Russia Analytical Report, March 23–30, 2026

4 Ideas to Explore

Thomas Graham writes in CFR that the Iran war has “at least temporarily alleviated a severe budget crisis” for Moscow. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and U.S. sanctions partly eased, “oil prices have surged” and “Russia’s oil revenue doubled during the first three weeks of the conflict,” he writes. In addition, Trump’s focus on Iran “inevitably distracts its [U.S.] attention from Ukraine,” and “the rapid depletion of munitions, especially for air defensive systems,” limits U.S. assistance to Ukraine, Graham observes in a commentary entitled “The Iran War Is a Boon for Russia. Putin Should Still Worry.” At the same time, Russia’s image as a great power has already suffered because America’s Iran and Venezuela operations “underscore Russia’s military inadequacies” and show “how little support it can provide its allies,” according to Graham.
Thomas Grove reminds us that Russia is stepping up its support for Iran, “providing satellite imagery and drone technology to help Iran target U.S. forces” and giving “tactical guidance on how many drones should be used in strikes and from which altitudes.” Russia is doing so in an effort “to salvage what’s left of its shrinking web of partnerships.” Russia sees the survival of the Iranian regime as key to maintaining “a toehold in the Middle East,” according to Grove. This WSJ journalist cites Kremlin-connected nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin as warning that without a harder line by Moscow against Washington, “one by one, our partners will simply fall.”
In “How Russia Weaponized the Cold Ukrainian Winter,” C.J. Chivers reminds us in NYT how missile and drone barrages shattered Kyiv’s energy grid, severing power and heat to hundreds of thousands. Ukrainian energy expert Oleksandr Kharchenko calls it a premeditated assault on the city’s “life‑support system,” warning that even in a best‑case scenario, only 30–40% of electrical capacity can be restored before next winter and that full recovery may take five years, according to Chivers.
In a commentary for War on the Rocks, Mariya Omelicheva challenges the idea that Vladimir Putin “cannot afford to lose” in Ukraine. “History offers little support for the proposition that military failure—or victory—alone topples authoritarian regimes,” she argues. U.S. “strategy should therefore proceed from the premise of authoritarian durability,” she writes. Omelicheva argues that “Putin operates within a system built to absorb significant costs.” “As long as revenue flows remain sufficient, elites lack secure exit options, the coercive core stays cohesive and society remains politically fragmented, he retains greater latitude to negotiate than the ‘trapped’ narrative suggests,” according to Omelicheva.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Interview of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko with TASS,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 03.28.26.

Andrey Rudenko says Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia “remains on the agenda,” with dates to be agreed “through diplomatic channels,” and recalls that the leaders last met in Beijing in September 2025, stressing that “regular meetings at the highest level contribute to strengthening bilateral relations, which have reached the level of strategic partnership and alliance.” On South Korea, he notes that despite “substantial degradation” of ties due to “unfriendly actions” by the previous government, Moscow has “managed to prevent a complete collapse” and that Seoul, though aligned with the “collective West” over Ukraine, “does not participate in direct deliveries of lethal weapons to the Kyiv regime,” but he warns that declarations of goodwill “have value only when backed by concrete practical steps,” especially in trade.
Asked about reports that Seoul might join NATO’s Priority Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), Rudenko says Russia “consistently conveys” that any direct or indirect participation in “pumping lethal weapons” to Kyiv, including under PURL, is “unacceptable,” and cautions that if South Korea takes such a step, “bilateral relations… may seriously suffer, and we will be forced to take retaliatory measures. I hope that we will not have to take such steps,” he adds. Turning to Japan, he criticizes “persistent steps… on the dangerous path of remilitarization,” citing Tokyo’s move away from pacifist constitutional provisions, a jump in defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, and “mass purchases of foreign, including strike, weapons,” arguing this “negatively affects stability in the Asia‑Pacific region” and “directly” impacts Russia’s security interests.
Rudenko reiterates that Moscow halted peace-treaty talks in March 2022 as a countermeasure to Japanese sanctions and says that despite the change of government, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s cabinet “maintains a Russophobic course,” with relations “continuing to degrade” and contacts at “the minimal level.” While Russia would like to see direct flights with Japan resume, he notes “no positive shifts,” as Russian carriers’ applications are “ignored,” in contrast to booming air links and tourism with Vietnam and Thailand. On India, he confirms that talks continue on a visa‑free group travel agreement, which he believes would “play a positive role” and spur tourism, but says it is “premature” to name dates for signing or entry into force.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“The Iran War Is a Boon for Russia. Putin Should Still Worry,” Thomas Graham, CFR, 03.27.26.

Thomas Graham writes that the Iran war has “at least temporarily alleviated a severe budget crisis” for Moscow: with Hormuz closed and U.S. sanctions partly eased, “oil prices have surged” and “Russia’s oil revenue doubled during the first three weeks of the conflict,” which “many observers believe… should ease the Kremlin’s concerns about funding their Ukraine war effort.” At the same time, he notes, Trump’s focus on Iran “inevitably distracts its attention from Ukraine,” and “the rapid depletion of munitions, especially for air defensive systems… limits the material assistance the United States is willing to supply Ukraine,” potentially making Russian “aerial assaults more deadly.”
Yet Graham argues this apparent “boon” masks deeper vulnerabilities: Russia’s image as a great power has suffered because the Iran and Venezuela operations “underscore Russia’s military inadequacies” and show “how little support it can provide its allies.” More fundamentally, he contends, “continuing the war against Ukraine does not benefit Russia strategically,” instead compounding “demographic and economic problems” and starving investment in AI and other technologies so that “each day the war continues, Russia falls farther behind in the great-power competition.” “Russia does not need resources to continue the war… it needs incentives to end it,” he concludes.
On diplomacy, Graham says the U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran has “taken a serious blow” to early hopes for better U.S.–Russia ties under Trump and crystallized a Russian elite consensus that “Washington is not serious about normalizing relations… and will throw its weight around… with no regard for Russia’s interests.” He notes that trilateral talks with Ukraine have been “paused” indefinitely, but emphasizes that Putin has been “noticeably reluctant to criticize Trump personally,” still believing the U.S. president “will help him achieve his goals in the ongoing war,” which makes “a sharp deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations… unlikely as long as Putin retains that confidence.”

“Why Russia Is Stepping Up Its Support for an Embattled Iran,” Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 03.29.26.

Thomas Grove writes that while Russia is seen as “one of the early winners in the Iran war” thanks to surging oil prices and eased U.S. restrictions, the conflict “poses a much bigger threat to its global ambitions.” Moscow has “stepped up its support for Iran,” its “closest partner in the Middle East,” by “providing satellite imagery and drone technology to help Iran target U.S. forces,” and giving “tactical guidance on how many drones should be used in strikes and from which altitudes,” he reports.
Russia is trying “to salvage what’s left of its shrinking web of partnerships” after U.S. moves in Venezuela, Cuba and the South Caucasus, and sees survival of the Iranian regime as key to maintaining “a toehold in the Middle East,” Grove argues. He notes that the Kremlin even offered Trump’s envoys to “stop providing targeting information for Iran if the U.S. did the same with Ukraine,” and quotes Hanna Notte that Moscow is “learning what it means when the United States acts completely unrestrained,” while nationalist Alexander Dugin warns that without “real patriotic reforms” and a harder line against Washington, “one by one, our partners will simply fall.”

“For Putin, the War in Iran Changed Everything,” Mikhail Zygar, The New York Times, 03.25.26.

At the start of the year, the Russian economy looked to be giving way. Under the strain of war and sanctions, revenues were falling, production was shrinking, and trade was running low. With rising tariffs, credit was prohibitively expensive and borrowing all but impossible: A wave of bankruptcies was on the horizon. In late January, Russia was forced to sell oil to India at just $22 per barrel, about a third of the market rate.
Officials and business leaders, for their part, understood that the continuation of the war was his absolute priority and that the country’s economic situation was of little consequence. But in February something shifted. Mr. Putin began, suddenly, to pay attention to the flagging economy. There were even signs he might be changing his mind on negotiations with Ukraine, perhaps seeking an exit from the conflict.
Then came the war in Iran. By a strange twist of history, the start of the war in Iran halted the prospect of ending the war in Ukraine—at the very moment when Mr. Putin appeared ready to consider it. We will never know what might have happened. On Feb. 28, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack; in the days that followed, everything changed. All of a sudden, the economic problems bedeviling Russia seemed to evaporate.
What’s more, divisions deepened between the United States and its NATO allies, who refused to send ships to the Strait of Hormuz. For Mr. Putin, whose foreign policy has been built around cultivating disorder in the West, this was welcome. Equally important is the absorption of America’s attention in the Middle East… it’s not just attention that is being diverted: The United States is burning through weaponry and ammunition that could otherwise be sent to Ukraine.
The situation inside Russia is becoming turbulent, too. Ahead of parliamentary elections this fall, the Kremlin is in a state of near-paranoid anticipation… A level of public discontent that until recently would have been unthinkable is now part of daily life. Before too long, it seems, Mr. Putin will have to make a consequential choice: either agree to some form of de-escalation in Ukraine, potentially including an end to the war, or move in the opposite direction—tightening controls across the board, even to the point of a new mobilization.

“Russia is sending upgraded drones used in the Ukraine war to Iran, officials say,” Emma Burrows, AP/Washington Post, 03.27.26.

U.S. and European officials told the AP that “Russia is sending a shipment of drones to Iran including upgraded versions of the drone technology that Tehran originally supplied to Moscow after its invasion of Ukraine,” Emma Burrows reports. Iran has been firing Shaheds at Israel, Gulf states and U.S. bases, and Russian specialists “have adapted and refined the Shahed drone by creating decoys with no explosives,” and by adding “jet engines, cameras, advanced anti-jammers, radio links, AI computing platforms or Starlink internet devices,” the AP writes.
One European intelligence official said Russian and Iranian officials have had “very active” talks this month on transfers, while a U.S. defense official admitted it is “unclear if the shipment is a one-time delivery or part of a series.” The same official said Moscow’s motives are murky, since “every munition sent to Tehran is one Russia is not able to launch at Ukraine.”
The AP notes that Russia and Iran are now “sharing intelligence,” with the U.K. saying Moscow almost certainly provided training and EW advice before the Iran war, while Iran “is also sharing information with Russia ‘quite generously,’” including word of Ali Larijani’s death before it became public. Advanced, jet‑propelled variants “are faster and therefore significantly harder for the U.S.’s anti-drone system… to take down,” the U.S. official warned.

“A dark analogy for the war in Iran,” Jason Willick, Washington Post, 03.29.26.

Jason Willick suggests that “it’s worth considering a darker analogy” for the 2026 U.S. war in Iran than Iraq: “Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine.” “From a purely ‘realist’ perspective,” he argues, “there are similarities”: “a strong power attacked a weaker power”; “a major casus belli was the fear that the weaker power might, at some point in the future, harbor weapons that could threaten the stronger power”; and “regime change was a goal of the attacker, at least at the start.”
Willick notes that “America’s adversaries surely see the Iran war as a reciprocal opportunity to bleed the U.S.,” with Russia “already supplying Iran targeting information and advanced drones,” and that the U.S. has fired “more than 850 Tomahawk missiles,” while a RUSI estimate says Washington spent “nearly 40 percent of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor stockpile in 16 days.” In his view, Iran was “a regional problem with a freshly damaged nuclear program, not a fundamental threat… worth this level of expenditure,” whereas “Zbigniew Brzezinski famously wrote, ‘Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire,’” making Putin’s war, however “evil,” “at least easier to understand.”

“Interview with Former Head of MI6 Alex Younger,” The Economist via Instagram, 03.25.26.

[When asked: “Who has the upper hand [in Iran] right now?”] “They do. … The reality is the U.S. underestimated the task, and I think as of about two weeks ago lost the initiative to Iran. In practice, the Iranian regime has been more resilient than I think anyone would have expected.”
“They took some good decisions actually as early as last June about dispersing their military capability and delegating the authority for the use of those weapons, which has given them significant extra resilience against this incredibly powerful air campaign. They have embarked on what's technically called horizontal escalation, i.e. firing rockets at anybody within range, which at the time honestly, I thought was nuts, but in fact, has been a very good way of putting in direct price on the U.S.”
“They've understood the significance of the energy war and held the strait at threat and globalized and essentially not internationalized, just globalized the conflict in a way that gives them some weapons. So, uh, you know, they've played a weak hand pretty well.”

“An Unnecessary War, a Necessary Victory,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta/Russia in Global Affairs, 03.25.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

Fyodor Lukyanov argues that by starting a war against Iran, “the United States miscalculated regarding its opponent,” writing that Trump was persuaded to “make use of the moment of Tehran’s maximum weakness” to “settle the psychological trauma” of 1979, “eliminate a regime dangerous for Israel,” “take control of significant volumes of oil and a strategically important transport route,” and “drive a wedge into Eurasian projects.” “The game was said to be worth the candle,” he notes, “and he agreed.” But Iran’s military potential “significantly exceeds the resources of those with whom the United States has entered into direct military confrontation for many decades,” and its ability to disrupt trade “is great,” he warns.
Lukyanov contends that Trump’s “America First” in foreign policy means “the ability of the United States to achieve any goals it deems necessary while avoiding any responsibility and ideally any costs,” summing it up as the late‑Soviet toast: “that we have everything, and that nothing happens to us for it.” That approach worked when Washington could “bend partners” who had “nothing to oppose,” but “it is another thing,” he writes, “to provoke a situation that you yourself cannot control and that creates growing problems for everyone else,” especially when this is a “war of choice” for the U.S., unlike Israel, which can at least claim direct security grounds.
Because the Hormuz crisis has “revealed the global significance of this artery in full,” Lukyanov argues that it is now “impossible to consider ‘Epic Fury’ successful if Iran retains control over the Strait of Hormuz.” “The conclusion is disappointing,” he writes: “The United States desperately needs an indisputable victory in this war.” The mutual demands “do not allow one to count on an amicable agreement. That means escalation. The stakes are too high,” he believes—and “the result will determine America’s possibilities on the world stage for the coming period, including after Trump.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“How Russia Weaponized the Cold Ukrainian Winter,” C.J. Chivers, New York Times Magazine, 03.30.26.

C.J. Chivers recounts how on Jan. 8 Russia launched “more than 240 long-range drones and three dozen cruise and ballistic missiles” at Kyiv just as Ukraine’s Patriot PAC‑3 stocks were depleted: “Ukraine’s shield was down.” City officials said the strikes “severed more than 400,000 households from electricity” and “left 6,000 buildings without heat,” producing “the most difficult run of winter weeks in Kyiv since the privations of World War II,” and prompting Trump to ask Putin for a pause that was exposed as “a sham” when roughly “450 drones and missiles” hit again on Feb. 2. Oleksandr Kharchenko calls it a premeditated assault “on the life-support system of a modern city,” with residents dubbing the experience kholodomor—a “cold plague” echoing the Holodomor famine.
In Kyiv’s Troieshchyna, Chivers writes, indoor temperatures plunged so low “residents’ breath sometimes frosted the air in their homes,” holy water froze in church basins, and many fled; Mayor Vitali Klitschko said cellphone data showed “more than 600,000 people had evacuated,” about one‑sixth of prewar Kyiv. Svitlana, a 66‑year‑old panelka resident whose family hailed from Russia and who once “saw herself as a Russian on adjacent land,” now says bluntly, “I’m ethnically Russian. Russia forced me to be Ukrainian,” knitting “two pairs of wool socks a day” for soldiers while keeping her unheated flat in the “40s Fahrenheit” with foil and blankets.
Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Industry Research Center in Kyiv, warns that “it will be years” to restore capacity—“in the best-case scenario, we will be able to restore maybe 30 or 40 percent of electrical capacity before next winter,” and “getting back to full capacity… will require as much as five years,” he says, urging buildings to invest in generators, boilers, and solar panels. For some, weaponized winter finished any residual affinity to Moscow: Zoya Perevozchenko, a Chernobyl liquidator’s widow once feted in Russia but whose friend Natalia was burned to death by a Shahed drone in the panelka the Soviets gave them, now says of the Russia that once honored them, “The only feeling I have toward them is hate.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“How Ukrainian drones paralyze the Russian invasion,” Max Boot, Washington Post, 03.30.26.

Max Boot notes that during his first visit to Kyiv in 2023, Russia fired “25 missiles and nine drones,” while on March 23–24, 2026 it fired “30 missiles and nearly 1,000 Shahed drones during a 24-hour period,” yet Ukrainian defenses “shot down 95 percent of the Shaheds, in part by using low-cost interceptor drones produced by no other nation.” President Volodymyr Zelensky now says “30,000 to 35,000 Russian soldiers are being killed or wounded every month… and that 90 percent of the losses are inflicted by drones,” Boot writes, adding that “Ukraine aims to build 7 million of them this year.”While this interception rate is impressive, one should keep in mind that in February 2026, Russia launched a total of 5,732 drones, 34 ballistic missiles and 175 cruise missiles at Ukraine. Of these, Ukrainian air defenses intercepted 5,083 drones and 132 cruise missiles, but did not intercept any of the 34 ballistic missiles, according to Belfer Center research associate Quinn Urich’s analysis of CSIS data for a recent Ukraine war report card published by Russia Matters.*
At the same time, Ukraine is “dispatching long-range drones to hit Russia’s oil export terminals on the Baltic Sea, more than 600 miles away,” with Boot reporting that “these audacious attacks cut Russia’s oil exports by 40 percent, and therefore decreased the oil revenue available to fund Vladimir Putin’s war machine.” On the tactical side, he describes visiting a secret Kyiv workshop where drones are built by hand because “the designs change every couple of months,” and says that parts such as “flight controllers, motors and fiber-optic cables” come from China—“in many cases produced by the same factories churning out parts for Russia’s drones”—while other components are 3D‑printed in-house.
With the 429th Separate Unmanned Systems “Achilles” Brigade near Kharkiv, Boot writes that its commander, Maj. Yurii Fedorenko, says the unit “hit nearly 38,000 targets last year” and “aims to hit 80,000 this year,” under a points system that rewards performance with “more funding.” Russia is expanding drone production and exporting to Iran, he warns, but Ukrainians retain “a not-so-secret weapon the Russians cannot match: the determination of a democratic nation to stay free,” quoting media CEO Roman Andreyko: “We want the war to stop. We want peace. But we are not ready to capitulate.”

“Russia’s Drone Use Is a Lesson for Iran,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 03.25.26.

Yaroslav Trofimov writes that video from Iran‑backed Iraqi militias “looked familiar to anyone who has followed the war in Ukraine”: “drones piloted by fiber‑optic wires that render jamming useless cruised above an American base in Baghdad” before FPVs “dived to strike their targets: an American Black Hawk helicopter on the ground and an air-defense radar system.” “It is a new way of war, and it has come to the Middle East,” he notes. Retired RAF Air Marshal Martin Sampson warns that “any U.S. boots on the ground or warships in the Gulf will be ‘close in’ targets, and FPV drone use will be part of both sides’ capabilities,” adding that “Iran has to have anticipated this weakness and gained understanding from Russia.”
Trofimov reports that Russia “pioneered the use of these wire-guided drones to devastating effect” in Kursk in late 2024 and has “upgraded and modernized the long-range Shahed drones that were originally designed by Iran,” with Andriy Zagorodnyuk saying, “Russia and Iran have an alliance… exchanging expertise, intelligence and technologies” and that Iranians “will try to absorb more.”
By contrast, a Russian academic tells him, “Iran had a good teacher in Russia, and was eager to learn from this war. I haven’t seen the same willingness in the U.S.” Michael Kofman agrees that “we are still in the early phases… trying to understand the FPV technology,” warning that “if you look at the defensive capabilities that are available, we have a long way to go to get to where Ukraine is at this stage.”

“The Uninhabited War in Ukraine,” Chapter Three of “UAVs: ISR, Deterrence and War,” IISS, 2026.

Ukraine, the authors of this IISS product’s chapter notes, has become “a combat incubator for the operational development of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), with new classes of such vehicles emerging.” When Russia launched its full‑scale invasion, “both belligerents were operating uninhabited aerial vehicles… in a broadly traditional manner,” but “three years later… the use and nature of the UAVs employed have transformed in both role and volume,” the authors write. Ukraine had “fewer than 100 UAVs in its inventory on 24 February 2022”; by contrast, it “aimed to produce 4.5 million in 2025, with Russian targets only marginally lower.”
From their traditional ISR and “niche air‑to‑surface weapon delivery” roles, UAVs “have become the most lethal type of system in the war,” the chapter stresses; by 2025 “they had surpassed artillery as the leading cause of front-line casualties, accounting for up to 80% of losses.” The “extraordinary number – in the thousands – of small and mini‑UAVs being operated concurrently” now provides “voluminous data contributing to arguably an unprecedented level of situational awareness for both Russia and Ukraine.”
To exploit this, the authors say, Ukraine has had to develop “new command‑and‑control (C2) tools capable of processing, integrating and exploiting this data in near‑real time,” and “when combined with UAV‑delivered ordnance,” this reflects “elements of what was once dubbed network‑centric warfare.” In effect, they argue, Ukraine “has… used uninhabited systems to create a tactical reconnaissance-strike complex, which is proving effective on the battlefield,” even as questions remain about how far this model will serve as a “template for UAV use” beyond the current war.

“10 Ukrainians Humbled Two NATO Battalions. When Will NATO Wake Up?” Bryan Daugherty, War on the Rocks, 03.26.26.

“Last May, NATO invited 10 Ukrainians to act as an opposing force during Hedgehog 2025, one of NATO’s largest exercises in the Baltics. The Ukrainians successfully simulated the destruction of 17 armored vehicles and conducted 30 strikes in half a day, effectively neutralizing two NATO battalions before dinner. One observing commander summed up the broader implication in three words: “We are finished.” Ominously, the exercise occurred without American forces.”
“The Western debate on Ukraine is sometimes framed as an act of generosity, with NATO propping up a beleaguered partner. This perspective is wrong and dangerously blind to a strategic asset for the alliance hiding in plain sight. Ukraine’s expertise has already proven vital, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announcing that Ukrainian experts are deploying to the Middle East to assist in countering Iranian Shahed drones, offering the United States concrete solutions to an otherwise expensive problem. Four years ago, the West answered Ukraine’s call for military aid. Now, Ukraine is ready to answer back.”
“I am not making an argument for Ukraine to be allowed to join NATO, necessarily. Rather, I am imploring NATO member states—including the United States—to start treating Ukraine as the strategic priority that it has proven itself to be. NATO should take immediate steps towards incorporating two-way training programs to learn from the combat-experienced Ukrainians. Over the longer term, NATO should recalibrate discussions around Ukraine’s membership accession.”
“What Hedgehog 2025 exposed was not a glitch. Ukraine has spent four years building a warfighting machine more agile than NATO’s legacy ecosystem. The fundamental differences in innovation, technology, and policy behind this gap should spur a recalibration of NATO’s views on Ukraine.”
“The first key difference is Ukraine’s unit-level feedback loop. Ukraine has integrated drone production into units with soldiers using 3D printers, soldering irons, and even improvised explosives, allowing localized adaptation to operational needs. Ukraine now 3D prints fiber optic cable spools to mitigate Russian electronic warfare. As soldiers rotate off position, they provide feedback to engineers who immediately modify designs. This cycle cannot be replicated by NATO’s centralized procurement.”
“The second difference is Delta, Ukraine’s AI-enabled battlefield management platform. Built by a group of volunteers in 2016, Delta integrates satellite imagery, electronic warfare, and drone reconnaissance into real-time battlespace awareness. By 2024, it detected 12,000 targets daily. Nearly a decade after Delta won a NATO hackathon, America’s equivalent — Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control—struggles to make meaningful progress because of top-down data integration strategies. Delta’s bottom-up origins enabled continuous battlefield refinement, extending decision windows and enabling software updates for commanders’ evolving needs.”

“The drone swarm in Louisiana is a warning about the future of war,” Editorial Board, Washington Post, 03.29.26.

“It’s impossible to ignore that a new era of drone warfare has begun — and that the U.S. is not ready,” the WP editors argue, pointing to a NATO exercise where “10 Ukrainian drone operators role‑playing as the enemy mock‑destroyed 17 armored vehicles and disabled two allied battalions in a day,” and to how “Iran originally supplied Russia with its Shahed drone designs for use against Ukraine” and now “Russia is sending upgraded versions back… with improved engines, better navigation and enhanced resistance to electronic jamming,” plus “satellite imagery and targeting data” to hit U.S. bases.
Several of the 13 American bases in the Middle East are “reportedly all but uninhabitable” after Iranian strikes that “damaged radar systems, communications infrastructure and troop housing,” forcing troops into hotels, the board writes. The “good news,” they say, is that “no military in the world learns on the job faster than America’s,” but “the Barksdale incident is a wake‑up call that it’s time to take drone defense far more seriously,” because “staying a step ahead of America’s enemies requires constant experimentation and innovation.”

“The Age of Asymmetric Warfare Is Here, and the West Is Not Ready,” Aliona Hlivco and Dalibor Rohac, Foreign Policy, 03.26.26.

“Ukraine, the most battle-hardened nation in Europe if not the world, has dealt with the threat of asymmetric drone warfare effectively and especially since late 2022, when Russian began deploying Shahed-136 drones to strike Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Although President Donald Trump had a point when he told Fox News last week that the United States had “the best drones in the world”—U.S. systems such as the Reaper are among the most advanced and capable in the world—he was flatly wrong in asserting that Washington has nothing to gain from Kyiv’s assistance with drone defense.”
“Those who have followed the Ukrainian advances on the battlefield since 2022 knew that eventually it would be Ukraine that would be providing military assistance to the West—though few expected it so soon, while Kyiv still deals with the Russian threat. Yet Ukraine is now supplying the United States with its interceptor drones and has dispatched its operators and instructors to help bring the U.S. military up to speed regarding battlefield tactics developed through years of Ukrainian defense against Shahed attacks.”
“For Ukraine—periodically asked to “thank” the West and the United States for their help—its technological edge is a new source of leverage. According to Ukrainian officials and reports in the press, Kyiv may be discussing drone interceptor cooperation with more than 10 countries, including partners in the Gulf. Ukrainian drone technologies and expertise are already drawing interest in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are seeking cheaper ways to defend against drone swarms.”
“The lesson here is that Western defenses against Iranian and Russian drones have to keep up continually. Whatever system is being used effectively to keep Russian and Iranian drones at bay today may well become obsolete by the time it is needed in a future conflict.”
“The West may not be at war yet. It is faced, however, with a dramatically new era of drone warfare, upending many assumptions of traditional defense planning. Americans and Europeans should consider themselves lucky to be able to rely on Ukrainian innovation and assistance in the process.”

Key conclusions from Essential Ukraine #20, Balazs Jarabik’s X account, 03.25.26. Full report available behind paywall here.

“Bottom line: the war is not headed toward resolution. Endurance is becoming decisive, particularly on Ukraine’s side,” according to the author.
“The war has settled into a prolonged phase of attrition. Spring will increase Russian offensive, but not change strategic outcomes. Russia advances slowly, deliberately so, and at scale. Ukraine can disrupt, strike back, but not reverse the trend.”
“Russia holds the structural advantage built over time for a long war. Manpower (and recruitment), production, economic/financial management, and political control allow sustained pressure at a deliberate, conservative tempo.”
“Ukraine’s main challenges are shifting: no longer only manpower (partly offset by drones), but economics and finances. A persistent funding gap, rising costs, delayed external financing, and the impact of the Iran war (domestic gasoline prices) are becoming the key variables.”
“The political mood has shifted: expectations of early elections have faded, replaced by preparation for a longer war. State systems under pressure: parliamentary crisis, anti-corruption infighting, tighter mobilization (reaching Kyiv), societal fatigue - all building up.”
“The war in Iran is reshaping the environment. It diverts US attention, strains AD supplies, drives up energy prices - benefiting Russia, complicating Ukraine’s position. The diplomatic track is stalled: Kyiv keeps engagement with Washington, but pressure is back onto Kyiv.”
“Large-scale combined strikes in March targeted Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, underscoring continued vulnerability despite partial restoration. Ukraine is also expanding its deep-strike campaign - pushing further into Russian territory with greater scope and frequency.”
“For European elites, sustaining Ukraine is increasingly about credibility and strategic autonomy. Internal divisions are growing driven by the Iran war, funding delays, disputes like Druzhba. The HUN–UA conflict is not bilateral, but reflects a deeper European fault line.”
“The frontline is only one part of a broader system-level endurance contest alongside economic, political, and geopolitical pressures. The key variable is which side can sustain pressure longer under shifting external conditions.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Russia Just Launched Its Spring Offensive in Ukraine. It’s Not Going Well," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 03.28.26.

Military aid to Ukraine:

No significant developments.

No significant developments.

“Zelenskiy Urged to Curtail Russia Energy Strikes, Proposes Truce,” Aliaksandr Kudrytski, Bloomberg, 03.30.26.

Aliaksandr Kudrytski reports that Volodymyr Zelensky “said Kyiv has been urged by some of its global partners to scale back attacks on Russian oil infrastructure following turmoil on global energy markets,” even as Ukraine has stepped up strikes on “Russian refineries, export pipelines and sea terminals” to hit “a key source of revenue for Moscow’s war machine.” Ukrainian attacks have coincided with a spike in crude prices after “Iran moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of global crude supplies travels,” and with Washington easing oil sanctions to curb the shock.
In audio responses to reporters, Zelensky said “Kyiv is ready for a ceasefire any time and a truce for Easter is one option,” and offered a conditional halt to energy strikes: “If Russia is ready to stop striking Ukrainian energy, we won’t be returning the strikes against their energy,” adding, “If Russians are ready — let them propose any time to us. We are ready to solve this issue.” Kudrytski notes that repeated drone attacks on Russia’s Ust‑Luga terminal have led to some drones crashing in Latvia, Estonia and Finland—incidents those governments blamed on Moscow—while Zelensky “has cautioned that previous instances of a temporary halt to hostilities with Russia had no lasting effect.”

“1 big thing — Zelensky: Russia wants more war,” Barak Ravid, Axios, 03.30.26.

Volodymyr Zelensky tells Axios he is “sure Russia wants [a] long war,” saying “they have benefits: The U.S. is focusing on the Middle East and may decrease military help to Ukraine. Sanctions are partially lifted. I see only benefits for Russia from the war with Iran continuing.” Asked if he fears a prolonged Iran war will hurt Ukraine’s weapons supply, he answers: “I am not just concerned, I am sure we will have such challenges. Absolutely.” He also criticizes U.S. sanctions waivers on Russian oil, warning that “if now they get more money from energy, it doesn’t help us.”
Looking ahead, Zelensky says he worries that once the Iran war ends, “the Trump administration will resume pressuring Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia.” “They don’t see another way to stop Putin other than withdrawing Ukrainian troops from our territory,” he tells Axios. “My concern is that nobody really values the danger of such a decision for our security.”

“Scoop: Rubio and EU official had heated exchange on Russia at G7 meeting,” Barak Ravid, Axios, 03.28.26.

Barak Ravid reports that during a G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas “asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio when the U.S. would get tough on Russia,” in what sources described as a “heated exchange” that reflected “mutual distrust between the U.S. and many of its European allies over the war in Ukraine.” Kallas, “a Russia hawk and former prime minister of Estonia,” reminded Rubio that a year earlier he had said that if Russia blocked U.S. efforts to end the war, Washington would lose patience. “A year has passed and Russia hasn’t moved,” she told him. “When is your patience going to run out?”
Rubio was “visibly annoyed,” according to three participants. “We are doing the best we can to end the war. If you think you can do it better, go ahead. We will step aside,” he “fired back, raising his voice,” Ravid writes. Rubio insisted “the U.S. was trying to talk to both sides,” but was “only helping one side, Ukraine, with weapons, intelligence and other support.”
Afterward, “several European ministers… interjected to say they still wanted the U.S. to pursue Russia-Ukraine diplomacy,” and Rubio and Kallas had a short pull‑aside “to try and cool down things,” Axios reports. A State Department official called it “a frank exchange of views,” while Rubio publicly denied “any tensions or criticism,” saying such meetings are “about thanking America… and appreciation for the mediating role we’ve tried to play.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Trump Just Made a One-Sided Peace Proposal to Ukraine—Again," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 03.27.26.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Testimony of Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and Answers to Questions, Forbes, 03.12.26. (Official transcript available here.)

Grynkewich told senators that “most of the Russian ground forces are focused on Ukraine, so we do not see significant Russian buildups right now,” but warned of “a fairly robust amount of what we call Russian hybrid activities or asymmetric activities,” including “information operations or sabotage” with “several incidences in the Baltics and in Poland in particular” in recent months. On Russia’s winter strikes, he said attacks on Ukraine’s grid left “just a couple of hours of electricity per day in Kyiv” and cut heat to “large swaths” of cities, adding that Moscow was “broadly intend[ing] to put pressure on the civilian population,” but “anytime you attack a civilian population, you usually end up finding that it just hardens their resolve.”
Grynkewich also noted that “the hardest part of a short two‑week war is the first couple of years,” using it to underscore how badly Moscow miscalculated in expecting a quick victory and instead finding itself in a grinding, multi‑year campaign in Ukraine.
He also argued that if Russia were able to redeploy 500,000 battle‑hardened troops away from Ukraine to other theaters, this would pose a serious potential military threat to NATO.
Asked about Russian support to Iran, Grynkewich said he was “certainly aware of all the public reporting” and echoed Defense Secretary Hegseth that “if Russia is doing this, they would be wise to reconsider providing any assistance to the Iranians during Epic Fury.” He stressed that “one of the main threats facing the Ukrainians today” is the Shahed family of drones, noting that Russia’s industrial base “got started, because of the Iranian sharing of technology of their Shahed drones and sharing the blueprints and teaching the Russians how to build them and how to build them at scale.”
Grynkewich also highlighted growing cooperation among U.S. adversaries, saying “we’ve certainly seen that with the North Koreans and the Iranians and the Russians,” and that “North Korean troops… have made up some substantial combat power shortfalls that the Russians have had,” while “North Korean individuals” now work “in the Russian industrial base” producing “ballistic missiles and UAVs.” EUCOM, he said, watches closely how “competitors around the globe will work with each other when they share interests,” while U.S. and allied air defenses in and around Ukraine and the Eastern Mediterranean are being used both “to defend some of our NATO allies” and to support Central Command as it executes Operation Epic Fury.

“Can NATO Survive a Crisis in U.S. Relations With Its Partners?,” Dmitry Trenin, Profile, 03.27.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Dmitry Trenin writes that after Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. stopped posing as a benevolent leader and instead as “a stern hegemon, demanding that allies fully pay for their defense.” In the new National Defense Strategy, he notes, Washington bluntly says Europe’s “military, economic, technological, demographic” potential “is quite sufficient” to contain Russia on its own, meaning “the Americans were not going to leave NATO, but retreated to the second line, offering the Europeans to occupy the forward positions.” On Ukraine, Trenin stresses, Trump “reduced—though did not end—America’s involvement,” shifted the costs of arming Kyiv “onto Europe,” and “began a negotiating process with the Kremlin, from which he did not admit the Europeans.”
According to Trenin, Trump’s public claims on Greenland and even Canada meant that “for the first time in NATO’s history, the head of the bloc publicly questioned the sovereignty of one ally over part of its territory and the right of another ally to exist as an independent state.” Together with the Iran war, where “not a single NATO country responded” to Trump’s call to use bases to unblock Hormuz and Spain and Britain “directly refused,” this “dealt a retaliatory blow to Atlantic solidarity,” he argues.
Trenin contends that all this “called into question the very foundations of NATO” and that Article 5 has “turned out to be a bluff.” “In fact,” he writes, “this article was a bluff from the very beginning,” because the U.S. Senate excluded automatic war with the USSR; now “it has become clear: the United States will not use nuclear weapons in the event of a hypothetical attack on any of the NATO members.” Looking ahead, he concludes, “NATO will not disintegrate, but it will no longer be the same:” mutual “musketeer” obligations will be “substantially weakened,” a single European army “will not exist,” and European units will form “the first echelon” against Russia while “the United States will move to the positions of the second echelon or even the reserve.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“War in Iran Tests the Limits of the ‘No-Limits Partnership’ Between China and Russia,” Elizabeth Wishnick, CNA, 03.24.26.

Elizabeth Wishnick argues that while some see war in Iran “bringing China and Russia closer together,” the conflict “has highlighted some real differences between the two strategic partners.” Russia has “greater economic and political incentives to support Iran’s resistance,” she writes, whereas “China has more to lose economically and politically in the continuation of the war,” given its exposure to Gulf trade in helium and sulfur and its “major negative political repercussions,” including the postponement of a Trump–Xi summit.
On military support, she notes that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi boasted Iran has “good cooperation” with Russia and China “politically, economically, even militarily,” and that Russia in particular is helping Tehran “in many different directions.” She cites reporting that Moscow is sharing “intelligence, drone technology and strategy,” while China, though “emphasiz[ing] the need for diplomacy,” has “picked up chemicals” for Iran and “provided Iran with access to the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System,” which “could explain the improved accuracy of its targeting.”
For Russia, “the economic and military benefits keep accumulating”—oil prices, sanctions relief to India, and U.S. distraction from Ukraine—while “China is more economically vulnerable in long term,” Wishnick writes. She quotes Wang Yi’s remark that “China and Russia are strategically independent… do not impose our will and agenda on each other,” calling it “a far cry” from the 2022 “no-limits partnership,” and concludes that the war has exposed “structural economic differences” and “a divergence in their current foreign policy priorities” even as the partnership remains consequential.

“From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains,” Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty, Atlantic Council, 03.25.26.

The authors argue that speculation about Beijing and Moscow “keeping their distance” from the Iran war “misunderstands the economic relationships and motivations behind the ‘Axis of Evasion’,” a network of adversaries that “coalesce to circumvent Western economic restrictions.” China “enables Russia and Iran by importing their sanctioned oil and selling them sophisticated dual-use technology,” they write, and trade among the trio “occurs outside of the Western financial system and, therefore, the reach of Western economic restrictions,” making integrated supply chains “more resistant to sanctions and export controls enforcement.”
Iran’s drone program is “the clearest example” of how the Axis uses localized supply chains: Shahed UAVs rely on “imported electronics, engines, navigation components, batteries, and semiconductors,” with many parts originating in the West but “routed through Chinese distributors or trading companies before they reach Iranian manufacturers.” The authors note that Chinese dual-use exports to Iran “spiked in January 2024” when a strategic partnership was formalized and again after Trump restored “maximum pressure,” while Russia and Iran have since “exchanged drone technology and production know-how,” moving “roughly 90% of Shahed assembly to Russia” by 2025 and now sending Russian‑made Shaheds back to Iran.
Beyond drones, China has given Iran access to its BeiDou satellite navigation system and Chinese markets supply “inertial sensors or satellite navigation modules” for integration into UAVs and missiles, while Chinese chemical firms have been “repeatedly linked to shipments of dual-use materials” and “precursors for rocket fuel.” The piece warns that “a failure to confront this Axis of Evasion across its networks” will let it keep “enabling the flow of dual-use technologies among its members,” allowing Iran “to rebuild and expand its drone and missile arsenals both during and potentially after the current war,” and urges Trump to confront Xi directly with tougher export controls, broader entity listings, and a focus on third‑country transshipment hubs.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “What the Iran War Means for China: Beijing Fears American Volatility More Than American Power,” Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Foreign Affairs, 03.30.26.
- “The Iran war will cement China’s superpower status,” Tej Parikh, Financial Times, 03.29.26.

Missile defense:

No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Scientists can save nuclear arms control,” Rose Gottemoeller, Science, 03.26.26.

Rose Gottemoeller warns that with New START’s expiry in February 2026, “there is an opportunity for leaders of these nuclear states to create new treaties,” but if nuclear arms control “remain[s] unresolved and stagnate[s] for the remainder of [Trump’s] term, that outcome would be dangerous.” She notes that for now both Russia and the United States “seem willing to stick with the status quo,” i.e., the New START limits of “1550 warheads, 700 delivery vehicles, and 800 launchers,” but cautions that an unsettled framework “could lead one side or the other to surge above the previous limits,” and that “Russia has more active production lines and could deploy nuclear warheads much more quickly.”
Gottemoeller stresses that China’s buildup is “quickly narrowing the gap,” citing Pentagon estimates that its stockpile will grow from “the current number, 600 warheads, to 1500 by 2035,” and warns the United States could face “the threat of two nuclear peers sooner than the 2035 date that is currently predicted.” “What is needed,” she argues, “is a way to prioritize nuclear arms control and prevent a nuclear arms race that the United States could lose.”
She calls for scientists from the three nuclear powers to step in “as they did in years past,” recalling that in 1988 U.S. and Soviet weapons scientists conducted a Joint Verification Experiment that cleared up disputes over the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Today, she writes, U.S., Russian and Chinese experts should “address the key issue of what level of activity is permitted under the nuclear testing moratorium, with the aim of confirming zero yield,” warning that if concerns over hydronuclear experiments are left “to fester,” “the testing moratorium may collapse and with it, any chance of launching new negotiations.”

Securing the Future: Arms Control and International Security for the Modern Age, House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee , 03.25.26. Summarized by RM student associate Jack Lennon.

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno argues New START “was ineffective and only constrained the United States while allowing Russia to build and maintain a vast rearranged nuclear arsenal.” Further, the treaty “no longer served the national interest of the United States” as it “had no impact on the nuclear weapons programs in China or other nation states.” He believes New START’s expiration opens opportunities to pursue “improved, modernized agreements” as “the President is calling for multilateral arms control.”
Representative Gregory Meeks criticizes the Trump administration for “walking away from existing arms control frameworks without a viable plan to replace them” and President Trump’s threats to “resume reckless and unnecessary nuclear testing.” In turn, DiNanno argues “there was no extension available to the United States and Russia” since New START expired, and that the U.S. “continue[s] to engage with Russia and China as part of our multilateral course of business at the P5.” He thinks the P5 process “has to be more effective.”
DiNanno says “we have problems with the Russians across the entire array” of WMD proliferation issues, including the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and Russia’s “commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing.” Regarding New START, DiNanno describes the Russians as “serial violators” and argues the treaty’s “verification regime was not strong enough.” He acknowledges “good and predictable” pieces of the treaty but emphasizes it was signed in 2011 and “not appropriate for the security environment of today.”
Representatives Joe Wilson, Johnny Olszeweski and Jim Baird assess, “China and Russia seek to expand their ability in commercial small reactors” through “aggressive state-backed export programs” to the developing world, raising concerns that U.S. adversaries are implementing nuclear energy abroad “without guard rails or oversight.” DiNanno notes the U.S. is competing to “make the United States the partner of choice” for developing countries, avoid proliferation risks, and reap the “tremendous” commercial and strategic benefits of small modular reactor technologies. He notes significant “front-end work to be done with partner and allied nations.”
Representative Kieth Alan Self counts Russian superweapons and “fifth-generation grayzone warfare” among the many significant and “once unimaginable” strategic challenges faced by the United States. He notes, “Russia continues to deploy advanced nuclear systems including the RS28 Sarmat ICBM, the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, the SSCX9 Skyfall cruise missile, and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle… Adversaries including Moscow and Beijing exploit hybrid tactics to undermine the U.S. and its allies...Airspace violation, weaponized mass migration, infrastructure sabotage, cyber intrusions, all blurring the lines between war and peace.”
Representative Meeks argues “no one has benefitted more from Donald Trump’s in decision to start this War in Iran more than Russia” and criticizes the administration’s “decision to ease sanctions on Russian oil to offset skyrocketing gas prices.” Representative Greg Stanton likewise sees the Trump administration as “going back on years of bipartisan consensus to limit Russia's oil revenue,” which “hurt[s] the effort to support Ukraine” because “the boost in revenue gives Vladimir Putin the confidence to continue the war in Ukraine indefinitely.”
Representative Keating criticized State Department cuts to programs assisting the Prosecutor General’s Office in Ukraine. In response, DiNanno referenced his recent meeting with “the Ukrainian Ambassador… to make sure that the programs we have in place continue.” He reiterated the administration’s “robust” support for the PURL initiative, which coordinates NATO member state purchases of U.S. weapons for Ukraine.
DiNanno believes current nonproliferation regimes suffer from “a generational architecture problem” and need to be reevaluated and modernized. DiNanno and Representatives Bill Huizenga and Jonathan Jackson discussed the Missile Technology Control Regime, noting its constraints on sharing U.S. capabilities with strategic partners, and its failure to prevent Russia and Iran from acquiring western technology. DiNanno states, “The MTCR is 40 years old… if we are trying to solve for missile technologies and prevent the technology from getting into the hands of our adversaries, we haven’t done a very good job.” He argues, “We can’t let anything get in the way of equipping our allies with these sorts of systems, ballistic strike [capabilities], [and] UAVS.”

“Reflections on Russia’s Nuclear Behavior,” Stephen Blank, Kennan Institute/The Russia File, 03.16.26.

Stephen Blank argues that post‑2022 Russian doctrine and practice point to “a first strike and even a preemptive Russian strategy,” warning that “Putin is the ultimate decisionmaker and can override doctrine.” He notes that the 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence extends deterrence “against purely conventionally armed states,” citing “aggression… with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to [Russian and Belarusian] sovereignty,” and that Moscow’s deployment of “Oreshnik (Hazelnut) IRBM, hypersonic dual-use missiles… MIRVed” in Belarus “reduced restrictions on a nuclear first strike,” while blatantly violating both INF and New START.
Blank stresses that Russia “can produce 2500 ballistic and/or cruise missiles annually and is now stockpiling them,” quoting Fabian Hoffmann that this “points to only one conclusion: Russia is stockpiling missile systems for other contingencies, including a potential NATO-Russia confrontation in Europe.” He highlights exercises—Ocean maneuvers, Zapad‑2025—that for the first time “began not with a conventional threat or attack but with a scenario involving nuclear use of TNW against Europe,” and involve Kinzhal and Iskander systems, as evidence that “Russia has a growing interest and possible readiness to begin a war with Europe with a seemingly limited nuclear strike.”
On arms control and NATO, Blank says “the arms control regime collapsed largely due to Russian cheating,” citing a bipartisan U.S. commission that Russia “has either violated or has failed to comply with nearly every major arms control treaty or agreement,” and argues that without verification, reported understandings to “abide by [New START’s] numbers” are “meaningless.” He notes that on Feb. 23, 2026, Putin reaffirmed that “development of the nuclear triad remains an absolute priority,” and concludes that with Russia’s “mounting sabotage efforts in Europe” and orders “to seize more territory,” both “conventional and nuclear deterrence are urgent necessities,” requiring NATO to accelerate procurement and even “a new generation of nuclear weapons and missile defenses—not least theater nuclear weapons—to counter Russia’s threat of first strikes.”

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with France Télévisions public television broadcaster,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 03.26.26.

Nuclear weapons/nuclear issues

“When the Americans tell us that we should resume dialogue on strategic stability, nuclear deterrence and arms control, we believe that this becomes relevant at a certain stage. However, the conditions for such dialogue are not yet present, given that the Americans have completely undermined our partnership in the military sphere, in the strategic sphere.”
“At present, the Americans are more inclined towards coercing the People’s Republic of China into participating in those eventual talks. Our position is straightforward: the PRC makes its own judgment as to what serves its national interests. China has laid out its position, and we fully respect it. But China is not our ally, and we do not have any allied commitments. Meanwhile, the United States has such commitments with France (which is your country, and you might be interested in this) as well as with the UK. Therefore, speaking about the need to restore a nuclear deterrence and strategic stability dialogue while excluding France and the UK will lead to a blind alley. This is especially true now that President Emmanuel Macron has shown a keen interest in nuclear issues.”
“Even your President, Emmanuel Macron, has attempted to ‘place’ a nuclear bomb on this European stage. He is now promoting a new strategic initiative, offering French nuclear forces as a nuclear umbrella and declaring plans to expand France’s nuclear potential, without specifying the quantities. This suggests that he may not intend to engage in any
“When the Americans tell us that we should resume dialogue on strategic stability, nuclear deterrence and arms control, we believe that this becomes relevant at a certain stage. However, the conditions for such dialogue are not yet present, given that the Americans have completely undermined our partnership in the military sphere, in the strategic sphere.”

Iran/Middle East/U.S.–Israel actions

“You mentioned intelligence regarding the location of U.S. military bases. Everyone in the region knows their coordinates. This is not classified information. This information is readily available. I am not surprised to see Iran target them.”
“Our Western colleagues should not persistently demand that Iran cease any retaliatory measures while neglecting to urge the United States and Israel to halt the war they initiated without any justification whatsoever.”

Russia-Ukraine war

“As for the objectives we seek, they have been articulated by President Vladimir Putin. We have reiterated them repeatedly. They are defined by the causes of this crisis.”
- “First, we were assured at political levels that Ukraine would not be admitted into the alliance and that NATO would not expand. Then, when these assurances and agreements—reached within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—were violated, we were told they were political commitments, not legal ones. In other words, they lied to us when they signed these political declarations at the OSCE’s highest level.
- “The second issue we and our compatriots—Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine—have faced is the wholesale eradication of their rights, met with total silence from so-called beacons of freedom and democracy like France and other EU members.”
- “Now, the West promises Ukraine ‘security guarantees.’ President of France Emmanuel Macron has spoken on this topic with such fervent conviction, claiming these ‘guarantees’—including the deployment of ‘stabilization forces’ from unspecified international structures—are part of the solution. In reality, this would amount to outright occupation.”
- “And finally—you mentioned civilian casualties. I suppose this is what interests you most? You listed a series of facilities which, according to your sources, were targeted. These were civilian sites, with civilian casualties. We have repeatedly stated—through the words of President Vladimir Putin and the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense—that we never direct strikes at purely civilian targets. s.”
“The prolongation of the conflict is largely due to this subversive policy of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance leadership.”
“After Anchorage, all further progress in negotiations has been stalled by the EU and NATO leadership, especially Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Rutte, who worked hard to undermine these understandings and to steer the U.S. administration away from the agreements that it had put forward and Russia had supported.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI:

"AI May Win Battles in Iran, But Ukraine Startups Can Sway Wars," Parmy Olson, Bloomberg, 03.24.26.

Parmy Olson reports that Ukraine now “produces about four million unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) annually, more than any other NATO country,” and that “a $400 drone can destroy a Russian tank worth millions of dollars,” with these “cheap and nimble machines… estimated to be behind the destruction of more than 80% of enemy targets, according to Ukraine officials.” By contrast, she notes that the U.S. opening in Iran leaned on “aircraft carrier groups, F-35 fighter jets and Patriot missiles worth hundreds of millions of dollars,” even as AI tools compressed the kill chain “into 60 seconds for the strike that killed Iran’s supreme leader.”
Ukraine’s edge, Olson argues, is not any single technology but “its speed of iteration and adaptability,” with “nearly every Ukrainian regiment in regular contact with UAV, software or surveillance equipment producers—many of them startups.” She highlights the Brave1 “Amazon-like marketplace” where “more than 600 domestic drone manufacturers” sell gear and frontline units “earn points based on verified kills—destroying an enemy rocket-launch system earns up to 50 points, a tank wins 40—and they can then spend those points on kit.”
Olson contrasts this with the U.S., citing a February 2026 CSIS report that the Pentagon is “failing to leverage the full potential of the U.S. commercial sector” in unmanned and AI tools, and U.S. officials complaining of “rules and rigid budget allocations” that hinder work with startups. She notes that “nearly a third of [Ukraine’s] unmanned systems procurement goes to non-traditional vendors including startups,” while the U.S. has no comparable figure and has even “fallen out” with leading AI lab Anthropic mid‑war—an “immature and fractious relationship” with startups that she says “needs urgent mending.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "AI Is Top National Security Concern of 2026, Intelligence Community Says," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 03.29.26.
- “China is winning the AI talent race,” The Economist, 03.25.26.
- "Rules or Practice: New Forks in the Road for Global AI Regulation," Anton Tamarovich, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 03.27.26. (In Russian.) This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Will the Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Stop ‘Epic Fury’?,” interview with Mikhail Krutikhin, Republic, 03.2026. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Russian energy analyst and Iran specialist Mikhail Krutikhin dismisses Trump’s supposed “good and productive” talks with Tehran as “a smoke screen around military operations,” calling all talk of negotiations “imitation of activity.” “There are no negotiations,” he says; both sides have put forward “completely unacceptable” conditions, and Trump’s 10‑day pause is “the same as when he issued ultimatum after ultimatum” on Ukraine while “just pretending” to negotiate: “This has absolutely nothing to do with reality. It’s empty chatter,” Krutikhin argues.
On military options, he calls seizing Kharg Island pointless: “If this island passes under American control… that will mean they are giving their oil to someone. Is this a real scheme? I cannot imagine it,” and notes Iran would “simply stop feeding oil there.” Even a large ground operation to capture “several hundred kilometers of Iranian coast, and Qeshm Island, and Bandar Abbas” would not “save the Strait of Hormuz from Iranian drones,” which “can be launched from deep inside Iran,” so any such move is “more propagandistic than military or economic.”
Krutikhin says Operation Epic Fury is not in a dead end: its real aims are to “deprive Iran of the ability to build an atomic bomb,” “launch ballistic missiles,” and “finance terrorists across the Middle East,” and on those “they are being solved successfully.” He notes that before the war “about 20%” of world oil went through Hormuz; now only “one or two tankers a day” pass, so talk of Iran “allowing” traffic is “empty.” Russia, he adds, is a beneficiary of higher prices but faces its own crisis: “all Russian oil exports that went through the Baltic are stopping” as Ust‑Luga and Primorsk are repeatedly bombed, and if Ukraine hits Novorossiysk “then exports from the Black Sea will stop,” so “how can you make big money if you cannot export and sell this oil?”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "The Iran War and Russia’s Renewed Leverage in Global Energy Flows," Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, Observer Research Foundation, 03.26.26.
- "Ukraine Spent Big to Shield Energy Industry From Drones. Is the Mideast Next?" Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 03.24.26.

Climate change:

No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin Is Not Trapped: Why Regime Survival Does Not Depend on Victory,” Mariya Omelicheva, War on the Rocks, 03.30.26.

Mariya Omelicheva challenges the idea that Putin “cannot afford to lose” in Ukraine, arguing that “these policy frameworks rest on an underdeveloped account of how battlefield developments translate into political breakdown.” She notes that U.S. approaches from Biden through Trump’s envoys Keith Kellogg, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner share the “pressure, but not too much pressure” logic, assuming the war is “existential for Putin” and that any ceasefire “must ultimately be politically survivable in Moscow,” but “rarely specify the mechanisms through which battlefield setbacks would generate coordinated elite defection, coercive unreliability, and systemic instability,” she writes.
Drawing on history, Omelicheva contends that “authoritarian collapse rarely follows a single shock,” stressing that “regime stability does not require growth—only enough revenue to fund patronage and coercion,” and that in Russia today “for many elites, wealth and security are now inseparable from regime continuity.” She argues that “survival does not depend on winning the war. It depends on preventing fiscal shock, elite fragmentation, and erosion of coercive reliability,” and that the coercive core and “managed passivity rather than mass mobilization” make large‑scale revolt “unlikely even if Putin cannot achieve his preferred result.”
Policy should “distinguish clearly between regime collapse, regime strain, and regime bargaining,” Omelicheva insists, because “collapse is unlikely absent a broader political cascade” while “bargaining under pressure remains possible.” She concludes that sustained military and economic pressure—“advanced air defense,” “expanded long‑range strike capabilities,” stricter sanctions and price‑cap enforcement—“can alter the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculus and make negotiation rational—not because the regime is collapsing, but because continued fighting ceases to advance its interests,” and warns that overemphasis on Putin’s supposed “existential trap” needlessly narrows U.S. options.
U.S. “strategy should therefore proceed from the premise of authoritarian durability. Putin operates within a system built to absorb significant costs. As long as revenue flows remain sufficient, elites lack secure exit options, the coercive core stays cohesive, and society remains politically fragmented, he retains greater latitude to negotiate than the “trapped” narrative suggests,” according to Omelicheva.

“Starting this year, the world has become different. For everyone, not just for our country,” Oleg Deripaska’s post on his Telegram account, 03.30.26.

“This is no longer an economic crisis caused by tight monetary policy, interest rates, and the Central Bank macroeconomists’ futile attempts to strengthen the ruble.
And it is not only the result of the law enforcement agencies’ destruction of legal institutions, on which—like on a foundation—both domestic and foreign investment in the Russian economy rested.
This crisis is deeper. It has been brought on by a painful transformation: from the global opportunities we once had to regional ones, with all kinds of restrictions.
But we will have to go through this path anyway—and preferably as quickly as possible. I agree, we don’t have many resources. To be precise, we have only one, and it is tied to our national trait: in difficult moments we know how to pull ourselves together and work more.
And the faster we ourselves switch to this new schedule—from eight to eight, including Saturdays—the faster we will get through this transformation.
P.S. Although I know a few dozen people who started living on this schedule back in the 1990s and have never left it… Well, it will be a bit easier for them than for the others.”

“The War Has Killed Television: Russia’s inability to win in Ukraine is eroding public trust in TV propaganda,” Re:Russia War Review, 03.25.26.

Re:Russia argues that “four years of war in Ukraine have effectively brought the era of television in Russian politics to an end,” noting that TV’s influence, already eroded by the internet, has taken “another significant blow” because the Kremlin has “failed for more than four years to demonstrate convincing military success.” On the eve of the invasion “around 60% of Russians surveyed named [TV] as their main source of news,” but by 2026 this had fallen to “47%,” while “the share of those… who never watch television and do not have a TV set at home rose from 18%… to 33% in March 2026.”
Trust is collapsing in parallel: in the mid‑2010s “more than 55%” named television as the source they trusted “more than others,” but by early 2026 that figure had dropped to “31%,” while those who “do not trust any sources of information” climbed from “21–22%” to “32%.” Among people under 30, “only 16%” now see TV as their main source, compared with “57%” for news sites and “54%” for forums and social media; just “13%” of young respondents say they trust television, the authors note.
Re:Russia concludes that television “appears to have irreversibly lost its role as one of the principal instruments of authoritarian control,” even though it “played a significant role in justifying the war and mobilizing patriotic sentiment in 2022–2023.” In 2024–2025, they write, its “propaganda potential” has ebbed as the “protracted and unsuccessful war” has a “demobilizing effect,” with the “special military operation” now ranking first among topics Russians say are covered excessively on TV—evidence that “its failures and protracted nature appear to have substantially undermined trust in TV propaganda.”

“The TV in the Fridge: Russians Are Getting Poorer but Continue to Demonstrate Loyalty to the Authorities,” Alexei Levinson, Levada Center / Ubri et orbi, 03.30.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

Alexei Levinson notes that Levada’s monthly polls still find “66%” saying “things in the country are going in the right direction,” while only “22%” think Russia is “moving along the wrong path.” When asked if they approve of Putin’s work as president, “12% of Russians find in themselves the courage… to answer: ‘No’,” he writes, estimating that “the total number of those dissatisfied with how the country is governed” is “about a quarter of the adult population.” Yet among this critical minority, “55% nevertheless support the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine,” and even among Putin’s supporters “one-tenth” say they do not, he observes.
On lived conditions, Levinson reports that 25% said their own life “became worse” in 2025 and 39% thought the “standard of living” of the “main part of the population” fell, while only “17%” thought it improved. On health care, “20%” said it got better and “35%” worse; on “the possibility of earning good money,” only “one-fifth” said better while “a third” said worse. He emphasizes that on freedom of expression, just “14%” saw more opportunities, while “28%” saw fewer, and among office workers the ratio was “one to four (‘at work, don’t talk too much’).”
Paradoxically, “television, radio and print media” are seen as improving: “23%” say they “worked better” in 2025, versus “13%” worse, with TV still the “main source of information” for a majority and praised by “57%” of older respondents. Levinson cautions critics of the “fridge vs. TV” theory that “we are not supporters of this rather vulgar economic determinism,” arguing that in Russia “the combination of the state as an apparatus of violence (Marx) and an organized apparatus of propaganda (Lenin)… has always turned out to be stronger than the so-called material conditions of the masses.” Russians themselves, he concludes, are saying: “let our material life weaken, but our symbolic armor (TV) and our ‘organs’… grow stronger. While they are with us, we both approve and support.”

“Cracks Spread Through Putin’s Power Structure,” Alexey Kovalev, Foreign Policy, 03.27.26.

Alexey Kovalev recounts how loyalist lawyer Ilya Remeslo—who “credits himself… with building the legal case that sent opposition leader Alexei Navalny” to the Arctic prison where he died—published “Five reasons why I stopped supporting Vladimir Putin,” calling the invasion a “dead-end war” that has “destroyed the economy, and crushed all domestic opposition,” and declaring that Putin “is no longer ‘a legitimate president’ and must ‘resign and be brought to trial as a war criminal and a thief.’” Within 48 hours, Remeslo “was in a psychiatric ward,” an echo of “Soviet practice of pathologizing dissent,” Kovalev notes.
The article argues Remeslo’s break coincides with “the most aggressive internet crackdown in Russian history,” as the Kremlin throttles Telegram and WhatsApp, rolls out the MAX super‑app “met with near‑universal hostility,” and imposes mobile blackouts that now hit “office workers… businesses unable to process cashless transactions, taxi drivers,” and even public toilets whose payment systems are offline.
Kovalev concludes that the regime is now “dismantling the very infrastructure it used to build support:” “Telegram, the app that carried the war’s propaganda to millions of phones, is being strangled by the state that used it to promote its message,” while “farmers who never thought about politics are blocking roads,” and “the Kremlin spent years constructing a narrative so total that reality could not intrude. It is now discovering that when you seal every window, you also cut off your own air.”

Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Plenary session of the RSPP Congress, Kremlin.ru, 03.26.26. Machine translated.

Transcript of a speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin for the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
“Trusting, thorough cooperation between the state and business is especially significant today, when around the world, on global markets, the level of uncertainty and even stress has sharply increased. We all know well the events of 2014, when we were compelled—Russia was compelled, we were forced… to do everything necessary to protect our people then in Crimea, later in the southeast of Ukraine as a whole. But after that, illegal sanctions followed. They are illegal… because they were never confirmed by decisions of the United Nations.”
“The armed conflict in the Middle East… is causing significant damage to international logistical, production, and cooperative chains. Entire sectors have come under attack—those connected with the extraction and processing of hydrocarbons and metals, with the production of fertilizers. To respond to the challenge of the times, Russia must be… strong… and united in understanding its national interests. Despite objective difficulties and artificial restrictions introduced against our country, we are managing to maintain macroeconomic stability.”
“Thank you… for supporting our guys, our heroes, the participants in the special military operation and their family members. Thank you very much for your contribution to the economic revival of Donbas and Novorossiya.”
“There may be a temptation… obtain windfall incomes and, so to speak, ‘eat them up.’ We need to maintain prudence. Moderate conservatism and a moderately conservative approach are necessary both in the corporate sphere and in public finances. For this it is necessary to strengthen our own sovereignty. Without sovereignty it is impossible to protect one’s fundamental interests.”
“We will especially support the introduction of solutions in three key cross-cutting technologies: artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and digital platforms. We plan to develop such cooperation… primarily through BRICS. We decided to expand it and build a second building for 50 beds, increasing capacity by about 500 people per year. Rehabilitation is probably the key issue that interests the servicemen today. We stay in contact with each of them.” Interestingly, Putin seems unaware of the contradiction in asserting that economic sanctions applied to Russia were “illegal” because they were not approved in the United Nations, when neither Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 nor its full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were approved in any U.N. forum.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "World War III's First Shots Will Be Fired in Space," Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 03.30.26.
See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Beyond Oil: Hormuz Closure Puts Russia in the Lead in the Fertilizer Market,” Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Politika, 03.24.26.

Alexandra Prokopenko argues that while attention is on oil, “the changes [from Hormuz’s closure] in the global fertilizer market will be more gradual, but irreversible,” warning that “food prices will take six to nine months to react to the supply shock” and that Russia “might enjoy more lasting benefits than temporarily lining its pockets with petrodollars.” Persian Gulf states handle “about 46% of global seaborne urea transit and around 30% of ammonia transit,” she notes, and with that shipping “almost completely paralyzed,” nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer prices have already surged.
Russia, by contrast, “accounts for about 23% of global ammonia exports, 14% of global urea exports, and—together with Belarus—40% of global potash exports,” and its export infrastructure is “completely independent of the Strait of Hormuz,” Prokopenko writes. Importers in Nigeria and Ghana are “already pre‑purchasing Russian fertilizers for the third quarter of 2026,” and, she stresses, “once established, these connections will solidify into a dependency that could outlast any ceasefire.” Fertilizers are “even more convenient as leverage” than grain because they attract less Western media attention yet are “more critical for the agricultural sector.”
Prokopenko cites Kremlin aide Nikolai Patrushev calling the U.S.‑Israeli operation a “catalyst for the redistribution of the global energy market and the disruption of maritime logistics” with “unpredictable humanitarian and economic consequences,” and proposing Russian naval convoys to protect merchant ships. She concludes that while “additional oil revenues are likely, but could run out,” sustained higher fertilizer and food prices are “a victory of a different magnitude,” giving Moscow a chance “to convert its market power into political influence” over countries in Africa and Asia whose neutrality is vital for the West—so that by 2027, “Russia will be able to position itself as an indispensable supplier that saved the world from starvation… The Kremlin did not sow this harvest, but it will most likely reap it.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel,” Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, Foreign Affairs, 03.25.26.

Ukraine:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"The secret to Ukraine’s remarkably resilient labor market," Sarah O'Connor, Financial Times, 03.24.26.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “Why America’s AI Push in Armenia Faces Political and Security Risks,” Nima Khorrami, The National Interest, 03.30.26.

Endnotes

ISR = intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; FPV = first-person view; MALE = medium-altitude long-endurance; OWA = one-way attack; UAV = uninhabited aerial vehicle.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Rescue workers try to put out a fire caused by the fragments of a Russian drone that hit a private house during air attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, March 25, 2026. (AP Photo/Andrii Marienko)

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Russia Analytical Report, March 23–30, 2026

4 Ideas to Explore

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

Iran and its nuclear program:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Military aid to Ukraine:

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Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

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Missile defense:

Nuclear arms:

Counterterrorism:

Conflict in Syria:

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Energy exports from CIS:

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U.S.-Russian economic ties:

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Defense and aerospace:

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

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Ukraine:

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