Russia Analytical Report, June 9-16, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. The primary goal of operation “Rising Lion,” which Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu launched against Iran on June 13 with America’s tacit support, is regime change in Teheran, not its nuclear program, according to a commentary in Foreign Policy by Jeffrey Lewis of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. However, if Netanyahu’s most powerful ally and U.S. President Donald Trump is committed to a nuclear-free Iran, then “his best bet is to get the Iranians and Israelis to stop the war and bring Tehran back to the negotiating table,” Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group argues in Foreign Affairs. In fact, as Financial Times' Gideon Rachman warns, “It would be a supreme irony—and a terrible policy failure—if Trump found himself dragged into another war for regime change in the Middle East.” During his June 14 call with Trump, Vladimir Putin called for de-escalation of the conflict and offered to mediate talks between Iran and Israel while denouncing the latter’s attack on the former. One key question for both the belligerents and external stakeholders in this conflict is whether Israel can attain a durable end to Iran’s capacity for producing nuclear weapons and/or eliminate Iran’s purported intent to acquire such weapons with use against Israel in mind (by somehow having a less hostile leader installed in Teheran). While, in theory, Russia could try to help Iran’s current regime prevent Israel from attaining such goals,1 it can be argued that it is actually in Russia’s national interest to keep Iran, separated from Russia by only the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, from crossing the nuclear threshold. It is also, however, in Russia’s interest to prevent Israel and its allies from changing the regime in Iran, with whom Russia has recently signed a treaty on strategic partnership.2 Moscow—which has already lost one regional ally (Syria)—is interested in the survival of the current Iranian regime if only because it needs to keep Teheran on its side in its war against Kyiv and in the standoff with the West in general. Thus, if Iran were somehow denied the capability to produce nuclear weapons (by force or through resumed negotiations) while Iran is still ruled by a Russia-friendly regime, then the Kremlin would be content with such a dual outcome. The benefits Russia may collect from a protracted Iranian-Israeli conflict in which neither side prevails may also include further diversion of America’s already diminished attention from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Additional, shorter-term benefits for Russia from the protraction of this conflict could also include increased oil prices.*
  2. “The era of nuclear weapons reductions appears to have ended,” SIPRI proclaimed in its newly released Yearbook 2025. “Bilateral nuclear arms control between Russia and the USA entered crisis some years ago and is now almost over,” according to the yearbook. Moreover, “revitalized national debates in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia about nuclear status and strategy suggest there is some potential for more states to join the nuclear club.” The book warns that “the signs are that a new qualitative nuclear arms race is gearing up and, compared with the last one, the risks are likely to be more diverse and more serious.”3
  3. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Thomas Graham believes four steps need to be taken to end the Russia-Ukraine war. “First, confidential negotiations, not public spectacles such as in Istanbul, must commence in earnest,” he writes in The National Interest. “Second, the talks must be embedded in discussions of European security and strategic stability questions,” according to Graham. “Third ... the Trump administration needs to engage actively in diplomacy” and “fourth, the United States must continue its full support of Ukraine,” according to Graham. However, “even if these four steps are taken, ... settlement will not produce the moral clarity or clear-cut victory that Europe and Ukraine seek,” he writes. “Ultimately, the aggressor will not be stripped of all his ill-gotten gains. ... Instead, the United States, its European allies and Ukraine will have to find a way to coexist with Russia. Peace is the priority,” according to Graham.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Nuclear Claims Are a Smoke Screen for Hopes of Toppling Iran," Jeffrey Lewis, Foreign Policy, 06.13.25. 

  • “Why is Netanyahu acting now?”
    • “First, he has a compliant partner in the Trump administration, which doesn’t seek to be directly involved but also isn’t interested in restraining him.”
    • “Then there’s the domestic politics. As has been evident throughout the military operation in Gaza, an ongoing security crisis is an essential element of Netanyahu’s strategy for prolonging his hold on political power and delaying his verdict for corruption.”
  • “If Israel succeeds in toppling the Islamic regime in Tehran, the strike will have been worth it. But if Israel doesn’t ... What then? ... If the regime does not fall, then Israel will have to do all this over again and again. Even if the strike significantly damages Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran can simply reconstitute it.”

"Look at the Ukraine War to Understand Why Israel Struck Iran," David French, The New York Times, 06.14.25. 

  • “One could easily imagine a NATO-enforced no-fly zone, or granting Ukraine weapons and a freedom of action to use those weapons that is more similar to the freedom Israel currently enjoys. But at every step Western powers have worried that they might be pushing Russia too far. ... Russia’s nuclear arsenal, in other words, serves as the world’s most dangerous insurance policy. It grants Russia the ability to launch aggressive military operations while also exercising at least some degree of control over the armed response.”
  • “Now, imagine Iran with even a modest nuclear arsenal.”

"Don’t Give Up on Diplomacy With Iran: To Avoid a Wider War, America Should Push for a Nuclear Deal," Ali Vaez, Foreign Affairs, 06.16.25. 

  • The author writes: “If Trump is committed to a nuclear-free Iran, his best bet is to get the Iranians and Israelis to stop the war and bring Tehran back to the negotiating table. Without a deal, Iran’s frightened government seems more likely than not to sprint for nuclear weapons as conditions allow. Then Trump would have to either accept a nuclear Iran or join another Israeli assault on the country, risking precisely the kind of catastrophic Middle East entanglement he promised to avoid.”

"Israel’s Strikes on Iran Could Change the Middle East," Michael Froman, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.13.25.

  • “It’s too soon to tell how exactly the current wave of Israeli strikes could transform the region, but one thing is clear: Israel’s actions have fundamentally reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East in the span of less than two years,” according to the author.
  • “As Ed Husain observed, we have witnessed ‘the end of multiple Iran-aligned regimes and proxies, and a coming together of U.S.-aligned powers, including gulf states, to uphold a security infrastructure in the region that the Iranian government wants to see destroyed. So, on balance, what the Israelis did last night consolidated a dominant American security infrastructure in the region.’ A full-blown regional war is certainly possible, but with Iran’s retaliatory and defensive capabilities in doubt, it’s unclear if they would be able or inclined to start one,” according to the author.

"How the Israel-Iran war may develop," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 06.16.25. 

  • “There are many in Washington who believe (or fear) that the US will join a second stage of the bombing campaign, in an effort to destroy Fordow and finish off Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But there would be no guarantee that even an American-led attack on Fordow could achieve that. Ehud Barak, the former prime minister of Israel, writes: ‘The truth is, even the Americans cannot delay Iran’s arrival at nuclear weapons by more than a few months.’ Barak argues the only way to guarantee that Iran never goes nuclear is for the US and Israel ‘to declare war against the regime itself until it is brought down.’”
  • “But Donald Trump has repeatedly pledged to be a peacemaker and has called on Iran and Israel to make a deal. Just last month, he gave a landmark speech in Riyadh in which he scorned the idea that outsiders can bring positive change to the Middle East through force. It would be a supreme irony — and a terrible policy failure — if Trump found himself dragged into another war for regime change in the Middle East.”

"Commentary by Aide to the President of Russia Yury Ushakov Following the Telephone Conversation Between Vladimir Putin and President of the United States Donald Trump," Yury Ushakov, Office of the President of Russia, 06.14.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of the United States of America Donald Trump have just had another telephone conversation. ... Naturally, it was focused on the dangerous exacerbation of the situation in the Middle East.”
  • “Vladimir Putin denounced the Israeli’s military operation against Iran and expressed a grave concern over the possible escalation of the conflict, which would have unpredictable consequences for the entire situation in the Middle East region.”
  • “Our President advised the US counterpart on his yesterday’s telephone contacts with the Israeli Prime Minister and the President of Iran. He emphasized the importance of preventing the conflict from escalating and the readiness of the Russian side to engage in possible mediation efforts.”
  • “For his part, Donald Trump also views the situation as very alarming admitting, however, the effectiveness of Israel's strikes on its targets in Iran. But it is characteristic that the Russian and US presidents, notwithstanding such a complicated situation, do not rule out a return to the negotiating track on Iran’s nuclear program.”
  • “In addition, our President also informed Donald Trump about executing the agreements reached by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul on June 2. ... The Russian side has expressed its readiness to continue its talks with Ukrainians, as agreed, after June 22.”
  • “Of course, Vladimir Putin wished Donald Trump a happy birthday – the President of the United States turned 79 today.”

"Russian Foreign Ministry Warns of Risks to Bushehr Nuclear Plant Amid Iran-Israel Conflict," Interfax, 06.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “The Iran-Israel conflict presents a dangerous situation for the Bushehr nuclear power plant,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.
  • “Of course, all of this [the conflict – IF] is extremely dangerous. And if so far it has avoided the gravest consequences—and in this case, of course, we have our own sources of information and we see what IAEA representatives are reporting on the matter—that is simply, for now, a matter of circumstance,” Ryabkov told reporters on Monday.
  • “The risks are too high,” he said.
  • “It is necessary to end the use of force so that the situation can be stabilized,” Ryabkov emphasized.
  • “The situation with the Iran-Israel conflict requires a return to the negotiating table,” Ryabkov said.
  • “What is needed is not an escalation path, not a spiral of force that, broadly speaking, causes deep concern and threatens the gravest consequences, but a display of common sense and a return to negotiations,” he said.

"Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation Explaining the Reasons for Convening the Special Session of the IAEA Board of Governors: 'Israeli Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities under IAEA Safeguards,'" Russian Foreign Ministry, 06.16.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “On the night of June 13 and throughout the day on June 13, Israel carried out a series of large-scale, unprovoked strikes on the peaceful nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Targets included uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow, as well as, among others, uranium conversion and nuclear fuel production facilities in Isfahan. All these sites are under IAEA safeguards, were subject to regular inspections, and had Agency inspectors present.”
  • “The Israeli leadership has openly stated that strikes on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities will continue. It is important to emphasize: this is not about an armed conflict that might pose potential risks to nuclear infrastructure—it is a deliberate and premeditated attack on peaceful nuclear facilities, with the declared aim of their complete destruction. The level of seriousness of what is happening is unprecedented for the IAEA, the Agency’s safeguards system, and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

"Israeli Strikes on Iran Will Ricochet onto Ukraine," Ruslan Pukhov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 06.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “The timing of the Israeli strike was chosen quite well. Tehran’s ability to respond is seriously limited by previous Israeli actions, which inflicted significant damage on Iran’s main proxies and allies in the region, starting with Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran has also lost such a significant ally as Assad’s Syria. Donald Trump is in the White House, and despite all his disagreements with the Israeli leadership, he firmly supports Tel Aviv in its efforts to eliminate Iran’s nuclear potential and is entirely unconcerned with the ‘chimeras’ of international and humanitarian law. The European Union and Russia are focused on the Ukrainian conflict and will assess Israel’s actions primarily through that lens.”
  • “Turning to an assessment of the situation from the perspective of Russian interests, I would note that, likely, the greatest military-political damage in this situation—aside from Iran itself, of course—will be borne by Ukraine. A new war in the Middle East will not only divert global attention from the special military operation, but will apparently also contribute to a final reorientation of the United States toward providing military assistance to Israel.”
  • “The first signs of this are already visible. The ruthless aggressiveness of Israeli strikes will undermine the validity of any criticism of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine—politically, humanitarily, and legally. A war with Iran will almost certainly lead to a rise in global oil prices, dashing the hopes of Ukraine and its Western European allies for a reduction in Russia’s oil revenues, which are crucial for financing the Russian military budget.”

“Middle Eastern Challenges for Russia,” Andrei Kortunov, Kommersant, 06.15.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “If we set aside humanitarian considerations and speak in the most cynical terms, it could be assumed that a new round of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation is in some ways even advantageous for Russia.”
  • “First, it’s obvious that any escalation in the Middle East automatically drives up global prices for hydrocarbons, including Russian ones.”
  • “Second, any flare-up in the Middle East distracts Moscow’s opponents from the issue of Ukraine and shifts the priorities of Western military aid programs.”
  • “Third, given our allied relationship with Tehran, Russia could theoretically act as an impartial mediator between the warring parties, contributing—if not to a resolution—at least to a de-escalation of the crisis.”
  • “The fact remains: Russia was unable to prevent Israel’s massive strike on a state with which it signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement just five months ago.”
  • “Fortunately for Iran’s international partners, Israel’s ambitious goal still seems unattainable. If the Iranian regime is destined to fall, it will be due to deepening contradictions and internal conflicts among the ruling elite and society. However, the resilience of the Islamic Republic’s institutions remains significant. Moreover, Israel’s current actions will only serve to consolidate power and society.”

"Dragon Races," Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 06.14.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “The liberal world order, which had reached its zenith by the beginning of the 21st century, stimulated the dismantling of the former Middle East. It was believed that ‘liberal democracy’ would finally bring peace and stability to the troubled region. It did not work out.”
  • “Today we are witnessing a clash between two powerful countries, whose open confrontation has largely determined the course of the plot in recent years … The outcome of the battle is not a foregone conclusion, Iran has missed a very serious blow, but has not been knocked out. Nevertheless, there is a consequence that is already noticeable. And it is symbolic.”
  • “Today, Israel can compete with Turkey in terms of the manageability of its political system. And in ideological terms, liberal democracy in Israel is being steadily replaced by a militarized, religiously and nationalistically oriented consciousness. Its embodiment is the current government headed by Netanyahu.”
  • “The Middle East will change. The dream of both Donald Trump and the Israeli right is to physically eliminate all threats, turn over the countries that were their bearers (primarily Iran), and finally begin to develop the region on the basis of mutual benefit. The ‘Abraham Accords’ will help everyone.”
  • “The utopia of universal democratic fusion that was toyed with in the early 2000s is being replaced by a utopia of rationalized mercantilism relying on force. Force was there back then, too, to help democratize those who for some reason were in no hurry to find themselves on the right side of history. What all this has led to, we are seeing right now. How today's transformations will end, we will see tomorrow. But there is a suspicion that their outcome will be the same.”

“Russians React to Israeli Strikes on Iran: Fear of Nuclear War, Partition of Iran,” Simon Saradzhyan and Angelina Flood, Russia Matters, 06.13.25.

  • “As of Friday afternoon, Russian President Vladimir Putin was yet to directly weigh in on Israel’s overnight attacks on military, nuclear and other targets in Iran, though his spokesman Dmitry Peskov did speak out. In his statement, Peskov avoided blaming Israel explicitly, saying Russia is concerned and condemns ‘the sharp escalation’ of tensions between Isael and Iran. As for Peskov’s boss and Russia’s ultimate decision-maker, Putin was to take a call from Benjamin Netanyahu on the strikes, according to Peskov. Putin’s deputy in the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, invoked the threat of a nuclear war in his response to the attacks.”
  • “In contrast to Peskov, who condemned the escalation, Russia’s Foreign Ministry also weighed in, condemning Israel’s overnight attacks on Iran as ‘unacceptable.’ The statement was echoed by Konstantin Kosachev, who said ‘there was “no excuse for Israeli actions.’ Of pro-Kremlin commentators whose views on the attacks we managed to find, most criticized Israel, while some expressed concern about the disintegration of Iran, which only 11% of Russians view as an ally despite the newly concluded Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty and Teheran’s supply of attack drones for Russia’s war against Ukraine.”
  • “When it comes to Russian authorities’ practical public steps, they have mostly focused on ensuring the safety of Russian citizens. Russia’s Embassies in Iran and Israel advised Russian citizens to avoid traveling to these countries. In addition, Russia’s federal aviation service (Rosaviatsiya) banned Russian airlines from flying to or over Israel and Iran. Meanwhile, Brent crude surged as much as 13%1 while the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) Russia Index and the RTS were both up 0.33% in the wake of the attacks.”

"Russia’s strong ties with both Israel and Iran could help it emerge as a power broker," Associated Press, 06.15.25. 

  • “Israel’s military strikes this weekend on Iranian nuclear and military facilities, killing top generals and scientists, and Tehran’s response with drones and missiles, put Moscow in an awkward position, requiring fine diplomatic skills to preserve ties with both parties. But it also could open opportunities for Russia to possibly become a power broker to help end the confrontation.”
  • “Maintaining good ties with both Israel and Iran could pay off now, placing Moscow in a position of a power broker trusted by both parties and a potential participant in any future deal on Tehran’s nuclear program.”
  • “Many observers believe the Israeli attacks will likely fuel global oil prices and help enrich Moscow at a time when its economy is struggling. Some commentators in Moscow also argue the confrontation in the Middle East will likely distract Western attention and resources from the war in Ukraine and make it easier for Russia to pursue its battlefield goals. ‘The world’s attention to Ukraine will weaken,’ said pro-Kremlin analyst Sergei Markov. ‘A war between Israel and Iran will help the Russian army’s success in Ukraine.’”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Trump Has Given Putin a Chance to Win a War of Attrition. Will the Kremlin Be Able to Take Advantage of It?" Re: Russia, 06.11.25.

  • “Overall, the pace of the Russian army's advance this year is twice as fast as in the first five months of 2024: around 635 square kilometers were captured last year, whereas in 2025, the figure has reached approximately 1,280. However, this change is not decisive. By the end of last year’s offensive, the Russian army had occupied around 4,000 square kilometers, which amounted to 0.6% of Ukraine’s territory. Doubling the pace is not a significant breakthrough.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Europe's risky war on Russia's 'shadow fleet'," Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 06.16.25.

  • “The European Union’s latest moves (as part of its 17th package of sanctions against Russia declared in May) to target much more intensively Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers and other vessels illustrate the danger that, as long as the Ukraine war continues, so will the risk of an incident that will draw NATO and the EU into a direct military clash with Russia.”
  • “If the Russians do sink a Swedish or Estonian warship, the Trump administration will face a terribly difficult decision on how to respond to a crisis that is not of its own choosing: intervene and risk a direct war with Russia, or stand aside and ensure a deep crisis with Europe. The U.S. administration would therefore be both wise and entirely within its rights to state publicly that it does not endorse and will not help to enforce this decision.”
  • “Washington also needs — finally — to pay attention to what the rest of the world thinks about all this. The overwhelming majority of senators who are proposing to impose 500% tariffs on any country that buys Russian energy have apparently not realized that one of the two biggest countries in this category is India — now universally regarded in Washington as a vital U.S. partner in Asia. And now America’s European allies are relying on U.S. support to seize ships providing that energy to India.”
  • “European governments and establishments seem to have lost any ability to analyze the possible wider consequences of their actions. So — not for the first time — America will have to do their thinking for them.”

"Sanctions on Russia Are Working: It’s the Right Time to Tighten the Screws Further," Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 06.11.25.
 

  • “More sanctions and better enforcement of existing ones would come at exactly the right time: the Russian economy is stumbling and an extra hit would have an outsize impact. What is more, the EU’s 18th package now under consideration aims at precisely the right things: lowering the price cap on oil exports that can be serviced by western shipping and insurance companies, putting the Nord Stream pipelines permanently out of business, imposing sanctions on more of the ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers and cracking down further on the remaining financial channels open to Russian trade.”
  • “There are more things that could be done. In particular, moving forward with segregating Russia’s hundreds of billions of reserves immobilized in the EU (mostly at the Euroclear depository in Belgium) so that they can be transferred to Ukraine as compensation for damage, and stopping other moneymakers for Moscow.”
  • “If the Russian economy has proved resilient, it is because Ukraine’s western friends have refrained from putting it under as much pressure as they are capable of. And the expectation that they won’t do so plays a large part in how Putin chooses to pursue his assault on Ukraine. Change that expectation and you can turn the tide of the war.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Four Steps Necessary to End the Russia-Ukraine War," Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 06.11.25.

  • “What Are the Requirements for a Russia-Ukraine Ceasefire?”
    • “First, confidential negotiations, not public spectacles such as in Istanbul, must commence in earnest.”
    • “Second, the talks must be embedded in discussions of European security and strategic stability questions.”
    • “Third, it follows from the prior point that the Trump administration needs to engage actively in diplomacy.”
    • “Fourth, the United States must continue its full support of Ukraine, especially the provision of armaments.”
  • “Even if these four steps are taken, the path to peace will prove long and arduous. The necessary compromises will not come easily. A settlement will not produce the moral clarity or clear-cut victory that Europe and Ukraine seek. Ultimately, the aggressor will not be stripped of all his ill-gotten gains, Putin will not be hauled off to The Hague to face a war tribunal, and Russia will not pay in full for the colossal damage it has inflicted. Instead, the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine will have to find a way to coexist with Russia. Peace is the priority.”

 "Trump Can’t Force Russia and Ukraine to Make Peace," Doug Bandow, The American Conservative, 06.12.25. 

  • “The war is a tragedy and Ukraine is a victim, but that is not a sufficient cause for America to risk a conflict with a major nuclear power. Especially since Ukraine matters far more to Russia, which relies on its nuclear weapons to cover its substantial conventional gap with the U.S. and NATO.”
  • “The Trump administration should continue to push Ukraine and Russia to seriously negotiate. Warns Lieven: ‘as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.’ Anatol Lieven advises against ‘walking away’ from the diplomatic process, on grounds that only the U.S. can prod both Russia and Ukraine into making peace. However, given Washington’s past support for Kyiv, the former will never be seen by the Kremlin as an unbiased moderator. While the U.S. should continue to encourage peace, its first priority should be to ensure that America no longer risks being dragged into a major conventional and possible nuclear conflict. That requires disengaging from the ongoing fight.”

"Putin Tries to Wear Trump Down," Leon Aron, The Wall Street Journal, 06.16.25.

  • “Mr. Trump's moral indifference means he has no motivation, much less urgency, to help Ukraine. As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it in June 10 congressional testimony, ‘a negotiated peace settlement is in the best interest of both parties and our nation's interest.’ Mr. Hegseth said the word victory hasn't been well-defined, but isn't an end to Russian aggression clear enough?”
  • “Moscow's measured ‘flexibility’ is keeping futile negotiations alive until Mr. Trump wearily disembarks. As long as Mr. Trump wavers, Mr. Putin can continue proceeding, as Lenin put it, ‘one step forward, two steps back.’”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"The Era of Disorder," Richard Haass, Project Syndicate, 06.15.25.

  • “We are witnessing the end of one era of world history and the dawn of another.”
  • “The Middle East is in the early phases of a modern-day Thirty Years’ War, in which political and religious loyalties are destined to fuel prolonged and sometimes savage conflicts within and across national borders.”
  • “Asia, for its part, has remained mostly at peace. But it is a precarious peace.”
  • “Other reasons for growing global disorder have to do with the United States. The 2003 Iraq War exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions and removed a critical barrier to Iranian ambitions.”
  • “Russia under Vladimir Putin seems determined to use intimidation and force to restore lost parts of its empire. Europe increasingly lacks the means and the mindset to play a significant global role.”
  • “This is not to argue that we are in for a new Dark Ages.”
  • “There is also the possibility of pushing back against the new disorder... But what can be accomplished is likely to be limited by countries’ domestic politics, the absence of international consensus, and the waning of US influence.”

"The Future of American Soft Power," Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate, 06.15.25.

(This article was posthumously published in Project Syndicate’s PS Quarterly magazine.)

  • The Era of Disorder," Richard Haas “Soft power grows out of a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policies. In the short term, hard power usually trumps soft power. But over the long term, soft power often prevails. Joseph Stalin once mockingly asked, ‘How many divisions does the Pope have?’ But the papacy continues today, while Stalin’s Soviet Union is long gone.”
  • “A Norwegian historian described Europe as divided into a Soviet and an American empire. But there was a crucial difference: the American side was “an empire by invitation.” That became clear when the Soviets had to deploy troops to Budapest in 1956, and to Prague in 1968. In contrast, NATO has not only survived but voluntarily increased its membership.”
  • “While prior US presidents have violated aspects of the liberal order, Donald Trump is the first to reject the idea that soft power has any value in foreign policy. … The effects of a US administration surrendering soft power are all too predictable. “
  • “American democracy is likely to survive four years of Trump. The country has a resilient political culture and a federal constitution that encourages checks and balances. … American soft power recovered after low points in the Vietnam and Iraq wars, as well as from a dip in Trump’s first term. But once trust is lost, it is not easily restored. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia lost most of what soft power it had, but China is striving to fill any gaps that Trump creates. … Restoring what he has destroyed will not be impossible, but it will be costly.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

 "The U.S. Can Rise to the Chinese Challenge," Robert M. Gates, The Wall Street Journal, 06.14.25.

  • “The Trump administration’s disruption of outdated institutions provides a great opportunity to strengthen America’s nonmilitary arsenal. Failing to do so would mean abandoning the field to the Chinese, who already are running rings around us. Above all, there must be an overarching national strategy developed by the president and secretary of state—in collaboration with Congress—for applying nonmilitary instruments of power to the contest with China. We have no time to lose.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"How Nuclear War Could Start," Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Allie Maloney, The Washington Post, 06.11.25.

  • “A decision to use the most destructive weapons ever created could grow out of human error or a misunderstanding just as easily as a deliberate decision on the part of an aggrieved nation. A faulty computer system could wrongly report incoming missiles, causing a country to retaliate against its suspected attacker. Suspicious activity around nuclear weapons bases could spin a conventional conflict into a nuclear one. Military officers who routinely handle nuclear weapons could mistakenly load them on the wrong vehicle. Any of these scenarios could cause events to spiral out of control.”
  • “Such occurrences are not just possible plots for action movies. All of them actually happened and can happen again. Humans are imperfect, so nuclear near-misses and accidents are a fact of life for as long as these weapons exist.”
  • “There is no substitute for being able to reliably communicate with your adversary in a crisis to resolve a potential accident from spiraling out of control.”
  • “Another critical element to avoiding catastrophic error or misunderstandings is transparency — through arms control agreements that provide a window into the forces and intentions of each country.”
  • “The United States and the Soviet Union had 30 minutes or less to make nuclear decisions. Those timelines will seem luxurious when missiles and underwater nuclear torpedoes can hit their targets almost without warning. Today's nuclear dangers demand that all states with these weapons take the steps necessary to prevent unwanted or accidental escalation — while there is still time.”

"SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Summary," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2025.4

  • “Global security continued to deteriorate throughout 2024. Markers of this persistent deterioration included major armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine. Military spending, meanwhile, rose for the 10th successive year and exceeded $2.7 trillion in 2024. Ecological disruption also continued, with 2024 being the first year on record in which the average global temperature was clearly more than 1.5°C above the pre-industrial average. New uncertainties arose in the first quarter of 2025 following the election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States, which prompted a significant departure from previous US policy and assumptions about global security and relations with allies.”
  • “The era of nuclear weapons reductions appears to have ended. Bilateral nuclear arms control between Russia and the USA entered crisis some years ago and is now almost over. Revitalized national debates in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia about nuclear status and strategy suggest there is some potential for more states to join the nuclear club. The signs are that a new qualitative nuclear arms race is gearing up and, compared with the last one, the risks are likely to be more diverse and more serious. Among the key points of competition will be technological capacities in cyberspace, outer space and ocean space. Thus, the idea of who is ahead in the race will be even more elusive and intangible, and the old largely numerical formulas of arms control will no longer suffice.”
  • “With President Trump’s return to the White House, there is a repeat of the paradoxical situation experienced during his first administration, in which none of the three great powers is committed to defending and upholding the world order. China, as a rising power, Russia, as a declining power, and the USA, as a profoundly disaffected power under Trump, all seek freedom from the constraints of agreed rules whenever they are inconvenient. One way forward is for medium and small powers to work together in coalitions with like-minded governments on specific goals. Cooperation is of value even when it is not comprehensive. It is a pragmatic, viable approach: the new realism.”
  • “A return to an era of reductions to the global nuclear arsenal, however, requires agreement among the three great powers. A new, general understanding is needed that nuclear weapons do not buy security and that their existence demands balanced behavior by political leaders. Initial small steps towards reducing risk could form guardrails against disaster. Together with the voices of an informed public, they could also be part of building pressure on the three great powers to take the next steps in reducing their nuclear arsenals.”

 "Ukraine’s Drone Attack on Russia’s Strategic Aviation Has Broader Implications," Maxim Starchak, Carnegie Politika, 06.10.25.

  • “The need to ramp up the security of the triad elements will require the Russian authorities to thoroughly reconsider many of their approaches. And there is no guarantee that subsequent changes will comply with the principles of control and verification outlined in the New START. Moreover, Russia may decide that it has lost part of its nuclear potential, and start restoring that potential unmonitored—and not just by focusing on aviation.”
  • “Under the terms of the New START, each party has the right to independently determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive weapons. In other words, Russia could compensate for ‘nuclear losses’ to its aviation by strengthening other elements of the triad. At a time when control mechanisms are not functioning, there is a risk of strategic uncertainty emerging over the development trajectory of Russia’s nuclear forces. The United States already believed that Moscow was not complying with the restrictions on the number of deployed nuclear warheads established by the New START. Now there are even more grounds for such concerns.”
  • “The recent attack doesn’t just raise questions for Russia, but for other nuclear powers too. The Ukrainian operation showed that it is possible to carry out an effective surprise attack on dozens of aircraft without using cruise or ballistic missiles.”
  • “What should the response be to the loss of several nuclear weapons carriers? Where is the red line that will trigger an inevitable nuclear response? And how can the organizer of such an attack be identified if no one claims responsibility? Answers will now have to be found to all of these questions, and included in future arms control agreements—if, of course, there ever are any.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

“Ukraine's Drone Attack Points to a U.S. Vulnerability,” Jon Gruen, The Wall Street Journal, 06.11.25.

  • “Consider what happened last week in Russia. Ukraine sneaked cheap explosive-laden drones deep inside Russia to destroy high-value aircraft parked at air bases thousands of miles from the front lines. Some of the destroyed bombers were nuclear-capable. The total value of the damaged and destroyed assets likely exceeds billions of dollars. The cost to Ukraine? A few tens of thousands of dollars in parts and payloads. Russian air defenses never saw it coming.”
  • “The skies above our stadiums, airports and substations are essentially undefended at ground level. … That's why I support bipartisan legislation in Congress that would allow trained state and local officials to deploy approved counterdrone systems at high-risk venues. It's a common-sense step that brings our legal framework in line with today's reality.”
  • “Ukraine's Defense Ministry plans to purchase 4.5 million first-person-view drones this year. That's more than the entire U.S. drone industry could produce in a year -- and 96% of those drones are made in Ukraine.”
  • “We're unprepared for the next war, and the next war won't wait until we're ready. Drones have changed the game; we need to change our strategy, preparations and laws to match.”

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

"This Former National Security Advisor [Jake Sullivan] Is Warning About Trump’s ‘Let Her Rip’ AI Approach," Chris Morris, Inc., June 2025.

  • “When AGI [when AI surpasses human intelligence] will happen is one of those things that even the experts can’t agree on, but they all say it’s inevitable. Elon Musk has forecast AI will reach the point of AGI by the end of this year or next. Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis says it could be another 10 years.”
  • “Whatever the timeline, Sullivan said, protective measures need to be in place long before the technological advance happens—and they need to be agreed upon and followed by all of the companies chasing that goal.”
  • “I think we need to race as fast as we can, but we also do need guardrails to ensure safety and alignment,” he said. “At the same time, we have to pay attention to the fact that if we are pursuing a bunch of guardrails, maybe alongside other like-minded states, and China’s choosing the ‘no’ approach, you know, that could give them an advantage in the competition as we go forward.”

Energy exports from CIS:

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at "Meeting of the Security Council," Kremlin.ru, 06.10.25.

  • “Our fundamental values include the unity of the people of Russia, commitment to truth and justice, mercy and humanism, a strong family and love for our children, mutual assistance and a striving not only for personal well-being but also for the success of our country as a whole, as well as patriotism and devotion to our Motherland, of course.”
  • “We need to consistently and vigorously promote our own values, develop our own humanitarian and cultural meanings that are in demand both in Russia and in the world. Russia’s approach has been widely declared – we stand for respect for the identity of countries and peoples, for their customs and cultures. In this regard, we have numerous supporters all over the world, who share or respect our beliefs. It is important to coordinate our efforts with our partners in BRICS, the CSTO, the CIS and other countries that share our approaches.”
  • “Today, let us discuss how the Plan of Measures for the implementation of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Values is being carried out overall, which tasks have been accomplished, and which issues remain unresolved.”

“Following Putin’s Lead, Russians Warm Up to Trump’s America, Want Mended Fence,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 06.12.25.

  • “The latest of the Levada Center’s polls on Russians’ attitudes toward foreign countries reaffirms the proposition that whatever major foreign policy decision Vladimir Putin makes, most of his country’s subjects tend to eventually publicly support, even if that decision constitutes a U-turn of the kind Russia’s authoritarian ruler did when deciding to pivot from West to East.”
  • “That Russians, like their leader, are eventually warming up to Trump’s America in spite of the ongoing Cold War 2.0 also follows from Levada’s estimate that the share of respondents who place the U.S. among the five countries most hostile to their homeland declined from 76% in the last year of Biden’s presidency to 40% in the first year of Trump’s second presidency. In fact, that share (40%) is the lowest since the midpoint of Barack Obama’s presidency (Table 2).”
  • “In May 2025, as many as 64% of Russians had a negative view of the EU, none of whose executive leaders have anything comparable to Trump’s relationship with Putin for obvious reasons. … In fact, the share of Russians with a dim view of the EU has been at times comparable with the share of Russians who have a negative view of Ukraine, despite the fact that EU members’ armed forces are not directly involved in combat against Russian forces, while Ukraine’s are.”
  • “Also of note, the Russians’ persistently negative views of Ukraine and its European allies contrasts with the high regard Russians have for countries such as Belarus, China, Kazakhstan and India, which all are portrayed mostly positively by Russia’s Kremlin-controlled national TV channels. At the same time, North Korea, which is the only belligerent directly involved in combat on Russia’s side and which also supplies ammunition and weapons to Russia, continues to lag behind these countries.”
  • “Given the enormous influence that the Kremlin exercises on public opinion in Russia,1 the Levada respondents’ belief that Russia should improve relations with the West could be evidence that Putin himself presently sees the downsides of keeping all eggs in one (Chinese) basket.2 Should, however, Trump “disappoint” Putin on Ukraine (or other issues), expect another swing first in Putin’s views and then in the Russian public opinion away from normalizing relations with the West and toward even deeper alignment with China.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at “Meeting on key parameters of draft State Armament Program for 2027–2036,” Kremlin.ru, 06.12.25.

  • “Since the start of the special military operation, the air defense forces have taken out over 80,000 air targets, including 7,500 modern short-range and cruise missiles as well as rocket projectiles which were almost 100-percent Western-made. ... In view of that, the new state armament program must ensure creation of a universal air defense system capable of operating under any conditions and effectively hitting air assault weapons regardless of their type.”
  • “Our drone operators account for a significant part of the enemy’s destroyed and damaged equipment and facilities, up to 50 percent. In addition, drones are actively employed for reconnaissance, counterbattery and electronic warfare, for mining and demining... In this connection, I should note that we are now creating unmanned systems forces as a separate branch of the military.”
  • “The development of the Space Forces remains crucial. We need to complete the formation of an orbital constellation of space vehicles of different purpose on schedule and in full. This will enhance the capabilities of all kinds of reconnaissance as well as troops and weapons control in real time.”
  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Ukraine:

“Anti-Corruption Efforts Risk Paralyzing Ukraine’s Court System,” Liubov Velychko, Global Press Journal, 06.13.25.

  • “Over the decade since pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych fell in 2014, Ukrainian lawmakers have struggled to reform a corrupt judicial system. A slew of anti-corruption bodies has been created, among them the Public Integrity Council, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the High Council of Justice and others.”
  • “The scale of the problem is vast. One 2020 analysis by the Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, compared the judiciary to a criminal syndicate. There has been progress. In 2024 alone, 48 judges were dismissed on various charges, including collusion with the Russians. In May 2023, the head of the Supreme Court was arrested, accused of taking a $2.7 million bribe.”
  • “The High Council of Justice is central to these efforts. It created the investigation system to be accessible, to ensure that allegations against judges are heard from across the spectrum of Ukrainian society. But that accessibility, critics say, is too easy to abuse. There’s now a backlog of more than 13,000 complaints against the country’s system of roughly 4,400 judges. Some complaints are serious … others are petty or focus on issues that are outside a judge’s purview.”
  • “‘Conscientious judges fear not only being rightfully held accountable for their actions, but also being subjected to illegitimate punishment disguised as legal procedure — meaning the use of seemingly legitimate procedural tools that are actually illegal,’ says Oleh Yurkiv, a judge in Halytskyi District Court in the western city of Lviv.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"How Putin Could Open a New and Dangerous Front Against Ukraine," Jim Geraghty, The Washington Post, 06.12.25.

  • “Life in wartime Ukraine has few guarantees, but at least the Ukrainians have been able to know the attacks are coming from the north and east, and south from Crimea. If Russia manages to sway the Moldovan government and station 10,000 troops in Transnistria, suddenly Ukraine's southwestern border would also become vulnerable.”
  • “The Moldovan government becoming another pawn of Putin sounds like the sort of thing that the U.S. government ought to worry about. But it's June, and President Donald Trump hasn't even nominated a candidate to be U.S. ambassador to Moldova. Or next-door Romania. Or Ukraine. Or Russia. Or … well, you get the idea.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:


Footnotes

  1. Russia could, for instance, reciprocate for Iran’s sharing of Shaheed drone production know-how by supplying more S-300 air defense systems, which Iranians already know how to operate, though, of course, Israel would seek to destroy them before they are deployed for operational use.
  2. The treaty doesn’t contain any equivalent of NATO’s Article 5.
  3. Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,241 warheads in January 2025, about 9,614 were in military stockpiles for potential use, according to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025. Russia and the U.S. together possess around 90% of all nuclear weapons. SIPRI estimates that China now has at least 600 nuclear warheads.
  4. The yearbook presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms control, peace and international security.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Leo Correa.

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