered a strategic system.
• [This is] our most modern vessel armed with the latest equipment and capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions. You know this better than many, but it is an extremely important issue. You can work against surface and submerged targets, as well as stationary ground targets. It is difficult to name the tasks which our missile carriers or similar warships cannot fulfil. They can do anything, and we will continue to improve all their capabilities.
• It is our belief that the Navy is one of the main guarantees of Russia’s state security and global strategic stability, because there is a certain strategic balance between Russia and the United States, and we will treat this balance with the utmost care. We will act in a measured and timely manner.
• We have just witnessed the launch of the fifth Project Yasen-M cruiser. Plans are in place to build five more such ships and three more Borei-A ships. However, our plans for the development of the Armed Forces and the Navy are not limited to this. Other plans call for building surface ships and strategic missile carriers.
• In response to my instructions, a strategy for the development of the Navy is currently being drafted, along with a program for the construction of surface ships and submarines until 2050.
• The General Staff of the Defense Ministry has approved a program to reorganize the Marine Infantry. We will gradually transition brigades into Marine Infantry divisions. This year, two divisions, including the 155th Brigade, will be established; next year, two more divisions; and the following year, another division.
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"The Bear Who Came to Tea: Russia, Libya and the Kremlin’s Playbook for Fragile States," Tarek Megerisi, ECFR, 03.28.25.

• Over the past decade, Russia has re-entrenched itself in Libya, making the country the main hub of its African operations.
• It has used three opportunistic processes: “cultivation” (seeding proxies), “Wagnerfication” (propping up strongmen) and “domestication” (harnessing local assets).
• To understand these is to understand Russia’s playbook for embedding itself in fragile states.
• It is also to identify weaknesses European states can exploit to curb Russia’s influence in Libya, a major vulnerability on the continent’s southern flank.

Ukraine:

“Zelensky, Trump and Putin may all have done U-turns on elections in Ukraine Preparations are under way for a presidential vote, though many doubt they can be done in wartime,” The Economist, 03.30.25.

• “Serious preparations are now under way for Mr. Zelensky to go before the electorate for a second time, and quite soon. Government sources say Mr. Zelensky called a meeting last week to instruct his team to organize a vote after a full ceasefire, which the Americans believe they could impose by late April (Easter Sunday, April 20th, would have a certain resonance). The first confirmation of one may come in the run-up to or on May 5th, the deadline for a parliamentary vote to extend martial law, which expires on May 8th. Cancelling martial law is a necessary first stage to start an election process. The sources differ on the exact timeline, but most say Mr. Zelensky is aiming for summer. The law requires at least 60 days for campaigning, so the earliest possibility would be early July. But some sources say the campaign would have to last three months: this is the time election authorities have reportedly told parliament that they require to reconstitute voter lists in the middle of war.”
  • “An Ukrainian official thinks Mr. Zelensky will try to catch rivals off guard with a July election, hoping that a short timetable would let him run unopposed. Such a turn would benefit not only the president, the source argues: “A long campaign would tear the country apart.” In fact, a rushed vote risks worsening the already bitter relations between the powerful, centralized presidential office and the rest of Ukraine’s political world.”
  • “The two long shadows cast over Ukrainian life, Messrs Putin and Trump, may not now want a quick election either. Both presumably demanded one believing it would lead to Mr. Zelensky’s exit. Given that the calculation has flipped upside-down, they might not sit quiet while he fast-tracks his progress to a second term.”
• Also see sections on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict above.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Playing Both Sides: Central Asia Between Russia and the West," Annette Bohr, Chatham House, 03.26.25.

• The ability of the Central Asian states to maneuver between East and West with increased confidence and agency limits the prospects for a Ukrainian scenario coming to pass in the region.
• China’s role as Central Asia’s undisputed economic overlord also makes it unlikely that any regional state will become a vassal of Moscow in the mold of Belarus. Beijing views Russia’s concern about Central Asia’s colonial drift with a disinterested nonchalance, secure in the knowledge that time is on its side in the post-imperial drive for influence.
• Moscow… needs Central Asia now more than ever as a conduit for sanctions evasion, to re-orient its trade and to demonstrate that it still has allies. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the regional decolonization process that was already well underway in Central Asia before 2022, fueled by new histories of the Soviet period, declassified documents and overhauled educational systems.
• Despite Russian efforts to reverse this trend, the process is set to only become more pronounced when the Soviet-era elites currently at the helm give way to a younger demographic with limited knowledge of the Russian language and no historical memory of the USSR.
• That is a problem for Moscow, which needs Central Asia now more than ever as a conduit for sanctions evasion, to re-orient its trade and to demonstrate that it still has allies. Russia will therefore double down on the ties that still bind Central Asia to its former colonial metropolis, such as pipelines, railways and elite relationships.
• The Central Asian states, in turn, will seek to continue cooperation with Russia when it furthers their own interests, even as they pursue stronger relationships with Western partners. As Moscow continues its periodic threats to bring the Central Asian states to heel, the region’s leaderships will need to refine and employ the most sophisticated tools they have in their respective arsenals to continue this balancing act.

“In the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal, Russia May Try to Play Spoiler,” Zaur Shiriyev, CEIP, 03.28.25.

• In mid-March, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced they had finalized the text of a long-anticipated peace agreement, which, if signed, marks a potential end to more than three decades of conflict. Yet the signing remains elusive. As a prerequisite for signing the deal, Azerbaijan is insisting on changes to Armenia’s constitution to remove language it sees as implying territorial claims. It also wants a guarantee of unimpeded overland access to its Nakhchivan exclave, a landlocked territory bordered by Armenia, Iran, and Türkiye, and separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. Though not unsurmountable, these unresolved issues risk stalling the fragile momentum.
• The resurrection of talks reflected not only new military realities but a broader recalibration of power across the South Caucasus, as Russia—preoccupied with occupying its neighbor and increasingly weakened—lost its grip on the region, prompting Armenia to reassess its strategic orientation. Baku, sensing an opening after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moved swiftly to consolidate its military and diplomatic gains. In 2023, it regained full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within its internationally recognized borders, and compelled the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers a year before their mandate was due to expire. This outcome was unthinkable just a few years earlier. Baku also advanced its role in regional trade and energy corridors and deepened partnerships with Türkiye and the EU. Moscow viewed these moves warily. Rather than welcoming peace, it saw the process as a challenge to the monopoly it had reasserted after 2020, undermining the system of managed instability it had long used to exert control.
• Yet Russia has not exited the scene. As Baku and Yerevan inch toward normalization, Moscow may seek to play spoiler. It might argue that, absent a signed agreement, the foundation of their relations remains the defunct 2020 ceasefire and its 2021 auxiliary protocols, signed under Russian patronage. Only a new, jointly ratified peace accord can displace Moscow’s claim to that role. Russia could point to the ceasefire’s vague language on transit route monitoring—including the route to Nakhchivan—as a pretext to argue that connectivity can only be resolved through its involvement. Yet under the finalized peace agreement, both sides have agreed not to allow third-party forces along their mutual border—a principle that should apply to Russia as well.
• The stakes extend well beyond Armenia and Azerbaijan. A signed peace deal would reshape the regional order. Türkiye, which sees the South Caucasus as part of its strategic hinterland, has tied the reopening of its border with Armenia to progress in Baku-Yerevan talks. For Armenia, that opening offers not just symbolic value but a vital economic and geopolitical alternative to reliance on Russia. But the window is narrowing. If no agreement is signed by year’s end, the momentum built since 2022 could collapse. Armenia’s domestic fragility, a distracted international environment, and the prospect of renewed Russian pressure all threaten the process. A U.S.-Russia settlement over Ukraine—especially one that sidelines Kyiv—could free Moscow to reassert itself in the South Caucasus. More than that, it could tacitly affirm Russia’s claim to a sphere of influence in the region, which Azerbaijan has actively challenged since 2020. Rather than being sidelined, Russia may seize the moment to reclaim the dominance it lost after 2022.
• Russia’s hegemonic moment in the South Caucasus has passed, but it retains the ability to spoil… The opportunity created by Russia’s distraction will not last. Without peace, Baku risks mistaking short-term leverage for lasting influence. With an agreement, Azerbaijan could consolidate its leadership and help shape a more stable regional order less dependent on Russian oversight. Without one, its recent gains—and the region’s future—could remain uncertain. 

Footnotes

1. In his latest comments on the Russian-Ukrainian war, Trump told NBC on March 30 he is “pissed off” at Putin for stalling his efforts to end the war in Ukraine. His frustration focused on Putin’s calls for Zelenskyy’s removal and the establishment of a transitional government, according to NYT’s Marc A. Thiessen. In his comments to NBC, Trump also warned: “If a deal isn’t made, and if I think it was Russia’s fault, I’m going to put secondary sanctions on Russia.” Later on the same day, Trump said he still believed Putin “wants to make a deal” and criticized Zelenskyy—who, BTW, may run for re-election as soon as July—suggesting he was wavering over a deal to grant the U.S. access to Ukraine’s mineral supply, according to the The Hill.
2. This footnote is extracted from reporting in “The Secret History of America’s Involvement in the Ukraine War,” Adam Entous, NYT, 03.29.25.
3. This bullet point is from “The Secret History of America’s Involvement in the Ukraine War,” Adam Entous, NYT, 03.20.25.
4. This bullet point is from “The Secret History of America’s Involvement in the Ukraine War,” Adam Entous, NYT, 03.20.25.
5. Also see the chart in "Does Ukraine Need a New Black Sea Grain Initiative?" Emma Dodd, Joseph Glauber, and Caitlin Welsh, CSIS, 03.28.25. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Michael Probst, file.