Russia Analytical Report, June 22–29, 2026

4 Ideas to Explore

  1. Vladimir Putin has disclosed that he received “new proposals” from Kyiv, including mutual halts on deep strikes and confining fighting to four Ukrainian provinces (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk). Answering questions of a journalist from the Kremlin pool on June 28 he appeared to reject these proposals, arguing that Kyiv had made them to try win “salvation” for its troops. Putin then vowed to pursue “the final liberation of Donbas and Novorossiya." In mentioning Novorossiya, Putin may be signaling a re‑expansion of Russian territorial ambitions in Ukraine. According to ISW, the Kremlin believes nine eastern and southern Ukrainian provinces1 constitute Novorossiya. The Kremlin used to refer to Novorossiya for years (since 2014), but the frequency of such references diminished somewhat last year as Putin, perhaps, became hopeful that Volodymyr Zelensky would agree to withdraw from the remainder of Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) as a condition for peace talks. These hopes perhaps peaked at the 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska, but then diminished as Zelenskyy continued to refuse to give up the remainder of Donbas with or without U.S. mediation. This may explain why Putin—who insists Russian forces are advancing in Donbas—invoked Novorossiya again on June 28, signaling that Kyiv’s refusal to give up the remainder of Donbas will be punished by Russia reviving more expansive territorial demands (hence, Novorossiya). A report last month by NYT’s Paul Sonne and his colleagues estimated that “[a]t its average monthly rate of advance so far this year, it would take Russia more than 30 months to seize full control of the Donbas.”
  2. Ukrainian medium and long-range drone and missile strikes are depicted across multiple Western media outlets as a combined military and influence campaign that is inflicting mounting stress on Russia. The Financial Times’ Max Seddon and Fabrice Deprez report that Putin has publicly conceded drone “problems” and fuel shortages over the weekend. Meanwhile, Dave Lawler at Axios reminds us that last week saw Volodymyr Zelenskyy announce “a 40-day influence operation” to be carried out by Kyiv’s long-range strike units “aimed at compelling [Russia] to end the war.” Catherine Belton and Natalia Abbakumova at the Washington Post also report on the “influence operation” in an article entitled “Unease deepens in Russia as Ukraine steps up long-range strikes.” Influence operations are much more about manipulating perceptions than changing facts. An influence operation is essentially what reality TV (an entertainment format intimately familiar to both President Trump and President Zelenskyy) does: carefully selecting, framing, and presenting information to shape how audiences feel and what they believe.
  3. CEIP contributor Artyom Shraibman argues that Belarus’s quiet compliance with Kyiv’s ultimatum to shut border relay stations aiding Russian drones signals a new vulnerability-driven pragmatism in Minsk: Lukashenko, aware that Belarus is highly exposed to Ukrainian long‑range strikes and that Belarusians are unwilling to fight, is making unilateral concessions that reveal Russia’s waning ability to shield its ally. Still, Belarus under Lukashenko remains a growing security threat as an integrated platform for Russian coercion, according to Ondrej Ditrych at EUISS.
  4. In a counterpoint to collapse narratives, The Economist’s “Russia’s war economy has problems—but is not about to crash” article argues that talk of imminent breakdown of the Russian economy under sanctions and Ukrainian strikes is overstated. The article concedes the 0.2% year‑on‑year drop of the Russian GDP in Q1 2026, but argues that this decline does not continue a genuine recession. Citing alternative gauges (Goldman Sachs, Russia’s VEB), The Economist sees sluggish growth but no slump, noting real GDP per capita up 12% since 2022, real wages 25% above 2019, unemployment near 2%, inflation at about half its recent peak over 10%, and April 2026 exports slightly above the previous year. It stresses that, despite war spending of 7–8% of GDP and a deficit near 3%, the Kremlin still has substantial fiscal levers—higher taxes, sovereign funds, captive domestic borrowing, and even deposit “raids.” Meanwhile Torbjörn Becker and Moritz Schularick argue in a Kiel Institute report that “the Russian economy has not collapsed, but the structural foundations have eroded faster than the headline numbers reveal.”

U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Radioactive Measures: Hybrid Threats and Nuclear Risks in Europe and Beyond,” Daniel Salisbury, IISS, 24.06.26.

  • Salisbury writes that “Russia has increasingly ramped up hybrid activities in recent years against the backdrop of its illegal war in Ukraine,” from “incursions and harassment by small uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the sabotage and targeting of critical infrastructure, as well as conducting cyber operations and disinformation,” and that these have “increasingly blurred the lines between war and peace.” He argues there is “some evidence that Russia is interested in manipulating nuclear risks to turn up the pressure on Western capitals,” noting “recent small UAV activity around nuclear bases and power plants in Europe” that “suggests an intent to create unease around nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.” Beyond Putin’s “nuclear saber-rattling,” he says, “Russian disinformation has also focused on nuclear-related narratives in Ukraine and beyond, collectively aiming to destabilize Europe, generate uncertainty and fear, and undermine public support for Western governments’ arming of Ukraine.”
  • The report stresses that “it is not only Russia that has recognized the potential to weaponize concerns over radiation,” pointing to Chinese and North Korean cyber operations against “nuclear organizations, such as operators and government bodies,” and disinformation “seeking to raise concerns around the safety and security of nuclear facilities and manipulate public attitudes towards nuclear power.” Salisbury concludes that while hybrid activity may “marginally increase some physical risks to nuclear infrastructure” and “create some potential for escalation,” “the greatest impacts lie in the information sphere,” as states “exploit concerns about nuclear safety and security in information warfare.” Such operations, he warns, target the “social license” for nuclear energy and deterrence: by “undermin[ing] confidence in the safety and security of nuclear assets,” they can erode “political and public acceptance of the technology,” with “strategic implications” for energy security, public support for nuclear weapons and “partnerships and basing arrangements with nuclear allies.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Between War and Peace: What the Iran–Trump Deal Means for Russia,” Nikita Smagin, Carnegie Politika, 06.23.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • Smagin says that the prospect of ending the U.S.–Iran conflict is “not the best news for Moscow,” arguing that the oil shock from their war “allowed Russia to smooth out serious budget problems, avoiding cuts that had seemed inevitable” and “pulled international attention and American weapons away from Ukraine.” He notes that “in May alone the Russian federal budget received 175 billion rubles of additional oil and gas revenues,” and writes that the current situation—“when the Strait of Hormuz is now opened, now closed”—“quite suits Russia. The main thing is that the sides don’t reach a final agreement.”
  • On Iran, he calls the impact “mixed:” Russia had to halt work at Bushehr and other projects, but “the fighting and the American blockade forced Iran to step up cooperation with Russia,” rerouting “about two million tons of wheat” via the Caspian and boosting Russian grain exports to Iran by “81%.” Tehran is trying to make the Caspian a “‘road of life’ supplying it with food and weapons,” including Russian‑adapted “Geran’” drones, which Smagin says are “a modernized… analogue of Iran’s Shahed‑136.”
  • The real danger, he argues, is that an Iran–U.S. deal “potentially threatens Russia’s main gain from the war—energy prices”: after the ceasefire memorandum, “the price of oil immediately went down,” and when Washington granted a 60‑day export waiver, “the same thing happened.” If sanctions are lifted, Iran could again export not just to China but “to other countries of the world,” and “even the expectation of the return of Iranian oil may further lower prices.” While he thinks a full Iranian “pivot to the West” is unlikely, he warns that renewed oil income “may give Tehran a chance to improve its economic situation” and “reduce its dependence on Russia.” For now, Smagin concludes, this “intermediate position between peace and war quite suits Moscow,” as it can “simultaneously earn from elevated oil prices and increase its influence in Iran,” even if a future deal keeps markets jittery.

“Iran War Fallout Gifts Putin Diplomatic Victory at ASEAN Summit,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Politika, 06.25.26.

  • Gabuev notes that while “images of an explosion lifting the roof of an oil storage tank into the air in the Russian capital quickly went viral,” Putin was in Kazan, where the ASEAN summit became “one of the Kremlin’s biggest diplomatic successes since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.” Despite sanctions, a stalled battlefield and economic problems, he writes, Putin “was able to gather the leaders of one of the world’s most dynamic regions,” representing “more than 700 million people and about 9% of global GDP growth,” largely because “U.S. President Donald Trump’s war against Iran has created major problems for the countries of Southeast Asia, forcing them to seek alternative sources of hydrocarbons and fertilizer,” and “one of their solutions has been to turn to Moscow.”
  • ASEAN states, Gabuev argues, are “an important market for Russian exports: not only oil, gas, and fertilizers, but also weapons and nuclear power equipment,” and Russia “must rapidly build trade, technological, and financial ties with the Global South if it wants to sustain its confrontation with the West.” He stresses that “none of the documents signed at the summit mentioned the war in Ukraine,” and that Singapore’s prime minister told Putin his country valued “our relationship with Russia,” a line Russian media “had a field day with.” Still, he cautions that ASEAN “will not become a counterweight to Russia’s dependence on China,” noting that in 2025 Russia–ASEAN trade was about $22 billion versus $228 billion with China, and that without the Ukraine war, sanctions, and “pressing need to develop these ties as a substitute for relations with the West,” such outreach “would have been much easier to achieve.”

“Is the Iran War America’s Winter War?,” Arman Mahmoudian, National Interest, 06.26.26.

  • Mahmoudian argues that critics who say Trump’s Iran memorandum “appears too favorable to Tehran” worry it “may embolden rival states to act more aggressively, assuming that Washington is unwilling or unable to sustain the costs of escalation.” He draws a parallel to the USSR’s 1939–40 Winter War, writing that the Red Army’s “mediocre performance against a much smaller opponent severely damaged the Soviet Union’s military reputation” and reinforced Hitler’s belief that “we have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down”—a “catastrophic miscalculation” that helped bring on Operation Barbarossa. In both cases, he says, a great power enters a war with “real security concerns” but with “broader political ambitions that complicate the conflict and distort its aftermath,” and ends up accepting “an outcome that critics interpret as less than decisive.”
  • He notes that the United States “did not lose militarily in Iran” and “demonstrated impressive operational capabilities,” degrading air defenses and striking “more than a thousand Iranian targets,” while casualties were “limited in relation to the scale of the campaign.” But like the Soviets, Washington assumed “overwhelming force would produce rapid political results” and instead wound up with “an interim memorandum of understanding, rather than a decisive settlement” on nuclear, missile, proxy, or regime questions. The real constraint, he argues, was not military but political and economic: “opposition at home, division within Trump’s own political coalition, market anxiety, energy disruption, and the pressure created by Iran’s ability to threaten or obstruct the Strait of Hormuz.”
  • The danger, Mahmoudian contends, is that adversaries “may look at the U.S.–Iran war and conclude that Washington’s tolerance for escalation is lower than its military power suggests.” The lesson they are likely to draw is “not that America will not defend itself, but that America’s willingness to fight for others—Ukraine, Taiwan, Israel, or Gulf partners—may be more fragile than before.” He warns that, as in 1941, misreading resolve can be fatal: “wars often begin not because power is absent, but because power is misread.” If rivals conclude that the United States “remains powerful, but its patience is shorter, its domestic consensus weaker, and its commitments easier to test,” he argues, that is “a conclusion U.S. adversaries should not be encouraged to test, and one Washington should be careful not to confirm.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Why a ‘whole-of-society’ model is essential for Ukraine’s recovery,” Orysia Lutsevych and Jaroslava Barbieri, Chatham House, 06.22.26.

  • Lutsevych and Barbieri write that “Russia’s full-scale invasion and the ongoing war have fundamentally altered Ukraine’s social landscape,” with needs “from psychological and rehabilitation support for veterans, to housing and employment for internally displaced people (IDPs)… [to] educational and mental health support for children,” and that “the sheer scale of social needs exceeds the capacity of traditional government structures.” They argue that “Ukraine’s success in resisting Russian invasion lies in its ‘whole-of-society’ model of defense—involving a high level of mobilization among citizens, local community leaders, philanthropic organizations and the private sector,” and that civil society “stands willing to apply this innovative and collaborative spirit to the post-war recovery.”
  • Their 2026 survey shows that “65% of CSOs, jointly with community leaders, remain engaged in recovery-related activities,” and that “of these, 55% provide social, educational or health services to citizens,” while “a significant number of CSOs also undertake activities related to the implementation of systemic reforms and provide basic humanitarian assistance.” Yet they warn that “CSOs feel that they are not yet treated as equal partners across all stages of Ukraine’s recovery process,” and that “without deep early civic integration, recovery policies risk being top–down, opaque and misaligned with the priorities of local communities.”
  • The authors note that wartime practices and reforms “are laying the groundwork for the emergence of a new ‘social contract’, in which civil society actors are not just emergency responders but pillars of national resilience,” but stress that “the biggest barriers to an inclusive recovery right now” are “the lack of a national champion in central government,” the threat of “hostilities continuing indefinitely,” and “limited engagement with citizens on recovery processes.” To enable transformation, they say, Ukrainian leadership must “engage in substantive discussions about responsibilities, resource allocation and the values underpinning Ukraine’s social recovery.”

“Ukraine Recovery Conference, Gdańsk—June 24, 2026,” Balazs Jarabik, 06.24.26.

  • Jarabik says that arriving in Gdańsk, “the first impression from the ground is telling: despite the conference's focus on long-term recovery, the central conversation is about defense—and where the European money is actually going.” Essential Ukraine #26, he notes, frames the war as “competing theories of victory:” “Kyiv's bet is on adaptation and escalation, seeking deeper Western engagement,” while “Russia's theory remains attrition: manpower, missiles, industrial scale, and endurance.”
  • “The tide has not turned,” he argues: “Ukraine's strike campaign has real operational effects, but more than anything it shapes the war of perception rather than the war on the ground.” Escalation and diplomacy are now “inseparable,” with Ukraine trying to “transform adaptation… into leverage” and Russia seeking to “transform attrition into concessions.” With winter emerging as “the recognized critical timeline,” Jarabik says the key question is whether “Kyiv [can] convert adaptation into strategic leverage before Moscow converts attrition into political advantage,” as Gdańsk debates treat “reconstruction and defense…as one.”

“Ukrainian Strikes Turn Crimea From Prize Asset to Liability for Putin,” Thomas Grove and Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 06.26.26.

  • Russian-installed authorities in Crimea have declared a state of emergency, citing a fuel and energy crisis caused by what officials describe as “more than 100 drone strikes every day.” Kyiv’s campaign has destroyed bridges, rail lines, fuel depots, ferries, power installations and port facilities and is targeting fuel trucks on the new Novorossiya highway, leaving the peninsula “seriously, nearly completely, isolated,” according to Ukrainian analyst Alina Frolova. Some 2,500 vehicles were queued at the Kerch Bridge on Friday, with waits of about five hours to exit Crimea; to keep an escape route open for tourists and settlers, Ukraine has so far not struck the bridge in this phase.
  • Crimea (population 2.5 million) has banned civilian fuel sales; locals now buy gasoline on the black market from soldiers “at several times” the previous pump price. Authorities have limited trains to Russia to just seven per day, only as far as Kerch, and imposed an effective 8 p.m. curfew by ordering shops and restaurants to close early. Residents report shortages of bread, sugar and other staples, empty ATMs, power and water cuts, and mobile‑network outages. Hundreds of thousands of Crimeans have left for Ukraine‑controlled areas since 2014, while “several hundred thousand” Russian settlers have moved in—now many of those with means are trying to get out as Crimea shifts from Putin’s “crown jewel” to a logistical and political liability.

“Russians Feel the War’s Hardships as Ukraine Pummels Crimea,” Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 06.28.26.

  • Grove reports that after four years of trying to shield Russians from the war, “residents and tourists drawn to [Crimea’s] sandy beaches are now enduring the conflict’s costs firsthand,” as Ukraine turns the annexed peninsula into “a new theater of the war with hundreds of Ukrainian drone attacks each day” on power and fuel facilities. Zelenskyy calls the strikes “long-range sanctions.” Crimea now has “regular air-raid alerts, power outages and a gasoline black market with a going rate of as much as $25 a gallon,” while a drone “blockade… has effectively cut Crimea off from Russian supplies.” A state of emergency has been imposed as “thousands of residents and tourists fled across the Kerch Bridge,” and in Sevastopol one resident says “most stores are not operating at all. It’s impossible to withdraw cash. Public transportation is running very poorly.”
  • Tourism, which brought in “some seven million visitors last year,” has been hammered: the Association of Russian Tour Operators says bookings have fallen “by as much as half.” One Moscow tourist says she paid 500 rubles a liter—“about $25 a gallon, about six times the average price”—for black-market fuel. Putin has acknowledged the strikes and promised to “make up for any deficit,” framing them as an “information campaign to break Russia’s morale,” while officials urge residents to “hold the line, and trust only official sources of information.” Yet ordinary Crimeans describe “constant anxiety” and shuttered services; as one Sevastopol resident sums it up, “Sevastopol is holding on.”
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:


“Ukraine's drones take the war to Russia,” Dave Lawler, Axios, 06.27.26.

  • Lawler reports that “Ukraine's sustained and sophisticated drone warfare has knocked out refineries, tilted the battlefield balance and brought the war home to some Russians for the first time in four years of fighting,” with Zelenskyy announcing a “40-day influence operation” intended “to force Moscow to sign a peace deal.” Just hours after that announcement came “one of the largest drone attacks of the war, targeting 12 regions of Russia as well as occupied Crimea”; Russian authorities claimed “at least 660 Ukrainian drones were intercepted,” while a massive blast at Moscow’s largest refinery a week earlier “filled the sky with black smoke” and left residents emerging to “black rain,” with the plant “likely to remain offline until 2027,” Reuters sources said. As refineries and power stations across Russia and Crimea are hit, occupied Crimea has “halted all fuel sales” and declared a state of emergency.
    • “It's unclear whether Zelenskyy's drone campaign can actually provide fresh momentum for peace talks,” according to Axios. “While it's piling pressure on Moscow, some analysts argue it will harden sentiments in Russia that Ukraine must be fought and defeated,” according to Axios.
  • Zelenskyy frames the strikes as leverage for real talks: “If Ukraine burns, your Moscow will burn too,” he warned, blaming Russia’s “many difficulties” on the fact that “Putin refuses to end his war and to hear our proposals for a meeting, genuine negotiations, and a dignified peace.” Putin counters that Russia is ready to negotiate “on its terms,” admitting the drones are “causing some damage” but insisting that “strikes against civilian infrastructure” are meant “to destabilize society… to create a sense of uncertainty about the actions of the Russian armed forces” and “will fail to divide society.” Lawler notes that U.S.-led diplomacy has “stalled,” and it is “unclear whether Zelenskyy's drone campaign can actually provide fresh momentum for peace talks,” with some analysts warning it may instead “harden sentiments in Russia that Ukraine must be fought and defeated,” even as Trump, after G7 meetings, now says Ukraine is “doing pretty well” and has reportedly signaled he could walk back the earlier “Anchorage understandings.” 

“Ukraine’s New Air-Power Paradigm,” Jillian Kay Melchior, Wall Street Journal, 06.24.26.

  • Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov says Ukraine has “quadrupled” its midrange interdiction strikes in recent months; in May 2026 alone, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi reported 414 Russian “headquarters, command posts and other important rear objects” hit. The Defense Ministry and General Staff have allocated more than $111 million for midrange (“middle‑strike”) procurement, with domestic producers now covering the 15‑ to 125‑mile band. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) says that, for the first time since 2023, Ukraine is liberating more ground than it is losing, and that Ukraine now has “the advantage and the initiative” over Russia in midrange strike capability.
  • Finnish President Alexander Stubb told NZZ that Russian losses have risen from a 3:1 to an 8:1 casualty ratio—“eight Russian casualties for every Ukrainian killed or wounded”—and that Russia is suffering about 35,000 casualties per month in 2026 while recruiting only about 27,000 men. Ukraine’s sustained strikes on Crimea’s “few vulnerable supply lines,” plus earlier attacks that forced much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to withdraw from the peninsula, are intended to turn Crimea “from an asset… into a liability” for Moscow and to raise Kremlin costs while weakening Russia’s negotiating position.

“As the Tide Turns Against Putin, Beware the Drowning Man,” Peter Frankopan, Foreign Policy, 06.25.26.

  • Frankopan notes that the war Putin expected to last “a few days” has now gone on longer than both the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany and all of World War I. GCHQ director Anna Keast‑Butler recently cited intelligence that Russian war deaths have “likely reached almost 500,000”; “various Western sources” put total Russian casualties (killed and wounded) at well over 1 million. Some data suggest Russia even lost territory in April–May 2026. Attrition ratios are put at about 8 Russian soldiers killed or seriously wounded for every 1 Ukrainian, with “average monthly casualties” over 30,000 this year; Moscow is offering sign‑up bonuses “as high as $80,000” and up to $140,000 in debt relief to recruit.
  • Ukrainian long‑range drones (FP‑1, FP‑2, Hornet) have, by Reuters’ estimate, cut Russia’s refining capacity by 700,000 barrels per day; one June strike appears to have disabled Moscow’s largest refinery “until 2027.” More than half of Russia’s regions are rationing fuel; Crimea has suspended public fuel sales; Russia’s diesel output fell another 10% in May, and gasoline exports are temporarily banned. Germany’s BND estimates military spending is already about 50% of the state budget; Swedish intelligence chief Thomas Nilsson says the economy faces either “long‑term decline or shock,” both leading to “financial disaster.” Residential construction fell “almost 40%” in Q1 2026 vs. Q1 2025, and flight cancellations have quadrupled since the start of the year.
  • To fill coffers, oligarch “voluntary contributions” are expected to raise about $4 billion by end‑2026; the Kremlin has confiscated assets worth “over $7 billion” from Rusagro founder Vadim Moshkovich. Frankopan argues that as these pressures mount, and with Putin having lowered Russia’s nuclear‑use threshold in a 2024 doctrinal revision, the risk is “drowning man” behavior: more sabotage, cyber‑attacks, and hybrid operations against Europe and NATO as the Kremlin tries to stay afloat despite mounting battlefield, economic, and political costs.

“Is Ukraine Gearing Up for an Attack on Crimea?” Stavros Atlamazoglou, National Interest, 06.26.26.

  • Atlamazoglou notes that “the Ukrainian military continues to pound Russian positions in the occupied Crimean Peninsula,” and that in recent weeks Kyiv has launched “a growing number of strikes against Russian military and critical infrastructure in Crimea and the occupied southern land bridge … raising suspicions that a possible counteroffensive might be in the works.” Citing the Institute for the Study of War, he writes that “Ukrainian forces continued to systematically strike bridges and other transport infrastructure supporting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that connect occupied Kherson Oblast with Crimea,” and that Ukrainian strikes on “transport and railway infrastructure have disrupted Russian ground lines of communication… negatively affecting the Russian military’s logistics” in southern Kherson. These long‑range fires, he argues, are part of “Ukraine’s long-range fires strategy” and “might also reveal Kyiv’s ambition for another counteroffensive in the direction of the strategic peninsula.”
  • He recalls that “Ukraine has repeatedly insisted that it will retake Crimea from Russia, but doing so would be a daunting challenge,” pointing out that from 2014 to 2022 Moscow “fortified Crimea… stationing vast stockpiles of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles and tens of thousands of soldiers on the peninsula.” In the summer of 2023, “the Ukrainian forces launched an ambitious counteroffensive with the goal of liberating Crimea,” but those ambitions “broke on a defensive wall not seen on European soil since the end of World War II” as Russian forces laid “hundreds of thousands of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines” and miles of fortifications; “despite some tactical successes, the Ukrainian counteroffensive fizzled out within weeks,” he writes. Since then, “Russia’s hold on Crimea has remained firm,” yet Atlamazoglou argues that “a renewed wave of long-range strikes against the strategic peninsula suggests that Kyiv might be ready to try again,” even though he stops short of saying a land attack is imminent and emphasizes how formidable such an operation would be.

“Russia’s Crimean conquest is turning into a deadly mess,” The Economist, 06.23.26.

  • On the night of June 20–21, Ukrainian drones hit power lines, blew up an oil terminal in Kerch, and damaged a cargo ferry; ferry crossings have now been shut down, leaving only the land corridor via Donetsk–Zaporizhia–Kherson, where burned‑out trucks show it is “increasingly vulnerable.” On June 21, Crimea’s governor ordered a temporary halt to fuel sales at all petrol stations; Sevastopol separately banned fuel sales on June 22–23 with possible extension. Nationwide, petrol is now being rationed in more than half of Russia’s regions after refinery strikes near Moscow (June 16 and 18) and in Siberia.
  • Dzhankoi, a rail hub used as a staging point for Kherson, has “boomed” from military presence, but a recent drone strike injured several civilians on a passenger train and killed five in a residential building. Many Sevastopol residents “with money” are reportedly buying property in other Russian regions and moving families out, while Crimea’s indigenous Tatars feel compelled to stay.
  • Secret United Russia focus groups in late May found that “most participants wanted the fighting to end, with or without a Russian victory,” and state-pollster surveys show Putin’s ratings falling (exact figures not published, trend emphasized). Units of Russia’s elite increasingly see the war as a “dead end,” and the article concludes that Putin’s biggest political problem is that “he has nothing to show” for the war—leaving Crimea and Russia more broadly in a state of visible exhaustion and rising disillusion.

Vladimir Putin’s Responses to Questions of a Russian Journalist, Kremlin.ru, 06.28.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • "With regard to strikes on critical, on critically important infrastructure in general, and on energy infrastructure in particular, of course these strikes on facilities of our infrastructure create problems, that is obvious. We are now observing a certain shortage, but it is not critical, I will say this now. There are several tasks here that we must solve. We have just been discussing this with our colleagues."
  • "The first task is to quickly and significantly increase the production of the most in-demand air-defense systems. To constantly improve them in accordance with the needs of conducting combat operations and covering the relevant facilities, taking into account what the enemy is using, taking into account the new unmanned aerial vehicles with new technologies that are being supplied to them from Europe. In fact, we have all these means of protection. The question is the speed of ramping up their production and delivery to the troops or for covering critically important infrastructure facilities."
  • "It is also necessary to coordinate the work of all levels and structures involved in repelling attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles on our infrastructure and, most importantly, on people."
  • "Overall, strikes against our civilian infrastructure are carried out not only in order to inflict some damage on us (although that, I think, is also important for the enemy), but also to feed an information campaign, or, perhaps to be more precise, not just a campaign but an information operation as part of the confrontation with Russia, at a minimum with the aim of sowing in us a lack of confidence in ourselves and in our strength, and even better—to bring about a split in Russian society and force Russia to halt, at least for a short time, the advance of our troops along the line of contact and create conditions for the start of a negotiating process on terms favorable to them, that is, to our enemy. We will not give them such a chance."
  • [When asked on negotiations with Ukraine] "Yes, indeed, there are contacts, and they have been established along several tracks, along several channels. I do not see any secrecy in this. There are also new proposals. But the proposals for a meeting with the head of the regime in Kyiv are well known. The request to halt hostilities, even for a short time, along the line of contact is also nothing new."
  • "But there are also new proposals; some of them I am ready to name. For example, the cessation of strikes deep into the territories from both sides. And it is clear why this proposal is being made. Because our retaliatory strikes deep into Ukrainian territory are much more powerful, more sensitive and, frankly, more destructive; they lead to truly serious consequences for the Kyiv regime."
  • "Another proposal is to limit hostilities—I ask for your attention—to only four territories, that is, to conduct military operations only in Kherson Region, Zaporizhzhia Region, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, and to cease hostilities in all other territories. It is also clear why. Because this would allow, if we agree to this, the Armed Forces of Ukraine to withdraw their troops from Mykolaiv Region, Dnipropetrovsk Region, Kharkiv and Sumy Regions, as well as from certain sections of the state border, and redeploy these units to the four above‑mentioned regions."
  • "Under conditions of a catastrophic shortage of manpower, the Armed Forces of Ukraine apparently believe that this could be their salvation. But saving the Kyiv regime is not part of our plans. Although we pay close attention, and I say this without any irony, to every proposal that comes from that side."
  • "Indeed, in the current situation we do not rule out the possibility of attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine—sudden, as the enemy believes, unexpected for us—diversionary attacks with limited objectives by special‑purpose units, with the aim of diverting our attention and our forces from solving the main task: the final liberation of Donbas and Novorossiya." "The Ukrainian regime will pay for its crimes on Kursk land with the loss of territories that we need in order to create a security zone in the border area."

“Meeting with graduates of military academies,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 06.23.26.

  • Putin tells top graduates they are entering service “at a difficult time,” with Russian officers “courageously and effectively carrying out their duties during the special military operation, liberating our historical lands and defending our people.” He claims that whereas NATO once merely “supported the Kiev regime,” today “the West is openly talking about preparing for a war against us and building up their military offensive budgets,” accusing it of first “creat[ing] threats for our country” and then “immediately” blaming Russia “to justify their continued aggressive policy.” He repeats that Russia has “consistently advocated equal and indivisible security for all,” saying this can only be achieved through a “multipolar system of international relations” and pledging to “promptly and appropriately respond to any external and internal threats.”
  • On the war’s trajectory and diplomatic endgame, Putin offers no new negotiating line, instead doubling down on endurance and militarization: he boasts of “a qualitative leap” in weaponry since the invasion, says more than “1,000 types of weapons and equipment have been tested in combat conditions” over the past year, and emphasizes that “no technological breakthrough” can replace “the courage and professionalism of our service personnel.” Defense Minister Andrei Belousov tells the graduates that their combat experience in the “special military operation” must be integrated with “modern tactics” to “improve combat effectiveness,” and a General Staff graduate concludes that “we need [our knowledge] now more than ever before to attain the goals of the special military operation,” insisting “every one of us is ready to selflessly serve our Fatherland, protect our national interests and strengthen Russia’s combat capability”—with no hint of compromise over Ukraine.

“Kyiv’s military reforms come late for exhausted troops,” Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 06.24.26.

  • Ukraine’s first phase of reform introduces three fixed‑term contracts ranging from 10 to 24 months for frontline troops. For infantry closest to the line, the average monthly salary will be about ₴300,000 (≈€6,000). All contracts guarantee six months away from duty after completion, with additional time off based on combat service and years served since February 2022; a soldier serving since the full‑scale invasion “could be out of the army for up to 18 months” after his contract.
  • Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has said about 200,000 people have deserted and more than 2 million are wanted for draft‑dodging. Sociologist Anton Hrushetskyi argues these incentives won’t permit a shift away from compulsory mobilization, noting that “money isn’t the key issue” behind reluctance to join; fears about poor commanders, death, and inadequate training weigh more heavily. Draft‑office reform—targeting abuses dubbed “busification”—is slated to begin over the summer.

“Ukraine’s Most Potent Weapon Is the Soldiers Who Refuse to Quit,” Alistair MacDonald and Nikita Nikolaienko, Wall Street Journal, 06.24.26.

  • The article profiles Jr. Lt. Ihor Vizirenko and his infantry company in the 21st Mechanized Brigade, who have been fighting more than four years, including almost a year holding Chasiv Yar and now near Lyman. Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told parliament in January that about 200,000 Ukrainians are listed as absent without leave and that recruitment/retention is a major problem, yet a core of long‑serving soldiers has stayed at the front.
  • A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll from April found 57% of Ukrainians reject giving up the Donbas for peace; among soldiers, 59% oppose the terms “being pursued by Washington.” One soldier interviewed has served since Russia seized Crimea in 2014 and says he has known “over 100 people” who have died in a decade of war. Vizirenko himself has lost 10 friends, suffered two concussions, and sees his youngest daughter only twice a year for 15 days at a time, but insists: “I’m tired, but we have to finish this.”

“‘They’ve emptied all the villages around’: Russia struggles to recruit contract soldiers,” Olga Churakova, Olesya Gerasimenko, Ivan Zhadaev, Verstka/Vazhnyye Istorii, 06.24.26.

  • A Moscow city source says 1,708 people were sent to the front in April 2026 and 1,378 in May; in 2025 there were “about 1,000 more per month,” implying roughly a one‑third collapse in the flow. Nationwide, contract recruitment in Q4 2025 was 1.5 times lower than in Q4 2024. Researcher Janis Kluge estimates that in Q1 2026 some 800–1,000 people signed contracts daily—about 20% below the same period a year earlier. In Lipetsk region, some days now see fewer than 50 new recruits across the whole region versus 150–200 previously.
  • One soldier says units are manned at 30–40% of strength; specialized companies (snipers, air‑defense) are cut from 60–80 men to 15–30, with surplus sent to infantry after a three‑day training. He reports 19 deserters from a single “tiny settlement” near the front and believes there are “hundreds” of such cases each week along the line.
  • To compensate, regions more than doubled average monthly spending on recruiter bonuses in 2026, from 358 million to 802 million rubles, with total payouts of at least 7.7 billion rubles. When Tyumen region raised the bonus for inexperienced recruits to 3 million rubles, applications “immediately doubled.” Sources say local “villages have been literally emptied,” recruiters are being sent to other regions (e.g., Dagestan), police detainees are being offered contracts “instead of prosecution,” and multiple insider and Western intelligence sources say scenarios for a new mobilization wave—possibly after the October Duma elections—are under discussion.

“Unease deepens in Russia as Ukraine steps up long-range strikes,” Catherine Belton and Natalia Abbakumova, Washington Post, 06.27.26.

  • The Kremlin held an emergency meeting after gasoline output fell 25% across Russia in the week of June 15–21, pushing “dozens” of regions into fuel rationing. Ukrainian drones this week alone hit oil facilities “across Russia,” the VZPP‑S semiconductor plant (key for ballistic missiles) in Voronezh, the Dubna satellite center near Moscow, and an ammunition‑linked chemical plant in Tula; in occupied Crimea, rolling blackouts and a halt to fuel sales prompted a state of emergency. Russian stocks are down more than 13% since early June—the biggest drop since September 2022—amid falling oil prices “back to pre‑Iran war levels.”
  • Budget stress is severe: the 2026 federal deficit, planned at 3.8 trillion rubles (~$48bn)** for the whole year, had already reached **6 trillion rubles (~$83bn) by end‑May—more than double last year’s level—while the sovereign wealth fund is described as “almost exhausted.” The Central Bank rate is 14.25%, and the Duma has amended the budget code to let the Finance Ministry spend and borrow without full parliamentary approval. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov called for “mobilizing” some 130 trillion rubles in private and corporate bank deposits; the Finance Ministry is also preparing to tap about $40 billion in private pension savings.
  • Rosneft chief Igor Sechin, in a leaked letter, called damage to refineries “unprecedented,” and officials are weighing a total diesel export ban. Business elites fear the state may raid savings, while a Moscow executive says “everyone is thinking about how to get their money out and leave.” Analysts expect Putin to answer pressure not with concessions but with a “new cycle of escalation,” even as a former senior finance official warns, “The budget is shaking… the deficit is enormous,” and some regions face a “catastrophic” fuel situation.

“The Nord Stream Conspiracy—the murky space between peace and state-on-state conflict,” Jonathan Ford reviewing “The Nord Stream Conspiracy: The Inside Story of the Explosions That Shook the World by Bojan Pancevski Hutchinson Heinemann,” 06.24.26.

Military aid to Ukraine:

  • No significant commentary.

“Put Pressure on Russia by Enforcing Sanctions,” Sen. Jerry Moran, Wall Street Journal, 06.22.26.

  • Moran argues that “oil sanctions on Russia have been an effective tool at tightening Moscow’s budget and forcing Vladimir Putin to choose between funding the war in Ukraine or providing for the well-being of his own people,” and says that at the G‑7 Trump “indicated he will soon resume enforcing sanctions on Russian oil.” He insists that “now is the time to dial up the economic pressure on Russia and use oil sanctions to deprive Mr. Putin of the oil revenue he desperately needs to continue his unjust war in Ukraine,” noting that despite a “financial reprieve,” “the Russian military has yet to achieve a breakthrough in Ukraine, and domestic discontent inside Russia is rising.”
  • The senator writes, “I have opposed this waiver on the Senate floor,” and says he “urged the administration not to extend the waiver on Russian oil, which recently expired.” With “the price of crude oil in the U.S.… returned to levels last seen in March,” he contends that “sanctions have proved effective at choking off critical revenue for Moscow,” and concludes that “Russia’s economic squeeze will further aid the Ukrainians in the defense of their homeland” and that “continued sanctions relief for Russia goes against our national interests.”

“Putin admits Ukrainian drones are causing ‘problems’,” Max Seddon and Fabrice Deprez, Financial Times, 06.28.26.

  • “Vladimir Putin has conceded that Russia is facing fuel shortages as Ukraine intensifies long-range drone strikes… but while Putin said earlier on Sunday that Russia was going through a “difficult period”, he insisted his forces would press on with their offensive and appeared to float the possibility of new conquests in Ukraine,” according to FT.
  • FT reports, “Zelenskyy announced last week “a 40-day influence operation” to be carried out by Kyiv’s long-range strike units “aimed at compelling [Russia] to end the war”. “Russian military logistics in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, and the very presence of the occupiers there, are severely hindered,” he said in an evening address.
  • In his remarks, “the Russian president made a series of unsubstantiated battlefield claims,” FT reported… Putin also “suggested Ukraine had offered Russia a mutual moratorium on long-range strikes as well as a suggestion to limit combat operations to four frontline Ukrainian regions,” according to FT, He then rejected the offers. “Putin said Ukraine’s attacks were aimed at “distracting our attention and our forces from achieving the main task at hand—the final liberation of the Donbas and Novorossiya,” according to FT. “The claim for “Novorossiya” indicated Putin’s territorial ambitions had grown since a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Alaska last year,” according to FT. “There, Putin offered to relinquish Russia’s claims to two partly occupied regions in southern Ukraine if Kyiv withdrew its forces from the Donbas.”
  • “Russia expects Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, who have led the stalled efforts to secure a peace deal, to visit Moscow once the ceasefire in the Middle East war takes hold, Putin said,” FT reported.


“The White House’s New Pro-Ukraine Tone Shift,” Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 06.22.26.

  • Skove writes that after a “rocky 2025,” top U.S. officials now sound “increasingly enthusiastic about Ukraine,” noting that at this year’s G-7 Trump called Russia the “offensive” party and signed a pro‑Ukraine statement, which Emmanuel Macron hailed as “a real change in approach.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio in May said Ukraine had “the strongest military in Europe” and that “the Russians are losing five times as many soldiers a month as the Ukrainians,” while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said “Ukrainians are holding their lines even in the face of sustained Russian assaults.”
  • Ostap Yarysh of Razom links the shift to Ukraine’s battlefield successes, especially medium‑ and long‑range drone strikes that create “dramatic images of smoking wreckage in Moscow and St. Petersburg,” saying “Ukraine’s effective strikes speak more loudly and more powerful than any Russian propaganda.” Yet Skove stresses that rhetoric has often outpaced policy: in 2025 Trump said Kyiv could “win all of Ukraine back in its original form,” then cooled on long‑range Tomahawks “following a call with Putin,” and even now the administration has not announced new Patriot transfers and often hesitates to “publicly criticize Russia” for fear of harming U.S. peace talks.

“The G7’s Alignment on Iran and Ukraine Is Deeply Fragile,” Liana Fix, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.17.26.

  • Fix argues the Évian G7 produced only a “rare moment of transatlantic alignment” that is “much more brittle than it appears,” built on “a framework agreement that the Europeans privately doubt and a Ukraine negotiating window they fear the United States will squander.” Europeans “cautiously breathe a sigh of relief” that the U.S.–Iran framework may stabilize energy and de‑escalate, but their expectations are “modest,” fearing a deal “significantly weaker than the Iran nuclear deal” that fails to curb Iran’s proxies. The accord has “almost overshadowed the serious rift” over Europe’s limited role in the Iran war and U.S. troop withdrawals from Germany, even as the Pentagon uses this “to push for a reduction of the U.S. conventional military presence in Europe,” with Marco Rubio signaling “significant changes” in NATO.
  • On Ukraine, Fix writes that Trump’s “announced return to Ukraine negotiations is a fresh stress for the Europeans,” who want to exploit a moment when “the battlefield trajectory” and Russia’s “domestic discontent” give “a real opportunity to increase pressure” for an “unconditional ceasefire.” Their plan is to “ramp up sanctions pressure on Russia” and open E3 channels to convince Putin “he holds the weaker hand,” but they fear Trump, Witkoff and Kushner will again show “leniency on Russia.” With U.S. leverage now concentrated in “intelligence support” and scarce air‑defense interceptors after the Iran war, she urges a “two‑track approach”: get Trump on board while “ensuring that Europe and Ukraine can adopt a more independent negotiating position,” including co‑producing air defenses and Patriot in Ukraine so that “the stronger they make Ukraine and themselves, the less it matters whether Trump blinks.”

“A glimmer of hope in the Ukraine war,” Stephen Kinzer, Boston Globe, 06.24.26.

  • Kinzer notes that for “the last four years” European leaders have largely refused contact with Russian officials; now they are considering appointing a Moscow envoy as tensions spike. He recounts a Ukrainian drone strike on St. Petersburg “more than 1,000 kilometers” from Ukraine, quotes Zelenskyy saying that “distance is not the limit of our capabilities,” and cites Russia’s Foreign Ministry warning that “all foreign military contingents, including German ones… will become legitimate targets” if deployed in Ukraine.
  • He highlights incidents of Ukrainian drones unintentionally landing in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and notes growing NATO involvement: Sweden saying it would “help the Ukrainians as much as we can to… direct their attacks,” the NATO–Ukraine Council meeting “for the first time ever on Ukrainian soil,” and NATO’s SATU program in Wiesbaden becoming a permanent mechanism to coordinate training and equipment. Kinzer argues that with a “long-term confrontation” declared and war exhaustion mounting on both sides, a European envoy such as Angela Merkel or Mario Draghi could probe openings for talks and reduce the risk of a NATO–Russia war.

“Rubio-Lavrov Rift Reveals Moscow’s Blame-Shifting Strategy On Ukraine, Analysts Say,” Alex Raufoglu, RFE/RL, 06.27.26.

  • RFE/RL reports that Moscow is increasingly invoking the “spirit of Anchorage” to claim there is already a U.S.–Russian framework for ending the Ukraine war, allegedly reached at the August 2025 Trump–Putin summit in Alaska. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was in the room, flatly denies this, telling RFE/RL: “There was no agreement in Alaska. There was a proposal in Alaska, but there was no agreement… If there had been an agreement, we would have had an end to the war.” He says Russia wanted “the entirety of Donetsk” and other maximalist concessions that Washington did not accept.
  • Sergei Lavrov counters that if the U.S. “put on the table its proposals for a settlement” and “the other side expressed its consent,” then to say there was no agreement is “rather inelegant,” but former Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried calls this “conjur[ing] diplomatic advantage out of thin air,” noting the Kremlin suddenly reveres an unwritten “deal” while ignoring a written Russo‑Ukrainian border treaty Putin himself signed. Analysts Glen Howard and Paul Goble argue earlier freelancing by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff may have led Putin to believe Washington would force Kyiv to cede Donbas, expectations that “collapsed in Alaska,” and that the White House has since shifted to a hard freeze‑in‑place ceasefire, now aligned with Kyiv and explicitly rejecting phased territorial withdrawals.
  • The article links this diplomatic hardening to Ukraine’s recent battlefield gains—F‑16s with precision glide bombs, systematic strikes on Russian defense infrastructure, refineries, and the R280 corridor threatening to isolate Crimea—and to Moscow’s intensifying narrative war. Goble warns that by insisting on a fictitious “Anchorage framework,” the Kremlin is laying groundwork to claim the West “betrayed Russia yet again” and to justify further mobilization and escalation, especially in the window before U.S. midterms and Russian Duma elections. The fight over what happened in Alaska is thus less about historical record and more about pre‑positioning blame and justifying what comes next.

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at the 12th Primakov Readings International Forum,” Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Ministry, 06.24.26. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “You must understand that neither language nor religion do not benefit from protections in Ukraine as set forth in the UN Charter.”
  • “I am convinced that a political and diplomatic settlement of the situation around Ukraine remains possible. President Putin has repeatedly spoken about this.”
  • “Such a settlement requires concrete, legally binding security guarantees based on the principle of indivisible security, including guarantees for Russia’s security along its western borders.”
  • “At the same time, the West must understand—and the sooner the better—that it must abandon its plans for military‑political, geo‑economic and ideological expansion in areas that are of vital interest to Russia.”
  • “This is an absolute and indispensable requirement that cannot be treated as part of any negotiating package. It is an obligation that stands on its own.”
  • “In August 2025, the leaders of Russia and the United States reached a number of understandings regarding political pathways out of the Ukraine crisis. We remain committed to those understandings.”
  • “U.S. President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff visited Russia and presented a highly specific proposal. President Putin examined it carefully… He accepted the U.S. proposal, although it already reflected a compromise on our part.”
  • “We believed an agreement had been reached… To this day, however, we have received no response to the U.S. proposal that we supported… For now, I would say, after Alaska, the ball is in their court.”

“Meeting with Government members,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, 06.23.26. Clues from Russian Views.

  • On Ukraine, Putin tells ministers that “everything the Kiev regime does… is designed to achieve the single objective of creating favorable conditions for itself in case of negotiations or, to be more exact, of resuming peace talks, which were cut short at Ukraine’s initiative. They want to be in a position of strength once this happens.” He insists this is only “an illusion of a position of strength,” claiming that “on the ground there is a completely different reality,” with “our military units… advancing their positions every day… liberating one community after another, one territory at a time” and saying drone and missile strikes on Russia “do not change anything and cannot affect what is taking place on the front.”
  • Despite calling Kyiv a “Nazi regime” and highlighting attacks “especially… against children,” Putin reiterates that “Russia is ready to engage in peace talks with Ukraine, and is ready to proceed based on the Istanbul agreements,” stressing that “the Ukrainian delegation initialed these agreements” and that he sees “no reason not to stick to these agreements as far as Russia is concerned.” Any settlement, he says, must rest on “the foundation created by the agreements that were reached during the talks in Istanbul… the reality on the ground, and also the principles I had set forth… at the Foreign Ministry,” while Russia “will keep steadily advancing along all tracks” militarily and economically.

“The Spirit—Out?,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs/Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 06.24.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • Lukyanov says European leaders are “very pleased” with the Évian G7, believing they “managed… to influence the opinion of the U.S. president regarding the prospects of the Ukrainian conflict.” He recalls that until recently Trump held that “the outcome of the confrontation is predetermined, Russia will win, since it has an incomparably greater potential,” and that Ukraine “must recognize this” and accept concessions “more quickly.” The “understandings reached in Anchorage,” he writes, “proceeded from this.” Now, however, “Europe and Kyiv have probably managed to convince Trump that the outcome is not predetermined, and therefore it is not time to reach an agreement. There will be time, and the conditions later will be better.”
  • In Lukyanov’s view, “to a certain extent it is all the same” to Trump exactly how the war ends, provided there is no “big victory for Russia,” while “the rest of the possible outcomes are more or less acceptable, wherever the line of demarcation may pass.” Zelenskyy interpreted his France visit as “unambiguous support,” which explains his “sharp escapades” toward Belarus, Poland and Russia; “Europe encourages this, the United States does not hinder it,” he notes. “In fact,” Lukyanov argues, “Europe seeks escalation and is not afraid of direct confrontation with Russia, and the United States is making it clear that they do not intend to participate in this,” though they will likely support allies “remotely—with weapons (for money) and intelligence,” as with Ukraine now.
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"A Quasi-existential Threat: Can European public opinion withstand the challenge of direct Russian aggression?,” Re:Russia, 06.23.26.

  • Eurobarometer: 80% of EU citizens are worried about Europe’s security/defense in coming years; 76% see Russia’s invasion as a direct threat. Asked where the EU should act in the next five years, 36% name “security and defense” (vs 29% economy, 22% employment, climate, migration). 80% want stronger European defense cooperation; 64% back higher defense spending (29% oppose).
  • ECFR survey (15 countries): only 11% now see the U.S. as an ally (down from 16% in Nov 2025 and 22% in Nov 2024); 13% already see the U.S. as an adversary (20–25% in Denmark, Spain, Switzerland). Only about 25% think the U.S. would help if their country were attacked, but roughly two‑thirds expect help from “at least some European countries,” rising above 80% in Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden. On personal readiness to fight, averages are 43% who think most compatriots would fight and 38% who say they themselves would; in Germany only 29% say they would.
  • Defense and nuclear issues: just 29% favor replacing NATO with a purely European defense union, 28% oppose, 43% undecided. In many countries, support for more defense spending now exceeds opposition (Portugal’s net support jumped from +26 to +42 points; Spain from +1 to +16). About 60% favor buying European‑made weapons; a bit over 20% support buying U.S. arms. Support for deploying national troops if Russia attacks a Baltic state averages 39% (43% opposed), but reaches 60–62% in Sweden and Denmark and ~50% in the UK, Netherlands, Poland, while in Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, Romania supporters are 3.5–4 times fewer than opponents.

“A Senate Advance on Cheaper Weapons,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 06.26.26.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Graham Allison: U.S.-China competition is the ‘fiercest Thucydian rivalry of all time’,” World Economic Forum, 06.25.26.

  • Allison calls U.S.‑China relations “the fiercest Thucydian rivalry of all times,” with China a “meteoric rising power” on track to overtake a “colossal ruling power” (the U.S.). He notes that when a rapidly rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, this “structural dynamic” magnifies misperceptions and miscalculations so that manageable incidents can “trigger a vicious spiral that ends where nobody wants: in war.”
  • Citing his historical study of great‑power shifts, Allison says that of 16 major power transitions in the past 500 years, 12 ended in war. Yet he stresses that today’s U.S.‑China rivalry is constrained by deep interdependence and nuclear deterrence: in 2025, U.S. goods trade with China was about $414.7 billion, and China remains Washington’s third‑largest trading partner. Because the two economies are “so inextricably entangled” that “each requires a level of cooperation with the other to ensure its own survival,” leaders must somehow manage intense competition while preserving necessary cooperation—something history, he warns, suggests will be extraordinarily difficult.

Missile defense:

“A growing missile threat to the U.S. homeland and the emerging arms race,” Daniel Salisbury, IISS Missile Dialogue Initiative, 06.26.26.

  • Salisbury argues that “China, Russia and the United States’ missile arsenals, among other powers, will continue to grow, motivated by insecurity and extensive missile use in ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.” He notes that the U.S. Department of War “is planning to procure 10,000 low-cost containerized cruise missiles over the next three years, as well as up to 12,000 Blackbeard aero-ballistic missiles and 4,300 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ALCMs over the next five,” and that the ramp‑up is “apparent in the procurement of missile-defense interceptors to replenish depleted stocks—some by as much as an assessed 60–80%—during the recent conflict in Iran.” In February, he writes, RTX and the Pentagon agreed to “increase production of SM-3 IIA and accelerate production of the SM-3 IB” interceptors; the more capable SM‑3 IIA “are intended to be capable of engaging ‘ICBM-representative’ targets,” as shown in a 2020 test, and “long-standing concerns over strategic-missile defense will continue to drive missile-arsenal growth plans in Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang.”
  • Together, Salisbury concludes, “this suggests we are heading towards a world where missile threats are extensive and states are more vulnerable to strikes from afar.” He contends that “states’ massive procurement of conventional-strike capabilities, along with budget constraints and other factors limiting warhead production and deployment by the U.S. and Russia, suggests an impending conventional-arms race—at least in terms of the proliferation of sheer numbers of systems—may overshadow any nuclear one,” even as those conventional missiles will interact with and complicate existing nuclear deterrence relationships.

Nuclear arms:

“The Quest for Nuclear Superiority Makes No Sense,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 06.25.26.

  • Walt criticizes looming nuclear‑force expansions that will cost “hundreds of billions of dollars” for each of the United States, Russia, and China—and “trillions” globally over coming years—as unnecessary given that credible deterrence requires only a survivable second‑strike force of a relatively small number of warheads. He notes that even “five or ten” nuclear detonations on major cities would be a catastrophe far beyond any plausible political gain, making attempts to achieve first‑strike invulnerability irrational.
  • He emphasizes that the U.S. already has thousands of warheads yet has been deterred from attacking “lightly armed” states such as North Korea, which has only “a few dozen” weapons and modest delivery systems, illustrating the power of “existential deterrence.” By contrast, Washington did attack non‑nuclear states (Iraq, Libya), underlining how even small arsenals dramatically raise perceived costs. Walt argues that building offensive forces and missile defenses to threaten Russian and Chinese deterrents will simply provoke symmetrical buildups—an arms race—diverting vast resources and increasing nuclear‑war risk, when modernization at lower levels would suffice to maintain deterrence.

“The Broken Nuclear Umbrella: What Comes After Extended Deterrence,” Jennifer Lind Daryl G. Press, Foreign Affairs, 06.23.26.

  • Press writes that for decades “American allies in Asia and Europe have relied on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for their safety.” They “forswore acquiring their own nuclear weapons, agreeing instead to live under the protection of the United States’ nuclear umbrella,” an arrangement that “worked during the Cold War because the stakes of that competition were so high that the United States could credibly—if just barely—say that it would wage nuclear war, even at catastrophic risk to itself, to prevent the conquest of its allies.”
  • “But the world that created the U.S. extended deterrence system is long gone,” he argues, implying that the Cold War conditions that underpinned U.S. readiness to risk nuclear war over allies facing the Soviet Union/Russia no longer exist. In a context shaped by Russia’s nuclear signaling over Ukraine and China’s growing arsenal in Asia, the piece contends that Washington and its allies will need new approaches to reassurance and deterrence once the old nuclear umbrella can no longer be assumed to function as before.

“NATO 3.0: U.S. Conventional Retrenchment and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe,” Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 06.23.26.

  • Dolzikova argues that Washington’s “plan to re‑evaluate its posture in Europe could further undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence if it strips out conventional presence,” because the supposed separation between conventional and nuclear roles is “somewhat artificial.” The Trump administration has already signaled “the U.S. will play a reduced role in European conventional defense,” announcing withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, cancelling a Multi‑Domain Task Force long‑range fires battalion and a 4,000‑person rotation to Eastern Europe, and cutting “the number of fighter jets, maritime surveillance aircraft, aerial refuelling platforms, bombers, submarines and aircraft carriers allocated to NATO”—moves she says occur as “depleting U.S. weapons inventories” from Trump’s “misadventure in the Middle East” and the “Chinese threat” grow.
  • U.S. officials insist that “nothing has changed when it comes to the U.S.’ extended nuclear deterrence,” but Dolzikova contends that U.S. forces in Europe underpin “the credibility of extended deterrence,” acting as a “tripwire” and providing “rungs on NATO’s strategic escalation ladder” between “capitulation and a strategic nuclear exchange” with Russia. Cancelling deep‑precision strike assets such as MDTF‑2 and reducing high‑end air and naval capabilities weakens NATO’s ability to “credibly hold at risk critical Russian assets” and so “directly undermines deterrence dynamics in Europe,” she warns, leaving Moscow more likely to believe Europe would face a choice between “attrition and eventual capitulation, or escalation to the use of UK or French strategic nuclear weapons.” Europe, she concludes, must invest in non‑U.S. advanced conventional capabilities and accept that British and French deterrents “will have to play a larger role,” planning to “deter and defend against Russian aggression alone if needed.”

Andrey Kolesnikov interviewed by Vadim Radionov for “I Gryanul Grem” (YouTube) channel, 06.18.26.

  • Kolesnikov says Russia’s leadership and public are sleepwalking toward nuclear use, warning that people need to understand this is not an abstract “beautiful drone in a reel” but “that thing with tens of kilograms of explosives that can fly into your home,” and that such fear “can become a starting point for a real, non‑imitative negotiating process.” Instead, he hears elites and ordinary Russians treating nuclear weapons as usable: on focus groups, he reports people saying, “Well, what? America hit Hiroshima and nothing happened,” forgetting that “the Japanese could not answer with a nuclear strike on Washington. Now they will,” which, he stresses, could mean “the disappearance of humanity.”
  • Most disturbing, Kolesnikov recounts a closed‑door talk where, he says, Sergei Lavrov, “our formal chief diplomat,” dodged questions about use but then concluded, “Well, after all, I would use it,” calling it “another mental and psychological mystery” that a generation raised on “there are no winners in a nuclear war” now believes in “limited” use. He and Radionov describe a “new religion” of the bomb, in which Patriarch Kirill’s promise of forgiveness for those who die in war and the Kremlin’s rhetoric create faith in a “superweapon” that will solve everything “for peace,” when in reality, Kolesnikov insists, “it will not be victory, it will not be peace… Guys, stop. It will be worse for you.”2


“Expert Yuri Knutov: The General Staff Is Developing a New Offensive Tactic,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (via Rambler), 06.22.26.

  • Yuri Knutov argues that Russia is “approaching the moment when the question will arise of using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield,” and explicitly points to 152‑mm artillery shells “with special warheads, that is, with low‑yield charges.” These, he says, “should ensure our breakthrough on key axes:” if such shells are used “in three or four places” along Ukrainian defensive lines, Russian forces would “[be guaranteed to] move forward due to the absence of fortifications and manpower,” while keeping, in his words, “the level of use of tactical weapons minimal.” He presents this as a theoretically possible course of action that “fits into battle tactics known to our General Staff.”
  • He wrote “For instance, we have 152mm shells with special warheads—that is, low-yield charges—in our arsenal. These are intended to secure a breakthrough in key sectors. If we employ them at three or four points along the AFU’s defensive lines, we are guaranteed to advance, as the enemy’s fortifications and manpower will be eliminated. Crucially, this entails only minimal use of tactical nuclear weapons. We would then encircle and destroy any remaining forces in the rear. Theoretically, this is feasible; such maneuvers are part of established combat tactics and are well known to our General Staff. There is also a need for the large-scale deployment of our most powerful aerial bombs, the FAB-3000 and FAB-9000. Intensive use of these munitions in a specific sector could pulverize enemy defenses, including deeply buried strongpoints.” The article could not be accessed on RG’s site on June 23, 2026. It might have been taken down. One potential reason for doing so by the editors of this federal government’s mouthpiece is Knutov’s referral to Russia’s possession of 125mm shells with special warheads. Such possession would have violated the PNIs.
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“The West can learn from Ukraine’s AI future vision beyond the battlefield,” Andrew D’Anieri, Atlantic Council, 06.25.26.

  • D’Anieri writes that Ukraine’s defense sector is “arguably the most innovative military in the world today,” noting that its “AI-enabled drones, targeting technology, and counter-UAV capabilities are the envy of many Western militaries.” He highlights Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s ambition “to deploy fully autonomous front line defenses,” and says Ukraine is “moving forward with partially autonomous systems to combat a significant manpower disadvantage against an imminent threat to its existence.” The Brave1 accelerator, he notes, “provides fledgling defense startups with grants, data, and software to develop and scale their products at speed,” which is why “European and American officials and defense industry leaders are lining up to partner with Ukraine’s military tech companies.”
  • Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine is “leaning into AI for government services for the same reason it has become a world leader in AI-enabled weaponry: The country faces a human capital gap.” He points to Diia.AI, “the first AI agent for a national government to provide simple bureaucratic services to citizens,” built on Gemini Flash 2.0, and quotes former deputy minister Valeriya Ionan: “Agentic systems expand the ability to manage complexity and decision-making at a scale no workforce can match.” Ukraine’s new digital chief Oleksandr Bornyakov, he adds, is pushing an “‘agentic state,’ an ecosystem of AI agents to carry out a range of bureaucratic functions.”
  • D’Anieri argues that “governments that do not integrate AI-enabled services risk growing friction with increasingly AI-native populations,” and suggests Western democracies could “build off the example of Diia.AI” by piloting narrow, secure AI agents—“much as governments procure micro quantities of drones for battlefield testing before buying in bulk.” Just as “cooperating with Ukraine in drone development may prove crucial” for future deterrence, he contends, “a more open-minded approach to learning from Ukraine’s forward-leaning AI deployment strategy may be useful in modernizing government service provisions to citizens.”
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russian Oil Sector Battered but Not Broken by Ukrainian Air Attacks,” Sergey Vakulenko, Carnegie Politika, 06.22.26.Clues from Russian views.

  • Vakulenko writes that June’s successful Ukrainian strikes on Moscow’s Kapotnya refinery “signaled a new phase in Kyiv’s campaign against the Russian oil industry,” showing that “not even the heavy air defenses around Moscow can stop drones getting through.” After an initial focus on export terminals, where Ust‑Luga shipments briefly fell by half before rebounding so that seaborne crude exports in late April hit “some 3.8 million barrels a day—about 500,000 barrels more than the combined average for 2023, 2024, and 2025,” Ukraine shifted to refineries: “In April and May, there were twenty-six Ukrainian attacks on refineries—exactly the same as in August and September 2025,” but this time refined‑oil output fell by “up to 700,000 barrels” from 5.2 million in March—“a decline of 13%.”
  • Judging from NASA fire maps, “more Ukrainian drones are reaching their targets than ever before,” damaging not just primary units but complex isomerization, cracking and hydrotreating installations; “the amount of gasoline available in Russia…is determined by a race between Ukrainian drones and Russian repair teams,” and “that’s what we are currently seeing.” At times in late May throughput dropped “below 4 million barrels a day,” then briefly “exceed[ed] 4.5 million” before new hits on Kapotnya and TANECO knocked out “about 600,000 barrels a day,” so that if earlier‑damaged plants can’t recover, “Russia’s loss of capacity might be 28% down on previous years.” The geographic focus around Moscow is especially dangerous: refineries supplying the capital (Yaroslavl, Ryazan, Kstovo) have all been hit, in a region that holds “about 14% of Russia’s 53 million passenger cars” and 40% of air traffic.
  • So far, seasonal factors, reserves, and the trick of legally selling Euro‑3 as Euro‑5 have “allowed Russia to avoid shortages immediately,” but Vakulenko warns that if a true deficit emerges, the Kremlin must choose between “letting prices rise so high that drivers choose not to travel,” “price controls and ration cards,” or queues and black markets. From a market view, he argues, “there’s a lot to be said for scrapping damper payments,” since “during a period of deficit, it’s crazy to be stimulating demand by artificially depressing prices,” though doing so would be politically painful.

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at the Meeting on supplying the domestic market with fuel, Kremlin.ru, 06.28.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

In his 28 June 2026 meeting on fuel supplies, Putin stressed that “previously accumulated fuel volumes have been sent to the domestic market” and that, despite drawing on reserves, gasoline stocks “as of now…amount to 1.7 million tons,” which “practically corresponds to the level of the same period last year” with “a small decrease, only 4%.” He noted that to protect “domestic consumers” Russia has “temporarily introduced a complete ban on the export of gasoline and aviation kerosene” and is “considering” a similar full ban on diesel exports, while refineries are operating at “maximum” capacity: the “largest oil refineries” plus “medium and small enterprises” are fully engaged, repair times have been shortened, and scheduled maintenance deferred so that “already in July, according to forecasts, production of the main types of fuel should exceed June’s figures.”

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

  • No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s war economy has problems—but is not about to crash,” The Economist, 06.22.26.

  • The article notes that after four years of sanctions‑busting growth, many analysts now speak of “structural exhaustion” or “the coming crisis in Russia’s political economy,” and even official data show GDP down 0.2% year‑on‑year in Q1. But it argues this is “in large part, a statistical mirage”: a VAT hike pulled demand into late 2025, early 2026 had fewer working days and “grim weather,” and alternative gauges (Goldman Sachs, VEB) point to “sluggish growth but no slump,” with Russia “almost certainly not in recession” despite strains from the Ukraine war and Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure.
  • The piece notes that between 2022 and 2025 Russia’s real GDP per person “rose by 12%,” and that official data showing a Q1 2026 GDP fall of 0.2% year on year are likely distorted by a VAT rise (from 20% to 22% in January) pulling purchases into late 2025 and by fewer working days and bad weather. Unemployment is “close to a record low of around 2%,” inflation is “half its recent peak of more than 10%,” real wages are “already 25% higher than in 2019,” and in April 2026 overall goods exports were “slightly higher than in the previous year” despite lower oil prices and Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure.
  • Russia is spending “the equivalent of 7–8% of GDP on the armed forces,” an increase of about “3–4% of GDP from the pre‑war norm,” and runs a budget shortfall “currently around 3% of GDP.” The article argues Moscow can still raise more revenue (as with the VAT hike), draw on “rainy‑day funds,” borrow from a “captive domestic market,” or, as a last resort, “raid the ruble deposits” of firms and households. Overall, it judges Russia is likely to see GDP growth of “around 1% this year,” roughly comparable to France or Canada, barring “something much more radical” in sanctions or shocks.

“Putin’s system is in a state of slow implosion,” Alexandra Prokopenko, Financial Times, 06.23.26.

  • Prokopenko argues that the real sign of strain in Putin’s war system is not elite splits but the quiet erosion of fiscal rules as the Ukraine war drags into a fifth year. She notes that the Duma took only “72 hours” to let the Finance Ministry spend and borrow beyond the legal debt ceiling without revising the budget, as the 2026 federal deficit hit “6tn rubles ($83bn)” by end‑May—“2.6% of GDP, twice last year’s level and already past the Rbs3.8tn meant to cover the whole of 2026.” The liquid part of the National Welfare Fund is down to “about Rbs3.4tn,” the policy rate is “14.25%,” VAT has been raised, and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has warned the military and security services may need “an extra Rbs2tn” this year, with an estimated “352,000” Russian soldiers killed and each death triggering a Rbs14.2m payout.
  • She describes a state increasingly funding the Ukraine war by “quietly invoicing the population and suspending the state’s own rules”: regions have federal loan repayments pushed to 2030, consumers pay via inflation and high interest rates, companies have spent “more than $1bn” on their own improvised air defenses against Ukrainian drones after the Kremlin refused to share costs or even classify strikes as a “military risk.” What had been a proud record of low debt and rule‑based budgeting has given way to ad‑hoc borrowing and rule‑changes, she writes; a “cornered autocracy is rewriting the fiscal rules as it goes,” heading toward “a poorer, angrier country, a financial system out of control, and war funding it cannot count on”—“the sort [of decline] that begins long before anyone names it.”

“Endgame: The State of the Russian Economy,” edited by Torbjörn Becker and Moritz Schularick, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, June 2026.

  • Becker and Schularick write that “four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the contours of a genuine economic endgame are coming into view,” noting that “the Russian economy has not collapsed, but the structural foundations have eroded faster than the headline numbers reveal.” They highlight that the economy contracted 0.3% in Q1 2026 “despite a 44% year-on-year increase in government spending,” and that the official 2026 growth forecast has been slashed to 0.4%, a figure they say “might prove optimistic in light of growing evidence of labor scarcity and supply shortages.” The report describes a “two-track structure of the economy” in which “war-related industries [are] expanding at the expense of a stagnating civilian sector,” with “fixed investment near standstill outside military priorities and trade volumes at a fifteen-year low,” so that “the headline numbers substantially overstate the health of the productive base” and the economy is “operating at the limits of its productive capacity.”

“Ukraine’s vibe shift is bad news for Russia’s economy,” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 06.28.26.

  • Sandbu argues that “this year…both on the battlefield and in the economy, it is Russia’s grip that is seen to be slipping,” noting that “Ukraine’s extraordinary innovation in military technology is now undeniable” and that the widely cited figure that Russia is losing “30,000–40,000 casualties a month…has been internalized in governing circles around Europe.” He writes that “estimates suggest that Russia has been losing territory (albeit marginally) for the past three months.”
  • Sandbu also contends that “it has been clear for some time that Russia has maxed out its economic capacity,” with “inflation—probably higher than official rates suggest” and a deficit that is “slipping: the government has already exceeded its target for deficit spending for the entire year,” even as “growth went into reverse in the first quarter” and payouts for dead and wounded are “macroeconomically significant.” Citing the Kiel Institute’s “Endgame” report, he says it shows “the limits of the economic lifelines Moscow relies on,” and argues that secondary sanctions are already weakening China‑mediated trade. By contrast, Ukraine “has clawed back some of the collapse in output from 2022 and is expected to keep growing this year.”
  • The “vibe shift,” he concludes, creates “a window of opportunity” for Kyiv’s friends to “tilt that balance further” by tightening and better enforcing sanctions and transferring frozen Russian assets, so that “for the first time, not just Ukraine but all of Europe could dare to dream of victory.”

"Why is Trump using the Qatari plane? I answered your questions,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 06.29.26.

  • On Russian losses and the army’s future impact at home, Ignatius said: “Putin keeps pushing soldiers into the meatgrinder. When this abused and battered army comes home, angry and defeated in Putin's war of obsession, Russia will be shaken.”
  • On domestic pressure inside Russia, he replied: “Russian analysts say there is growing disaffection among elites, and ordinary Russians too, because of a war that has cost Russia an estimated 1.3 million casualties and has no end in sight. I don't see any prospect that Putin will be toppled. His hold on power is too tight. But as the body count rises and Russians lose access to some basic online services because of a security squeeze on the internet, public anger seems to be growing.”
  • On prospects in Ukraine, Ignatius argued: “We can be optimistic that Ukraine's courage and technological innovations in drone warfare are holding Russia to a stalemate—at huge cost for both sides. I don't see that war ending anytime soon, but for Ukraine, survival is a kind of victory.”

“Moscow gets a taste of Vladimir Putin’s war,” Anastasia Stognei, Financial Times, 06.26.26.

  • Stognei reports that Moscow has seen a sharp rise in long‑range Ukrainian drone attacks “in both frequency and effectiveness.” Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed Russian air defenses shot down 250 drones approaching Moscow over two days in March, then a new record of 180 on June 18, when a massive strike set the capital’s main oil refinery ablaze. That attack drove many Muscovites into underground car parks and stairwells “for the first time since” the full‑scale invasion in 2022.
  • Residents complain that official warnings often arrive late or only on Telegram even as access is throttled. A regional message justified not activating sirens on the grounds that low‑flying drones could spark “panic” and “significant casualties” if people ran outside. After the refinery hit, Moscow suburbs reported “oil rain”—black droplets on cars and streets—while officials dismissed them as “combustion products”; an ecologist countered that “basic physics” showed they were soot and oil vapor from burning “tons of petrol,” posing particular risks to vulnerable people and animals. The blaze also gutted part of the Sadovod wholesale market, with traders losing “millions of rubles” in stock.
  • Analyst Andrei Kolesnikov says the attacks have hardened both anti‑war sentiment and hawkish calls for nuclear escalation, concluding that for Putin, such pressure is “a spur to escalate.”

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at United Russia Party Congress, Kremlin.ru, 06.28.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • "Russia is under harsh, one could say without any exaggeration, unprecedented pressure from the Western elites. They cannot inflict a strategic defeat on us, cannot defeat us on the battlefield, so they are trying to shake up the political situation, to sow internal turmoil—that isn’t working either. So they continue to encourage the Kyiv regime, which they have chosen as a battering ram in their struggle against Russia, showing no regard for the Ukrainian people. And the regime is retreating along the entire line of contact, and therefore has switched to openly terrorist actions."
  • "The West supposedly prefers not to notice all this, does not notice it, and at the very same time is introducing ever new, and I stress, illegal sanctions precisely against us."
  • "And of course, we will accomplish the tasks of domestic development, above all in the field of demography, the preservation of our traditional values, and the improvement of quality and standard of living in all regions of our vast country. We will bring the Russian economy to a fundamentally new technological level in all critically important areas."
  • "The [United Russia] party has a direct connection with the combat units of the Armed Forces, with defense plants, and with the mass volunteer movement. You help the residents of Donbas and Novorossiya, Crimea, Sevastopol, our border regions, you support the families of the defenders of the Motherland and, of course, the combat veterans themselves."
  • "Without a doubt, it is necessary to continue creating every condition so that such people—and they are, as I have repeatedly said, the true elite of Russia—can continue their service to the country in civilian spheres, in politics, in the economy, and in state and municipal administration. As we agreed at the last congress, active work is already underway in this area."
  • "I will repeat once again: Russia can only be a strong, sovereign power. Otherwise there will be no Russia at all."

“Dmitry Medvedev: The New People’s Program Will Be United Russia’s Work Plan for the Next Five Years,” United Russia, 06.28.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • Medvedev tells the first stage of United Russia’s XXIII Congress that the party has identified seven key “challenges,” stressing that the seventh is “ensuring the security of the Fatherland as a whole.” “We will be able to respond to it only with Victory in the special military operation,” he declares. “Without this, there will be no security, we already understand this perfectly well.” After that, he says, “it will be necessary to develop the sectors that ensure the protection of the sovereignty and national interests of Russia. This topic in the People’s Program should sound weighty and clear.”
  • He frames the new People’s Program as a direct response to war‑related pressures, calling Western attempts to impose “alien values” “part of the West’s hybrid war against Russia” and arguing that to answer this, “we must introduce people to their native history and culture, preserve the spiritual and moral foundations of our civilization.” The program, he insists, must be “thought-out, realistic and absolutely concrete, so that even in the most difficult conditions we can implement citizens’ initiatives, ensure the achievement of the national development goals formulated by the President. It is precisely for this that we are going to the elections—to win.”

“Russia’s Wartime Internet: A Contested Space with the Regime Still Predominant,” Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov, PONARS Eurasia, 06.24.26.

  • As of early 2025, Telegram had 90.6 million users in Russia (age 12+), with users spending 13 hours/month on the app; by early 2024 ~80% of 12–24‑year‑olds used it daily. Trust in state TV fell to 42%, while trust in Telegram channels rose to 18%; by September 2024, 28% of Russians reported getting news from Telegram. Among top channels in late 2025, pro‑Kremlin outnumbered anti‑Kremlin 404 vs. 114, and produced 4.1 million vs. 1.1 million posts.
  • Policymakers using Telegram jumped from 137 pre‑invasion to 452 post‑invasion; their posts rose from 92,849 to 712,219, with the median per user going from 200 to 922. In 2023, 18% of Russians said they had donated money to soldiers, and 56% said they had provided direct help to military personnel or families. One volunteer hotline reported 8,968 inquiries by Dec 2024; a single pro‑war channel raised RUB 13.29 million in 11 days for FPV drones and kits.
  • State spending on “patriotic” projects is estimated at $70m in 2022, $430m in 2023, and ~$700m in 2025. On engagement, anti‑Kremlin channels had higher average views per post, rising from 25,346 to 104,778, vs. 15,929 to 67,442 for pro‑Kremlin channels. The current crackdown has throttled Telegram (voice/video blocked in 2025; speeds limited Feb 2026; app “largely stopped working” by mid‑March 2026), while the state pushes Max, which has <75m monthly active users versus Telegram’s ~100m.
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

“The Next Russia Threat: Moscow’s Military Power After Ukraine,” Michael Kofman, Foreign Affairs, 06.23.26.

  • Michael Kofman argues that even if Russia is defeated in Ukraine, it will remain Europe’s principal military threat and will rebuild faster than many expect. Despite huge losses—roughly 400,000–500,000 killed and up to 800,000 seriously wounded—Russia’s active force has expanded from about 850,000 to 1.3 million troops, with many units enlarged and equipped with dedicated drone, reconnaissance, assault, and electronic warfare elements. Massive equipment losses have been offset by surging defense production: Russia now manufactures millions of tactical drones annually, tens of thousands of one‑way attack drones, and far more missiles than before the war, giving it powerful deep‑strike capabilities.
  • At the same time, the quality of Russia’s forces has declined. It has lost much of its capacity for large‑scale combined‑arms maneuver because experienced officers and trained personnel have been killed, limiting its ability to exploit new technologies offensively. Reconstitution will also be constrained by economic and demographic problems, yet high defense spending—effectively $400–500 billion when adjusted for purchasing power—underpins continued military expansion. With arms control collapsed and Russia’s nuclear arsenal unconstrained, Kofman warns NATO must adapt quickly, or it risks suffering heavy early losses in any future conflict with a reconstituted Russian military.
  • See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
  • See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

  • No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Putin’s Asia diplomacy may help Russia avoid isolation. But it won’t deliver his goals in Ukraine,” Grégoire Roos, Chatham House, 06.22.26.

  • Roos writes that even as G7 leaders “restated their united support for Ukraine and vowed to increase economic pressure on Russia,” Putin could showcase in Kazan that “none of the leaders present had severed ties with Russia or joined the West in treating it as an international pariah.” Yet he argues that while “Russia looks less isolated globally, it has not been able to persuade others to support its position on Ukraine,” noting that Moscow has “so far failed at forcing Ukraine to accept its territorial claims,” “has not split the G7,” and has not gotten China, India or ASEAN states to “endorse its preferred endgame.”
  • China, he says, has become Russia’s “indispensable economic partner,” but “the Russia–China relationship is not a coalition for victory in Ukraine”: Beijing “helps Russia to endure. But it does not help Russia win diplomatically,” and the war has made Russia “more dependent on China at precisely the moment when Moscow wants to present itself as an independent pole.” Across Asia, governments will “trade with Moscow, buy from Moscow where useful, and engage Moscow when it serves their interests,” but “they are preserving options, not joining a project… engaging Russia because it is useful, not because they want Russia to define the future of European security.”

“Russia Makes Inroads in Southeast Asia,” Joseph Rachman, Foreign Policy, 06.24.26.

  • Rachman writes that after the Iran war and energy shock, the Kazan ASEAN–Russia summit shows how “Russia has deepened its diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia,” with nine ASEAN leaders attending and “energy—oil and gas or nuclear—a key part of its offer.” Since 2022 ASEAN statements have “called for peace and talks but failed to mention the words ‘Russia’ or ‘invasion,’” and “only Singapore imposed any sanctions,” he notes; this year attitudes “seem to have softened further,” with ASEAN chair Ferdinand Marcos Jr. praising “steady political and security engagement between ASEAN and Russia” and stressing food and energy security.
  • Moscow is using this to blunt Western efforts to isolate it over Ukraine: a joint communiqué called for cooperation on “civilian nuclear energy” and the ASEAN Power Grid; Marcos said the Philippines is working on a mechanism to buy Russian oil “on a regular basis” and was open to nuclear cooperation; Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim hailed meetings with Putin as proof of ASEAN’s “centrality” and announced work on a long‑term Russian oil and gas deal. Rachman argues that Southeast Asian governments are not endorsing Russia’s war aims, but their energy‑driven engagement “illustrates how the invasion of Ukraine has not left Russia isolated in large parts of the Global South,” complicating Western pressure on Moscow.

Ukraine:

“Zelenskyy may get the last laugh over Trump,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 06.23.26.

  • Luce asks which man is likelier to be in power in 2029 and argues “the savvy bet would be Zelenskyy,” noting that “no other world leader can claim to have survived and thrived on the enmity of both Trump and Vladimir Putin.” He recalls that in the Oval Office 15 months ago Trump told Zelenskyy he “did not have any cards” and that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reportedly called him “this little fucker” and a “special‑needs child for the Europeans,” but says Ukraine’s battlefield innovation shows “Zelenskyy does not face such challenges.” At the G7, by contrast, Trump backed a statement praising Ukraine’s “resilience” and “new momentum,” and the House passed an $8 billion aid package.
  • Luce argues Zelenskyy now has leverage: Ukraine fields “the largest and most modern military in Europe,” its drone and defense startups are in high demand, and Kyiv’s push for EU membership could “help give birth to a genuine European defense identity” as NATO and EU debates fuse under U.S. uncertainty. In a West whose leaders often look timid, Zelenskyy’s forthright liberal‑democratic rhetoric “stands as a rebuke,” and he “is reminding the west of itself” even as Trump “is no friend of the ‘west.’”

“Poland, Ukraine, and the Ongoing Battle Over the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,” Pawel Markiewicz and Maciej Olchawa, Foreign Policy, 06.23.26.

  • Markiewicz and Olchawa write that Zelenskyy’s May 26 decision to name a Special Operations Forces unit after “the heroes” of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), followed by a state reburial for OUN co-founder Andrii Melnyk, has triggered a backlash “across the political spectrum” in Poland, where the UPA is remembered for “the premeditated ethnic cleansing of Poles,” with “as many as 100,000 people” killed in Volhynia and elsewhere. Polish President Karol Nawrocki has moved to strip Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, and “Polish politicians from both the right and center-left have called for Warsaw to put new conditions on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union,” even as both governments seek closer cooperation against Russia.
  • They stress that Moscow is exploiting the rift: “Needless to say, these historical tensions have only played into Russia’s hands,” with Putin telling Poles that “the responsibility lies with Bandera’s nationalists” while warning Ukrainians that Poland will use Volhynia as a pretext to seize territory, and the Russian Foreign Ministry linking “Banderites” in 1943 to “today’s Ukrainian neo-Nazis.” Yet Poland still spends “close to 5% of its GDP on defense” and sends arms to Ukraine; polls show 44% of Poles backing aid in late 2025 and nearly 60% saying they “couldn’t imagine Ukraine acceding to NATO or the EU without first coming to terms with its past.” The authors argue that, to keep their anti‑Russia partnership on track, Kyiv should “grant Poland unobstructed access to conduct exhumations,” Warsaw should resist Russian meddling, and both sides should confront Volhynia “in a spirit of openness, not grievance and resentment.”

“The strength of our Constitution is in people,” Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukrainska Pravda, 06.28.26.

  • Zaluzhnyi writes that “our Constitution is the right of the Ukrainian people to a free, secure existence, development, and memory of the struggle for our Freedom,” and that “today, the Ukrainian people deserve for the Constitution to become for us the embodiment of our struggle and its result. Because the price has already been paid is too high.” With Russia’s aggression since 2014, “people stood up to defend their freedom, their own free choice, and territorial integrity. That is, to defend their Constitution,” so that “the term protection of the Constitution is often used as a synonym for protection of the state.”
  • He argues that revolutions such as the Revolution of Dignity were “the realization of the people's right to revolt” against a violated social contract, and that “the strength, the key to protecting our Constitution, lies not only in the number of missiles and tanks, but in the readiness of the people to defend it.” Today’s fight is “for the right of our children to be educated in the Ukrainian language, the right of citizens to choose their government, the right of journalists to ask uncomfortable questions,” and “the real strength of our Constitution is in people… only their will to fight for their chosen future is the only determining factor in our stability and preservation of the Constitution.”
  • See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Union Weakness: Why Lukashenko Complied With Kyiv’s Ultimatum,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Politika, 06.23.26.

  • Shraibman writes that the growing confrontation between Ukraine and Belarus “seems to have reached a new level,” as Kyiv now issues ultimatums and “Minsk, without much fuss, fulfills them.” On June 18, Zelenskyy demanded that Belarus turn off relay stations on cell towers along the border that were “helping navigation of Russian drones,” or Ukraine would “do it itself.” “A few days later,” Shraibman notes, “enough confirmation had accumulated that Minsk really fulfilled Kyiv’s demand,” with Russian pro‑war sources reporting mobile disruptions and Ukrainian monitors saying Russian drones had not flown there for three days; by evening Zelenskyy stated “the relays in Belarus have stopped working.”
  • He calls this “rare pliancy” from Lukashenko “another indicator of how the balance of power in the Russian‑Ukrainian war has changed,” arguing that “awareness of both his own and Russia’s vulnerability to Ukraine’s long‑range strikes no longer allows Minsk to fully rely on allied Russia,” forcing “unilateral concessions to Kyiv” to reduce risk. Shraibman quotes Lukashenko admitting that if Ukraine hit Belarus “its territory and all objects on it would be ‘like on the palm of your hand’” and explaining his reluctance to enter the war by “this vulnerability and the unwillingness of Belarusians to fight.” Yet he warns that if Kyiv moves from relay towers to demands to stop Belarusian arms and fuel exports to Russia, “the situation may approach a dangerous line,” since such strikes “could become for the Kremlin a convenient pretext” to answer in kind against “Ukraine’s allies in Europe,” and would underline that “Russia is ever less able to cope with the consequences of the war it unleashed.”

“Blunting the Belarusian blade: The growing threat Belarus poses to European security,” Ondrej Ditrych, EUISS Brief, 06.23.26.

  • Ditrych argues that under Aleksandr Lukashenka, “Belarus… has become a growing threat to European security,” noting that Minsk “supports Moscow’s war effort and is increasingly serving as a platform for Russian coercion, escalation and intimidation against the EU.”
  • He writes that Russia’s deepening military integration with Belarus is “steadily eroding the country’s sovereignty while creating new risks for the EU and Ukraine,” as “expanded basing arrangements, military infrastructure development and the deployment of nuclear-capable systems mean that Belarus is increasingly becoming part of a single military space with Russia.”
  • The brief insists the EU’s Belarus policy “should not be reduced to a choice between engagement and isolation.” Instead, Ditrych calls for “a recalibrated approach” that “should combine sustained pressure, conditional incentives and stronger support for democratic forces, while limiting Russia’s capacity for interference and including Belarus in any discussions about a future European security architecture.”

“Parliamentary Elections in Armenia in Two Dimensions,” Sergei Markedonov, Russian International Affairs Council, 06.25.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian views.

  • Markedonov notes that Armenia’s June 2026 elections preserved a three‑party parliament, but with a sharpened power imbalance: the ruling Civil Contract party of Nikol Pashinyan won 49.745%, gaining 3/5 of seats (enough to govern alone but not to amend the constitution), while Strong Armenia took 23.27% and the Armenia alliance 9.92%; Prosperous Armenia fell just short of the 4% threshold with 3.89%. He argues the vote was “geopoliticized” and “securitized,” with the collapse of the “miatsum” project (unity with Karabakh) driving a “radical change” in state‑building priorities and a sharp foreign‑policy reorientation.
  • Domestically, Pashinyan’s “revolutionary” project has morphed into what Markedonov calls a drive to “completely homogenize” Armenia’s political space. Since 2018, Pashinyan has dismantled all potential centers of “fronde” (parliament, courts, security services, Karabakh authorities) and used criminal cases against former presidents and oligarchs; in 2026 the main challenger Samvel Karapetyan ran his entire campaign under house arrest, and some 200 people were detained on election day. After the vote Pashinyan vowed to “destroy” threats named as “Robert Kocharyan, the Kaluga oligarch (Samvel Karapetyan) and the pro‑Belarusian oligarch (Gagik Tsarukyan)… in their lair,” suggesting early elections and a bid for a new constitutional majority remain on the table.
  • Internationally, Markedonov argues Armenia is neither “a second Ukraine nor a second Moldova,” but a distinct case. The “Karabakh catastrophe” and the shift from “Historical Armenia” and miatsum to the doctrine of “Real Armenia” (the former Armenian SSR borders) have triggered a deep revision of relations with Russia: Yerevan has recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, accepted the exodus of Armenians from the region, and sought closer ties with the U.S. and EU—without, he stresses, obtaining “clear security guarantees” or Western integration prospects. Armenian elites, he writes, “overestimated” Russia’s problems in Ukraine and the Caucasus and were “insufficiently critical” about Western cooperation. As a result, domestic polarization and Pashinyan’s political monopoly now “layer over” a foreign‑policy turn that “creates problems with the old ally ‘here and now’” without reliable compensators. For Moscow, he concludes, this is a “difficult but not insurmountable challenge,” recommending broader contacts beyond official structures, delaying formal recognition of the election results to leverage Russian interests, and avoiding steps that would open economic and security “niches” to competitors hostile to the Russian‑Armenian alliance.
  • See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Endnotes

  1. The nine provinces are Kharkiv Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, Zaporizhia Oblast, Kherson Oblast, Crimea, Mykolaiv Oblast, Odessa Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
  2. Andrey Kolesnikov’s account of Sergei Lavrov allegedly saying in a closed‑door SVOP discussion, “Well, after all, I would use it,” is disputed. Arms‑control analyst Dmitry Stefanovich (X: @KomissarWhipla), who says he attended the same SVOP Assembly, states that Lavrov “did not say anything like that about nuclear use” and points to the published video of the session as evidence (RM, 06.23.26).

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

AI agents were used in production of this digest.

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko, seen on a monitor at the Presidential Situation Center at the Kremlin in Moscow during joint nuclear drills on Thursday, May 21, 2026. (Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

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