Russia Analytical Report, June 19-26, 2017
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
- No significant commentary.
NATO-Russia relations:
“NATO's Northeastern Flank. Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,” Christopher S. Chivvis, Raphael S. Cohen, Bryan Frederick, Daniel S. Hamilton, F. Stephen Larrabee, Bonny Lin, RAND Corporation, June 2017: The political scientists behind this report write that challenges posed by the rise of the Islamic State and renewed tensions with Russia have made for a far less secure Europe, with the Baltic States at particular risk from Russia. Strategic trends among the countries in NATO’s northeastern flank vary. Poland is willing and able to contribute resources to regional defense, while the Baltic States do not have quite as much in terms of resources. Although Finland and Sweden are not NATO members, they are increasingly debating membership and already have close partnerships with NATO, and have resources to contribute towards defense. Countries contending with “varying degrees of pro-Russian sentiment,” such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, would provide more limited contributions. The authors of the report recommend making certain that Poland can “provide a secure logistics and staging point for forward-based U.S./NATO operations,” strengthening relationships with Finland and Sweden and supporting their airspace defense goals. The authors also recommend bolstering the defense contributions of the Baltic States and ensuring that they can receive ground forces and support air forces.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant commentary.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
“The US Has No Coherent Policy for Syria or the Wider Region. If Vladimir Putin Is Seeking an Exit Strategy From the Country, Trump Is Not Helping,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 06.21.17: The author, international affairs editor at the Financial Times, writes that while Syria is in a state of chaos, much of the confusion surround the country’s future “emanates from the chaos of the White House.” The other external actors in Syria have clear goals: Russia is looking for “a return to superpower status” and leverage against Europe, Iran wants to “consolidates its Shia axis,” the Sunnis and Saudi Arabia want to stop Iran, while Turkey wants to keep Kurds allied with Turkish Kurd insurgents out. The U.S., however, has no clearly discernable policy. The attempts to wind down the Syrian conflict “are almost all coming from Russia,” including the ceasefire, “de-escalation zones” and a constitutional blueprint. Some suggest these initiatives indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is looking for an exit strategy; however, the U.S. does not look “likely to help him find one.”
“Trump Is Tripping Over Iran and Russia’s Red Lines in Syria. Moscow and Tehran Know What They’re Fighting for. Does Washington?” Jonathan Spyer, Foreign Policy, 06.26.17: The author, director of the Rubin Center (formerly the GLORIA Center), IDC Herzliya, writes that U.S. forces in Syria have struck at the Assad regime and its allies at least four times in the last five weeks. The most notable of these occurrences was the downing of a Syrian Su-22 jet that threatened to bring Moscow and Washington into conflict. As Syria devolves “into a free-for-all,” the chances of confrontation between the regional powers remains high as they attempt “to realize mutually incompatible objectives.” As such, a “geographically inevitable contest of will is developing” as regime forces, including regime ally Moscow, and “U.S.-associated SDF and Arab rebel fighters” both push east. The author notes that “the real contest” is not in the skies over Syria, but on the ground, with the main prize being “the eastern governorate of Deir Ezzor,” home to much of Syria’s oil resources. The author wonders if Moscow’s threat to U.S. planes west of the Euphrates means that “this area will need to be ceded in its entirety to the regime” and how Washington might react to this idea. To understand the puzzle, a clear U.S. policy is necessary. Washington can either accept the new realities imposed by Russia and Iran, or challenge them and risk conflict.
“It's Time to Break Up Syria,” Denis Dragovic and Richard Iron, The National Interest, July-August 2017: The authors, an international development expert and a British army veteran, write that removing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or eliminating ISIS is only justifiable if a functioning state can remain in the aftermath. Looking at Iraq and Afghanistan, the authors suggest redrawing Syria’s borders to allow “various nations of people” to establish their own governments and set off on a path to independence backed by the international community. Redrawing the borders is “the best way” for Syria’s many groups demanding self-rule to achieve their goals and it also recognizes the changing nature of the international political environment. A large group, mostly Alawites, would continue to owe allegiance “to a Damascus rump state.” The Kurds of Rojava in the north and the Sunnis in the east could create their own states in their respective areas, or the Kurdish YPG, Sunni Arabs and others in the Syrian Democratic forces could set up a multiethnic state in northeastern Syria. The authors propose this idea not as “part of a grandiose scheme to build a new Middle East, but as a unique opportunity to reshape Syria and break the cycle of intense violence.”
Cyber security:
“Here's How to Keep Russian Hackers From Attacking the 2018 Elections; A Computer Security Platform that Even Congress Can Get Behind,” J. Alex Halderman, Justin Talbot-Zorn, The Washington Post, 06.21.17: The authors, a professor of computer science and a Truman National Security Fellow, write that Congress needs to provide states with funds to upgrade their voting technologies and replace paperless machines with ones that include “a good old-fashioned paper ballot.” States should also conduct “risk-limiting audits.” Inspecting just 0.5% of ballots would give states high confidence that the computer results match the paper ballots. Congress should also have states partner with federal agencies for “serious and comprehensive threat assessment” and to apply best practices in cybersecurity.
Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:
“Obama's Secret Struggle to Punish Russia for Putin's Election Assault,” Ellen Nakashima, Adam Entous, Greg Miller, The Washington Post, 06.23.17: The authors, national security reporters for the Washington Post, write that the Obama administration was informed in August 2016 of a Russian cyber campaign to disrupt the U.S. presidential election. The CIA report on this campaign detailed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s instructions on the operation’s objective to “damage Clinton and help elect Trump.” The Obama administration debated “dozens of options for deterring or punishing Russia” over the next five months, including extreme sanctions, cyberattacks on Russian infrastructure and the release of embarrassing CIA information on Putin. Options on the table early on “were ambitious” and then-Secretary of State John Kerry “was at critical moments one of the leading hawks.” The administration feared that a pre-election response might provoke escalation from Moscow and that any action “would be perceived as political interference in an already volatile campaign.” Obama instructed aides to get high-confidence reports from U.S. intelligence on Russia’s intent and role, to “shore up vulnerabilities in state-run election systems” and to seek bipartisan support from leaders in Congress to condemn Moscow and have states accept federal aid. However, there were numerous obstacles. In December, Obama approved a modest combination of measures previously drawn up to punish Russia for other things, as well as a covert measure to plant cyber weapons in Russia’s infrastructure. That cyber operation is still in its early stages and involves deploying “implants” in crucial Russian networks. A legal review conducted after some voiced fears that the damage caused by this measure could be difficult to contain, found that “their deployment would be considered ‘proportional.’” The measure is long-term, and only required Obama’s signature for intelligence agencies to begin work on it. Further approval from Trump is not necessary, and a countermanding order from Trump would be necessary to stop it.
Energy exports from CIS:
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“To Deal with the Russians, America Must Think Like the Russians,” Bruce Allyn, The National Interest, July-August 2017: The author, a senior fellow and affiliated faculty at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, writes that “Russians themselves suggest that American fails to understand not only their interests, but how to work with them.” When the author and a colleague facilitated meetings of the Harvard-Soviet Joint Study on Nuclear Crisis Prevention in 1983, they presented the Russian participants with a “Partisan Perception Chart,” showing the grievances of both sides side-by-side. The chart redesigned in 2017 “looks a lot like the one” from 1983, but with “some new twists.” Both sides continue to blame each other for many things, but the new additions include accusations of interference in each other’s elections, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 1996 election of Boris Yeltsin in Russia. Russian values are more conservative in terms of foreign policy and social issues. Russia also feels wronged by the U.S. pushing NATO east. “In the absence of a new shared vision for common security, of a ‘grand bargain’ to support democracy in Russia … the United States led the expansion of NATO deep into Russia’s historic sphere of interest in ways that have increased the risk of war.” However, the U.S. did invite Russia into the G-8 and to be a NATO partner, but the mess of the former Soviet Union gave the U.S. “little to work with.” The purpose of negotiation is not to the rehash the past, but rather “to facilitate a meaningful dialogue in an emotionally deadlocked situation.” The author notes that there are other tools to help the U.S. “think like a Russian,” including “off-the-record Track II and Track 1.5 conversation,” like the Elbe Group. Another option involves a shift from a narrative of transactionalism to conflict transformation. “Negotiation tools could enable a critical dialogue.”
“US Sanctions Bill Dashes Investor Hopes for Rapid Russian Recovery,” Neil Buckley, Financial Times, 06.21.17: The author, Eastern Europe Editor of the Financial Times, writes that even a somewhat softened version of Washington’s new sanctions bill is “bad news for investment in Russia.” Handing control of sanctions over to Congress could make them “stickier, or harder to lift.” Russia also appears more upset over these sanctions, as it claims the U.S. frequently commits election interference, thus making a response from Russia likely. Russia also needs “investment in new capacity and raising productivity” to move beyond a 1.5% growth level, which could lead to a vicious cycle of low growth and deterred investment. The genuine structural reforms needed to boost growth remain doubtful, as does normalization of relations with the West.
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant commentary.
China:
“Bigger, Not Better: Russia Makes the SCO a Useless Club,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.23.17: The author, a senior Carnegie Moscow Center associate, writes that the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may make it “a more ceremonial and less viable organization.” Russia “is happiest” about the addition of India and Pakistan, which gives the organization claim to 45% of the world’s population; however, other organizations, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (AEM) represents more people, global GDP and land. The SCO was China’s “first experiment in creating an institutional ‘condominium’” and due to Russia’s historical dominance of the region, needed Moscow to participate. The organization has “largely succeeded” in helping to coordinate Russia and China’s security interests in Central Asia. However, China’s economic goals, including an SCO free trade zone and a developmental bank, have not come to fruition. Moscow “decided to torpedo” these initiatives due to the “disparity in economic potential” between China and Russia. Although China initially opposed Russia’s push to have India join the SCO, it began to change its position in 2013. “Beijing realized that Moscow would not accept the creation of an SCO development bank and free trade zone on terms China found reasonable,” but it also realized it did not need the bank to promote its economic interests in the region. 2013 also saw the beginnings of the project that would become the One Belt, One Road initiative. China also began to experiment with “establishing universal financial institutions.” Due to its fears over China’s rise, Moscow turned “a multilateral organization established to develop rules of the game for Eurasia into a useless bureaucracy.” The author notes that “preparing normative document for a Eurasian bank” instead of trying to stop it would have better served Russian interests, and advises Russia to learn from its mistakes.
Ukraine:
- No significant commentary.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Vladimir Putin is Suddenly on the Defensive Against Corruption,” Stephen Sestanovich, The Washington Post, 06.22.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that while Russians trust President Vladimir Putin with the future of their nation, they do not trust him to do something about corruption, an issue of increasing importance. During this year’s call-in show, Putin’s answer to a question regarding corruption was “prickly” and evasive, but it did not stop him “from playing his usual role as national problem solver.” The recently successful campaign of opposition leader Alexei Navalny against the current regime highlights the issue of corruption. Putting the Russian president “off balance in this way is a psychological success for Navalny,” as were the June 12 protests across Russia. Instead of pretending to be against corruption, Putin has now deemed the issue “fake news,” making dismissal the regime’s new default on the contentious issue. “Putin appears to have decided that it’s safer to run for reelection saying something absurd and unpopular than to keep saying he believes in honest government.”
“Putin’s Post-Political Government,” Tatyana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.26.17: The author, director of the analytical department of the Center of Political Technologies in Moscow, writes that this year’s Direct Line call-in show with Russian President Vladimir Putin was different from previous ones. This year’s show did not deal with any substantive political matters, and instead “reduced government policy dilemmas to personal and local problems.” The problems addressed were made out to be unusual cases where “government policy had broken down,” but Putin did not discuss the policy as a whole. Rather than providing long-term solutions, “the scope of government policy was reduced to the technical elements of business management.” The author argues that Russia’s administrative and political spheres “are becoming hermetically sealed,” with the state’s agenda becoming increasing different from that which is presented to the public. The call-in show supported the idea that Putin “equates his legitimacy with that of the state.” What threatens Putin is seen to threaten Russia. While the idea is not a new one, “there’s something different about the refrain now.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.