3 Ideas To Explore

1. “Some NATO leaders fear that the situation on [Ukraine’s] frontline could deteriorate seriously by this autumn,” with the country reaching “a breaking point within six months,” Gideon Rachman warns in his latest Financial Times column, without defining what that point could look like.¹ “Without a clear vision of victory—or at least of an end to the war—a sense of hopelessness risks descending over the country,” Rachman writes, pointing to the Ukrainian military’s shortages of air defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles as well as to the combat personnel shortages. Even NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte “could struggle to keep smiling by the end of the year,” Rachman concludes in his column, which was published as Western press reported that Russian forces advanced within 12 miles from the capital of northern Ukrainian region of Sumy though the pace of the Russian advance has remained slow: estimated total of 42 square miles in the past week.²

2. In the UK’s The Critic Tony Brenton and Robert Skidelsky of Warwick University argue that the West partly provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citing NATO’s expansion eastward,  the Kosovo war as well as Western support for Ukrainian nationalism and for the revolutions in Ukraine, as drivers of Russian insecurity. According to Lawrence Freedman of King's College London and John Lough of Chatham House, however, NATO gave no binding promise on non-expansion, Ukraine posed no existential threat to Russia, and Putin’s fear was Ukraine’s independence and European choice—not Western provocation. Provoked or not, Russia now constitutes the most significant and direct threat facing this Alliance. This follows from remarks by NATO Secretary General  Rutte at a pre-NATO summit press conference last week. In his remarks Rutte also reminded the audience that the 2024 NATO summit’s declaration said Ukraine was on a “irreversible path” to enter the alliance. In contrast, the 2025 summit’s declaration contained no references to this path, reflecting the Trump team’s reluctance to let Ukraine advance towards NATO membership.

3. Cessation of missile strikes by Israel and U.S. on one side and Iran on the other begs the question: who has won?Leaders of all the three countries have declared victory, but we won’t know which of these declarations is closest to reality until and if plausible evidence emerges in the public domain on how tangible and lasting has been the damage done to Iran’s purported nuclear weapons program by the U.S. and Israeli attacks. What we do know already is that Iranian leaders have stated that their nuclear program has suffered serious damage. That said, some respected analysts believe, contrary to the Trump administration’s views on the effectiveness of the strikes, that the core of Iran’s enrichment program remains intact (Nicole Grajewski thinks so) or that it can be rebuilt (Gary Samore thinks so). We also know that if the leaders of Israel and U.S. did indeed attempt to attain a change of regime in Iran in the course of their exchanges of missile blows with Israel, which is something they either openly called for or hinted at, respectively, then their attempts fell flat. That combination (setback of Iran’s nuclear program and survival of the current regime in that country) is actually in the interest of at least one external key stakeholder, Russia. First, having a nuclear armed neighbor has never been in Russia’s interest. Second, it is in Russia’s interest that whoever rules in Teheran is friendly to Moscow (though the Iranian regime’s friendliness towards the Kremlin may have decreased in the aftermath of the conflict, if accusations that Moscow has done little to help Iran during the conflict are true). One cannot know what is on Putin’s mind. Chances are, however, that the Russian leader views this dual outcome as a “win” that advances Russia’s longer-term interests.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"Russia is Now Actively Funding North Korea’s Nuclear Program," Wojciech Pawlus, RUSI, 06.24.25. 

• "Since Jan. 1, 2024, Russia was involved in transfers of arms and related materiel including artillery, ballistic missiles, and combat vehicles from North Korea to Russia for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine."
• "Russian forces have been training North Korean troops deployed to Russia to directly support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine."
• "Russia has supplied refined petroleum products to North Korea that far exceed the yearly United Nations Security Council-mandated cap."
• "Russia has created a facility via which North Korea can access the international financial system, allowing North Korean banks to clear transactions using the Russian ruble."
• "As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia had previously supported sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program but has now become a financier of nuclear proliferation."
• "The renewed DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed at the end of 2024 marks a binding relationship for mutual benefit, sacrificing Russia’s political credibility to sustain its war effort."
• "Russia’s actions are in breach of Financial Action Task Force standards requiring measures to counter proliferation financing."
• "The international community’s exposure to proliferation financing has skyrocketed due to Russian individuals, companies, and vessels operating within their borders."
• "The global effort to counter proliferation financing is now stalled, but with Russia openly flouting its UN commitments and supporting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, renewed international focus is urgently needed."

"America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran," W.J. Hennigan, New York Times, 06.29.25.

• “One day after 14 American 30,000-pound bombs thundered down on Iran, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a typically florid public statement… claiming the United States had ‘violently trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.’”
• “Unlike North Korea, Iran doesn’t yet have a nuclear weapon. But for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, America’s airstrikes on Iran’s aspirational nuclear infrastructure must have reinforced what he has long held to be true: that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for his and his nation’s survival.”
• “Despite decades-long efforts by the United States and other world powers to persuade North Korea off the nuclear path, the small, isolated nation is estimated to have assembled around 50 warheads and produced enough fissile material for up to 40 more.”
• “Unlike with Iran, President Trump is not threatening war to disarm North Korea. In fact, five months into his second term, he doesn’t seem to be paying much attention at all, even as Mr. Kim has grown stronger through new nuclear weapons, missiles and alliances.”
• “America can no longer afford for its outdated denuclearization demands to be an obstacle to kick-starting diplomacy.”
• “Washington does not officially acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, [but] the U.S. military already plans and conducts drills based on the fact that North Korea has a nuclear arsenal.”
• “The Trump administration should draw up a diplomatic road map that would freeze North Korea’s fast-growing nuclear program in place in exchange for relief from the sanctions that have crippled the nation’s economy.”
• “To understand the scope and sprawl of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program… it is hard to envision how Mr. Kim’s multibillion-dollar, yearslong investment in his nuclear and missile complex… can ever be entirely dismantled.”
• “If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, then Washington’s approach to North Korea certainly meets that mark.”
• “No nation armed with an arsenal of this size has ever given it up—other than former Soviet nations, which didn’t control the weapons on their territories.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

"The Most Significant Long‑Term Consequence of the U.S. Strikes on Iran," Nicole Grajewski, Carnegie Endowment, 06.26.25. 

• "Iran appears to have safeguarded the core of its enrichment program by reportedly relocating its most sensitive materials ahead of the strikes."
• "This physical destruction of nuclear infrastructure may impede immediate operations, but it does not eliminate the risk of proliferation."
• "Whether Operation Midnight Hammer effectively curbs the proliferation threat from Iran hinges on Tehran’s domestic political resolve and the ability of diplomatic efforts to reestablish IAEA safeguards."
• "The sealing of entrances at Fordow and especially Natanz introduces more than short-term access barriers."
• "Despite the damage, Iran’s long-term capacity to reconstitute its nuclear program remains fundamentally intact."
• "The strikes have not eliminated the core elements that have sustained the Islamic Republic’s nuclear trajectory for over two decades: a broad and distributed infrastructure, technically trained personnel, domestic supply chains, and resilient political will."
• "Even assuming total destruction of the sites, the game is not over. The initiative—both politically and operationally—is in the hands of the side that understands the rules of a smart game."
• "Iran’s increasing alignment with Russia, China, and North Korea creates potential pathways for technology transfer and technical cooperation."
• "The collapse of IAEA monitoring represents perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of the U.S. and Israeli operations."
• "Without IAEA oversight, Iran gains operational space to pursue covert reconstitution efforts while the international community loses crucial oversight on Iran’s nuclear activities."

“The U.S. strikes on Iran are bad news for Moscow and Beijing, Laurent Marchand, Ouest France, 06.28.25.

• “Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, reflects on two weeks of Israeli and American strikes against Iran. The risk of escalation persists, he says.”
• LM: “From a nuclear proliferation standpoint, [do the most recent Israeli and American attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure] convince dictators that without the bomb, they are vulnerable?”
• BT: “There are two opposing takeaways. First, without the bomb, you are vulnerable to massive military attack. But the bomb is no guarantee against such an attack either, as shown by Iran’s strikes on Israel in spring 2024. Second, the twelve-day war also illustrates how dangerous pursuing nuclear military activities is.”
• LM: “How are Moscow and Beijing reacting to these American strikes?”
• BT: “Overall, it’s bad news for them. It’s a spectacular show of force. For Moscow, it’s problematic because one of its main regional partners, Iran, is weakened—following regime change in Syria. Iran’s ability to support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, especially with drones, is now in question.”
• LM: “And for Beijing?”
• BT: “While China likes seeing the West distracted by Europe or the Middle East, a war in the Persian Gulf is never good news for Beijing, given its dependence on hydrocarbon imports—especially from Iran.”
• LM: “The NATO summit confirmed Washington’s demand that Europeans contribute much more to their own defense. A victory for Trump?”
• BT: “The U.S. has been urging Europeans to spend more since 1952. It’s not new, though Trump voiced it more forcefully. The key will be whether U.S. military commitment to Europe truly decreases—and whether European military capabilities really grow. I don’t believe all European countries can raise their military budgets to 3.5% in the next decade.”
• LM: “Unrealistic?”
• BT: “Totally unrealistic. Take France: unless taxes rise significantly, and public spending cuts deepen, I don’t see how we’d reach 3.5% by 2035.”

“Patience and pragmatism: Moscow’s view on the Israel‑Iran‑U.S. war,” Kadri Liik and Kirill Shamiev, ECFR, 06.24.25. 

• “While Iranian drones played a major role earlier in the Ukraine war, Moscow can now produce them domestically with improved speed, lethality and radar evasion. The yet unused Iranian short-range ballistic missiles, reportedly supplied in 2024, are similar to the Russian Tornado-S and Iskander-M systems, both of which are currently in short supply but being actively produced.”
• “Moscow will also welcome the normalization of escalating conflicts and regime change efforts around the world, as it will no longer be the sole state accused of war crimes and violating international law. The longer the conflict on the Middle East persists, especially with ongoing U.S. involvement, the more effective Russia’s patience strategy will be perceived.”

"Russia no longer needs Iran’s help to sustain the war in Ukraine," Hanna Notte, Financial Times, 06.25.25.

• “The Israel-Iran war—and the U.S.’s direct involvement in it—was unwelcome news for Russia. It upended Moscow’s strategic calculus in the Middle East and exposed the limitations of its power projection. But this war will not force Russia to ease off in Ukraine.”

"Does Iran’s nuclear program have a future?," Gary Samore, Financial Times, 06.24.25. 

• “Given these risks, Iran might be better off remaining within the NPT and seeking a purely peaceful nuclear energy capacity under international inspection. But, as this war has shown, such an approach is no guarantee against future attacks on ostensibly peaceful enrichment facilities.”

“What the U.S. Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Program Means for NATO,” Stephen Cimbala, Lawrence J. Korb, National Interest, 06.28.25.

• “Time will tell, but the shake and bake of the Iranian regime and its nuclear program may involve spillover from transactional to improved existential deterrence concerning Russia and China.”
• “NATO must invest in competitive, advanced technologies that will define who the great powers are and who the lesser, as we move forward in the twenty-first century.”
• “Given that NATO is a coalition of democracies, public opinion must support an energetic deterrence agenda.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “On GPS: Jake Sullivan says allies are trying to 'de-risk' from the U.S.,” interviewed by Fareed Zakaria, GPS, CNN, 06.29.25. Video.
• “A Weakened Iran Poses an Alliance Test for China, Russia and North Korea," Timothy W. Martin, Thomas Grove and Austin Ramzy, The Wall Street Journal, 06.25.25.
• "Did the Attacks on Iran Succeed? Israel and America Bought Themselves Time but Will Pay in Other Ways," Richard Nephew, Foreign Affairs, 06.26.25.
• "Iran's nuclear program is damaged — not 'obliterated'," Max Boot, The Washington Post, 06.26.25.
• “Russians React to Strikes on Iran: Condemn US, Welcome Its Diversion From Ukraine, No Concrete Help to Iran,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 06.23.25.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"What has happened to Ukraine’s refugees?," Sarah O’Connor, Financial Times, 06.25.25. 

• “The relatively successful integration of Ukrainian refugees abroad (albeit with the caveat of underutilized skills) could become a double-edged sword for Ukraine. The more people settle in, the less they say they want to go back. According to CES surveys, the share of refugees who say they definitely plan to return has dropped from 50% in November 2022 to 20% in December last year.”
• “A well-funded effort, supported by the international community, to rebuild housing and economic capacity would probably encourage some to return. And of course, there could be some advantages to Ukraine in having a vast diaspora community, which could assist with remittances, investment and trade links. But it is a reminder that once war begins and people scatter, it is very hard to put all the pieces back together.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“NATO’s summit cannot disguise Ukraine’s plight,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 06.30.25. 

• “While things are going better for Ukraine diplomatically, the war itself seems to be going worse. Some NATO leaders fear that the situation on the frontline could deteriorate seriously by this autumn.”
• “Military assessments suggest that both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are nearing the point of exhaustion. But while Russia can probably keep up the current level of operations for another year, Ukraine may reach a breaking point within six months—if it does not receive significant new military support.”
• “With Ukraine’s air defenses stretched thin, the Patriots are badly needed… There are also some shortfalls—in particular in Ukrainian troop numbers—that the country’s western allies cannot fix.”
• “Without a clear vision of victory—or at least of an end to the war—a sense of hopelessness risks descending over the country.”
• “Russia has only succeeded in capturing an additional 0.25% of Ukrainian territory over the past year.”
• “Even Rutte could struggle to keep smiling by the end of the year.”

“The Grandfathers Fighting on Ukraine's Front Lines; Kyiv has resisted drafting young men, anxious to protect the country's long-term future. That means there is a lot of gray hair on the battlefield,” Serhii Korovayny, Wall Street Journal, 06.28.25.

• “The call sign “Did” or “Grandpa” is so common in Ukraine’s army that two artillerymen in a four-man howitzer team on the eastern front use it.”
• “Now 46,... one of the two, Andriy Kukhar,.. listens carefully to the radio, awaiting his next instructions as he keeps an eye on his phone for news about his granddaughter back home. The other Did is his 53-year-old comrade Mykola Voskres, who has five grandchildren, most of whom now live abroad.”
• “The ubiquity of the nickname points to a growing problem Ukraine faces as its war for survival continues into its fourth year: It needs all the fighters it can get.”
• “U.S. officials have pressed Ukraine to lower the age of mandatory service, but Kyiv has resisted, worrying that a wholesale slaughter could badly damage the country’s demographic.”
• “The economic turmoil of the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, triggered a sharp drop in birthrates. Ukraine has significantly more men over 40 than in the 18-25 bracket, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.”

• “All men between the ages of 25 and 60 can be drafted to serve in Ukraine’s 880,000-strong defense forces. Ukrainian soldiers say the units’ most common age group is 40 to 45.”

  "Russian and Ukrainian Drones Have Changed Warfare Forever" Harrison Kass, National Interest, 06.29.25.

• "The ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the evolving application of weaponized drones in warfare."
• "Both sides have become increasingly dependent upon drones, the tactics of which have evolved over the course of the four-year conflict."
• "Commercial drones were used to locate enemy positions, adjust artillery fire, spot armored movement, and scan trench lines."
• "By 2023, both sides had begun using first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones to target enemy soldiers and vehicles."
• "Kamikaze drones proved cheap and highly effective for offering stealthy, precise, and psychologically damaging impacts—forcing troops to constantly scan the skies for these tiny invaders."
• "Kamikaze drones were adept at navigating with articulation—around trees and bunkers and obstacles, making them lethal in both urban and forested combat zones."
• "Ukraine has launched DIY long-range drones with 1000-kilometer-plus range, used to target oil refiners, radar stations, and airfields deep within Russian territory."
• "Russia has used Shahed and Geran drones to attack Ukrainian power plants and air defense systems, using swarm attacks overnight to saturate defensive measures."
• "The proliferation of drone warfare has had an immense psychological and strategic impact on both Russian and Ukrainian troops."
• "In retrospect, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will be the war that normalized drone warfare—an inevitability that analysts have been expecting for some time and which now seems to have fully occurred."

"Ukraine is inching towards robot-on-robot fighting. It is ahead of Russia, for now," The Economist, June 26, 2025.

• "UGVs are already rolling around the front lines, with [Ukraine’s] 3rd Assault Brigade among the pioneers."
• “There are currently about 40 mostly private Ukrainian firms producing some 200 UGV models.”
• "In spring Ukraine announced plans to deploy 15,000 ground robots."
• "There are currently about 40 mostly private Ukrainian firms producing some 200 UGV models."
• "The war’s widening 'grey zone'—10km of ground either side of the contact line, watched and punished by drones—is spurring demand for the most robust robots that let men stay underground."
• "'It will be a success if we replace 1% of our manpower needs on the front,' says Vasyl, the founder of UGV Robotics.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine’s Arms Industry Is the Wild West," Luke McGee, Foreign Policy, 06.26.25.
• "The Weapon That Terrorizes Ukrainians by Night [Shahed drones]," Yurii Shyvala (with C.J. Chivers and Finbarr O’Reilly), The New York Times, 06.25.25.
• "I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck," Jakub Jajcay, War on the Rocks, 06.26.25.
• “Ukraine Has Gotten Really Good at Killing Russian Generals,” Peter Suciu, National Interest, 06.28.25.
• “Russia grooms Ukrainian teens as spies and saboteurs, Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 06.30.25.

Military aid to Ukraine:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Shifting the Burden: Europe is currently managing to replace U.S. financial aid to Ukraine, but a new model for military supplies still needs to be worked out," re‑Russia Analytics, 06.20.25.
• Zelenskyy Is Begging Trump for More Patriot Missile Batteries. Can He Deliver?
  Brandon J. Weichert, National Interest, June 29, 2025.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"What is the status of Russia’s frozen sovereign assets?," Alexander Conner and David Wessel, Brookings Institution, 06.24.25.³

• "Among the most potent of these tools was to freeze Russia’s foreign exchange reserves and use them as the basis for a large-scale loan to Ukraine."
• "The Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force most recently estimated frozen reserves at $280 billion."
• "Euroclear manages about 90% of frozen reserves in the EU, while France holds much of the remainder."
• "Neither the nations of the REPO Task Force nor the EU internally have agreed on seizing the frozen reserves outright, largely citing legal barriers and the fear of eroding international norms."
• "Under the plan, the G7 and the EU collectively lent $50 billion to Ukraine, which will be repaid with the interest on frozen Russian assets."
• "The Trump administration has not articulated a policy on frozen Russian assets."
• "Vice President JD Vance has argued against seizure on the grounds that it could harm the dollar."
• "Russian officials say seizure would violate international law and that Russia would challenge seizure in all legal venues possible."
• "In private, the Russians have already written this money off."
• "Using the frozen assets against Russia increases the credibility of Europe’s commitment to Ukrainian security and emphasizes the European position that Russia’s current terms are unacceptable."

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "A well-intentioned Senate move against Russia is hopelessly messy," Jim Geraghty, The Washington Post, 06.24.25. 

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Vladimir Putin’s "Answers to media questions," Presidential Press Office, The Kremlin, 06.27.25.

• “Regarding the [Russian and Ukrainian] memorandums, as expected, there were no surprises. I will not tell you anything surprising, either. These are two absolutely opposing memorandums, but that is precisely why talks are set up and held—to find ways to bring positions closer. The fact that they were diametrically opposed does not seem surprising to me, either. I would not like to go into details, as I believe it would be counterproductive—even harmful—to get ahead of the talks.”
• “The humanitarian aspect matters because, as diplomats say, it creates conditions for substantive discussions on core issues. We agreed that after completing these exchanges and the humanitarian operation which we proposed—specifically, the transfer of the servicemen’s bodies—we would press ahead with more contacts. We have already handed over more than 6,000 bodies and are ready to transfer nearly 3,000 more, but it is now up to the Ukrainian side to agree to accept the remains of their fallen soldiers.”
• “We agreed that after this phase is completed, we would hold the third round of talks. We are ready for it overall. The venue and the time need to be agreed upon. I expect President Erdogan to keep unchanged his supportive stance with regard to this process. We are very grateful to him for that. We stand ready to hold this meeting in Istanbul. As for the exact timeframe, the heads of the negotiating teams from both sides—who remain in constant, direct contact and regularly get on the phone with each other (which, I believe, is a good sign)—are discussing the date for the next meeting. The agenda? In my opinion, the discussion should focus on the memoranda from both sides.”
• “A lopsided game is over. If they [West] want to increase their military spending, let them... What is happening in Western countries? They have been burying us all the time. They themselves will die soon enough. Nevertheless, they bury us all the time, never stopping.”.
• “Russia’s 6.3% of the GDP on defense equals 13.5 trillion rubles, whereas our total GDP is 223 trillion. Is 13.5 of 223 too much or too little? It is not little.”
• “Yes, we do want to complete the special military operation with the result we need. Certainly. This is what we take into account when planning our defense expenses, not aggressive aspirations against Europe and NATO countries. And we want to decrease the expenses, while they want to increase them.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Did the West provoke Russia? Tony Brenton argues that it did and Lawrence Freedman argues that it did not,” Critic, 06.26.25.

Tony Brenton:

• “By ‘provoked’, I do not mean that Western action was the sole cause of the Russian assault on Ukraine… it was a necessary but not a sufficient condition.”
• “At the end of the Cold War… NATO survives... and then the question of NATO expansion arises… The Russians come away feeling betrayed. At regular moments thereafter, you find Russians saying: you promised, and you broke your promise.”
• “George Kennan… said expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy... It inflames nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.”
• “The Kosovo War… was an illegal attack on an ally of Russia, and it was an aggressive war on NATO’s part…” “One consequence is that Yeltsin… looks for a man… to stand up for Russia… Vladimir Putin emerges… part of the consequence of NATO enlargement.”
• “Putin… makes it clear that he is absolutely averse to NATO enlargement.”
• “Bill Burns… warned his bosses… Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite.”
• “Putin told Bush [Junior]… ‘The emergence of a powerful military bloc on our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russian security…’ That is as close as you can get… to saying it would be a casus belli.”
• “Bush ignored him, as we have ignored similar warnings all the way through. And Ukraine is now paying the price.”

Lawrence Freedman:

• “Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. It is not acting in self-defense because Ukraine did not attack Russia.”
• “There can be no justifications for an aggressive war of this sort.”
• “The Russian government might have kidded itself that this would be a walkover… it is still stuck in a hopeless campaign.”
• “Moscow’s lack of understanding of Ukraine’s determined and resilient national identity is another indicator of Russia’s moral as well as military failure.”
• “If the Russian government had not fallen prey to its own insecurities… it would have held fire.”
• “When Russians speak now about the ‘root causes’… they tend to be referring to NATO’s enlargement and the position of Russian speakers inside of Ukraine.”
• “On NATO expansion we must deal with the falsehood that there was once a firm promise… that NATO would not expand.”
• “Ukraine would still not be a member [of NATO] even if there had been no war.”
• “What Putin finds objectionable is not Ukraine’s friendships but its agency—its right to make its own decisions and chart its own course.”
• “Whatever the faults of Western policy it did not goad Putin into invading a sovereign country.”
• “Putin does not deserve our legitimation let alone our apologies. He deserves only condemnation and a determination to make sure that this reckless, shameful, and unwarranted invasion is defeated.”

“Could war in Ukraine have been avoided? Robert Skidelsky argues that the West is partly to blame and John Lough argues that it is not” The Critic, 06.27.25.

Robert Skidelsky:

• “In arguing that Russia’s invasion was provoked, I am not saying that it was justified.”
• “Western support for Ukrainian nationalism has added a crucial foreign policy dynamic to this toxic cocktail by linking it to the West’s aim of incorporating Ukraine into NATO.”
• “The Russian story cites two betrayals: by the Americans for making a promise they had no intention of keeping and by Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev for failing to nail down the promise in a new security treaty.”
• “The immediate cause of the present war was the Maidan uprising of January–February 2014”… “The Russians see [Maidan] as a CIA financed and orchestrated coup against a democratically elected government.”
• “There is plenty of evidence that Kyiv was never willing to grant autonomy to the Donbass region, and we now have the admission by former Chancellor Merkel and former French President Hollande that the Minsk negotiations were a deliberate deception to buy Kyiv time to crush the rebellion by force.”
• “We are guilty of egging the Ukrainians on by supporting, financing, and orchestrating anti-Russian nationalism.”
• “It’s only by accepting our share of blame for the carnage and understanding that conciliation is not the same as surrender that we will be morally fit to take part in the healing needed for a lasting peace.”

John Lough:

• “I believe I am not alone in this hall in regarding this motion as disrespectful to those millions of Ukrainian citizens who, well before the start of the “big war” in 2022, had shown that their allegiance was to an independent Ukraine, one free to choose its own destiny. Their choice is what provoked Russia.”
• “Putin was shocked and humiliated by his miscalculation that he could simply shoehorn Viktor Yanukovych into the presidency.”
• “The desire of Ukrainians for their country to develop along European lines and not on the template of Putin’s Russia was the trigger for the invasions of 2014 and 2022.”
• “This is entirely different from claiming that the West provoked the Russian bear into taking such an extreme step.”
• “Putin regime made Russia unappealing to vast numbers of Ukrainians who were previously well disposed to Russia.”
• “Ukraine was becoming freer and society was developing a voice.”
• “The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s establishment of separatist regimes in Donbas in 2014 galvanized the process of ‘Ukrainianization.’”
• “Ukrainians showed that they were not prepared to be subsumed into Putin’s backward-looking ‘Russian World.’”
• “Ukraine will preserve its independence and find its path to becoming a full member of the European family.”

“Press Conference: Donald Trump Hosts a Press Event at the NATO Summit - June 25, 2025,” The Roll Call, 06.25.25.

• “Europe [is] stepping up to take more responsibility for its security will help prevent future disasters like the horrible situation with Russia and Ukraine. And hopefully we're going to get that solved. Last week, they lost 7,000 soldiers, mostly soldiers, but they're also getting hit in Kyiv. They're getting hit in some of the towns also. And that means life. Life is disappearing also in the cities and towns. That should have never happened, would have never happened if I was president.”
• When asked whether Putin has “territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine:” “That's possible. I mean, it's possible. I know one thing he'd like to settle. He'd like to get out of this thing. It's a mess for him. He called the other day. He said, can I help you with Iran? I said, no, you can help me with Russia. Because you know, in the last few weeks, we took care of India and Pakistan, Kosovo, Serbia.”
• When asked if he discussed ceasefire with Zelensky during their meeting in the Hague: “No, no. I just—I wanted to know how he's doing. He was very nice actually. You know, we had little rough times, sometimes. He was—couldn't have been nicer. I think he'd like to see an end to this. I do. I think what I took from the meeting couldn't have been nicer actually, but I took from the meeting that he'd like to see it end.”
• “You know, last week, they had, I guess close, I told you, seven—close to 7,000 young soldiers, Russian and Ukrainian soldiers were killed 7,000 in one week. It's crazy, it's crazy. So I'll be speaking to Putin. No, I had a good meeting with Zelenskyy.”
• Ukrainians “do want to have the anti-missile missiles, as they call them, the Patriots and we're going to see if we can make some available. You know, they're very hard to get. We need them, too. We were supplying them to Israel and they're very effective. 100 percent effective. Hard to believe how effective. And they do want that more than any other thing, as you probably know.”
• “The Ukraine crisis has also highlighted the urgency of rebuilding our defense industrial base both in the United States and among the allied nations.”
• “We cannot afford to be dependent on foreign adversaries for critical minerals. And as you know, we made a deal with Ukraine to take a vast amount of the land they have for minerals. We need it.”
• “We assessed that the American strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities ha[ve] set back Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons for many years to come. This achievement can continue indefinitely if Iran does not get access to nuclear material, which it won't. It's so, so sad that that whole thing had to go. But I just—I just want to thank our pilots.”

"Pre‑summit press conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte ahead of the NATO Summit in The Hague," NATO, 06.23.25.

• "We meet at a truly historic moment, with significant and growing challenges to our security. Allied leaders will take bold decisions to strengthen our collective defense, making NATO a stronger, a fairer and a more lethal Alliance… This will include a major new defense investment plan, raising the benchmark for defense investment to 5% of GDP."
• “We are committed to defending every inch of Allied territory."
• "The defense investment plan that Allies will agree in The Hague introduces a new baseline: 5% of GDP to be invested in defense. This is a quantum leap that is ambitious, historic, and fundamental to securing our future."
• "A five-fold increase in air defense capabilities. Because we see Russia’s deadly terror from the skies over Ukraine every day, and we must be able to defend ourselves from such attacks."
• "Thousands more tanks and armored vehicles… and millions of rounds of artillery ammunition, because it is by having these stockpiles that we can deter aggression from any threat."
• "At present, there is not nearly enough supply to meet our increased demand on either side of the Atlantic."
• "There is an urgent need. There is also a tremendous upside to ramping up our defense production—not only will we be more secure, but there is huge economic potential for our societies—including more jobs."
• "The most significant and direct threat facing this Alliance remains the Russian Federation. Moscow continues to wage war against Ukraine with the support of North Korea, Iran, China, as well as Belarus."
• "We all want peace for the Ukrainian people and an end to the terrible war against them. Yet, as work is ongoing in pursuit of a just and lasting peace, we must continue to make sure Ukraine has what it needs to defend today and deter in the future. Our support for Ukraine is unwavering and will persist."
• "This is the reason why, last year in Washington, NATO Allies agreed that for Ukraine, there is an irreversible path to enter NATO, and that is still true today, and it will still be true after this Summit."
• "If Russia would try something today, they know our reaction will be devastating. It would be very unwise by Vladimir Putin or his crony in Belarus to try anything against us."
• "But there is great worry in many circles that between 3, 5, 7 years from now, Russia will be able to successfully attack us if we do not start investing more today."
• "China is rapidly building up its military—a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030 and a massive naval build-up—and we have to be sure we can defend ourselves against them as well."

"The Hague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2025)," NATO, 06.25.25. 

1. “We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in The Hague to reaffirm our commitment to NATO, the strongest Alliance in history, and to the transatlantic bond. We reaffirm our ironclad commitment to collective defense as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. We remain united and steadfast in our resolve to protect our one billion citizens, defend the Alliance, and safeguard our freedom and democracy.

2. United in the face of profound security threats and challenges, in particular the long- term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the persistent threat of terrorism, Allies commit to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defense requirements as well as defense-and security-related spending by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective obligations, in accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Our investments will ensure we have the forces, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, warfighting readiness, and resilience needed to deter and defend in line with our three core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

3. Allies agree that this 5% commitment will comprise two essential categories of defense investment. Allies will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually based on the agreed definition of NATO defense expenditure by 2035 to resource core defense requirements, and to meet the NATO Capability Targets. Allies agree to submit annual plans showing a credible, incremental path to reach this goal. And Allies will account for up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defense industrial base. The trajectory and balance of spending under this plan will be reviewed in 2029, in light of the strategic environment and updated Capability Targets. Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours, and, to this end, will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defense and its defense industry when calculating Allies’ defense spending.

4. We reaffirm our shared commitment to rapidly expand transatlantic defense industrial cooperation and to harness emerging technology and the spirit of innovation to advance our collective security. We will work to eliminate defense trade barriers among Allies and will leverage our partnerships to promote defense industrial cooperation.

5. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. We look forward to our next meeting in Türkiye in 2026 followed by a meeting in Albania.”

"Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum," NATO, 06.24.25. 

• "Today, NATO’s military edge is being aggressively challenged by a rapidly rearming Russia, backed by Chinese technology and armed with Iranian and North Korean weapons."
• "It’s simply unthinkable that Russia, with an economy 25 times smaller than NATO’s, should be able to outproduce and outgun us."
• "We must spend more, to prevent war. We must win this new war of production."
• "Across the Alliance, we have opened hundreds of new production lines and expanded existing ones. We are now on course to produce more ships, planes and ammunition than we have done in decades."
• "There’s no defense without a strong defense industry. And there’s no European security without a strong transatlantic bond."
• "Only Europe and North America together can rise up and meet the challenge."
• "We are working very closely with Ukraine, almost as one team, where we have NATO and EU teams coordinating efforts to support Ukraine’s defense."
• "The Readiness 2030 plan promises to unleash up to 800 billion euros for defense."
• "NATO’s leaders are about to take an historic step to provide the resources necessary for strong defense, with an ambitious new Defense Investment Plan to spend 5% of GDP for defense."
• "The better must not be the enemy of good—we focus on speeding up cooperation among the vast majority of allies rather than slowing down on one or two laggards."

"Five key priorities for NATO after the summit in The Hague—and how to make progress," Armida van Rij and Kajsa Ollongren, Chatham House, 06.27.25.

• “The first priority is support for Ukraine.”
• “The second priority is continuing the review of NATO’s strategic approach to Russia that was agreed at last year’s summit.”
• “The third priority is preparing for U.S. troop reductions in Europe”.
• “The fourth priority: the need to build industrial capacity.”
• “The fifth and final priority is engagement with NATO’s Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners to help counter China.”

"NATO’s “Brain Death” in The Hague," Max Bergmann, CSIS, 06.25.25. 

• "It’s generally unwise to initiate a fight you are unlikely to win."
• "NATO has just kick-started a massive guns vs. butter fight in Europe."
• “There is… a clear consensus that the way Europeans spend on defense is utterly wasteful and ineffective."
• "It is a dangerous illusion for European countries to remain fixated on inputs (defense spending) rather than addressing the more structural issue of translating spending into outputs (improved combat effectiveness)."
• "Raising the European defense spending commitment to 5% of GDP may be politically unviable under current conditions."
• "This would create a political opportunity for large populist parties on the far-right and far-left to argue they are for 'peace' and engagement with Russia in order to preserve national social services."
• "This means that every NATO meeting for the next decade could easily be consumed with finger-wagging lectures and U.S. scolding about whether Europe is fulfilling its spending commitments fast enough."
• "As the threat of Russian aggression becomes more acute, these countries will decry the lack of solidarity… Russia is seen everywhere as a major threat to Europe."
• "NATO risks validating Emmanuel Macron’s earlier warning that the alliance could become 'brain dead' if it fails to get serious in confronting its new strategic reality."

“‘Ukraine Can Win’ Trump’s Nominee for Europe Commander Tells Senate,” Steve Brown, Kyiv Post, 06.25.25.

• U.S. President Donald Trump’s nominee for the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Lt Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, faced a Senate confirmation hearing on June 24 alongside Vice Admiral Charles Cooper, nominated to be Commander of the US Central Command. Grynkewich was questioned on a range of security issues that the US currently faces, including the war in Ukraine, during which he said that he believed Ukraine could win a war against Russia.
• Alabama’s Republican Senator Tommy Tuberville asked him why he thought that way, to which Grynkewich replied: “I think any time your own homeland is threatened, you fight with a tenacity that’s difficult for us to conceive of – if we haven’t found ourselves in that same situation.”
• On the face of it, his view on the potential for a Ukrainian victory contradicts the publicly stated views of Trump and his team that there can be no military solution to the war in Ukraine and that Kyiv and Moscow must negotiate an end to the fighting. However, he went on to say: “The president has been very clear on his objectives in Ukraine are to achieve an end to the war and a ceasefire, and if confirmed, my responsibility will be to provide him a wide range of options in order to achieve that objective.”
• Grynkewich said that US forces have been actively studying the course of the war in Ukraine and have identified lessons to be drawn from key areas, including the upsurge in the role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). “The pace of innovation that we’ve seen really on both sides of the equation has shown that smaller drones, precisely maneuvered with lethal payloads, can have a devastating effect on enemy forces on the front line,” Grynkowych said.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Putin Has Lost Something Worse Than a War," Michael Kimmage, The New York Times, 06.24.25.
• NATO is worth paying for. Trump is right that Europe needs to do more, Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 06.24.25.
• "Might Unmakes Right: The Catastrophic Collapse of Norms Against the Use of Force," Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, Foreign Affairs, 06.24.25.
• "Beware the Europe You Wish For: The Downsides and Dangers of Allied Independence," Celeste A. Wallander, Foreign Affairs, 06.24.25.
• "A Putin War With NATO Would Cost the World $1.5 Trillion," Bloomberg, 06.24.25. (infographics)
• "NATO Has Dodged Collapse Before. It’s Never Been This Close," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 06.24.25.
• "The MAGA Isolationist Mirage," Karl Rove, The Wall Street Journal, 06.26.25
• "With Trump, Flattery Gets NATO Somewhere," Daniel J. Wakin, The New York Times, 06.25.25
• "At the NATO Summit, Trump Casts Himself as a Global Peacemaker," Tyler Pager, The New York Times, 06.28.25.
• "The war in Ukraine shows the West can re‑arm without re‑industrializing," The Economist, 06.26.25.
• "As U.S. Dismantles VOA, Rival Powers Hope to Fill the Void," Tiffany Hsu, The New York Times, 06.25.25.
• “NATO Is Avoiding a Difficult Conversation,” Rawi Agrawal, Foreign Policy, 06.25.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Russia and China amid Trade Wars and Sanctions," Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 06.27.25. 

• "The trade war in the form of increased import tariffs became one of the hallmarks of Donald Trump’s second presidential term."
• "China was one of the few countries that dared to mirror the tariff increases."
• "In the U.S. trade war ‘against the whole world’, China remains the main target."
• "China’s growing industrial and technological power is turning into a political problem for the United States."
• "So far, the U.S.-China trade war has had little impact on Russia–China relations."
• "Even amid new escalations of the trade war, China is unlikely to abandon Russian supplies."
• "If the negotiations fail, the U.S. is ready to return to escalating sanctions."
• "Chinese companies have become a key target of U.S. secondary sanctions related to Russia."
• "The mere threat of secondary sanctions forced Chinese banks to exercise great caution in transactions with Russia."
• "The EU’s practice of secondary sanctions is still far weaker than that of the United States."
• "Russia could feel the consequences of the trade war if the U.S. demands that China buy American energy as a way to fix the trade balance."
• "Such a measure would hardly solve the imbalance problem, but it could affect the volume of Russian oil supplies to China."
• "For China, Russia remains a reliable supplier of energy resources that does not engage in politicization."

“Hope in fraught times: Trump-Xi bond could shift ties for the better, say US experts,” Yew Lun Tian, Straits Times, 06.26.25.

• “Speaking at a session developed in collaboration with The Straits Times at a World Economic Forum event in Tianjin on June 26, Harvard professor Graham Allison pointed out that Mr. Trump is not a China hawk. Prof Allison noted that Mr. Trump had said to Mr. Xi that when China and the US work together, they can solve most of the world’s problems.
• He said he believed that Mr. Trump is determined to be a “great deal maker” and a “great peacemaker.”
• “If he is going to succeed in that mission, the opportunity for Trump and Xi to surprise us on the upside, I think, is enough to be hopeful,” said the national security analyst who has served under former US presidents Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan.” 

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

•  “Russia Won’t Sit Out a U.S.‑China Asia‑Pacific War,” Garrett I. Campbell, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 06.24.25.
• "Why Recent Surprise Attacks Against Russia and Iran Should Worry Taiwan," Michael A. Hunzeker and Yuster Yu, War on the Rocks, 06.25.25.

Missile defense:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Trump Wants a ‘Golden Dome’ to Shield the U.S.. Is It Even Feasible?" Courtney McBride, Bloomberg, 06.25.25 

Nuclear arms:

“The world is going nuclear,” Fiona Hill interviewed, UnHerd, 06.30.25. Video. 

• “In the video interview, “Dr. Hill analyses the ‘12-day war’ between Israel and Iran in June 2025, ended by U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, resulting in a fragile ceasefire. She explores the risks of increasing global nuclear proliferation and the defense ties among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and debates NATO’s 2025 Hague Summit pledge to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP and Western military preparedness against these threats. Dr. Hill and Freddie Sayers examine whether foreign policy is turning more hawkish and realist, ask whether today’s volatile world of hybrid warfare and global instability brings us closer to World War III.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How to Survive the New Nuclear Age: National Security in a World of Proliferating Risks and Eroding Constraints," Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Foreign Affairs, 06.24.25.
• "Europe’s Bad Nuclear Options: And Why They May Be the Only Path to Security," Florence Gaub and Stefan Mair, Foreign Affairs, 06.24.25.
• "Optimal Deterrence: How the United States Can Preserve Peace and Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race with China and Russia," James M. Acton, CFR, 06.18.25. 

Counterterrorism:

“Terrorism Means Something Different Now: The firewall between violent nonstate actors and conventional warfare has become highly permeable,” Foreign Policy, Colin P. Clarke and Christopher P. Costa, Foreign Policy, 06.25.25.

• "The recent conflict between Iran and Israel… has once again raised the specter of Iran-backed terrorism in the West."
• "Even as terrorism remains a live issue, there is a clear mismatch between the level of the threat and the resources allocated to combat it."
• "Great-power competition and counterterrorism are not mutually exclusive."
• "If a state-sponsored terrorist attack emanating from the Kremlin led to the downing of a cargo plane... could that lead to a broader war? Almost certainly."

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Central Asian Fighters and Global Jihad," Andrew C. Kuchins, The National Interest, 06.24.25. Video, with participation of Gavin Helf, Asfandyar Mir, and Noah Tucker.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Can AI help Russia Decisively Improve its Information War Against the West?," Dr Antonio Giustozzi, RUSI, 06.27.25.
• "How the Kremlin shapes the information environment," Julia Voo and Virpratap Vikram Singh, IISS, 06.26.25.
• “For NATO’s collective defense, Europe must lead on data sharing,” Georgia Cole and Isabella Wilkinson, Chatham House, 06.24.25.
• "The Risks of Preventive Attack in the Race for Advanced Artificial Intelligence," Zachary Burdette and Hiwot Demelash, RAND, 06.26.25.
• "Hand and Glove: How Authoritarian Cyber Operations Leverage Non‑state Capabilities," Jakob Bund, SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 06.26.25. 

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"The Russian Federal Budget 2025–2027," Mark Stalczynski, RAND, 06.26.25. 

• “The Putin government has asserted that the Federal Budget 2025–2027 will enable Russia to achieve its war aims in Ukraine while eventually transforming Russia into a “more sovereign,” defense technology–focused economy, in which demographics will improve over the long term because of continued transfers to families and veterans. However, when confronted with the fact that National Defense and other spending on the war could not be reduced and larger deficits could not be easily offset by the NWF and domestic borrowing, the government chose to raise taxes within the Income and Imports revenue category, which was growing along with the general economy. This approach creates a large problem moving forward: how to continue economic growth amid sanctions and external shocks on the back of high National Defense spending while controlling inflation.”
• “The Russian economy is not immune to external shocks, and the government is again seeing its forecasts miss targets during these uncertain times. In April 2025, the government passed an amendment to the Federal Budget 2025–2027, in which the forecast for Oil and Natural Gas revenues was revised down in 2025 from 10.9 trillion rubles to 8.3 trillion rubles, as the price of Russian oil is now forecast to be lower—from $69 per barrel to $56—because of the announced U.S. tariffs, the effects on the global economy, and a decision by OPEC+ to boost oil production. The result is an upward revision to the deficit from 0.5% to 1.2% of GDP for 2025 only, with no changes to the planning years. Additionally, the inflation forecast was increased from 4.5% in 2025 to 7.6%, another harrowing sign.”
• “Economists are beginning to predict “stagflation”—that is, high inflation and low economic growth. The Putin government is unlikely to decrease National Defense spending, not only because of its war aims, but also because it has become the main driver of economic growth. An alternative source of growth could be sanctions relief. Providing Russia with sanctions relief could potentially allow it to attract foreign investment, improve its fiscal condition, and find its soft landing on inflation. But there is no guarantee that the Putin government would reorient its budget to a prewar level of National Defense spending.”
• “The Federal Budget 2025–2027 does not appear to be exhausted despite the amended forecast, but underlying economic conditions and external factors suggest that Russia will be increasingly constrained over time—something that the United States and its allies and partners should well consider during negotiations with Russia.”

"The Cat and Mouse Game of Internet Censorship and Circumvention in Russia," Natalia Garina, Russia.Post, 06.27.25.

• “According to a Levada center survey, in March one third of respondents in Russia reported being unable to access familiar digital services.”
• “VPN users rose to 36%, marking an increase of 11 percentage points compared to March 2024.”
• “The first attempts to restrict online information in Russia date back to 2012, when the authorities began blocking websites by their IP addresses for disseminating ‘illegal content.’”
• “In 2022, more than 247,000 websites or internet pages were blocked, including Russian and foreign media outlets.”
• “Meta was designated an extremist organization, and the social networks Facebook and Instagram were banned.”
• “By January of this year, YouTube had been almost completely blocked… in May its traffic from Russia dropped to around 10% compared with around 43% in July 2024.”
• “The most popular tool to bypass the Russian government’s censorship is a VPN, which creates an encrypted connection between a user’s device and a server.”
• “In March 2025, 36% of Russians reported using VPNs regularly or occasionally, up from 25% in March 2024.”
• “Since March 1, 2024, it has been illegal to share information about circumvention tools, including scientific, technical and statistical information.”
• “Many of the most popular VPN services and circumvention tools… are now blocked in Russia. Roskomnadzor shut down 197 VPN services in 2024 alone.”

“Soviet Figures Still Dominate Russians’ Most Outstanding Global Figures List,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 06.27.25.

• “When recently asked by the Levada Center to name “the most outstanding individuals of all time and peoples,” the top three named by Russian respondents were Josef Stalin (42%), Vladimir Putin (31%) and Vladimir Lenin (28%). In fact, of the top 10, only three are not military-political leaders: poet Alexander Pushkin (4th), cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (6th) and chemist Dmitri Mendeleev (10th), according to the results of Levada’s poll, which was conducted in April and published in June Levada is yet to take its analytical take on the dominance of authoritarian leaders in the Top 10. Meanwhile, one can guess that it might have something to do for a strong preference for a strong state led by a strong leader among many Russians, which should not be surprising, given the long history of authoritarian rule in Russia.”
• “It should be noted that of the top 10, figures, as many as five came to prominence in Soviet times: Stalin, Lenin, Gagarin, Georgy Zhukov and Leonid Brezhnev, while four lived in pre-Soviet Russia: Pushkin, Mendeleev, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Opposition-minded Russians may find Vladimir Putin not so great, especially when compared to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, but he is the only person in Levada’s April 2025 top 10 to have come to prominence in post-Soviet times.” 

"Eastern Pivot 2.0: Forward to Greater Eurasia," Sergey Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 06.26.25 Clues from Russian Views.

• “Right now, we are repelling what is, hopefully, the last attack by the declining West, which is trying to reverse history by inflicting a strategic defeat on us on the battlefields of Ukraine. In this struggle, we must win—even if it means threatening or, if necessary, using the harshest means. This is essential not only for the country’s victory but also to prevent the world from sliding into World War III.”
• “But… the fight with the West must not distract us from the most important constructive tasks. Among them is the new development and rise of the entire east of the country. Not only do the development of geoeconomics and geopolitics demand this, but the inevitable climate change over the coming decades both necessitates and proves the feasibility and benefit of advancing and energetically implementing a new—Siberian Turn for all of Russia, shifting the center of its spiritual, human, and economic development to the East.”
• “The conquest of the American West, which everyone knows about, is but a pale shadow of the series of feats achieved by our ancestors.”

Defense and aerospace:

• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• "Big powers and the United Nations: The UN’s dysfunction undermines global security, argue Ban Ki-moon and Helen Clark," The Economist, 06.24.25. 

Ukraine:

"Foxes Guarding The Henhouse: What Ukrainian MPs Promised Before Being Convicted Of Corruption," Andrii Tkachuk, Transparency International, 06.23.25.

• “Ukrainians are still waiting for corruption convictions, or at least they think they are. What often goes unnoticed is that many such verdicts have already been delivered. And not just for judges, prosecutors, or heads of state-owned enterprises, but also for some of the most brazen top officials, including Members of Parliament.”
• “According to statistics, the High Anti-Corruption Court has issued more than a dozen corruption convictions against MPs. And each one serves as a reminder of just how empty campaign promises can be when it comes to our future lawmakers. Most ironically, during their campaigns, nearly every second MP on this dishonorable list pledged to eliminate corruption and hold greedy officials accountable.”
• “Failed reforms, incompetent officials, total political corruption have led to a significant decline in the socio-economic well-being of the population over the past five years,”—that’s how the thunderous election manifesto of MP Anatolii Hunko begins. The same Hunko who, in March this year, was sentenced by the HACC to seven years in prison with confiscation of property. Sure, the verdict hasn’t entered into force yet (he’s appealing), but the symbolism is hard to ignore. In 2023, Hunko was caught red-handed receiving an $85,000 bribe for granting use of 1,700 hectares of state-owned land belonging to the National Academy of Agrarian Sciences of Ukraine (NAAS). And that was only a down payment—the full bribe he allegedly sought totaled $221,000. But the real plot twist? At the very same time he was pocketing bribes for land deals, Hunko was chairing a parliamentary temporary investigative commission, dedicated, no less, to uncovering corruption at NAAS.”
• “All these examples vividly illustrate just how wide the gulf can be between a campaign promise and a public servant’s real-life behavior. Despite loud pledges to fight corruption and clean up the system, these MPs managed to find themselves right in the thick of corruption scandals. At the same time, their stories also show that Ukraine’s anti-corruption system is increasingly capable of holding even high-ranking, politically connected figures to account.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Could a Woman End Turkmenistan’s International Isolation?, Galiya Ibragimova, Carnegie Politika, 06.27.25.

• “For the last few years, Turkmenistan has been ruled by the father and son tandem of Gurbanguly and Serdar Berdymukhamedov. Their power-sharing arrangement began in 2022 when Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov stepped down as president in favor of his son and became the head of the People’s Council of Turkmenistan. Now, though, the tandem has become a triumvirate with the emergence of a third key player: Serdar’s sister, Oguljahan Atabayeva.”
• "Atabayeva has suddenly taken on a public role, and is regularly shown on state-owned television."
• "It has long been rumored that Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is unhappy with how his son is running the country."
• "Relatives usually end up playing a major role in running the country. This is not simply nepotism: blood ties are seen as the ultimate guarantor of loyalty."
• "The rise of Atabayeva seems to be part of the same process of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov trying to show that he remains in control."
• "Atabayeva’s cosmopolitanism means that she could easily step into such a role [like a First Lady]."

"The bear behind the ballot: Moldova’s election in the shadow of war," Andrew Wilson, ECFR, 06.30.25.

• “Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moldova has been Russia’s second most important target, with hybrid war stopping just short of direct military intervention.”
• “After three tense votes rife with Russian interference, Moldova is gearing up to elect its next parliament in September that will see it through until 2029—the eve of the country’s possible EU accession.”
• “In the parliamentary election, President Maia Sandu’s pro-European party, PAS, will run up against a variety of political parties supported by Russia. These range from outwardly pro-Russian to ostensibly pro-European parties designed to chip away at PAS’s vote.”
• “In the uphill battle against Russian interference, the EU should support Moldova by spending its allocated funding more wisely, fighting misinformation, communicating the benefits of EU integration and providing Moldova with a clear path to accession.”

See this for more commentary/analysis on this subject

"Belarus Is a Warning," Pasha Kritchko, The New York Times, 06.28.25

Footnotes

1. Back in January 2025 Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, was reported to have warned Ukraine’s survival could be at risk if talks to end the war with Russia don’t start by summer. The authenticity of this warning, which reported by Ukrainska Pravda, was questioned, however.
2. RM’s calculations, which are, for this occasion, based on Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s data on Russia’s territorial control, indicate that Russia gained 42 square miles (108 square kilometers) in the period of June 22–29, 2025.
3. This post was originally published in April 2025 and has been updated to reflect more recent developments. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Remko de Waal, Pool Photo via AP.