Russia Analytical Report, March 13-20, 2023
5 Ideas to Explore
- Xi and Putin pat each other on the back for advancing their strategic partnership, but only Putin sees “no limits” to the partnership. In his commentary for Rossiiskaya Gazeta ahead of the March 20-22 visit to Russia, Xi describes Russia and China as “strategic partners [engaged in] comprehensive cooperation,” celebrating “eternal friendship” between the two countries. The Chinese leader—who is to sign two declarations with Putin while in Moscow—also offered some vaguely worded support for peace in Ukraine, while signaling to the U.S. that “there is no world order where the decisive word belongs to an individual country.” In his commentary for China’s People’s Daily Newspaper, Putin was harsher than Xi in criticizing the U.S., while also claiming readiness for peace talks with Ukraine as long as they factor in “geopolitical realities” (i.e. Russia keeps annexed territory). Putin also lauded the state of Russia-China relations, proclaiming that the latter “have reached the highest level” and that “they surpass Cold War-time military-political alliances in their quality, with no one to constantly order and no one to constantly obey, without limitations or taboos.” In doing so, Putin invoked the language on a “friendship [of] no limits and forbidden areas” from the joint statement he and Xi had adopted less than three weeks before his Feb. 24, 2022, invasion into Ukraine. In contrast, Xi’s March 20, 2023, commentary did not contain any explicit references to “no limits,” reflecting what FT has recently described as China’s decision to drop this phrase from the official communications with Russia in the wake of the invasion.
- Does entanglement in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict constitute a vital U.S. national interest? No, it doesn’t, according to Florida’s GOP governor and presidential hopeful Ron DeSantis. Therefore, the U.S. should neither “provide assistance that could require the deployment of American troops” nor “enable Ukraine to engage in offensive operations beyond its borders,” DeSantis wrote in a recent statement. “Without question, peace should be the objective” rather than a regime change in Russia, he wrote. According to the WP editorial board, however, DeSantis is “dangerously wrong” because “supporting Ukraine is squarely in America’s national interest.” Statements by DeSantis and Donald Trump reflect that GOP voters are “steadily shifting toward an antiwar position” and fuel Putin’s hope that one of them will become the next president, eroding the West’s resolve to prop up Ukraine, according to FT’s Edward Luce.
- The quality of Ukraine's military force has been degraded by casualties of up to 120,000 that have taken many of the most experienced fighters off the battlefield. The shortage of experienced personnel has made Ukrainian officials question their army’s readiness to mount a major offensive this spring, as has the depletion of military equipment stocks, WP reported. A senior Ukrainian government official told WP: "I don't believe in a big counteroffensive for us. I'd like to believe in it, but I'm looking at the resources and asking, 'With what?'”
- Chances of the ICC’s arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin leading to his arrest or trial are slim, but they give victims of Russia’s war against Ukraine “some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future,” according to Chatham House’s Rashmin Sagoo and Talita Dias. They also play an important role in helping deter similar international crimes by other leaders in Russia and around the world, the researchers argue in a commentary for Chatham House.
- A new Atlantic-Asian Security Community that Ukraine (and eventually Russia) could join should be created and serve as the cornerstone of “a new security vision for the region,” according to Georgetown University’s Lise Morjé Howard and Brookings’ Michael O’Hanlon. The scholars envision AASC’s long-term purpose to be similar to NATO’s, but in the short term, its main task would be to supervise and legitimize the presence of Western military troops on Ukrainian soil. These troops would act as a tripwire to prevent fresh Russian aggression, according to Howard and O’Hanlon. If Putin is replaced in the Kremlin by a leader committed to peace, Russia should be eligible to join AACS as well, they write.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- “Warrants of arrest for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.”
- “The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC. However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.”
- “The chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offenses are slim. The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.”
- “But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law—it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence. The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future.”
- “The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since Nov. 21 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.”
“Could Putin Really Be Prosecuted for War Crimes?”, reporter Erik Larson, Bloomberg, 03.17.23.
- “What are war crimes? They are violations of the rules of warfare as set out in various treaties, notably the Geneva Conventions, a series of agreements concluded between 1864 and 1949. War crimes include willful killing, torture, rape, using starvation as a weapon, shooting combatants who have surrendered, deploying banned weapons such as chemical and biological arms, and deliberately attacking civilian targets. The Kremlin has rejected allegations that its troops have committed such transgressions in Ukraine.”
- “What is Putin accused of? The Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) accused Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, his commissioner for children’s rights, of bearing responsibility for the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia since the war began.”
- “ICC sent a team of 42 people—its largest such deployment—to Ukraine to investigate crimes that fall within the court’s jurisdiction. Although Ukraine is not an ICC member, it accepted the court’s jurisdiction for incidents on its territory starting months before Russia seized the country’s Crimea peninsula in 2014.”
- “What are the prospects of trying Putin or other Russian officials? Barring a change of regime in Moscow, not good. The ICC doesn’t permit trials in absentia, and the court is unlikely to gets its hands on Putin or his lieutenants. It relies on its member states to make arrests, and accused Russian officials could always avoid traveling to a country that might turn them over.”
- “Of the two dozen people against whom the ICC has pursued war crimes cases, about a third remain at large. Those charged have been members of armed groups rather than political or state military leaders, with four exceptions … none of whom have been turned over to the ICC. Numerous political leaders were prosecuted for barbarities in the Balkans and Rwanda, but those tribunals were established by the Security Council, where Russia has a veto.”
- “International mechanisms like ICC jurisdiction and cross-case actions have been shown to have negligible effects on conflict-related sexual violence. And in some intrastate conflicts, ICC interventions have been associated with increased sexual violence by government forces, possibly due to the strategic initiation of ICC interventions to repress domestic opposition.”
- “[I]t’s not the severity of the punishment that serves as a deterrent—for deterrence to be effective, perpetrators need to believe that there is an increased likelihood that they themselves will be arrested and face punishment.”
- “[W]hat is needed are interventions to change harmful societal gender norms that enable and excuse sexual violence. How to do this—and do it well—is complex. Insights from social psychology suggest the promise of ‘social norms marketing’ to shift attitudes about gendered violence through the use of mass media to influence perceptions of acceptable and appropriate behavior. As the policymakers, practitioners, advocates and activists committed to combatting conflict-related sexual violence cheer the renewed attention to the issue and the emerging policies, they should not pin all their hopes on closing the impunity gap. There is no silver bullet. A concerted, long-term and multi-pronged effort is needed to address the root causes of conflict-related sexual violence.”
Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “The quality of Ukraine's military force, once considered a substantial advantage over Russia, has been degraded by a year of casualties that have taken many of the most experienced fighters off the battlefield, leading some Ukrainian officials to question Kyiv's readiness to mount a much-anticipated spring offensive.”
- “U.S. and European officials have estimated that as many as 120,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or wounded ... Russia is also facing ammunition, manpower and motivation problems—and has notched only incremental gains in recent months despite the strained state of Ukraine's force. As bad as Ukraine's losses are, Russia's are worse, a U.S. official said.”
- “Ukraine has lost many of its junior officers who received U.S. training over the past nine years, eroding a corps of leaders who helped distinguish the Ukrainians from their Russian enemies at the start of the invasion, the Ukrainian official said.”
- “Statistics aside, an influx of inexperienced draftees … has changed the profile of the Ukrainian force, which is also suffering from basic shortages of ammunition, including artillery shells and mortar bombs.”
- “One senior Ukrainian government official … called the number of tanks promised by the West a ‘symbolic’ amount. ... ‘If you have more resources, you more actively attack,’ the senior official said. ‘If you have fewer resources, you defend more. We're going to defend. … I don't believe in a big counteroffensive for us. I'd like to believe in it, but I'm looking at the resources and asking, 'With what?' … We don't have the people or weapons,’ the senior official added. ... U.S. officials said they expect Ukraine's offensive to start in late April or early May.”
- “Dmytro, a Ukrainian soldier whom The Post is identifying only by first name for security reasons, said some of the less-experienced troops serving at his position with the 36th Marine Brigade in the Donetsk region ‘are afraid to leave the trenches.’ Shelling is so intense at times, he said, that one soldier will have a panic attack, then ‘others catch it.’”
- “U.S. security assistance works best when the leaders of countries that receive such help are highly motivated to strengthen their militaries. The simmering war in eastern Ukraine between 2014 and early 2022 was not enough to compel the Ukrainian leadership to implement crucial changes in its security sector. It took the largest war on European soil since World War II to persuade Kyiv to embrace reform and maximize the value of U.S. assistance. Of course, Ukrainians are responsible for coming up with and pursuing many reforms and innovations since the 2022 invasion. But weapons and ammunition from Western countries were essential to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight against Russia. Ukraine’s success does not demonstrate that U.S. security assistance works writ large but, rather, that U.S. security assistance is most useful in the cases when those receiving the aid are driven to do whatever it takes to strengthen their forces.”
- “The facts about the downing of the U.S. Reaper drone are still emerging, and many relevant specifics are yet to become public, but as we attempt to get our bearings it is worth beginning with applied history. Applied historians ask: have we ever seen anything like this before? Five cases that are similar in relevant respects are worth recalling.”
- “The 2019 shootdown and capture of a U.S. Global Hawk drone by Iran: President Donald Trump tweeted that Iran had made a ‘big mistake’ and reportedly considered a series of strikes on Iranian radar and missile sites. Nonetheless, no strikes were conducted. Instead, the United States filed a complaint at the United Nations, imposed additional sanctions and reportedly conducted cyber attacks.”
- “The collision with a Chinese fighter that forced an EP-3 spy plane to land in Hainan in 2001: The dispute was resolved with a face-saving half-apology … China responded by releasing the crew and, after disassembling the plane and extracting information about its intelligence capabilities, returned its parts in boxes several months later.”
- “The North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo (a spy ship) in 1968: the United States apologized, gave North Korea a written admission that the ship had been spying and made a commitment not to spy in the future in exchange for the crew’s return. North Korea kept the Pueblo.”
- “Two U.S. U-2 overflights of enemy territory during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Despite the loss of life and the fact that he had previously approved plans for retaliatory airstrikes against any Soviet SAM sites that fired on U.S. aircraft, Kennedy held back in favor of a brilliant last-ditch gambit that brought the crisis to a successful conclusion.”
- “Against this historical canvas, over the next several days we should expect the two parties to present competing stories about what happened and where. ... The Biden administration will condemn Russia’s action, but not retaliate militarily. And soon the next bright shiny object will appear consigning this shootdown to the dustbin of history.”
“Replying to Russia's Drone Provocation,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 03.16.23.
- “The Pentagon on Thursday released footage of a Russian fighter jet that harassed, dumped fuel on and then collided this week with an American [MQ-9] reconnaissance drone. The provocation warrants a U.S. response, and the right one is giving the Ukrainians the sophisticated and long-range weapons they need to defeat Vladimir Putin's military.”
- “The Biden Administration has been calibrating its Ukraine policy based on its own anxiety about Mr. Putin's reaction, but this crash is the latest reminder that Mr. Putin takes whatever risks he thinks he can get away with.”
- “President Biden now has more reason to do what he could have done long ago: Give Ukraine the weapons needed to win. Priority No. 1 is the Army tactical missile system, which would allow strikes deeper into Russian positions in Ukraine to gain momentum on the ground. Another worthy platform for Ukraine is, as it happens, the MQ-9.”
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “Transferring frozen Russian reserves would be morally right, strategically wise and politically expedient—particularly with a restive U.S. Congress. Governments would have plenty of legal justification for moving ahead. On Nov. 14, 2022, the United Nations formally recognized that Russia must ‘bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for the injury, including any damage, caused by such acts.’ The United Nations called for creation of an institution, now, to implement this compensation.”
- “Those who hold Russian assets are entitled, under the international law of state countermeasures for a grave breach of international law, to cancel their obligations to the Russian state and apply Russian state funds to pay what Russia owes. This asset freeze should not be treated, as some think it should be, under a surreal ‘sanctions’ paradigm, waiting upon a fantasy of Russian surrender. Ours is a wartime paradigm, and the compensation cannot wait. And applying the debtor's funds to pay its debts is a common way to encourage a settlement.”
- “In state action against another state's property, there are no due process concerns. Russia is not a ‘person’ under the U.S. Constitution, and the property being taken is not ‘private.’ There is no sovereign immunity issue, because this is state-on-state; there are no private litigants.”
- “European leaders have stepped up. The Biden administration has not yet followed suit. It should use Russia's frozen funds and its diplomatic leverage now, while it can decide the outcome of the war. The time has arrived for President Biden to tell his advisers what FDR would have told them: This is the right thing to do. Find a way.”
- “Banned products continue to flow into Russia via countries that have traditionally strong trade ties or are geographical neighbors of Russia. This creates additional risks for international manufacturers who have ceased operations in Russia but still might become exposed to Russia-related sanctions risks through Russia’s trade partner countries.”
- “Our analysis of official statistics reveals the dramatic growth in three particular countries’ exports to Russia from 2021 to 2022: Armenia (whose exports to Russia grew by 287%), Turkey (145%) and Kazakhstan (125%).”
- “Although most international companies remain focused on their potentially sanctionable direct links to the Russian market, they need to evaluate their exposure to Russia through third countries that trade with Russia. The sophistication of the parallel import schemes suggests that obtaining an end-user certificate may not guarantee that companies’ products do not land in Russia.”
- “How can organizations manage the risk of their products being diverted to Russia?”
- “Assess. There are several steps you can take to determine the level of risk facing your organization’s products.”
- “Investigate. Organizations that identify reasons to investigate the risk of product diversion further have two means to do so: an internal investigation within their organization and relevant third parties, or the use of additional intelligence gathering.”
- “Prevent [through] … Reviewing investigative reporting and advisories and enforcement action by governments … Monitoring sales data in countries trading with Russia … Applying additional scrutiny to subsidiaries, third parties and end customers in countries trading with Russia … Training frontline employees engaged in business development in the typologies for product diversion and the legal consequences … Conducting compliance audits of higher-risk subsidiaries and third parties … Ensuring your whistle-blower hotline is open for internal and external use and prompt action is taken to investigate any incoming reports.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
- “Ending a war occurs in three phases: prior preparations, pre-negotiations and the negotiations themselves.”
- “Right now, the United States is in the early stages of prior preparation, and it has yet to resolve disagreements over the role, pace and effect of military actions—and how they can best be timed to shape favorable outcomes, including through negotiations.”
- “As Washington and the other relevant parties establish more unified positions, pre-negotiations aimed at bringing Russia and Ukraine into direct talks can receive more attention. … One practical way to do this would be to hold so-called proximity talks, which bring both parties to the same city and allow third-party intermediaries to shuttle back and forth between them. These talks could also begin to set the agendas for future direct negotiations, settle logistical questions … and determine who aside from the warring parties will participate.”
- “More formal face-to-face talks could follow, also mediated by third parties. ... [T]he United States and its European partners will also want to ensure that any peace arrangement makes the region more secure and helps stabilize the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship, especially in the nuclear arena.”
- “One issue that is sure to be contentious and thus require careful handling is the role of Ukraine’s economy in Europe.”
- “Harder will be agreeing on security relationships: should Ukraine join NATO or be pressed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization of former Soviet states? Will it make that decision after a referendum that fairly captures the views of its citizens and a waiting period of, say, ten years?”
- “Most challenging of all … will be territorial questions. These will be influenced by military realities and other sources of leverage.
- “With care and confidentiality, the leaders of the United States and other important third parties should accelerate their prior preparations and begin pre-negotiations. They should aim to build confidence, persuade the parties to confront harsh realities and remove impediments to diplomatic progress. Otherwise, Russia and Ukraine could fall into a vicious cycle of self-deception, denial of diplomacy and endless war.”
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- “At some point later in 2023, or perhaps 2024 … Western policymakers need to be ready with a new security vision for the region. The issues are too complex to be improvised on the spot if and when peace talks begin.”
- “Ukraine must be brought into the democratic world and strengthened so that it can resist future Russian aggression. It also needs some type of Western military protection. But policymakers need to think more broadly about Russia’s role in the postwar order, as well. The nation needs a constructive vision, not just a plan to rein in its worst impulses. If after the war ends Russia is permanently banished from the international community, it will emerge, furious and humiliated, as a renewed threat.”
- “Such an outcome will require both deterring Russia and simultaneously offering it a path to redemption—or at least to peaceful coexistence. One way to do so would be to create a new security community—call it the Atlantic-Asian Security Community—composed of many NATO members, as well as Ukraine, its allies and any neutral states that wished to join. Once Putin’s regime falls and is replaced by a government committed to peace, Russia should be eligible to join, as well.”
- “The AASC could have a long-term purpose similar to NATO’s, but in the short term its main task would be to supervise and legitimize the indefinite presence of Western military troops on Ukrainian soil. These troops—from NATO and non-NATO countries alike—would monitor Russian troop activity, help train Ukraine’s armed forces, assist with demobilization, monitor any future peace deal and act as a tripwire to prevent fresh Russian aggression. This mission could be led by a non-NATO officer, perhaps from India or another country seen as neutral, but it must include U.S. troops. Nothing short of American boots on the ground can ensure Ukraine’s democratic future.”
“America's foreign policy has lost all flexibility,” columnist Fareed Zakaria, WP, 03.17.23.
- “On his trip to Saudi Arabia last year, President Biden made an emphatic declaration about U.S. policy in the Middle East: ‘We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran.’ Last week's rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, suggests that this is precisely what has happened.”
- “There is now a whole slew of countries with which the United States has either no relations or only limited, hostile contact—Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Myanmar, North Korea. You can make the case for opposing any one of these countries individually; collectively, though, the effect is to create a rigid foreign policy—one in which we're unwilling to talk to everyone in the room and unable to show flexibility, presumably based on the idea that it's best to simply hope for the overthrow of these regimes.”
- “This is not really a criticism of the Biden administration, but rather of U.S. foreign policy over the past decades. America's unipolar status has corrupted the country's foreign policy elite. Our foreign policy is all too often an exercise in making demands and issuing threats and condemnations. There is very little effort made to understand the other side's views or actually negotiate.”
- “The Obama administration tried to take a different path. ... But the political climate in Washington was largely hostile to this kind of Kissingerian diplomacy. ... All this evokes the inertia of an aging empire. Today, our foreign policy is run by an insular elite that operates by mouthing rhetoric to please domestic constituencies—and seems unable to sense that the world out there is changing, and fast.”
- “Russian President Vladimir Putin held his strongest strategic hand on Feb. 23, 2022, the day before his ill-judged and catastrophic invasion of Ukraine. He stood on the edge of extracting concessions from Ukraine and the West and, if he had turned his troops around, would have convinced the world that U.S. and British intelligence were crying wolf. He squandered this chance. Since then, he has lost a significant portion of his military forces, called Russian martial prowess into question, and become a pariah (at least in the West). His partial (and stealth) mobilizations and crackdowns on dissent have set what remained of Russian civil society back years. Ukraine never posed a danger to Russia, and Putin’s invasion was predicated on his own imperial ambitions and distorted view of history. Every day the war drags on sees more Russians dead and costs tens of millions of dollars. So why won’t he cut his losses?”
- “While dictators suffer from the occupational hazard of an insecure retirement, all leaders are susceptible to the terrible logic of war—not unlike a ruinously high-stakes poker game—that demands riskier sacrifices to redeem the previous losses. ... Like a casino, the house of war pays out just often enough to entice strategic gamblers to put their chips down, thinking this time fortune may favor them.”
- “The sunk-cost fallacy of war is to commit ever more troops and resources in a vain attempt to make the previous losses mean something or take on a larger purpose. Leaders locked in armed struggle must convince their citizens that those sacrifices are part of a journey that ultimately leads to a better outcome. This logic isn’t limited to democracies or autocracies. It is better to continue fighting at even greater cost than to admit to the people that the previous sacrifices were in vain and no further blood should be spilled. Ares’s grisly merry-go-round spins ever faster: the more casualties, the more important securing a victory (or least improving on your initial position) becomes.”
- “‘Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia,’ Biden proclaimed, adding that the United States will support Ukraine ‘as long as it takes.’ Indeed, ‘as long as it takes’ has become the new talking point for Ukraine’s allies … But ‘as long as it takes’ also signals to many Ukrainians that the allies expect the war to drag on for years, with Ukraine bearing the brunt of it. And they are right: even as the United States and its allies have sent billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment to Ukraine, there remains one thing they seem unable to supply: a clear, united commitment to a rapid Ukrainian victory. Unless the United States wants to find itself embroiled in another forever war, on terms that very much suit Russian President Vladimir Putin, it’s time for that to change.”
- “Making a strategic commitment to victory on Ukrainian terms means flipping the logic of deterrence and escalation. ... [T]he incremental pace with which arms have been provided, and the very public deliberations over which arms to provide and when, has given the Russian military time to adjust and learn. Flipping that approach on its head would see the West make an immediate and open-ended commitment to giving Ukraine whatever it needs to win, even if not all of those arms can be delivered today.”
- “[A]llies should lay in the logistics for supply and maintenance now, and deliveries should be preapproved, ready to go on a hair trigger. The message to Putin and his generals would finally be clear: there is no compromise solution available, no line of defense except the Russian border itself, and no limit to Western resolve.”
- “Faced with the certainty of defeat, Putin’s calculus would shift. For the past 12 months, Western ambiguity has emboldened Putin to prolong this war, allowing him to believe that there may perhaps come a time when the flow of support will stop, and thus that he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Replacing that ambiguity with strategic clarity—robbing Putin of any viable option other than an organized retreat—can help bring this war to an end. To borrow a phrase from Biden’s State of the Union address in February, it’s time for the West to finish the job.”
Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis’s Answers to Tucker Carlson’s Ukraine Questionnaire, Twitter, 03.13.23.
- “While the U.S. has many vital national interests—securing our borders, addressing the crisis of readiness within our military, achieving energy security and independence, and checking the economic, cultural and military power of the Chinese Communist Party—becoming further entangled in a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia is not one of them. The Biden administration’s virtual ‘blank check’ funding of this conflict for ‘as long as it takes,’ without any defined objectives or accountability, distracts from our country’s most pressing challenges.”
- “Without question, peace should be the objective. The U.S. should not provide assistance that could require the deployment of American troops or enable Ukraine to engage in offensive operations beyond its borders.”
- “A policy of ‘regime change’ in Russia … would greatly increase the stakes of the conflict, making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. Such a policy would neither stop the death and destruction of the war, nor produce a pro-American, Madisonian constitutionalist in the Kremlin. History indicates that Putin’s successor, in this hypothetical, would likely be even more ruthless. The costs to achieve such a dubious outcome could become astronomical.”
- “The Biden administration’s policies have driven Russia into a de facto alliance with China.”
- “Our citizens are also entitled to know how the billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are being utilized in Ukraine.”
- “We cannot prioritize intervention in an escalating foreign war over the defense of our own homeland, especially as tens of thousands of Americans are dying every year from narcotics smuggled across our open border and our weapons arsenals critical for our own security are rapidly being depleted.”
“Ron DeSantis’s pandering on Ukraine is dangerously wrong,” Editorial Board, WP, 03.16.23.
- “Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis is dangerously wrong to say that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a mere ‘territorial dispute’ and that the United States lacks a vital interest in the outcome. The former Navy lawyer should know better than to peddle appeasement, but he's pandering to his party's isolationist wing by mimicking former president Donald Trump ahead of an all-but-declared bid for the GOP's 2024 nomination.”
- “Mr. DeSantis—presumably with the benefit of polling—is now following what he might perceive to be the easiest political path to peel away supporters of Mr. Trump. He's telling Mr. Carlson and his viewers what many might want to hear. A Washington Post-ABC News poll released last month showed that 50% of Republicans think the United States is doing ‘too much’ to support Ukraine, up from 18% last April.”
- “Mr. DeSantis betrays the hollowness of his rhetoric about fighting for ‘freedom’ by turning his back on the most inspiring freedom fighters in the world today. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited Mr. DeSantis on Tuesday to visit the front lines to see for himself why the Ukrainians' fight is our fight. He should take Ukraine up on the offer.”
- “As things stand, the 2024 presidential election is already shaping up to become one of the biggest battles in Ukraine's war for survival.”
“Putin holds a trump card in the 2024 US election,” U.S. national editor Edward Luce, FT, 03.15.23.
- “The Republican voter is steadily shifting towards an antiwar position. Fewer than 40% of them think the U.S. should still be providing weapons to Ukraine. ... Trump says he would end the war within 24 hours of becoming president. DeSantis this week said that further entanglement ‘in a territorial dispute between Russia and Ukraine’ was not in America’s national interest.”
- “There is little doubt that Putin’s best hope of winning his war in Ukraine is for NATO’s resolve to collapse and America’s supply of money and weapons to dry up. A Trump or DeSantis presidency would be Russia’s likeliest chance of disuniting the West.”
- “The risk is that the Kremlin leader will further cement the view on the Maga right that Russia is the global champion of their anti-woke cause. Russian flags and T-shirts proclaiming ‘I would rather be a Russian than a Democrat’ are a regular sight nowadays.”
- “Kevin McCarthy, the Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, is beholden to extreme allies, such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, to keep his job. Greene depicts Zelensky as a corrupt globalist who wants to put American men and women in harm’s way.”
- “Ukraine is likely to be on the ballot next year. … Second to the war on the ground, the battle Putin will be watching most closely is the Republican primaries. If all goes well for him, he will place his hopes on the general.”
- “There is no doubt that American support for Ukraine has been highly expensive. But what also must be considered is what the cost to America and its position in the world would be of reducing or ending this support. The U.S. could incur far, far greater costs if Washington curtails—and especially if it ends—its admittedly expensive military assistance to Kyiv.”
- “A decline in American support for Ukraine would reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's view that America and the West will tire of the conflict and withdraw from it, leaving Ukraine to his tender mercies.”
- “The argument that American support for Ukraine somehow distracts Washington from preparing for a conflict involving China is an odd one. Massive American support for Ukraine, which has enabled it to stoutly resist Russian aggression, must give Beijing pause that the U.S. might give massive support to Taiwan to resist an attack from China. Reducing or ending American support for Ukraine, by contrast, could only raise hopes in Beijing that there would also be a limit to Washington's support for Taiwan.”
- “Less American assistance to Ukraine will not necessarily induce Putin to stop raising the specter of nuclear war.”
- “The costs America has incurred through supporting Ukraine so strongly have been great. But the costs America would incur through reducing, much less ending, support for Ukraine would be far, far greater.”
- “Today, White House policy is essentially: We support Ukraine's defending itself, but not enough to be too effective. This formula for protracted, inconclusive war ignores risks to America as well as Ukraine. Critical U.S. munitions supplies are being depleted, and our current capacity to restock is insufficient, mirroring concerns about replacing our aging nuclear-powered submarine fleet while also supplying Australia under the Aukus deal. Although it is better we experience these problems now, before America itself comes under fire, shortfalls in U.S. stockpiles buttress isolationists who don't want to assist Ukraine in the first place.”
- “One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn't it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin's nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow's threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin's own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.”
- “The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine's supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a ‘blank check’ or that we are in another ‘endless war’ (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.”
Remarks by Vladimir Putin during Visit to Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant, Kremlin.ru, 03.14.23. Clues from Russian Views.
- “[A]ll the problems began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. … [I]t seemed to us then, and it seemed to me too that … any reasons for confrontation between the former Soviet Union (and the new Russia) with the Western world ended, too. ... It turned out that we were wrong. … [I]mmediately … they started putting pressure on us, rocking Russia’s boat. They tried to create a ‘fifth column’ in Russia to destabilize internal politics and sent hordes of international terrorists to attack us; these groups began to operate in various regions of the country, including, and above all, in the North Caucasus.”
- “We have been patiently trying for decades to establish proper relations with the modern Ukrainian state. The situation changed drastically in 2014, when the coup d’état took place at the behest of the West. ... The year 2014 and onwards saw the physical extermination of everyone in Ukraine who was in favor of normal relations with Russia. ... Then, came the issue of Donbas. We have been trying for eight years to talk our so-called partners into resolving the Donbass issue peacefully. Now it turns out they were giving us the run around, deceiving us. They are saying this publicly without mincing the words. All of that led to where we are today.”
- “If for our so-called Western partners, our today's adversary … the point is about improving their geopolitical position … For us this is not a fight to achieve some geopolitical status. For us, it is about a fight for the survival of Russian statehood, because our adversary or, as I referred to them previously, our partners, have one goal … which is to destabilize us and pull our country apart.”
- “[O]nly when the adversary sees that our society is strong, composed and consolidated, then, without a doubt, what we are striving for and what you mentioned, success and victory, will come to pass in each of the areas that we are working in today.”
- “It is clear that Russia completed an extremely important stage in its development last year. This may be our most important achievement of 2022. What does this mean? We have increased our economic sovereignty several times over.”
- “Kennan came to essentially agree with the journalist Walter Lippman, his most incisive critic of the time, that he had exaggerated the extent of the Soviet threat and helped to empower paranoia, militarism and ideological hysteria within the U.S. Lippman argued that Kennan had both ruled out the possibility of compromise with Moscow and committed America to go to war to resist Soviet influence in regions that were of no real interest to the U.S.”
- “If Kennan were still alive today, he might write a new version of his long telegram, modified by Lippman’s critique and by his own regrets. In such a vision, Russia would be contained; the pursuit of total victory would be eschewed as both unnecessary and monstrously dangerous; and every opportunity for reasonable compromise would be seized.”
“The Return of the Strategic Arctic,” Belfer Center’s Steven Miller, Arctic Yearbook, March 2023.
- “The world is changing again and the Arctic seems to be emerging once more as an important arena of strategic competition between the nuclear-armed rivals. The confluence of five considerations makes it likely that the strategic Arctic will reappear in a way that leads to the further securitization of the region.”
- “The broadest and most obvious factor in changing the character of the Arctic is the dramatic deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow and indeed between Russia and the West.”
- “Second, the Ukraine war has dramatically elevated concerns about nuclear deterrence and about possible use of nuclear weapons.”
- “Third, reinforcing the previous point, U.S. nuclear doctrine has displayed a striking continuity in pursuing counterforce strategies that aim to give Washington ability to degrade Russian nuclear forces and thereby limit damage to the United States in the event of nuclear conflict.”
- “Fourth, nuclear modernization is likely to exacerbate these trends.”
- “Fifth, all of this is playing out in a strategic context in which arms control has largely collapsed.”
- “Fueled by guns, gold and social media, the rivalry between Russia and the West in Africa is rapidly escalating. The latest flashpoint is Chad, a sprawling desert nation at the crossroads of the continent, now a plum target for Russia’s expanding effort.”
- “The United States recently warned Chad’s president that Russian mercenaries were plotting to kill him and three senior aides and that Moscow was backing Chadian rebels massing in the neighboring Central African Republic. At the same time, Moscow is courting sympathizers inside Chad’s ruling elite, including cabinet ministers and a half brother of the president.”
- “The decision by the U.S. government to share sensitive intelligence with the head of an African state—a disclosure it then leaked—reveals one way in which the Biden administration is moving more assertively in Africa and using new tactics to stymie Russian gains on the continent.”
- “To many in Africa and beyond, the heightening great-power rivalry smacks of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union backed rival African leaders, including dictators.”
- “For their part, African leaders have made it clear that they do not want to be forced to choose sides. ‘Africa has suffered enough from the burden of history,’ Macky Sall, the African Union chairman, told the U.N. General Assembly in September. ‘It does not want to be the breeding ground of a new Cold War.’”
- “For months, U.S. and European officials have cast the conflict in Ukraine in stark moral terms. If Putin can succeed with a war of aggression across his borders, the argument has gone, then a dark agenda of territorial conquest and might making right wins out. President Biden has framed the contest as a clash between ‘all democracies’ and Putin's authoritarian project. Last November, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin described the collective efforts of Ukraine's Western allies as a reflection of ‘how much countries around the world value and respect the rules-based international order.’”
- “The legacy of Iraq undermines this rhetoric. For many people in the Middle East and elsewhere in the global South, the U.S. invasion is the most glaring recent episode in a long history of Western meddling and U.S. hypocrisy on the world stage. For officials in China and Russia, de facto adversaries of the United States, the Iraq War is an easy precedent to put forward to shoot down Washington's talking points, no matter how self-serving and cynical that may be.”
- “‘No one in the Biden administration today cares that [the Iraq War] ruined what credibility America had as a pillar of international order in the global south and gave Putin cover for his own atrocity,’ wrote Juan Cole, a historian of the Middle East at the University of Michigan. ‘Who remembers anymore that, in 2003, we were Vladimir Putin?’”
- “‘Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a criminal act of great recklessness. So too was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,’ wrote Andrew Bacevich, chairman of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, this week. ‘Biden appears to believe that the Ukraine war provides a venue whereby the United States can overcome the legacy of Iraq, enabling him to make good on his repeated assertion that 'America is back.'’”
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- "China and Russia are the largest of neighbors, strategic partners [engaged in] comprehensive cooperation… [B]ilateral cooperation … is entering a new era. … China and Russia adhere to the concept of eternal friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation."
- "My visit to Russia is aimed at strengthening friendship, cooperation and peace. I am ready, together with President Vladimir Putin, to outline new plans and measures for the sake of opening up new prospects for China-Russia relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation."
- "On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the [Russia-China Friendship] Treaty, President V.V. Putin and I have decided to extend it and fill the agreement with new content, taking into account the new realities of the time."
- "China and Russia firmly uphold the U.N.-centric international system and world order based on international law. … The international community is well aware that no country in the world is superior to others. There is no universal model of government and there is no world order where the decisive word belongs to an individual country… Multipolarity, economic globalization and democratization of international relations constitute an irreversible trend."
- "Since the beginning of last year, we have seen an all-encompassing aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis. … China has always taken an objective and impartial position and has made active efforts to promote reconciliation and peace negotiations. … [It is necessary] to abide by … the U.N. Charter, respect the legitimate security concerns of all states, support all efforts toward a peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian crisis and ensure the stability of global production and supply chains."
- "'China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis' … reflects the unity of the world community's views on overcoming the Ukrainian crisis. … We are convinced that a rational way out of the Ukrainian crisis and a path to lasting peace and universal security in the world can be found if everyone is guided by the concept of common, comprehensive, joint and sustainable security, and continue dialogue and consultations in an equitable, prudent and pragmatic manner."
- "Russia-China relations have reached the highest level in their history and are gaining even more strength; they surpass Cold War-time military-political alliances in their quality, with no one to constantly order and no one to constantly obey, without limitations or taboos. We have reached an unprecedented level of trust in our political dialogue; our strategic cooperation has become truly comprehensive in nature and is standing on the brink of a new era. … Unlike some countries claiming hegemony and bringing discord to the global harmony, Russia and China are literally and figuratively building bridges."
- "Our countries, together with like-minded actors, have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain 'rules' serving the needs of the 'golden billion.' Russia and China have consistently worked to create an equitable, open and inclusive regional and global security system that is not directed against third countries. In this regard, we note the constructive role of China's Global Security Initiative, which is in line with the Russian approaches."
- "The U.S.'s policy of simultaneously deterring Russia and China … is getting ever more fierce and aggressive. The international security and cooperation architecture is being dismantled. Russia has been labelled an 'immediate threat' and China a 'strategic competitor.'"
- "We appreciate … [China's] well-balanced stance on … Ukraine… We welcome China's readiness to make a meaningful contribution to the settlement of the crisis. … [W]e advocate for … strict compliance with the U.N. Charter, [and] respect for the norms of international law, including humanitarian law. We are committed to the principle of the indivisibility of security, which is being grossly violated by the NATO bloc. We are deeply concerned over … dangerous actions that jeopardize nuclear security. We reject illegitimate unilateral sanctions, which must be lifted."
- "Russia is open to the political … resolution of the Ukraine crisis. It was not Russia who broke off the peace talks back in April 2022. The future of the peace process depends solely on the will to engage in a meaningful discussion taking into account current geopolitical realities. Unfortunately, the ultimatum nature of requirements placed on Russia shows that their authors are detached from these realities."
- "The crisis in Ukraine, which was provoked and is being … fueled by the West, is the most striking, yet not the only, manifestation of its desire to retain its international dominance… NATO is striving for a global reach … and seeking to penetrate the Asia-Pacific. It [is] obvious that there are forces persistently working to split the common Eurasian space into a network of 'exclusive clubs' and military blocs that would … contain our countries' development and harm their interests. This won't work."
- "Russia-China … provide an example of harmonious and constructive cooperation between major powers."
- "Xi has attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to present China as a neutral mediator in the war, issuing a roundly dismissed 12-point position paper as a supposed basis for peace talks. He may try to balance his summit with Putin by holding an unprecedented virtual meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shortly after his visit to Moscow. The chances of pulling off this diplomatic high-wire act, however, seem slim."
- "As Putin is eager to pull Xi even closer to his side, the Russian leader will undoubtedly play up China’s support well beyond what his counterpart may intend. Sensitive conversations between the two sides may be leaked to reveal new Chinese pledges of economic—or even military—support for Russia."
- "Even a virtual meeting with Zelensky could easily go off script. The Ukrainian leader could push Xi to take an unambiguous stand on the war."
- "Yet, focusing on the enormous baggage Xi brings with him to Moscow and the apparent futility of trying to present China as a neutral actor in the war overlooks other possible strategic calculations behind his visit. As demonstrated by its role in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia earlier this month, China still maintains a capacity for diplomatic sophistication and dexterity—one that the West underestimates at its peril."
- "Like some Western analysts, Chinese leaders may see an armistice similar to the one that ended the Korean War in 1953 as the most probable, and even desirable, outcome of the war in Ukraine. A stalemated war with two exhausted belligerents could give China an outsized role at the negotiation table. Xi’s biggest liability today—close ties to Putin—might then be an asset used to shepherd an armistice agreement to fruition."
"The real meaning of Xi’s visit to Putin,” foreign affairs commentator Gideon Rachman, FT, 03.20.23.
- "The current Chinese 'peace plan' says nothing about Russian withdrawal from occupied Ukrainian land. If Xi proposes a ceasefire in the war, the Russians can safely feign enthusiasm—knowing that Ukraine will reject the idea while their lands are occupied. Even if a ceasefire was declared, Russia could always violate it—as it has in the past."
- "For Xi, however, it is useful to present China as a pragmatic peacemaker—interested, above all, in trade and shared prosperity. America, by contrast, is portrayed by China as an ideological warmonger, dividing the world into friends and enemies—and fixated on preserving its own hegemony. That narrative helps China in the battle for opinion in the 'global south'—and it worries the Americans. But behind the talk of peace, the substance of the Xi-Putin summit will push in the opposite direction—since it will involve increased Chinese support for Russia, as it wages a war of aggression. Alexander Gabuev, one of Russia’s leading China watchers, now in exile, comments: 'Make no mistake: The trip will be about deepening ties to Russia that benefit Beijing, not about any real peace brokering.'”
- "The really sensitive question will be Putin’s requests for Chinese weapons—in particular artillery shells and missiles to make up for the shortages that are undermining Russia’s war effort. The U.S. warned last month that China was considering making this move. Whatever Putin and Xi agree is likely to remain a closely guarded secret."
- "The pictures of Xi and Putin together in Moscow will send a clear message. Russia and China remain close partners—linked by their joint hostility to America and its allies."
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms:
- "As an alternative to bringing China into existing bilateral treaties, we propose a new strategic framework that would broaden participation in arms control and provide mechanisms to include all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the P-5), with China, Britain and France joining the United States and Russia in a future accord. Let the brainstorming about the best name for such an accord begin—but one starting point might be to call it 'All START,' to underscore that it would include all states that legitimately possess nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, it could eventually even include Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea."
- "To achieve its inclusive purpose, All START would de-emphasize quantitative arms limits without jettisoning them entirely. Limits on nuclear warheads and delivery devices, like those obtained under New START, would remain in place for Russia and the United States. The remaining countries would submit information on their own plans for nuclear arsenal modernization and nuclear force deployments. But in the new format, the main obligations of China, the UK and France would be to accept the transparency and monitoring provisions that are at the heart of modern strategic arms control—and that remain useful even in an era when numerical limitations may now make less sense for many reasons."
- "Given the state of great-power relations today, this kind of accord may well not prove negotiable for some time. However, in light of the current eroded state of the international arms control architecture, we are already overdue for a conceptual debate about how to think about the future of arms control once that is again possible. Perhaps Putin has just reminded us to get on with it."
- "[Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty] worsens the already dim prospects for retaining nuclear arms control past 2026 when New START expires."
- "Moscow's decision points to a fork in the road for U.S. policymakers wishing to prevent nuclear war: Either the United States and Russia will manage to continue using arms control as a tool of national security and deterrence, as we have for the past six decades, or we need to start planning for a world without it."
- "The prudent choice is to prepare for both scenarios—through continued pressure on Moscow to resume dialogue, but also through investment in a resilient deterrence strategy and capabilities that leverage commercial innovation and increase strategic stability. Success in achieving these objectives will require bipartisan support in Washington."
- " As frictions around New START have ramped up over the past year, the messages from Washington and Moscow have sounded very different: While the United States has emphasized New START compliance and the need to reduce nuclear risk and maintain dialogue, Russia has suggested that progress on New START will depend on obtaining concessions in the war in Ukraine. This has precluded any progress on nuclear arms control."
- " It is not yet clear whether the Russian linkage of New START to Ukraine is a short-term tactic (and bluff) or reflects Russian leaders' view that geopolitical circumstances are changing so drastically that nuclear arms control is no longer valuable as a key element of strategic stability. The latter option would signify that Moscow may now be willing to abandon nuclear arms control as a risk-reduction tool and that the understanding of strategic stability long shared by the two nuclear superpowers is starting to diverge. Understanding this is crucial for strategic deterrence policy."
- "Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent decision to suspend Russia’s participation in the New START pact on nuclear weapons could be a blessing. If it prompts the United States to acknowledge that the bipolar world of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms agreements is a thing of the past, and that China must now be reckoned with as a third major nuclear power, then Putin will have done the United States a favor."
- "By addressing only strategic and not tactical nuclear weapons, the treaty effectively ratified a huge existing Russian advantage. New technologies—such as hypersonic missiles—have rendered it obsolete. … These flaws, however, pale before the emerging tripolar nuclear world’s complexities. China clearly understands this reality, and no doubt that is why it has refused to join any negotiations over a New START successor. … [F]acing two major nuclear adversaries, the United States must urgently recalibrate its warhead and delivery-system requirements in multiple, new, uncharted scenarios."
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security/AI:
- "A game designed to answer a question—who would win a war over Taiwan? How would American support for Ukraine affect the war?—needs five qualities. It needs to be believable, it needs the right players with the correct expertise and demographics and there must be enough players and game iterations to come to realistic conclusions. The best war games control for bias within their scenarios and rules. Good data collection is vital."
- "The lesson is that we shouldn’t draw too much certainty from any one game and should instead look for insights across multiple games. The U.S. think tanks’ games suggested there would be no clear winner in a Taiwan fight. That fits with other analysis. However, variables such as individual leadership styles, weapons capabilities or campaign choices can lead to different results."
- "Remember that even the best games are not predictions of the future. A recent series I ran over three years with 580 players found that cyber threats to nuclear weapons arsenals did not lead to nuclear escalation. However, it revealed that the games which did go nuclear always occurred when I gave players cyber weapons that could target nuclear command and control. These weapons were all the more dangerous in the hands of those with limited experience in nuclear strategy. The power of this game series, therefore, was what it revealed about when and why things went awry."
Energy exports from CIS:
- "Modern war—or at least modern war as fought in and around Ukraine—doesn’t have any exemptions for civilian infrastructure. Belligerents who can get away with destroying it, be they state or non-state actors, will do so. That’s why it’s important to go beyond cui prodest discussions and vague trails and establish what really happened in September 2022, near the Danish island of Bornholm."
- "That should provide pointers on other potential targets and perhaps suggest methods of safeguarding them. If a non-government actor blew up the Russian pipelines, it’s an uncomfortable thought that extremely sensitive infrastructure is relatively easy to destroy; if a government did it, defending against such attacks should be a national security priority for every country that relies on undersea cables or pipelines."
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- No significant developments.
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “Russia’s hubristic ‘special military operation’ to denazify Ukraine floundered on contact with real Ukrainians, who turned out to be very different from those constructed in the Kremlin’s mythomaniac minds. Russia found in Ukraine a nation where it believed there was not one. And yet recognizing this would have a deeply destabilizing impact on official conceptions of Russia’s identity. It would ultimately require rewriting Russian history and national identity from scratch—which is exactly what Putin is fighting against. In fighting to impose its memory on Ukraine, Russia is risking not only its future but also its past. Unfortunately, this could make for a long war.”
- “A year into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian elites … have been unable to muster any enthusiasm for the ‘special military operation.’ ... Hardly anyone genuinely shares President Vladimir Putin’s goals in starting this war. Many of those in the so-called ‘party of war’ are politicians who saw the war as a career elevator. Those in the ‘party of peace,’ on the other hand, are focused on minimizing the consequences of war for Russian society, while senior managers continue to adapt their enterprises to the new reality and try not to follow the news too closely.”
- “The vacuum left for the elites by the real Putin has been filled by the ‘collective Putin’: a small group of his representatives who claim to have an understanding of the president’s wishes and intentions. Those people have given no indication when the war might end, but have one simple message: ‘You’re either with us or against us.’”
- “Putin’s assurances that people who don’t agree with the war will not be persecuted are not enough to calm the elite’s fears of a likely wave of repression. Both business circles and officials expect that 2023 will see the start of the exposure of ‘disloyal’ people and demonstrative punishments.”
- “The absence of any mechanism for getting sanctions lifted, or even any dialogue on this issue, means the Russian elite has no choice but to hunker down in Russia.”
- “The Russian elites are completely atomized. They are not yet ready to come together to generate a vision for the future. Nor do they want to lose their assets, freedom or their lives. Given the long line of mysterious deaths of senior managers at Russian state companies and their close relatives—both in Russia and abroad—that last threat no longer looks so outlandish.”
“Putin’s War on Young People,” Lucian Kim of the Wilson Center, FP, 03.19.23.
- “Putin’s war has become a trap for young Russians who oppose it. Fleeing the country is not a realistic option for most people, and active resistance is futile and dangerous.”
- “Nobody can say what will come after Putin. Much depends on how he loses power—whether his departure comes as a natural death, a chaotic collapse or a palace coup behind the Kremlin walls. It is possible, even probable, that another aging former KGB officer will take over at first. But sooner or later, there will be a change of generations.”
- “When Putin goes, there will be no Putinism to outlive him. There is no ideology, like communism, nor a political structure, like the Communist Party, to carry on his life mission of piecing together a broken empire. Putin has exploited lingering nostalgia for the Soviet Union for his lost cause, but he offers no vision of a future that young Russians are supposed to fight and die for.”
- “When a new generation of Russians comes to power, the challenges they face will be monumental, from making peace with Ukrainians to taming the destructive forces Putin unleashed to fight his forever war against the West. The ‘new Russians’ I discovered in the years before Putin’s invasion have not disappeared. Although they do not make up a majority now, these young people are the world’s best hope that Russia can change for the better.”
“Russia's population crisis is making Putin more dangerous,” columnist Max Boot, WP, 03.14.23.
- “Russia's population peaked in 1993 at 148.6 million. At the start of 2022, it was estimated at 145.6 million. That's a decline of only 2%, but, by way of comparison, the U.S. population grew 33% from 1990 to 2020.”
- “Putin has tried in vain all the normal ways to reverse the trend, from offering financial incentives for citizens to have more children to trying to lure immigrants from Central Asia. His invasion of Ukraine can be seen as a desperate gambit to increase the Russian population at gunpoint.”
- “There's little hope that Russia's demographic woes will curtail the threat it poses anytime soon. If anything, Putin's awareness of the ‘demographic doom loop’ makes him more desperate and more dangerous.”
- “Soviet historical precedents show that after the departure of autocrats—first Stalin and later the ‘sequence of state funerals’ featuring Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko—liberalization began in the country. Intra-elite struggle did take place but subsided rather quickly.”
- “After Putin’s departure, events could develop on a similar pattern too. The struggle for power should not lead to chaos or moreover the collapse of Russia, owing to the heavy dependence of the regions on the federal budget. Anyone who in the Putin era seemed to be a loyal ally will immediately take steps toward opening Russia back up, liberalizing the economy and gradually democratizing politics. The reason is the serious resource depletion that is taking place before our eyes. By resources I mean not only what is material and monetizable, but also the moral and psychological fatigue of society.”
- “Last month, Foreign Policy published a piece by Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, formerly of Moscow, attacking the rabbis and Jewish community leaders represented by the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR). Having chosen to abandon his own Moscow congregation, Goldschmidt appears to be besmirching the rabbis of Russia who’ve committed to remaining at their posts, even, or especially, during these difficult times.”
- “Today, more than 200 Chabad rabbis—the vast majority of the country’s Jewish religious leaders—live and work throughout Russia under the auspices of FEOR, Russia’s largest Jewish umbrella organization. Drawing inspiration from their heroic communist-era Hasidic predecessors—who under incomparably worse circumstances were nearly alone in dedicating, and (at times) sacrificing, their lives for the preservation of Jewish life in the Soviet Union—these rabbis vow to remain with their communities from Moscow to Birobidzhan.”
- “Russian Chief Rabbi Berel Lazar has loudly and publicly called for the immediate cessation of bloodshed in Ukraine. ‘Every day we receive information from our brethren, from rabbis in Ukraine, that blood is being spilled, that people are dying—including children!’ Lazar said from Russia on March 2, 2022. ‘We feel the pain of our brothers, no matter what faith they belong to. The current situation cannot be allowed to continue; no believer should, nor can they, reconcile themselves with this.’”
“Why Bad Things Happen to Bad Leaders,” columnist Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 03.15.23.
- “After 24 years in charge, [Putin] knows that a leader like him—who has stolen as much money as he has—could never trust any successor to let him peacefully retire to his reported $1 billion mansion on the Black Sea. (His official salary is $140,000 a year.) He knows that to live or to at least live freely, he must remain president for life. So, Putin's two greatest innovations have been poison underwear and poison-tipped umbrellas to dispense with perceived enemies.”
- “Putin can afford a long war of attrition in Ukraine, where he never has to admit he was mistaken. He has huge margins for his errors. ... Russia can survive a leader who plays Russian roulette.”
“A win for the dream of a free Russia,” Editorial Board, WP, 03.13.23.
- “The film ‘Navalny,’ awarded best documentary feature film at the Academy Awards on Sunday, is not being screened at maximum security penal colony No. 6 east of Moscow where its star, Alexei Navalny, sits in solitary confinement.”
- “It appears unlikely Russia will return to the democratic path it began in 1990s. Much will depend on the war's outcome. Hopefully, Ukraine will become a thriving, open European society. But we agree with Mr. Navalny that postwar Russia must escape Mr. Putin's grip and the oppressive autocracy he has imposed.”
Defense and aerospace:
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant developments.
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- “For the past decade, Georgia has been under the de facto rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire oligarch and founder of Georgian Dream. An authoritative summary of his career can be found in this essay by Régis Genté for the European Council on Foreign Relations think-tank.”
- “As Genté explains, Ivanishvili is an ambiguous figure, neither wholeheartedly pro-Russian nor incorrigibly anti-Western. A year ago, Georgia’s government condemned Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. It also applied last year for EU membership—but, unlike Moldova and Ukraine, was told to wait until it reversed its democratic backsliding.”
- “Still, it is significant that Ivanishvili has almost never come under criticism from the state-controlled Russian media. He made his fortune in the chaotic, corrupt Russian capitalism of the 1990s. Under his influence, Georgia has avoided joining Western governments in imposing economic sanctions on Russia for its attack on Ukraine.”
- “Georgian democracy has undeniably gone backwards under Ivanishvili ... He controls the ruling party, security services, judiciary and much of the economy.”
- “There are important lessons to be drawn from this history [of post-Soviet Georgia].”
- “First, the unsettled questions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia kept alive Georgian nationalism in a form that disrupted the young state’s path toward democracy and the rule of law.”
- “Second, no matter how strong the pro-Western inclinations of Georgian society, any prospect of joining the EU or NATO will require much greater evidence of mutual tolerance and respect for the law among political actors.”
- “Lastly, all these shortcomings have given Russia not only a foothold in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the opportunity to keep meddling in Georgian public life as a whole.”
Footnotes
- Summary was machine-translated from Russian, then edited by RM staff.
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