Russia Analytical Report, March 12-19, 2018
This Week’s Highlights:
- The Russian presidential election was a fake one, but it still demonstrated that a majority of Russians accept the rules imposed on them by Putin, according to Leonid Bershidsky. In his new term, Putin might develop an interest in intensifying the conflict with the West, according to analysts cited by The Washington Post. It is Putin’s assertive foreign policies that make him so popular among Russian voters, according to Elena Chernenko. Putin will have to balance his geopolitical agenda with the pressing need to fight poverty and income inequality and improve healthcare and education, former Kremlin official Konstantin Kostin told Financial Times.
- While Americans have every reason to be angry about Russian election interference, argues Stephen Walt, it is also important to recognize that Washington has repeatedly interfered in the politics of other countries and used overt and covert methods to dispatch governments it didn’t like. He also points out that Russia’s actions were possible only because Americans had already allowed their democratic institutions to be corrupted. Benjamin Haddad holds a similar view, arguing that Western “establishment politicians have preferred to rely on a politically convenient narrative to explain away the populist explosion: Russian interference.”
- David Ignatius writes that Putin's aggressive use of covert action to settle scores hit an international tripwire after the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter.
- Barring a simultaneous U.S. attack against both, Russia and China will not form a military bloc, writes Dmitri Trenin. The current formula of their relationship—'never against each other, but not necessarily always with each other’—suits them well.
- Increased Western aid to Donbass may slowly sway public opinion in eastern Ukraine, argues Balázs Jarábik. But the fear in Kiev is that Moscow may be serious about peacekeepers and leaving Donbass, where Ukraine has been pursuing a “creeping offensive,” having advanced 10 kilometers in 2017. Neither the Barrett M107A1 sniper rifles nor the Javelin anti-tank missiles will be able to challenge the prevailing artillery, electronic warfare, command and control or aerial superiority (manifested through drones) of the Russia-backed rebel forces, according to Jarábik. The 210 Javelin missiles authorized by the U.S. State Department is enough to provide a momentary tactical advantage, but the number is insufficient to tilt the balance of power, writes Daniel L. Davis.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant commentary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
“I Knew the Cold War. This Is No Cold War. Everyone's favorite historical analogy makes for disastrous foreign policy today.” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 03.12.18: The author, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes: “Viewing today’s troubles as a new Cold War downplays the role that human agency and bad policy decisions have played … . what is happening today is a very different animal … the world today is not bipolar … today the United States is vastly stronger on nearly every dimension that matters … there is no serious ideological rivalry … .” Instead of the global competition of the past, “the geopolitical issues that divide the United States and Russia today are confined to areas close to Russia’s borders … . But wait: What about those dastardly Russian attempts to manipulate the 2016 U.S. election, and to sow discord and disunity … ?” While “Americans have every reason to be angry … our moral outrage ought to be tempered just a bit by the recognition that Washington has repeatedly interfered in other countries’ politics and used both overt and covert means to dispatch of governments we didn’t like. … there are hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who lost their lives because of our well-intentioned efforts to ‘liberate’ them. … Russia’s various activities were possible only because Americans had already allowed our democratic institutions to be seriously corrupted long before Moscow got involved. … Lastly, thinking of the current conflict … as a new Cold War … distracts us from the far more serious challenge we face from a rising China. … we would do better to think seriously about the missteps and blunders that have brought the United States and Russia to the present impasse, and look for creative new ways to unwind them.”
“Five Myths About Espionage,” Mark Kramer, The Washington Post, 03.18.18: The author, director of Cold War studies at Harvard University and a senior fellow at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, writes: “The poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter … highlights the role of espionage in Russia's relations with the West. … Myth No. 1: Espionage increases tensions between hostile states. … Even when a spy scandal leads a government to expel another's diplomats … , the furor usually subsides quickly … . Myth No. 2: This assassination attempt will make Russia a pariah. … previous Russian attacks in Britain have not had significant consequences for the Kremlin. … Myth No. 3: Spies betray their country mostly for money. … it was a factor in only 28 percent of the known cases of Americans who spied for foreign countries from 1990 through 2015. Myth No. 4: Concerns about Soviet spies in the 1940s were overblown. … declassified materials from the former Soviet intelligence archives reveal that hundreds of U.S. citizens, including some high-ranking officials like Hiss, who had been a senior State Department aide, worked for Stalin's intelligence agencies. … Myth No. 5: Espionage mostly aims to sway the policies of hostile powers. … the dominant purpose of intelligence agencies is to gather information about foreign countries, especially hostile ones.”
“Russia Has a Long History of Eliminating 'Enemies of the State': The nerve-agent attack on Sergei Skripal is a throwback to earlier KGB measures,” Calder Walton, The Washington Post, 03.13.18: The author, an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School, writes: “The Kremlin has a long tradition … of eliminating political ‘dissidents’ at home and abroad … to send messages to other political opponents. … At the outbreak of World War II, Stalin saw eliminating Trotsky as a higher priority for the NKVD than collecting intelligence on Adolf Hitler's Germany. … The NKVD also experimented with elaborate methods of killing ‘enemies of the people’ … . In the 1930s, it established a sophisticated medical section, the Kamera, which developed lethal toxins. One of its inventions was a gel that induced a heart attack when rubbed on a victim's skin. … In 1961, a KGB assassin, Bogdan Stashinsky, defected to the West, revealing his Kremlin-sanctioned missions to kill traitors using a poisoned gun. In 1978 … the KGB's technical department devised … an umbrella capable of firing a poisoned pellet … . As [Bulgarian emigre playwright, Georgi] Markov walked across London's Waterloo Bridge, an assailant stabbed him with the lethal umbrella, implanting a pellet laced with ricin. Markov died an agonizing death four days later. … It is unsurprising that the Kremlin should undertake killings in the KGB's manner, given Putin's former KGB career. Russia's current intelligence services … have expressly embraced the KGB's Cold War methods. … A likely motivation, in this case, is revenge for Skripal’s espionage for MI6. … it would not be surprising if the nerve agent is the latest example of this horrific tradition.”
“We Must Stand Against Russia,” Boris Johnson, The Washington Post, 03.15.18: The author, the British foreign secretary, writes: “If the Russian state is prepared to deploy a banned weapon in a British city—amounting to the unlawful use of force against the United Kingdom—then the Kremlin is clearly willing to act without restraint. … I interpret this incident as part of a pattern of reckless behavior by President Vladimir Putin. The common thread that joins the poisonings in Salisbury with the annexation of Crimea, the cyberattacks in Ukraine, the hacking of Germany's Parliament and Russian interference in foreign elections is the Kremlin's reckless defiance of essential international rules. Most tellingly of all, Russia has made immense efforts to conceal the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria. … In its blatant Russian-ness, the nerve agent [Novichok] sends a signal to all who may be thinking of dissent in the intensifying repression of Putin's Russia. The message is clear: We will find you, we will catch you, we will kill you—and though we will deny it with lip-curling scorn, the world will know beyond doubt that Russia did it. … All responsible nations share an obligation to take a principled stance against this behavior.”
“Putin Has Finally Gone Too Far,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 03.16.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes: “Putin's aggressive use of covert action to settle scores hit an international tripwire after the poisoning of a former Russian spy and his daughter … . So how can the United States and its closest allies alter Putin's behavior, if they're truly serious about holding Russia to account? The answer … is to use America's network of alliances to put Russia under strain. Putin has been playing a weak hand well, but the high cards remain in Western hands. Russia's greatest vulnerability is its dependence on sales of oil and gas. Here, the United States is uniquely positioned for payback. … Russia's outrageous behavior in Syria should be on the table, too. … Russia has been getting a pass for the Syria carnage, thanks partly to its manipulation of Turkey and its quiet liaison with Israel. … If the United States is serious about altering Russian behavior, it must organize a new coalition of the willing. For NATO allies and Israel, participation should be mandatory. … By his reckless actions, Putin has sharply raised the price of his admission to the club he needs to join if his dreams of a revived Russia aren't come crashing down around him.”
“Answering Moscow’s Implausible Deniability: An isolated Britain should muster old allies if Putin is to be deterred,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 03.16.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “The macabre episode [of Sergei Skripal’s poisoning] sends a warning to exiled Russians deemed traitors or enemies of President Vladimir Putin: they will never be safe—anywhere. … It also displays a disdain for the U.K. and its laws, contempt reinforced by the sarcastic tenor of Moscow’s subsequent denials. … Britain could and should go further in its response than Mrs. May proposed. … several European countries have shown signs of wavering on the continued imposition of sanctions imposed on Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea. To stiffen their resolve, the U.K. must first provide its allies with incontrovertible evidence that Moscow was responsible for this latest crime. Europe and the U.S. should act as one in response.”
“Vladimir Putin's Toxic Reach,” Editorial Board, New York Times, 03.12.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “Asked during his annual give-and-take with reporters in 2010 how he would treat treason, Mr. Putin, a former KGB agent, replied: 'Traitors will kick the bucket, trust me. These people betrayed their friends, their brothers in arms. Whatever they got in exchange for it, those 30 pieces of silver they were given, they will choke on them.' … If Russia's message is that no 'traitor' is safe anywhere, it should be in the interest of every nation to send an indelible message to Mr. Putin that he cannot deploy his weapons of war anywhere he wants.”
“Russia's Been Waging War on the West for Years, We Just Haven’t Noticed,” Max Boot, The Washington Post, 03.16.18: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes: “Russia has been waging war on the West for at least 10 years, and the West hasn't bothered to notice. … The war arguably began in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia … . Rather than punishing Vladimir Putin for his aggression, the Obama administration later responded with a ‘reset’ of relations. … Putin has little reason to fear retribution because he has suffered so little to date. … What would the West do if it were to get serious about Russian aggression? Putin and his cronies have billions of dollars stashed in the West. … Freeze the money. Seize the properties. Hurt them where it counts. The United States can also designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism, just like North Korea, which also used a nerve agent for an assassination abroad. … Putin has already been kicked out of the Group of 8 gatherings; he can be removed from the G-20, too. Kick Russia out of the SWIFT system … . Invoke NATO's Article 5 collective-defense clause. There is a rich menu of retaliatory options—none of which would risk a nuclear war in spite of Putin's saber- rattling.”
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant commentary.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary.
Cyber security:
“Why Russian Hackers Aren't Poised to Plunge the United States Into Darkness,” Philip Bump, The Washington Post, 03.16.18: The author, national correspondent for the news outlet, writes: “Since at least March 2016 … Russian hackers have ‘targeted U.S. government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and critical manufacturing sectors.’ … Homeland Security released an extensive alert documenting the tools used by the hackers in their efforts … . The natural question that emerges is how serious this hacking actually is. The idea of Russian hackers having access to the control switches of America's power infrastructure is particularly unnerving … . Several experts … explained that this is not only oversimplistic but that it is almost certainly impossible. The effects of infiltration of America's power grid would be much more geographically limited thanks to the distributed, redundant nature of the system. In fact, it's more than a little like another alert issued by the government about Russian infiltration efforts: the one on Oct. 7, 2016, warning about Russian efforts to tamper with state voting systems.”
Elections interference:
“'Blame Russia' Is Getting Old,” Benjamin Haddad, The Wall Street Journal, 03.14.18: The author, a research fellow at the Hudson Institute, writes that “voters around the world have been expressing their deep dissatisfaction with political elites. Yet establishment politicians have preferred to rely on a politically convenient narrative to explain away the populist explosion: Russian interference. … Take Italy. Two euroskeptic movements, 5 Star and Northern League, made a strong showing in the general election earlier this month. … ‘Italy joins long list of elections influenced by Russia,’ tweeted Samantha Power, President Obama's U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. … Russian bots supposedly were behind the Brexit campaign, America's #ReleaseTheMemo hashtag and the Catalan independence movement. That's not to mention the credit Russia is given for all the racial tension in the U.S. and the political clashes that follow school shootings … . It seems income stagnation, unbridled immigration, economic inequality, automation and the opioid crisis don't influence voters as much as a few poorly produced memes. … In France, Emmanuel Macron managed to fend off a populist opponent who rode a wave of fake news peddled by Russian-backed hackers. He did it by offering French voters meaningful economic reforms and a narrative of change. Elites in other Western countries ought to do the same.”
“The Rise of Euro-Putinism,” Bret Stephens, New York Times, 03.16.18: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes: “Vladimir Putin will be re-elected to a fourth presidential term in Sunday’s sham ballot. The larger question is what other elections can Putin win in the coming years. He’s on a roll. … The big winners in Italy’s election this month … are highly sympathetic to Putin. Austria’s young new chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, governs in coalition with the far-right Freedom Party, which in 2016 signed a contract with Putin’s puppet political party, United Russia … . German elections in September saw gains for the far-left Left Party and the far-right Alternative for Germany. Both are popular with pro-Putin voters. The list continues … . The deeper reason Putin seduces is that he believes in the principle of power. … The uses of his power are mainly wicked. But wickedness, at least, is a quality, particularly when it is wedded to political efficacy, personal forcefulness and the appearance of great cunning. Compare that to the last decade or so of European leaders … . What did any of them stand for? What in their personalities was anything other than feckless and pallid? Who among them would pull a trigger for their country’s preservation—or even for their own? ... Vladimir Putin is a criminal president who poses a clear and present danger to democratic society. But … he’s exciting in the way of a tiger pouncing on prey. So long as he’s allowed to pounce he’ll continue to win new admirers and future elections, not just his own.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Tillerson Refused to Do Another Russia Deal. The former Exxon chief knew how to negotiate with Putin, but chose not to deploy that skill as secretary of state,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.13.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “In little more than a year as secretary of state, he [Rex Tillerson] proved incapable of the deal-making magic his boss sought at the beginning of his administration. … Tillerson, who had had deep doubts about Russia's business climate, made his huge deal with Rosneft by going directly to Putin and building a relationship. … But starting from his confirmation hearing, Tillerson showed that his opening bid in any negotiations would be far less accommodating toward the Kremlin than it was at Exxon Mobil. … Tillerson knew how to negotiate with Putin and his inner circle, but chose not to demonstrate that skill as secretary of state. He must have made up his mind early on that he wouldn't be smeared along with Trump by the unfolding Russia scandal. … [In] the attempted poisoning of … Sergei Skripal in the U.K., Tillerson hastened to put the blame on Russia, echoing and even somewhat amplifying the assessment of U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May. … It's not that Tillerson's replacement, Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo, will be any softer on Russia.”
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
"Putin's Pivot: 4 New Features of Russian Foreign Policy," Daniel Treisman, Russia Matters, 03.14.18: The author, a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, writes that "the Crimean operation introduced a new style in Russia’s international behavior that has persisted. Four key features characterize the current approach: risk taking, neglect of exit strategies, outsourcing and saber rattling. ... As he sent commandos to occupy Crimea in 2014, Putin seemed almost to relish the prospect of military confrontation with the West. ... Had the operation gone wrong ... Russia’s international image would have suffered serious damage. ... Some reports suggest he [Putin] had ignored the doubts of aides before ordering the intervention. ... Subsequent actions show the same penchant for gambling. ... Intervening in Syria was another roll of the dice. ... Since 2014, Russia has plunged into a series of situations with inadequate preparation and no clear exit strategy. ... Crimea ... also showed off the Kremlin’s increasing use of non-state groups and contractors. ... Using unofficial actors aims to conceal Russia’s responsibility and circumvent bottlenecks and bureaucratic obstruction. However, it muddles lines of command and creates problems when such actors prove incompetent or go rogue. ... This new approach ... has done better than might have been expected. Since 2015, Putin has suffered no huge disaster and enjoyed notable successes. ... However ... It offers little hope of progress on the most important goal—boosting Russia’s economic performance—and it requires considerable luck and juggling skill. ... there is no guarantee that this will continue."
China:
“Dynamism Hallmark of China-Russia Relations,” Dmitri Trenin, China Daily/Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.19.18: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “China and Russia have been cooperating closely over the past three decades. But since the Ukraine crisis, the process has become more dynamic. Moscow and Beijing are now coordinating their policies on a wider range of issues … Still, barring a simultaneous U.S. attack against both, which is unlikely, Russia and China will not form a military bloc … . The current formula of their relationship—'never against each other, but not necessarily always with each other’—suits them well. Yet Russia’s economy is five times smaller and population 10 times smaller than China’s … sanctions have sharply reduced Russia’s access to Western credits, investment and technology and Russia has come to rely more on China. In these circumstances, there is little in the realm of foreign policy that Moscow needs as badly as a realistic strategy of economic interaction with Beijing that would help Russia’s development while avoiding over-dependence on its neighbor. A Russia that feels comfortable about its relationship with China is also in Beijing’s best interest.”
Ukraine:
“Donbass Diplomacy: Ukraine Bides Its Time,” Balázs Jarábik, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 03.16.18: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes: “The Minsk agreements are not dead, nor is the conflict in Donbass frozen. … the status quo is for the time being an acceptable option for all sides. … The recently approved deal to send U.S. lethal weapons to Ukraine will not change the situation …, but plans to increase Western aid directly to Donbass may slowly sway public opinion in eastern Ukraine. … The fear [in Kiev] is that Moscow may be serious about peacekeepers and leaving Donbass—a notion that was unthinkable even a month ago. Some commentators insist that Kiev isn’t really interested in ending the conflict … . The war is also used as an excuse for not implementing reforms in many cases. … As Ukraine’s defense capacity has grown, it has been pursuing a ‘creeping offensive.’ … the army advanced 10 kilometers in Donbass in 2017 … . … Kiev’s objective is to buy time, highlight Russia’s role in the conflict and avoid implementing the political requirements of the Minsk agreements. … Moscow’s aim is ‘making the conflict more entrenched’ … . Moscow is trying to reduce its own responsibility while increasing the status … of the self-proclaimed formations that undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity. … Mired in the upcoming election cycle in 2019, Kiev can’t meet the political requirements of the agreements, and considers Donbas as collateral for its ongoing nation-building project.”
“What Does America Gain by Arming Ukraine?” Daniel L. Davis, The National Interest, 03.14.18: The author, a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, writes: “Why should Washington spend money and risk the lives of our troops for a mission that would leave the country at a net loss? In the current standoff in the Ukraine, Washington would certainly prefer to see a peaceful resolution to the violence. For Moscow and Kiev, however, the matter is existential … each is willing to expend considerable capital and take significant risks to resolve the conflict in their favor. … The 210 anti-tank missiles the State Department authorized is enough to equip four or five mechanized or infantry battalions for a short period of time. These missiles could provide a momentary tactical advantage, but strategically, the quantity is insufficient to tilt the balance of power … . Washington’s intention with the missile sale may be to increase the pain felt by Putin to drive him to a negotiated settlement, but the actual result will almost certainly be a further militarization of the situation and an increase in the potential for an expansion of the conflict.”
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Conflicting Realities in Russia and the EU’s Shared Neighborhood,” Jaba Devdariani, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.15.18: The author, a longtime analyst of post-Soviet politics and a former international civil servant at OSCE, writes: “The EU—legally and institutionally—gravitates toward mediating the Georgia-Russia conflict, but sees little possibility of headway. EU leverage on Moscow is limited … . Further confrontation would add—or change—little. But precisely because the conflict with Georgia now has a lower profile than Ukraine, the EU and Russia might start exploring ways to minimize the risk of confrontation and even test approaches for accommodation. There are possible areas where the conflicting realities meet. … Firstly, underlying military tension must be reduced. … Secondly, the EU can underscore its commitment to human rights as a central feature of its neighborhood agenda and actively propose technical solutions that would improve the lives of residents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Putin's Hawks Got the Confirmation They Wanted: The Russian President defeated his strongest opponent—voter apathy,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.19.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “The Russian presidential election that took place on Sunday … clearly demonstrated that a majority of Russians accept the rules imposed on them by President Vladimir Putin. That in itself is a kind of democratic choice, with clear implications for Putin's enemies inside and outside Russia.” The author argues that the “election was fake” for a number of reasons, but that there are “fewer reasons this time around … to describe the outcome as fake, too. … [an] electoral statistician ... noted that the vote falsification level was ‘likely at a record low’ … . Putin didn't run a campaign as such this time around … . What he did was stress defiance of U.S. hegemony in a major speech that showcased half a dozen new strategic weapons. The Skripal affair rounded off Putin's minimalist vote-getting effort. … There is no reason for the Kremlin to pull back from any of the numerous conflicts it has with the West today … . The vote results also strengthen the hawks in Putin's entourage and weaken the technocrats who point out that the stagnating economy undermines the stability of the regime. … a high abstention percentage … would have signaled a certain readiness for change … . But apathy has been vanquished as easily as Putin's tame rivals. The likelihood of a smooth handover of power to a similarly hawkish successor has just increased, and the West must brace itself for an extended period with a tough, wily, hostile, uncompromising Russia.”
“With Putin's Reelection, Expect Rising Tensions With the West,” Anton Troianovski and Matthew Bodner, The Washington Post, 03.19.18: The authors, the Moscow bureau chief for The Washington Post and a journalist based in Moscow, write: “With his landslide win Sunday, Putin got the election show he wanted. As he figures out what's next, expect rising tensions with the West. In the weeks leading up to Putin's reelection … the president hardly campaigned and offered few concrete plans for major domestic reforms. He did, however, awe Russians with displays of fantastic new weaponry while state-controlled television intensified a drumbeat of reporting about the threats allegedly posed by the United States and its allies. The unified story line: Russia is under attack, and it needs a strong leader to survive. … [Putin will] need to manage the competing interests of a ruling elite angling for influence in a post-Putin era that will someday arrive. … as infighting over the country's domestic course continues at the top, Putin will have an interest in intensifying the conflict with the West. … the road is clear on paper for Putin … to rule until 2024—something that would give him close to a quarter-century in power. But what then? Analysts increasingly say they wouldn't be surprised to see him try to extend his rule beyond that, perhaps by taking a page from Chinese President Xi Jinping's book and eliminating term limits or taking on some kind of extra-political office that would turn him into a national leader akin to Iran's ayatollah.”
“Putin Confronts Strategic Choice After Big Russian Election Win,” Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, 03.19.18: The author, a correspondent for the newspaper, writes that “although the landslide [election] victory has given Mr. Putin a new mandate, it is not at all clear what the Russian president will do with it. … Mr. Putin laid out two contradictory, if not mutually exclusive, agendas: an economic reform push that would drastically change people’s lives for the better and a bid to force the west to respect Russia with what he called ‘invincible’ new nuclear weapons. … when the Russian economy was in a deep recession sparked by the global fall in oil prices and made more painful by western sanctions … there was a flicker of hope among reform-minded Russian officials that Mr. Putin would change course. But that optimism is long gone. … Russian political experts warn that the population’s patience with economic pain and international isolation will not last forever.”
“Putin and Russia in 2018–24: What Next?” Chatham House, Sir Andrew Wood, 03.15.18: The author, an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House and a former British ambassador to Russia, writes: “The main objective of the incumbent regime is to protect its hold on power. It will therefore continue, between now and 2024, to follow the three main policy guidelines set by Putin in 2012: to do without significant structural economic reforms because of the political risks attached to them; to control the population; and to pursue ‘great power’ ambitions. … all indications are that economic performance will be mediocre at best in the coming years. … The domestic interests of the population at large will continue to take second place to the security and military expenditure favored by the leadership. … As 2024 approaches, the question of who or what will replace Putin will come increasingly to the fore. There is already a sense that Russia is entering a post-Putin era. … Putin’s abiding commitment to Russia’s right to be a great power ... was once more made plain in his ‘state of the nation’ address … . The use … of a military-grade nerve agent to poison a former GRU officer and his daughter … has reinforced the case for greater vigilance as to the real nature of the present Kremlin. … The West should pay close attention to the Kremlin’s human rights record over the next several years, and the way it fits with Russia’s existing international obligations. … Putin’s Kremlin is not the whole of Russia: the Russian people will to an important degree judge the countries of the West by their moral record in considering what may be good for Russia in due course.”
“What Makes Putin So Popular at Home? His Reputation Abroad,” Elena Chernenko, New York Times, 03.16.18: The author, foreign editor of Kommersant, writes: “Even the president’s opponents admit that he is so popular that he could win the election even without manipulating the results at the ballot box. … [one] factor that undeniably helps keep Mr. Putin so popular at home is how he is perceived in the West. Why would he need to bother with a campaign? For several years, Forbes magazine has named him the ‘most powerful person in the world.’ … President Trump’s national security strategy describes the country [Russia] as ‘a great power’ once again. … Even the accusations of Russian meddling in America’s 2016 presidential elections play into Mr. Putin’s hands. … The West has responded to some of the Kremlin’s policies—in particular in Ukraine—with sanctions … . But if these sanctions are supposed to bring Russians into the streets to protest their government and demand change, they are having the opposite effect. … It is clear that Mr. Putin is more interested in foreign affairs than he is in domestic policy. … So far, his adventurous foreign policy has worked for him … . As he eyes the eventual exit, he may be looking to leave a more august legacy, one that includes real and durable achievements. The problem is that in recent years, what Russia sees as victory too often means a loss for someone else.”
“The Succession Dilemma,” Torrey Taussig, The American Interest, 03.14.18: The author, a post-doctoral fellow in the at Brookings Institution and at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, writes: “30 years ago, 23 percent of all autocracies were ruled by personalist leaders; today 40 percent are. In these systems, a powerful individual dominates all elements of the state apparatus and keeps the support of his peers and followers through a ‘cult of personality.’ … One of the greatest threats to personalist regimes’ stability is succession. … personalist systems have no institutional structure for preparing the next generation of autocrats. Both Putin and Xi … have decided that grooming eventual candidates is too dangerous to their own political ambitions and could jeopardize their control. There is also the question of whether Xi is taking cues from Putin’s consolidation of control, or if Putin is looking to Beijing as an example of how one carries out indefinite rule. … In part, Putin’s consolidation of control is a matter of personal wealth … . Putin’s recent changes … have replaced many in the old guard with new, younger unknowns. It is possible that one such cultivated loyalist will be chosen as Putin’s handpicked successor … . These internal changes have important consequences for the United States and its European allies. … personalist regimes are more likely to carry out volatile and unpredictable foreign policies. They also make for difficult allies. … In an era of renewed great power competition, understanding these power shifts within autocratic states should be a high priority for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.