Russia Analytical Report, March 20-27, 2023
7 Ideas to Explore
- Vladimir Putin’s announcement that Russia will deploy nukes in Belarus is meant to unsettle the West with the prospect that the war in Ukraine could escalate into a nuclear conflict, according to experts interviewed by NYT. Even if Putin implements his plan to transfer non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) to Belarus, that would not change the nuclear threat level substantially, according to Pavel Podvig of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research. Putin said that Russia has already supplied Iskanders, which would carry nuclear warheads, to Belarus. He also said Russia will start training Belarussian crews on April 3 to operate NSWNs and that the storage facility for these weapons will be completed by July. Putin’s March 25 announcement came only four days after he joined a visiting Xi Jinping in issuing a statement on March 21 that said “All nuclear powers should not deploy nuclear weapons outside national territories and must withdraw all nuclear weapons stationed abroad.” It remains unclear if during their talks on March 20-21 Putin warned Xi about his plans to deploy NSNWS in Belarus.1 Putin’s March 25 announcement has not come as a complete surprise. He and Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko discussed refitting some of Belarus’s Sukhoi warplanes to carry nuclear-armed munitions in June, with Putin announcing in August that the refitting had been completed. More recently, Putin warned in a statement issued after talks with Xi on March 21 that “Russia will be forced to respond accordingly” if the U.K. implements its pledge to supply depleted uranium shells to Ukraine. In his March 25 announcement, Putin claimed that it was this pledge that prompted him and Lukashenko to enter discussions on the deployment of NSNWs. However, depleted uranium cannot produce a nuclear yield and, therefore, it is unclear how deploying nuclear weapons can be viewed as a proportional response to deliveries of shells with such uranium.2
- Xi’s visit to Moscow has reaffirmed that he and Putin have built the most consequential undeclared alliance in the world, according to Graham Allison of Harvard University. “Along every dimension—personal, economic, military and diplomatic—the undeclared alliance that Xi has built with Russian President Vladimir Putin has become much more consequential than most of the United States’ official alliances today,” he writes in FP, noting that U.S. policies of confronting Russia and China at the same time have contributed to the emergence of this alliance. The recent Sino-Russian summit in Moscow has reminded us that theirs is an alliance of unequals, with China edging toward domination of Eurasia, according to David Ignatius of WP. That’s bad news for America, even though Putin and Xi have jointly announced that theirs is not a military-political alliance and is not directed against third countries.
- Why Russia is not a declaring formal alliance with China and what Moscow needs to give up to avoid an unhealthy dependence on Beijing. Russia and China are “really inclined” to declare a formal alliance because the latter would require assuming obligations and limiting pursuit of interests in favor of another state, according to Fyodor Lukyanov of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. Reflecting on the recent Xi-Putin summit in his Rossiiskaya Gazeta column, Lukyanov asks himself whether the relationship between Russia and China is that of equals, only to avoid giving a direct answer. Equal or not, Russia’s dependence on China has already become “great” in the economic sphere, acknowledges Alexei Maslov of Moscow State University. “We need to give up Russian globalism and utopian ideas of influencing the whole world and build relations with China in such a way that we don't fall into an unhealthy dependence on Beijing,” Maslov told an RIAC interviewer.
- The West should recognize that punitive measures “are not going to affect Putin’s strategic calculus, which will be shaped much more heavily by events on the battlefield,” according to Peter Harrell of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Western countries need to be prepared to credibly threaten—and use—force while also being more effective at countering Russia’s messaging in the developing world, he writes in FA.
- Putin’s Russia can take a lot more losses than it has already, if one were to infer Russians’ tolerance for casualties by studying how many losses were endured by the forces operated by authorities in the Russian-controlled parts of Donbas, according to Russian commentator Sergei Shelin. These forces lost about 7,000 servicemen, and yet that did not lead to a revolt in Donbas. It follows then, that Russia, whose total population is 40 times greater that that of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic,” would endure losses up to 250,000-300,000, Shelin claimed in a commentary for The Moscow Times translated by Russia.Post. “Putin has no reason to worry about the rear. ... The country will put up with many more tens, if not hundreds of thousands of dead. Thus, the war will not be decided in the Russian rear, but on the Ukrainian front line,” according to Shelin.
- Pushing for the breakup of Russia is “unrealistic” as ethnic Russians account for 80% of the Russian Federation and “unhelpful” because it would trigger a wave of local civil wars and ethnic cleansing, according to Peter Rutland of Wesleyan University. “Putin should be condemned ... but that does not mean that we should put any political capital into promoting a fantasy future where Russia does not exist,” he writes in a commentary for Responsible Statecraft.
- The best hope for justice for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lies in creating a new tribunal, Kevin Jon Heller of the University of Copenhagen argues in his commentary on the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova. Whether Putin ends up being prosecuted or not, the ICC indictment is already creating “a more bifurcated world,” according to Mark Lawrence Schrad of Villanova University.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- “It is not surprising that the arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been met with raised eyebrows. Commentators note—correctly—that since Russia never ratified the 1998 Rome Statute creating the court and does not recognize its jurisdiction, the ICC has no mechanism to force Russia to surrender Putin to The Hague, and even if it did, Russia also wields a veto on the United Nations Security Council that would ensure its president never sees the inside of a courtroom, regardless of the abduction and deportation of some 16,000 Ukrainian children.”
- “Yet the ICC’s move was hardly empty symbolism: It was a major decision and an impactful one, thoroughly cognizant of both the challenges and the necessity of putting principles ahead of power. Indeed, the ICC’s Putin indictment has the potential to be both dramatic and consequential in ways that might be difficult to foresee.”
- “First the indictment is a Rubicon: a point of no return for Russia and the world, so long as Putin remains in power.”
- “By branding Putin a global outlaw, the ICC indictment is creating a more bifurcated world. By driving a wedge between liberalism and illiberalism, it effectively forces the rest of the world to side with either the Kremlin or the rights-based order.”
- “Will the indictment of Putin help uproot the antipathy and hostility that has been entrenched in Washington for the past 40 years? Will we return to the traditional recognition that U.S. national interests—from facilitating trade and commerce, to national security, to the promotion of liberty and human rights at home and abroad—actually rely on a robust, laws-based international order? Now for that, I’ll remain skeptical.”
- “This article describes the existing venues for prosecuting international crimes, including the ICC and national courts in Ukraine and in other countries, as well as the defendants most likely to face charges before each. As discussed below, the crime of aggression will be the most difficult of all to prosecute. The best hope for justice for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine thus lies in creating a new tribunal.”
- “Several venues currently exist for prosecuting the war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Ukraine. Most notably, despite Russia not being a member, the ICC has jurisdiction over those crimes because Ukraine has accepted its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, the current investigation by the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is by far the most ambitious in the court’s history.”
- “The crime of aggression is a different story. Although there is no doubt that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine qualifies, very few options currently exist for prosecuting the high-ranking Russian governmental and military leaders who are responsible for the invasion.”
- “Because of the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction and the limits on national prosecutions, the international community has spent much of the past year trying to create a new tribunal for holding Russian leaders criminally responsible for aggression. Most notably, 47 states have joined Ukraine to form a Group of Friends of Accountability whose central goal is to reach a common position on what a new aggression tribunal should look like. That group—which consists almost entirely of states in Europe and North America—is considering three different types of tribunals.”
- “Two would be ad hoc international tribunals along the lines of those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”
- “The third type of tribunal, by contrast, would be a hybrid tribunal consisting of both Ukrainian and international elements.”
“Finally, a Serious Offer to Take Putin Off Russia’s Hands,” columnist Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.22.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “The ICC has given post-Putin Russia an easy way to get rid of Putin without bothering with security guarantees or having to put up with him as a honored retiree—something both post-Soviet Russian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Putin, have handled with ill grace with regard to their predecessors—Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin himself, respectively.”
- “For all the Russian national pride—few Russians would support handing over a leader to be tried in the West … it’s not that hard to imagine any post-Putin government shipping him off to the ICC in exchange for a reopening of business and borders with the West. A deposed leader who has run the country for as long as Milosevic did (14 years) or Putin (22 years so far) is a liability and a threat—and besides, there’ll be immediate bonuses for the Russian elite and much of the Russian population if a deposed Putin is removed to the Netherlands. This prospect is one that Putin cannot just laugh off.”
Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
“Friends Over Factories: Why Ukraine’s Alliances Are Worth More Than Russia’s Industries,” Cynthia Cook of CSIS, FA, 03.27.23.
- “As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are at risk of running out of weapons and equipment. ... Russia has worked to increase its defense production and is channeling munitions straight from its factories to the frontlines. On the Ukrainian side, despite the quantities of weapons and supplies that have poured into its armories, relatively little of this war materiel has come from the production line.”
- “The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of alliances and partnerships. ... [A]t the same time that many advanced industrialized countries provided Ukraine with intelligence, materiel and training, they hit Russia with sanctions … The lesson, then, is clear: in contemporary warfare, a country that has limited defense production capacity need not be at a military disadvantage, as long as it can acquire what it needs from foreign sources. And conversely, a country with very large capacity may struggle if it is cut off from global supply chains. … The war in Ukraine has shown that, for small countries, allies matter more than factories.”
- “It would have been extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible, for Ukraine to keep fighting as long or as effectively as it has without a continual inflow of weapons from foreign countries—and without the sanctions that have limited Russia’s own access to global supply chains. In contemporary warfare, a small country can make up for its relatively limited production capacity through firm connections to global suppliers. The unanswered questions surround how China and Taiwan will take note of these lessons and incorporate them into their own plans. The United States must do the same, working with its allies and developing its capabilities as tensions mount over Taiwan.”
- “Russian authorities have not been able to suppress Ukraine’s partisan movements or civil disobedience actions. ...This, in turn, reduces Russia’s ability to defend itself against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. The Russian military has also failed to protect vulnerable sections of critical Russian land-based infrastructure.”
- “The Ukrainian resistance movement is a factor in preventing Moscow’s military and political goals, including the denial of the Russian narrative about the ‘liberation of the Ukrainian people from Nazi rule’ and the institutionalization of military occupation in the occupied territories. Moreover, the resistance movement undermines the ability of Russia to defend itself against a Ukrainian counteroffensive, not to mention conducting its offensive operations, and it accelerates the liberation of all occupied territories.”
- “Yet the resiliency of Ukraine’s resistance is not limitless. To speed up the victory of Ukraine, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of the resistance movement. Special material and legal assistance should be provided to public activists. Developing advocacy and human rights protection networks and advancing civilian war crimes monitoring and investigation systems are other expedient activities.”
- “Only through a concerted effort by the Ukrainian military, the resistance movement, and Western assistance can Kyiv prevent Russian aggression now and elsewhere in Eurasia in the future.”
- “They rushed to Ukraine by the thousands, many of them Americans who promised to bring military experience, money or supplies to the battleground of a righteous war. Hometown newspapers hailed their commitment, and donors backed them with millions of dollars.”
- “Now, after a year of combat, many of these homespun groups of volunteers are fighting with themselves and undermining the war effort. Some have wasted money or stolen valor. Others have cloaked themselves in charity while also trying to profit off the war, records show.”
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “The primary lesson of Western sanctions on Russia is one that sanctions experts and practitioners have long noted: officials should not rely too much on such measures. Sanctions are a valuable supporting tool but are rarely going to be a magic bullet or radically alter the decision calculus of an adversary in the short term.”
- “Russia’s economy proved resilient for three main reasons. First, Russia was initially able to profit off its own war … Second, Russia was prepared. … Third … sanctions on Russia have been somewhat more limited in scope.”
- “Policymakers should recognize that sanctions and export controls are not going to affect Putin’s strategic calculus, which will be shaped much more heavily by events on the battlefield.”
- “Western countries will not be willing to finance Ukraine’s war indefinitely. … Handing Russia’s frozen assets to Ukraine offers a way to continue providing necessary support to the defense of the country. … Western countries can also use the tariffs they have imposed on the Russian goods they continue to import as a source of support for Ukraine. … Finally … history suggests that the prospect of lifting of sanctions can be a useful incentive over the long term.”
- “In the context of the West’s overall strategy toward Ukraine … a related lesson is also clear. Countries continue to operate in a hard-power world. ... The United States and their allies need to be prepared to credibly threaten—and use—force to preserve the broader peace and defend their interests. … [The U.S. also needs to be more] effective at countering Russia’s messaging in the developing world.”
- “The principal lesson of U.S. sanctions on Ukraine is that sanctions are less valuable as a tool of first resort than as a supporting tool of U.S. national security. Washington should be at least as focused on developing and harnessing the other tools as it has been on deploying its tools of economic coercion.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
- “Mr. Xi succeeded in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia together precisely because he was on neither’s side. With stubborn discipline, Beijing maintained a neutral position on the two countries’ squabbles and didn’t moralize their conflict or bother with whose side history would take. Nor did China bribe Iran and Saudi Arabia with security guarantees, arms deals or military bases, as all too often is our habit.”
- “Whether Mr. Xi’s formula will work to end Russia’s war on Ukraine remains to be seen. But just as a more stable Middle East where the Saudis and Iranians aren’t at each other’s throats benefits the United States, so too will any effort to get Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table.”
- “The greatest threat to our own security and reputation is if we stand in the way of a world where others have a stake in peace, if we become a nation that doesn’t just put diplomacy last but also dismisses those who seek to put diplomacy first. In tomorrow’s world, we should not worry if some roads to peace go through Beijing, New Delhi or Brasília. So long as all roads to war do not go through Washington.”
- “Mr. Putin likely doesn't hope for a war of attrition but wants the world to think he does. His disinformation campaigns have been designed to depict himself, and Russia, as stronger than they are. If he faces an unwinnable war, the best outcome he can hope for is to mask that weakness and intimidate his foes into blinking first. Ukraine may not want to give up, but if an outside power can broker a peace deal, that is Mr. Putin's best option by a long shot. His openness to China's lopsided peace proposal suggests that he is eager to fold with gains still in hand.”
“A chance for the patient: why Beijing is trying on the role of a peacemaker,” Andrei Kortunov of RIAC, Forbes.ru/RIAC, 03.23.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “China, by all appearances, is ready to take on a ... difficult and delicate task—the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It is likely that Beijing would prefer to evade this, but the new status of the PRC does not allow it to remain aloof from the largest and most dangerous clash of recent years. One can, of course, be as ironic as one likes about the 12 points of the Chinese ‘peace plan’ published at the end of February, look for contradictions between individual points, or even accuse the Chinese leadership of political demagoguery. Perhaps the Chinese initiative will not bring the desired results in the near future. But, as they like to say in China, ‘a journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.’”
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- “The hope in Washington and European capitals is that a Ukrainian counteroffensive … will punch a hole in Russia's control of Ukrainian territory this spring. In theory, that gives Kyiv's forces such a battlefield advantage that Putin is nudged into peace talks … Then Ukraine is free to anchor its future in the West, and a defeated and diminished Mr. Putin can face the wrath of his own people.”
- “But few officials have any confidence the war and the peace will unfold so neatly, and there is little sign Ukraine's Western allies have a serious plan to help shape events.”
- “There is no clear consensus on what to do about Mr. Putin should Ukraine win. There is broad agreement that Ukraine ought to be given the means to deter a future Russian invasion … But French President Emmanuel Macron and some allies have said they are wary of humiliating Russia … Others instead want to see Russia's military permanently degraded.”
- “Mr. Putin, who has a deep well of troops to draw from, thinks he can wait out Western resolve, so why negotiate? ... The prospect of a possible change in the U.S. administration in 2024 might also encourage Mr. Putin if he believes a Republican president would offer less support for Kyiv. ... The support Mr. Putin received recently from a visit from Chinese leader Xi Jinping likely increased his tolerance for patience.”
- “Even newly supplied with armaments, Ukrainian forces are unlikely to gain such a decisive enough battlefield advantage that Kyiv is in position to demand the return of all that ground … Ukrainian gains soon after the invasion were achieved against a mix of Russians operating far from their own territory, a collapse in Russian supply lines and a deep morale problem among Russian forces.”
- “One senior European diplomat said that while there are some discussions among the allies around what a victory or defeat for Ukraine could mean and about elements of a post-conflict settlement, there is no serious diplomatic initiative in the offing.”
- “Putin is likely to continue the war in Ukraine—not because it is in Russia’s interest but because it is in his personal interest. Fighting on makes sense for Putin for one fundamental reason: wartime autocrats rarely lose power.”
- “The most promising path to stop the war, then, is through greater U.S. and European support to Kyiv.”
- “Most immediately, Kyiv needs decisive weapons and in greater numbers. … The United States and Europe should also strengthen Ukraine’s offensive capacity by providing army tactical missile systems: long-range weapons that would give Ukraine the ability to strike at greater distances, including Russian targets in Crimea. The West could also strengthen Ukraine by providing stronger offensive air capabilities, such as fighter jets and advanced drones.”
- “Critically, the United States needs to move beyond its rhetorical promises to support Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’ … and make tangible commitments of abiding support. Congress, for example, could adopt legislation that lays out a long-term schedule for delivering weapons to Ukraine. … Money and resources are far more likely than words to shape Putin’s calculus about his wartime prospects.”
- “Kyiv's ability to credibly threaten to retake territory is important in shaping Putin’s calculus because it provides an unambiguous signal of his incompetence as a leader, one the Kremlin cannot as readily manipulate for domestic audiences. If Kyiv can hold Crimea at risk, for example, Putin could see it as in his interest to avoid the domestic risks that come with a decisive defeat and negotiate an end that falls well short of his war aims. In such a scenario, the United States and Europe must be ready to provide Ukraine with a robust security guarantee—ideally, NATO membership—that would ensure that Russia does not try to invade again.”
- “Ukraine must either end the war for him or threaten Putin with a defeat—one so unambiguous that he sees it as a matter of self-preservation to negotiate.”
- “As the U.S. Republican presidential primary heats up, so too will the debate about the future of conservative American foreign policy. ... Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have indicated that they see continued military support for Ukraine as essential, for instance, whereas former U.S. President Donald Trump and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis have questioned the wisdom of becoming further entangled in a distant conflict that could ultimately land the United States in a shooting war with Russia.”
- “Conservatives should embrace policies that force Europeans to take primary responsibility for their own security. ... The United States should therefore encourage and incentivize the strengthening of the non-NATO security architecture in Europe.”
- “Conservatives should also embrace a military pivot away from the Middle East. Washington should maintain its long-standing naval presence in Bahrain as well as a regional counterterrorism force with long-range strike capabilities to target terrorist groups … But the United States should withdraw most other troops from the region, including from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.”
- “At the same time that they deprioritize Europe and the Middle East, conservatives should focus Washington’s attention on securing U.S. interests in East Asia. China poses a much greater threat to the long-term safety and economic prosperity of the United States … But conservatives should not act as though a war with China is preordained, lest they wind up unintentionally sparking one.”
- “Acknowledging that the United States faces real limits to its power does not mean accepting a broader narrative of American decline. To the contrary, adopting a more prudent foreign policy will ensure that U.S. power isn’t squandered and provide the means to guarantee the safety and prosperity of future generations of Americans.”
- “There is a small but growing lobby in Europe and the United States making the case for the break-up of the Russian Federation. Their main argument is that Putin’s denial of Ukraine’s right to exist proves that the Russian state is irredeemable imperialist, and that none of its neighbors can feel safe living alongside such a revisionist and expansionist state.”
- “This maximalist approach to the Russia problem is unrealistic and unhelpful.”
- “There is minimal chance of the Russian Federation breaking up in the foreseeable future. … Sovereignty is not a credible option for any of the non-Russian peoples who live in Russia’s vast territory. The Chechen wars showed the lengths which Moscow was willing to go to resist secessionism.”
- “In only six of the 21 ethnically designated republics does the titular nationality make up a majority of the local population. According to the 2021 census, only five nations have more than 1 million adherents (Tatars, Chechens, Bashkirs, Chuvash and Avars). The Tatar, Bashkir, and Chuvash republics are located in the middle Volga region and are completely surrounded by Russian territory.”
- “If the Russian Federation was to fragment, it would trigger a wave of local civil wars and ethnic cleansing—a grim prospect made even more alarming by the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons on Russian territory. For these reasons, the break-up of the Russian Federation would not serve U.S. national interests.”
- “Another problem with the ‘Russia must go’ approach is that it will antagonize Russian political elites and make it even less likely that a post-Putin ruler will emerge who can reach a reasonable modus vivendi with Russia’s neighbors.”
- “Putin should be condemned for his repression of the nationalist opposition inside Russia, and the mounting restrictions on the right to education in the native languages of the ethnic republics. But that does not mean that we should put any political capital into promoting a fantasy future where Russia does not exist.”
“Ukraine smolders as Europe comes slowly awake,” Editorial Board, WP, 03.26.23.
- “[Europe’s] awakening has been too slow, and its collective efforts to provide for its own and Ukraine's security too sluggish. The EU's funding for artillery shells does respond to an acute immediate need, a need that Europe rightly regards in its own interests given its overreliance on U.S. brawn, and a dawning future in which Washington may shift its strategic gaze toward China. But while Europe sees the threat clearly, the anemia in its long-term planning, capability and strategy remains. That is not tenable.”
- "The collapse of the European Union is not far off. Of course, the Europeans will not tolerate this supranational superstructure, which not only does not justify itself, but also pushes the Old World into open conflict with our country."
- "America's problem is that it has played too many geopolitical games, forgetting about its own pressing problems."
- "Russia is a historical defender of the sovereignty and statehood of any peoples who turned to her for help. She saved the United States at least twice--during the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. But I don’t believe that helping the United States to maintain its integrity this time would be expedient."
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “When one steps back and analyzes the relationship between China and Russia, the brute facts cannot be denied: Along every dimension—personal, economic, military and diplomatic—the undeclared alliance that Xi has built with Russian President Vladimir Putin has become much more consequential than most of the United States’ official alliances today.”
- “Many observers still find this alliance hard to believe. As former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis put it in 2018, Moscow and Beijing have a ‘natural nonconvergence of interests.’ Geography, history, culture and economics—all the factors that students of international relations focus on—give both nations many reasons to be adversaries.”
- “In recent years, Sino-Russian economic ties have grown. ... [I]n every area where China can support Russia without incurring major costs to itself—unlike lethal arms sales to Russia that violate U.S. sanctions, which CIA Director William Burns recently said China was ‘considering’ but ‘reluctant to provide’—it has done so.”
- “Furthermore, while many Americans discount Sino-Russian military cooperation, as a former Russian national security advisor has put it to me, China and Russia have the ‘functional equivalent of a military alliance.’”
- “Their diplomatic coordination has also ramped up as Xi and Putin become increasingly convinced Washington is seeking to undermine their regimes.”
- “By confronting both China and Russia simultaneously, the United States has helped create what former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski called an ‘alliance of the aggrieved.’”
- “Since Xi and Putin are not just the current presidents of their two nations but leaders whose tenures effectively have no expiration dates, the United States will have to understand that it is confronting the most consequential undeclared alliance in the world.”
- “Fortunately, in Biden and Xi we have two serious, sane leaders who recognize that war between their nations would be catastrophic. If a local war over Taiwan escalated to a full-spectrum war with nuclear attacks upon each other, it would risk the survival of both their nations.”
- “[T]here are lessons to learn from the ancient Chinese concept of ‘rivalry partners.’ ... What would a rivalry partnership in U.S.-China relations today look like?”
- “The starting point would be recognition of the fundamental structural realities both nations face today. In a phrase, they must survive in a MAD world.”
- “As inhabitants of the same enclosed biosphere, Americans and Chinese also face an analogue of MAD in unrestrained greenhouse gas emissions.”
- “In the current globalized world, we also have a thickly-integrated financial system that is subject to crises like the Great Recession of 2008 that could cause another Great Depression.”
- “Beyond these shared interests there are pandemics, mega-terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other global challenges that neither can manage by itself. And finally, there are the irresistible benefits of global integration, particularly in the economic arena that bring with them MAED (mutual assured economic disruption).”
- “Of course, some arenas will be marked by fierce rivalry.”
- “The military arena is mostly zero-sum, where ‘every domain is contested,’ as former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it starkly in his 2018 National Defense Strategy.”
- “Since the two rivals will also be competing for economic and technological dominance, selective decoupling is inevitable.”
- “In sum, the U.S. and China are locked in conditions defined by two contradictory imperatives: to compete in the greatest rivalry of all time, and to cooperate for each to ensure its own survival. For each, creating a grand strategy that combines competition and cooperation will require extraordinary strategic imagination. As policymakers in both nations are wrestling with this assignment, clues from the ‘rivalry partnership’ that gave the Song and Liao 120 years without war can be instructive.”
“Here's the real lesson from the showy Xi-Putin meeting,” columnist David Ignatius, WP, 03.21.23.
- “A strong China is bolstering a weak Russia. That's the real headline that describes the showy meetings in Moscow this week between the two countries' leaders. The Chinese aren't providing weapons (yet), but Xi certainly offered moral and psychological support in what might be described as a get-well visit to an ailing relative. White House spokesman John Kirby on Tuesday rightly called Putin a ‘junior partner.’”
- “Xi's rescue strategy for Russia seems to center on a peace plan that would stanch the bleeding in Ukraine. From what we know, Xi proposes a cease-fire agreement that would freeze Russia's gains from last year's illegal invasion. That version won't fly with Ukraine or the United States.”
- “Xi's emerging role as the leader of a Eurasian bloc presents dilemmas for U.S. strategists. For a generation, separating China from Russia was a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Driving that wedge was a major reason for the historic visit to China in 1972 by President Richard M. Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger. The Biden administration initially hoped it could try that strategy in reverse … Now it's Xi who is the triangulator. He is playing off the bitter split between the United States and Russia, helping Putin, but also keeping a bit of distance, too. Xi similarly used China's close relations with Iran to make the diplomatic breakthrough between Riyadh and Tehran that the United States could never achieve.”
- “The bottom line: The International Criminal Court indicted Putin last week for war crimes. Xi is his only powerful friend. Dealing with them separately is bad enough. If they truly become partners in Eurasia, sharing dominion under a Chinese banner, that would be worse.”
- “Rather than pressing Russia and China closer to each other, it is time for the United States to seek new possibilities within the strategic triangle. A more promising approach would recognize the salient differences between Russia and China and use that recognition not to split them but to establish a U.S.-China modus vivendi. In addition to ending the current rush toward serious conflict with China—which Biden says he wants to avoid—comity with China would also expand diplomatic possibilities for bringing Russia to the negotiating table.”
- “Today, the United States and China both view their differences as making them incompatible, but those same differences just as often create a potential for complementarity. Whether the issue is a global climate transition, a framework for developing country debt restructuring, or leveraging diplomatic influence over both sides to end Russia’s war against Ukraine, making space for China in the global system is a far better strategy for pursuing U.S. goals than is a destructive attempt to isolate and exclude it.”
- “Relations between Russia and China, while not being a military-political alliance similar to those formed during the Cold War, are superior to this form of interstate interaction, are not bloc and confrontational in nature, and are not directed against third countries.”
- “Emphasizing the importance of the Joint Statement by the Leaders of [the P5] ... the Parties reiterate that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it must never be unleashed. The Parties call on all countries that have signed the Joint Statement to follow in practice its key postulates, including effectively reducing the risk of nuclear war and any armed conflict between states possessing nuclear weapons. ... All nuclear powers should not deploy nuclear weapons outside national territories and must withdraw all nuclear weapons stationed abroad. The Parties confirm that [the NPT] is the cornerstone of the international mechanisms for nuclear disarmament and the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
- “The Parties will regularly conduct joint maritime and airborne patrols and joint exercises.”
- “The Parties stand for an objective, unbiased, professional investigation into the explosions at the Nord Stream gas pipelines.”
- “The parties intend to develop cooperation within the Russia-India-China and Russia-China-Mongolia formats.”
- “The Parties express serious concern about the implications and risks for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region due to the establishment of AUKUS.”
- “The Parties insist that NATO strictly comply with the obligations relating to the regional and defensive character of said organization.”
- “The Parties note the positive contribution of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to ensuring regional security.”
- “The Parties will strengthen contacts and coordination on issues related to African states.”
- “The Parties stand for the preservation of the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability and constructive cooperation.”
- “It is unnecessary for the West to be skeptical of closer China-Russia relations. China has made its stance very clear that China-Russia relations are not the kind of military-political alliance during the Cold War, but transcend such an old model of state-to-state relations and have the nature of no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party, according to the latest joint statement released by China and Russia on deepening their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era.”
- “China has also reiterated its stance on the Ukraine issue. Maintaining an objective and impartial position based on careful consideration of the facts, China stands ready to continue to play a constructive role in promoting the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis and will actively promote peace talks as the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis.”
- “In fact, featuring mutual trust, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation, the relationship between China and Russia sets a good example of the new model of major-country relations. … It seems that decision-makers in Washington cannot let go of the zero-sum Cold War mentality. They are trying to frame the world in the pseudo-proposition of ‘democracy vs autocracy,’ while their own democracy is deeply troubled at home.”
- “China and Russia, together with most of the developing world, share both the need and motivation to safeguard the U.N.-centered international system, a multi-polar world, greater democracy in international relations and the common values of humanity—peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom.”
- “The old days of a unipolar world have long gone. Power politics and hegemonic ambitions belonged to the Cold-War era, rather than today's world that is becoming inevitably multipolar and increasingly diverse.”
- “To realize a world with lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity, it is necessary for all countries in the world to take a new path. Beijing, Moscow, along with the rising Global South are working hard on that.”
“A Question in Hindsiught,” Fyodor Lukyanov of Russia in Global Affairs, Rossiiksaya Gazeta/Russia in Global Affairs, 03.24.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Are Russia and China allies? Both countries have limited experience with alliances and are not really inclined towards this form of relationship. An alliance (union) implies obligations, and most importantly, limitation of one's own interests and opportunities in favor of another state... the dominant setting in both Chinese and Russian political logic is freedom of action and maximum degree of sovereignty. Therefore, both Moscow and Beijing shy away from calling their ties as allied, finding more ornate formulations.”
- “Are the relationships equal? The issue of equality is largely conditional—it is not clear how to measure its degree. There is no formal hierarchy in relations between Russia and the PRC, and in principle it cannot exist. ... At first glance, Russia needs [China] more now ... but there is another side. China has finally realized that the time of peace and comfort for development is over. ... Beijing has no partner more solid and reliable than Moscow—there are simply no other candidates.”
- “Did China support Russia over Ukraine? ... Perhaps the main thing is that China is extremely uninterested in the success of Western policy in Ukraine, which would mean a significant weakening of Russia ... a gradual increase in assistance can be expected.”
“It was important for Beijing to support the Russian economy right now,” interview with Director of the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University Alexei Maslov, RIAC, 03.25.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “If we talk about [Russia’s] economic dependence [on China], then it is great. China continues to be partner No. 1 for the Russian Federation. For China, the Russian Federation is partner number 12.”
- “Oddly enough, but the current difficult choice has made China politically dependent on Russia. [Russia is] the only partner with whom one can have a dialogue that is pleasing to the Chinese mind. No other major country has supported China as actively as the Russian Federation did.”
- “Realizing that we do not have many partners in economic dialogue, China will impose its own standards, for example, in the field of the Internet and software. If we do not have time to prepare our technologies, we will have to switch to Chinese ones. There are also dangers in education. For example, we see that today there are a lot of Chinese textbooks on the Russian market, which are published by the Chinese for Russians.. ... If we do not provide the Siberian and Far Eastern regions with projects and finances, then after a while Chinese private entrepreneurs will start buying up local businesses.”
- “We need to give up Russian globalism and utopian ideas of influencing the whole world and build relations with China in such a way that we don't fall into an unhealthy dependence on Beijing. ... We must listen more carefully to what signals China is transmitting. They should be responded to, not our fantasies about China. Then gradually we will manage.”
“Xi in Moscow: Russia Offers China a Glimpse of Its Own Future,” Mikhail Korostikov, Carnegie Endowement, 03.24.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “The current situation benefits [Russia and China]: China is buying more oil and gas from Russia, while selling more household appliances used for both peaceful and military purposes. In addition, much of this trade will be conducted in yuan, whose share in Russian trade has increased from 0.5% to 16% in two years.”
- “The new format of Russian-Chinese relations is both simpler and more complicated for Moscow than it was before the war. On the one hand, it’s increasingly dependent on Beijing economically and politically. On the other, Beijing is also left with fewer options as its confrontation with the West escalates.”
- “China has few alternatives to the Russian resource base. While Africa and Latin America can potentially replace it, they are too far away, and the Chinese fleet will continue to lag far behind its U.S. counterpart for at least the next 15 or 20 years. This fact evens the playing field a little, and gives Moscow hope that Beijing won’t use its newly acquired economic leverage excessively. In fact, it has no reason to do so yet, since Russia is voluntarily providing China with everything it needs and is quite happy with the exchange. As a bonus, Xi Jinping provides Vladimir Putin with respect and symbolic capital: the commodities the Russian president values the most.”
- “EA: Chinese support for Russia also looks a lot like China has Russia over a barrel. There are more summits coming in the next year—Putin will go to Beijing, Xi will return to Moscow—but the outcome is likely to look the same. Russia is frantically seeking to look like it has friends, and China is taking economic advantage. I’m not too worried about Chinese support for Russia. If this is the best that Russia can muster in support of its war in Ukraine, then it isn’t much.”
- “The ‘no limits’ partnership Xi and Putin declared last year, shortly before Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, was always highly unequal. Moscow’s war has left it even more dependent on China. This gives Xi real leverage, should he choose to use it. It may not be in Beijing’s interest for Putin to suffer a humiliating defeat, putting his leadership at risk. But nor is it in its interest to be dragged deeper into a long and destabilizing conflict.”
- “A wiser course for Beijing would be to put more public daylight between itself and Moscow’s aggression, and privately to impress on Putin that he cannot win in Ukraine. Beijing’s current path only serves to fuel more tension with the west and accelerate the decoupling from its biggest trade partners.”
“The Epic Ambitions of the Chinese-Russian Alliance,” columnist Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 03.26.23.
- “The Ukraine war is forcing Russia into a deeper dependence on China, which Putin finds tolerable but other Russian nationalists may not. The more this alliance succeeds, ironically, the harder it may be to maintain: A world in which U.S. power has been weakened around Eurasia’s periphery is one in which lingering tensions between Russia and China, the two expansionist powers at its core, might become more salient.”
- “While Xi Jinping was being received with great pomp and ceremony in Moscow last week, Fumio Kishida was 500 miles away in Kyiv.”
- “This shadow boxing between China and Japan over Ukraine is part of a broader trend. Strategic rivalries in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are increasingly overlapping with each other. What is emerging is something that looks more and more like a single geopolitical struggle.”
- “[There is a] historical parallel, which I find more compelling—and that is with the rise in international tensions in the 1930s and 1940s. Then, as now, two authoritarian powers—one in Europe and one in Asia—were deeply unsatisfied with a world order they regarded as unfairly dominated by the Anglo-American powers. In the 1930s, the dissatisfied nations were Germany and Japan.”
- “Had Putin’s Russia also scored an ‘astonishing military triumph’ [as Germany did during initial stage of WWII] and taken Kyiv in three days, Xi might have drawn similar conclusions about the weakness of Western power in Asia and decided that the time was ripe for radical change.”
- “But the danger of a slide into global conflict is far from over. The outbreak of war in Europe, combined with the rise in tensions in east Asia—and the growing connections between these two theatres—still has distinct echoes of the 1930s. All sides have a responsibility to make sure that, this time, linked rivalries in Europe and Asia do not culminate in a global tragedy.”
“The U.S. should beware of the Beijing-Moscow axis,” Editorial Board, WP, 03.25.23.
- “President Biden has framed the war in Ukraine as ‘a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.’ While his line of argument is true, it is of limited persuasiveness with Mr. Xi, who is trying to peddle the idea of Western-style democracy as a spent force.”
- “An appeal to self-interest, however, might help convince Mr. Xi to use his growing friendship with Mr. Putin to push for a real solution to the conflict. China's economic and trade relations with Europe are far more crucial than with Russia, and Mr. Xi should be reminded of this whenever he meets visiting European officials, starting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who will assume the European Union Council's rotating presidency this year, and French President Emmanuel Macron, scheduled to visit China next month. The Europeans need to send a clear and unequivocal message that China needs to use its leverage with Mr. Putin to end the conflict, not to bolster Russia's economy.”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms:
- “President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said he would be able to position nuclear weapons in Belarus by the summer, a claim that analysts said was likely bluster but which underscored the Kremlin's determination to use its vast nuclear arsenal to pressure the West to back down from its support of Ukraine.”
- “In response to a question focused on Britain's decision to send weapons containing depleted uranium to Ukraine, Mr. Putin condemned the British move and then said he was moving ahead with a plan, first revealed last year, to give Russia the ability to base nuclear weapons in Belarus.”
- “Analysts pointed out that even if Russia were to transfer some of its warheads, the action wouldn't substantially change the nuclear threat posed by Russia since it can already target a vast range of territory from inside its own borders. … Mr. Putin said that the nuclear warheads Russia intended to position in Belarus were of the '’tactical'’ variety, meaning that they would be meant for battlefield use and have lower explosive power.”
- “Putin cast the initiative as ''nothing unusual,'' saying the United States has long deployed its own nuclear weapons within the borders of its European allies and that he was taking the step in response to a request from President Aleksandr G. Lukashenko of Belarus.”
- “Pavel Podvig, a scholar on Russian nuclear forces, said that such a move might not go against the letter of the [NPT] treaty … even though it would violate the spirit of nuclear disarmament. He also pointed out that Russia has declared that NATO's 'nuclear sharing,' in which American nuclear weapons are based in allied countries like Germany, is a violation of the nonproliferation treaty.”
- “Podvig … said he ... considered it unlikely that Russia would actually move nuclear warheads into Belarus, despite Mr. Putin's latest comments. Russian nuclear storage sites are so complex, Mr. Podvig said, that he doubted that a facility in Belarus could be ready to receive them by July.”
- “On Saturday, Putin announced that Moscow would station nuclear weapons in Belarus for the first time in decades. ... A storage facility in Belarus will house tactical nuclear weapons from July 1, Putin told state media. Russia has already transferred an unspecified number of Iskander missile systems to Belarus, Putin said. These systems are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.”
- “The U.S. has ‘not seen any reason to adjust our own strategic nuclear posture,’ a senior administration official said in the wake of the announcement. There were no ‘indications Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon,’ but the U.S. will ‘continue to monitor this situation,’ the official said.”
- “The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War think tank said on Saturday that despite the announcement, the risk of escalation to nuclear war ‘remains extremely low,’ with Putin repeatedly threatening ‘to use nuclear weapons without any intention of following through in order to break Western resolve.’”
- “It is nonetheless an escalation, according to Col. (Ret.) Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, who previously commanded U.K. and NATO chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense (CBRN) forces. ... A deviation from the nuclear policy of the last 30 years, it is also ‘a massive strategic error,’ de Bretton-Gordon told Newsweek. It is also a move that pulls Belarus into the war, de Bretton-Gordon added. ‘Belarus is now a target.’”
- “Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled Belarusian opposition leader, said on Saturday that placing nuclear weapons in Belarus makes the country a ‘potential target for preventive or retaliation strikes.’”
- “First, the Biden administration should state that the United States will continue to observe New START’s numerical limits for as long as it assesses that Russia has not exceeded those limits.”
- “Second, the administration should declare that, for a limited period—say six to nine months or until the end of 2023—the United States will continue to provide the data and notifications required by New START. However, if Russia has not returned to full compliance by the end of that period, the United States would cease the unilateral provision of data and notifications.”
- “Third, while the 2012 Pentagon study suggested that Russia could exceed New START limits without jeopardizing US security, the White House should task the Pentagon with preparing a report on possible response options should Russian strategic forces grow beyond those limits. Those options could include deploying more US strategic warheads by uploading US strategic ballistic missiles (most of which carry fewer warheads than their capacity) and deploying ICBMs to 50 silos that are empty but maintained in “warm” status (i.e., ready to receive a nuclear-capable missile). As it prepares to build and deploy the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the Sentinel ICBM, and the B-21 bomber, the Pentagon report could also weigh whether the currently planned numbers for those systems suffice.”
- “It is difficult to be optimistic about New START’s future. Still, preserving the treaty—which by its terms would remain in force until 2026—would give Washington time to figure what, if anything, should follow New START in a more complex international security environment marked by a hostile Russia and a China apparently intent on a major expansion of its nuclear capability.”
“The Nuclear Education of Vladimir Putin,” Amy J. Nelson of the Brookings Institution, FP, 03.23.23.
- “As recently as 2021, Russia President Vladimir Putin demonstrated his commitment to arms control as a means of ensuring strategic stability when he and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to a 5-year extension of New START beyond its original 10-year lifespan. The joint statement from the two leaders noted that ‘the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.’ Then in September 2022, on the margins of the 10th Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Putin and Biden committed to negotiations for a successor treaty to New START.”
- “Knowing the stock Putin put in the concept when relations with the United States were better, it is possible that Putin believes there is enduring strategic value in arms control treaties. But it’s more likely, at this point, that he perceives the political value of using New START to other ends as higher.”
- “While the United States has held fast to the idea that bilateral arms control exists in a protected space, immune from political vicissitudes, Putin does not share this idea. Today, he is using New START politically—to irritate, annoy or otherwise upset the United States, and to curry favor domestically. In doing so, he has turned New START into a prop in his propaganda machine. While he fully comprehends strategic stability and the potential risks of fully withdrawing from New START, Putin will continue to play an arms control game with rules all his own. And the United States will have to adapt.”
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security/AI:
- No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant developments.
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- No significant developments.
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Putin’s Russia can take a lot more losses than it has already,” journalist Sergei Shelin, The Moscow Times/Russia.Post, 03.23.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “If we accept a minimum figure for Donbas losses at 7,000 today and take into account that Russia is 40 times the size of the DNR and LNR, then Russia could take losses of 250,000-300,000. Though arbitrary, these calculations give an idea of the scale of what is possible.”
- “The losses of the Russian side, including killed DNR and LNR soldiers (more than 7,000) and several thousand missing, approach 50,000. Though such an estimate cannot claim to be precise, it gives an idea of the scale of what is happening.”
- “On the one hand, the casualties are already twice or three times higher than Soviet losses in the Afghan adventure or Russian (federal) losses in either of the Chechen wars. On the other hand, they are five or six times lower than the ‘ceiling’ of casualties that has already been reached by the Donbas people’s republics without triggering a revolt there.”
- “Vladimir Putin has no reason to worry about the rear. Prisoners can keep being put into the meatgrinder. They have not run out yet. Another one or two waves of mobilization are also quite feasible.”
- “The country will put up with many more tens, if not hundreds of thousands of dead. Thus, the war will not be decided in the Russian rear, but on the Ukrainian front line.”
Defense and aerospace:
- “A symbiotic relationship exists between the Minister of Defense and his first deputy, the Chief of the General Staff: the Minister of Defense cannot build a strong political position if the Armed Forces are weak, and the Chief of the General Staff cannot strengthen the influence of the Armed Forces in the broader national security system if the Minister of Defense does not have a strong position in the government.”
- “The United States and Russia have chosen distinct models of military command authority: largely decentralized in the case of the United States and highly centralized in the case of Russia.”
- “The case study of Ukraine suggests that the emphasis on secrecy and deniability materially constrained the ability of the Russian General Staff to orchestrate the 2014 war in Ukraine—i.e., Russia's use of force was not entirely under the General Staff's control.”
- “The Russian intervention in Syria, by contrast, appears to have been prosecuted in a manner largely concordant with the General Staff's mandated roles and responsibilities.”
- “The Russian General Staff, as an institution, seems to emphasize interpersonal relationships among key players.”
- “It is plausible that the broader, bottom-up issues discussed in this report—for example, the General Staff's tight grip on information and its treatment of knowledge as currency and the military's institutional resistance to reforms—are at least partly responsible for the Russian military's performance in Ukraine thus far.”
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- “Germany’s Russia policy is unpleasantly like a zombie: it keeps clawing its way back out of the grave. A devastatingly comprehensive new book by journalists Reinhard Bingener and Markus Wehner describes the networks connecting the SPD, the energy industry and Russia. The fat spider in the middle of it all: Gerhard Schröder, former chancellor, Russian lobbyist and personal friend of Vladimir Putin.”
- “Another recent book by journalist and Russia expert Michael Thumann (full disclosure: we are friends and former colleagues) traces a long arc from the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo between the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union to today. It concludes scathingly: ‘The Rapallo Treaty and the Nord Stream projects were united by a common false assumption: that Russia and Germany are connected by higher interests that matter more than good relations with the states of central and eastern Europe and the West.’”
- “Following the invasion of Ukraine, CDU leader Friedrich Merz spoke of “severe failings” in his party; he has not volunteered any further details since then. And there is more: the scandal over a Russian mole in the German external intelligence service’s cyber security department; the florid fraud and oversight failures revealed in the Wirecard financial services case (the company’s fugitive chief operating officer Jan Marsalek is suspected to have been a Russian spy); the ongoing revelations about a climate foundation that acted as a conduit for Gazprom money to help finish the construction of Nord Stream 2 (since suspended) ahead of the Russian invasion.”
- “All this suggests two things. Germany’s vulnerability to economic corruption is systemic. And that is a security risk—not just to Europe, but to the Western alliance. Germany needs a parliamentary commission of inquiry. It is time for a comprehensive reckoning.”
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- “Mr. Lukashenko increasingly acts contrary to U.S. interests. The State Department described his recent visit to Tehran as ‘an extension of the deepening relationship between Iran and Russia.’ The visit ended with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi openly boasting that his regime was ‘ready to share our experiences’ of Western sanctions ‘with the friendly Belarus in this regard.’”
- “We hope that Washington and its allies will continue to apply as much pressure as possible on Mr. Lukashenko's vile regime. We need his role in Mr. Putin's war to end and for Russian troops to leave Belarus for good. We need the gulags to empty and the people of Belarus to be able to decide without fear of retribution how they want to be governed. The choice is between democratically elected leaders and a Kremlin stooge.”
Footnotes
- Putin reportedly failed to explicitly warn Xi about his plans to invade Ukraine when the two met in China on Feb. 4, 2022. Since the invasion, Xi has repeatedly called for an end to nuclear threats over the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
- Here and elsewhere italicized text represents contextual commentary by RM staff.
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