5 Ideas to Explore

1. Russia is unleashing a summer offensive to “break Ukraine,” according to the Economist, whose “military sources” believe the eastern region of Donetsk’s Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk are to “be the center of Russia’s summer campaign.” On June 8, the Russian MoD claimed that elements of its 90th Tank Division reached the western border of the Donetsk region and are developing an offensive into the east-central region of Dnipropetrovsk, according to ISW. Ukrainian authorities rejected the claim, but also told reporters that Russia seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Sept. 1, 2025, and to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.¹
2. Ukraine’s successful clandestine operation to smuggle multiple drones into Russia and then launch them from trucks to damage multiple Russian strategic bombers have prompted a number of Western commentators to ponder what the U.S. should be doing to protect elements of its own strategic triad as well as whether the attacks may increase probability of use of nuclear weapons. "Any country that has strategic bombers, strategic missiles and silos, or strategic nuclear submarines at port is looking at the attack and thinking the risk to our arsenal from a containerized set of drones disguised as a semitrailer poses a real risk," RAND’s Jason Matheny told The Washington Post. The urgent task for NATO in the wake of the June 1 attacks is to “determine the vulnerabilities of its own air bases, bombers and critical infrastructure,” James Patton Rogers of Cornell told The New York Times. The U.S. should also be pondering whether the June 1 attacks increase the probability of nuclear weapons use, according to Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group and the Belfer Center. “Boxed in and humiliated, Putin might consider a tactical nuclear strike… [e]ven if this scenario remains unlikely, it is likelier than it was before June 1,” Bremmer warns in a commentary for Project Syndicate.
3. “Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear coercion will be the central challenge for the U.K. and its NATO Allies in the coming decades,” predicts the U.K.’s newly-released Strategic Defense Review. Russia’s “strategies for warfighting rely on the threat of limited nuclear use to terminate a conflict on advantageous terms,” according to the review, which has been co-led by Lord Robertson, Richard Barrons, and Fiona Hill. “Russia is at war with us” and “we can’t rely exclusively on anyone anymore,” Hill, a member of Harvard’s board of overseers, is quoted as saying in a Guardian article focused on the outcomes of the review.²
4. Would Russia mount an invasion into a NATO country? If so, when would Moscow be ready to do so? To hear NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte say it at Chatham House June 9, “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO” by 2030. Of some 25 earlier predictions for what year Russia would be ready to attack a NATO country by, catalogued by Simon Saradzhyan, 2030 is the most frequently forecast year. In his June 9 speech at Chatham House, Rutte urged NATO countries to spend 5% of GDP on defense in order to acquire “more forces and capabilities,” warning that, presently, "in terms of ammunition, Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO produces in a year.” The alternative to spending more on defense for NATO’s European members is to “learn to speak Russian,” Rutte warned, according to NYT.
5. A secretive intelligence unit of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) refers to the Chinese as “the enemy,” according to what The New York Times describes as an eight-page internal FSB planning document that it has obtained. The FSB officers “say that China is spying on the Russian military’s operations in Ukraine to learn about Western weapons and warfare. They fear that Chinese academics are laying the groundwork to make claims on Russian territory,” according to The New York Times. “Despite all of these vulnerabilities, the FSB report makes clear that jeopardizing the support of China would be worse, warning the secretive unit’s officers that they must receive approval from the highest echelons of the Russian security establishment before taking any sensitive action at all.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“UN nuclear chief Rafael Grossi: ‘I am a calm person. I focus on what I can do,’” Gillian Tett, Financial Times, 06.06.25.

• “‘There is much more bombardment there [at the Zaporizhzhia NPP] now, and the Russians are pushing hard,’ Grossi says, explaining that a rotating IAEA team has been present since 2022, in a bid to prevent another Chernobyl-style disaster. ‘It’s dangerous. But we have to be there,’ he adds, revealing that he has made five trips himself — under direct gunfire.”
• “Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons. ‘This is worrying because it normalizes this,’ Grossi admits with masterly understatement. ‘In the past, this was quite taboo, but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.’”
• “progress is tough. Grossi explains that the IAEA monitoring team in Zaporizhzhia have travelled there via Ukraine, to underscore its rightful sovereignty, but that means crossing front lines. ‘It’s dramatic — you cross a bridge, and walk and then climb a rope,’ he says. ‘I have done it before . . . but the Russians are saying now that if you come, you will be killed, probably.’ By whom? ‘We never know really who is shooting,’ he says, diplomatically.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"Guided Development: North Korean Weapons Break Cover with Russian Design Features," Douglas Barrie and Joseph Dempsey, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 06.02.25.

• “North Korea has revealed mock-ups of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, leading to concern in South Korea that Russia may have provided technical support. If the systems are introduced into service, they could enhance North Korea’s air-to-air combat capability.”
• “It is clear that defense relations between Moscow and Pyongyang are growing, with the latter benefitting from access to tactical guided weapons technology. Concerning enough in itself, this will only be compounded if Russian support is forthcoming in the strategic weapons realm. North Korea, for instance, is believed to be looking to improve the materials technology for re-entry vehicles, an area where Moscow could also provide considerable help.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"A Test Case for Saving Ukraine's Lost Children," Lizzie Johnson and Kostiantyn Khudov, The Washington Post, 06.04.25.

• “The Conflict Observatory — part of Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which has consistently provided the most accurate data but will shutter on July 1 because of Trump’s federal funding cuts — has verified that at least 19,500 children were forcibly deported from occupied areas of Ukraine, funneled into reeducation camps or adopted by Russian families, their identities erased.”
• “The real number is probably much higher, senior Ukrainian officials say, but cannot be proved because of poor recordkeeping. ‘Maybe 50,000. Maybe 100,000. Maybe higher. Only Russia can provide us with this information,’ said Mykola Kuleba, former children’s ombudsman for Ukraine and head of the nonprofit Save Ukraine.”
• “In three years of full-scale war, only a small fraction of them have been returned — about 1,300 children — in deals brokered by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Holy See, as well as in covert rescue missions run by volunteers.”
• “Ukraine demands the full return of its abducted children and accuses Russia of committing war crimes.”

"Why Isn’t the West Supporting These Russian Exiles?" Ekaterina Sachkova, Chatham House, 06.06.25.

• “What to do about the nearly one million liberal-minded, globally educated Russians who have fled their home country since the invasion? ... Those who have left Russia over the past three years … are in their late 20s to mid-40s, globally minded and highly skilled. They come from Russia’s biggest cities – Moscow and St Petersburg – and predominantly work in the IT sector, academia, media, education and the arts. Most left with accumulated savings and speak fluent English. Eight out of 10 hold higher education degrees, while one in 10 has a PhD.”
• “The West’s apprehension towards this diaspora, and the regime they left behind is understandable. But if Europe’s democratic leaders are serious about challenging Putin’s Russia, they must begin to see that the experiences, perspectives and social ties of these exiles can be an asset, not a threat.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Putin Unleashes a Summer Offensive to Break Ukraine," The Economist, 06.08.25.

• “A large-scale summer offensive by Russia that aims to break Ukrainian morale and deliver president Vladimir Putin a symbolic victory at almost any cost appears to have been unleashed.”
• “Ukrainian intelligence believe that Kostiantynivka and neighboring Pokrovsk [both in the Donetsk region] will be the center of Russia’s summer campaign. There are concerns about the north-eastern province of Sumy too. Russia has massed 50,000 troops there.”
• “Military sources say they still expect that once Russia establishes a so-called buffer zone it will shift focus to the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia fronts to the south—continuing the attritional warfare that has turned the region into a pockmarked wasteland.”
• “Ukrainian sources claim that captured Russian officers tell them the summer campaign is being presented as ‘one last push,’ to break Ukraine’s morale.”
• “Some Ukrainians are skeptical that Russia can ever break through ... but their soldiers are more cautious. A key part of Ukraine’s resilience has been its early edge in drone warfare, but that advantage is now eroding.”
• “Once the fighting stabilizes after the summer offensive is over, a window of diplomacy might become possible again.”

"How Russia’s Grinding Advance Complicates Ukraine Peace Push," Henry Foy, Financial Times, 06.09.25.

• “Russia has claimed that its forces have advanced into Ukraine’s east-central region of Dnipropetrovsk. It would be a symbolic victory at the start of a potentially critical week for the future of the almost 40 months-long war.”
• “The claimed entry of units from Russia’s 90th tank regiment into Dnipropetrovsk, which Ukraine’s armed forces denied last night, would mark the first time Moscow’s land forces have entered the region since the early months of the war, and be another sign of their brutal, incremental advance as peace talks stall.”
• “Ukraine is also bracing for the outcome of what Putin has vowed will be a large-scale military retaliation for Kyiv’s surprise drone attack earlier this month that destroyed dozens of Russian bombers.”

"Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2025," Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel, ISW Press, 06.06.25. 

• “Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025. Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea.”
• “Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists. The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.”
• “The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield.”

“Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine,” Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, CSIS, 06.03.25.

• “The evidence suggests that Russia has largely failed to achieve its primary objectives and has suffered high costs. Russia will likely hit the 1 million casualty mark in the summer of 2025—a stunning and grizzly milestone.”
  • “First, Russian forces have advanced an average of only 50 meters per day in such areas as Kharkiv, slower than during the Somme offensive in World War I, where French and British forces advanced an average of 80 meters per day… Even Russia’s rate of advance in parts of Donetsk Oblast, averaging 135 meters per day, has been remarkably slow.”³
  • “Second, Russia’s seizure of approximately 5,000 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine since January 2024 has been paltry—amounting to less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory—and has occurred mainly in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Russia’s marginal gains are particularly noteworthy compared to its conquest of 120,000 square kilometers during the first five weeks of the war and Ukraine’s recapture of 50,000 square kilometers in the spring of 2022.”
  • “Third, Russia has lost substantial quantities of equipment across the land, air, and sea domains, highlighting the sharp matériel toll of its attrition campaign. Since January 2024, for example, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery, and 1,865 tanks. Even more noteworthy, Russian equipment losses have been significantly higher than Ukrainian losses, varying between a ratio of 5:1 and 2:1 in Ukraine’s favor.”
  • “Fourth, Russian fatalities and casualties have been extraordinary. Russia will likely hit the 1 million casualty mark in the summer of 2025—a stunning and grizzly milestone. Overall, a high of 250,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine, with over 950,000 total Russian casualties, a sign of Putin’s blatant disregard for his soldiers..”
• “Russia’s poor performance has likely been caused by several factors: the Russian military’s reliance on dismounted infantry and mechanized forces to take Ukrainian territory, Russia’s failure to use operational fires in a coordinated way that enables maneuver, and Ukraine’s effective utilization of defense in depth.”

“Ukraine's drone triumph opens window to the future of war,” Zachary Basu, Axios, 06.03.25.

• “‘You don't have the cards,’ President Trump dismissively told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during their Oval Office blow-up in February.  Three months later, Zelensky played a hand no one saw coming.”
• “Ukraine's audacious drone operation, which destroyed nuclear-capable bombers deep inside Russian territory, delivered a strategic gut punch to Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
• “Ukraine is calling it ‘Operation Spiderweb.’ Pro-Kremlin bloggers are calling it ‘Russia's Pearl Harbor.’ Military experts are calling it a new nightmare for national defense.”
• “All can agree: Ukraine's ingenious use of low-cost drones has vast implications not only for the future of this war — but for the future of all war.”
• “The calculus from Kyiv, therefore, was simple: If the world won't help Ukraine intercept Russian bombers in the sky, Ukraine must destroy them on the ground.”
• “For national security experts, Operation Spiderweb has raised new alarms about the threat of commercial infrastructure — say, Chinese container ships docked in the U.S. — being repurposed for covert attacks.”

"How Russia Responds to Ukraine’s Drone Attack Depends on Trump," John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 06.02.25. 

Foreign Policy spoke with George Beebe, a former director of Russia analysis at the CIA in the wake of Ukraine’s June 1 attacks.

• “This kind of dramatic strike ... gets a lot of attention. ... But it doesn’t significantly impair Russia’s ability to continue to fight the war in Ukraine the way it has been. It doesn’t change that fundamental correlation between Ukraine’s military industrial capacity—its ability to train and field troops on the battlefield—and Russia’s quite substantial materiel and structural advantages in those regards.”
• “I doubt it [the attack] had much of an impact on Russia’s ability to continue fighting the war in Ukraine the way it has been. The Russians are involved in a war of attrition. ... They’re trying, over time, to grind down Ukraine’s ability to put well-trained and well-equipped forces on the battlefield. And they are making significant progress on that.”
• “I don’t think it’s a significant blow to Russia’s nuclear triad. ... But it did strike against Russia’s strategic nuclear triad, and that, in and of itself, is something that is quite alarming. The Russians recently revised their nuclear-use doctrine, and one of the things that they specifically said in there was that if there are attacks by an adversary on important state or military infrastructure that would disrupt responses, potentially by Russia’s nuclear forces, that is potentially a trigger for Russian nuclear use. ... Now, would those criteria fit in this particular situation? We need to be concerned that the Russians might believe that it does.”
• “The question is, what do the Russians do to respond to this? Do they do nothing? My guess is that what they do is going to be conditioned heavily by how the Trump administration handles this.... there is no question that it increases the likelihood of a direct confrontation, unless the Trump administration takes active steps to defuse this.”
• “I think the [Ukrainians’] target audience for this operation was here in Washington, not in Russia.”
• “It is embarrassing for Putin. ... Putin is the ultimate decision-maker, and whether he agrees with that or not, we will have to see. But it’s very much in America’s interest to defuse this situation, because this is one that could escalate.”

"The West Is Rethinking How to Fight Wars," The Economist, 06.03.25.

• “The Ukrainian drone strike on bombers far inside Russia on June 1st will be ranked among the greatest military raids in history. The operation, combining old-fashioned sabotage with the iconic weapon of the Ukraine war, illustrated two things. One is that new technology, deployed inventively, can be lethal. The other is that even major powers are vulnerable to attacks on critical infrastructure deep inside their own territory, overturning the assumptions of the 1990s and 2000s.”

"A Drone Strike Devastated Russia's Air Force. The U.S. Is Vulnerable, Too," Ellen Nakashima and Warren P. Strobel, The Washington Post, 06.04.25.

• “Ukraine's surprise Sunday strike that used relatively inexpensive drones to knock out a significant portion of Russia's long-range bomber capability was arguably the single largest blow to Moscow in its three-year war on its neighbor and a stunning display of asymmetric warfare.”
• “‘The Pentagon should be very worried about this,’ said Stacie Pettyjohn, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who focuses on drone warfare and nuclear deterrence. A Ukraine-style attack — using drones hidden in shipping containers or trucks — could very well happen on U.S. soil, or against U.S. air and naval bases overseas, she said.”
• “‘Any country that has strategic bombers, strategic missiles and silos, or strategic nuclear submarines at port is looking at the attack and thinking the risk to our arsenal from a containerized set of drones disguised as a semitrailer poses a real risk,’ said Jason Matheny, CEO of the Rand Corporation and a former director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, which develops advanced technologies for U.S. spy agencies.”
• “The ‘character of warfare is changing at a ratio faster than we've ever seen,’ Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, told Congress in April. ‘Our adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones that we shoot down with $2 million missiles. That cost-benefit curve is upside down.’”

"As Drones Transform Warfare, NATO May Be Vulnerable," Lara Jakes, The New York Times, 06.04.25.

• “‘This is more than an isolated incident — it’s a glimpse into the character of future conflict, where war won’t be confined to neatly drawn front lines,’ said James Patton Rogers, a drone warfare expert at Cornell University. He said the urgent question for NATO, after ‘an impressive attack by Ukraine,’ is to determine the vulnerabilities of its own air bases, bombers and critical infrastructure.”
• “China protects its aircraft with over 3,000 hardened shelters, while the United States has exposed tarmacs ‘and assumptions,’ Simone Ledeen, a top Pentagon policy official during President Trump’s first term, wrote on social media after Ukraine’s broad drone attack.”
• “The U.S. military reported 350 drone sightings across about 100 military installations last year, Gen. Gregory Guillot, the head of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, told lawmakers in February. A new government review of Britain’s defense capabilities, released this week, made clear that other alliance members are also aware of their vulnerabilities.”

"Ukraine’s Strategic Game-Changer," Ian Bremmer, Project Syndicate, 06.06.25.

• “Ukraine has just demonstrated, in spectacular fashion, that a small but determined and innovative country can deploy cheap, scalable and decentralized technology to challenge a much larger, conventionally superior foe.”
• “‘Operation Spider’s Web’ destroyed or severely damaged as many as 20 strategic aircraft, including nuclear-capable bombers and early-warning planes. (Ukraine claims the true toll could reach 41.) … Using drones produced indigenously for less than the cost of an iPhone, Ukrainian armed forces took out strategic bombers worth upward of $100 million each … At a 300,000-to-one return on investment, this was the kind of asymmetric operation that can upend the rules of modern warfare.”
• “At the same time, Ukraine’s recent battlefield victories also increase the tail risk of a dangerous escalation. ... By making the Russian leader look weak, this increases the risk that he will feel compelled to retaliate dramatically, to restore his credibility at home and abroad. … [A] more disturbing possibility is that, boxed in and humiliated, Putin might consider a tactical nuclear strike. … [E]ven if this scenario remains unlikely, it is likelier than it was before June 1.”
• “[B]y showing that it has leverage, and that Russia has more to lose than Putin thought, Ukraine has altered the strategic equation and opened a narrow window for diplomacy – even if the endgame remains as elusive as ever.”

"Ukraine’s Massive Drone Attack Came With a Hidden Message," Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 06.03.25.

• “Another inconclusive round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine on Monday was largely overshadowed by recent events on the ground — Russia's pulverizing missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and a military training ground, followed by Ukraine's brazen drone attack against five air bases deep inside Russia over the weekend and an apparent underwater bomb assault on the Kerch Strait Bridge, a key Russian supply line, on Tuesday.”
• “The Ukrainian attack, by contrast, was unexpected, and it was as diplomatically pointed as it was surprising, sending messages with profound meaning for the war.”
  • “Ukraine is still capable and determined to fight back effectively.”
  • “Ukraine must not be sidelined in negotiations.”
  • “Ukraine fights a just and morally defensible war.”

“Attack On Russian Strategic Aviation,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 11 (163) 2025, 06.20.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• "Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb marked a significant escalation, targeting key Russian air bases and destroying or damaging strategic aircraft. This operation coincided with a string of increasingly bold Ukrainian attacks, including on the Kerch Bridge and Russian railway infrastructure."
• "The Kremlin views these acts of sabotage — directed both at strategic forces and civilian infrastructure — as an enhanced national security threat. In response, it is set to reinforce its commitment to a more forceful and accelerated effort to dismantle the current Ukrainian state."
• "Putin continues to pursue a dual-track strategy: large-scale military retaliation alongside diplomatic outreach, including to Donald Trump and, unexpectedly, the Vatican, while keeping up talks."
• "Putin’s strategic objective remains consistent: the dismantlement of Ukraine as a pro-Western state. While his tactics may shift — in tone, sequencing, or the degree of military pressure — the underlying goals are fixed. For Moscow, both negotiations and warfare are instruments serving the same end."

"Ukraine's Dirty War Is Just Getting Started," David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 06.06.25.

• “Ukraine's daring drone attack against Russian air bases last weekend delivered ‘a serious slap in the face of the power … of the Russian Federation,’ as Lt. Gen. Vasyl Malyuk, the head of SBU, Ukraine's security service, boasted after the operation. Some Ukraine supporters hoped the strikes might mark a breakthrough in the war.”
• “With Trump stepping back as a peacemaker, at least for now, Ukraine will depend more than ever on its intelligence services, which have shown an ability to strike Russian forces deep inside their home country and around the world. The front line inside Ukraine will remain a hellscape of drones and artillery. But covert operations could expand into a ‘dirty war’ beyond the front, with more targeted killings, sabotage, and strikes on countries that supply arms to Ukraine and Russia, respectively.”
• “Ukraine's readiness to launch risky spy operations has produced recurring tension between Washington and Kyiv, U.S. and Ukrainian sources told me.”
• “The countries bordering Ukraine might become new battlegrounds as the war continues.”

"Ukraine Will Win This War," Bernard-Henri Lévy, The Wall Street Journal, 06.03.25.

• “This weekend's drone operation is a further step on the path to victory. I don't know what form that victory will take, or whether it will be the front, the rear or its regime that will give in first in Russia. But the balance of power is increasingly clear.”
• “On one side, a ridiculed general staff, an ultimate weapon that is greatly diminished and discredited, troops so demoralized that they fight only with the support of North Korean, Chinese, Ghanaian, Bangladeshi and Iranian mercenaries.”
• “On the other side, a patriotic citizen army, motivated and knowing why it combats -- an army that has proved its mastery of the most advanced military technologies, its excellence not only in trench warfare but also in the new remote and ghost warfare.”
• “Ukraine will defeat Russia on the battlefield or impose the terms of a just peace. Either way it will win the war.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web Shows Future of Drone Warfare," Michael C. Horowitz, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.03.25.
• "What Is the Impact of Ukraine’s Raid on Russia’s Air Force?" Franz-Stefan Gady, Foreign Policy, 06.04.25.
• “The Ukrainians’ New Way of War," Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 06.06.25.
• "Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web is a Game-Changer for Modern Drone Warfare. NATO Should Pay Attention," Katja Bego, Chatham House, 06.06.25.
• "David's Slingshot: How Drones Became a Survival Strategy for Ukraine, Are Changing the Global Balance of Power, and Are Becoming a Global Threat to International Order," Re: Russia, 06.04.25.
• "Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries," Molly Carlough and Benjamin Harris, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.03.25.
• "A Digitized, Efficient Model of War," Rupert Barrett-Taylor and Gavin Wilde, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 06.03.25.

Military aid to Ukraine:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"The Senate’s New Ukraine Bill Will Not Work—But Here Is How to Fix It," Stephen Sestanovich, Council on Foreign Relations, 06.04.25.

• “Members of Congress have launched a potentially significant effort to toughen U.S. strategy toward Russia’s war in Ukraine. On April 1, Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 (SRA2025), which calls for—in Graham’s words—'bone-crushing’ sanctions to cripple the Russian ‘war machine.’”
• “Revisions could include the following:”
  • “Sanctioning them [the three largest Russian oil and gas companies—Rosneft, Gazprom, and Lukoil] now, as well as all Russian banks, and then imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese and Indian banks that do business with them, would be a far more effective way of cutting Russian export earnings than the hopeless tariff threats made by SRA2025.”
  • “Further reducing the $60-per-barrel price cap adopted by Group of Seven (G7) governments in December 2022 holds similar promise.”
  • “Congress should put pressure on the executive branch to take enforcement seriously.”
  • Seize “Russia’s sovereign assets, most of them now frozen in European banks.”
  • “Finally, sponsors of SRA2025 should reconsider the bill’s link between sanctions and negotiations.”⁴

"Graham’s ‘Bone Crushing’ Russia Sanctions Bill Could Freeze US Trade With the World’s Largest Economies," Amy Mackinnon, Politico, 06.07.25.

• “[I]f enacted, the South Carolina Republican’s proposal to impose 500 percent tariffs on any country that buys Russian energy would effectively cut the U.S. off from some of the world’s largest economies — including allies in Europe. ... Graham appeared to acknowledge as much on Wednesday, when he proposed a broad carve-out for countries that provide aid to Ukraine. This exemption would spare the European Union, which continues to import almost 20 percent of its gas from Russia.”
• “[E]xperts remain skeptical that the sky-high tariffs proposed in the Sanctioning Russia Act are in any way feasible.”
• “India and China buy roughly 70 percent of Russian energy exports, but several other countries that buy any oil, gas or uranium from Moscow — and aren’t included in the carve-out — could also be exposed to tariffs under the bill.”
• “The United States, which is still reliant on imports of enriched uranium from Russia to fuel its nuclear reactors, could also run afoul of the bill.”

"Putin’s Pressure Point: Congress Should Wield Oil Sanctions to Force Russia to Negotiate," Edward Fishman, Foreign Affairs, 06.04.25.

• The author writes: “Over the past four months, Trump has threatened to levy sanctions against Russia on at least half a dozen occasions. Each time, Putin has called his bluff and Trump has flinched.”
• In the author’s view, “Trump’s handling of Russia diverges sharply from his approach to every other country. He hasn’t hesitated to impose massive tariffs on China while pursuing a trade deal or to levy new sanctions on Iran amid nuclear negotiations. In most cases, he sees coercion as compatible with diplomacy. With Russia, he seems to believe that the two are mutually exclusive.”
• The author believes “[i]t’s time for Trump to rethink that strategy” vis-à-vis Russia.
• The author admits that “[o]f course, it will be even harder for Trump to coax Putin into a just peace in Ukraine than it was for Obama to strike a nuclear deal with Iran. Putin has transformed Russia’s economy into a war machine and covets a decisive military victory more than sanctions relief. But that only underscores the need for more pressure. Without it, diplomacy is wishful thinking.”

"EU Sanctions: A Signaling Package," Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council, 06.06.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• "The European Union’s seventeenth sanctions package was under discussion by EU authorities for a long time. Amid U.S.-Russia negotiations over Ukraine, it symbolized the EU’s independent political stance and the unity of its ranks on the Ukrainian issue. The new package fulfilled its signaling and symbolic role. However, Brussels once again failed to achieve any more decisive results through sanctions."
• "Over the past three years since the start of the special military operation, the European Union has imposed a significant volume of sanctions on Russia. The previous sixteen packages varied in both quality and scale. Their cumulative effect has pushed EU–Russia economic ties back by decades. In the history of Russian-European relations, there may not have been a precedent for such a deep paralysis of trade for political reasons. Even the extreme 20th century left many loopholes for economic interaction due to the lack of political unity in Europe. Today, such loopholes are fewer and narrower. However, this is unlikely to bring Brussels any closer to achieving its political goals regarding Russia."
• "By introducing a new package of restrictive measures, the EU was demonstrating that its political course would not waver with a change of administration in Washington. However, on more sensitive issues — such as tariffs — neither Brussels nor individual EU countries challenged Washington. On the Ukrainian issue, though, sanctions served to demonstrate commitment to the course of the past three years, without stepping on Washington’s toes. The seventeenth package showed that the EU retains the ability to coordinate and adopt new restrictive measures by consensus — that is, with the support of all member states. Brussels is not changing the rules for making foreign policy decisions and continues to uphold the importance of every Eurozone country’s voice. Even the rise of right-wing forces does not fundamentally affect foreign policy."
• "In the final analysis, the seventeenth sanctions package introduces relatively cosmetic changes compared to the volume of restrictions included in previous packages. It does not affect the interests of producers and consumers in the EU and is targeted at areas that were already under EU and/or partner sanctions. It is quite sufficient to fulfill symbolic and signaling objectives. But it does not represent any substantive breakthrough. Its chances of influencing Moscow’s political position are close to zero."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "‘Gee, I Don’t Know How We Can Stop This’: Republicans Prepare to Push Trump on Putin," Jonathan Martin, Politico, 06.06.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Will Trump Take 'No' for an Answer?" Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 06.05.25.

• “President Trump wants to be a peacemaker, but his interlocutors in Moscow and Tehran keep resisting his offers. When will he finally take ‘no’ for an answer?”
• “Mr. Trump said on social media Wednesday that he had spoken by phone to Vladimir Putin for 75 minutes, but he disclosed no new interest in peace. ‘President Putin did say, and very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the [Russian] airfields,’ Mr. Trump wrote, without comment. Mr. Trump later posted a link to a column in the Washington Post supporting a Senate sanctions bill against countries that buy energy from Russia. But Mr. Putin will take this for a bluff unless Mr. Trump tells the Senate to go ahead with a vote.”
• “On Iran and Russia, America's adversaries are testing whether Mr. Trump will do more than talk to stop these countries as they seek regional dominance. These aren't real-estate negotiations.”

"Waiting Time," Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council, 06.03.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The second round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul turned out to be even shorter than the already brief first round and was largely limited to discussions of humanitarian issues. Those who had hoped for significant progress toward a full ceasefire — let alone a political resolution of the conflict — were surely disappointed."
• "The very prospect of a second meeting in Istanbul may well have been a factor contributing to the recent escalation: for both sides, it was important to secure the most advantageous negotiating positions in advance. Russia continued active offensive operations along the entire front line, while Ukraine sharply increased its drone attacks on targets deep inside Russian territory, including strikes on military airfields in five Russian regions."
• "Reducing the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue to occasional discussions of humanitarian issues creates more strategic risks for Kyiv than for Moscow. Of course, there is hope that during the next, third round of talks — whenever it may take place — the scope of the dialogue will be expanded. This prospect does not seem entirely unrealistic, especially if a meeting between the presidents of Russia and the United States takes place before the next round and initiates a discussion of numerous European security issues that go beyond the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Even the most preliminary framework agreements between Moscow and Washington on these matters could serve as a catalyst for more productive engagement between Moscow and Kyiv."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "According to The Kremlin's Script: How the Istanbul Talks Are Structured and Who Stands to Gain From Them," Re: Russia, 06.03.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Strategic Defense Review,” led by Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir Richard Barrons, and Dr. Fiona Hill, UK government, 2025.

• Dr Fiona Hill, Lord Robertson, General Sir Richard Barrons wrote in the review: “The world was already in turmoil. Russia, a nuclear-armed state, had invaded and brutally occupied part of a neighboring sovereign state. And in doing this it was supported by China, supplied with equipment from Iran and by troops from North Korea, deployed in Europe for the first time ever.”
• UK PM Keir Starmer wrote in the introduction: “In this new era for defense and security, when Russia is waging war on our continent and probing our defenses at home, we must meet the danger head on. We must recognize the very nature of warfare is being transformed on the battlefields of Ukraine and adapt our armed forces and our industry to lead this innovation.”
• The review also contained the following references to Russia:
  • “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a strategic inflection point. It irrefutably demonstrated the changing and dynamic nature of the threat, with state-on-state war returning to Europe, adversaries using nuclear rhetoric in an attempt to constrain decision-making, and the UK and its allies under daily attack beneath the threshold of war as part of intensifying international competition. The conflict has also shown the power of emerging technology to change where, how, and with what war is fought. Armed Forces that do not change at the same pace as technology quickly risk becoming obsolete.”
  • “Importantly, Ukraine is just one flashpoint of many amid growing global instability and a volatility that is exemplified by the remarkable rate of change in the international landscape since this Review was launched in 2024. Most immediately relevant at the time of writing, this includes: negotiations for a ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia war; the possible deployment of a ‘reassurance force’ to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire; and major questions about the future of European security that inevitably follow the United States’ change in security priorities.”
  • “The UK and its allies are once again directly threatened by other states with advanced military forces. The UK is already under daily attack, with aggressive acts—from espionage to cyber-attack and information manipulation—causing harm to society and the economy. State conflict has returned to Europe, with Russia demonstrating its willingness to use military force, inflict harm on civilians, and threaten the use of nuclear weapons to achieve its goals. More broadly, the West’s long-held military advantage is being eroded as other countries modernize and expand their armed forces at speed, while the United States’ (U.S.) security priorities are changing, as its focus turns to the Indo-Pacific and to the protection of its homeland.”
  • “Managing competition between states—and the potential for escalation to crisis and conflict—will be more challenging. States such as Russia are intentionally blurring the lines between nuclear, conventional, and sub-threshold threats, complicating the ability of the UK and its allies to manage potential escalation and miscalculation. Technology creates new paths for escalation by creating new ways to disrupt and coerce, for example, in cyberspace and space. States and non-state actors are ever more aggressive in using sub-threshold activities to seek advantage.”
  • “Nuclear-armed states like Russia and China are putting nuclear weapons at the centre of their security strategies, increasing the number and types of weapons in their stockpiles. The coming decades will be defined by multiple and concurrent dilemmas, proliferating and disruptive technologies, and the erosion of international agreements and organizations that have previously helped to prevent conflict between nuclear powers.”
  • “Russia [is] an immediate and pressing threat. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine makes unequivocally clear its willingness to use force to achieve its goals, as well as its intent to re-establish spheres of influence in its near-abroad and disrupt the international order to the UK and its allies’ disadvantage. While the Ukraine conflict has temporarily degraded Russian conventional land forces, the overall modernization and expansion of its armed forces means it will pose an enduring threat in key areas such as space, cyberspace, information operations, undersea warfare, and chemical and biological weapons. Russia’s war economy, if sustained, will enable it to rebuild its land capabilities more quickly in the event of a ceasefire in Ukraine.”
  • “China and Russia have deepened their relationship and there will continue to be grounds for both strategic and opportunistic alignment with Iran and the DPRK. However, the dynamics of these relationships will be conditioned by differing interests and longstanding mistrust. They will likely continue seeking to draw others into their transactional networks in pursuing a variety of objectives.”
  • “The Review recommends the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific as the next priority regions after the Euro-Atlantic for Defense engagement. The growing links between Russia, China, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea complicate calculations of deterrence and escalation management across regions.”
  • “Greater political and military leadership by European Allies within NATO is the best way to meet the challenge posed by Russia.”
  • “This is a once-in-a-generation inflection point for collective security in Europe: securing a durable political settlement in Ukraine that safeguards its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and future security is essential to deter Russia from further aggression across the region.”
  • “Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear coercion will be the central challenge for the UK and its NATO Allies in the coming decades. Russia is modernizing and expanding its extensive set of nuclear capabilities, which are designed for employment at multiple levels of warfare. Its strategies for warfighting rely on the threat of limited nuclear use to terminate a conflict on advantageous terms. China’s unprecedented nuclear expansion will place demands on U.S. nuclear forces and the deterrence it extends to the Euro-Atlantic. Potential collaboration and opportunism among these and other nuclear challengers—of the type seen in Ukraine—add further complexity to deterrence, escalation dynamics, and allied assurance.”
  • “To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, Defense must fundamentally change how it fights and how it supports that fight: rapidly increasing the Armed Forces’ lethality and enhancing their ability to fight at the leading edge of technology. Drawing on lessons from the war in Ukraine and enabled by organizational change under Defense Reform, the whole of Defense (the Armed Forces and Department of State together) should be driven by the logic of the innovation cycle—able to find, buy, and use innovation, pulling it through from ideas to front line at speed.”

"Russia is at war with Britain and the U.S. is no longer a reliable ally, UK adviser [Fiona Hill] says," Dan Sabbagh, The Guardian, 06.06.25. 

• Russia has hardened as an adversary in ways that we probably hadn’t fully anticipated,” Hill said, arguing that Putin saw the Ukraine war as a starting point to Moscow becoming “a dominant military power in all of Europe.” As part of that long-term effort, Russia was already “menacing the UK in various different ways,” she said, citing “the poisonings, assassinations, sabotage operations, all kinds of cyber-attacks and influence operations. The sensors that we see that they’re putting down around critical pipelines, efforts to butcher undersea cables.”
• “The conclusion, Hill said, was that “Russia is at war with us.” The foreign policy expert, a longtime Russia watcher, said she had first made a similar warning in 2015… “We said Putin had declared war on the west,” she said. At the time, other experts disagreed, but Hill said events since had demonstrated “he obviously had, and we haven’t been paying attention to it”. The Russian leader, she argues, sees the fight in Ukraine as “part of a proxy war with the United States; that’s how he has persuaded China, North Korea and Iran to join in.”
• “Hill’s argument is that in a time of profound uncertainty, Britain needs greater internal cohesion if it is to protect itself. “We can’t rely exclusively on anyone anymore,” she said.

​"The Trump Doctrine," Richard Haas, Project Syndicate, 06.04.25. 

• “Whatever the label, [Trump’s] doctrine signals that the U.S. will no longer try to influence or react to how countries conduct themselves within their borders. Trump’s actions, above all his pursuit of business deals with authoritarian governments in the Gulf and far beyond, underscore these words’ import. Unlike Reagan, Carter, Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden, Trump has made it clear that the U.S. has no interest in advocating for human rights and democracy, speaking out against authoritarian abuses, and pressing for the release of political dissidents.”
• “To be sure, the look-the-other-way doctrine avoids the sort of overreach that characterized Bush’s presidency, when zeal for spreading democracy led to the costly, ill-advised invasion of Iraq. It also makes it easier for the U.S. to work constructively with governments carrying out policies at home that would normally pose an obstacle to commercial ties or cooperation on critical bilateral, regional, or global issues.”
• “But the downsides of the new approach offset these considerations. The Trump Doctrine increases the odds that governments so inclined will double down on domestic repression and efforts to subvert democracy—a form of government often associated not just with greater personal freedom but also with free markets supported by the rule of law and less aggressive foreign policy. Promoting democracy thus benefits U.S. investors and limits the risk that America becomes mired in costly or prolonged foreign conflicts.”

“Building a better NATO,” NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte’s remarks at Chatham House, 06.09.25.

• “America has carried too much of the burden for too long.” (AP, 06.09.25)
• "Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within 5 years. Let’s not kid ourselves, we’re all on the eastern flank now.” (Politico, 06.09.25)
• “Wishful thinking will not keep us safe. ... We cannot dream away the danger. Hope is not a strategy. So NATO has to become a stronger, fairer and more lethal alliance.” (AP, 06.09.25)
• “The fact is, we need a quantum leap in our collective defense. The fact is, we must have more forces and capabilities to implement our defense plans in full. The fact is, danger will not disappear even when the war in Ukraine ends.” (Politico, 06.09.25)
• "Our militaries also need thousands more armored vehicles and tanks, millions more artillery shells, and we must double our enabling capabilities, such as logistics, supply, transportation, and medical support." (Sky News, 06.09.25)
• “We see in Ukraine how Russia delivers terror from above, so we will strengthen the shield that protects our skies.” (AP, 06.09.25)
• "Russia has teamed up with China, North Korea and Iran. They are expanding their militaries and their capabilities. Putin's war machine is speeding up, not slowing down." (Sky News, 06.09.25)
• "In terms of ammunition, Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO produces in a year, and its defense industrial base is expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles and 200 Iskander missiles this year alone. ... China is also modernizing and expanding its military at breakneck speed. It already has the world's largest navy, and this battle force is expected to grow to 435 ships by 2030." (Sky News, 06.09.25)
• “It’s not up to me to decide how countries pay the bill,” Rutte said. He said that Britain could opt not to meet the 5% target and, “you could still have the National Health Service” and other public services. “But you better learn to speak Russian,” Rutte warned. (The New York Times, 06.09.25)

“Would Russia Attack NATO and, If So, When?” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 06.05.25.

• “Would Russia be capable of mounting an invasion into a NATO country? If so, would it exercise that capability, and when?1 Western officials and experts provided no shortage of affirmative answers to these questions even before the launch of Russia’s full-blown invasion into Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, to say less of the subsequent period.”
• “Of the predictions for when Russia will acquire the capability and/or intent to attack a NATO country, which I have visualized in Figure 1 below, the most frequently forecast years for when Russia would be ready to attack a NATO country (capability) are:
  • 2030 (mentioned or implied 13 times),
  • 2029 (mentioned or implied 12 times) and
  • 2028 (mentioned or implied 10 times).”
• “As for when Russia might intend to attack a NATO country, the most frequently forecast years are 2027 and 2028 (each mentioned or implied 5 times). Whether and when Russia will be ready for new combat in Europe will depend on what kind of war it would want to wage once the conflict with Ukraine is over or frozen.”
• “However, not everyone thinks Russia would need to first be done with the war against Ukraine to attack a NATO country. For instance, ex-Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba believes ‘Moscow is capable of opening a new front while still battling Kyiv.’”
• “Not everyone publicly agrees that Russia would attack NATO, though. Last year saw John Foreman, the former British defense attaché in Moscow, pen an article entitled ‘Russia will not attack NATO’ in the Spectator. … The problem with the Kremlin’s assurances that NATO will not be a target for a Russian military attack, however, is that the Russian leadership said the same thing about Ukraine before Feb. 24, 2022.”

“The West is rethinking how to fight wars,” The Economist, 06.03.25.

• “Britain’s defense review, published the next day, deserves praise for recognizing both these lessons. It also serves as a worked example of the new, more flexible thinking that will be needed in Europe and Asia to deal with the breakneck innovations that are transforming warfare. However, the review also points to the hardest problem in turning such thinking into reality—finding the money to pay for it.”

"Putin is an open book. U.S. leaders have refused to read it," George F. Will, The Washington Post, 06.06.25.

• Putin “is an open book who has been reading himself to the world since long before he published his 2021 essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians."
• “Putin believes Russia is a "civilization-state" with cultural-cum-religious significance, rights and responsibilities that justify the erasure of other nations. Which is why the Economist correctly says that for Putin "war has become an ideology."”
• “Today, Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute writes: "The good news is that we know for a fact, based on the experience of the past three years, that even a relatively small and poor country such as Ukraine—never mind the top-shelf militaries of Poland or Finland—can stop Russia in its tracks, with what has been modest U.S. and international support." This reality has escaped the notice of "realists" who think Ukraine is flimsy.”

“The Seabed Is Now a Battlefield,” Alex Gilbert and Morgan D. Bazilian, Foreign Policy, 06.04.25.

• “The rules-based global order is under siege at sea. For most of the past century, U.S. naval superiority has bolstered the cooperative maritime security framework needed to build a prosperous global economy.”
• “Retreating sea ice is opening the Arctic where a resurgent Russia presses its icebreaker advantage (both conventional and nuclear powered) against an anemic U.S. presence.”
• “Across Europe and the Pacific, Russia and China are pioneering pipeline and cable sabotage, a form of gray warfare meant to perfect tactics for future great power conflict… Over the last two years, Russia and China have engaged in covert operations to cut cables and sever regional ties, often using deniable measures such as dragging anchors from nominally commercial vessels. These efforts are at least in part a response to alleged Ukrainian involvement in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline explosion in 2022.”
• “Along with space, the seabed must be treated as the next strategic domain. That means building a full-spectrum seabed defense strategy that provides effective deterrence across four pillars:
  • creating a Seabed Command or Joint Task Force
  • investing in seabed domain awareness and attribution capabilities
  • protecting U.S.-licensed and allied seabed operators, submarine cables, and other critical infrastructure through legal, diplomatic, and, as needed, defensive capabilities
  • engaging allies in shaping shared seabed governance mechanisms.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How Europe Can Save NATO," The World Today, multiple authors, Chatham House, 06.09.25.
• "The War of Revision Is Coming," Walter Russell Mead, The Wall Street Journal, 06.03.25.
  “Putin Is a Gambler, Not a Grand Master," Anastasia Edel, Foreign Policy, 06.03.25.
• "The long game: How Europeans can shape the outcome of Ukraine-Russia talks," Jana Kobzova and Nicu Popescu, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 06.06.25.
• "Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin’s Outdated Land Fixation," Erik Gartzke, The National Interest, 06.07.25.
• “As Trump meets U.S. allies, America's friends see a new world order,” Michael Birnbaum, Washington Post, 06.05.25.
• "Ukraine’s Valor Is Reminiscent of Britain’s in 1940," George F. Will, The Washington Post, 06.04.25.
• "Is the Ukraine War the Next Afghanistan?" Megan K. Stack, David French, and Derek Arthur, New York Times, 5 June 2025.
• "Growing Conflict and Uncertain Alliances: On the Future of European Security," Michael Froman, Michael Horowitz, Charles Kupchan, and Stephen Sestanovich: Council on Foreign Relations, 06.06.25.
• “America’s Allies Must Save Themselves: How to Pick Up the Pieces of the World Order Trump Is Breaking," Malcolm Turnbull, Foreign Affairs, 06.06.25.
• “Trenin: the process of militarization has begun in Europe with an eye on Russia,” Dmitry Trenin, Pravda.com, 06.03.25. (Pravda.com is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Secret Russian Intelligence Document Shows Deep Suspicion of China,” Anton Troianovski, Jacob Judah, Paul Sonne, New York Times, 06.07.25.

• A secretive FSB intelligence unit refers to the Chinese as “the enemy.” “This unit… has warned that China is a serious threat to Russian security. Its officers say that Beijing is increasingly trying to recruit Russian spies and get its hands on sensitive military technology.”
• “The intelligence officers say that China is spying on the Russian military’s operations in Ukraine to learn about Western weapons and warfare. They fear that Chinese academics are laying the groundwork to make claims on Russian territory. And they have warned that Chinese intelligence agents are carrying out espionage in the Arctic.”
  • “The threats are laid out in an eight-page internal F.S.B. planning document, obtained by The New York Times, that sets priorities for fending off Chinese espionage.”
• “Three days before Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, the F.S.B. approved a new counterintelligence program called “Entente-4,” the document reveals. The code name...belied the initiative’s real intent: to prevent Chinese spies from undermining Russian interests.”
• “Despite all of these vulnerabilities, the F.S.B. report makes clear that jeopardizing the support of China would be worse. The document squarely warns officers that they must receive approval from the highest echelons of the Russian security establishment before taking any sensitive action at all.”

“Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion,” Doug Bandow, The American Conservative, 06.05.25.

• “The Trump administration may be following its predecessor’s policy in looking to NATO for assistance against China. Alas, expecting European military aid in the Pacific is a fool’s errand. The best way for America’s NATO allies to assist Washington would be to take over their own defense in Europe. Nevertheless, some European governments, reluctant to protect their own homelands, succumb to the “Weltmacht temptation” to exercise power on the world stage.”
• “Of course, the ideal would be European security partners able and willing to provide meaningful assistance to America in the event of a confrontation with China. Most important, however, would be a European coalition that possessed sufficient conventional and nuclear assets to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia and any other unfriendly states in or near Europe. That is, to not insist on the U.S. maintaining tens of thousands of troops and massive amounts of materiel on the continent, backed by a formal security guarantee—seemingly forever.”
• “Another serious problem is Washington’s continued insistence on telling others what they should do. No government, even an ally, likes being ordered about as if it was equivalent to the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Instead of attempting to dictate to the Europeans, the U.S. should explain what it plans to do, while working with them as they craft a response. Yes, it would be great if the Europeans took “a big role” in the Asia-Pacific. But only if the Europeans first take over the defense of Europe.”

See this link for commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "On Taiwan: Does President Trump Seek Spheres of Influence?" Ryan Hass, Taipei Times, 06.09.25.

Missile defense:

"Golden Dome Is a Chance for Superpowers to Make Space Safer," Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 06.05.25.

• “Right now, there are no international rules or norms in place about when and how closely countries can approach other nations’ satellites, which of them should be off-limits, what the consequences of a cyberattack or temporary jamming might be, which ostensibly innocent actions might be perceived as hostile, and so on.”
• “The U.S. should press Russia and China to agree to a code of conduct for such orbital activities, similar to the incidents-at-sea agreements negotiated during the Cold War to prevent close encounters from spiraling into conflict.”
• “Russia and China should also join the U.S. in forswearing any further antisatellite weapons tests that create debris. All these measures would improve transparency, strengthen deterrence and reduce the risk of unintended confrontation.”

Nuclear arms:⁵

“Why we should worry about nuclear weapons again,” Jon B. Wolfsthal, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, Washington Post, 06.04.25.

• “Without working treaties, legal limits or a mutual agreement to cap their forces, both the United States and Russia could double their deployed nuclear arsenals in a year or two without building a single new weapon. Each country could simply move several hundred warheads out of storage and redeploy them on missiles, bombers and submarines.”
• “While buildups proceed, nations are becoming more secretive about their nuclear weapons.”
• “The era of nuclear reductions is over.”
• “Surviving this new nuclear age will require the constant and informed attention of leaders, policymakers and engaged citizens alike.”
• “Without renewed public pressure or political will, the world is condemned to live under the shadow of nuclear annihilation. We deserve better.”

“Where Trump and Putin Could Make a Deal,” Samuel Charap and Kinston Reif, Project Syndicate, 06.04.25.

• “U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach toward Russia has been dominated by his push to end the country’s war against Ukraine. But the administration has an opportunity to make progress on another urgent national security imperative: nuclear arms control. In fact, after returning to office this year, Trump wasted little time in calling for negotiations with Russia and China to “denuclearize… in a very big way.”
• “To be sure, reaching any new agreements, especially one that includes China, will take time. But as a first step, Russia and the United States could immediately return to implementing a currently moribund agreement that is already on the books: the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, better known as New START. Though New START’s February 2026 expiration is fast approaching, reinvigorating it and resuming a regular dialogue could lay the foundation for more far-reaching agreements, demonstrating to the world that the U.S. and Russia can still cooperate to manage nuclear risks.”
• “Even in the face of a growing Chinese arsenal that is not subject to treaty limits, keeping the New START limits in place makes sense. China is not projected to become a nuclear peer of either country in terms of deployed warheads for at least another decade, and the U.S. would still have enough force flexibility to delay that outcome.”
• “With over 85% of the world’s nuclear warheads between them, the U.S. and Russia have a special obligation to reduce the existential threat posed by these weapons. Returning to New START compliance and resuming dialogue on strategic stability would be an immediate step in that direction.”

"No New START: Renewing the U.S.-Russian Deal Won’t Solve Today’s Nuclear Dilemmas," Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller, Foreign Affairs, 06.03.25.

• The authors argue that “To begin meeting the demands of a two-nuclear-peer environment, the United States should prepare now for force posture adjustments once the New START limits disappear. The simplest place to start is by reversing those changes the United States agreed to in order to comply with New START.”
• “In the medium term, the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program—which was first outlined by the Obama administration and which will modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad—should be expanded to more accurately respond to the current nuclear landscape,” according to the authors. ”The overall increase in deployed warheads, however, need only be modest for the United States to maintain credible deterrence against both Moscow and Beijing.,” they write.
• The authors also argue that “any new arms control effort must cover the regional nuclear threats in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.”
• The authors conclude that “the United States should take all necessary steps to maximize the deterrent potential of its current arsenal. If it instead tries to hold on to New START constraints in the unrealistic hope that doing so will coax Moscow back to the table, it will find itself mired in Cold War nostrums about strategic stability that were derived from a bipolar world. “

"In Conversation with Fiona Hill on Donald Trump's Nuclear Nightmares," Jack Dickens interviews Fiona Hill, Engelsberg Ideas, 06.03.25.

• JD: “Is there a sense that the codes and rules that nuclear-armed nations used to abide by have unraveled and can’t be put back together again?
• FH: “… [I]n the case of Russia in Ukraine, I think we’re pretty certain that Vladimir Putin was contemplating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in 2022, when the tide was turned against the Russian military, when they were pinned down on the ground in the Kherson region and around the Dnipro River… Putin was talking quite openly and loosely about the use of a nuclear weapon and making threats, even when there’d been no change in the strategic perspective. There had been no shift, as we had seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Euromissile Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, in the positioning of nuclear weapons. There was no shift in nuclear doctrine. Nor had the United States and other nuclear powers made any major breakthrough in nuclear weapons technologies. His considerations were all purely about battlefield tactics. In other words, Putin was not only threatening to use nuclear weapons, but also clearly contemplating their use for tactical purposes on a battlefield. So, this has changed the whole picture in two ways: both in the rhetorical sense, in terms of the willingness to threaten the use nuclear weapons, and also a real sense, in terms of the actual contemplation of use.”

“Understanding the current monumental geopolitical changes,” Sergey Karaganov interviewed by Jelena Vidojević, Brave New Europe, 06.01.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “First and foremost, Russia has not only put up stiff resistance to NATO’s aggression in Ukraine, but it has also indicated that if this aggression continues, sooner or later it will force Russia to use nuclear weapons against targets in Europe. Americans are changing their mind because they do not need a nuclear war in Europe. They understand what a nuclear war is like. They began to retreat already under Biden, although Biden adhered to extremely aggressive rhetoric. But even under his administration, military assistance to Ukraine began to decrease here and there. For Europeans, the situation is much more complicated. While the Americans understand the danger of nuclear war and do not want it, the European elites have lost their senses. They live in a cloud of “strategic parasitism”, they have lost the fear of war and responsibility to their peoples. So losing everything along the way, they are pushing their countries towards war, despite the risk of self-destruction.”
• “In addition, the Americans have already achieved very important goals in this war. One of the goals was to prevent close alignment between Russia and Europe… Also, one of the Americans’ goals in unleashing this war in Ukraine was to increase their ability to rob Europe… the Americans are now both syphoning off European money and drawing European industry over to the United States. So the Americans have already won this war, but only against Europe. Now they would like to make a deal with Russia to somehow end this conflict and prevent it from escalating to the level of nuclear war. But the Europeans have gone berserk and are running amok straight into the abyss.”
• “Russia and China are informal allies. We complement each other in many ways. The Chinese have a surplus of labor, and we have huge resources… It is difficult to imagine how China could have resisted pressure from the United States and the West if it did not have Russia’s strategic power behind it… God helped us by striking our Western neighbors, especially the Americans, with insanity. By simultaneously putting pressure on China and Russia, they have pushed the two friendly countries into an alliance, dramatically increasing the potential power of each of us alone, as well as our combined power."

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Russia’s Military Apps Use West’s Open Infrastructure," Volodymyr Styran, Royal United Services Institute, 06.05.25.

• “Russia’s war on Ukraine is powered not just by weapons but by a decentralized ecosystem of Android military apps developed by Russian forces and affiliates. These tools rely heavily on Western cloud services—often provided by companies based in countries sanctioning Russia. The analysis of corresponding APK files (a format used to distribute Android apps) shows they use U.S.- and EU-based infrastructure, open-source maps, and Android's permissive sideloading model. This exposes a dangerous gap in how open tech infrastructure is governed in wartime.”

• “To mitigate these risks, governments and technology companies must take proactive steps:

  1.   Monitor and analyze usage patterns on cloud platforms to detect military activity by the entities waging illegal wars of aggression.

  2.   Enforce geofencing and API-level restrictions to block the Russian military and affiliated developers from exploiting Western cloud infrastructure.

  3.   Increase scrutiny of the app ecosystem, urging app stores and malware analysts to identify and flag sideloaded military tools.

  4.   Reassess tech neutrality policies for cloud and open-source platforms during wartime, establishing principles for responsible use in conflict zones.”

"Russia at the Forefront of Front-Line AI," Ksenia Buksha, Russia Post, 06.09.25.
 

• “The Russian AI market is small compared to the U.S., EU and even China. There are too many obstacles to its development. Back in 2021, a study commissioned by the Russian government identified serious problems with the Russian AI sector: a shortage of key personnel, a weak venture capital market, low penetration of Russian products into foreign markets, dependence on imported products and services, slow implementation of products by business and government bodies, and a weak link between ideas and their implementation as products.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

See this link for commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Is Marco Rubio Really the Next Henry Kissinger?" Jessica Karl, Bloomberg, 06.04.25.
• "What Musk Can Learn From Ma and Khodorkovsky," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 06.09.25

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects," Kremlin.ru, 06.06.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• At the Kremlin’s Council for Strategic Development and National Projects meeting, President Putin and top officials reviewed the launch of new national projects through 2036, with over 53 trillion rubles allocated. Key areas include technological sovereignty, healthcare, demography, space, and unmanned aerial systems. Some 2030 goals, like infant mortality reduction, have already been achieved, according to the president. Putin emphasized planning quality, regulatory frameworks, and widespread adoption of innovations. He also highlighted funding concerns, especially for the Far East and Arctic cities, proposing a dedicated budget share for their development. Overall, the projects aim to drive Russia’s long-term growth, innovation, and global competitiveness.

"Pivot to the East 2.0: Siberia as the Foundation of Russia’s Future," Sergey Karaganov interviewed by Trampolin Media, 05.12.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• "The concept of the 'Turn to the East' emerged back in the late 1990s amid globalization and the rising influence of Asia."
• "Now, with Europe closed off to Russia and Asia showing rapid growth, the need for a new, deeper, and more comprehensive 'Turn to the East' has become obvious. The military operation that began has finally allowed us to understand that the nearly 300-year-long Western influence has come to an end. We must not repeat the mistakes of the past, when resources were spent on restoring western territories at the expense of developing Russian regions themselves. It is time to turn inward, to our roots, and to create a new spiritual, cultural, and economic axis of the country. The time has come for Siberianization."
• "'Siberianization' is not merely a regional project but a path toward renewing the entire country, strengthening its civilizational unity and humanistic values. Shifting the center of gravity eastward is a response to global challenges—one capable of inspiring society and giving Russia a new 'dream-idea.'"
• "The question lies in the right policy and national orientation: do we see our future in a figurative Paris or in a figurative Krasnoyarsk?"

“Siberianisation and the pursuit of a new civilizational platform,” Sergei Karaganov interviewed by Almayadeen.net, 06.08.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “With regard to Russian identity and in Russian thinking, Siberia is mainly associated with boundless expanses and unlimited possibilities, but most importantly with freedom, volya.”
• “Siberia is, as some Russian writers say, the place where the best of the Russian character was brewed, that is, a combination of all the best and the strongest in it.”
• “Siberia is also a unique ethnic “alloy.””
• “Russia is facing a much more ambitious task from my point of view: the spiritual, cultural, political, and economic development of Russia in the eastern direction to the Urals and Siberia. The western direction of our policy and economic ties has bleak prospects.”
• “One element in the process of the Siberianization of Russia is the creation of a third Russian capital, which is absolutely necessary… I think the best place is the Minusinsk Basin. It is a paradise where peaches and apricots grow, 600 km north of Krasnoyarsk.”
• “One of the goals of the special military operation, of the war with the West in Ukraine, is our mental, political, and economic liberation from Western influence.”
• “Anti-Asian sentiment in Russia was purposefully kindled and stoked by the West and liberal, Westernized Russians.”
• “I frequently write that Russians are Great Russians—descendants of the peoples that lived in Central Russia Old Rus'; Russians are Ukrainians; Russians are Belarusians; Russians are Tatars; Russians are Kalmyks; Russians are Yakuts; Russians are Jews; Russian are Bashkirs; Russians are Armenians; etc.”

Defense and aerospace:

"Vladimir Putin’s Sickening Statistic: 1m Russian Casualties in Ukraine," The Economist, 06.02.25.

• “Before the month ends, Russia will probably suffer its millionth casualty since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, based on current trends of about 1,000–1,200 soldiers killed or injured every day… The grim tally of losses comes from figures compiled by the Ukrainian general staff, leaving it open to question.”
• “Apart from its ill-fated counter-offensive two years ago, Ukraine has been fighting a largely defensive war. Advances in drone technology have thus far favored defense over offence.”
• “Another reason why Russia’s casualties are much higher is that Ukraine has only about a quarter as many people to draw upon, so it cannot afford to waste its soldiers’ lives.”
• “Given the intensity of Russian operations for much of the past year, it would not be hard to reach a figure of about 250,000 killed by now.”
• “It is remarkable how Russia continues to absorb such staggering losses: it needs to recruit 30,000–40,000 soldiers a month to fill the lines.”
• “For now, Russian society accepts that the system is an alternative to fully enforced mobilization, said Elena Racheva, a Russian former journalist now researching at Oxford University.  Some 88% approve of contract soldiers receiving money and benefits for going to war “instead of us.” For the families of the dead and injured, huge payouts “alleviate… their grief, such as feelings of injustice… and they allow society to avoid moral responsibility for the casualties and injuries they endure,” wrote Ms. Racheva. In other words, the contract is not just between the soldier and the state, but also wider society. The question nobody can answer is how long that contract will hold.”

"Putin’s Insatiable Appetite for War," Alexandra Prokopenko, Financial Times, 06.05.25.

• “The war between Russia and Ukraine has escalated dramatically in recent weeks. Yet western policy remains anchored in the dangerously misguided assumption that Russia’s economy will crack under the staggering cost of militarization, anemic economic growth and decreasing oil prices. President Vladimir Putin has no intention of demilitarizing the economy, even if the fighting in Ukraine were to end. The Kremlin aims to make its war machine bigger and better, stands ready to sacrifice ordinary Russians’ quality of life along the way and is unlikely to meet significant resistance.”
• “Putin’s focus is not on GDP, but on rearmament. He has already signaled to the government that growth slowing from the current 4.3% to around 1.5-2% would be an acceptable trade-off. In short, Russia is on a trajectory of sustained militarization… His overriding strategic goal is to strip Ukraine of the core element of sovereignty as he defines it: the ability to defend itself. If he fails now, he may try again with a bigger military and better arsenal. Appetite, after all, comes with eating.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Russian political consultant Igor Dmitriev’s untitled remarks on the outcome of Russia’s policies toward its neighbors on his Telegram channel, 06.07.25. Dmitriev has been quoted by pro-Kremlin media and is based in Russia, which makes his negative assessment of the outcomes of Russia’s policies toward its neighbors all the more remarkable. 

Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated from Russian.

• “Even the memory of that brief euphoria that accompanied the entry of the CSTO into Kazakhstan in January 2022 is gradually fading. Then it seemed that Russia was the guarantor of stability, the arbitrator, the center of power. Now there is nothing left of that feeling. Kazakhstan is confidently following its own path, forming its own security strategy. It signed a military cooperation plan with Great Britain, including the training of officers in British military academies. It is building a plant with its Singapore partners to produce 155 mm ammunition, NATO standard. It is introducing a territorial reserve system based on Western models. ... And all this in a paradigm where Russia is seen not as an ally, but as a potential threat.”
• “Azerbaijan has liquidated  the Armenian Artsakh without regard for the CSTO and with the deaths of Russian peacekeepers. And after the downing of the [Azerbaijani passenger] plane [unintentionally by a Russian missile]  in December 2024, he [Aliyev] publicly demanded an apology and compensation from Moscow, and closed the offices of Russian government agencies. Aliyev plays it safe - he is increasing cooperation with Ukraine, supplying humanitarian aid, and avoiding even formal neutrality.”
• “Armenia - in the past the main ally in the Caucasus - has effectively left the Russian orbit. Pashinyan has repeatedly announced his withdrawal from the CSTO, the country has recalled its permanent representative to the organization, and closed Russian propaganda channels.”
• “Uzbekistan has ignored the CSTO since 2012, but is actively developing partnerships with Europe through summits and sectoral agreements. Last year, there was tension between Moscow and Tashkent in connection with the assassination attempt on one of the government officials and the alleged ‘Chechen trace.’”
• “Instead of a neutral Finland, [Russia now has a] 1,300 km border with NATO. Sweden, which remained neutral even during the Second World War, participates in NATO military exercises and supplies weapons to Ukraine. The entire north of Europe is reorganizing its armed forces for joint actions in the Arctic and the Baltic. All of Europe is turning into a single anti-Russian coalition. Germany is reorienting its production capacities to military orders. The EU's defense spending is aimed at 5% of GDP. For the first time, a single European defense budget has appeared.”
• “Syria, which recently played the role of a showcase for Russian geopolitical influence, is now a platform for the mass execution of pro-Russian elements. And Russian bases in Syria are the most vulnerable point of [Russia’s] initiatives in Africa.”
• “Over the past three years, the security architecture in Eurasia has changed radically. Russia is no longer a regional leader, a political center or a guarantor of stability. Geopolitical weight is not just decreasing — it is approaching zero. In fact, the entire scale of Russia's foreign policy today is tactical battles in the Donetsk and Sumy regions. What was intended as a quick regime change in Kyiv has turned into a protracted meat grinder, devouring the country's geopolitical capital. The entire military machine is focused on storming Ukrainian villages. All resources are squeezed out for the sake of a front that is barely moving.”
• “Where everything is headed was clear back in 2022. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Russian Federation has been hammering away at the Ukrainian defense with maniacal persistence. Apparently, the Kremlin believes that if they manage to destroy Ukraine, all the problems will dissolve on their own and 2021 will return.”
• “We haven't even touched on the issue of sanctions, loss of markets, total dependence on China.”
• “Previously, Russia was surrounded by a buffer zone of formal neutrality; now it is surrounded by a system of defensive alliances, where Moscow often has neither allies nor intermediaries. ... The geopolitical ‘special operation’ has led to the exact opposite results.”

"Global Responsibility and Russia’s National Interests," Timofey Bordachev, Valdai Discussion Club, 06.06.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Russia’s core foreign policy aim has historically been independence from Western dominance, not global missionary outreach.
• Today, global power has shifted from Europe to a more multipolar world where countries like China and India shape events. This opens space for Russia to assert its interests without relying on Western alliances.
• However, Russia must define its global role responsibly and pragmatically, balancing strategic engagement with its non-messianic tradition. Europe’s ongoing decline makes Asia increasingly central to Russia’s external priorities and geopolitical future.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Finance Minister: ‘War Is Like a Black Box,'" Mishal Husain, Bloomberg, 06.06.25.

• “War is like a black box because you can’t expect people to be 100% dedicated to protecting your country. It’s a different world. People operate in a different reality, and I don’t know any other countries that don’t have problems with some mismanagement or corruption during war.”
• “We have a lot of audits and scrutinized processes, which help us provide necessary data, reports and analysis to our partners. We are very reliable, we are very transparent, and we can track all of the dollars that we received in our budget accounts. But we are talking about publicly collected money. When we are talking about procurement of weaponry, ammunitions—there definitely could be a lot of issues related to some ministries and some businesses.”
• “There are a lot of intermediaries, trying to help us to find shells, for instance. You know, there is no market for shells. You can’t go to the supermarket and purchase the shells. That’s why there are some people, business people—the middlemen—who take their cut. “

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine the Indomitable," Jeff Jacoby, The Boston Globe, 06.08.25.
• "Ukraine's Previous President Says He Knows How to Win Over Trump," Siobhán O'Grady, Isobel Koshiw, and Serhiy Morgunov, The Washington Post, 06.08.25.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "The Costs of Georgia’s Self-Isolation," Kornely Kakachia, PONARS Eurasia, 06.02.25.
• "Georgia at the Crossroads: Democratic Backsliding and Departure from a Pro-Western Course," Franziska Smolnik and Giorgi Tadumadze, SWP Comment, 06.03.25. In German.
  
   

Footnotes

1. In addition to the reported offensive operations in the east of Ukraine,  the Russian military launched almost 500 air strikes in the night of June 8-9, which is, the largest total in more than three years of war, according to RFE/RL.
2. In a separate interview with Engelsberg Ideas, Hill said that “we’re pretty certain that Vladimir Putin was contemplating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in 2022.”
3. According to the CSIS study, Russian forces advanced at the average daily rate of 50 meters in the Kupyansk offensive on Nov. 13, 2024–April 23, 2025. According to the study the Russian offensive in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk area averaged 135 meters a day in the period of Feb. 15, 2024–April 23, 2025. According to data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russia gained 5,671 square kilometers across all of Ukraine during the 431 days from Feb. 15, 2024 to April 22, 2025. That, according to RM’s calculations, comes to an average daily gain of 13 square kilometers (or 5 square miles) a day.
4. Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to "use [The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, a bill in the U.S. Senate] if it's necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting. (ISW, 06.07.25)
5. Russia is considering ending its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles., Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the moratorium, enacted after the collapse of a landmark arms control treaty with the United States, is “coming to its logical end,” according to MT/AFP.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP.