This Week’s Highlights

• The Kremlin has come up with a policy paper called Nuclear Deterrence Policy Guidelines, officially called “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” spelling out the principles of Moscow’s deterrence strategy. The guidelines provide for the deployment of nuclear weapons in response to an attack against the critical national infrastructure that is responsible for controlling and employing nuclear weapons, writes Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin. This new provision may refer, for example, to cyberattacks that can disable Russian strategic command and control systems. The timing of the publication, Trenin writes, suggests that the Kremlin takes a world without arms control seriously and is preparing for it.  
• Two things are new, or newish in the “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” writes Olga Oliker of International Crisis Group. First is the clear statement that Russia can launch under warning of ballistic missile attack. This is in line with Putin’s statements, but still notable to see in a formal document, according to Oliker. Second, is the equally clear statement that an attack (military or otherwise) on Russia’s nuclear, command and related infrastructure, broadly defined, justifies a nuclear response. This has been a matter of speculation, and often assumed to be true. Now it’s confirmed.
• Failure to extend New START will not mean an immediate increase in numbers of strategic systems, but it will make an arms race more likely over time, writes Andrei Baklitsky, head of the PIR Center's Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation program. In the event that the treaty is not extended, U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations would have an important stabilizing effect, just as their absence would be destabilizing, according to Baklitsky.
• The pandemic-induced economic downturn may generate more volunteers looking to serve in private military companies [PMCs] and more opportunists seeking to curry favor with the Kremlin, writes Carnegie’s Paul Stronski. The spread of the pandemic could even create new global hot spots, he writes, affording the Kremlin further opportunities to capitalize on the West’s distraction by deploying PMCs in expanding its foreign policy adventures.
• A number of Western commercial banks announced their plans to cease providing loans for Arctic oil and gas projects. If duly implemented, climate change policies like these will have a serious impact on Russia’s export and budget revenues, according to Maria Shagina of the University of Zurich. Even prior to the pandemic, it was projected that due to the energy transition, Russian energy exports and budget revenues will decrease by 15 percent and 17 percent, respectively, by 2040. The pandemic will only exacerbate this dynamic, Shagina writes, and will put more strain on Russia’s commodity-oriented export economy.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War:

“Retreat From Germany,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 06.07.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “The Chinese threat to democratic values extends far beyond the Pacific, and the U.S. needs allies across the world to resist. That's one of many reasons President Trump's partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany would be damaging.”
• “There's been no official word or explanation. But the Journal reported [June 5] that Mr. Trump has ordered 9,500 of the 34,500 Americans stationed in Germany to leave by September. Troop levels in the country—the heart of America's presence in Europe—sometimes rise to more than 50,000. They now will be capped arbitrarily at 25,000. Some may be moved elsewhere in Europe, though infrastructure built over decades can't go with them.”
• “Deterring Russian aggression is one purpose of the U.S. presence. But the U.S. can also respond to far-flung threats faster thanks to its German bases. U.S. Africa Command is based in Stuttgart, while other U.S. facilities support American efforts in the Middle East. This lets the U.S. project power while maintaining a smaller presence in dangerous regions.”
• “Withdrawal is a gift to Vladimir Putin, who delights at divisions in NATO and has done nothing to warrant a drawdown of U.S. forces. The Russian military said [June 5] it is deploying a brigade with advanced equipment to the country's west. It's a reminder that Russia, despite being an economic backwater, still poses a significant military threat to Europe.”
• “Mr. Trump should be reinforcing America's commitment to alliances, not giving adversaries new openings to exploit.”

“Yes, America Is in a Cold War With China; Some lessons from the Soviet era apply: Seek bipartisan consensus and allies, and avoid armed conflict,” Mike Gallagher, Wall Street Journal, 06.07.20: The author, a U.S. Congressman, writes:

• “Like it or not, the new Cold War is a reality. Better to acknowledge it than to hope for an elusive, cooperative relationship. New cold warriors aren't trying to reanimate the original Cold War.”
• “Most obviously, Communist China isn't the Soviet Union. Communist China is a more formidable economic rival to the U.S. than Soviet Russia ever was, and America and China are more deeply connected than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were. America and the Soviet Union occasionally sought economic integration as a means of de-escalation. But American national security now demands some form of economic breakup with China, at least in certain industries.”
• “Yet lessons from the Cold War apply. For example, though a cottage industry calls for ‘Sputnik Moments’ to galvanize new ‘Manhattan Projects’ or ‘Marshall Plans’ to keep up with China's investments in things like artificial intelligence, cyber and quantum computing, it seems prudent to invest in research and development of new technologies and aggressively work to restore a posture of deterrence in cyberspace.”
• “The ‘bipartisan foreign-policy consensus’ of the Cold War is romanticized and exaggerated, but there seems to be some cross-party agreement on confronting the Communist Party. … Finally, calling it a new Cold War is a good reminder to avoid armed conflict.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Impact of the pandemic:

“Double Shock: The Impact of COVID-19 and the Oil Price Collapse on Russia’s Energy Sector,” Maria Shagina, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 06.04.20: The author, a CEES postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Zurich, writes:

• “A combination of a collapse in oil prices and the global pandemic has sent shockwaves through the oil industry. Compared to other oil-producing countries, Russia is better prepared to weather this oil price shock. Since 2014, Russia’s economy has developed certain resilience, thanks to conservative monetary and fiscal policies.”
• “However, the double shock will take its toll on Russian energy majors’ profits and will have repercussions for the government’s budget revenues. According to the Skolkovo Energy Centre, the overall losses will equate to 60 percent of export revenues and 30 percent of budget revenues. Depending the degree of compliance with the OPEC+ deal and the severity of lockdowns, these losses would result in an 8-12 percent drop in gross domestic product (GDP) and would be comparable to the total reserves of the National Wealth Fund (NWF).”
• “The global gas industry has been less affected so far, but the spillover from the oil industry is already evident. On May 29, gas spot prices fell below $33 per thousand cubic meters on the Dutch hub. As 60 percent of Gazprom’s contracts are linked to pricing on the European hubs, the company’s profitability will be threatened (its target is currently set at $100 per thousand cubic meters).”
• “The diminishing revenues from the energy sector will inevitably affect other adjacent industries … The ability of the energy sector, as the main revenue generator, to cross-subsidize non-commodity industries will decline. 
• “In the long term, the pandemic will have repercussions for hydrocarbon-dependent economies. Decarbonization strategies and climate change policies are getting more urgent in Russia’s key export markets. … If duly implemented, these decisions will have a serious impact on Russia’s export and budget revenues. Even prior to the pandemic, it was projected that due to the energy transition, Russian energy exports and budget revenues will decrease by 15 percent and 17 percent, respectively, by 2040.”

“Coronavirus and the Kremlin: Will Putin’s Ratings Keep Falling Through Fall?,” Daniel Shapiro, Russia Matters, 06.04.20: The author, an associate with Russia Matters, writes:

• “A poll conducted in April and released in May by … the Levada Center, shows that 59 percent of Russians approve of Putin’s actions as president. … [T]his figure actually represents Putin’s lowest approval rating in his 20-year tenure as Russia’s leader. Levada’s poll also shows that Putin’s approval ratings have decreased over the last few months: in February, his approval ratings were reported at 69 percent; in March, 63 percent. Other Russian polling organizations’ reports support the Levada Center’s findings.”
• “Public trust in Putin has dropped as well, although not as sharply. … [P]ublic opinion on the Russian government and its leader, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, is less clear, as different indicators and different organizations show different trends. … [However,] support for the United Russia political party has thus far remained clearly unchanged throughout the COVID-19 crisis.”
• “That Putin’s ranking would plummet in case of a pandemic comes as no surprise. After all, the idea that a pandemic could strike Russia, causing thousands of deaths, a contraction of the economy and a decrease in popularity for Putin and pro-Putin political forces, has been predicted by a number of experts.”
• “Some experts argue that Putin’s ratings might not be done falling just yet. … Denis Volkov [says], the full effect of the pandemic on the ratings of the Russian authorities won’t be felt until fall. … Stephen Sestanovich of Columbia University believes that should the pandemic in Russia drag on and oil prices remain low, Putin could face economics-based protests from the population and competition from other elites in the near future. … Others, however, are less convinced that the drop in ratings will have such profound effects on the Putin administration. Lev Gudkov of the Levada Center argues that … there is not yet a singular rallying cry around which those disillusioned with Putin can coalesce.”

“The Coronavirus Could Hit Putin Most of All,” Maria Snegovaya, Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov, Foreign Policy, 06.05.20: The authors, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a deputy director and a senior research fellow for the Levada Center, write:

• “The ongoing pandemic will probably hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis. … Putin’s trust ratings, as measured by asking Russians to name leaders they trusted, have declined from 35 percent in January to 25 percent in May 2020. This indicator has never fallen that far in 20 years of observations. … Another indicator—Putin’s approval rating—has also now reached a historic low.”
• “The pandemic also undermines the Kremlin’s ability to provide public services. In a study by the Center for European Policy Analysis and the Levada Center we found that even prior to the start of the pandemic, respondents were particularly concerned about a lack of access to medical care.”
• “Currently, Putin retains higher levels of trust among respondents older than 55 years … But, as our study demonstrates, respondents who gain experience of the deficiencies of Russia’s medical system fundamentally revise their view of the political system—and attitudes toward Putin. … [T]he coronavirus crisis will likely undermine Putin’s support among his core constituencies. As short-term trends work against Putin’s regime, the longer-term trends are also not in its favor. Russian society continues to modernize.”
• “What do these findings mean for the sustainability of Putin’s regime? While previous crises such as the 2008 recession were seen as problems that the state could assist in surmounting, the ongoing pandemic exposes the Kremlin’s failure to deliver both longer-term economic growth and daily social services. An impending health care crisis will accelerate the trend of public disapproval in the Kremlin. And as Putin gets older, Russian society is becoming more modernized, more urbanized and less dependent on state-controlled media. Russia is no longer a society that can be ruled in a purely autocratic fashion. … And by 2024 … these changes may become deep enough to represent fundamentally new challenges to Putin’s ability to sustain his hold on power.”

“Putin Is Warping Russia’s Pandemic Response,” Leonid Gozman, Foreign Policy, 06.04.20: The author, a Russian commentator and politician, writes:

• “Despite the [coronavirus-induced] crisis, Putin’s chosen course for a global standoff with the West and the increase in his personal power will not be revised. The Russian president hopes that the pandemic … will showcase the advantages of dictatorships. There is nothing that can make him reject the foreign policy of the recent years and the continued dismantlement of democratic institutions in Russia. The vote on constitutional amendments that will essentially keep Putin in power for life will likely be held very soon. And the measures to control people introduced during the pandemic will most likely remain in place—they are fully in line with the ideology of the Putin system.”
• “All this is not without cost. The political consequences of the epidemic for Russia will be very serious. Putin’s approval rating has fallen to the lowest levels in recent years; the level of public trust in the president has gone down by more than half since the fall of 2017; and the approval of his actions as president dropped by 4 percentage points between the end of March and the end of April. Putin’s endless talk about new Russian weapons no longer elicits a reaction from the public.”
• “Many scenarios are possible: Putin could use the failures as an excuse to clean house or to quash dissent, pushing Russia back to a fully totalitarian state. But the government’s complete disdain for the interests of the people is now obvious even to those who had until recently supported the regime. It is also crucial that respect for the president has plummeted not only among the general public but also among the elites. His lack of action and silence during the first stage of the epidemic (reminiscent of Joseph Stalin’s behavior during the first days of World War II) has prompted many to accuse him of cowardice. The magic may finally have disappeared from Putin’s rule.”

“Crisis at Home Makes the United States Vulnerable Abroad,” Richard Haass, Foreign Affairs, 06.05.20: The author, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “Analysts of international affairs rarely focus on how the domestic condition of the United States shapes the country’s influence and role in the world, but today the connection could hardly be more relevant. The United States is currently experiencing three upheavals simultaneously.”
• “The American response to the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced doubts about American competence. That the novel coronavirus would reach American shores was inevitable … what was not inevitable was that the disease would take the toll it did. … The result is more than 100,000 fatalities, millions of infections and a deadly American course no one wishes to follow.”
• “The election of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 seemed to show that racism had abated to a significant degree; the gains of the civil, women’s and gay rights movements were a source of inspiration elsewhere; and even the country’s multiple experiences with impeachment seemed to showcase a system in which no person was above the law. Now, however, the image of a United States consistent with former President Ronald Reagan’s ‘shining city on a hill’ grows ever more distant in the eyes of the world.”
• “The perception that the United States has been shorn of much of its available power will likely affect the decision-making of other countries. The danger is that foes will see a United States weakened and distracted and move to take advantage. Some, arguably, already have. China has moved or spoken aggressively on Hong Kong, its contested border with India, and Taiwan. Russia has brazenly interfered with the operation of U.S. planes and ships.”
• “The moment is therefore dangerous. Three decades after the end of the Cold War … the state of the world is deteriorating. A traditional security agenda has reemerged, including a revisionist Russia, a rising and more assertive China and ever more capable hostile middle powers, such as Iran and North Korea; what is more, these concerns share the field with a new security agenda that includes terrorists with global reach, climate change and pandemics.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“The Prospects for US-Russian Arms Control,” Andrei Baklitsky, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 06.05.20: The author, a former visiting fellow with the Russia and Eurasia program at CSIS, writes:

• “With enough political will, Moscow and Washington could resolve their remaining issues [in relation to New START]. The treaty could then be extended for up to five years. There is not enough time to negotiate a new … treaty before February 2021. … While intermediate-range systems in Europe (and Asia) are not in the headlines at the moment, the current situation is not sustainable either. If Washington and NATO want to manage potential escalation, they should engage Russia in a military dialogue.”
• “Russia is not interested in the concept of trilateral arms control … Moscow does not see strategic arms control with Beijing as a priority, questions whether the idea is just a smokescreen for Washington to avoid engaging in arms control talks at all and will not push China to participate. There is no evidence that Washington can use a New START extension as a bargaining chip to persuade Moscow and Beijing to accept the proposal.”
• “Failure to extend New START … will make an arms race more likely over time. In the event that the treaty is not extended, U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations would have an important stabilizing effect, just as their absence would be destabilizing. Assuming a genuine interest from both sides in cooperative arms control, politically binding agreements could be a viable alternative to formal treaties. At the same time, political agreements would be less effective. Russia is not interested in arrangements that provide transparency but not agreed limits.”
• “Moscow and Washington have many issues on their bilateral agenda to which they need to devote attention and that could be included in further bilateral negotiations. The United States is interested in limiting Russian tactical nuclear weapons, new Russian strategic systems, as well as ground-based antisatellite weapons and ‘inspector’ satellites. Russia for its part is concerned about U.S. missile defense, space-based missile interceptors, space-based land-attack weapons (to some extent) and U.S. tactical weapons in Europe.”

“Has the United States Abandoned Arms Control?” Joshua Rovner, War on the Rocks, 06.02.20: The author, an associate professor in the School of International Service at American University, writes:

• “The United States has used arms control for a number of purposes over the years, including the pursuit of its own parochial goals. The process has required U.S. concessions, but the long-term results have been overwhelmingly positive: The number of nuclear powers has stayed the same, the number of nuclear warheads has gone down and the U.S. qualitative lead has increased. By publicly eschewing the pretense of mutual gains, Trump is putting U.S. gains at risk.”

“America’s Withdrawal From the Open Skies Treaty Undermines Euro-Atlantic Security,” Anatoly Antonov, The National Interest, 06.04.20: The author, the Russian ambassador to the United States, writes:

• “Whatever the real reason may be for the United States to abandon the Open Skies Treaty, it is obvious that all parties to the agreement and international security as a whole will lose. Washington’s European allies are fully aware of the increased risks to stability on the continent and most of them criticize White House’s intention.”
• “We share their concern. Despite the fact that Russia—similar to the United States—has advanced national technical means (which, if necessary, will allow Moscow to compensate for the most of the data gathered under the treaty), we value the Open Skies, first of all, for its unique role as an instrument of confidence-building and promoting dialogue. In today’s volatile global situation the international community cannot afford to squander agreements like the Open Skies Treaty.”

Counter-terrorism:

“Designating the Russian Imperial Movement a Terrorist Organization: a Drop in the Bucket of Needed US Counter-Extremism Responses,” Mariya Omelicheva, PONARS Eurasia, May 2020: The author, a professor of national security strategy at the National War College, writes:

• “On April 6, 2020, the U.S. State Department designated the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) as a terrorist organization and placed its leaders on its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. This unprecedented move … comes at a time of rising right-wing extremism and violence in the United States and around the globe as well as the internationalization of white supremacist movements.”
• “While the RIM’s ongoing paramilitary training and support for violent action outside of Russia is a case for real concern, the impact of labeling it as a terrorist entity will be limited at best. The RIM’s American connections are thin, its membership is small and its global reach is paltry compared to the shared influences of white supremacists in North America and Europe.”
• “Overstating the RIM’s connection to the Kremlin and Russia’s ability to incite violence via the U.S. far right obscures the homegrown nature of the U.S. white supremacist movement, which has been emboldened by the normalization of hate speech and the spread of racist and xenophobic views in mainstream politics. As the rapidly growing and diversifying far right continues connecting across borders, it is imperative to better understand common ties, influencers and networking platforms in order to develop comprehensive measures to counter the proliferation of violence and hate.”
• “For terrorist designations of white supremacist groups to be effective, they must be part of a comprehensive package of measures designed to confront the rise of far-right extremism.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy. The United States Must Recover the Full Range of Its Power,” Robert M. Gates, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020: The author, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes:

• “U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to go it alone in responding to the coronavirus pandemic is but the latest manifestation of the United States’ waning global leadership. … Many Americans—and not just the president’s supporters—believe that the United States’ allies have taken advantage of the country. They think that the costs associated with international leadership have been too high. They have lost patience with endless wars and foreign interventions.”
• “The United States remains the most powerful country in the world, in both economic and military terms. Yet nearly three decades since its victory in the Cold War … it faces challenges on multiple fronts. China and Russia are strengthening their militaries and seeking to extend their influence globally. North Korea poses an increasingly sophisticated nuclear threat in East Asia, and Iran remains a determined adversary in the Middle East. After 19 years of war, thousands of U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Islamic State (or ISIS) continues to conduct terrorist attacks. Deep divisions have beset the United States’ strongest allies in Europe. And now, nearly every country on earth is grappling with the devastating consequences of the pandemic.”
• “Without a return of U.S. leadership, these challenges will only grow, moving us closer to a dog-eat-dog, might-makes-right world and further from one shaped by international cooperation and the peaceful resolution of differences. But such a return would depend on first addressing the fundamental flaws in U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Washington has become overly dependent on military tools and has seriously neglected its nonmilitary instruments of power.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia's Fight Against the Coronavirus May Give Putin Even More Power,” Justin Sherman, The Washington Post, 06.02.20: The author, a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, writes:

• “What happens next for Russia, as the pandemic spreads and as technologies are increasingly deployed to halt it, is a complicated picture, and one that relies on speculation. Putin isn't exactly embodying the strong image he likes to project domestically, and the Russian populace is taking notice. This also comes as Putin was in the process of further consolidating power for when his time as president comes to an end. But what's clear is that Russia's pandemic surveillance is both coronavirus containment and state power expansion at once—and if the Russian state continues to struggle to adequately contain COVID-19, the Kremlin will make even greater use of the latter to maintain political control.”

Defense and aerospace:

 “Decoding Russia’s Official Nuclear Deterrence Paper,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.05.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “[T]he Kremlin has come up with a policy paper called Nuclear Deterrence Policy Guidelines (NDPG) spelling out the principles of Moscow’s deterrence strategy. … Making it public now sends several important messages not to be ignored. … One is to respond to Western interpretations of the Russian strategy as providing for ‘escalation for de-escalation’ … The Kremlin paper says up front that ‘in the event of a military conflict, nuclear deterrence should prevent the escalation of hostilities and allow their termination on conditions acceptable to Russia and its allies.’”
• “However, this provision … is contained in the paragraph referring to the general strategy of deterrence, rather than in the section which sets out specific conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be inferred from this that, in order to stop the fighting, Russia relies on the power of nuclear deterrence—its relevant capabilities and readiness—rather than on the actual use of nuclear weapons. … Questions will remain, but at least Russia has officially responded to the ‘escalate to de-escalate’ theory.”
• “Another message is directed at U.S. NATO allies. The Russian deterrence policy paper makes it clear that deployment of ballistic missile defenses, INF missile systems—whether nuclear-tipped or conventional—and other advanced weapons in the territory of non-nuclear weapons states in the vicinity of Russian borders would make them targets of Russian nuclear deterrence. … The Kremlin’s NDPG names launch on warning as the basic response to nuclear attack.”
• “Finally, the Kremlin policy guidelines provide for the deployment of nuclear weapons in response to an attack against the critical national infrastructure that is responsible for controlling and employing nuclear weapons. This new provision may refer, for example, to cyberattacks that can disable Russian strategic command and control systems.”
• “[T]he timing of the publication suggests that the Kremlin takes a world without arms control seriously and is preparing for it. … Discussion of military issues among professionals with the purpose of understanding the other side better is absolutely necessary. The U.S. NPR and now Russia’s NDPG present rich material for such dialogue. Adversaries should not be allowed to become enemies by mistake.”

“New Document Consolidates Russia’s Nuclear Policy in One Place,” Olga Oliker, Russia Matters, 06.04.20: The author, program director for Europe and Central Asia at International Crisis Group, writes:

• “On June 2, the Russian Federation published a brand new document titled ‘Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence.’ In this six-page document, Russia has laid out its official position on nuclear deterrence. This is the first time we’ve seen such a thing from Moscow. Any prior versions were classified.”
• “[P]utting it all in one place is very much what this new document, which I’ll be calling ‘Foundations’ … does. … Foundations echoes things we have heard from officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and read in formal documents past.”
• “Like the doctrines, Foundations underlines that the president of the Russian Federation makes any decision to use nuclear weapons. However, unlike the doctrines, it then, in paragraph 19 outlines four conditions that could allow for (not require) nuclear use: credible information that Russia is under ballistic missile attack … ; the use of nuclear or other WMD by an adversary against Russian territory or that of its allies; adversary actions against Russian critical government or military infrastructure that could undermine Russia’s capacity for nuclear retaliation …; and, finally, conventional aggression against Russia that threatens the very existence of the state.”
• “Some of this is old. But two things are new, or newish. First is the clear statement that Russia can launch under warning of ballistic missile attack. … Second, is the equally clear statement that an attack (military or otherwise) on Russia’s nuclear, command and related infrastructure, broadly defined, justifies a nuclear response.”
• “What about ‘escalate to de-escalate’? … Perhaps more plausibly, the combination of paragraphs … may be understood as follows:  Russia … will not use [nuclear weapons] for simple battlefield advantage or to ‘escalate to de-escalate.’ First use is allowed only in case of existential threat: to Russia or to its deterrent. But if those conditions are met, and Russia decides to use nuclear weapons, Russia will do so intending to prevent further escalation and end the conflict as favorably (or acceptably) as possible for itself.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Paul Stronski, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.02.20: The author, a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Against the backdrop of the sharpening confrontation between Russia and the West, PMCs [private military companies] are poised to expand their role as an instrument of Russian policy in Libya and other hotspots. Their relatively low cost make them an even more attractive tool for the Kremlin in an era when resources have been diminished by the economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic. It is also unlikely that exposing Moscow’s shadowy practices will prompt reevaluation or embarrassment on the part of Russian policymakers. Indeed, the use of surrogates is a long-established practice in Russian and Soviet foreign policies.”
• “If anything, the pandemic-induced economic downturn may generate more volunteers looking to serve in PMCs and more opportunists seeking to currying favor with the Kremlin. The spread of the pandemic could even create new global hot spots, affording the Kremlin further opportunities to capitalize on the West’s distraction by deploying PMCs in expanding its foreign policy adventures.”

“Russia’s Air War in Libya: A Diplomatic Gambit?”  Samuel Ramani, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 06.02.20: The author, a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford, writes:

• “On May 27, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) revealed that Russia had flown 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 fighter jets over Libya, in order to support Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). This announcement was the first official confirmation of Russia’s use of air power in Libya, as Moscow’s intervention has hinged on the deployment of Wagner Group private military contractors (PMCs) on Haftar’s behalf.”
• “Russian denials should be taken with a grain of salt, as Moscow denies that Wagner Group PMCs in Libya fight on behalf of the Russian state. Those same MiG-29 fighter jets were spotted in western Syria just days before the U.S. observed them in Libya.”
• “Although Russia’s deployments of MiG-29 and Su-35 jets to Libya have inspired predictions of a protracted air war, Moscow’s actions might be aimed at stemming Turkey’s advance and buying Russia time to facilitate a peace settlement, which advances its long-term interests. Instead of focusing purely on the military aspects of Russia’s recent actions, U.S. policymakers should pay closer attention to Russia’s recent assertiveness in the diplomatic sphere and efforts to institutionalize a division of Libya, which enhances its long-term influence in North Africa.”

“The West’s Libya Policy Is Strengthening Its Adversaries,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 06.03.20: The author, international affairs editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “The current chapter in Libya’s mayhem began with an offensive launched in April last year by Khalifa Haftar, a renegade commander based in eastern Libya, to capture the capital city of Tripoli, held by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord, which is led by Fayez al-Sarraj. General Haftar, a former Gaddafi officer who turned on his leader, gradually built up his self-styled Libyan National Army, with powerful backing not just from Russia and Kremlin-linked mercenaries but from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and (to an extent) Saudi Arabia. The tide turned against him this year after Turkey swung behind Tripoli and the GNA. Last month, deploying anti-missile batteries and drones, Ankara helped the Sarraj government recapture from the LNA the strategic al-Watiya air base south-west of Tripoli.”
• “The situation begins to look like Idlib, where Russia and the Assad forces clashed with Turkey and its Syrian proxies in late-February. But Libya is being Syrianized another way. Thousands of Syrian fighters are ranged on both sides: Turkey’s Syrian militia clients for the Tripoli government and pro-Assad militia with Gen. Haftar. After al-Watiya fell, Moscow upped the stakes by flying Russian jet fighters from an air base in Syria to eastern Libya, risking direct conflict with Turkey.”
• “Turkey and Russia’s goals are more about self-interest than Libya’s wellbeing. … Russia, its taste whetted by success in Syria, could end up with a useful foothold on the EU and NATO’s southern front by supporting Gen. Haftar.”
• “An EU-policed maritime embargo on arms to Libya is not only ineffective. It is likely to favor the general, who gets much of his resources overland. This is not just the EU in another muddle. In Syria as in Libya, the West keeps pursuing policies that end up strengthening adversaries such as Russia and wobbly allies like Turkey.”

“The Great Carve-Up. Libya’s Internationalized Conflicts After Tripoli,” Wolfram Lacher, SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), June 2020: The author, a senior associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP, writes:

• “The yearlong offensive on Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar’s forces has suffered fatal setbacks, and Libya’s conflicts are changing shape. Russia’s and Turkey’s attempts at carving out spheres of influence are bound to collide with the interests of other foreign powers and with the fluidity of Libya’s political landscape. Haftar could face increasing challenges to his authority over eastern and southern Libya. Rivalries within the anti-Haftar alliance will also return to the fore. Foreign intervention and the deep rifts that the war has inflicted on Libyan society will be the key obstacles to a political settlement.”
• “Western states should focus on preserving Libya’s unity and countering Russian influence as a matter of priority. … To curb Russian influence, the EU should wield sanctions to undermine Haftar, on whom Russia depends as a host and partner. In parallel, Western states should finally push their interests in a stable Libya more strongly when engaging with Haftar’s other foreign supporters, particularly Egypt and the UAE, to dissuade them from further cooperation with Russia.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine’s Latest Schism: Zelenskiy Against the Regions,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.03.20: The author, an independent journalist based in Moscow, writes:

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s team has managed to alleviate the old standoff between east and west that had dominated Ukrainian politics for many years. But it’s being replaced by a new dividing line: between the center and regional clans. While old foes from both east and west have been sidelined, local barons—unified by their unhappiness with the lockdown—are ready to challenge Zelenskiy’s hegemony in regional elections this fall.”
• “The president’s attempts to strengthen control over the regions immediately face two major obstacles. The first is a long-running reform aimed at decentralizing Ukraine, which boosts the position of regional elected officials. … The second is resistance to the center from local clans, which dislike the president’s fight against corruption and the fresh blood his team has brought in.”
• “Zelenskiy cannot abandon the decentralization reform. It’s part of the process of closer integration with the EU, and is financed by international institutions, in addition to being one of the terms of the Minsk agreements aimed at ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. … The problem is that local government has essentially been hijacked by regional factions that are largely in opposition to the president.”
• “The coronavirus pandemic has turned the mounting tension between the center and the regions into an open conflict. Zelenskiy’s lockdown measures were instantly met with insubordination and sabotage from influential regional politicians.”
• “The confrontation with regional clans is set to be a long-term factor in Ukrainian politics. That will cause problems for decentralization reform, which is a major focus of Western funding and assistance and supposed to be one of the keys to unlocking the Donbass conflict.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Does Belarus Election Mark Start of New Era?” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.02.20: The author, a journalist and political commentator, writes:

• “The Belarusian presidential election scheduled for Aug. 9 looks set to be less uneventful than the country’s longtime president Alexander Lukashenko had hoped. … Lukashenko is having to explain over and over again why, while the rest of the world is in various stages of lockdown, Belarus has chosen to tackle the new coronavirus pandemic in its own surprisingly liberal way: with parades, football championships and open borders.”
• “In addition, for the first time in twenty-five years, the election has coincided with a sharp economic decline. Belarus’s GDP is forecast to fall by 4–5 percent by the year’s end, due not only to the pandemic, but also the recent oil dispute between Belarus and Russia, followed by the slump in global oil prices, which hit Belarusian oil production and exports hard.”
• “These problems have contributed to a revival of protests. The charismatic video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky is touring the regions, persuading recently apolitical people to take to the streets to call for Lukashenko’s resignation under the gloves-off slogan ‘Stop the Cockroach.’ When Tikhanovsky was barred from running in the election on a formality, his wife registered her candidacy instead.”
• “Even more unusually for Belarusian politics, two other presidential candidates hail not from the opposition, but from the establishment. Valery Tsepkalo is a former ambassador to the United States and deputy head of the Foreign Ministry who later created the Belarus Hi-Tech Park, while Viktor Babariko is a banker and philanthropist. Their ideas are similar: sweeping modernization of the state and liberalization of the economy, a two-term limit for presidents and a neutral, pragmatic foreign policy.”
• “If Tsepkalo and Babariko manage to avoid prison after the election, that will be an important precedent. Other businessmen and officials who don’t like the state of affairs in the country might also decide that it’s worth the risk of going into politics.  This will lift the moratorium on entering politics for a new category of people. …  If the 2020 election doesn’t cause the Belarusian power system to wobble today, then it will likely become a staging ground for the country’s post-Lukashenko political arena.”  

“Belarus Is Having an Anti-‘Cockroach’ Revolution,” Vitali Shkliarov, Foreign Policy, 06.04.20: The author, a fellow at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, writes:

• “The most unusual ongoing protests in the world, and the most disruptive to the existing political order, aren’t in the United States, but rather in Belarus. After 26 years under the firm rule of Alexander Lukashenko … Belarusians are now gathering in the streets and online to make a call to ‘Stop the Cockroach.’”
• “When Lukashenko announced in early May that he would hold presidential elections in Belarus in August, during a global pandemic that he has publicly called a hoax, many Belarusians became fed up. They took inspiration from a relatively unknown blogger named Syarhey Tsikhanouski … On March 11, he had taken off on a trip around the country in a van with the phrase ‘Country for Living’ painted on the side—an ironic reference to a phrase from one of Lukashenko’s propaganda videos.”
• “On May 6, Tsikhanouski announced his intention to run for president against Lukashenko—under the campaign slogan ‘Stop the Cockroach.’ Tsikhanouski’s blog and his quixotic candidacy quickly earned a surge of support. … Predictably, Tsikhanouski was soon arrested under dubious charges and thus made ineligible to run for president. But this time, Belarusians haven’t given up. After his arrest, his supporters found a way to keep the momentum going—they recruited his wife, Svetlana Tihanovskaya, to take his place and started collecting the signatures for her to be included on the ballot.”
• “In reality, there’s little chance that Tsikhanouski or anyone else can actually beat Lukashenko in the presidential election. But for the first time since he took office, Lukashenko’s standing and reputation in Belarus have taken a serious hit. Regardless of the final outcome of the election, something fundamental has shifted in Belarusian politics.”
• “At root, it’s about the coronavirus pandemic. Lukashenko’s approach to the coronavirus has shown Belarusians how little their president cares for their safety and well-being. He is one of the only leaders on earth to openly call the coronavirus a hoax and refuse to take any measures to protect his citizens.”

“What Does Russia Have to Teach Us About Burying Confederate Statues?” Jordan Brasher and Derek H. Alderman, The National Interest, 06.06.20: The authors, a doctoral candidate and a professor at the University of Tennessee, write:

• “An estimated 114 Confederate symbols have been removed from public view since 2015. In many cases, these cast-iron Robert E. Lees and Jefferson Davises were sent to storage.”
• “The idea of a Confederate monument graveyard is modeled after ways that the former communist bloc nations of Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia have dealt with statues of Soviet heroes like Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin.”
• “Many countries have opted not to destroy or hide their Soviet-era monuments, but they haven’t left them to rule over city hall or public plazas, either. Rather, governments in Eastern Europe have altered the meaning of these politically charged Soviet statues by relocating them. Dozens of Soviet statues across Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia have been pulled from their pedestals and placed in open-air parks, where interested visitors can reflect on their new significance.”