Russia Analytical Report, March 17-24, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. In a wide-ranging interview with Tucker Carlson, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff shared his views on causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the prospects for ending it as the U.S. mediates indirect Ukrainian-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia this week. “What’s the ultimate goal? The ultimate goal is a 30-day ceasefire, during which time we discuss a permanent ceasefire. We’re not far away from that,” Witkoff told Carlson. Looking further into the future, he asked: “Who doesn’t want to have a world where Russia and the United States are doing, collaboratively, good things together?,” advocating for future U.S.-Russian relations based on shared business interests. Witkoff has also used the interview to state what has already been accomplished in the U.S.-mediated negotiations. “We have moved Russia in ways that no one thought was possible… they agreed to an energy infrastructure ceasefire,” Witkoff said. “They’ve never talked about reinstituting the Black Sea moratorium on maritime hits… now that’s going to be implemented over the next week or so,” he added. During the interview, Witkoff also made several claims that implied proximity to Russia’s positions on the conflict. For instance, he noted that all the Ukrainian regions, which Moscow now claims to be part of Russia, held referenda to join Russia, with “the overwhelming majority of the people… indicat[ing] that they want to be under Russian rule.”1 “The Russians are de facto in control of these territories. The question is: Will the world acknowledge that those are Russian territories?” Witkoff asked. “Can [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy survive politically if he acknowledges this? This is the central issue in the conflict.” Witkoff also described these regions as “Russian-speaking.”2 Witkoff also repeated a Russian narrative about Ukraine’s statehood, even though he didn’t explicitly endorse it. “There’s a sensibility in Russia that Ukraine is a false country, that they just patch together in this sort of mosaic, these regions. And that’s the root cause, in my opinion, of this war, that Russia regards those five regions as rightfully theirs,” Witkoff said.3 Witkoff also confirmed that the threat of nuclear war remained on the minds of those in the White House even after the change of guard led to formidable changes in U.S. policy toward the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the course of the interview, Witkoff also repeatedly praised Russian President Vladimir Putin—whom he does not “regard … as a bad guy”—for sending “all kinds of signals” to Trump. These signals included Putin’s disclosure to Witkoff during their second meeting that Putin had prayed in a church for Trump after a bullet grazed his ear last July in an assassination attempt, and that he then commissioned a portrait of Trump that Witkoff delivered to the latter, who was “clearly touched by it.”4
  2. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy awaits negotiations to end Russia’s war in his country, Harvard University’s Graham Allison recommends that he should reflect on an earlier chapter. In November 2022, Mark Milley, then U.S. chairman of JCS, argued controversially that Ukraine was bogged down in a stalemate and should seize a “window of opportunity for negotiation.” Although nothing came of his proposal, Milley’s Ukrainian counterpart, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, concluded a year later that the time had come to say the forbidden word in Kyiv: “stalemate,” Allison writes in his March 18 commentary for FP, entitled “It’s Time for Ukraine to Accept an Ugly Peace.” “Had Milley’s proposal ended the war by early 2023, over 300,000 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians would have been spared, and swaths of critical infrastructure left intact. Instead, Ukraine’s economy remains below prewar levels, and a quarter of its citizens are displaced,” Allison writes. Zelenskyy should focus on Ukraine’s achievement: preserving the country’s independence. Zelenskyy must now negotiate an ugly but sustainable peace, according to Allison. As Zelenskyy accepts this reality, Allison suggests seven pointers in his FP commentary:
    1. First, Zelenskyy must show Trump respect—with a capital R.
    2. Second, Ukraine must seek to survive within Russia’s de facto sphere of influence.
    3. Third, Ukraine must settle for an extended ceasefire or armistice.
    4. Fourth, Zelenskyy should forget NATO.
    5. Fifth, Zelenskyy should consider Trump’s suggestion that “China can help” in a peace agreement.
    6. Sixth, peace cannot be a respite for Putin to rearm.
    7. Finally, Ukraine’s best hope lies in a path to EU membership.
  3. Some Russian experts, both pro-Putin and pro-democracy, have expressed doubts that the Russian-U.S. rapprochement in general, and efforts to quickly end the Russian-Ukrainian war in particular, may succeed. “The negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump marked a step toward resolving the Ukrainian conflict. However, the outcomes remain uncertain,” Ivan Timofeev of pro-government RIAC and Valdai Club wrote earlier this month. “A reversal could occur at any moment, given the multitude of unresolved, accumulated issues. The flawed legacy of the European security system will continue to weigh heavily on the prospects of normalization for the foreseeable future,” he warns. Another prominent pro-Kremlin expert, Sergei Karaganov, predicted that the conflict would continue for several more months and expressed skepticism that the U.S. and Russia could become partners again. When asked by La Stampa if they could, Karaganov said: “Trump is not our friend. A strong America means a strong competitor.” “The hypothetical normalization of U.S.-Russian relations is still in its infancy, and the high-profile economic projects that both sides are so keen to boast about have every chance of collapsing due to the poor investment climate in Russia and the glaring contradictions between the positions of Moscow and Washington,” according to Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center senior fellow Tatiana Stanovaya. “There is every chance that this rapprochement will eventually hit a dead end, with nothing to show but a couple of local projects,” she argues. According to Russian influentials, such as Vyacheslav Nikonov, a deputy chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the lower house of the Russian Parliament, interviewed by NYT earlier this month, the Kremlin sees negotiations over Ukraine and over U.S.-Russia ties as running on two separate tracks. “Mr. Putin continues to seek a far-reaching victory in Ukraine but is humoring Mr. Trump’s ceasefire push to seize the benefits of a thaw with Washington,” NYT’s Anton Troianovski writes.5

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korean troops key to Russian advances in Kursk, says Ukraine,” Lizzie Johnson Kostiantyn Khudov and Catherine Belton,” WP, 03.18.25.

  • "A fresh supply of North Korean troops, command of the air and a crushing superiority in numbers helped Russia last week retake the town of Sudzha, Ukraine's last stronghold in western Russia, according to interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and officials familiar with the battles of the last few weeks."
  • "Russia's heavy use of North Korean troops and equipment to nearly retake the Kursk region after seven months of Ukrainian control demonstrated the Kremlin's desire to reclaim the land at any cost and prevent Kyiv from forcing a territorial exchange as part of future negotiations. Russia occupies around 20 percent of Ukrainian territory."
  • "Without North Korean troops, Russia cannot even hold onto its own territories with its own army," said Ruslan Mykula, the co-founder of Deep State. "These were massive waves of reinforcements, much larger than our group. And the harsh reality is, we simply didn't have enough ammunition and drones to eliminate them all."
  • "Military analysts said that Ukraine losing its foothold in Kursk resulted in a retreat that at times bordered on chaotic — but which was better organized than previous withdrawals, such as from Avdiivka last year."
  • "Early last month, the North Koreans returned to [Kursk region]. While they'd initially operated as simple rifle units, these new brigades included the 91st and 92nd Special Forces and now had their own command structures and attack plans sharpened by previous missions. Operating in small groups on either flank, they joined elite Russian forces and outnumbered the Ukrainians by a ratio of about 2 to 1 — helping seize the key stronghold of Sverdlikovo near Ukraine's main logistics routes."

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Why is the US government giving up on Ukrainian children abducted by Russia?" Editorial Board, Boston Globe, 03.24.25. 

  • Many of the Ukrainian children — numbering nearly 20,000 — were taken from their families by Russian troops early in the invasion and sent to live in Russia as part of what seemed an attempt at the Russification of the population by President Vladimir Putin. The abductions, experts say, are ongoing.
  • A Yale University-based research team has been tracking the whereabouts of the children, sharing its data with the International Criminal Court. The Hague-based court is still collecting evidence of war crimes against Putin and has issued arrest warrants for him in connection with the child abductions.
  • But now the team’s work has been effectively shut down by the Trump administration, and its invaluable database — including satellite imagery and biometric data tracking the identities of the children — is no longer publicly available, its whereabouts unknown.
  • It is difficult not to view the State Department’s actions as anything other than an attempt to appease Putin, perhaps as a prelude to negotiations on ending the three-year war in Ukraine. But this is not ground that the Trump administration should be yielding.
  • To steal children is a crime. To ignore that crime is to be complicit in it. To not restart this program would be a lasting stain on this nation’s soul.

"Deporting Ukrainian Refugees Weakens America," Tetiana Kotelnykova, FP, 03.21.25. 

  • Deporting vulnerable people back to a war zone is not just cruel; it is counterproductive. By forcing them to leave, it wastes the contributions they could make to society and nullifies the support they’ve already received. \
  • Deporting Ukrainian refugees does not serve U.S. interests. It does not strengthen the economy. It does not bolster national security. It does not make America greater. It weakens it.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine’s army escapes from Kursk by the skin of its teeth, The Economist, 03.17.25.

  • The partial withdrawal—from the town of Sudzha and other villages inside Kursk—is a blow to Ukraine’s military leadership. But it is not quite the complete disaster claimed by Russian propaganda, which Donald Trump inexplicably decided to amplify in a social-media post claiming that “thousands of Ukrainian soldiers” were “completely surrounded”. That was never the case. There have been serious losses; the withdrawal was chaotic in parts, and Russia captured at least dozens of prisoners. But the Ukrainians retreated relatively intact and a sizeable force still remains up to 10km inside Russia, having taken up more defensible positions on high ground. “Trump appears to be getting his information from Russian Instagram reels,” one military commander says.
  • A high-level source in Ukrainian intelligence says the Russian surge seemed timed to coincide with Mr. Trump’s push for a ceasefire. On March 10th, during talks in Saudi Arabia, Ukraine agreed to an American proposal for a ceasefire; Mr. Putin is yet to reciprocate. “The Russians will not agree to a ceasefire while we are still in their land,” the source says. “They don’t want us to have that bargaining chip when the fighting stops.”
  • Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk continues to divide opinion. Some top officers opposed it from the start; the commander of one of the four elite units spearheading the August 2024 offensive resigned before it started. Others who had been excluded from the armed forces commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky’s decision-making thought it a mistake. Some have since tempered their opposition, admitting it diverted (and killed) some of Russia’s best troops. “We’ve lost lots of good men, and maybe it was a rash decision”, says one intelligence officer, “but you have to ask what the tens of thousands of soldiers Putin diverted to Kursk might have done elsewhere.”
  • The chaotic final weeks have certainly left a sour note, and many question why Mr. Zelensky and General Syrsky left it so long to retreat. But the operation was undeniably a boon for the nation’s morale in an otherwise grim 2024. It demonstrated that Russia was struggling too. “

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Europe’s War in Ukraine," Jack Watling, FA, 03.24.25. 

"Europe’s Best Bet for Protecting Postwar Ukraine," Rajan Menon, FP, 03.19.25. 

  • In order to move toward greater autonomy in defense and to enable Ukraine’s armed neutrality, Europe must move quickly to acquire the capabilities that it badly needs but sorely lacks. That will require addressing numerous military weaknesses—exemplified by the serious problems plaguing the armed forces of Germany, one of the continent’s richest countries—that owe, in no small measure, to Europe’s good fortune of having been able to count on U.S. protection for more than 70 years.
  • As for Ukraine, now that NATO membership looks all but impossible, it needs sustained military training and weapons supplies, which Europe can provide to make armed neutrality a feasible strategy.

"Europe Is About to Make Its Biggest Strategic Mistake," Martin Sandbu, FT, 03.20.25. 

  • Europe may be militarily weaker than the US. But in one sphere of power, the EU is the world’s single superpower. Of the roughly $300bn or so the Central Bank of Russia held in western countries when Putin launched his full-scale aggression, more than two-thirds is blocked under EU sanctions. The bulk of this — €183bn on the last public information — consists of a bank deposit in Euroclear, the Belgian bank and securities depository.
  • This is a lot of money — as much or more than all the western aid to Ukraine to date. What happens to it could decisively tilt the balance between Moscow and Kyiv — on the battlefield or at the negotiation table. Returning it to Russia would give a huge lifeline to an economy that is maxing out its capacity to fuel the war and unable to import more resources. It would also destroy an opportunity to secure Ukraine’s resources for years to come and boost its ability to say “no” to a Trump surrender deal.
  • At the very least, Europe must forestall the return “by default” of the assets to Moscow in case politicians fail to decide anything. For the EU, that means acting now to segregate Euroclear’s Russia-related balance sheet in a new banking institution with targeted investment instructions. For the UK (and Canada) it means parallel moves to segregate Russia-related Euroclear funds in their jurisdictions and make them directly subject to domestic sanctions.
  • The time has come to make political choices — and the choices come down to favoring Russia or favoring Ukraine.

“Unfreezing Russian investors,” Harriet Agnew, FT, 03.24.25.

  • Russian assets have been taboo for most investment managers for the last three years for good reasons beyond the ethical ones.
  • But we are seeing signs of a defrosting. Donald Trump’s administration is continuing a rapprochement with Vladimir Putin. The ruble has surged against the dollar this year on ceasefire talks. And while actual trades are thin on the ground, some hedge funds and brokers are on the hunt for assets that might be first in line to rally if US sanctions relax and Russia becomes a tradable market again. “There is definitely some excitement, predominantly in the hedge fund community,” said Roger Mark, fixed-income analyst at investment firm Ninety One.
  • So far that has meant looking at forward bets on the ruble known as non-deliverable forwards that can be settled in cash rather than the currency, to avoid needing to have rubles on hand. Some investors are also asking holders of battered Russian bonds if they are keen to sell.  But it is very tentative.
  • A decree by Putin did allow some investment managers, including Jane Street, GMO and Franklin Templeton, to sell frozen Russian shares to a US hedge fund called 683 Capital Partners that will then trade them to Russian funds. But that is still a long way from investors seeing Russia under Putin as an investable market again over the long term.

“It’s Time for Ukraine to Accept an Ugly Peace,” Graham T. Allison, FP, 03.18.25.

  • By late 2023, though, Zaluzhnyi reluctantly concluded that the time had come to say what in Kyiv was a forbidden word: “stalemate.”
  • As Zelensky begins to accept this reality, I would suggest seven pointers.
    • First, he needs to understand that the most important player at the table is Trump—and that the U.S. president’s views are unlikely to change.
    • Second, Zelensky should accept the geographical fact that Ukraine shares a roughly 1,400-mile border with a great power. It cannot escape the shadow of Russian power any more than Canada or Mexico can with the United States.
    • Third, Ukraine’s alternative to hot war cannot be the “just and lasting peace” that Zelensky dreams of. Instead, it will likely have to be an end to the killing in an extended cease-fire or possibly an armistice similar to the agreement that ended the Korean War.
    • Fourth, to achieve the best insurance that he can get against Putin using a cease-fire as a respite to rearm before launching another invasion, Zelensky should forget about NATO. For Trump, NATO membership for Ukraine is simply off the table.
    • Fifth, Zelensky should be realistic about the security commitments that may be available to him. Europeans are actively talking about commitments from individual countries—but, of course, talking is what Europeans do best.
    • Sixth, the key issue on which Zelensky and Trump agree is that peace (or the absence of hot war) must be sustainable—not simply a respite for Putin to rearm.
    • Finally, Ukraine’s larger hope for a viable future lies in its relationship with Europe. A peace agreement should confirm its right to strengthen economic relations with the European Union on a path to membership. 

“Trump is nearing a sharp fork in the road to Ukraine peace," David Ignatius, WP, 03.18.25.

  • President Donald Trump appears far more eager for a peace deal in Ukraine than does Russian President Vladimir Putin
  • In his pursuit of peace, Trump now faces a dilemma. He could embrace Putin's hard-line positions and attempt to bludgeon Ukraine into accepting them, but that would infuriate Britain and France, historically two of America's closest allies. Alternatively, he could pressure Putin to make concessions, with new sanctions that would jeopardize Trump's goal of "an END to this very horrible War," as he put it on Tuesday.
  • Putin has already won the most important U.S. concession, which is Russia's return from its status as a pariah to what the Kremlin said was Trump's agreement on "normalizing bilateral relations." That's a big, symbolic reprieve for a leader who has been accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Court.
  • American accounts of Tuesday's conversation don't address what will probably be the hardest issue in this negotiation: security guarantees for Ukraine that would deter Putin from resuming his assault after a deal is reached.
  • After meeting with Ukrainian officials in Saudi Arabia last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the United States recognized Ukraine's need for these guarantees.
  • Graham Allison, a Harvard Kennedy School professor who has counseled several generations of White House officials, argued on Tuesday in Foreign Policy that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will have to make further concessions to narrow the gap between his position and Putin's. "Zelensky should accept the geographical fact that Ukraine shares a roughly 1,400-mile border with a great power," he wrote. "It cannot escape the shadow of Russian power any more than Canada or Mexico can with the United States. It must therefore seek to survive within the de facto sphere of influence of its hostile neighbor." That might be Trump's view, too.

"Want to End the Ukraine Conflict? Look at Finland's ‘Winter War,’" James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 03.20.25.

  • Let’s start with Finland, where the parallels are quite strong. The war began with a surprise attack in November 1939, when the Red Army under Joseph Stalin conducted an unprovoked assault against a far-smaller neighbor. Despite being enormously outnumbered and outgunned, the Finns mounted a spirited and creative defense. Using the winter weather to their advantage, and improvised weapons like the famous Molotov cocktail, they fought the Soviets largely to a standstill. They are justifiably proud of their performance.... But here’s the bad news. The Finns ultimately were forced to give up about 11% of their territory to Russia. The enormous disparity in manpower and combat equipment ultimately made that inevitable. The Finns also had to pledge they would remain neutral and not join any coalitions of the West. It was an unpalatable choice, but it preserved Finland as a sovereign state.
  • The lesson here is clear: When faced with a more powerful opponent, you must maintain flexibility and be willing to trade land for peace. You may also have to forswear joining the defense alliances of your choice. Live to fight another day, as Finland did, and you may one day end up in NATO.
  • The Korean War has two powerful lessons to offer... The first lesson from Korea that applies to Ukraine is the imperative of creating a significant physical deconflict zone between combatants.. The other lesson from the Korean War is not pleasant: War can continue even after the shooting stops.
  • Don’t let the desire for a perfect outcome become the enemy of a pretty good one — especially if it allows the guns to go silent.

"I Don’t Believe a Single Word Trump and Putin Say About Ukraine," Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 03.18.25.

  • I do not trust a single word that Trump and Putin say about their private conversations on Ukraine — including the words “and” and “the,” as the writer Mary McCarthy famously said about the veracity of her rival Lillian Hellman. Because something has not smelled right from the start with this whole Trump-Putin deal-making on Ukraine.
  • I just have too many unanswered questions. Let me count the ways.
    • For starters, it took Secretary of State Henry Kissinger over a month of intense shuttle diplomacy to produce the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria that ended the 1973 war — and all of those parties wanted a deal. Are you telling me that two meetings between Trump’s pal Steve Witkoff and Putin in Moscow and a couple of phone calls between Putin and Trump are enough to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine on reasonable terms for Kyiv?
      • Message to President Trump and Vice President JD Vance: If you sell out Ukraine to Putin, you will forever carry a mark of Cain on your foreheads as traitors to a core value that has animated U.S. foreign policy for 250 years — the defense of liberty against tyranny.
    • Why else am I suspicious? Because Trump keeps saying that all he wants to do is end “the killing” in Ukraine. ... Putin needs to enlist Trump’s help only if he wants something more than an end to the killing. I get that Ukraine will have to cede something to Putin. The question is how much. I also get that the only way for Putin to get the extra-large slice that he wants and the postwar restrictions that he wants imposed on Ukraine — without more warfighting — is by enlisting Trump to get them for him."

"What’s the Thinking Behind Putin’s Maneuvering Around Trump?" Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Politika, 03.19.25.

  • "While Trump is trying to achieve some fast results in Ukraine, Moscow sees what is happening as a far more protracted process in which a lot—though far from everything—depends on Washington. In any case, Putin will eventually have to deal with an unwavering Kyiv and an increasingly radical Europe. That means that the war may well continue even without the United States. This is what lies behind Russia’s tactical maneuvering. Moscow is trying to neutralize the United States in geopolitical terms by normalizing bilateral relations with it."
  • "Moscow is signaling to Washington that it is ready to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue; rapprochement has begun on Syria; the two countries are voting in solidarity at the UN; and Russia has drastically toned down its rhetoric in support of Palestine. But the main focus of normalization is economic cooperation. Full-fledged embassy operations have yet to be resumed, but work in the economic sphere is already in full swing."
  • "The Kremlin is willing to throw Trump a few insignificant or even fictitious bones to prevent fundamental disagreements over Ukraine from disrupting the trend toward the normalization of bilateral relations. That suits Trump just fine, which makes Ukraine’s situation even worse."
  • "Nevertheless, the hypothetical normalization of U.S.-Russian relations is still in its infancy, and the high-profile economic projects that both sides are so keen to boast about have every chance of collapsing due to the poor investment climate in Russia and the glaring contradictions between the positions of Moscow and Washington. There is every chance that this rapprochement will eventually hit a dead end, with nothing to show but a couple of local projects and close to zero progress in Ukraine. Even that outcome, however, will be considered a good result for the Kremlin."

"How to Negotiate With Putin," Laurie Bristow, FP, 03.19.25. 

  • Ukraine’s allies need to refrain from doing Putin’s work for him.
    • Don’t let the Kremlin control the timing or substance of negotiations.
    • Don’t let the Kremlin change the subject, set its own agenda, or create false equivalence.
    • Don’t agree to measures that have the purpose of destabilizing Ukraine.
    • Do plan for what happens after a cease-fire: Russia will certainly seek to undermine Ukraine’s stability, decouple it from its allies, and evade any obligations Russia has taken on.
    • Don’t let ambition to do deals with a strongman damage the alliances that are democracies’ greatest asset in containing threats to our interests.
    • Don’t fall prey to the illusion that Putin dislikes, fears, and resents U.S. power any less because Trump is in the White House. There is no prospect of peeling Russia off from China.
    • Finally, do plan for how to keep the peace: a difficult, expensive, long-term effort, mostly by Europe but with U.S. engagement, that will need to be sustained for as long as an angry, bitter, malevolent Russian leadership is waiting for its chance to redraw the post-Cold War settlement in Europe.

“Three Years of Stress Test: Interim Results for Russia,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club/RIAC, 03.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • The negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump marked a step toward resolving the Ukrainian conflict. However, the outcomes remain uncertain. A reversal could occur at any moment, given the multitude of unresolved, accumulated issues. The flawed legacy of the European security system will continue to weigh heavily on the prospects of normalization for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, a window of opportunity for achieving peace remains open. The motivation to seize such opportunities may hinge on the interim outcomes Russia has achieved thus far and the potential scenarios that could unfold if hostilities persist.
  • Among the key results, the most striking is Russia’s demonstrated readiness to use force to defend its interests in Europe. For three decades following the Cold War, Russia’s military capacity to protect its positions was rarely taken seriously. The special military operation shattered this perception. It revealed that security relations with the West had reached an impasse, leaving no viable alternatives – at least from Russia’s perspective. It became evident that the use of force and a large-scale conflict in Europe are real possibilities, meaning Moscow’s demands and concerns can no longer be dismissed with vague assurances. Russia is prepared to endure significant losses and risks to safeguard its fundamental security interests. There will be no further retreat, even if it means saving face.
  • In the realm of diplomacy, a notable outcome has been the absence of any significant anti-Russia coalitions involving non-Western nations. While the West has consolidated around an anti-Russian stance, it has failed to draw other global players into such a coalition. China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others have distanced themselves from the sanctions policy.

"‘Total victory is no longer achievable. Donald will ultimately stop Russia, but the red line is Kyiv in NATO,’" Sergey Karaganov, interview with La Stampa, republished by Russia in Global Affairs, 03.24.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • [When asked “Are we close to ending the conflict in Ukraine?”] Unfortunately, not yet. I think the war will continue for several more months, but the situation has improved: we may reach an agreement. Trump might stop us before complete victory... We might be able to stop without fully defeating the Nazi regime in Kyiv and breaking the will of the deranged European elites. Now, at last, there is a chance to end this war, and it must be taken—of course, with guarantees that whatever remains of Ukraine will be completely demilitarized and become a neutral state. At this point, unfortunately, denazification does not seem possible.
  • We want to cease hostilities as soon as possible, but we will not make a decision without a basis for a solid, long-term peace: Ukraine must be demilitarized and have neutral status. There must also be a demilitarized zone along the new border. It should be staffed not by Europeans—who are responsible for the war—but by Indians, Chinese, Pakistanis, and others.
  • European elites are failing on all fronts—from social inequality to the green agenda and migration policy—and they are trying to cover up their failures with war.
  • Above all, we are concerned with security. I’ve said many times to our poor Baltic neighbors that the best way to ensure their security is to have good relations with Russia.
  • [When asked] “Is Trump’s America becoming a partner to Putin’s Russia?” Trump did what any American president should have done: he wants to get out of this war, which America will lose anyway. But Trump is not our friend. A strong America means a strong competitor.

"Putin Won’t End the War. He Can’t Afford To," Mikhail Zygar, NYT, 03.18.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • People hoping for peace are likely to be disappointed. Despite President Vladimir Putin of Russia signaling readiness for a deal, nothing could be further from the truth. I’ve been talking to Kremlin insiders who have known Mr. Putin for years and they all agreed: Mr. Putin has come to love war and can no longer imagine a future without it. Instead, his plan is to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the United States, take advantage of Mr. Trump’s apparent friendliness to improve relations with America and keep the war machine running.

“Readouts of Trump-Putin Call Reaffirm Divergence of US, RF Views on Path to Peace,” Simon Saradzhyan, Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Angelina Flood, RM, 03.20.25.

  • The U.S. and Russian readouts of the [Trump-Putin] call revealed substantive differences between the two sides’ interpretations of the content and outcomes of the March 18 conversation.
  • While the White House version claims that the leaders agreed that the movement to peace will begin with a 30-day energy and infrastructure ceasefire, the Kremlin version refers to an energy infrastructure ceasefire only. Likewise, the Kremlin readout includes items not mentioned in the White House readout, including a claim that the two leaders discussed “a complete cessation of providing Kyiv with foreign military aid.”
  • The Kremlin's version, more than double the length of the White House readout, provides considerably more detail about the topics discussed, signaling Putin's greater interest in unfreezing the bilateral relationship now that the U.S. no longer treats him as a pariah, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict notwithstanding.
  • In a clear effort to encourage Trump to move with Putin toward further normalizing the U.S.-Russian relationship, the Kremlin's readout says the Russian leader praised his U.S. counterpart during the call for “striving to achieve the noble goal of ending the hostilities,” a panegyric not reciprocated in the White House readout.
  • Some divergence also appears regarding the description of future engagements between the two countries’ governments. For instance, the Kremlin version notes the formation of Russian and American expert task forces to continue bilateral efforts toward a Ukrainian settlement, which is absent from the White House summary.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump's former Russia analyst discusses Putin's possible next moves in the war,” Sarah McCammon, NPR, 03.22.25.

  • The Russian government's goal is to weaken our country, to diminish America's global role and to neutralize a perceived U.S. threat to Russian interests. President Putin and the Russian security services aim to counter U.S. foreign policy objectives in Europe, including in Ukraine, where Moscow wishes to reassert political and economic dominance.
  • Putin certainly does want a deal [on Ukraine], but on his terms. So going back to the clip that you used from the testimony, the goal of Russia for economic, political and, you know, frankly, territorial dominance in Ukraine remains.... there is an overlap between what Vladimir Putin wants and what President Trump also seems to want. He himself seems to want to pull the United States out of Europe, not just pull the U.S. support away for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to basically push Russia back.
  • I don't think it [conflict with Russia] is inevitable. I think if you can restore deterrence - in other words, make it very clear to Russia that war doesn't work, that Putin is not going to achieve the goals that he's set out by military means - then you can change the whole course of these relationships.
  • Right now, from the European perspective, just to be very clear here - and I'm talking to European counterparts all the time - there's a real fear that the United States has switched sides and that, in fact, you know, a war that is being waged in Ukraine, which is also for the future of Europe and European security, is now going to be basically joined by the United States taking sides with Russia - not, obviously, fighting against Europe, but certainly taking the positions that Russia has thus far taken in the war.

"Trump Has Launched a Second American Revolution. This Time, It’s Against the World." Stewart Patrick, CEIP, 03.19.25. 

  • Just two months into his second presidency, Donald Trump is revolutionizing U.S. foreign policy. His policies will upend world order by destabilizing and ultimately destroying established institutions and patterns of international cooperation. Since 1945, the United States has been the leading champion, underwriter, and guarantor of an open, rule-bound global system under international law. Now, it rejects the logic of multilateralism, including any self-restraints on the exercise of U.S. power and any responsibilities for global leadership and stability.
  • Ten Themes in Trumpian Foreign Policy
    1. Abdication of U.S. Leadership and Responsibility
    2. Sovereignty on Steroids
    3. Denigration of the West and U.S. Alliances
    4. Revival of Spheres of Influence
    5. Dismissal of International Law
    6. Preference for Bullying Bilateralism
    7. Repudiation of Economic Multilateralism
    8. Disavowal of Global Development
    9. Abandonment of Democracy Promotion
    10. Rejection of Global Public Goods
  • Trump has launched his revolution against the world America made. But whether it spreads globally, meets resistance, or inspires counterrevolution is largely out of his hands. Beyond undermining long-term U.S. interests and credibility, the administration’s policies have created a vacuum of global leadership that others will compete to fill, for good or ill. The world order that ultimately emerges from this turbulence will not be made in America alone.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with Krasnaya Zvezda Media Holding Company for the film ‘Diplomacy as a Way of Life: I Prefer Fair Play,’ 03.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. (Krasnaya Zvezda is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Donald Trump is a pragmatist. His slogan—common sense—signifies, as all observe, a shift in modus operandi. Yet, the goal endures: “MAGA” (Make America Great Again). His new cap now proclaims, “Promises Made, Promises Kept.” This injects a visceral, human dimension into policy, stripping away the dehumanized bureaucratic frameworks to which we have grown accustomed. It renders him interesting.
  • His team—Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz—are absolutely reasonable people in every sense of the word. They talk based on the assumption that they do not boss us and we do not boss them. It is just that two serious countries have sat down to discuss what is wrong between them and what their predecessor has fouled up over the past four years by destroying all without exception channels for contact and introducing a number of sanctions, which led to the banishment of U.S. companies that ended up sustaining hundreds of billions of dollars in losses.
  • I do not want to be anti-European, but today’s situation confirms the idea formulated by many historians. During the last 500 years (after the West took shape that has preserved until today, albeit with some changes), all major global tragedies have either originated in Europe or been a result of European policy. Colonization, wars, crusaders, the Crimean War, Napoleon, World War I, Adolf Hitler. If we look at history in retrospect, the Americans did not play any warmonger or belligerent role.
  • The Chinese diplomatic school has never even entertained the notion of refusing to engage in dialogue with any country, much less a neighbor, and closing the door on relations. Yet our neighbor in the form of the West (Europe) has done precisely that. This is not diplomacy.

"Vladislav Sourkov, the Wizard of the Kremlin: 'Russia Will Expand in All Directions, as Far as God'," L’Express, 03.19.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • I built an official ideology based on the concept of the 'Russian world', which already existed in philosophical circles. The Russian world has no borders. The Russian world is everywhere there is Russian influence, in one form or another: cultural, informational, military, economic, ideological or humanitarian... In other words, it is everywhere. The extent of our influence varies greatly from region to region, but it is never zero. So we will spread out in all directions, as far as God wills and as strong as we are. The important thing is not to get carried away and not to take on too big a piece.
  • The EU was founded in 1992, immediately after the collapse of the USSR. Your Union was built on the ruins of ours. This has gone to the head of your politics. The EU began to expand in a frenzied and, I would even say, imprudent manner. It has put on unwanted weight. It has favored quantity over quality. The result is a governance structure that is obese, overly collegial, and produces nothing but half-measures. In this context, we have seen the emergence of generations of European politicians whose speciality is half-measures. Now Europe has to decide whether it is a state or not. The member countries have delegated their sovereignty to the EU, but not entirely: another half measure! As a result, neither the EU nor its members are entirely sovereign. We need to get out of this precarious in-between situation, either by returning to the previous state of a purely economic community, or by taking a decisive step towards a sovereign federation. Either way, it will take willpower and a generous dose of good old-fashioned authoritarianism. Many Europeans think like this. The Euro-Putinists and Euro-Trumpists are gaining strength. 

"Europe’s Quest for ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Needs Refocusing," Andrey Kortunov, Global Times/RIAC, 03.24.25. Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Lately the not-so-fresh idea of a “European strategic autonomy” has got back in circulation in many EU capitals. This should come as no surprise, given the condescending and even arrogant attitude displayed by the Donald Trump administration toward U.S.' European allies. Politicians and state officials across the European continent can no longer take the transatlantic commonality of values or even the enduring U.S. leadership for granted and they have to start thinking about Europe playing a more independent role in the turbulent and unstable world of today and tomorrow.
  • What is surprising, however, is that the ongoing discussions about the desired parameters of “strategic autonomy” almost exclusively focus on its military dimension. This emphasis may be understandable, but arguably it is not very practical. Even if all the needed political, legal, administrative and financial decisions were already in place, it would still take many years, if not decades, for Brussels to become a significant global military actor comparable to already established great powers. Furthermore, the likely cost of such an epic rearmament effort by the EU would be exceptionally high, and for many European nations that are currently faced with significant economic and financial challenges, the cost would be prohibitively high.
  • However, there is another, no less important dimension of “strategic autonomy,” which is often overlooked or suppressed in Europe, and where tangible practical results can be achieved much faster and at a much lower cost. That is the vital economic dimensions of "strategic autonomy.” These dimensions, above all, include the advancement of critical modern technologies (digital infrastructure, semiconductors, AI, green economy) and diversification of supply chains to limit the current overwhelming EU dependence on U.S. trading partners.
  • The EU would need stronger economic ties with China. In many ways, Brussels and Beijing face similar challenges coming from Washington.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Russia and Chinese Private Military and Security Companies in Africa: Two Competing Models?" Djenabou Cisse, Simon Menet, and Marie de Vries, Recherches & Documents n°03/2025, FRS, March 2025.

  • The Sino-Russian relationship has emerged as one of the structuring axes of the strategic landscape in an international context marked by the war in Ukraine and power rivalries. While it is just one, relatively marginal aspect of their “no limits friendship”, the privatization of security remains a strategic issue for both powers as well as for France and its allies.
  • From Beijing’s perspective, PMSCs represent a response to shortcomings in protecting Chinese interests abroad as well as support for security diplomacy. On the side of Moscow, Class 3 and 4 PMSCs primarily serve as vectors of influence and destabilization in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. For both countries, PMSCs play a crucial role in political security—a top priority for the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai.
  • However, while China and Russia derive significant benefits from the activities of PMSCs, both models are not without shortcomings, as illustrated by incidents involving Russian and Chinese PMSCs in Africa. These incidents raise legislative and control issues for Moscow and Beijing alike. Moreover, the rapid development of Russian and Chinese PMSCs on the continent presents significant risks to local security, owing to the patterns of human rights violations committed by certain companies, as well as to Western interests through increased market dominance at the expense of Western firms and the use of “grey zone” strategies by Russian PMSCs.
  • Several lines of thought should be considered. For France, it would be appropriate to:̶
    • Developing our understanding of PMSCs, with a focus on military intelligence (documentation intelligence, broad-spectrum targeting, foresight work, and systemic analysis), as well as on tender procedures that can provide insights into the organizational structures, influence, and operational methods of these entities. Regarding Chinese PMSCs, for example, efforts should particularly focus on identifying potential links with defense conglomerates and Chinese intelligence services."

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"Nuclear Disarmament. The End of History?" Ivan Timofeev, RIAC, 03.18.25. Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • "The ongoing negotiations between Russia and the United States on the Ukrainian issue have rekindled hopes for a return to constructive dialogue on other fronts, particularly in the realm of strategic stability and nuclear arms control. To what extent are Moscow and Washington prepared for such dialogue? What political preconditions exist, and what parameters might it take?"
  • "The ongoing negotiations between Russia and the U.S. offer a glimmer of hope for de-escalation. The Trump administration has publicly committed to resolving the Ukrainian conflict. However, the talks are expected to be exceptionally complex, with disagreements among allies—such as the EU, the UK, and even Kiev—undermining the new U.S. president’s initiatives. The gulf between the parties’ positions remains vast."
  • "Nevertheless, should agreements on Ukraine be reached and sustained, the risks of unintended or uncontrolled escalation, including in the missile and nuclear sphere, could diminish."
  • "In the U.S., the modernization of nuclear forces, a process initiated by previous administrations, will continue. Trump is likely to revisit the issue of China’s participation in a new security architecture."
  • "New START is unlikely to be revived, as doing so would require extensive preparatory efforts. At the same time, a full-blown strategic nuclear arms race between Russia and the U.S., reminiscent of the Cold War, appears improbable. A significant build-up of nuclear warheads and delivery systems would not fundamentally enhance security—the resources expended would not yield commensurate benefits. Instead, the development of strategic nuclear forces is likely to focus on qualitative improvements, driven by technological advancements. The arms race will likely deepen rather than broaden, with enhancements to weapon characteristics, control systems, and other components taking precedence over sheer numbers."
  • "The situation surrounding intermediate and shorter-range missile systems is particularly destabilizing. The risk of mass deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe remains high."

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

"The Political Transition in Syria: Regional and International Interests," Sinem Adar, Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Margarete Klein, and Guido Steinberg, SWP Comment 2025/C 11, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 03.18.25. 

  • ""A key supporter of the Assad regime in the past, the Kremlin has shifted to a policy of damage control while simultaneously seek­ing to regain political leverage in order to secure its key interests in Syria, in particular the use of military bases. Russia has offered to cooperate with the new leadership in Damascus and wants to position itself as a pragmatic actor willing to adapt to the new power dynamics. Until Dec. 7, 2024, Moscow classified HTS as a ter­ror­ist organization, but on Dec. 8, 2024—the day on which the Assad regime fell—it referred to the group as “Syria’s armed opposition” and later as the “new authori­ties.” In a bid to engage with HTS, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, claimed that Russia’s alliance with Syria “was not connected to any regime.""
  • "However, Moscow may well find it dif­ficult to fully “normalize” relations with the HTS-led government, as became evident when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov visited Syria in late Janu­ary 2025. During that visit, al-Sharaa made it clear that Russia must acknowledge its “past mistakes” in order to “rebuild trust.” Two demands from Damascus are likely to pose serious challenges for Moscow, par­ticularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine: the extradition of Assad and reparations. The former is highly improb­able, as handing over Assad would under­mine Russia’s credibility as a reliable pro­tector of authoritarian allies. With regard to the latter demand, Moscow could offer to write off part or all of Syria’s sizable debt to Russia or to supply grain and/or oil—without officially acknowledging any obli­gation to make reparations."
  • "There can be no doubt that Russia’s ability to shape Syria’s transition process has diminished significantly."

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Opening Nord Stream 2 Would Be a Catastrophic Mistake," Constanze Stelzenmüller, FT, March 2025.

  • Remember the bizarrely menacing Russian video of ice-bound European cities set to a baleful song called “Winter Will Be Long?” It went viral in September 2022, about six months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and for Germans, it remains a visceral, shudder-inducing reminder of their country’s worst energy crisis since the second world war.
  • That year, Germany had finally—after years of sanctions threats from the U.S., as well as urgent warnings from its eastern European neighbors—grasped the enormity of its error in making itself hugely dependent on Russian energy. Now it was racing to undo it. As it became clear that Russia was about to attack Ukraine in February 2022, Berlin refused to certify the new twin Nord Stream 2 pipeline that was to double the capacity of the older Nord Stream 1. Later, it announced a step-by-step decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, with gas imports to end in 2024.
  • Recent reports of U.S.-led efforts to open the last undamaged Nord Stream 2 pipeline and possibly repair another are therefore somewhat startling, to say the least. As this newspaper pointed out, “it would require the U.S. to lift sanctions against Russia, Russia to agree to resume sales it cut off during the war and Germany to allow the gas to flow to any potential buyers in Europe.” Indeed.
  • Germany would be trapped again—but this time, between a Russia determined to extinguish Ukrainian sovereignty and pull the rest of the continent into its sphere of influence, and a Trump administration bent on pursuing a condominium of authoritarian great powers. It would be a betrayal of Europe. 

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“For Russia, Trump Has a Lot to Offer, Even Without a Ukraine Deal,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 03.24.25. 

  • President Trump says he is focused on stopping the “death march” in Ukraine “as soon as possible.” But for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, cease-fire talks with Mr. Trump are a means to much broader ends.
  • Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia on Monday to deepen their negotiations about technical details of a partial cease-fire to halt attacks on energy facilities and on ships in the Black Sea. While Ukraine says it’s ready for a full truce, Mr. Putin has made it clear that he will seek a wide range of concessions first.
  • The upshot: The Kremlin appears determined to squeeze as many benefits as possible from Mr. Trump’s desire for a Ukraine peace deal, even as it slow-walks the negotiations. Viewed from Moscow, better ties with Washington are an economic and geopolitical boon—one that may be achieved even as Russian missiles continue pounding Ukraine.
  • Interviews last week with senior Russian foreign-policy figures at a security conference in New Delhi suggested that the Kremlin saw negotiations over Ukraine and over U.S.-Russia ties as running on two separate tracks. Mr. Putin continues to seek a far-reaching victory in Ukraine but is humoring Mr. Trump’s cease-fire push to seize the benefits of a thaw with Washington.
  • Vyacheslav Nikonov, a deputy chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the lower house of the Russian Parliament, said that Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin were developing a “bilateral agenda” that was “not connected to Ukraine.” “Ukraine is running its course,” Mr. Nikonov said in an interview on the sidelines of the New Delhi conference, called the Raisina Dialogue. “The offensive is ongoing,” Mr. Nikonov added. “But I think that for Putin, relations with America are more important than the question of Ukraine specifically.”

"By Muting VOA, Trump Did Something Stalin, Mao, and Khomeini Couldn't," Dana Milbank, WP, 03.18.25.

  • VOA [Voice of America] has been the voice of freedom across the globe, a constant force countering totalitarianism during World War II, the Cold War and the decades since.
  • Adolf Hitler couldn’t silence it. Joseph Stalin and his successors, right up through Vladimir Putin, couldn’t silence it. Mao Zedong and his successors, through Xi Jinping, couldn’t silence it. Ruhollah Khomeini and the ayatollahs couldn’t silence it.
  • But Donald Trump has just silenced the voice of freedom. For the first time since 1942, VOA has been taken off the air, after Trump put virtually all of its 1,300 staff members on leave. The administration also shut down VOA’s sister outlets Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia.
  • The world’s autocrats are doing somersaults.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Continuing War and Continuing Nationalizations," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 03.21.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Putin held a meeting with an influential lobby group, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (often dubbed the “Oligarchs’ Union”), on Tuesday, just before his much-anticipated phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump. RSPP chairman Alexander Shokhin sought to focus on the protection of property rights. But Putin wanted to discuss geopolitics ahead of his call with Trump… Behind closed doors, Putin also avoided the question of property rights, instead continuing to talk about Ukraine.
  • Perhaps Shokhin got his answer about property rights the following day when Putin attended a meeting with Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov and other prosecutors. Krasnov’s agency has been leading the way on nationalization, and he told Putin that more than 2.4 trillion rubles ($28.7 billion) worth of property had been returned to the state (while he did not specify the period, Russia began seizing property after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine).
  • In particular, Krasnov highlighted that five strategic companies had been nationalized—four of them were previously owned by foreigners. “The owners gave instructions to transfer products and profits to jurisdictions that are unfriendly to us, did not invest in infrastructure development, did not fulfil social obligations to their staff, and did not pay taxes in full. They spent the money they withdrew from circulation on their own needs. In a number of cases, these funds were used to finance Ukrainian groups fighting against us,” Krasnov said.
  • Putin said nothing about business concerns about nationalizations at the meeting and, instead, lavished praise on Krasnov. “I want to express my gratitude to Russian prosecutors for their professionalism and dedication in carrying out their duties,” he said.

"Does Russia Really Face a Wave of Bankruptcies?" The Bell, 03.21.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The Russian economy faces the threat of a large-scale surge in corporate bankruptcies,” the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasts (CMASF) wrote in its January report. CMASF was founded by current Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and is now headed by his brother Dmitry. Even such respected individuals as Sergei Chemezov, head of state defense corporation Rostec, and Russia’s wealthiest man Alexei Mordashov are complaining about the difficulties of servicing their debts. The government set up a special commission under deputy PM Alexander Novak to discuss state support for troubled industries.
  • Objective indicators support the lobbyists’ concerns. At the end of 2024, over 20% of companies in the manufacturing sector were paying more than two-thirds of their pre-tax profits on debt repayments—double the number of firms as in 2023.Despite debt problems in a whole range of sectors, talk of a full-blown crisis is premature, according to experts who spoke with The Bell.
  • [However] Despite debt problems in a whole range of sectors, talk of a full-blown crisis is premature, according to experts who spoke with The Bell.
  • Economist Sergei Skatov noted that the banks—who have the most accurate information about borrowers—are not anticipating a wave of bankruptcies. If they were worried about this development, lenders would have needed to establish additional reserves last year to cover bad debts. However, according to Central Bank figures, this didn’t happen.
  • Overdue payments on corporate loans remain (.xlsx) at their lowest level since mid-2021—2.7 trillion rubles. Due to the rapid expansion of the loan portfolio, any problems with new debts are not immediately apparent. “But even allowing for the effect of this rapid growth, the overall economic situation does not lend itself to alarmist forecasts,” Skatov reassured.

"Auditing the Auditors: Does Putin Trust Anyone Now?" Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Politika, 03.24.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • A new type of Russian bureaucrat has emerged in recent years: those appointed by President Vladimir Putin to oversee certain agencies or sectors, and keep an eye on the officials formally in charge—even those who ostensibly enjoy the Kremlin’s trust. These “auditors” can now be found everywhere: from the Russian delegation conducting negotiations with the United States to the Defense Ministry, the Emergencies Ministry, and the presidential administration.
  • It’s all strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era practice of installing KGB operatives in companies and government agencies. The only difference is that today these are not security officers, but men and women from the extended “Putin family” and his inner circle. While these appointments help to reassure Putin that he remains in control, they also threaten to undermine the viability of Russia’s power vertical.
  • It’s recently become clear… that the president does not trust even long-serving officials, and has decided to create a new tier of bureaucracy to oversee them. One example of such an “auditor” is Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), who is closely involved in negotiations between Moscow and Washington over the war in Ukraine… Dmitriev is there to keep an eye on the other members of the [Russian negotiating] delegation (including long-serving and trusted associates of Putin like Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Kremlin foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov). If necessary, Dmitriev will be able to provide an alternative analysis and put forward different options.
  • This is far from a unique case. Sergei Tsivilev, the husband of Putin’s first cousin once removed Anna Tsivileva, was made energy minister last year to oversee Putin’s old friends in the energy sector: Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller, and businessman Gennady Timchenko.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

"Russia to Face Crime Wave as War Veterans Return," Mikhail Tegin, Republic.ru/Russia.Post, 03.24.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

  • In early March, Internal Affairs Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev revealed that every second beat officer had left the force in the past year, which brought total vacancies in the Internal Affairs Ministry to over 172,000 across the country—a jump of 33,000 in a single year. In some regions, nearly a third of police personnel are lacking, raising serious concerns about crime, particularly with the return of Ukraine war veterans, including former convicts with serious criminal records.
  • Experts note that since the beginning of the war, many Ukraine veterans have faced PTSD. According to international studies, PTSD affects up to 35% of soldiers on average, meaning at least 150,000 soldiers and civilians coming back to Russia after the war will need psychological help.
  • Yevgeny Smirnov, a lawyer with the Pervy Otdel (Dept. One) project, agrees: following any war, violent crime always increases sharply, including murders, robberies and rapes. This is because violence becomes the norm for the mentally traumatized men returning from the front lines. “They get used to solving problems the way they did [at war],” the lawyer points out.
  • Psychologist and publicist Lyudmila Petranovskaya spoke about this in an interview with Republic. She warned that many Ukraine veterans may be psychologically unstable, with their loved ones and Russian society as a whole advised to exercise caution around them. 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

"Ukrainians Rally Around Zelenskyy After Bruising Trump Encounter," Fabrice Deprez, FT, 03.23.25.

  • Opinion polls have shown traditional opposition figures like Poroshenko or Tymoshenko trailing well behind Zelenskyy in terms of popularity, though previous surveys suggest former top military commander Valery Zaluzhny beating the Ukrainian president in a run-off. Zaluznhy has not said whether he would run in future elections.
  • Far from the 4% approval rating Trump claimed Zelenskyy had dropped to, Ukrainians’ trust in their president jumped to 67% in the week after the clash in the Oval Office, according to an opinion poll published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). That score represents the highest since December 2023.
  • Petro Poroshenko told the German tabloid Bild earlier this week that Zelenskyy was “moving the nation towards a dictatorship”, describing the asset freeze and travel ban imposed on him as illegal. But he stopped short of endorsing Trump in calling Zelenskyy a dictator and suggesting he should be removed from office.
  • Dmytro Razumkov, an MP and former campaign manager in Zelenskyy’s 2019 presidential run turned fierce critic of the Ukrainian president, told the Financial Times there should be no election until the end of the war’s “active phase.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Peace Prospects in the South Caucasus," Callum Fraser, RUSI, 03.18.25. 

  • The agreement on terms of an Armenian-Azerbaijan peace deal is a significant development for the South Caucasus and the implications of greater stability within the region have wide reaching impact. However, if signed, the longevity of this agreement remains uncertain. Trust between signatories remains low and irredentism remains a significant risk. The South Caucasus' location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe means that while the topic of connectivity remains unresolved, it is one that will dominate discussion over the next few years. Europe should not lose focus on this key region of its Eastern flank and should engage with this emerging opportunity rather than relying on outdated policy.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Footnotes

  1. This claim ignores the fact that many residents of these provinces had fled their regions by the time the referenda were held in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions in 2022, and that the supposed plebiscites were condemned as violations of international law. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called the referendums a "violation of the U.N. Charter and international law” on Sept. 29, 2022. On Sept. 7, 2022, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia Bujar Osmani, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Pia Kauma and the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Matteo Mecacci, condemned the Russian Federation’s holding of so-called “elections” in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories. EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell denounced the illegal referenda held in Russian-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine on Sept. 28, 2022.
  2. Witkoff did so even though Ukraine’s latest census in 2001 showed Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as predominantly Ukrainian-speaking.
  3. In a separate interview with Fox News on March 23, 2025, Witkoff said of Putin, “I feel that he wants peace."
  4. Putin has a well-thought-out approach toward leaders he seeks to woo/establish close personal relations with. With Bush Jr., it was the story about Putin saving the pectoral cross from a burning dacha; with Trump, it is praying for Trump after last July’s assassination attempt and commissioning a portrait of him.
  5. On March 23, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov downplayed expectations for a rapid resolution to the war in Ukraine, saying talks were just beginning and that “difficult negotiations” were ahead, AFP reported.
  6. For an explainer of  “What are the issues in US talks with Ukraine and Russia?” see this Reuters story.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Evan Vucci, File.

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