This Week’s Highlights

• U.S. unwillingness to accept great powers’ claims to special privileges in their respective neighborhoods forecloses opportunities to negotiate sphere-of-restraint settlements that might be able to enshrine those privileges in a peaceful and orderly manner, writes Evan R. Sankey, a research analyst at Johns Hopkins University. The Russian intervention in Ukraine arguably reflected U.S. short-sightedness along these lines. More broadly, an inflexible U.S. policy of preventing spheres of influence increases the likelihood of military crises on great-power frontier, Sankey argues.
• Prof. Li-Chen Sim argues that the renegotiation of an OPEC+ agreement is the most realistic way to end the oil price war. Meanwhile, Prof. Nickolas Gvosdev writes that in the oil war, the Kremlin is gambling that, by year’s end, it will be able to not only push back against the United States but also to reconstruct its partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Financial Times’ Henry Foy writes that, as the oil price war rages on,  Russia’s biggest oil companies may still be able to turn a profit even if prices fall to $15 a barrel and that the resilience of Russian oil companies to endure lower prices is partly a result of attempts by the U.S. and Europe to hurt them via sanctions.
• Harvard’s Stephen Walt writes that former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov’s description of life in the Soviet Union may be a more accurate description of American life than Americans would like to admit: “[We] stole from ourselves, took and gave bribes, lied in the reports, in newspapers, from high podiums, wallowed in our lies, hung medals on one another. And all of this—from top to bottom and from bottom to top.” Walt argues it is upon Americans now to prove that their country is still competent enough to figure out what it needs to do about the coronavirus. RAND’s Charles Ries writes that the U.S., Russia and other G20 members should commit not to impose restrictions on trade in critical goods for fighting the pandemic, while former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul notes that after the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. and Soviet leaders, and especially American and Soviet scientists, learned that on nuclear issues, we were, as Siegfried Hecker characterized it, "doomed to cooperate." The coronavirus pandemic, McFaul argues, should teach Chinese and American leaders that even rivals are sometimes doomed to cooperate.
• Alexander Lukin and Anatoly Torkunov of MGIMO write that the main geopolitical consequence of U.S. policy toward Russia and China is that it drives Moscow and Beijing closer together. As a result, efforts by China and by Russia are now aimed at creating a comprehensive Eurasian partnership, the geography of which almost completely matches the geography of the “anti-hegemonic alliance” whose creation Brzezinski had feared, according to Lukin and Torkunov.
• Temur Umarov argues that while many people see Russia as China’s main rival in Central Asia, Russia cannot compete with China in the region: Russia’s economic structure is too similar to that of Central Asia to allow Russia to become a major buyer of raw materials from the region. If anything, Umarov write, Moscow is in competition with Central Asia.  

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Changing global order/new Cold War:

“Reconsidering Spheres of Influence,” Evan R. Sankey, Survival, 03.23.20: The author, a research analyst at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

• “The most articulate opponents of spheres of influence argue that they have contested boundaries which are ‘prone to great power conflict’ and that prevention enhances international stability. But the policy of universal deterrence believed necessary to forestall the emergence of spheres of influence is also subject to great-power tension and instability. Russia and China are alarmed by America’s efforts to cultivate strong relationships with their neighbors.”
• “Russian and Chinese policymakers resent America’s efforts to maintain military primacy, especially because it requires the presence of U.S. military forces on their frontiers. … Nuclear weapons compound the problem. Russia and China could risk nuclear escalation to secure geographically proximate interests, and could issue credible nuclear threats if the U.S. began to prevail in a conventional fight.” 
• “Conceptually, spheres of influence are security-enhancing because they serve as buffers to secure vital interests, those for which a great power would risk war. They are stability-enhancing when rivals recognize them as a means of signaling respect for vital interests. The U.S. has historically benefited from these security- and stability-enhancing effects.”
• “U.S. unwillingness to accept great powers’ claims to special privileges in their respective neighborhoods forecloses opportunities to negotiate sphere-of-restraint settlements that might be able to enshrine those privileges in a peaceful and orderly manner. The Russian intervention in Ukraine arguably reflected U.S. short-sightedness along these lines.”
• “More broadly, an inflexible U.S. policy of preventing spheres of influence increases the likelihood of military crises on great-power frontiers. And the relative erosion of America’s military power-projection capabilities increases the likelihood that such crises will end badly for the United States and compromise the territorial integrity of small front-line countries.”

“Right-Wing Extremism: The Russian Connection,” Shelby Butt and Daniel Byman, Survival, March 2020: The authors, an undergraduate research scholar in Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies and a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, write:

• “Russia is cultivating extreme right-wing support to undermine the West, using a variety of actors to woo different partners. … One of Moscow’s most pernicious efforts is its support for white-supremacist and other far-right groups, encouraging them with propaganda, providing them with a haven, and otherwise making them stronger and more dangerous.”
• “At this point, Russia is not seeking to inspire white supremacists to commit mass murder in the West, but its efforts to stir the pot and support or tolerate extremists are likely to lead to an increase in violence and create significant long-term risks.”
• “Shaming and exposing Russia itself is worth doing, but the world should not expect significant change in Moscow’s conduct. … Given the limited scope for modifying Russia’s behavior, it would make sense for Western partners to mount concerted efforts to directly target seditious organizations that have accepted Russian training…. Beyond targeting Russia and the outfits it supports, U.S. and allied counter-terrorism organizations must recognize the wide variety of other actors involved and tailor their responses to their actions.”
• “Treating violent right-wing groups with international links like genuine terrorists is another important policy measure. The United States rarely designates such organizations as terrorist groups, even if they have international connections. So designating them would make it illegal for individuals or organizations to finance, join or otherwise support these groups, depriving them of resources and affording investigators and prosecutors significantly greater leverage.”
• “Finally, the right-wing threat warrants increases in the resources flowing to the FBI and other law-enforcement and intelligence agencies for counter-radicalization programs.”  

“Russia's Plan to Modernize Its Nuclear Bombers Is Gaining Speed,” Mark B. Schneider, The National Interest, 03.25.20: The author, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, writes

• “Absent an economic collapse in Russia, the Russian strategic nuclear bomber force will continue to expand in terms of the number of platforms, the number of nuclear weapons they carry and their strike range. The New START Treaty has virtually no effect on these developments. The problem will be made worse by the Backfire bomber and the Su-34 strike fighter reportedly being given prohibited nuclear long-range cruise missile capability. Russian strategic bombers will also be given nuclear capable hypersonic missiles.”
• “USAF’s current B-21 program … will not offset the Russian advantage in nuclear hypersonic missiles. Russia is talking about using these missiles in a nuclear decapitation attack on the U.S. National Command Authority. Russian heavy bombers would be able to implement such a strike at short notice while evading our early warning capability. There is clearly a need to both deter and defend against such attacks. The New START Treaty prevents none of this.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Enhancing Deterrence and Defense on NATO's Northern Flank. Allied Perspectives on Strategic Options for Norway,” James Black, Stephen J. Flanagan, Gene Germanovich, Ruth Harris, David Ochmanek, Marina Favaro, Katerina Galai and Emily Gloinson, RAND Corporation, March 2020: The authors of the report write:

• “Allies do not anticipate direct threats to Norway in the short term. Instead, the most significant threat is horizontal escalation of a conflict triggered in another region. … The High North holds strategic importance to Russia's Bastion Defense in the Barents Sea and Arctic. NATO must plan for possible future operations in an increasingly contested environment.”
• “The Bear and GIUK gaps are key to warning of Russian Northern Fleet operations against NATO in any future conflict.”
• “The rise of China is seen as a significant issue for NATO, though Allied officials differ over the urgency and scale of this challenge. … Norway could use its national defense strategy to shape NATO's thinking on topics such as Russia, societal resilience and innovation.”

Pandemic:

“Pandemics Can Fast Forward the Rise and Fall of Great Powers,” Matthew Kroenig, The National Interest, 03.23.20: The author, director of the Global Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, writes:

• “How well Washington and Beijing manage the ramifications of the coronavirus in the weeks ahead may determine who leads the international system decades hence. After all, as I explain in a new book, global pandemics have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers in the past.”
• “In the Peloponnesian War with its rival Sparta Athens was struck by the plague in 430 BC. … Prior to the outbreak, Athens appeared on the verge of victory, but weakened by the affliction, it sued for a temporary peace in 421 BC. When the fighting resumed, Athens was eventually defeated and its democratic form of government overthrown by the victorious Spartans.”
• “Like Athens Venice contended unsuccessfully with repeated bouts of the plague. The Italian Plague of 1629 to 1631, was believed to have originated in China and spread West over Silk Road trading routes. … The Italian Plague contributed to a major shift in the European balance of power as Venice declined and Northern European states, such as England and the Dutch Republic, rose to become major geopolitical powers.”
• “Fortunately for the United States, my research shows that democracies generally outperform their autocratic competitors in great power rivalries. Still, there is no time to lose. As U.S. leaders formulate their response to the coronavirus, they must think not only in terms of the immediate public health crisis, but also about the very future of American global leadership.”

“In a COVID-19 World, Russia Sticks to International Distancing,” Mathieu Boulègue, Chatham House, 03.29.20: The author, a research fellow at Chatham House, writes:

• “Russia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic—‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’—while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.”
• “With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.”

“Coronavirus Fake News Isn’t Like Other Fake News,” Sarah Kreps and Brendan Nyhan, Foreign Affairs, 03.30.20: The authors, professors of government at Cornell University and Dartmouth College respectively, write:

• “Russia is taking a page from its 2016 playbook and trying to use disinformation about the coronavirus to foment political unrest in Europe and the United States. But so far, social media and Internet groups have earned praise for making a concerted, and thus far successful, effort to limit misinformation.”
• “In the desperate fight against the novel coronavirus, social media platforms have achieved an important victory: they have helped limit the dissemination of life-threatening misinformation that could worsen the pandemic. But this success should not cause us to adopt a similar approach to political speech, where greater caution is required.”

“Russia Claims It Has COVID-19 Under Control. The Facade Is Cracking,” Garry Kasparov, The Washington Post, 03.29.20: The author, chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, writes:

• “The human cost would be beside the point to Putin, who cares only about sending the message that he is strong and in control. If you think that description also applies to President Trump's recent news conferences, you wouldn't be wrong.”
• “While we battle to stop the virus from destroying our bodies, we must also hold dearly to our souls. America will outlast the coronavirus despite Trump, and it doesn't have to become like him to do it.”

“What the G-20 Can Do About Coronavirus,” Charles Ries, Wall Street Journal, 03.29.20: The author, vice president, international at the RAND Corporation, writes:

• “Here are four specific commitments and actions G-20 countries—in cooperation with other international organizations—could take.”
• “Commit not to impose restrictions on trade in critical goods for fighting the pandemic. … Allow production-enhancing subsidies and other measures governments may wish to take to deal with shortfalls. … Prepare to deploy a vaccine. … Upgrade the system of immunization records for travelers.”

“It's Imperative for the US and China to Work Together on the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 03.26.20: The author, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and former U.S. ambassador to Russia, writes:

• “The novel coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated already tense relations between the United States and China. Even before the coronavirus came along, many experts were already describing the relationship … as a ‘new Cold War’ or ‘Cold War 2.0.’ But now, the virus has added a new accelerant to the confrontation — with both sides now blaming each other for creating and spreading the disease. … This blame game serves neither the long-term interests of the United States nor China.”
• “During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union learned to confront each other on several issues … and at the same time worked out ways to cooperate when their interests overlapped … American and Chinese leaders must learn similar habits.”
• “Both President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping should begin by initiating confidence-building measures to set the stage for more regular diplomacy. Xi should remove his flame-throwing spokesperson at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, and find a face-saving way to allow the ousted American journalists to return. Trump and his team should stick to scientific terminology when describing this global virus.”
• “Next, Trump and Xi should establish a high-level working group to engage in direct talks, air their differences, agree to new norms for public discourse, and—most importantly—develop a joint plan for combating the virus, our common enemy. … U.S. and Chinese leaders should also should provide leadership in multilateral arenas.”
• “After the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. and Soviet leaders, and especially American and Soviet scientists, learned that on nuclear issues, we were, as Siegfried Hecker characterized it, ‘doomed to cooperate.’ The coronavirus pandemic should teach Chinese and American leaders—not to mention scientists, doctors and health-care officials in both countries—that even rivals are sometimes doomed to cooperate.”

“The Death of American Competence: Washington’s reputation for expertise has been one of the greatest sources of its power. The coronavirus pandemic may end it for good,” Stephen M. Walt, The Washington Post, 03.23.20: The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “No matter how the federal government responded, the United States was never going to escape COVID-19 entirely. Even Singapore, whose response to the virus seems to be the gold standard thus far, has several hundred confirmed cases. Nonetheless, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration’s belated, self-centered, haphazard and tone-deaf response will end up costing Americans trillions of dollars and thousands of otherwise preventable deaths. … Far from making ‘America great again,’ this epic policy failure will further tarnish the United States’ reputation as a country that knows how to do things effectively.”
• “Former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov’s description of life in the Soviet Union may be a more accurate description of American life than Americans would like to admit: ‘[We] stole from ourselves, took and gave bribes, lied in the reports, in newspapers, from high podiums, wallowed in our lies, hung medals on one another. And all of this—from top to bottom and from bottom to top.’
• “It is upon Americans now to … prove that their country is still competent enough to figure out what it needs to do. And then they need to do it.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

“Don’t Lose Sight of the Enduring Global Terrorist Threat,” Raffaello Pantucci, Royal United Services Instittue (RUSI), 03.30.20: The author, a senior associate fellow at RUSI, writes:

• “As the world’s attention remains understandably concentrated on the coronavirus pandemic, it is important to remember that other threats have not gone away. … Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS), has started to tell its adherents to take advantage of the chaos in the West caused by the coronavirus pandemic to launch attacks.”
• “There is evidence of growing coherence amongst the global jihadist movement. Rather than disintegrating, they appear to be developing and strengthening their connections. This has been most visible in Africa, where reporting from the Sahel suggests that Al-Qaida- and Daesh-aligned groups on the ground are working together. … A similar, though maybe less surprising, level of coherence is visible within Al-Qaida’s various African factions.”
• “All of these moves are taking place against a backdrop of escalating U.S.–Iran tensions. … The danger is that these shifts will produce a dramatic terrorist attack which will shock the West out of its current collective coronavirus focus. Daesh’s suggestion to its adherents represents a first indication that the terrorist organisation sees the West as distracted, and may seize the opportunity to launch a dramatic attack. The broader trends that have been visible with Al-Qaida date back to before the current crisis, but show a threat picture which is developing in directions that warrant close attention.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“How Russia’s Troll Farm Is Changing Tactics Before the Fall Election,” Davey Alba, New York Times, 03.29.20: The author, a technology reporter, writes:

• “Ahead of November’s election, American intelligence officials and others are on high alert for mischief from Russia’s Internet Research Agency. … To avoid detection, the group has since [the 2016 election in the U.S.] evolved its tactics. Here are five ways its methods have shifted.”
• “The troll farm published posts with many spelling, grammar and syntax errors. … Now Russian operators are trying to avoid detection by copying and pasting chunks of texts from other sources directly into their posts. … The troll farm’s posts were wordy and included many hashtags … [but] is now using less text in posts and fewer hashtags.”
• “Instead of writing its own text, the troll farm now also posts screenshots of tweets created by real Americans. Computer programs typically do not scan images for text. … The Russian group tried to build large followings on Facebook and Instagram. The group appears to be trying to hide its accounts, leading to fewer followers.”
• “The troll farm stamped images with watermarks and logos … The group appears to be removing watermarks or blurring them. … The troll group previously created accounts directly on Facebook to influence Americans. Now it appears to be hiring local people to open social media accounts, a practice known as ‘franchising’ that adds a layer of camouflage.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Oil Price War of 2020: Winners, Losers and Ways Forward,” Li-Chen Sim, Russia Matters, 03.25.20: The author, an assistant professor at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates, writes:

• “As a rule, lower prices are good for oil-importing countries and bad for oil exporters. … [T]heoretically, if crude oil prices now average $30 in 2020 instead of $60, China would be able to save around $300 million per day on imported oil. … China should be able to leverage lower oil prices to feed its significant oil import requirements and to re-start economic activity in the country. This optimistic perspective, however, needs to be nuanced.”
• “First, China’s economic recovery is dependent on demand elsewhere. … Second, lower oil prices may negatively affect key sectors of the Chinese economy that are independent of overseas customers. … Third, China’s economic slowdown pre-dated the outbreak of coronavirus.”
• “Oil traders and tanker owners, more so than China, are the outright beneficiaries of the oil price war. … There are no winners among key oil producers and exporters. The question here is who is worse off and will be first to fold.”
• “Russia and Saudi Arabia seem to be on par in terms of economic and financial buffers … It is in the socio-political realm that Russia is arguably more resilient. In Russia today, stability is privileged over growth. … As for U.S. shale producers, the most indebted with acreage outside the Permian basin may not weather low oil prices.”
• “The oil price war of 2020 is underpinned by simultaneous shocks in demand and supply. This makes it highly unusual but not unprecedented. … There are three possible ways the oil price war can end. The first is demand recovery, especially in China … [H]owever, China’s role as a locomotive is tempered by its intermediary role in global supply chains and its own structural shortcomings. … Eliminating the oil supply overhang would be the other way … However, Gulf oil producers and Russia have announced intentions to increase oil supply … This leaves the re-negotiation of an OPEC+ agreement as the most realistic way to end the oil price war.”

“Why Russian Oil Groups Are Well Positioned for a Price Crash,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 03.29.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia’s biggest oil companies are well positioned to withstand low prices for the next couple of years, given certain advantages they have over global rivals, and may still be able to turn a profit even if prices fall to $15 a barrel.”
• “The resilience of Russian oil companies to lower prices is partly a result of attempts by the U.S. and Europe to hurt them. Six years of Western sanctions have restricted their access to foreign technology and capital. As a result, the vast majority of their costs and liabilities are in rubles rather than dollars.”
• “Russia’s free-floating currency … is another boon. As oil prices fall, the ruble generally weakens, increasing domestic earnings per exported barrel. … It also has a tax system that reduces levies on producers in line with oil prices, and its producers have big foreign exchange reserves saved up over the past few years.”

“Who Wins When Saudi Arabia and Russia Fight an Oil War? Does America?” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 03.28.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “The Kremlin is gambling that, by year’s end, it will be able to not only push back against the United States but also to reconstruct its partnership with Saudi Arabia.”
• “The coronavirus panic provided Russian energy producers with an opportunity to argue that further OPEC+ cuts would do nothing to prevent a collapse of energy prices—and that Russia would continue to lose market share. The Saudi response has been to match and call Russia’s bluff by promising to produce more at even lower prices. But the Russians still have several advantages.”
• “Russia seems willing to engage in a major stress test of the U.S. energy export approach to a prolonged price war. Given that the Trump administration is unlikely to purchase large amounts of U.S. production at a guaranteed high price for the strategic reserve, U.S. producers will face the prospect of much lower revenue—and reach a point where it no longer makes business sense to stay in operation.”
• “Would the Saudis then be more inclined to return to bargaining with Moscow? Possibly. A good deal depends on how U.S.-Saudi relations fare during a prolonged energy price war.”
• “So Russia enters this oil price war with two overarching objectives: drive U.S. producers out of business, and expose Riyadh to the limits of American support. Thanks to a talented team at the country’s finance ministry, they have the rainy-day funds in place to achieve that goal. Putin has taken a page from the Trump playbook of trade wars: be prepared to take short-term damage if you think your opponents will be forced to concede. Perhaps these will assumptions hold up in the weeks and months to come.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“US Elections and Russia-US Relations: Can the Two Countries Break the Vicious Circle Of Confrontation?” Dmitry Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.26.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The root cause of this [U.S.-Russian]standoff is the lack of a satisfactory settlement following the end of the Cold War. Having lost that confrontation under the name of the USSR, Russia refused to get integrated with the U.S.-centric system as the United States' junior partner. Moreover, it embarked on a policy of regaining the status of a great power. The winner in the Cold War, the United States, which had in fact already written off Russia as a major international actor, found Moscow's offer of partnership on parity terms utterly unacceptable. This is the most important factor about the end of the Cold War.”
• “The current state of Russia-U.S. relations is grave but stable. Their further worsening is possible and even most likely, but a fatal turn may occur only as a result of a tragic coincidence of circumstances. A safety net protecting the two sides from a direct military clash does exist.” 
• “The main risk is a possible emergence of a new bipolar model, in which Russia, which refused to be the United States' junior partner, might turn into a vassal of China. Washington's pressure on both Moscow and Beijing contributes to the implementation of this scenario.”
• “Russia appreciates its current relations with China and will not take the United States' side in its confrontation with China. … There are enough reasons to say that double containment of Russia and China does not agree with America's strategic interests, either, but it has to be borne in mind that the United States' policies have not been strategically impeccable lately.”
• “If Russia succeeds in standing firm and retaining strategic independence, then its relations with the United States may bear fruit. A less global and more national-oriented approach by the United States to world affairs, while creating security vacuums in different parts of the world … may create conditions for Russian-U.S. cooperation within certain limits.”
• “Or course, Moscow should closely monitor the situation in the United States, but by no means try to intervene in events there. Attempts at hacking into the political sanctum of other countries always triggers an outcry and almost never yields benefits. ... For the time being it is strongly advisable for Russia to focus on gradually lessening the level of confrontation with the U.S. and, in the longer term, to look for conditions that would end it altogether.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin, Forever: The Russian President Remains as Inscrutable as Ever,” Peter Rutland, NYU Jordan Center/Transitions, 03.16.20: The author, a professor of government at Wesleyan University, writes:

• “It is hard to say what is preferable—a leader with a master plan, or a leader who changes his mind in response to changing circumstances. Either way, Putin’s penchant for repeated and abrupt reforms undermines the efforts of those who want to see more stable and transparent political institutions in Russia. Putin has got used to a ‘fire-fighting’ management style. And that seems to be what the Russian people have come to expect from their leaders: a late January poll found Putin’s approval rating stable at 68 percent.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

 “The 2020 Oil Crash: Is Russia Still an Energy Superpower?” Peter Rutland, PONARS Eurasia, March 2020: The author, a professor of government at Wesleyan University, writes:

• “Russia’s policymakers have always wanted to turn its energy wealth into geopolitical influence, but it continues to wrestle with the state’s ‘resource curse.’”
• “There is a curious imbalance between Russia’s resurgence as a power on the world stage and its anemic economic performance. This is largely explained by the decisive role that energy plays in structuring Russia’s domestic political economy. Russia remains very much a ‘petrostate,’ in which the energy rent-seekers, in alliance with the security forces, have the upper hand over the profit-seekers. So the main geopolitical importance of energy when it comes to understanding Russia is not its role as a tool of power projection abroad but its role in shaping the behavior of the Russian power-elite at home.”
• “The concept of an ‘energy superpower’ is somewhat contradictory, lumping together two quite distinct logics: that of the energy market and that of military superpowers. Russia wants to convert its energy wealth into geopolitical influence. But energy rents come with all the drawbacks of the ‘resource curse,’ from corruption at home to market volatility abroad.”
• “It is unusual to see a resource-rich country taking on the attributes of a world power. … Russia, of course, is the grand exception: Tsarist Russia was rich in resources but created the world’s largest empire. The expansionism of the tsars was driven by a concern for security and prestige rather than a search for resources. Likewise, the USSR’s quest for empire was not primarily driven by a need for more resources, but by a combination of security fears and ideological fervor. Putin’s Russia seems to be reverting to a similar pattern. Unfortunately, it ended badly both for the tsars and the Soviets.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Trump’s Policies and the Sino-Russian Entente,” Alexander Lukin and Anatoly Torkunov, Survival, 03.23.20: The authors, the director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the president of MGIMO, write:

• “U.S. strategists advocated restricting Russia’s—or, for that matter, any other power’s—development in [Eurasia]. … The collapse of the Soviet Union did not stop the non-Western centers of power from gaining strength—as experts back in the 1970s and 1980s had predicted … and a multipolar world from emerging. The reluctance of the U.S. to accept this process led these non-Western powers to establish a counterweight to the United States by forming their own organizations and groups.”
• “[The Trump] administration established three primary objectives in the region: maintaining and strengthening U.S. leadership, ‘containing’ a rapidly growing China that had managed to mount a significant challenge to the U.S. over the course of the previous decade and uniting and mobilizing U.S. allies behind Washington’s policies.”
• “The U.S. strategy is clearly aimed at checking a rapidly rising China and its Belt and Road Initiative, by which Beijing allegedly ‘seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global pre-eminence in the long-term,’ and describes Russia as a ‘revitalized malign actor.’”
• “The main geopolitical consequence of U.S. policy … is that it drives Moscow and Beijing closer together. ... By shutting China out of the Asia-Pacific on all fronts, Washington leaves Beijing no choice but to seek partners on an anti-U.S. basis, just as shutting Russia out of Europe leaves Moscow with no other choice. … The Trump administration’s policy in the Asia-Pacific has effectively stimulated the very eventuality that several generations of U.S. strategists had feared—namely, Washington’s loss of control over Eurasia resulting from the deepening rapprochement between the two major Eurasian powers. It remains to be seen whether Washington will be able to cope with it.”

“China Looms Large in Central Asia,” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.30.20: The author, a consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “China is gradually laying down the foundations for the construction of a Pax Sinica in Central Asia.”
• “For China, security interests come first. … The first Chinese military base appeared not so long ago, in the Murghob district of Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. … Since 2016, the PLA has conducted seven exercises with the national armies of Central Asia. … China also provides the countries of Central Asia with assistance in military technology.”
• “Central Asia’s economic growth largely depends on China. … While Central Asia accounts for 0.8 percent of Chinese imports and 0.9 percent of Chinese exports … China is now the destination for about 22 percent of all Central Asian exports, and the source of 37 percent of their imports. … Could something [like a Chinese debt trap scare] happen in Central Asia? The countries most at risk are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The debts of both countries to China are greater than 20 percent of their GDP.”
• “The main symbol of Chinese soft power is the Confucius Institute and its China studies classes. The organization has thirty-seven branches in Central Asia … [T]he issue that has caused the most damage to China’s reputation in Central Asia is, however, the Chinese Communist Party’s policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”
• “The region’s growing dependence on China is prompting more and more concern. … Many people see Russia as China’s main rival in the region. … But Russia cannot compete with China in Central Asia: Russia’s economic structure is too similar to that of Central Asia to allow Russia to become a major buyer of raw materials from the region. If anything, Moscow is in competition with Central Asia. Moscow’s primary role in the region is that of a military stabilizer.”

Ukraine:

“Desperate for Aid, Ukraine First Has to Fight Corruption,” Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 03.27.20: The author, Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Much of Ukraine's aid, including a pending $5.5 billion package from the International Monetary Fund, is tied to meeting anti-corruption benchmarks. Those have been slipping, putting assistance in doubt at a precarious time.”
• “Oleksiy Honcharuk, the former prime minister, said in an interview that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy fired him and most of his cabinet earlier this month after he crossed the interests of a coterie of powerful insiders in the Ukrainian economy.”
• “The unraveling of Mr. Zelenskiy's team could hardly have come at a worse time. Investors are fleeing emerging markets like Ukraine in favor of presumably safe assets like United States government bonds. Mr. Zelenskiy on [March 23] asked the IMF to double its lending program for Ukraine that was agreed to in principle last year but never implemented because the parliament failed to pass a law to prevent politically connected oligarchs from siphoning off some of the aid through bank bailouts.”
• “Zelenskiy's close ties to an influential oligarch, Ihor Kolomoisky, have raised suspicions that he might be susceptible to pressure. … Donors to Ukraine's Western-backed government are not eager to see aid effectively vanish into the business empire of Mr. Kolomoisky.”
• “The Ukrainian oligarchs grew enormously wealthy by controlling the management of the country's 3,754 poorly run state companies through executives known as the smotryashchi, or the watchers. These are figures who ostensibly work for the state but in fact keep an eye on government assets to be sure their true bosses take a share of profits. … With the system still in place, any money entering the Ukrainian budget risks leaking into foreign bank accounts. … Overall, Ukraine's 100 largest state companies lost about $925 million in 2018 … That figure was nearly as much as the $1.2 billion Ukraine received that year in foreign aid.”

“Pandemic Unsettles Ukraine’s Zelensky,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center 03.26.20: The author, a Ukrainian journalist, writes:

• “It’s clear that the president understands the inevitability of closing down the country, and is trying to do so before the number of coronavirus deaths sparks panic and unrest. Many in the country believe that Zelenskiy’s actions are irrational and that the economic damage from quarantine could be too great, but for Zelenskiy, humanitarian issues usually outweigh economic losses.”
• “The coronavirus pandemic will significantly alter the global agenda. Ukraine, which has gotten used to its problems being among the world community’s priorities, must be prepared to see the issues of Crimea and Donbass take a back seat amid everything else that is happening.”

“Abandon Ship: Why Ukrainians Are Leaving Their Country for Other Opportunities,” Dimitri Alexander Simes, The National Interest, 03.27.20: The author, president and CEO of The Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “In late January, the Ukrainian government caused a storm when it released a digital census whose results suggested that the country’s population had fallen far more significantly than previously imagined. The census found that there are 37.3 million people living in Ukraine—a decrease of 11.2 million people since the last official census was conducted in 2001. The figure also represents a considerable drop from Ukraine’s post-independence population of nearly 52 million people.”
• “Ukraine’s demographic decline is fueled by a combination of low birth rates, high mortality rates and mass migration.”
• “The end result of Ukraine’s demographic decline is not just a smaller population, but also an aging one. In 2013, the Ukrainian State Statistics Service reported that there were 339 pensioners per 1,000 people ages 16 to 59. That number had risen to 389 in 2019. By some estimates, there is only one working-age Ukrainian joining the domestic labor market for every three or four older citizens that are retiring.”
• “Ukraine’s budgets are not the only thing likely to suffer as a result of its dwindled population … demographic decline would leave Ukraine more vulnerable against Russia and even more dependent on the West for security.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Post-Soviet State Responses to COVID-19: Making or Breaking Authoritarianism?” Marlene Laruelle and Madeline McCann, PONARS Eurasia, March 2020: The authors, the co-director and the program coordinator for PONARS Eurasia, write:

• “Pandemics are not only a medical and social issue. They also are deeply political—even geopolitical—and feed strong-state efforts to regulate human bodies.”
• “While the crisis is still emerging, one can already identify three broad models: the Chinese model, in which the authoritarian state is capable of taking draconian measures to prevent the spread of disease; the Asian model … characterized by mass testing and a population ready to heed state instruction closely; and the European model, where states have difficulties restraining populations’ autonomy and are unable to deploy the repressive arsenal necessary to enforce order in the face of national emergency. A fourth broad model may be emerging in the former Soviet Union: leadership that denies the importance of the crisis.”
• “Armenia was one of the earliest and most active responders to the coronavirus outbreak. … Georgia also took active measures to prevent the spread of the virus. … Azerbaijan waited over a week longer to set up screening at the border. … [In Kazakhstan] the military was recruited to help disinfect cities, and an anti-crisis economic package is currently in development. … Moldova has closely followed broader coronavirus containment decisions across Europe. … Ukraine imposed a three-week nationwide quarantine and shut down educational institutions and public events with over 200 people. … Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been slow to assess the levels of risk resulting from close proximity to and economic dependence on China. … Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Belarus have all either denied or minimized the severity of the COVID-19 public health crisis.”
• “For the Eurasia region, previous literature has shown how much post-communist regimes’ legitimacy relies on the ability to manage natural or industrial disasters. It thus remains to be seen if a health disaster may challenge, reinforce or weaken popular support for the authorities.”

“Coronavirus Inflames Russia-Belarus Quarrel,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.25.20: The author, a journalist and political commentator specializing in Belarusian foreign and domestic politics, writes:

• “The coronavirus pandemic has shown how little trust is left between Minsk and Moscow.”
• “Belarus is one of few countries in Europe that has not only not introduced mass quarantine, but has not closed its borders either. All of its neighbors, including Russia, have done so.”
• “Russia has banned Belarusians from entering its territory from March 18 to May 1, and has closed the border between the two countries for individuals, letting through cargo only. As a result, many Belarusians have found it much harder to return home from abroad via Russia, and some have gotten stranded along the way. … The border closure has also hit residents of Belarus’s eastern regions, who used to go to Russia to sell goods, work and buy gasoline there. But the problem is not the economic consequences, though they will be serious for Minsk.”
• “In closing its border with Belarus, Russia hit Lukashenko where it hurts. In 1996, he and Russia’s then prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin cut the ribbon on a symbolic border between the two countries, signifying its removal. It was one of the main achievements of Lukashenko’s political youth, and now it has been undone, albeit temporarily. … The ruling elite and the part of society that had oriented itself on Russia is getting used to the idea that Belarus can count on no one but itself. Unconditional friends are a thing of the past.”

“Someone Else’s Virus,” Andrea Schmitz, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 03.23.20: The author, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, writes:

• “Until very recently Central Asia remained a blank on the maps showing the spread of COVID-19. In the meantime, the virus has appeared there, too, and most countries are implementing the same protective measures used elsewhere. But … Tajikistan is following a different strategy … A few cases will probably soon be reported officially, simply for reasons of credibility. But the reported numbers will settle at a low level. And who is going to verify them anyway? In view of the lack of capacity to take meaningful action, making society immune by mobilizing cultural resources is an obvious option.”