This Week’s Highlights

• As U.S. officials mull further responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, America’s “remarkably poor” record in “covertly arming foreign dissidents” serves as a cautionary tale, Lindsey O’Rourke of Boston College writes in Foreign Affairs: “Out of 35 U.S. attempts to covertly arm foreign dissidents during the Cold War, only four succeeded in bringing U.S. allies to power.” The failures included “an early U.S. operation to support Ukrainian nationalists in their bid to secede from the Soviet Union during the early Cold War,” which the CIA later deemed “ill-fated and tragic.”
• Military analyst Michael Kofman of CNA predicts that in the next two weeks the Russian military will concentrate on Ukrainian forces in the east of the country. He ventures a guess that “Moscow is searching for something it can use to declare a victory. Taking the Donbas, and having leverage to attain concessions from Kyiv, is probably what they're looking to accomplish at this point.”
• The United States is the only country other than Russia with sufficient military might to alter the balance of power in Europe and to act as guarantor for a final settlement between Moscow and Kyiv, Yale’s Thomas Graham and CUNY’s Rajan Menon write in Foreign Affairs. The priority now must be an end to the suffering in Ukraine. A political settlement could include the following: no NATO presence in Ukraine; measures that allow Ukraine to be confident in its security; Russia’s departure from territories it has occupied since its Feb. 24 invasion; a procedure for determining the future status of Crimea and the Donbas statelets; and provisions for the reconstruction of war-ravaged Ukraine, which will require the U.S. and its allies to put forward a plan for the removal of Russia sanctions.
• In an interview with The Atlantic, Cornell historian Nicholas Mulder—whose new book explores the history of sanctions as a tool of modern war—discusses the collateral damage inflicted by the Russia sanctions, as well as their efficacy and aims. He identifies “four ways we can think about sanctions working”: their deterrent function (preventing war), their “compellent” function (trying to force the Kremlin to end its war), regime change in Russia (“a pretty ambitious goal”) and “the long-run degrading of Russian power. … Right now, it’s not really clear whether our goal is two, three or four. It’s only clear that No. 1 didn’t work, because the war happened.”
• More than a quarter of a million Russians by some estimates have left their country since the invasion of Ukraine, journalist Masha Gessen writes in The New Yorker: “Their departure accelerates a long-running process of shutting down Russia’s civil society, without the state having to persecute and imprison people individually.” Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently referred to the exodus last week, saying that “this natural and necessary cleansing will only strengthen our country, our solidarity, our cohesiveness and our readiness to face any and all challenges.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“The Wisdom Of Nuclear Carve-Outs From The Russian Sanctions Regime,” War on the Rocks, Richard Nephew, 03.17.22. The author, a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, writes:

• “Ending Russia’s ability to service its existing [nuclear] facilities would have several downsides and would not meaningfully contribute to the central cause of compelling Russia to halt its invasion of Ukraine.”
• “For starters, it could deny access to energy supplies for existing facilities and create constraints on their future supply. … Beyond the immediate effects of such a supply disruption, there is a larger nonproliferation problem of undermining the idea that countries can rely on the global market for their nuclear fuel. … It is also unclear how targeting Rosatom will influence future relations between the nuclear supplier states. … There are also specific risks from targeting Rosatom, such as that the Russians might refuse to undertake their part in the re-implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.”
• “Fortuitously, to go along with the broad reach of potential sanctions tools, the United States and its partners also have the ability to exempt from sanctions certain activities that they might judge as being prejudicial to their overall interests.”
• “For example, Rosatom could be designated by the United States for providing support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, particularly as Rosatom is now apparently taking ownership of Ukrainian nuclear facilities. But, in imposing the sanctions, the United States could do so using the “directive” approach it has taken to sanctions rather than adding the company to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. This list is the primary means whereby banks and other companies automatically screen for sanctions compliance, and not adding Rosatom to this list would in and of itself ensure a more careful private-sector implementation approach.”
• “There will continue to be criticism of this approach, particularly good-faith expressions of frustration from Ukraine as it seeks to maximize attention and support for its cause. Although it will be difficult to maintain this stance, the risk of overindulging in the pressure campaign is potentially as great as leaving some leverage on the table if the consequence is an undermined global nonproliferation regime.”

"Russian Invasion of Ukraine Spotlights the Dangers of Nuclear Reactors in War," Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, The National Interest, 03.17.22. The authors, respectively program adviser and executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, both of whom have served in senior nonproliferation policy roles under past U.S. presidential administrations, write:

• “Just as the terrorist attacks on 9/11 required a reexamination of how best to protect against terrorist airplane hijackings, Russia’s military assault on Ukrainian nuclear plants raises questions about the security of nuclear reactors in war zones. In the wake of 2001, the United States quickly took simple but effective measures to prevent a repeat of 9/11. Comparable quick fixes are likely not possible for protecting nuclear power reactors on a battlefield. The concern is, of course, the possible spread of radioactivity from the reactor’s core and even more from the reactor’s highly radioactive store of used fuel.”
• “After the Russian attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station, Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm posted on Twitter that the reactors ‘are protected by robust containment structures and reactors are being safely shut down ... We have seen no elevated radiation readings near the facility.’ What was the point of such a statement? The Ukrainians know the dangers better than anyone, so Granholm’s statement didn’t do anything for them. The American public is not threatened by leaking radiation from Ukrainian reactors at all. The nuclear industry, however, is: Any suggestion of reactor radiation leaks could jeopardize U.S. public support for expanding nuclear construction to which the Department of Energy, just like the old AEC, is utterly devoted.”
• “That single-minded devotion to nuclear energy has to change, at least with regard to nuclear exports to regions in which military conflict cannot be excluded. We should not export nuclear power plants to these volatile regions or encourage potential importers there to opt for nuclear energy.”
• “As for the nuclear plants that currently operate in potential war zones, our government needs to be frank about the risks and what, if anything, can be done to reduce them. After the Russian army’s shelling of Ukraine’s civilian nuclear plants, these risks can no longer be ignored.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

War in Ukraine—Military aspects:

“Kulminatsionny Moment?” Ben Hodges and Julian Lindley-French, The Alphen Group, 03.15.22. The authors, the former Commander of U.S. Army Europe and the former Eisenhower Professor of Defense Strategy at the Netherlands Defense Academy, write:

• “The culminating point is reached when a force can no longer conduct operations. For a force engaged on offensive expeditionary operations that point is reached when a force simply can no longer advance. In the wake of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, several constraints on the capacity to conduct a Blitzkrieg became immediately apparent.”
• “The moment Russian forces crossed the Ukrainian border a large gap appeared between the scale and quality of the Russian forces needed to maintain offensive Russian military momentum and the force available given the capacity of Ukraine’s capacity to resist and the space in which to conduct defensive operations on their own terrain. … It also became rapidly clear that the basic operational and tactical planning of the Russian General Staff was inadequate.”
• “The result is becoming increasingly self-evident for a poorly-planned and executed Russian military campaign in which incompetence marches side-by-side with costly but stalled momentum with Russian forces forced to adopt a campaign of attrition against Ukrainian civilians for which they are not designed.”
• “The war in Ukraine is testament to the abject failure of the Russian General Staff to modernize the Russian Army in particular. Consequently, Putin’s entire political strategy of using coercion and implied threat of force to extract concessions from his neighbors already lies in tatters. Does that mean the end of Putin and bully Russia is over?  No, far from it.”
• “What must the West now do? First, accelerate and expand the delivery of capabilities and weapons specifically intended to help Ukraine destroy the land and sea-based artillery, rockets and cruise-missile launchers that are land-based and sea-based platforms. This means more intelligence, more counter-fire radar, more long-range systems, more ammunition, and more anti-ship, and naval mines. Second, look to the future. Both China and Russia will already be deconstructing this war to identify and implement lessons for the future. So must we!”

“Tacit rules to avoid a NATO-Russia war,” Steven Pifer, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 03.14.22. The author, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “First, President Biden, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and NATO member-state leaders have said that, while they will defend NATO territory, NATO forces will not take on Russian forces to defend Ukraine.”
• “Second, U.S. and NATO intelligence-sharing with Ukraine appears acceptable under the rules. Intelligence officials gather information about Russian forces from various sources, including satellite imagery and communication intercepts, and can quickly pass that to the Ukrainian military. There are some limitations on what is provided, in part out of concern that Russian intelligence officers may have penetrated the Ukrainian military.”
• “Third, the rules permit at least some Western arms shipments to Ukraine. In the weeks before and since Russian forces attacked, the United States, NATO member-states and others have provided a stream of defense assistance to Ukraine, including man-portable anti-aircraft missiles and anti-armor missiles such as the Stinger and Javelin. While many weapons were flown directly into Ukraine prior to Feb. 24, it now appears that they enter Ukraine via land routes.”
• “Fourth, economic and other sanctions appear acceptable, if disliked, within the tacit rules, even if they went well beyond what the Kremlin might have anticipated. … It is unclear what the sides are doing in the covert world of cyberspace. Difficulties in attribution may lead countries to believe that they can take certain cyber actions without fear of retaliation.  In any case, it is difficult to see any tacit rules in this area.”
• “To the extent that the United States, NATO and Russia abide by these kinds of tacit rules, they can reduce the prospect of a direct military clash. However, tensions between the sides are high, and Russia is conducting a full-scale war against Ukraine. As some rules and red lines are not clear, they leave a risk of miscalculation and conflict that neither side presumably wants.”

“The False Promise of Arming Insurgents: America’s Spotty Record Warrants Caution in Ukraine,” Lindsey O’Rourke, Foreign Affairs, 03.18.22. 

On the current state of the war and where things might be heading, Michael Kofman, Twitter, 03.20.22. The author, director of Russia Studies at CNA, writes:  

• “About 2 weeks ago I suggested that Russian forces have ~3 weeks before combat effectiveness becomes increasingly exhausted. I think that's generally been right, but we're not quite there yet.”  
• “The area to watch in the coming week is the Russian attempt to encircle UKR forces in the JFO [ed: Joint Forces Operation]. A slowly progressing pincer movement from the north and south. … This is where UKR forces could be in a precarious position.”
• “Since inception the Russian military effort has lacked focus. Too few forces, on too many axes of advance, some competing with each other. I think in the next two weeks they are likely to concentrate on UKR forces in the east and the battle for Mariupol. I suspect unrealistic political aims & timetables have driven an unsound mil strategy. Kyiv, Odesa, Donbas, etc. There's a desperation to show progress.”
• “I think Moscow is searching for something it can use to declare a victory. Taking the Donbas, and having leverage to attain concessions from Kyiv is probably what they're looking to accomplish at this point. This is at best a guess. Much depends on what Putin knows and thinks about the course of the war, and whether he feels pressured at home. Our impression of the war & reality on the ground might be quite different from his. Its not clear he understands what the prospects for Russian success are.”
• “Has the war entered a stalemate? Yes and no. Russian forces may make slow, incremental advances in the Donbas. I suspect UKR military can hold on most fronts and perhaps even counter attack on others. However, attrition is undoubtedly taking its toll on both sides. In general I've tried to be cautious in rendering predictions because I think we don't know if this point in the conflict is near the beginning, the middle, or the end of the war. Few things are as contingent and indeterminate.” 

“The first phase of Russia’s war may be over, analysts say. That doesn’t mean the bloodshed is,” Marc Santora, The New York Times, 03.20.22. The author, the International News Editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “There is an emerging consensus in the West that the war has reached a bloody stalemate. ‘Russian forces are digging in around the periphery of Kyiv and elsewhere, attempting to consolidate political control over areas they currently occupy, resupplying and attempting to reinforce units in static positions, and generally beginning to set conditions to hold in approximately their current forward positions for an indefinite time,’ according to an analysis issued on Saturday by the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington research body.”
• “Russia has made some gains in the eastern part of the country, where Britain’s defense intelligence agency said forces were still working to encircle cities, and it continues to hold territory in the south around Kherson. But with its ground forces meeting stiff Ukrainian resistance, Russia has increasingly turned to long-range missiles to target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure. In a war of attrition, analysts said, Russia hopes it can break down the Ukrainian military while crushing the public’s spirit with relentless assaults.”

“How Russia’s Revamped Military Fumbled the Invasion of Ukraine,” Thomas Grove and Stephen Fidler, The Wall Street Journal, 03.18.22. The authors, a correspondent and the U.K. and Brexit editor for the news outlet, write:

• “The Russians didn’t follow their own doctrine of launching the campaign with the Russian version of ‘shock and awe’ under which they would have established superiority in the air and on the ground through rapid and massive deployment of weaponry. Instead, the Russians attempted to send in light forces deep into Ukraine that were poorly equipped to repel fierce resistance and far from supply lines.”
• “Mr. Putin ‘really thought this was an illegitimate government that would quickly fall,’ said CNA’s Mr. Kofman. ‘It’s clear he never left 2014, he really hasn’t understood anything that’s happened since 2014.’ … After failing in phase one, Russian tactics seem to have switched to terrorizing cities perhaps in search of a favorable political settlement.”
• “Some military analysts expect the critical next phase to be around Kyiv where Russia likely plans to encircle the capital, blockade it and shell it into submission. This would replicate tactics used by the Russian army … during the second Chechen war that reasserted Moscow’s control over the predominantly Muslim statelet in 2000.”
• “Russia—whose economy before the invasion was about the size of Italy’s—may have spread its efforts too thinly and the modernization effort also appears to have been undermined by fraud and corruption, said analysts including Michael Clarke, a former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank, and now associate director of the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, citing estimates that some 25% of the invading force are conscripts.”
• “Weapons systems haven’t performed well and commanders pretended they had capabilities that weren’t there, Mr. Clarke said. Of Russia’s effort to create a ‘large, modern army,’ he said: ‘The part which is modern is not large, and the part which is large is not modern.’”

“Why Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Nadia Schadlow, The Wall Street Journal, 03.21.22. The author, a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Hudson Institute, writes:

• “Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.”
• “The U.S. spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the U.S. had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.”
• “The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate.’ That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Mr. Putin's ability or willingness to do so.”
• “Could this conflict have been averted with a more convincing demonstration of American resolve? We will never know for sure. Deterrence is an art, not a science. But the U.S. almost certainly faces a challenge if it wants to keep the peace in the future. Restoring the perception of American will to deter conflict may, ironically, require an even more forceful manifestation of that will on the battlefield. In a world of diminished deterrence, the desire for peace could make conflict more certain.”

War in Ukraine—Sanctions:

“The New Economic Containment: Russian Sanctions Signal Commitment to International Order,” Carla Norrlöf,  Foreign Affairs, 03.18.22. 

“After Ukraine, Russia may never get back to business as usual,” Olivier Knox, The Washington Post, 03.17.22. The author, a correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “If the 400 companies that have withdrawn from Russia, scaled back operations there or suspended their activities (connoting temporariness) start thinking about a return, there are at least five big reasons that will prove difficult, barring global action from governments.”
  1. “Banking sanctions: Russia’s central bank and all 10 of the country’s largest financial institutions face American and European sanctions that are designed to sever them from international banking … Russia’s central bank is also under sanctions, making it impossible to defend the ruble using foreign currency reserves, which has caused the currency to plummet.”
  2. “The WTO’s appeal is what’s called ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) status … As of mid-March, Bloomberg News recently reported, a quarter of the WTO, accounting for 58 percent of global gross domestic product, was moving to suspend Russia’s MFN standing.”
  3. “Putin’s nationalization threat: Putin recently threatened to nationalize the assets of companies that exit Russia—not just physical infrastructure, but even potentially their intellectual property, including trademarks. That sounds like a painful blow to those firms. But it is likely to make companies thinking of returning to think twice. Or three times. Or rethink that plan entirely.”
  4. “Crash of the ruble: Concerted U.S. and allied sanctions drove the ruble for a time to its lowest level on record against the dollar. Buying things from Russia, at least in ruble-denominated transactions, would be a lot cheaper if you were paying in dollars. But anything that earns income in rubles is now ‘wildly unprofitable,’ according to a trade association expert on the sanctions.”
  5. “Wednesday, President Biden slapped the ‘war criminal’ label on Putin, personally, after days of the administration ignoring the question or treading gingerly on the issue.”

“War in Ukraine and food security: Developing a judicious ‘food first’ strategy for autumn,” Bettina Rudloff and Linde Götz, SWP, 03.14.22. The analysts write:

• “As during the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS)—a monitoring system developed by the G20 in response to past food price crises—should be used for an international information campaign to prevent price-pushing export restrictions by means of appeals. However, more important than appeals would be the adoption of strict criteria and deadlines for these measures that are enforceable at the WTO level.”
• “In the future, AMIS should cover not only agricultural products, fertilizers and energy sources, but also the condition of and access to trade infrastructure. Here, restrictions heavily influence supply and price and should therefore be included in a comprehensive warning system for international supply potential.”
• “Furthermore, a future international political offensive for fertilizers and their raw materials is needed. Not only must the market situation be monitored and—in the event of shortages—be accompanied by aid early on. Technologies to make their use more efficient and to increase fertilizer production capacities as well as approaches to their substitution—whether technologically or by cultivation—are also needed.”

“Sanctions Should Give Russians a Way Out,” Alex Garcia, The Wall Street Journal, 03.17.22. The author, a business executive, writes:

• “The barriers the West is erecting are an ironic reversal of history. The Soviet Union built the Berlin Wall to keep Eastern bloc citizens in. Today the West is building a wall around Russia. This has three important implications.”
• “First, cut off from the world, Russians are forced into loyalty to the Putin regime. Oligarchs and ordinary citizens alike no longer have the option to escape. … Second, isolation will build xenophobia within Russia … Third, unlike in the Soviet era, Mr. Putin’s nomenklatura itself is under attack today.”
• “Granting asylum to Russians who sever their ties with Russia would reverse the counterproductive effects of sanctions.”
• “There is no doubt that severe penalties should be imposed on a state invading another in cold blood. It is critical that the secondary effects of these measures are coordinated with long-term priorities of security and regime change. We can only hope that Western policy makers won’t let anti-Russian hysteria get in the way of enacting measures that will be truly painful for Mr. Putin.”

“How to Tell If Sanctions Are Hitting the Russian Economy: The Kremlin is trying to hide the impact of measures taken against its economy by limiting information and data,” Paul Hannon and Caitlin Ostroff, The Wall Street Journal, 03.16.22. The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write:

• “Since the Russian invasion last month, Europe and the U.S. have hit the world’s 11th largest economy with sanctions designed to cut it off from the global financial system and from the imports it needs to run its economy. Hundreds of companies have gone beyond the sanctions and stopped doing business with Russia.”
• “Estimates of the economic damage vary widely. The Institute for International Finance … expects Russian economic output to fall by a third this year. Economists at credit-ratings firm Standard & Poor see a contraction of 6.2% in 2022, while Moody’s Analytics estimates the sanctions-induced slowdown will cut economic output by between 13.5% and 24% depending on the duration of the conflict, and the scale of the decline in Russian energy exports.”
• “There are two ways to track the impact of the sanctions: with economic data or with on-the-ground details like layoffs, shortages and production cuts. Russia has moved to limit access to both. … However, other figures pointed to a pickup in inflation, while a survey of purchasing managers at manufacturers recorded a decline in output and new orders for the first time in six months. This measure, known as the Purchasing Managers Index, is produced by a private company and will likely give the first insight into how the economy has responded to sanctions when it is released on April 1.”
• “More current data indicates problems ahead for the Russian economy. The ruble has weakened, with one dollar buying 112 rubles, up from 75 at the start of the year. Russia’s central bank more than doubled interest rates to 20%, to encourage holders not to sell the ruble.”
• “‘When you have war, you don’t care about accurate reporting,’ said Maxim Mironov, an associate professor of finance at IE Business School in Madrid who grew up in the Soviet Union and has researched Russia’s economy and corruption. ‘You do care about propaganda.’”

"Can Sanctions Stop Russia?," Annie Lowrey, The Atlantic, 03.10.22. The author, a staff writer for the magazine, interviews Nicholas Mulder, a professor of history at Cornell University, who says:

• “We’re in totally new territory. The speed, the sweep, and the size of the sanctions, or the size of the targets of the sanctions — those three factors make them extraordinary. An intense sanctions package came together — supported not only by the U.S. but by the entire European Union and a number of Asian allies as well — within four or five days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And there’s potentially more coming. Before this, the states that were targeted by sanctions tended to be U.S. adversaries or adversaries of the West, but many of them were small- or medium-sized … They are significant actors in their regions, but they’re not hugely important in terms of the global economy.”
• “On top of the government sanctions, there is an enormous global private-sector reaction. It’s a divestment wave. To some degree, that process is people overreacting to sanctions, or acting beyond the scope of the sanctions. The fact that we have these combined state and private-sector sanctions means that they are hitting not only the Russian government, but Russian civil society and the private economy as well.”
• “The idea behind sanctions is that we apply pressure in ways that make countries do what the West would like them to do. But that requires a specific set of circumstances. The situation isn’t always right. And when you apply sanctions, it can happen that countries move in the opposite direction.”
• “The important thing is to have clarity about the aims of the sanctions. Our governments in the West have said the end of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the withdrawal of all troops and equipment, and respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine is the goal. But in imposing the new sanctions, they haven’t reiterated it. There is not a common, clearly shared U.S.-European position.”
• “In Putin’s regime, the essential, implicit bargain made between him and the oligarchs was: If you want to be wealthy and have all this property, do not meddle in politics. Especially not in foreign policy. … They are suffering from these expropriations, but it’s not clear they can translate that into sway over the policy-making process.”

"We Have Yet to See the Full Economic Costs of War With Russia," Davod C. Hendrickson, The National Interest, 03.14.22. The author, president of the John Quincy Adams Society, writes:

• “The sudden and brutal divorce signified by the sanctions, including the abolition of contracts, will wrench and contort the world economy and hit Europe the worst — at first. As divorce does generally, it will make both parties poorer and will be cruel and unfair to the little people hurt most. The interdependence that allowed the West to execute such a devastating blow against Russia in the initial phases of this economic war leaves the West and the world acutely vulnerable to very serious retaliatory costs.”
• “The great standoff also intrinsically poses risks to the financial system, whose deepest fear must always be the prospect of defaults. To assess this risk, I proffer a four-step theory for effectuating paroxysms in the world economy:”
  • “first, abolish all contracts with the most important player in important sectors of the world economy;”
  • “second, make those sectors be energy, metals, and agriculture, where ‘globalization’ has been especially triumphant;”
  • “third, have it all go down in an arena comfortable with lots of leverage, magnifying the mutual risk in the event of defaults;”
  • “and fourth, let the demon loose in sectors where capital returns were poor and investment languished in the past decade.”
• “Those seem like sufficient conditions for a great disruption in commodity markets, for a payments crisis that is also a supply chain crisis, and an energy crisis that is also a massive food crisis.”
• “These vulnerabilities exist against the backdrop of the declaration of economic war by one party, and the effectual counter-declaration of the same by the other, which will magnify said fragilities. No one seems to be frightened by this, but I am frightened by it. The financial press and commentariat, by contrast, are positively Pollyannish regarding the ‘bearable’ costs to the ‘middle class’ if the creaking economic mechanism that is the world economy throws a gear. We will assess the consequences later, say the wise men, when they’re irreversible.”

War in Ukraine—Great Power rivalry/New Cold War:

“How to Make Peace With Putin: The West Must Move Quickly to End the War in Ukraine,” Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon, Foreign Affairs, 03.21.22. 

“What would a Ukraine peace deal look like?” Interview with Rose Gottemoeller, Financial Times, 03.17.22. In this interview, the former deputy secretary-general of NATO says:

• “Vladimir Putin has ceased to talk about regime change in Ukraine, and it is, I think, really what is behind dropping the notion of denazification as one of the conditions for Russian withdrawal. But it’s not clear to me how much that means so far because they have continued to pound Kyiv. … And so seizing the capital city and really making that the centerpiece of their campaign at the moment is, well, it seems to be still very much on the table.”
• “I do really take seriously the comments of the Ukrainian president in recent days that he does not see NATO membership on the cards immediately for Ukraine, so he evidently is thinking himself through what neutrality would mean … But to my mind neutrality would look something like what Austria has today.”
• “This notion of demilitarization, even in the Russian mind, as I’ve read it, does not seem to imply a total dissolution of the Ukrainian armed forces. But the Russians seem to be talking about ensuring that there are no large offensive missiles and certain kinds of advanced weapons systems deployed in Ukraine.”
• “I think that NATO must concentrate on preventing World War 3 from breaking out. That has got to be its strategic objective here. And for that reason, it will continue to support Ukraine with military assistance and humanitarian assistance in every way it can. But actually becoming involved in the fight? I don’t see it.”
• “I think any use of weapons of mass destruction is a red line. That’s all there is to it. And so I think that … getting intelligence out there to ensure that the Russians know there will be no impunity here. We understand if there is a chemical, biological or, heaven forbid, a nuclear use in some way in this Ukraine invasion that the blame will be firmly on Russia. … [A]nd that the consequences for Russia will be dire again in terms of its really being shut off from its own access to the rest of the world community, becoming a pariah state.”

"Putin in His Labyrinth: Alexander Gabuev on the View from Moscow," Jonathan Tepperman, The Octavian Report/Substack, 03.14.22. The author, editor in chief of the newsletter and former editor of Foreign Policy, interviews Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, who says:

• On China’s view of the Russian invasion: “I think that China has chosen a very smart strategy. It has a template for how to react to moves that it cannot anticipate by Russia, which is often unpredictable and irrational in the Chinese view. That template was set by Crimea. … China will criticize NATO expansion and U.S.-led military alliances, as we see it doing. As the situation on the ground gets more and more dire, they will add some talking points expressing sympathy toward the Ukrainian people. … China is a very selfish, very pragmatic great power. For China, noninterference means noninterference in China’s affairs. China itself interferes in the affairs of its neighbors all the time.”
• On the possibility of a peace deal: "Zelensky will not accept the maximalist deal that Putin is pushing now, because he knows that the moment he does, the popularity he’s gained in the war will be destroyed. Ukraine is now hostage to its own propaganda. I think that many Ukrainians actually believe that they’re winning the war and that if they don’t stop Putin, they will all die. So they will not surrender. It’s really tragic, but I don’t think that they will accept a peace settlement that makes them semi-dependent on the aggressor, even if it saves their cities. The ugliest days of this war are in front of us, not behind us."
• On what advice he would give Biden: "Look, I’m a Russian citizen and I’m a Russian patriot. It’s tragic what’s happening in Ukraine and it’s a tragedy for my country too. On an emotional level, it’s very hard to process. You cannot explain to yourself why Putin sees war as an instrument to achieve Russia’s foreign policy goals in Ukraine. It’s unfathomable because the downsides are just so obvious. … It’s tragic, but I don’t want to give President Biden advice on how to squeeze my own country."

"Why Putin Probably Won’t Give Up Anytime Soon," Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, Foreign Policy, 03.17.22. The authors, respectively a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and an associate professor in political science at Michigan State University, write: 

• “The United States and its allies and partners have charted an effective course in supporting Ukraine and its ability to defend itself as well as in imposing steep costs on Putin. These efforts must continue. If Putin does indeed double down, forcing Kyiv to make difficult choices to end the death and destruction in Ukraine, then the United States and its allies and partners must be prepared to sustain a prolonged period of confrontation with Putin and his regime.”  
• “Yet while Washington applies that persistent pressure, so too must it plan for how to improve relations with Russia once Putin departs the scene — a reality that seems closer now than it did before the war began.” 

“The Case for Ukrainian Neutrality A Deal Doesn’t Have to Be a Death Sentence,” A. Wess Mitchell, Foreign Affairs, 03.17.22.

“Western leaders must be honest about what it takes to stand up to Putin,” Constanze Stelzenmüller, Financial Times, 03.15.22. The author, Fritz Stern Chair at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “Western policymakers have been at odds over proposals to bring Ukraine into the EU; to give Kyiv Polish MiG fighter planes; to cut off Russian energy immediately; or to establish a no-fly-zone over Ukraine, which would mean bombarding Russian air defenses in Russia and make NATO a combatant.”
• “Public anger, amplified by social media, risks pushing leaders into hasty decisions when they should be thinking soberly and prudently. So a key challenge in what could be fateful weeks ahead will be for Scholz and his peers to maintain clarity and message discipline: explaining what we can and cannot do; that there will be a price for standing up for Ukraine and against Putin; and that in doing so we will also be standing up for ourselves.”
• “As for Russians living among us, they must be protected against bullying and hate. To those living in Russia, we should say (whether via short wave radio, low-orbit satellite communications or the Dark Web): our quarrel is solely with the war criminal in the Kremlin and the cronies that enable him. You are not our enemy. But Putin is. And he is yours as well.”

“Putin’s Folly: A Case Study of an Inept Strategist,” Joshua Rovner War on Rocks, 03.16.22. The author, an associate professor in the School of International Service at American University, writes:

• “Vladimir Putin is a bad strategist. He does not understand the relationship between force and politics, and he is incapable of predicting international reactions to his ham-fisted military campaigns. … Today, his misuse of Russian power is leading Russia towards impoverishment and isolation.”
• “Misperception, escalation and war termination are fundamental strategic challenges. They are especially challenging when the adversary is a bad strategist. How can the Biden administration cope with the problem today? While there are no textbook solutions to this problem, the administration might start by reconsidering how it uses the intelligence community. … [I]ntelligence transparency has reached the point of declining marginal returns.”
• “Secret intelligence might be useful for managing all three of the problems described above. Intelligence agencies have a long history of clandestine communications with wartime adversaries. Spy chiefs can communicate with their counterparts outside the public eye, gauging the response to diplomatic messages. … Of course, this can only work if both sides have reason to believe that their communications will remain secret.”
• “Intelligence agencies might also help reduce the danger of escalation. Historically, wartime covert action has acted as a release valve among great powers, a means of competing with one another that does not require the kind of violence that can get out of control.”
• “Finally, secret intelligence might help stop the fighting. It can establish quiet channels for peace feelers, outside the view of domestic spoilers on all sides. It might also reduce the credibility problem by monitoring Russian compliance with the terms of any possible deal. Leaders will be rightfully skeptical of Russian promises. Diligent intelligence work will at least provide faith that there will be early warning if the peace starts to break down. The fact that the intelligence community gave accurate warning before the war surely bolsters their own credibility with policymakers.”

“Putin Got Ukraine Completely Wrong,” Yaroslav Hrytsak, The New York Times, 03.19.22. The author, a professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University, writes:

• “Though Mr. Putin may escalate further, he is far from the military victory he sought. A master tactician but inept strategist, he has made his most profound miscalculation. Yet it’s one based on the belief that he is at war not with Ukraine but with the West in Ukrainian lands. It’s essential to grasp this point. The only way to defeat him is to turn his belief—that Ukraine is fighting not alone but with the help of the West and as part of the West—into a waking nightmare.”
• “How this could be done, whether through humanitarian and military help, incorporating Ukraine into the European Union or even supplying it with its own Marshall Plan, are open questions. What matters is the political will to answer them. After all, the struggle for Ukraine, as history tells us, is about much more than just Ukraine or Europe. It is the struggle for the shape of the world to come.”

"Kyiv’s Trilemma: Possible Settlements to the War in Ukraine," Robert Person, The National Interest, 03.18.22. The author, an associate professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy and director of West Point’s International Affairs curriculum, writes:

• “As Russia’s brutal invasion grinds slowly across Ukraine, leveling cities, destroying innocent lives, and leaving ghastly carnage in its wake, talk has already turned to providing ‘off-ramps’ for Russian president Vladimir Putin to allow him and his army to exit Ukraine while saving face. Such wishful thinking is understandable, given the Ukrainian people’s fierce resolve and their military’s unexpected combat effectiveness against Russia. But such talk is premature—this war is far from over.”
• “In a perfect world, Ukraine would emerge from this tragic episode ‘whole, free, and at peace,’ to paraphrase President George H.W. Bush’s vision for Europe in 1989. Sadly, short of the implosion of Putin’s regime, this utopic vision is a near impossibility without a vigorous and sustained Western effort. Instead, Ukraine will likely be forced to come to terms with reality: at best, they can achieve two out of the three goals in the Bush troika. At worst, Russia will deny Ukraine all three, leaving the country divided, subjugated, and at war. Tragically, this ‘zero outcome’ appears the most likely for the foreseeable future without increased Western support of Ukraine. This is what I refer to as Ukraine’s “’rilemma,’ a situation where Kyiv cannot achieve all three elements of the troika and will have limited ability to shape which of the remaining outcomes it can obtain.”
• “The United States must ensure that the Ukrainian military and people are fully equipped to resist Russia’s onslaught indefinitely. This means massive infusions of humanitarian and economic aid to help the civilian population, as well as continued supplies of anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-missile weaponry that will allow Ukraine to at least fight Russia to a stalemate, if not an outright victory.”
• “Not since World War II have the stakes been higher for European security and the global order of sovereign nations. Whenever Putin is finally forced to come to the negotiating table and look for a way out of his self-induced quagmire, the United States must ensure that he has no choice but to settle according to the terms set by Ukraine and its transatlantic partners.”

"The Perils of Emotional Arguments for Intervention in Ukraine," Sumantra Maitra, The National Interest, 03.18.22. The author, a national security fellow at the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy told a special session of the U.S. Congress on Wednesday that ‘Russia has turned the Ukrainian sky into a source of death for thousands of people. This is a terror Europe has not seen for eighty years and we are asking for an answer to this terror from the world,’ he said. ‘Is that a lot to ask? To create a no-fly zone over Ukraine to save people. Is this too much to ask?’”
• “If there is one glaring similarity between Zelenskyy and Churchill, it is that Zelenskyy understands as much as Churchill that dragging the United States into a potential world war — even a nuclear war — is in the interest of his country. Whether it is in the interest of the United States is a different question altogether. A new poll showed that American support for a no-fly zone plummets when respondents are told that a no-fly zone means ‘the U.S. military would shoot down Russian military planes flying over Ukraine, possibly triggering a war between the U.S. and Russia.’”
• “Proponents of further Western military support to Ukraine do not grapple with the risks of escalating the conflict. The fear is not that NATO could lose a conventional war, but that it would push Russia into a corner from which a nuclear response would be Moscow’s only choice.”
• ‘European rearmament presents a golden opportunity to refocus American grand strategy and narrow national interests. Europe can assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe, with only American nuclear and naval forces acting as offshore balancers. It is a fallacy that so much of our modern commentary focuses on a World War II-era narrative of good and evil. More attention should be paid to the complexity of the multipolar era before World War I, when alliances were chained together and smaller countries on the periphery dragged great powers toward utter civilizational catastrophe.”

"With Russia unleashing ‘Armageddon’ from the sky, Biden should allow for the transfer of fighter jets to Ukraine," The Editorial Board, The Boston Globe, 03.16.22. The newspaper's editorial board writes:

• “In his stirring plea to Congress Wednesday morning, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine highlighted just a handful of things he wants from the West as his country mounts its desperate defense against the Russian invaders: tighter economic sanctions on Moscow, more sophisticated air defense systems, and fighter jets. The air defense systems and sanctions seem likely to come, but the United States is blocking the transfer of jets. That’s a mistake. With Russia unleashing a punishing bombing campaign from above, Ukraine needs every opportunity to protect its people below.”
• “The best answer would be a NATO-imposed no-fly zone. But here, the West is right to be leery — direct combat between NATO and Russian pilots would be dangerous. But absent that kind of cover, the United States and its allies are obligated to give Ukraine a chance to contest its own skies.”
• “The Biden administration has argued that supplying Ukraine with more fighter jets wouldn’t have much effect; the country is flying a limited number of sorties with the planes it already has, officials say, and other kinds of weaponry are more important to the overall war effort. But that rings hollow given that the White House supported the transfer of the MIGs just days ago — and that the Ukrainian president, who presumably knows his country’s defense needs best, is pleading for jet fighters again and again. Besides, this shouldn’t be a matter of providing one class of weapon or another. NATO nations are perfectly capable of delivering both the jets and the air defense systems Ukraine is requesting. And they should.”
• “Getting jets to Ukraine is not a risk-free proposition. But it’s a low-risk proposition. And the moment demands action. ‘To be the leader of the world,’ Zelensky said, toward the end of his speech, ‘is to be the leader of peace.’ On the whole, America has done a fine job of rallying the West to Ukraine’s defense. But here it can do more.”

"How Biden and NATO can end Russia’s war with Ukraine," Justin B. Hollander, The Boston Globe, 03.16.22. The author, a professor at Tufts University where he teaches public policy and planning, writes:

• “The current US policy of arming Ukraine with lethal weapons and imposing unprecedented economic sanctions is one path forward that could make the costs of war so high that President Vladimir Putin of Russia yields. But it might also prolong the conflict, extending the pain and suffering of the Ukrainian people for years.”
• “Another option for Biden is to compromise on NATO membership invitations. Oxford historian Robert Service recently pointed to an agreement between the United States and Ukraine in November 2021 as the catalyst for the current crisis. In the Charter on Strategic Partnership, Service explained, the United States formally asserted support for Ukrainian NATO membership. Just one month later, in a letter to the United States and its allies, Russia demanded that they unwind that agreement and guarantee in writing that Ukraine be barred from joining NATO.”
• “Biden can address NATO’s threat to Russia and the ongoing fighting in Ukraine today through de-escalation instead of the economic and proxy war he threatens. Reaching a compromise with Russia and restricting the ability of Ukraine to join NATO would end today’s violence and prevent us all from sinking into a larger, avoidable conflict.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Xi Jinping’s Faltering Foreign Policy: The War in Ukraine and the Perils of Strongman Rule," Jude Blanchette, Foreign Affairs, 03.16.22.

"China’s Great-Power Play Xi Jinping is standing by Russia on Ukraine, and the costs of doing so will mount.," Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 03.17.22. The newspaper's editorial board writes:

• “If Beijing’s plan is to adopt Russia as some sort of client state, is it really ready to take responsibility for an impoverished and badly governed economy of Russia’s scale? Nor will Mr. Xi’s great-power play be an obvious boost to the domestic political stability he craves. Every other great power has discovered that such a prominent global role comes with incessant internal debates about how to wield such power. Such a debate may be simmering under the surface now.”
• “The pot boiled up briefly last week in an unusual public essay in which prominent think-tank scholar Hu Wei warned that Mr. Xi’s Russia policy may backfire by encouraging other countries to ally against China. Beijing now appears to have censored that essay, but the questions it raised are sure to linger in a year when Mr. Xi is set on securing another five-year term as the country’s leader.”

"Ukraine’s Lessons for Taiwan," Jeffrey W. Hornung, War on the Rocks, 03.17.22. The author, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes:

• “While trying to prevent surprises, policymakers should recognize that there will still be unintended consequences. Russia’s war has led to dizzying changes that even a month ago seemed impossible. Belarus amended its constitution to allow it to host nuclear weapons. Finland and Sweden have signaled their interest in joining NATO. And Germany has taken unprecedented steps to increase its defense spending and arm Ukraine.”
• “In response to a Chinese onslaught against Taiwan, regional countries might make similar changes. For example, a Chinese attack could coalesce U.S. partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific. This could create a quasi-alliance between Japan and Australia and also push several states like the Philippines, Thailand, or Vietnam — which have been trying to balance between Washington and Beijing — closer to the United States. Even South Korea may decide that the price of trying to play nice with China is no longer advantageous.”
• “As with Germany, a conflict could force Japan to rethink aspects of its strategic approach to the world. Already, the Ukraine crisis has caused Tokyo to take unprecedented steps to brace for the fallout of Russia’s actions. A Taiwan conflict could lead Tokyo to accept its first combat role since WWII and possibly to make rapid changes in its defense policies. Political leaders might prove willing to host U.S. ground-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles or a U.S. Army Multi-Domain Task Force. Given recent chatter among some in Japan’s political elite on the need for a nuclear-sharing arrangement with the United States, there is always a possibility that a war with China could push Japan into a position where it feels a nuclear deterrent is necessary.”
• “Chinese leaders are learning from the conflict in Ukraine, not just by observing Russia’s actions, but also the West’s response. The United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners should be learning too. By doing so, they can help ensure that Beijing comes away from the current crisis with a greater appreciation of the risks that attacking Taiwan would entail.”

"Chinese ambassador: Where we stand on Ukraine," Qin Gang, The Washington Post, 03.15.22. The author, China's ambassador to the United States, writes:

• “Let me say this responsibly: Assertions that China knew about, acquiesced to or tacitly supported this war are purely disinformation. All these claims serve only the purpose of shifting blame to and slinging mud at China. There were more than 6,000 Chinese citizens in Ukraine. China is the biggest trading partner of both Russia and Ukraine, and the largest importer of crude oil and natural gas in the world. Conflict between Russia and Ukraine does no good for China. Had China known about the imminent crisis, we would have tried our best to prevent it.”
• “Some people are linking Taiwan and Ukraine to play up the risks of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This is a mistake. These are totally different things. Ukraine is a sovereign state, while Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory.”
• “In Ukraine, China has made huge efforts to push for peace talks and the prevention of a humanitarian crisis.”
• “As a Chinese proverb goes, it takes more than one cold day to freeze three feet of ice. The long-term peace and stability of Europe relies on the principle of indivisible security. There must be a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. The priority now is to achieve a cease-fire to protect civilians from war. But as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a responsible major country, China will continue to coordinate real efforts to achieve lasting peace. We stand ready to do whatever we can and work with other parties. Our ultimate purpose is the end of war and support regional and global stability.”

"Is China Helping Russia Hide Money? The Kremlin May Have Stashed Billions in Offshore Accounts," Benn Steil, Benjamin Della Rocca, Foreign Affairs, 03.21.22.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

"The World’s Most Dangerous Man: Putin’s Unconstrained Power Over Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal," Scott D. Sagan, Foreign Affairs, 03.16.22.

"Why America Should Not Deepen Its Military Involvement in Ukraine," Tom Z. Collina, The New York Times, 03.18.22. The author, an expert on nuclear weapons, missile defense and nonproliferation, writes:

• “Even as our hearts go out to the brave Ukrainian people, the Biden administration is right to resist calls to deepen American military involvement in Ukraine, because the consequences of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could be unimaginably dire. If Mr. Biden bows to public pressure and, for instance, attempts to create a no-fly zone in Ukraine, we could be stepping on the path to nuclear war. As the U.N. secretary general, António Guterres, said this week, ‘The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility.’”
• “Putin warned that ‘anyone who tries to interfere with us’ will suffer ‘consequences you have never faced in your history.’ He is, in effect, using his nuclear arsenal as a terrorist weapon to hold Ukraine hostage and keep other nations out. Is he bluffing? Maybe. But given the potential consequences, we can't afford to be wrong. What can we do?”
  • “First, we must stay the course and end this brutal war. The sanctions that have already been imposed on Russia and the weapons that the Pentagon is sending to Ukraine are meant to raise the cost of the conflict to Mr. Putin, so that he will eventually see the wisdom of a political settlement.”
  • “Next, we must change our attitude toward nuclear weapons, understanding that the old ways of thinking are not only outdated but also dangerous. … The Biden administration should rule out first use and seek to build an international consensus around the idea that the sole purpose for nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others.”
• “We should all want to end this senseless war, protect Ukraine and avoid nuclear catastrophe. The hard part is striking the right balance. To reduce Russia's leverage in the future, we must face the fact that nuclear weapons are more useful to Mr. Putin than they are to the West. The bomb is a weapon of terror, pure and simple, and we must do all we can to keep it in check.”

"In striking Ukraine, Russia also hit nuclear arms control," Petr Topychkanov, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 03.15.22. The author, an associate senior researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Program, writes:

• “The the longer Russian troops stay in Ukraine and the more harm they inflict on Ukrainians, the more Russia will be ostracized. As a result, Russia’s opportunities to return to business-as-usual with the United States and its allies recedes, including in the field of nuclear arms control. … Also, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, together with President Putin’s warning of dire consequences if NATO intervenes, undermines trust in nuclear weapons agreements.”
• “A mere three months ago, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) issued a joint statement about the impossibility of winning a nuclear war. More recently, the Russian leadership has spoken openly about the possibility of resorting to extreme measures — nuclear weapons — if NATO intervenes in Russia’s armed conflict in Ukraine. This threat devalued not only Russia’s signature under the P5 document but the entire document.”
• “In two weeks, the Russian leadership, of its own accord, migrated from the category of ‘partner’ of the United States and Europe to the category of ‘regime with which contacts are minimized to avoid reputational risks in political and economic spheres.’ If the parties are meant to restore a minimum trust level, they will need a considerable amount of time.”
• “From a Russian point of view, Ukraine’s virtually non-existent nuclear program was enough to provoke a military response. This opens Pandora’s box for false interpretations. That is, nuclear concerns may be used as a pretext for military interventions, which lowers the nuclear threshold. Russia has also targeted Ukraine’s civilian nuclear facilities, which carry radiation risks, while limiting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access to information necessary for safety. This action weakens the IAEA and negatively affects international nuclear safety and nonproliferation cooperation.”
• “Finally, Russia introduced a nuclear dimension into a regional, conventionally armed conflict. That presents a risk of rapid escalation to a nuclear exchange. Given the crisis in Ukraine, is the taboo on nuclear weapons use intact? The answer is no longer clear. The nuclear and non-nuclear powers must adapt their nuclear arms control doctrines and forces to this new reality.”

"A New Nuclear Arms Race Is a Real Possibility," Sarah Bidgood, Foreign Policy, 03.15.22. The author, director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, writes: 

• “The Strategic Stability Dialogue process should be resumed as soon as it is feasible to do so. Not only could it provide a valuable forum for communication during this crisis, but the longer it remains on hiatus, the more difficult it will become — politically and bureaucratically — to return. Further, if domestic stakeholders in either country conclude from this crisis that more nuclear weapons are needed to serve their national security interests, this process will have little chance of yielding meaningful results. If it fails, this will have serious implications for an already impoverished arms control architecture, the last vestige of which will expire in 2026.”
• “The good news is, as was true 60 years ago, the deliberate, persistent, and personal advocacy of leaders in both Washington and Moscow can go a long way toward overcoming these barriers. Without a clear sense for how this conflict ends, however, it is hard to say whether or when there will be political will for this kind of work on either side. What is certain is that Putin’s recent actions do not align with last year’s U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement, which affirmed that, ‘even in periods of tension, [the United States and Russia] are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.’ It remains to be seen whether the two sides will be able to meet this relatively low bar in the future.” 

"Escalation Vortex: Nuclear Risks in the Russia-Ukraine War," Angela Kellett and Chase A. Enright, The National Interest, 03.15.22. The authors, respectively a fellow and the development coordinator with Ploughshares Fund, write:

• “President Vladimir Putin’s recent order to put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert sparked panic that the situation in Ukraine could go nuclear. Russia and the United States have the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, so the notion that President Putin would even consider using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is unsettling.”
• “What exactly does the increased nuclear alert level mean? According to Jon Wolfsthal, Global Zero’s Senior Advisor, this relates to changes in Russia’s personnel readiness. While the heightened alert may ultimately be considered a more symbolic decision, the fact that President Putin is willing to transmit this signal to the world — that the possibility of nuclear use is not out of the equation — reinforces the concern that nuclear war is not an impossibility in this current crisis.”
• “This isn’t the first time that Putin’s Russia has acted this aggressively. Wolfsthal notes that “we’ve seen Vladimir Putin’s horrific behavior towards Chechnya, towards Syria, towards Russians in Russia.” Rather than providing a path to understanding Putin, these past examples of Russian aggression reinforce his skewed cost-benefit calculus, thus making it difficult for experts and policy-makers to predict what he will do next.”
• “Russia believes that it can invade Ukraine without military action from the United States, as the risk of nuclear conflict is too high. At the same time, the United States believes it can provide military aid to Ukraine without Russian retaliation due to the increased nuclear risk it would create. However, when the nuclear threshold is broken, the paradox breaks as well, and both the United States and Russia may find themselves in an escalating vortex that will be very difficult to escape.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

"Why You Haven’t Heard About the Secret Cyberwar in Ukraine," Thomas Rid, The New York Times, 03.18.22. The author, a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

• “In 2022 the war came but seemingly without the cyberapocalypse and waves of pummeling digital strikes we expected. ‘Cyberattacks on Ukraine Are Conspicuous by Their Absence,’ headlined The Economist a week into the war. Such claims, however, are misleading. Cyberwar has come, is happening now and will most likely escalate. But the digital confrontation is playing out in the shadows, as inconspicuous as it is insidious. Several interlocking dynamics of cyberoperations in war stand out from what we have seen in Ukraine so far.”
  • “First, some cyberattacks are meant to be visible and, in effect, distract from the stealthier and more dangerous sabotage. On Feb. 15 and 16, Ukrainian banks suffered major denial-of-service attacks, meaning their websites were rendered inaccessible. Western authorities swiftly attributed the attacks to Russia's intelligence service, and Google is now helping protect 150 websites in Ukraine from such attacks.”
  • “Second, cyberoperations in wartime are not as useful as bombs and missiles when it comes to inflicting the maximum amount of physical and psychological damage on the enemy. An explosive charge is more likely to create long-term harm than malicious software.”
  • “Finally, without deeper integration within a broader military campaign, the tactical effects of cyberattacks remain rather limited. Thus far, we have no information on Russian computer network operators integrating and combining their efforts in direct support of traditional operations.”
• “To harden our defenses, we must first recognize cyberoperations for what they have been, are and will be: an integral part of 21st-century statecraft. The United States has a unique competitive advantage through its vibrant tech and cybersecurity industry. No other country comes even close to matching the U.S. public-private partnership in attributing and countering adversarial intelligence operations. These collaborative efforts must continue. The contours of digital conflict are slowly emerging from the shadows, as digitally upgraded intelligence operations at the edge of war: espionage, sabotage, covert action and counterintelligence, full of deception and disinformation.”

"Why Russian Cyber Dogs Have Mostly Failed to Bark," Jelena Vićić and Rupal N. Mehta, War on the Rocks, 03.14.22. The authors, respectively a postdoctoral scholar with the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, write:

• “The growing humanitarian crisis — as well as increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Moscow — highlights just how precarious the situation truly is. While cyber operations targeting networked systems, including infrastructure, might seem like attractive, their impact is far from known and may lead to escalation and miscalculation during the times of war.”
• “Low-level, targeted cyber-influence operations against the Russian military or general public could serve to counter to broader Russian information campaigns and compound pressure on Putin without risking escalation. Finding creative off-ramps and other means of deescalating across domains (including the promise of sanctions relief if Russia agrees to end its campaign of terror) may be the only way to stop the atrocities in Ukraine.”

"The Dangers of Putin’s Paranoia: Why Isolation Encourages Escalation," Dmitri Alperovitch, Foreign Affairs, 03.18.22. 

"An Isolated Russia Will Pose New Cyber Threats," Christopher Whyte, The National Interest, 03.18.22. The author, an assistant professor in the homeland security and emergency preparedness program in the Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University, writes:

• “The future of cyber engagement with and from Russia is nowhere near as clear-cut as many pundits would suggest. Yes, Russia’s reliance on its ‘gray’ tools of contestation seems likely to remain and even deepen. But strategic context dictates that Russian cyber aggression will be shaped by unprecedented circumstances.”
• “In the near term, the forced isolation of the Russian economy and the shape of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will likely make lateral efforts to harass Western societies more likely than the ‘cyberwar’ imagined by so many pundits. In the longer term, Russia’s changing relationship to the internet itself actually suggests that perhaps old ideas about the logic of cyber conflict will have to give way to a nested understanding of why countries use cyber. After all, cyber action and reaction in a world of walled-off kingdoms amidst open terrain will inevitably look different from that in a world of free movement of information.”

“The Cyber Warfare Predicted in Ukraine May Be Yet to Come,” Chris Krebs, Financial Times, 03.20.22. The author, former head of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the co-founder and partner of the Krebs Stamos Group, writes: 

• “[T]here are several factors which would explain why Moscow’s proven cyber capabilities took a back seat in the overall strategy. For one, it seems the Kremlin kept battle-planning to a small group that may have excluded the Russian security services’ cyber personnel.”
• “There’s also the matter of necessity. Intercepted transmissions point to Russian forces using radio handsets and Ukrainian telecommunications networks to co-ordinate movements and update commanders back in Russia. In this scenario, Moscow would keep networks operational for their own use. If the Kremlin thought Ukrainians would fold in the face of a lightning strike on the capital, then they would have wanted to maintain critical infrastructure services for when they moved in.”
• “The danger is that as political and economic conditions deteriorate, the red lines and escalation judgments that kept Moscow’s most potent cyber capabilities in check may adjust. Western sanctions and lethal aid support to Ukraine may prompt Russian hackers to lash out against the west, sending a clear message: ‘knock it off, we can make this much worse for you.’ Russian ransomware actors may also take advantage of the situation, possibly resorting to cybercrime as one of the few means of revenue generation. … A wounded bear can still lash out, inflicting great harm for as long as it draws breath.”
• “Mitigating this risk means we need decisive action. Government offensive cyber teams must continue to disrupt Russian attacks, while rapidly sharing information with industry on Moscow’s intent and capabilities. We must accept, however, that stopping all attacks is not realistic. Industry executives should recognize they have an obligation to make themselves harder targets so the government can focus on supporting Ukraine, rather than putting out fires back home.” 

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

"Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?" Shiloh Fetzek, IISS, 03.15.22. The author, an associate fellow for conflict security and development with IISS, writes:

• “Given the situation in Ukraine, the key messages of the latest IPCC report and the implications for security and the strategic environment may not have reverberated as loudly as they might in the news agenda … There is also a medium- to long-term risk that the immediate crisis in Ukraine crowds out the recent attention and focus on climate threats to the strategic environment and defense energy transition.”
• “This latest report … finds that the Earth system is already undergoing profound destabilization, and is rapidly approaching thresholds and tipping points, beyond which systemic and cascading risks become exponentially more likely.”
• “Closer defense cooperation in the context of reducing reliance on a petrostate could accelerate the greening of NATO and European militaries. … However, as the invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrates, conventional capabilities still matter, and militaries will need to use fossil fuels to move anything heavy in theatre, as ‘green’ alternative technologies have yet to be developed. More unified preparation for a less certain security future among NATO and its allies might result in prioritizing R&D to support the defense energy transition.”
• "The implications of climate change for security in a rapidly evolving geostrategic and security environment are significant. ... As well as the physical climate impacts on conflict drivers, the dynamics of repurposing the global energy system to avoid the worst of climate change may come with their own set of geopolitical concerns, and complex interactions with how conflicts play out, as we are seeing in the global responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine."
• “We do not yet know whether the international system will be strengthened or weakened by current events to deal with these challenges, but scientists are clear that climate change will bring significant disruption, whatever we now do.    Ukraine also shows us that difficult decisions can be taken quickly in the face of a crisis, and that countries can still act together to address complex and dangerous situations. This might provide some grounds for optimism, but how these different factors play out remains to be seen.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Social media can help stop the spread of misinformation—and Putin," Tara D. Sonenshine, The Boston Globe, 03.15.22. The author, professor of practice of public diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, writes:

• “It is estimated that 36 million Russians use TikTok, the social media app that delivers entertaining and informational short videos. That explains, in part, why the Biden administration brought 30 social media influencers onto a Zoom call for a briefing about Ukraine.”
• “The hope is that many Russian TikTok users will be able to access social media and influence their fellow citizens on Russia’s invasion of sovereign Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin understands the influence of social media. He shut down foreign media and blocked Instagram as of Monday, leaving his own population in the dark. Meanwhile, news outlets inside Russia have been instructed not to say anything about Ukraine. Independent news stations have been shut down, and even state-run media staff have walked off the job.”
• “But where social media and media writ large will matter is in the days and months ahead, when a Russian occupation of Kyiv will run headlong into public opposition from within Russia and from around the world. Occupying a nation is expensive and deadly. As the economic pain of sanctions grows real for ordinary Russian citizens, the best hope is that critics within Putin’s circle will feel empowered to resist the authoritarian rule that is ruining their nation. That is the moment when social media can penetrate the iron curtain and inspire resistance.”
• “This war has raised the stakes for everyone, everywhere. Information from Ukraine has come steadily and constantly, galvanizing citizens in every corner of the globe. Correspondents are reporting live from the ground. Refugees are posting video diaries. Ukrainian officials are tweeting from shelters.”
• “The Biden administration is right to keep social media influencers in the loop on the war, in the hopes that some Russians, through VPN technology or by other means, will be able to download news about what Russia is really doing in Ukraine rather than accept Putin’s propaganda or remain in the dark. Information energizes public sentiment. Energizing global opinion against Russia and in favor of Ukraine will continue if the wall-to-wall reporting, on all platforms, continues.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Russians Must Accept the Truth. We Failed," Ilia Krasilshchik, The New York Times, 03.16.22. The author, the former publisher of independent news outlet Meduza, writes:

• “I want to believe we did everything in our power to rein in Mr. Putin. But it's not true. Though we protested, organized, lobbied, spread information and built honest lives in the shadow of a corrupt regime, we must accept the truth: We failed. We failed to prevent a catastrophe and we failed to change the country for the better. And now we must bear that failure.”
• “The Russians who oppose the war now find themselves in a terrible state. It's not just that we couldn't stop this senseless and illegal war—we can't even protest against it. A law passed on March 4 makes the expression of antiwar sentiment in Russia punishable by up to 15 years in prison.”
• “It is as if we're being viewed as criminals not only by our own state but also by the rest of the world. Yet we are not criminals. We did not start this war, and we did not vote for the people who did. We did not work for the state that is now bombing Ukrainian cities. Time and again, we raised our voices against the government's policies, even as it became ever more dangerous to do so.”
• “We must now put aside our individual concerns and accept our common responsibility for the war. Such an act is, first and foremost, a moral necessity. But it could also be the first step toward a new Russian nation—a nation that could talk to the world in a language other than wars and threats, a nation that others will learn not to fear. It is toward creating this Russia that we, outcast and exiled and persecuted, should bend our efforts.”

"The Russians Fleeing Putin's Wartime Crackdown," Masha Gessen, The New Yorker, 03.20.22. The author, a staff writer for the magazine, writes: 

• “In the world as it existed before Russia invaded Ukraine, on Feb. 24, the Vnukovo International Airport, in Moscow, was a point of departure for weekend-holiday destinations south of the border: Yerevan, Istanbul, Baku. In the first week of March, as tens of thousands of President Vladimir Putin’s troops advanced into Ukraine, Vnukovo teemed with anxious travelers, many of them young. The line for excess baggage split the giant departure hall in half. These people weren’t going for the weekend. ... My friends, a prominent gay journalist and his partner, were among the Russians—more than a quarter of a million, by some estimates—who have left their country since the invasion of Ukraine.”
• “Independent media outlets, now blocked in Russia, were deleting their Web sites and hiding YouTube videos and social-media posts to protect staff members who could face prosecution under new censorship laws. At home and abroad, Russians were wiping their social-media accounts to shield themselves and those who had liked or left comments on antiwar petitions, or even posts simply containing the word ‘war’—acts that were now punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.”
• “Some of the conversations—about elderly parents who couldn’t make the journey, or teen-age children forced to separate from their first loves—were familiar to me from the nineteen-seventies, when a small number of people, mostly Jews, were able to leave the U.S.S.R. But this was different. The old Russian émigrés were moving toward a vision of a better life; the new ones were running from a crushing darkness.”
• “People have fled Russia because they fear political persecution, conscription and isolation; because they dread being locked in an unfamiliar new country that eerily resembles the old Soviet Union; and because staying in a country that is waging war feels immoral, like being inside a plane that’s dropping bombs on people. They have left because the Russia they have built and inhabited is disappearing—and the more people who leave, the faster it disappears.” 

"Putin’s war is a tragedy for the Russian people, too," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 03.18.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “Older Russians will shudder at the echoes of some of the darkest days of the 20th century, but few of them will leave. Some young people and professionals are doing so, however; one Russian economist estimates at least 200,000 Russians departed the country in the first 10 days of the war.”
• “An accelerating brain drain will rob Russia of some of its best human talent, just as sanctions squeeze the funding and knowhow the country needs. None of this compares with the human and physical destruction being visited on Ukraine by Putin’s forces. The longer it goes on, however, the clearer it becomes that the president’s war is a calamity, too, for his own people.”

"Russia Will Remake Itself. But It Has to Crumble First," Varia Bortsova, The New York Times, 03.20.22. The author, the founder of Soviet Visuals, writes:

• “For Russians, there is the fear and disgust at watching Mr. Putin’s ruthless campaign, which will inevitably raise the civilian death toll. There’s also the feeling of helplessness of not having been able to stop it and the shame of being from the country of the aggressor. And unsurprisingly, Russia has been catapulted into a dark hole. Many foreign companies — clothing and credit card brands, car manufacturers and tech corporations, fast food and retail chains — have suspended operations, affecting every corner of the economy. The West’s sanctions have mostly cut Russian civilians off from the global economy.”
• “Meanwhile, Mr. Putin has ensured that Russians who express opposition to the invasion face persecution: A new law punishes anyone spreading anything it deems ‘false information’ about the war with up to 15 years in prison. This crackdown on freedom is not new to Russians, but it has reached a peak of absurdity: Standing in the street with a flower or a blank sign now gets you loaded into a police van. Between arrests for speaking out, censorship, rumors of martial law and relentless propaganda, it’s as though we had landed straight in the Stalin era.”
• “The Russia I knew has been erased. What’s coming next is dark.” 

"The war of Putin’s imagination," Maria Stepanova, Financial Times, 03.18.22. The author, a poet and writer living in Russia, writes:

• “There was a proverb I used to like: ‘a soldier would never hurt a child’—a phrase you could use to suggest that everything would be OK, we’ll find a way. The proverb has vanished: now we read about soldiers and children in publications that are forbidden in Russia, via a virtual private network.”
• “I’m writing this in Russian and with every sentence it gets harder. The ridge of language, its living conversational edge, changes first. It’s like an ancient minefield, and the old mines begin exploding as you pick your way across. They are all live now, these mines. The language isn’t to blame, just as the earth isn’t. But it has changed, it is rutted and cratered. And the craters will only grow in number.”

"Why is Russia’s church backing Putin’s war? Church-state history gives a clue," Scott Kenworthy, The Conversation, 03.21.22. The author, a professor of Comparative Religion at Miami University, writes: 

• “Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church has defended Russia’s actions and blamed the conflict on the West. Patriarch Kirill’s support for the invasion of a country where millions of people belong to his own church has led critics to conclude that Orthodox leadership has become little more than an arm of the state – and that this is the role it usually plays. The reality is much more complicated.”
• “[After the dissolution of the Soviet Union] [t]he church was suddenly free, yet facing enormous challenges after decades of suppression. With the collapse of Soviet ideology, Russian society seemed set adrift. Church leaders sought to reclaim it, but faced stiff competition from new forces, especially Western consumer culture and American evangelical missionaries....”
• “In 2012, Pussy Riot, a feminist punk group, staged a protest in a Moscow cathedral to criticize Kirill’s support for Putin – yet the episode actually pushed church and state closer together. Putin portrayed Pussy Riot and the opposition as aligned with decadent Western values, and himself as the defender of Russian morality, including Orthodoxy. A 2013 law banning dissemination of gay ‘propaganda’ to minors, which was supported by the church, was part of this campaign to marginalize dissent. Putin successfully won reelection, and Kirill’s ideology has been linked to Putin’s ever since.”
• “Kirill does not represent the entirety of the Russian Orthodox Church any more than Putin represents the entirety of Russia. The patriarch’s positions have alienated some of his own flock, and his support for the invasion of Ukraine will likely split some of his support abroad. Christian leaders around the world are calling upon Kirill to pressure the government to stop the war.” 
• “The patriarch has alienated the Ukrainian flock that remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate. Leaders of that church have condemned Russia’s attack and appealed to Kirill to intervene with Putin. A broader rift is clearly brewing: A number of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops have already stopped commemorating Kirill during their services. If Kirill supported Russia’s actions as a way to preserve the unity of the church, the opposite outcome seems likely.” 

"Why Russians Support Putin’s War Against Ukrainians," Maria Snegovaya, The National Interest, 03.14.22. The author, a visiting scholar at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, writes:

• “Why have Russians embraced Putin’s war? A typical answer is that Russians are brainwashed by the Kremlin propaganda.”
• “Yet some evidence does not comply with the argument that Russians only rely on propagandist media for information. Russia is a country where 85 percent of the population has internet access. After Western sanctions were announced, long lines to get money from the ATMs and to purchase goods from Ikea and McDonalds after these companies decided to leave Russia suggest that some real-life information breaks through to the Russian people. Rather than fully trusting propaganda, Russians seek out alternative information channels on issues that concern them personally (as in their personal wellbeing). It is on issues that are of low salience to them (like foreign policy) that they embrace official propaganda narratives.”
• “Russians’ embrace of the war does not have to do with the lack of information alone. Ukrainians and journalists who try to reach out to Russian people often encounter direct refusal to believe the evidence of the atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine even when directly provided evidence of it—even when such information is presented by their blood relatives. It is common for Russians to deny and refuse to believe these facts, instead claiming that such facts/photos/videos are fake.”
• “This phenomenon is known as cognitive dissonance. When people encounter information that challenges their preexisting beliefs, it leads to a cognitive dissonance, a mental discomfort, which people naturally want to avoid. Hence, they tend to reject the information that creates unpleasant feelings.”
• “When the sanctions bring true economic crisis to Russia, many will decrease their support for war. However, in light of the above considerations, these changes may not be as radical and pronounced as many in the West expect. Western policymakers should thus be crafting strategies designed to reach out to Russians and help them overcome their cognitive dissonance. Liberalizing media flows is not enough. One should be thinking about ways to force people out of their resistance and denial, to make them challenge and ultimately revise their beliefs.”

"The Bankrupt Colonialist: What kind of peace could Russia afford?" Lawrence Freedman, Comment is Freed/Substack, 03.15.22. The author, Emeritus Professor of War Studies King's College London, writes:

• “Estimates of the impact of the war on Ukraine are already well over $100 billion, and this for an economy that also faces already a contraction of at least 10% in its economy and probably more. A recent IMF assessment noted that in addition to the economically consequential damage to ports and airports: ‘As of March 6, 202 schools, 34 hospitals, more than 1,500 residential houses including multi-apartment houses, tens of kilometers of roads, and countless objects of critical infrastructures in several Ukrainian cities have been fully or partially destroyed by Russian troops.”
• “Whatever the impact on Russia’s ability to prosecute the war it is hard to see how Russia is going to have much spare capacity to compensate Ukraine for the damage it has inflicted upon it, even in the unlikely event it was prepared to offer to do so as part of an agreement.”
• “Consider what happened to Chechnya after Russia’s war to prevent secession which also involved brutal attacks on civilian areas. ... This relatively small territory is already costing Moscow close to $3 billion a year. Crimea, annexed in 2014, may be costing a similar amount.”
• “In launching this disastrous war he [Putin] has revealed himself to be not only a vicious bully but also a deluded fool. War is rarely a good investment. Putin has acted for reasons of political and not economic opportunism. The prospects for any territory ‘liberated’ by Russia is bleak. They will not prosper and will remain cut off from the international economy. To the extent that people stay they will have to be subsidized for all their needs while there will be little economic activity.”
• “’Fanaticism,’ according to George Santayana, ‘consists of redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim.’ As his original war plans failed Putin has insisted his forces follow a disruptive and cruel strategy that has put his original aims even more out of reach and Ukraine with a say over the future of the Russian economy.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

"How Punitive Are Russians? Insights From a National Survey on Law Enforcement in Russia," Daniel Horn, Gavin Slade, Alexei Trochev, PONARS Eurasia, 03.14.22. The authors, respectively a research associate in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Strathclyde (Horn); and associate professors in the School of Sciences and Humanities at Nazarbayev University (Slade, Trochev), write:

• “While Russia remains a punitive state … with a peculiar relationship to the practice of incarceration, this relationship is changing. Russians no longer stand out globally in their support for the death penalty. Russians do not want prisoners to undergo poor conditions or inhumane and harsh treatment while serving prison sentences. They understand that Russian prisons remain cruel institutions that make people worse and fail to protect, deter, or rehabilitate.”
• “On the other hand, in global terms, Russians still have a very strong preference for sentencing criminals to prison terms — at least as a go-to option. This is in conflict with state policy — the overall prison rate has been in decline for 20 years; fewer people are in prison in Russia today than at any time since the Soviet Union disappeared.”
• “While the declining prison rate should be welcomed and encouraged by the international community, it must not deflect from the failures of the prison system evident to ordinary Russians — high recidivism rates (60 percent), continued inhumane treatment of prisoners, regular cases of torture, and poor prison conditions.”
• “Moreover, policymakers should recognize that authoritarian penal policy is driven by an executive that can easily reverse the prison rate trend as and when a populist leadership finds it expedient to realign state punitiveness with popular sentiment. Our findings, as concerns the relationship between various measures of social values and punitiveness (forthcoming), further suggest a much more complex relationship between concepts of punitiveness, conservatism, and other attitudes within Russian society than has been previously reported.”

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

"No, it’s not the world against Russia. In fact, it’s far from it. Why a lot of nations aren’t on board with economic sanctions," James Pindell, The Boston Globe, 03.16.22. The author, a reporter for the newspaper, writes:

• “The world, it seemed, changed the moment Russia invaded Ukraine about three weeks ago. The assault galvanized most of the world’s largest economies. With one economic sanction after another, it was Russia against the West. And Japan. And Australia. But, possibly lost in all the headlines is that it is not the entire world against Russia. In fact, most of three huge continents – Asia, Africa, and South America – are either still working with Russia or trying to project the image of neutrality.”
• “Much has been written about China’s complicated stance as it relates to Russia. While China and Russia took steps to grow closer before the Ukrainian invasion, China has taken a non-committal position during the war so far, though their state media have basically parroted the Russian narrative. The Chinese fence-sitting may also be the key reason why other Asian nations are not committing to get behind Western sanctions. For example, the Chinese influence over Pakistan is so strong that its leader, who makes the point to defend Muslim communities all over the world, is silent when it comes to Chinese genocide against a Muslim minority in a Western province. This, in effect, may have convinced Pakistan’s biggest rival, India, to also play it safe on Russian sanctions.”
• “In fact, the United States should be aware that no ally, no matter how close, should be automatically counted on to just go along with sanctions. For example, it took weeks for Israel to announce that it will refuse to be a place where Russian oligarchs can go around Western sanctions. Possibly the most complicated place to watch is the greater Middle East. The United States is trying to convince oil-rich countries to sell more crude and natural gas to Europe as a replacement for Russian oil and gas. This could be a boon to these nations but at the same time, some have grown closer to China in the recent decade. Amid all of that is an Iranian nuclear deal that might be back on, if Russia — of all places — signs off.”

Ukraine:

"Neo-Nazis are exploiting Russia’s war in Ukraine for their own purposes," Rita Katz, The Washington Post, 03.14.22. The author, executive director of the SITE Intelligence Group, writes:

• “We at SITE, an intelligence group tracking global extremists, have noticed a surge in online activity by white nationalists and neo-Nazis in conjunction with the war in Ukraine. Among the hundreds of individuals who have announced their intent to join Azov in recent weeks are several known neo-Nazis. For instance, ‘MD,’ an American member of Azov's recruitment chat group, has repeatedly tried to get fellow countrymen to join the battalion in Ukraine.”
• “Western white supremacists and neo-Nazis, for the most part, do not support the current Ukrainian government - and not simply because of its ban on antisemitism, President Volodymyr Zelensky's Jewish heritage or other specific matters. Ukraine is a developing democracy, which far-right extremists oppose as contrary to the fascist governments they want to see.”
• “Furthermore, while some white nationalists have expressed admiration for Putin, many Western far-right extremists oppose Russia, which they conflate with the former Soviet Union and therefore consider communist. Yet this mobilization on Ukraine's behalf is driven by more than just a mutual enemy: The mobilizers see the Russia-Ukraine war as a major opportunity to advance white nationalism via militancy. To them, Ukraine is a sandbox for fascist state-building, ripe for the kind of armed far-right power grab they long to see in their own countries.”
• “The extremists who successfully make it to Ukraine could return home with new weapons and combat experience under their belts - or stay in Ukraine, where they can further influence their countrymen online. Just because extremists are ‘somewhere else’ does not make them any less dangerous to the countries they come from, as we've learned all too well. No matter where war takes place, it always amounts to opportunity for extremists.”

"How Are Putin’s Far-Right Fans In The West Reacting To His War?" Stephanie Foggett, Mollie Saltskog and Colin Clarke, War on the Rocks, 03.18.22. The authors, respectively the Soufan Group's director of global communications, senior intelligence analyst, and director of policy and research, write:

• “Not all corners of the white supremacy online ecosystem support Putin’s invasion of Ukraine or believe they have something to gain from the power shifts that may result from a Russian victory. A Canadian neo-Nazi shared with his followers that Ukraine is becoming ‘a graveyard of the White race.’ He states that both global forces — Russia and the West — are ‘anti-white,’ and he warns his followers that support for Putin means that ‘Islamo-Eurasianism led by Russia and China can triumph.’ His rhetoric builds on another common narrative among white supremacists: that Ukraine is caught between two ‘anti-white’ imperialist empires — the West’s multicultural ‘globalist’ degeneracy on the one hand, and Russia’s multicultural ‘Eurasianist’ empire on the other.”
• “In Scandinavia, the largest neo-Nazi organization in the region has determined that no side is worth the group’s official support. In commentary and statements posted online since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they have empathized with ‘both sides’ of the conflict but implore their followers to see that neither side is worth dying for.”
• “It should also be acknowledged that far-right elements are present on the Ukrainian side of this conflict. While the Azov Battalion garnered much attention for its far-right ideology during the first battle with the Russians dating back to 2014, the current iteration of Azov is believed to be more nationalist, and less racially or ethnically focused, than in the past.”
• “While the war is still in its early days, and the far-right extremist movement is far from monolithic in its views of it, the event will likely serve to invigorate extremists around the world, including in the United States. … The most insidious and violence-oriented extremists will harness Russia’s war in Ukraine to further advance their own hateful creed — whether in the form of online radicalization, nurturing transnational networks, or providing logistical support for individuals who travel to join in the fighting. It is imperative that the United States and allies remain vigilant against these developments and counter calls or attempts for mobilization to violence.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.