I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Remember the Cold War? Putin has brought it back,” Stefan Wolff and Tatyana Malyarenko, The Washington Post, 03.19.18: The authors, a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham and a professor of international security at the National University Odessa Law Academy, write: “Many think the crisis in Ukraine has signaled the start of a new Cold War. … Expert analysis of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has largely divided into two schools of thought. The first is that Russia has acted opportunistically. The second is that we’re glimpsing a grand strategy to restore Russia’s global superpower status. The latter view suggests that, as in the original Cold War, Russia is playing a worldwide zero-sum game… Our study indicates that this is precisely the logic that Russia has been following in the Donbass region. … Russia considers Ukraine a strategically important prize… Ukraine hasn’t been the only battleground on which Russia and the West have been fighting to impose their respective geopolitical visions. … Russia has increasingly shown that to prevent the drift westward, it will intervene by any means it deems necessary. … The European Union and NATO also view Ukraine as too strategically valuable to concede. And so the two sides are escalating much as they did during the Cold War… That bodes ill for future East-West relations the world over, no matter what margin Putin wins by.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“The Navy Is Training for War with Russia in the Arctic,” Kris Osborn, The National Interest, 03.20.18: The author, managing editor for the Warrior Maven website, writes: “Navy fast-attack submarines have been firing torpedoes beneath the Arctic ice as part of a large-scale effort to speed up preparations for war in the region in response to growing tensions with Russia and the increasing pace of melting ice.” The U.S. Navy’s updated 2009 Arctic Road Map includes “discussion of a need for more ice-breakers, a large-scale increase in deploying Navy ships to the Arctic and various research efforts to further ruggedize Navy ships for Arctic conditions. … ‘[T]he current scientific consensus indicates the Arctic may experience nearly ice free summers sometime in the 2030’s,’ the text of the 2009 Arctic Road Map states. … More open water naturally leads to increased maritime transportation and greater competition for natural resources such as oil and gas mining. … Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive stance in Ukraine has added to the urgency of Navy preparations for Arctic warfare and, not surprisingly, the Russian Navy also has plans to increase its presence in the region. More Arctic Ocean waterways mean quicker and more prevalent routes for Russian ships to North America. … Competition for strategic influence, resources, territory and geographical access is growing quickly in the Arctic region… The largest existing Arctic shipping route, called the Northern Sea Route, largely parallels the Russian border with the Arctic … [and] has seen a large increase in traffic in recent years.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“The US Glimpses Possible Common Ground With Russia,” Paul Sonne, The Washington Post, 03.21.18: The author, a national security reporter for the news outlet, writes: “President Trump’s pledge to pursue arms control talks with Russian President Vladi­mir Putin … offers a remote chance that the two leaders could revive Cold War-era pacts… Some interpreted Putin’s show [announcing that Russia was developing its own new nuclear weapons] as a veiled entreaty for new arms control negotiations with the United States…  [In a subsequent interview,] he left no doubt that Russia stood ready to hold arms control talks with the United States. Trump has long been interested in participating in such negotiations… It’s unclear how much substantive progress Trump could make … in an atmosphere in which the broader U.S. political establishment has grown to mistrust his interactions with the Russian leader… Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said … that the weapons the Pentagon is developing will give U.S. diplomats leverage in negotiating arms control agreements with Russia, suggesting that the Pentagon also would like to see the burgeoning arms race curtailed. … The only relatively recent arms control breakthrough between Washington and Moscow came almost a decade ago,… when the Obama administration negotiated the New START Treaty with then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. … U.S. officials said they wouldn’t entertain the idea of new arms control agreements with Russia until two things happened… Both occurred in February. … Trump could agree to the New START Treaty’s extension as a ‘low-hanging fruit’ that satisfies both sides.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“How the US Can Play Cyber-Offense: Deterrence Isn't Enough,” Michael Sulmeyer, Foreign Affairs, 03.22.18.

“The Next Russian Attack Will Be Far Worse Than Bots and Trolls,” Alina Polyakova, Lawfare Blog, 03.20.18: The author, an adjunct professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins University, writes: “The same malware that took down Ukraine’s electrical grid in 2015 and 2016 has been detected in U.S. utilities. … The nightmare of cyberattacks crippling critical infrastructure systems still has the sound of science fiction to most Americans. But in Ukraine, this nightmare is real. As the laboratory for Russian activities, Ukraine has seen a significant uptick in attacks on its critical infrastructure systems since the 2013–14 Maidan revolution. … In December 2015, a well-planned and sophisticated attack on Ukraine’s electrical grid targeted power distribution centers and left 230,000 residents without power… The Ukrainian government attributed the attacks to the Russian hacking group called Sandworm. … And Ukraine’s systems … were more secure at the time of the attack than those in the United States. … At the 2017 Defcon hacker conference, attendees were tasked with breaking into a range of American voting machines… The hackers did so in less than two hours … [and] managed to breach every piece of equipment by the end of the gathering. … [The ransomeware] ‘WannaCry’ … presents a potential new threat vector: Malicious actors … hack Western intelligence agencies and leak the information to third parties … that then post the exploits publicly… In this case, it is more difficult to definitively lay the blame on a single actor, which constrains the West’s ability to respond. … The United State and Europe seem ill-equipped to deter and respond to online disinformation attacks, much less a cyber attack on critical infrastructure.”

Elections interference:

“Four and a Half Reasons Not To Worry That Cambridge Analytica Skewed the 2016 Election,” Kris-Stella Trump, The Washington Post, 03.23.18: The author, director of the Anxieties of Democracy program at the Social Science Research Council, writes: “Cambridge Analytica made headlines after whistleblower Christopher Wylie revealed that the company had used data from millions of Facebook profiles to psychologically profile U.S. citizens and target them with political messages, including during the 2016 presidential elections. Newly named national security adviser John Bolton’s PAC was among its users… The way that the data was collected from Facebook arguably did not allow for informed consent. … Cambridge Analytica itself may have broken U.S. election laws… [However,] [w]hen Cambridge Analytica took credit for Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, social scientists mostly responded with eye-rolling and references to ‘snake oil.’ … Here are four reasons Cambridge Analytica’s claim of psychological manipulation doesn’t pass the social scientist’s smell test. 1. Personality is not a good predictor of political views. … 2. Predicting personality is hard. … 3. Changing individuals’ choices based on their personality profiles is harder than it sounds. … 4. They had stiff competition from other campaigns. … [Additionally,] Cambridge Analytica does not seem capable of pulling off the large-scale and complex personality-based profiling operation that it claims to have mastered.”

 “The Misleading Appeal of the Grand Theory of Russia Collusion,” Philip Bump, The Washington Post, 03.21.18: The author, national correspondent for the news outlet, writes: “When we hear about efforts by Russian actors to interfere in U.S. campaigns, interference that prompted a counterintelligence investigation by the FBI, it's natural that our minds jump to ‘Homeland’-style conspiracies. … We start with SCL Group… Its value proposition was that it could overlay psychological insights onto traditional marketing efforts. … A few years ago, conservative donor Robert Mercer funded the creation of the U.S.-based Cambridge Analytica to bring SCL Group's techniques here. … Cambridge paid a researcher at a British University for data pulled from Facebook… That was combined with surveys conducted among Americans to test political messages. … In 2016 … the Mercers turned their attention to the [presidential] campaign of Donald Trump—after Trump's campaign also hired Cambridge. … the founding of Cambridge overlapped heavily with another prominent figure on the web of Trump-Russia connections: Stephen Bannon. … [R]esearch into Putin, in particular, raised eyebrows. … Cambridge chief executive Alexander Nix bragged about setting up political opponents with bribes and sex scandals and insisted that his firm's tactics were central to Trump's campaign. Another Cambridge employee discussed how the company would spread negative information through outside groups as a tactic in the U.S. campaign. This is a role that Bannon used to fill. … So running a thread from Bannon to Cambridge to Russia is, for conspiracy-pattern-seekers, irresistible. … But it's important to differentiate the real links—campaign adviser George Papadopoulos being told that the Russians had dirt on Hillary Clinton, for example—from the Hollywood-‘Beautiful Mind’ ones. … By assuming that Cambridge and Bannon were dark masters, we miss the reality of how Trump won: appeals to disenchanted Americans worried about changing demographics that leveraged mass media effectively.” 

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Escalation With Russia Just Became More Likely,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.23.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “The newfound unity among European Union leaders … and the appointment of fierce Russia hawk John Bolton as President Donald Trump's national security advisor are potential precursors of collective Western action against Russia [over the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter]. … [Moscow has claimed that] Russia did not produce the toxic agent named by the U.K. government and that since its formula had been published … anyone could make it … . Moscow has worked to confuse rather than convince… The pressure … to take a united stand … create[s] a window of opportunity for Russia hawks in the U.S. administration… Coincidentally, with Bolton's appointment, the hawks' influence in the Trump administration has just been boosted. … He [Bolton] has also called for a stronger response to the Skripal poisoning than diplomat expulsions. … [Bolton] doesn't believe one can make any kind of deal with Putin and other authoritarian rulers… Relatively soft, personalized sanctions … were largely exhausted in previous years. Now, only a list of far stronger options remains open … . These moves … could prompt an asymmetric response from the Kremlin… [M]ost EU leaders are too risk-averse to be pushed into an escalation with Russia. … Trump, for his part, has proved remarkably resistant to all attempts to force his hand on Russia. That's a lot of inertia for Russia hawks to overcome on both sides of the Atlantic.”

“The White House’s False Choices on Putin and Russia,” Aaron Blake, The Washington Post, 03.22.18: The author, senior political reporter for The Fix, writes: “Despite signing on to a strong statement alleging Russia was at least complicit in the nerve agent attack on former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, the White House … has defended Trump's apparent willingness to gloss over that and any alleged shenanigans in Putin's reelection… Trump has seemingly no desire to challenge Putin. … In it [a White House news briefing], spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders responded to questions about Trump congratulating Putin by saying the U.S. can't tell other countries what to do. ... While that statement is strictly true, it's really not the point. The United States … can sure apply pressure—whether through tough words, sanctions or other means. … Sanders was presenting a false choice between drawing a line in the sand and accepting Putin's win as legitimate. In reality, there are many choices in between. That same false dichotomy … has been a regular feature of his [Trump’s] defenses of a desired alliance with Putin. … [I]t ignores the fact that every alliance is predicated on trust and not being taken advantage of. … Trump has signaled that pressing Putin on election interference and the Skripal poisoning is unimportant in the grand scheme of things—despite other parts of his administration regarding each as something of a red line.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“And Now What? Russian Foreign Policy in Putin’s Fourth Term,” Kadri Liik, European Council on Foreign Relations, 03.20.18: The author, a senior policy fellow at ECFR, writes: “The events of recent years have shattered quite a few foreign policy assumptions in Moscow. … These failed predictions have occasioned a lively foreign policy debate in Moscow… On one side, a coalition of intra-system liberals … argues in favor of improving relations with the West… The need for technocratic modernization … seems to be understood also by President Putin, at least intellectually, if not passionately. … This dovetails with a foreign policy argument that holds that Russian foreign policy is overstretched and would benefit from ending a few conflicts. … The other camp in Moscow, though, remains skeptical. They fear the West will view ‘concessions’ as a sign of weakness; or that rapprochement with the West would make Russia’s non-Western allies—from Iran to China—fear Russian ‘betrayal.’ However, the skeptical camp does agree … [that] foreign policy indeed needs to change. … Such was the state of the debate when, on the afternoon of March 4, … Sergei Skripal was found … poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok… This crime remains puzzling. Murders of exchanged spies … have not been part of Moscow’s behavior so far. … Domestic political incentives are unlikely… [T]hese questions are now wedded to the question about the course of Russia’s foreign policy. Just two weeks ago, the various factions in Russia assumed that after the elections, Putin would choose his course and then we will know. Now, whoever committed the crime seems to have chosen for him.”

 “Theresa May Should Go After Putin’s Debt,” Emile Simpson, Foreign Policy, 03.21.18: The author, a research fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows, writes: “Last week, in the middle of the U.K.-Russia diplomatic row, Russia issued $4 billion in Eurobonds, half of which were purchased in the United Kingdom. The failure to sanction the issuance of new Russian sovereign debt has been a key weakness in existing EU and U.S. sanctions… [E]xisting sanctions target Kremlin-linked banks and energy companies to pressure the Russian government but not the state itself… ‘[M]ore security checks on private flights’ and the like … will hardly keep those [Putin’s] cronies awake at night. … [T]he U.K. government is wrong to think it can push back against the Russian hybrid threat by focusing narrowly on the private actions of Putin’s entourage. … To counter the Russian hybrid threat, the United Kingdom and its Western partners need to hit back against the Russian state itself. … London should at least push to fix the weakness in the existing sanctions regimes against Russia as regards new sovereign debt issuances. The easiest way to do that is to break the link between Russian sovereign debt and key Western clearing houses… [T]he U.K. is unlikely to get support from the United States or the EU at this time… [T]he Trump administration is clearly reluctant to toughen existing sanctions on Russia. … it would disrupt financial markets, which would harm U.S. investors as well as the Russian state… [This] all but confirms Putin’s assumption that Western leaders are so nervous about upsetting financial markets that they will forfeit the only serious weapon they have… [Meanwhile,] the EU itself is internally split on whether to upgrade or tone down Russian sanctions.”

 “The UK and Russia: What is to be Done?” by “a senior former British intelligence official who has chosen to write this article anonymously to articulate unhindered views,” Royal United Services Institute, 03.20.18: The anonymous author writes: “The UK should be basing its actions on the need to put a stop to the overall Russian policy of assassinating people abroad. … Several key principles should guide Whitehall’s actions. These are: Ensure that the regime that sponsors such behavior … pays a severe price… Ensure that the organizations responsible pay a severe price, one that will offer a reasonable prospect of deterring them … and of limiting their capacity to repeat them. Include reference to further measures to be taken if further outrages occur. … [P]unishing the Putin regime … could include … following through on threats to freeze and seize assets in the U.K.… [This] would involve shoring up our own weaknesses… [K]ey here is the need to ensure that the Russian intelligence and security services that share responsibility for the Salisbury operation pay a price… In this regard, the expulsion of 23 Russian ‘diplomats’ should be seen … [as] a concrete challenge to the capabilities of these hostile intelligence services. … When the Soviet Russian intelligence service presence in the U.K. grew egregiously large and its activities difficult to monitor … virtually the entire intelligence representation was expelled. Furthermore, a ceiling was imposed set at the new reduced total of officials… [T]he ceiling susceptible to further reduction … worked as a permanent constraint on Russian intelligence service capability… [I]t’s critical to assure allies and the British public alike of the justification for the government’s actions. … [A] factually unassailable account of Russian assassination policy and practice should also be issued. … [T]he U.K.’s response must acknowledge that … Russia under Putin has become not just a disappointing partner or a part-nuisance; it is now hostile, and Whitehall needs to adopt a policy to accept that.”

“A Historical Interlocutor: How Willing is Italy to Support Russia?” Alexander Dunaev,^[3] Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.23.18: The author, a research fellow at Center for Security & Development Studies at Lomonosov Moscow State University, writes: “Virtually all of Italy’s political forces want to increase cooperation with Russia. But the Kremlin would be unwise to read too much into this. Rome values preserving mutual understanding with the European Union and the United States over advocating for lifting sanctions. A positive relationship with Italy is an important asset for Russian foreign policy, but it isn’t a game-changer.”

“Interpol Is Now a Crime Victim,” The Editors, Bloomberg, 03.21.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “[W]hile U.K. authorities are responsible for the investigation [of the Skripal deaths], their job is complicated by a crisis at Interpol. The global law-enforcement agency … would need to assist Scotland Yard if the trail leads to the Kremlin… Its primary tool is the so-called red notice. These alerts—requested by national authorities and reviewed and issued by Interpol—tell local authorities of travelers facing arrest in their home countries who should be detained for potential extradition. … The agency also issues ‘diffusions,’ which are similar but not vetted or made public.” This system is “being abused by Russia and other authoritarian regimes trying to punish political dissidents and others. Since 2009, the number of red notices has quadrupled, to more than 12,000 in 2016. … Azerbaijan, China, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela … have led the charge. … The most prominent victim is Bill Browder, the American-born British financier who employed the lawyer and anti-corruption activist Sergei Magnitsky… Russia has issued two diffusions for the arrest of Browder, who now lives in London. … Interpol has made some minor reforms, but it needs to bring in an independent body … [to] determine which countries are abusing the red-flag system… In addition, officials from those nations should be barred from top Interpol posts… Finally, member states should no longer be allowed to issue diffusions unilaterally.” 

China:

• No significant commentary.

Ukraine:

“Russia and Ukraine: From Brothers to Neighbors,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.21.18: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “The Ukraine crisis is usually seen as an act of final liberation of the second largest former Soviet republic from imperial Russia. The significance of the reverse effect, of Russia finally drawing the border between itself and Ukraine, is often overlooked. … The common Russian view portrays Ukraine’s independence as something unnatural and pernicious… Purely Ukrainian roots of the revolution [Ukraine’s 2004–2005 ‘Orange Revolution’] were dismissed as secondary. Rather than waking up to the challenge … the Kremlin continued to play with corrupt Ukrainian politicians. … Putin’s entire Eurasian integration project depended on Kiev aligning itself, economically as well as politically, with Moscow. …  Moscow did almost nothing to empower those elements in Ukraine that were friendly to Russia—with the important exception of Crimea. … the cost of the failure of Russia’s Ukraine policy has turned out to be lower than the entirely unaffordable cost that would have been incurred had it been a success. … Had Yanukovych … clamp[ed] down on Kiev’s Maidan crowd and impos[ed] a state of emergency in the country—the result would still have been the outbreak of a civil war in Ukraine. Rather than in the east … it would have broken out in the west… The main reason for the failures of Russia’s policy toward Ukraine lies in ignoring … [that] the entire Ukrainian elite … is permeated by a spirit of national independence… Russia’s … talk of uniting a ‘Russian world’ … was completely inappropriate for economics or politics. … As independent nations, Ukraine, overtly, and Belarus, less so, are tilting toward the European Union… A clever Russian policy should have seen that and offered them a concept of how to 'go west' without breaking with Russia.”

“The War Between People in Ukraine” (book review), Ilmari Käihkö, War on the Rocks, 03.21.18: The author, a visiting fellow at the Yale University’s anthropology department, writes: “With [Ukrainian] government coffers empty and rising fires of subversion in the eastern parts of the country, [Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen] Avakov advocated reaching out to patriotic citizens. … This forms the main narrative of ‘Volunteer Battalions: Story of a Heroic Deed of Battalions That Saved Ukraine.’ [The book] contains a number of oral histories from an eclectic cast of characters. … All this contributes to the feeling that one purpose of ‘Volunteer Battalions’ is to bolster Avakov’s political image. … it nevertheless offers a unique opportunity to gain insight into the Ukrainian side of the war in Donbass… Too often, existing literature and thought relegates Ukraine to the role of a mere battlefront between the West and Russia. … The absence of … critical voices exacerbates other methodological concerns… While the conflict may have become one between the West and Russia, the narratives in ‘Volunteer Battalions’ equally suggest that the separatism in the east also had domestic roots, resulting from a virtual collapse of the state. … The government was largely considered powerless to react against separatist subversion… Witnessing a state-in-breaking, thousands of ‘patriots’ took it upon themselves to maintain Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It should be emphasized that the initial volunteers mobilized not because of government initiatives (as Avakov suggests), but rather despite them… [T]he main feat of the volunteers was likely the way they dragged the unwilling state into the conflict. By escalating the situation, they effectively influenced government aims, and hence its strategy. … As Avakov makes clear, the government was caught between a rock and a hard place. … This effectively made violence the only available means in a war that, because of its internationalized and political nature, could not be won through violence alone.”

“Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem,” Josh Cohen, Reuters, 03.19.18: The author, a former USAID project officer, writes about Ukraine’s “growing problem behind the front lines: far-right vigilantes who are willing to use intimidation and even violence to advance their agendas, and who often do so with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies.” After Russia’s military moves in Ukraine four years ago, right-wing militias such as Azov—“which uses Nazi-era symbolism and recruits neo-Nazis into its ranks”—and Right Sector stepped into the breach left by Ukraine’s decrepit armed forces and “many Ukrainians continue to regard the militias with gratitude and admiration.” Formally “the militias have been … integrated into Ukraine’s armed forces, but some have resisted full integration” and run their own activities, with the more extreme among them promoting “an intolerant and illiberal ideology that will endanger Ukraine in the long term. … Azov and other militias have attacked anti-fascist demonstrations, city council meetings, media outlets, art exhibitions, foreign students and Roma. Progressive activists describe a new climate of fear that they say has been intensifying. … To be clear, the Kremlin’s claims that Ukraine is a hornets’ nest of fascists are false: far-right parties performed poorly in Ukraine’s last parliamentary elections… But connections between law enforcement agencies and extremists give Ukraine’s Western allies ample reason for concern. [Extremist group] C14 and Kiev's city government recently signed an agreement allowing C14 to establish a ‘municipal guard’ to patrol the streets; three such militia-run guard forces are already registered in Kiev, and at least 21 operate in other cities.” President Petro Poroshenko cannot do much about the situation because he is vulnerable politically and his chief rival, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, is a far-right sympathizer.

See also New Cold War/saber rattling section above.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

 “Putin's Succession Conundrum: How Authoritarians Navigate the Challenge,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, Foreign Affairs, 03.21.18.

“Russia’s Impossible Coalition: Putin’s New Politics,” Konstantin Gaaze, Carnegie Moscow Center, 20.03.2018: The author contends that the conflict that will dominate President Vladimir Putin’s fourth term is not between doves and hawks, but between two economic schools: the industrialists, who believe the economy is made up of manufacturing machines, and the liberals, who are convinced that it consists of money. No technocrat will be able to form an efficient team from people who have fundamentally different ideas of what the economy actually is. “The essence of the conflict,” he writes, “was revealed by the two parts of the president’s recent state of the nation address, in which he promised the incompatible dual policies of sustained high spending on defense (a new nuclear arms race) and increased spending on social programs and infrastructure.” The two economic schools in question “have been engaged in a deadlock since the end of the 1980s.” The faction that views the economy “basically [as] a large factory” includes Kremlin chief of staff Anton Vaino, presidential aide Andrei Belousov and Vnesheconombank’s chief economist Andrei Klepach, along with several less senior figures. Prominent representatives of the liberal group—for whom details like the market, money and business investment activity make up the economy—are former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. Two major issues that will loom over this battle will be the changing role of the presidential plenipotentiaries and the fate of the “meddlers” in the upper echelons of Russian bureaucracy, army and security services. What the latter “really need is what Putin himself needs: lifelong guarantees of their safety… But while for the president immunity comes with the position, the meddlers are not so lucky.” Their lifelong guarantees, the author suggests, “will be provided by the lifelong presidency of Putin himself.”

“Aggressive Abroad, Putin Is Cautious at Home,” Ruchir Sharma, The New York Times, 03.20.18: The author, chief global strategist at an investment management company, writes: “Mr. Putin was once a classic economic reformer. … By 2010 Russia was a middle-income country, and … it needed to reduce its reliance on oil … [and add] dynamic new private companies to replace the doddering state-owned oil and gas giants… Instead, the economic reformer … gave way to Putin the hyper-nationalist… [O]n the domestic economic front, a very different Putin has been at work: responsible and cautious to a fault… The current siege mentality has roots in the multiple financial crises Russia has suffered since the fall of Soviet Communism in 1989. … Russia … restrained spending to shrink its deficit and pay down hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign debt. Instead of lowering interest rates to stimulate growth, it raised rates to choke off inflation. To a large extent, these Fortress Russia policies worked. … Russia has developed a new policy to prevent the ruble from swinging wildly with oil prices … and that has worked too. … Caution has a cost, alas. … Putin will be hard pressed to restore Russia as a great power … if the economy grows at a pace that invites comparisons with the Brezhnev era of stagnation. … To increase productivity, Mr. Putin would need to reform an economy that still exports mainly oil, wheat and guns, and relies on a unique mix of mom-and-pop businesses and huge state-run companies, much as it did in the Soviet era. … Russia has a deficit of small- and medium-size companies—the sector that is often the hotbed of innovation and entrepreneurship, as well as productivity and job growth. For all its foreign adventures, Mr. Putin’s Russia has dispatched not even one company capable of disrupting global markets. …  Russia punches well below its weight in commercial competition in part because its brand of state capitalism fosters so little competition at home… Unfortunately Mr. Putin’s actions in recent years … suggest no change in his essentially feudal view of capitalism or his unwillingness to ease state control over the economy.”

“A Pro-Putin Town Explodes in Anger,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.23.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Next to it [the town of Volokolamsk] is the Yadrovo dump… [These dumps are] part of a nationwide problem of which Putin is well aware. … At the same time, Putin's friends have an interest in the Moscow garbage business. …  For Volokolamsk, the Yadrovo dump has recently become a major problem. … On March 3, a quarter of the town's population joined a rally, demanding that the dump be shut down. … 70.27 percent of the votes cast in Volokolamsk were for Putin. … Two days later, a local court ruled to keep the dump open, fining its owner—a former regional official—about $2,600 for violating sanitary rules. And on Wednesday, dozens of children around town were hospitalized with acute poisoning symptoms such as dizziness and vomiting. … The district head was shoved and threatened. Some pretty hard snowballs were thrown at the governor as he got into his car to make an escape. … What's happening to the town is a direct consequence of the Putin clique's way of running the country. The future only exists in speeches, while business is made today and for today, regardless of the consequences. Officials lie even when the truth is obvious to everyone, and courts won't protect ordinary citizens even when the case for such protection is so clear-cut that it's enough to sniff the poisonous air to see it. Ordinary Russians are treated no better than the garbage dumped right next to their houses… And yet the inevitable anger isn't directed at Putin.”

“Patriotic Youth Army Takes Russian Kids Back to the Future,” Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 03.22.18: The author, the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times, writes: “Often in Russia these days, what is old is new again or, to be more specific, what is Soviet is new again. The Youth Army, open to both boys and girls, is a militarized throwback to the Young Pioneers of the Soviet era. … The Youth Army jettisoned the Communist bits, emerging as a kind of hybrid version of the scouts and a reserve officers training program, with an emphasis on patriotism and national service. The trademark red endured. … Formed in May 2016, the Youth Army, or ‘Yunarmia’ in Russian, has grown to include 190,000 children aged 8 to 18 and spread over all 85 regions of Russia. To mark the holiday in February known as Defender of the Fatherland Day, the Ministry of Defense organized the first national forum of the organization… With the event—parts nationalistic pep rally, arms bazaar, junior Olympics and nerd science fair—the organizers made a distinct effort to make the Youth Army seem cool. … The defense minister was on hand at the forum to offer encouragement, telling the youths that whether they served in the army or went into the performing arts, the main point was to help Russia flourish.”

Defense and aerospace:

“This is How Bad Russia Wants Hypersonic Weapons,” Dave Majumdar, The National Interest, 03.23.18: The author, defense editor for The National Interest, writes: “Russia has placed such a high priority on its new Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle that it has placed two other intercontinental ballistic missile programs on hold. … The Russians are likely prioritizing the Avangard because of the Kremlin’s fear that future American missile defenses could undercut Moscow’s retaliatory second-strike capability. ... The Avangard will apparently be equipped with a single massive thermonuclear warhead with a yield exceeding two megatons. With a yield that high, the Avangard will have considerably greater destructive power in an individual warhead than a typical modern ICBM, which have smaller yields usually no more than 500 kilotons. … Analysts are extremely skeptical that the Russians can put the Avangard into operation by next year.”

“Here's Why Russia's 'New' Tu-160M2 Could Be NATO's Worst Nightmare,” Dave Majumdar, The National Interest, 03.23.18: The author, defense editor for The National Interest, writes: “Russia’s fleet of new build Tupolev Tu-160M2 Blackjack strategic bombers will be equipped with upgraded engines that would extend the range of the aircraft by roughly 600 miles. The massive Mach 2.0 capable bombers are also expected to receive a new generation of stealthy long-range cruise missiles as their main armament. … the Russian Air Force relies primarily on long-range standoff weapons to strike targets inside heavily defended airspace. … For Russia, given the role that its bombers play in both its conventional and nuclear doctrine, the upgraded Tu-160M2 seems to be a commonsense and relatively affordable way to recapitalize its fleet.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.