4 Ideas to Explore

1. The failed attempt on Donald Trump’s life has elicited a roar of comments by Russian politicians, experts and journalists, with both pro- and anti-Kremlin figures seeing a significant boost for the ex-president’s electoral chances following the July 13 attack. “It was Trump that was being shot at, but it was Biden who got hit,” as Russian self-exiled liberal political scientist Boris Pastukhov put it. Experts on bothsides of Russia’s political divide have also noted that the attempt on Trump’s life will contribute to the polarization of America, with some noting the Kremlin will benefit from this trend. Commenting on Trump’s survival, one pro-Kremlin writer wondered if the heavens intervened to save the ex-president.
2. Russian forces over the weekend pushed into Urozhaine after a “defense collapse” in that village in the eastern region of Donetsk in what became the latest in a series of slow but steady advances by the Russian army, according to NYT. Moreover, Russian forces are now less than four miles from Highway T0504, which, if taken, would lead to the isolation of the key town of Chasiv Yar, also in the Donetsk region.¹ The situation is not all doom and gloom for Ukraine, however, as its troops have now managed to halt Russian assaults near the city of Kharkiv in the northeast, according to NYT.
3. “It is magical thinking to expect that the current level of allied support [for Ukraine] can continue indefinitely” and “it is equally improbable that Ukraine can either hold out indefinitely or turn the tide of the war with the current level of allied support,” according to Eugene Rumer of CEIP. Staying the course “carries with it the risk of unintended escalation and little prospect of victory for Ukraine,” Rumer writes in a commentary for CEIP. Given all this, the challenge for the U.S. and its allies is how to “keep Ukraine in the fight for the long run but to find a way to end this war without sacrificing Ukraine in the process,” according to Rumer.
4. Iran’s recently elected president Masoud Pezeshkian has heaped praise on Beijing and Moscow for constantly standing by Teheran “during challenging times.” “Russia is a valued strategic ally and neighbor to Iran and my administration will remain committed to expanding and enhancing our cooperation,” Pezeshkian—who has been described as a “reformist”—wrote in a commentary for Teheran Times. In the commentary, the new president claimed that Iranians are “striving for peace for the people of Russia and Ukraine,” even as Iran continues to supply scores of attack drones and other equipment to the Russian military.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024,” Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight, BAS, 07.14.24. 

• “North Korea continues to modernize and grow its nuclear weapons arsenal. In this Nuclear Notebook, the authors cautiously estimate that North Korea may have produced enough fissile material to hypothetically build up to 90 nuclear warheads, but has likely assembled fewer than that—potentially around 50. To deliver the warheads, North Korea is enhancing and diversifying its missile force, most recently with new solid-fuel long-range strategic missiles, short-range tactical missiles, and sea-based missiles.” 

Iran and its nuclear program:

“My message to the new world,” Masoud Pezeshkian, Teheran Times, 07.12.24. Clues from Iranian Views.

• “I wish to emphasize that my administration will be guided by the commitment to preserving Iran's national dignity and international stature under all circumstances. ... With this in mind, my administration will pursue an opportunity-driven policy by creating balance in relations with all countries, consistent with our national interests, economic development, and requirements of regional and global peace and security.”
• “We will champion the establishment of a "strong region" rather than one where a single country pursues hegemony and dominance over the others. ... As a first measure, my administration will urge our neighboring Arab countries to collaborate and utilize all political and diplomatic leverages to prioritize achieving a permanent ceasefire in Gaza.”
• “China and Russia have consistently stood by us during challenging times. We deeply value this friendship. ... Russia is a valued strategic ally and neighbor to Iran and my administration will remain committed to expanding and enhancing our cooperation. We strive for peace for the people of Russia and Ukraine, and my government will stand prepared to actively support initiatives aimed at achieving this objective. I will continue to prioritize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia, particularly within frameworks such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasia Economic Union.”
• “The United States ... needs to recognize the reality and understand, once and for all, that Iran does not—and will not—respond to pressure. We entered the JCPOA in 2015 in good faith and fully met our obligations. But the United States unlawfully withdrew from the agreement motivated by purely domestic quarrels and vengeance.”
• “The U.S. and its Western allies, not only missed a historic opportunity to reduce and manage tensions in the region and the world, but also seriously undermined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by showing that the costs of adhering to the tenets of the non-proliferation regime could outweigh the benefits it may offer. Indeed, the U.S. and its Western allies have abused the non-proliferation regime to fabricate a crisis regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear program - openly contradicting their own intelligence assessment - and use it to maintain sustained pressure on our people, while they have actively contributed to and continue to support the nuclear weapons of Israel, an apartheid regime, a compulsive aggressor and a non-NPT member and a known possessor of illegal nuclear arsenal.”
• “I wish to emphasize that Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons and urge the United States to learn from past miscalculations and adjust its policy accordingly.” 

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“The rage of Ukraine’s army wives: Two years ago their husbands signed up to defend their country. They still have no idea when they will come home,” The Economist, 07.09.24.

• “[In Ukraine] [t]here is an upswell of anger from the families of those who volunteered to serve in the first months of the war and now find themselves trapped in the army, seemingly for the duration of the fighting. (A similar movement exists in Russia.) Ukraine needs more troops but who should be drafted has recently become a fraught political issue. As a consequence, the plight of those who feel they have already done their duty has been ignored.”
• “As the war drags on into a third year, the question of demobilization has become emblematic of the growing frustration that many Ukrainians feel.”
• “The rules about who gets called up and how long they serve originate in Soviet times, and have been patched over since independence with three decades of political expediency. As such, they can seem uncertain, arbitrary and sometimes brutal.”
• “Some soldiers said they felt increasingly alienated from the generals, politicians and ordinary people continuing with their lives far from the front. “Everyone here thinks we are serfs deceived,” wrote one. “The trenches are empty and there are no healthy people eligible for fighting. My brothers-in-arms have the same feelings. It is a social and political failure. A military one will follow.” A number have complained about their peers who have fled to Europe.”

“Wounded Veterans, Wounded Economy: The Personnel Costs of Russia’s War,” Thomas Lattanzio and Harry Stevens, WoR, 07.09.24. 

• “The cost of payouts to the family of a [Russian] soldier killed in Ukraine would come to at least 14 million rubles at the time of writing, excluding several smaller, long-term payments. ... Simple math shows that one-time payments would equate to 900 billion rubles for wounded personnel and at least 1.4 trillion for families of the dead, 2.3 trillion rubles total. This equates to 6 percent of the 2024 budget, a truly staggering amount that will continue to climb.”
• “Unfortunately for the Kremlin, it will not get off the hook with one-time expenses, at least if it wants to provide an adequate level of medical care for veterans. If anything, caring for wounded troops will be more difficult now than in the past ... Mental wounds may be even more daunting to treat. ... [T]he estimated yearly cost to the Russian economy of post-traumatic stress disorder among Ukraine veterans would be over 660 billion rubles a year, roughly 2 percent of the 2024 budget.”
• “Holding aside the staggering costs of treating veterans in Russia, there are also significant capacity issues that the Russians are woefully ill equipped to deal with. The number of hospitals in Russia has declined roughly 20 percent since 2012, and there are only 10 veterans’ hospitals in the country.”
• “Whether due to a lack of resources or to a view of post-traumatic stress disorder as a personal weakness, it appears highly likely that huge numbers of traumatized veterans will not receive adequate mental health treatment upon their return.”
• “Given the precedents set in the Afghan and Chechen wars of ignoring or severely underfunding mental health care, there is a serious possibility that this will be repeated with the invasion of Ukraine.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine Is Targeting Crimea, a Critical Base for Russia’s Invasion,” Marc Santora, NYT, 07.13.24. 

• “Ukraine, now armed with American-made precision missiles, is for the first time capable of reaching every corner of Crimea—and the missiles are increasingly flying in both directions.”
• “It is a new strategic push as Kyiv seeks to raise the cost for Russian occupation forces that have long used the peninsula as a base of operations just off Ukraine’s southern coast.”
• “While it is unlikely to have much effect on the front line, Ukraine’s campaign with the long-range version of the Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as ATACMS, appears meant to force the Kremlin to make difficult choices about where to deploy some of its most valuable air defenses to protect critical military infrastructure.”
• “Over the past three months, commercial satellite imagery examined by military analysts has confirmed damage to Russian radar installations, electronic warfare assets, logistics routes and air fields. “It is definitely fair to say the Ukrainians have had pretty impressive successes over the past couple of months,” said Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow for air power and technology at the Royal United Services Institute in London who has studied the satellite imagery.”
• “The strikes on Crimea are ... likely to have a minimal effect on the fighting on the front, especially in eastern Ukraine, where the heaviest battles are taking place and where Russian forces continue to gain ground.”
• “Crimea holds deep political, symbolic and military value for President Vladimir V. Putin, who has called it Russia’s “holy land,” placing it at the center of his false narrative that Ukraine is part of Russia.”
• “A senior U.S. official who closely tracks the war said Ukraine ... said Ukraine had enough ATACMS to keep up the Crimea campaign, adding that munitions were being replenished on a continuous basis. While not providing exact numbers, the official said the United States was sending “scores” of missiles, but not “hundreds.”
• “Russia has responded to the uptick in attacks on Crimea by bringing in air defense systems from Kaliningrad and other parts of the country, according to Ukrainian and Western officials. The Kremlin also dispatched its S-500 Prometheus air defense system to the battlefield for the first time, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, told reporters last month.”
• “But Ukraine shows no sign of slowing its campaign in Crimea, and residents there who were reached by secure messaging apps said the usual summer crowds of tourists were noticeably thinner. While people still go to the beaches, one person said, some now wear badges with their name, home address and contacts for their next of kin.”

“Ukraine Battles to Contain Russian Advances Across the Front,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 07.15.24. 

• “Russian forces over the weekend pushed into Urozhaine, [a Donetsk region] village won back by Ukraine last summer, the latest in a series of slow but steady advances that are reversing hard-won Ukrainian victories. The Russian advances are a sobering development for Kyiv as its troops battle to contain attacks along a more than 600-mile front line.”
  • “The Ukrainian military made no comment but maps of the battlefield compiled by analysts from combat footage also showed Urozhaine under Russian control, including a map by DeepState, a group with close ties to the Ukrainian Army. Russian forces “occupied Urozhaine,” DeepState said Sunday, describing the loss as a “defense collapse.”
  • “Urozhaine was one of the few southern villages that Ukraine liberated last summer, rare successes in an otherwise disappointing counteroffensive. In the east, Moscow’s troops are also pressing forward. They have entered the outskirts of Chasiv Yar, a Ukrainian stronghold in the region, and are closing in on a key Ukrainian supply route. Kyiv held on to Urozhaine for nearly a year after its liberation.”
• “Ukraine’s army general staff said Sunday that the “hottest situation” along the front line was near Pokrovsk, an eastern city turned military garrison that sits on a key road linking several Ukrainian-held cities in the area. Since Russia captured Avdiivka, a Ukrainian stronghold in the east, this year, its troops have been slowly advancing toward the crucial road, called Highway T0504. They are now less than four miles south of the road, putting it well within range of Russian artillery and drone strikes.”
  • “Should Russian forces reach the road, Ukrainian military operations in the eastern Donetsk region would be seriously hampered ... In particular, cutting off the road would further isolate the hilltop town of Chasiv Yar, one of Moscow’s main targets.”
• “The situation is not all gloomy for Ukraine. Its troops have now managed to halt Russian assaults near the city of Kharkiv, where Moscow opened a new front in late April and made its biggest territorial gains in more than a year.”
• “As the war reaches the two-and-a-half-year mark, Ukraine is pursuing a plan for a negotiated end to the fighting. President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday that he wanted to hold a second international peace summit later this year and that Russian officials should attend.”

Conclusion by Mathieu Boulègue in “Assessing Russian plans for military regeneration,” Chatham House, 07.09.24. 

• “More than two years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains able simultaneously to continue to prosecute the war and to effect wartime adaptations to its command structure. With varying degrees of success, the Kremlin has been able to rapidly mobilize reservists, employ private military companies, sustain military-industrial production for basic systems, and heavily militarize the public information space in support of the war.”
• “In terms of command structure, the separation of the Western Military District into Moscow and Leningrad districts in March 2024 is also telling. Moscow is now reverting to its “comfort zone,” namely Soviet-era command structures in the European theatre. The new Moscow Military District will concern itself exclusively with Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad, which will inevitably be of direct concern to the US and NATO in the Baltic theatre as well as on the eastern flank of the Alliance. The pace of implementation and the efficiency of continued reforms in the command structure, however, remain to be seen.”
• “On top of wartime adaptations in the command structure, the military industry has displayed resilience in its ability to deliver military equipment and hardware in the war against Ukraine. The ongoing reconstitution of military equipment and hardware will inevitably inform the next cycle of the State Armament Program (GPV) after 2027, as well as future plans regarding modern military technology and military innovation.”
• “Russia’s prospects for regenerating its military machine remain mixed, both in terms of speed and effectiveness. Yet as the war against Ukraine continues, and regardless of the depth of the reconstitution of Russia’s military power, the current Kremlin leadership will remain a threat to European and transatlantic security as well as a strategic competitor to NATO and its allies.”
• “Analysis of Moscow’s nuclear declaratory policy suggests that if Russia were to suffer sufficiently severe degradation of its conventional military power, such that the leadership deemed the existence of the Russian state to be under threat, this would create conditions under which Russia might consider the use of nuclear weapons. However, this possibility remains remote, especially while Russia’s air arms, and its naval forces beyond the Black Sea, remain relatively intact.”
• “Furthermore, Russia will continue to exploit its toolkit of asymmetric capabilities and ambiguous sub-threshold tactics. These tools must no longer be analyzed as part of a “grey zone” or “hybrid” range of measures aimed at blurring the line between war and peace. They are fundamentally part of Russia’s continued low-intensity warfare against Western interests.”
• “The single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its overall military power and leverage asymmetric capabilities in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine.”
• “Denying Russia victory and forcing it to continue in a long attritional struggle will further degrade all elements of its war-making capacity, including its ability to invest in and produce cutting-edge technological enablers. Critically, these efforts will also further undermine the Kremlin’s informational strategy both at home and abroad, diminishing its ability to destabilize Western democratic systems and, ultimately, weakening its long-term hold on power.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“High-Tech American Weapons Work Against Russia—Until They Don’t,” Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 07.07.24. 

• “The Excalibur artillery round performed wonders when it was introduced into the Ukrainian battlefield in the summer of 2022 … Within weeks, the Russian army started to adapt, using its formidable electronic warfare capabilities. It managed to interfere with the GPS guidance and fuzes, so that the shells would either go astray, fail to detonate, or both. By the middle of last year, the M982 Excalibur munitions, developed by RTX and BAE Systems, became essentially useless and are no longer employed, Ukrainian commanders say.”
• “A brand-new system, the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb munition, manufactured by Boeing and Sweden’s Saab, has failed altogether after its introduction in recent months, in part because of Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian and Western officials say. It is no longer in use in Ukraine pending an overhaul.”
• “Moscow has had successes against older generations of Western precision weapons, some of the more sophisticated systems are being withheld precisely so that Russia—and through it, China—wouldn’t develop effective countermeasures, military officials say. In a potential war, the U.S. and allies would have much more powerful capabilities, starting with massive air power.”

“NATO needs a realistic plan for ending the Ukraine war,” Michael O’Hanlon, The Hill, 07.09.24.

• “For now, we should indeed provide Ukraine almost everything it could ask for. Give Ukraine the rest of the year and into 2025 to build up its capabilities and attempt a major counteroffensive. But don’t plan on complete success.”
• “Meanwhile, allow politics in the U.S., France and elsewhere to settle a bit — or at least clarify their course. Start talking with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about how Western aid might be modified. And yes, cut back in some ways in 2025 if his next offensive does not succeed. At that point, depending on circumstances, consider falling back on a strategy that helps Ukraine protect the land it does hold, as well as Ukrainian cities from air and missile attack, while helping the country recover economically and build up its long-term defensibility.”
• “There is one more key piece to all of this too — Ukraine’s security anchor to the West. Most favor NATO membership for Ukraine. But that will most likely never prove negotiable with Moscow and may not be practical anytime soon. Lise Howard of Georgetown University and I have proposed an Atlantic-Asian Security Community instead. This would include the U.S. and some other key Western countries, and possibly other countries like India, as well as Ukraine (and maybe Russia someday, off in the distant future). Among other activities, this partnership would deploy a dense network of military trainers in uniform, but not organized in combat formations, throughout those parts of Ukraine controlled by Kyiv, perhaps even before the war ends, to act as a tripwire against future Russian attack.  The stated intent of members of this partnership would be to intervene to protect their trainers if they were ever threatened.”

“How to Make the U.S.-Ukraine Security Pact Stick,” Eric Ciaramella, FP, 07.09.24.

• “The bilateral security agreement signed by U.S. President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 13 marks a major step forward in Washington’s strategy toward Ukraine and Russia.”
• “To be clear, the U.S.-Ukraine agreement is not a security guarantee. It does not commit the United States to using its own armed forces in Ukraine’s defense. Nor does it outline a path for Ukraine to join NATO, which Kyiv believes is the only way to end Russia’s aggression for good.”
• “The U.S.-Ukraine agreement implicitly acknowledges that there is no shortcut to end the war: neither through a premature Ukrainian offensive nor through hasty negotiations.”
• “What is clear is that neither a quick Ukrainian battlefield victory nor a stable negotiated settlement is in the offing. With this in mind, U.S. commitments center on building up Ukraine’s long-term military strength for the twin purposes of defense and deterrence, rather than on preparing Kyiv for a specific offensive at some future date.”
• “But this long-term approach requires greater coordination between arms of government in the United States—otherwise progress could be undone partially or even completely with a change in power.”
  • “First, the Biden administration owes lawmakers a clearer picture of what Ukraine’s future force will look like and how much it will cost to build and maintain it.”
  • “Second, Congress should consider using its legislative power to strengthen the U.S.-Ukraine agreement. Commentators have noted the document’s obvious weak point: Although parts of it constitute a binding executive agreement, it has not been ratified by Congress. As a result, it contains no additional financial pledges and no guarantee that lawmakers will approve new funding to implement the agreement.”
  • “Finally, the White House and Congress should start discussing what the United States would do if, after major combat operations end, Russia attacks Ukraine again in the future. During a cessation of fighting, Russia must be convinced that it cannot rearm in order to prepare for another invasion, and Ukraine must be assured that it will have the enduring support of its partners in order to rebuild its military strength.”
• “If Washington can lead its allies in articulating a credible cease-fire enforcement mechanism now, Ukraine is far more likely to win the peace—whenever that day comes. Putin’s theory of victory is to exhaust Ukraine’s will to resist and the West’s will to support it. That strategy will no longer be viable if the United States and its allies properly coordinate and fund the commitments they have made to support Ukraine’s defense and deterrence capabilities over the long term.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Getting Ukraine’s Security Agreements Right,” Mykhailo Soldatenko, CEIP, 07.08.24. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Western Companies Are Now Paying for Russia Sanctions,” Giovanni Legorano, FP, 07.12.24. 

• “According to data collected by the Kyiv School of Economics and analyzed by Armin Steinbach, a nonresident fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, European Union and U.S. companies have pulled out around 40 percent of their Russian assets since February 2022. Foreign assets worth around $194 billion are still in Russia. Of these assets, $32 billion worth are owned by U.S. companies, while $90 billion belong to European companies, the data showed.”
• “The businesses that remained are in different situations. Some said they would leave but then backtracked or put their plans on hold. Others reduced their operations in Russia, sometimes to a minimum, while the rest are still trying to exit the country.”
• “The corporate exodus of around 1,000 foreign companies from Russia since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine has cost them more than $107 billion in write-downs and lost revenue, according to a Reuters analysis of company filings and statements published at the end of March.”
• “It’s also almost impossible for Western businesses to send the profits made in Russia back to their headquarters. These funds must be held in special accounts in Russia, called C accounts. “I have spoken with dozens of foreign clients, and only two managed to repatriate this money,” said Nabi Abdullaev, a London-based partner at Control Risks, a consultancy.”
• “Western banks are in a particularly difficult position. Eurozone banks still involved with Russia, in particular, have come under growing pressure in recent weeks from the bloc’s supervisors, as well as U.S. authorities, over their ties to the country. The European Central Bank (ECB) has asked eurozone lenders to provide a clear road map to exit the Russian market.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“NATO’s Biggest Test Since the Cold War Is Still Ahead,” Eugene Rumer, CEIP, 07.09.24.

• “It is magical thinking to expect that the current level of allied support can continue indefinitely. In the United States, the outlook for future congressional backing for more support packages for Ukraine on the scale of the $61 billion supplemental funding for Ukraine passed in April is bleak. It is equally improbable that Ukraine can either hold out indefinitely or turn the tide of the war with the current level of allied support.”
• “Having ruled out direct involvement, NATO allies find themselves at an impasse. On the one hand, they all recognize the unsustainable option of doing more of the same and expecting a different result. Staying the course also carries with it the risk of unintended escalation and little prospect of victory for Ukraine. On the other hand, they have zero appetite to negotiate with Putin, an accused war criminal leader wanted by the International Criminal Court. This unpalatable option is also unrealistic, since Putin has shown no inclination to negotiate until after a Ukrainian surrender.”
• “The challenge before the allies ... is not to keep Ukraine in the fight for the long run but to find a way to end this war without sacrificing Ukraine in the process.”

“Russia Sees Signs of Diplomatic Rehabilitation in Orbán Visit,” Alexander Baunov, CEIP, 07.10.24. 

• “Russia has been a pariah in the West since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The visit of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to Moscow on July 5 breached that isolation. Significantly, it was also Orbán who helped Moscow reestablish ties with the West after the Kremlin annexed Crimea in 2014.”
• “Despite these signs of war fatigue on all sides, it does not currently seem that Putin has any desire for peace in Ukraine. Even if the Kremlin does see Orbán as a possible peacemaker, then it is only in a very abstract way, and only under a particular set of circumstances. Instead, Orbán’s recent visit to Moscow has strengthened the Kremlin’s belief that the West will eventually be forced to deal directly with Russia again.”

“What China means when it says ‘peace.’ From Ukraine to Gaza, China sees a chance to promote an ultra-realist worldview,” The Economist, 07.11.24. 

• “A swift end to the Ukraine war on Russian terms would fill many governments with a sense of loss. In much of western Europe and beyond, a deal that rewarded Russia for its aggression—exchanging a ceasefire for vast swathes of Ukrainian territory, for instance, or a pledge that Ukraine will never join NATO or any other Western alliance—would feel like appeasement, not peacemaking. A pillar of the post-second-world-war order, involving a refusal to see borders redrawn by force, would have fallen.”
• “China disagrees. For Communist Party bosses in Beijing, a quick Russia-friendly end to the fighting in Ukraine would be grounds for celebration. Most simply, it would humiliate the Biden administration and every power that backs Ukraine, while vindicating China’s confidence that Western unity cannot last. More important, it would offer a glimpse of a future world order which, according to Chinese officials and scholars, already enjoys the support of most governments, notably in the developing world.”
• In effect, China’s coldly realist version of international relations sees no meaningful distinction between appeasement and peacemaking.” 

“Defining Europe’s Frontiers,” Nikolas Gvosdev, NI, 07.12.24. 

• “While direct [Russia-Ukraine] diplomatic talks are not on the table, it is a mistake to think that negotiations aren’t happening. ... The first “negotiation” is over the terms of Ukraine’s integration into the key institutions of the Euro-Atlantic world. My prediction is that what I term “core Ukraine” will be integrated as a full member of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What remains now is the question of timetable and conditionality.”
• “With Europe’s institutional border fixed along whatever the Ukraine-Russia line of control ends up being—whether coterminous with or separate from the 1991 internationally recognized borders—the process of delineation will turn to whether or not that line will encompass Belarus and Moldova (in whatever form the latter exists).”
• “The Mediterranean serves as Europe’s southern frontier. NATO’s defense zone ends at the Turkish borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Increasingly, the plausibility of a Turkish entry into the EU strains credulity, so the European zone begins to dissipate at the Anatolian heartland. That leaves the South Caucasus. For Armenia, which is trying to disentangle itself from its long-established alliance with Russia, and Georgia, whose dreams of full Euro-Atlantic integration have been dashed in the past, the question will be whether to continue to pin hopes on Washington and Brussels continuing with an enlargement process. The alternative option is exploring ways of joining with other Silk Road states to set up the Middle Corridor as the primary trade linkage between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic worlds.”
• “The negotiations are currently taking place on the battlefield (the physical zones of combat, as well as in cyberspace and financial markets). They will eventually return to the diplomatic realm, and when they do, I believe these are the parameters on which the talks will take place.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“NATO Is Helping Ukraine to Fight—but Not to Win. The Washington summit was heavy on promises but light on plans,” Amy Mackinnon, FP, 07.12.24. 

• “The measures announced this week [at the NATO summit]—including the establishment of a new NATO command to coordinate training and arms deliveries, the delivery of F-16 fighter jets, and a new security compact—underscore efforts underway in Western capitals to shift support for Ukraine to a long-term footing as Russia shows little sign of abating.”
• “But the summit also highlighted a central tension in Western strategy to support Ukraine: Military aid has played a decisive role in enabling Kyiv to fend off Russian forces, but it has fallen short of enabling it to actually win the war.” We’re basically propping up Ukraine to stay in the battle and make some advances and not outright win the battle,” said Liana Fix, a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations. “There’s not a real strategy for the war.”
• “Analysts are skeptical that the measures announced this week can turn the tide on the battlefield. “The Ukrainians need more to win than just what we have set up,” Royal Netherlands Navy Adm. Rob Bauer, the chair of NATO’s Military Committee, told Foreign Policy on the sidelines of the summit on Thursday.”
• “There is a gaping hole between saying we want to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and what we’re actually doing,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, the director of the trans-Atlantic security program at the Center for a New American Security. “Right now, it just feels like we’re all saying it but people don’t really believe it.”
• “It is magical thinking to expect that the current level of allied support can continue indefinitely,” Eugene Rumer, the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia program, wrote in a recent commentary. “The challenge before the allies at this summit is bigger than anything they have faced since the Cold War. It is not to keep Ukraine in the fight for the long run but to find a way to end this war without sacrificing Ukraine in the process.”

“Washington Summit Declaration,” NATO, 07.10.24.

• “Russia bears sole responsibility for its war of aggression against Ukraine, a blatant violation of international law, including the UN Charter.  There can be no impunity for Russian forces’ and officials’ abuses and violations of human rights, war crimes, and other violations of international law. Russia is responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians and has caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure.”
• “To help Ukraine defend itself today, and deter Russian aggression in the future, we have:”
  • “Decided to establish the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) to coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine by Allies and partners.”
  • “Announced a Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine ...Allies intend to provide a minimum baseline funding of €40 billion within the next year.”
  • “Taken forward the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC),”
  • “Welcomed the Secretary General’s decision to appoint a NATO Senior Representative in Ukraine.”²
• “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.  Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance. We welcome the concrete progress Ukraine has made since the Vilnius Summit on its required democratic, economic, and security reforms.  ... we will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.  We reaffirm that we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met..,.. The Summit decisions by NATO and the NATO-Ukraine Council, combined with Allies’ ongoing work, constitute a bridge to Ukraine’s membership in NATO.”
• “NATO’s July 10 Washington Summit Declaration said: “Russia seeks to fundamentally reconfigure the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.  The all-domain threat Russia poses to NATO will persist into the long term.  Russia is rebuilding and expanding its military capabilities, and continues its airspace violations and provocative activities.  We stand in solidarity with all Allies affected by these actions. NATO does not seek confrontation, and poses no threat to Russia.  We remain willing to maintain channels of communication with Moscow to mitigate risk and prevent escalation”
• “NATO’s July 10 Washington Summit Declaration said: “Russia has also intensified its aggressive hybrid actions against Allies, including through proxies, in a campaign across the Euro-Atlantic area.  ... Russia’s behavior will not deter Allies’ resolve and support to Ukraine.“
• “NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities.”
• “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.  NATO reaffirms its commitment to all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, arms control policy and non-proliferation and disarmament objectives as stated in the 2022 Strategic Concept and 2023 Vilnius Communiqué.”
• “We condemn Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signaling, including its announced stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus, which demonstrate a posture of strategic intimidation.  Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapon systems and continued to diversify its nuclear forces, including by developing novel nuclear systems and deploying short and intermediate range dual-capable strike capabilities, all of which poses a growing threat to the Alliance.  Russia has violated, selectively implemented, and walked away from longstanding arms control obligations and commitments.” “We oppose any placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth,” the declaration said.”
• “The PRC continues to rapidly expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems.  We urge the PRC to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.”
• “The PRC has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defense industrial base.  This increases the threat Russia poses to its neighbors and to Euro-Atlantic security. We call on the PRC ... to cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort.  This includes the transfer of dual-use materials, such as weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defense sector.  The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.”
• “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran are fueling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing direct military support to Russia, such as munitions and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), which seriously impacts Euro-Atlantic security and undermines the global non-proliferation regime.”

“Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” White House, 07.11.24.

• “We just concluded this year’s NATO Summit. And the consensus among the members was it was a great success.  … For those who thought NATO’s time had passed, they got a rude awakening when Putin invaded Ukraine.  Some of the oldest and deepest fears in Europe roared back to life because, once again, a murderous madman was on the march.”
• “I made it clear that I will not bow down to Putin.  I will not walk away from Ukraine.  I will keep NATO strong.  That’s exactly what we did and exactly what we’ll continue to do. Now the future of American policy is up to the American people.  This is much more than a political question. …  It’s a national security issue.”
• “We have allowed Zelenskyy to use American weapons in the near-term, in the near-abroad into Russia.  … [B]ut if he had the capacity to strike Moscow, strike the Kremlin, would that make sense?  It wouldn’t. The question is: What’s the best use of the weaponry he has and the weaponry we’re getting to him?  … I got him more long-range capacity as well as defensive capacity.  … And we’re making a day-to-day basis on what they should and shouldn’t g- — how far they should go in.”
• “[W]e have to make clear China has to understand that if they are supplying Russia with information and capacity, along with working with North Korea and others to help Russia in armament, that they’re not going to benefit economically as a consequence of that —… And I think you’ll see that some of our European friends are going to be curtailing their invol- — investment … in China, as long as China continues to … help to Russia … in Ukraine.”
• “Putin has got a problem. First of all, in this war that he has supposed to have won … They’ve not been very successful. They’ve called horrible damage and loss of life.  But they’ve also lost over 350,000 troops, military — killed or wounded. They have over a million people, particularly young people with technical — technical capability, leaving Russia because they see no future there. … But what they do have control of is they are very good at controlling and running the — the public outcry that relates to how they use mechanisms to communicate with people.  …  They lie like hell about what’s going on. And — and so, the idea that we’re going to be able to fundamentally change Russia in the near term is not likely.  But one thing for certain: If we allow Russia to succeed in Ukraine, they’re not stopping at Ukraine.”

“You Can Count on a Strong NATO,” Jake Sullivan, NYT, 07.10.24. 

• “The strength of the allied response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated why NATO, a 75-year-old alliance, is still critical today. When the United States became aware of Vladimir Putin’s plan to invade, President Biden consulted with our allies and built a coalition to support Ukraine. Some were skeptical that Russia would follow through, but when it did, they stood with the Ukrainian people. America’s ironclad support for NATO reassured our allies that we would have their back if Russia attacked them. This allowed them to give Ukraine crucial air defenses and munitions that they may have withheld for their own defense had they believed that the alliance was hollow and it was every nation for itself.”
• “This is the first time since World War II that our European partners have carried more of the burden than the United States in a major conflict. America has contributed many billions of dollars in military and economic assistance to help Ukraine defend itself; Europe has spent more. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which tracks overall international support to Ukraine, the United States gave Ukraine $80 billion (74 billion euros) between January 2022 and the end of April 2024. Europe gave $110 billion (102 billion euros), including long-range missiles, the high mobility artillery rocket system, armored fighting vehicles, air defense systems and munitions.”
• “More remains to be done. Our allies need to spend more. We must continue our urgent work of strengthening our defense industry and investing in innovation. We must continue to deepen our alliances and strengthen deterrence. We must keep working to integrate Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community to help support a long-term foundation for peace and stability in Europe.”

“Europe Looks at How to Build a Military That Doesn't Lean on the U.S.,” Steven Erlanger, NYT, 07.12.24. 

• “There is a lot more that the Europeans should do to become less dependent on the United States, NATO officials and analysts said this week during the alliance summit in Washington. That includes committing more money to defense, building up arms manufacturing and coordinating the purchase of weapons systems that could replace those now provided solely by the Americans.”
• “Here are four of the key gaps that the Europeans should fill if they are serious about reducing their dependency on the United States for their own defense.”
  • “Money: Ten years after NATO members pledged to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on the military, two-thirds will do so by year’s end. But a third will not.”
  • “Troop Numbers: The problem is not just the numbers in uniform, but also the imbalance between combat troops and the “back offices” of European militaries, leading to a shortage of soldiers skilled in high-tech warfare.”
  • “The Strategic Enablers, including integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision artillery and missiles, air-to-air refueling tankers, transport aircraft both for troops and for heavy equipment like tanks, airborne surveillance aircraft, sophisticated drones and intelligence satellites.”
  • “The Nuclear Umbrella: President Emmanuel Macron of France has said that his country’s interests have “a European dimension.” But French nuclear doctrine is strictly national, and France currently plays no part in NATO’s nuclear plans. Would France be willing to put nuclear assets outside France? Similarly with Britain, which possesses only a submarine-based nuclear deterrent and is having trouble financing its modernization.”

“NATO’s revival of collective defense and the challenge of national commitments,” Nicholas Williams and Simon Lunn, ELN, July 2024. 

• “The approval of NATO’s regional plans at the Vilnius summit in 2023 marked the most important step by NATO towards a fully-fledged collective defense for the first time in over 30 years. It was a sign of how seriously NATO leaders took the Russian threat. The regional plans are demanding and complex. They will almost certainly cost NATO members more than the current commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense, let alone 2.5% of GDP, which many now believe is necessary. They have received remarkably little public or parliamentary scrutiny. They raise several questions in terms of affordability, oversight of the military and even their compatibility with the oft-debated question of a European defense capability. It is doubtful whether the full resource and policy consequences of these plans have been fully examined or absorbed.”
• “NATO’s regional plans should be the subject of detailed parliamentary scrutiny by the various individual national parliaments, whose role should focus on ensuring that national commitments to NATO are consistent with the resources and political aims of their respective countries. In particular:”

1. “The true costs of implementing NATO’s regional defense plans, both nationally and collectively, should be identified.”
2. “In light of a potential Trump presidency, the idea of a separable European military pillar within NATO should also be examined as a matter of urgency; NATO’s military authorities should also explore this idea. At the very least, given the all-embracing and intensive nature of NATO’s regional defense plans, the practical compatibility of a potential autonomous European defense with an actual NATO defense needs to be examined in further detail.”
3. “The system for securing national military commitments for NATO military purposes seems to give too much power to the NATO military authorities, particularly the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This process, again, should be the subject of detailed public and parliamentary scrutiny.”

“NATO and Countering Hybrid Warfare,” Daniel Byman, CSIS, 07.12.24. 

• “NATO’s response to Russian hybrid warfare should involve several measures.”
  • “First, it needs to integrate domestic intelligence services better into the alliance to ensure that their information is widely shared and that the services of member states are cooperating to protect NATO equities.”
  • “NATO must also prepare for military operations and countering sabotage and terrorism in an environment rife with disinformation.”
  • “Improving resilience across NATO is also vital.”
  • “Finally, NATO must improve its options for coercive diplomacy.”

“How Europe Should React to Shifts in US Ukraine Policy,” Dominik Tolksdorf, International Politik Quarterly, 07.12.24. 

• “In the face of a second Trump administration, European governments should adjust to Trump's transactional understanding of international affairs, but take a clear position on potential peace negotiations. They should make it clear to a second Trump administration that they are prepared to shoulder the majority of financial and military support for Ukraine in the medium term. Also, they could point out that they will continue to buy a significant proportion of defense acquisitions for both their national defenses as well as for Ukraine from US defense companies, which is already the case and will continue to be necessary for the time being due to the lack of European capacity.”
• “Trump may be prepared to hold back on changing Ukraine policy for the time being. But it may also be important who will speak on behalf of Europe. Poland, with its defense spending nearing 4 percent of GDP (far above NATO’s 2-percent-goal) and which will take over the EU presidency in early 2025, would be ideally suited.  At the same time, the Europeans should make it clear to Trump that while they are not opposed to ceasefire negotiations, they would not accept any talks over the heads of the Ukrainians or any negotiation outcomes that go against Ukraine’s interests, its independence and territorial integrity. However, this stance is only credible if the Europeans are in fact able to provide Ukraine with comprehensive military support.”

“What Do France’s Surprise Election Results Mean for the Far Right?” Matthias Matthijs, CFR, 07.10.24. 

• “While National Rally managed to further increase its vote share to 37 percent of the vote in the second round, it ended up with just below 25 percent of all the seats in the 577-seat Assembly (143), while the New Popular Front emerged as the largest group getting 31 percent of seats with just 26 percent of the vote (180) and Ensemble received 28 percent with just 25 percent of the vote (159).”
• “Will there be a governing stalemate? It definitely looks that way right now.”
• “This is clearly bad news for Macron, as it makes him a less effective president.”
• “Starting this summer, Macron will have to take into account the views of various other parties in the Assembly and make compromises. Though presidents in France hold wide sway over foreign policy including command of armed forces and national security bodies, Macron will no longer be able to dictate the agenda of his government on domestic issues. On backing Kyiv, there will be broad continuity, but it could be tougher to free up a lot more money to support Ukraine in its war against Russia. On any new EU initiatives, including on defense or energy policy, Macron could find himself hamstrung by a new government that is even less stable than the one he had before.”

“Would Putin Attack a NATO Member?” Steven Pifer, Stanford University, 07.09.24. 

• “Many Western analysts .... dismiss the possibility of Russia attacking a NATO member. They may be right. But those same analysts in 2018 or 2019 would likely have ruled out the kind of war that Russia unleashed on Ukraine two years ago.”
• “The point is: Putin overreaches, and he miscalculates. His blundering decision to launch the 2022 invasion will go down as an epic in the annals of miscalculation. He expected to win in a matter of weeks, with Russian troops greeted as liberators. Twenty-eight months and some 500,000 dead and wounded Russian soldiers later, Russia is bogged down in a war with no end in sight.”
• “Why would we not think it possible, were Russia to defeat Ukraine and rebuild its military, that Putin might not miscalculate again, particularly if Ukraine fell due to lack of Western assistance? If the United States did not stick with Ukraine, which has cost the lives of no U.S. soldiers, would Putin believe that it would send its military to fight to defend eastern Estonia? Nothing would break NATO more surely than a U.S. refusal to defend one of the allies. That could look awfully tempting to Putin.”
• “In the end, the probability that Putin would go so far as to challenge a NATO member militarily may not be that high. But that is far from a zero probability. Putin has done the unexpected and miscalculated before. Underestimating Putin’s ambitions would seem a risky proposition.”

"NATO Summit News: Allied Supreme Commander Says NATO Ready to Fight Russia," Sean Carberry, National Defense, 07.10.24.

• “NATO — no longer enmeshed in conflicts like Afghanistan — has reoriented its plans and force generation to deterring Russia, and if deterrence fails, the alliance has the plans and forces in place for high-intensity conflict with Russia, the commander of the organization said. “We have been building out a strategic concept and then the enablement of that strategic concept for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area,” Supreme Allied Commander Europe U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli said July 10 during the NATO Public Forum.”
• “What we've done is turn those into concrete plans — traditional, classical operational plans — that describe how we're going to defend specific areas of the alliance and what we're going to use to do it and what the sequence of events is. This is a big, big shift,” he said.”
• “We have the right number of troops forward right now, we've been practicing at large scale our ability to reinforce — as you know, those battle groups need to be reinforced when the time is needed, up to the brigade level — we've been rehearsing that. We've done extensive readiness checks to make sure they have the right amount of ammunition and so forth.”
• “Instead of just looking at the sharp side of the sword, we're looking at the whole sword now, and we've developed teams that will become active very soon that will go out and check readiness based on my authorities to inspect the readiness of the forces under my command or that are to be under my command in a time of crisis,” he said.”

“Modi-Putin Embrace Highlights Failure to Isolate Russia,” Dan Strumpf, Bloomberg, 07.09.24. 

• “For Washington, isolating Vladimir Putin just keeps getting harder.  As leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization gather in the US capital in the hope of projecting a united front against Russia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Moscow hugging Putin.”
• “Modi’s trip follows Russia’s hosting of foreign ministers from the expanding BRICS grouping, and comes barely a week after Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Kazakhstan, hailing their countries’ relationship as in the “best period in history.”
• “Russia’s embrace of China makes strategic sense given that both have emerged as Washington’s top two rivals, with trade booming since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. India’s relationship with Russia is arguably a more bitter pill for Washington to swallow. US diplomats have expended great effort in cultivating India as a bulwark against China. They have steered investment flows, encouraged technology sharing and boosted defense cooperation with New Delhi.”
• “Part of the reason for Washington’s inability to peel India away is historical — New Delhi’s close ties with Russia stretch back to the Cold War and India’s membership of the non-aligned movement. But it also has much to gain in the here and now: India is a major buyer of Russian oil and weapons, and sources say it’s seeking a long-term supply of uranium for a nuclear power plant.”
• “The US has made clear its concerns. State Department Spokesman Matthew Miller yesterday urged India to raise Ukraine’s territorial integrity with Russia. It’s unclear if Modi has done so. Even if he did, Washington seems powerless to prize what Miller called a “strategic partner” away from the Kremlin.”

“The Right Way for America to Counter Russia in Africa,” Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, FA, 07.09.24. 

“Putin Is Crushing the Arctic Ice While the US Is Barely Afloat,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 07.13.24. 

• “The Russians will soon have a combat ship capable of crushing through the icepack in almost any winter conditions. The only vessels comparable in icebreaking performance are Norway’s Svalbard class, but they lack offensive combat capability.”
• “The US Navy has no icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s antique Polar Star, commissioned in 1976, is on life support in a shipyard. The Coast Guard’s next-generation Polar Security Cutter program has been repeatedly delayed and gone hugely over budget, and isn’t expected to yield an operating craft until the end of the decade.”
• “China, despite having no Arctic footprint, is nonetheless building icebreakers. Beijing has three midsize ships ...the new ships are a clear signal that Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping are stepping up cooperation in NATO’s backyard.”
• “What is NATO to do? A new Arctic strategy should rest on four pillars.”
  • “First, the alliance must take advantage of having added two new nations with significant Arctic experience.”
  • “Next comes creating the alliance’s combat icebreaking capability.”
  • “A third element is in surveillance, training and patrolling.”
  • “Finally, NATO needs to reshape its contingency plans and tabletop exercises.”
• “When I was NATO’s military commander a decade ago and raised my Arctic concerns with senior Canadians, they would tell me to relax, that it was “High North but low tension.” One joked that if the Russians attacked Canada across the Arctic, “We would end up performing search and rescue on them.” Maybe. But that was well before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and his push on combat icebreakers. Russia’s Arctic capabilities are no longer a punch line.”

“The Path of the Tyrannosaurus,” Andrey Kortunov, Izvestiya, 07.11.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “NATO, celebrating its 75th anniversary, is somewhat reminiscent of this prehistoric giant [the T-rex]. ... It's no surprise that NATO claims the highest position in the modern geopolitical food chain. These ambitions were once again confirmed at the bloc's summit in Washington.”
• “The North Atlantic Alliance is also an extremely complex and, in its own way, perfect mechanism. At the last summit, a lot was said about breakthrough areas of military-technical R&D, about the unique production potential of defense corporations of the bloc’s member countries, about the success of training programs at various levels, about the developments of the alliance’s numerous expert and analytical centers and about many other achievements of recent years.”
• “But the T-rex also had its weaknesses. ... Many paleontologists generally believe that such a formidable-looking tyrannosaurus was not at all capable of coping with serious opponents, and therefore fed mainly on carrion.”
• “This also suggests involuntary analogies with NATO. Although summit participants in Washington once again praised “the most successful defense alliance in the history of mankind,” the results of the alliance’s latest military operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya and other conflict areas of the world were far from expected. As for the often mentioned fifth article of the NATO Charter on collective defense, it was used only once in the entire history of the alliance—after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The bloc's subsequent military operation in Afghanistan lasted for two decades and ended in complete fiasco. The situation is no better with NATO's attempts to address new threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, illegal cross-border migration or climate change.”
• “The NATO bloc ... has its own systemic shortcomings, determined by the very logic of the alliance’s creation at the height of the Cold War and its development in subsequent decades.”
  • “First, NATO is an asymmetrical alliance, where formal multilateralism only camouflages the hegemony of the United States.”
  • “Second, unbridled geographical expansion inevitably generates increasingly obvious divergences in the interests of member countries.”
• “The military-political alliance created in the mid-twentieth century is ill-suited to the rapidly changing political climate of our time. ... [R]adical changes are coming to the global political flora and fauna.”

"A Subsea Cable Went Missing. Was Russia To Blame?", Jordan Robertson and Drake Bennett, Bloomberg, 07.11.24.

• “In April 2021, [Guosong] Zhang was just back from Easter break when he noticed the LoVe observatory [a 31-mile cable on the floor of the Norwegian Sea called the Lofoten-Vesterålen Ocean Observatory used largely as a scientific tool but also by Norway’s military to gather data] had gone quiet. … [O]ne ship, a 197-foot-long, Russian-flagged trawler called the Saami … had passed back and forth over the LoVe cable at least four times [when it went dark on April 3, 2021]. … At the precise moment the cable went dead, the ship was right above it. … If the cable had been torn apart or cut by a trawl door, the break would have been jagged and uneven. But instead it had been sliced through cleanly, with some kind of power saw.”
• “Around 5 a.m. on Friday, Jan. 7, 2022, a 900-mile communications cable running from the Norwegian mainland to the far northern island of Svalbard stopped working. It was one of two cables servicing the Svalbard Satellite Station, the world’s largest ground station for collecting data from polar-orbiting satellites … that has dual civilian and intelligence uses for American and European government agencies … Journalists with the Norwegian Broadcasting Corp. later determined that a Russian-flagged fishing trawler, the Melkart-5, had crossed the cable’s path 130 times around the time it was damaged. One expert … described the ship’s pattern of movement as “completely illogical.”
• “According to Nils Andreas Stensønes, a vice admiral who heads the Norwegian Intelligence Service and formerly was chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy, Russia has long prioritized underwater operations. … One of the main vehicles for this work, Stensønes says, is a secretive agency called the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, known by its Russian acronym, GUGI.”
• “To [Katarzyna] Zysk, the researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, the slicing of the marine institute’s cable and the damage to the Svalbard cable bear the hallmarks of Russian intelligence operations. She hypothesizes they could have been relatively simple—and deniable—ways to try and weaken parts of Norway and NATO’s intelligence-gathering infrastructure, while also potentially serving as training exercises for Russian operatives specializing in sabotage of subsea infrastructure. Or they could simply have been a way for Moscow to demonstrate to officials in Oslo that their underwater infrastructure—from data cables and power lines to petroleum drilling platforms and pipelines—is vulnerable. … Both incidents involved cables with specific significance to the Norwegian military, rather than transcontinental ones that might provoke a more forceful NATO response. In Zysk’s description, that’s a sign of calibrated provocation.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan at the NATO Public Forum,” White House, 07.11.24.
• “When will Ukraine join NATO?”, The Economist, 07.11.24.
• "Can Norway Persuade Trump on NATO?", Alexander Burns, Politico, 07.09.24.
• "Wanted: New European ‘Trump Whisperer’ to Save Transatlantic Alliance," Matthew Kaminski, Politico, 07.09.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Why Are Putin and Xi ‘Best Friends’?” Anthony Halpin, Bloomberg, 07.12.24. 

• “Rivals for centuries, China and Russia now have a de facto alliance, even if it’s failed to reach the high “no limits” bar that Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin set just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The economic, military and political ties nurtured over the past decade between the world’s two most powerful authoritarian states — both of which aim to upend at least parts of the U.S.-dominated post-Cold War order — have grown as a result of the war, despite Chinese discomfort with the failures and excesses of Russia’s invasion.”
• “The growing cooperation between China and Russia has led some policymakers in the U.S. to fear that the country could be forced to fight wars on two fronts. One concern is that China might launch an attack on Taiwan, taking advantage of the U.S. focus on arming Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s invasion.”
• “There’s a wider concern that the combination of economic, military and political muscle the two can muster is emboldening other world leaders with autocratic tendencies, undermining confidence in democracy as a political system, and threatening the rules-based international order promoted by the U.S. and its allies since the end of the Cold War. Xi and Putin argue those rules benefit only the U.S. and its allies, which break them at will, a view that has gained support in the so-called Global South. Populist leaders in the West itself — including former U.S. President Donald Trump, who is running for the position again — also have undermined faith in democratic institutions.”

“Is China Stealing Russia’s Thunder in Eastern Europe?”, Dimitar Bechev, CEIP, 05.15.24.

• “In both Belgrade and Budapest, the Chinese leader received a hero’s welcome: crowds cheering his arrival at Palata Srbije and at the Buda Castle, his op-eds gracing the pages of Belgrade’s daily Politika and the Magyar Nemzet, and talk of a “shared future.” The visits to two of China’s closest friends in Europe yielded substance too, with Serbia signing a host of cooperation agreements, while Hungary continued discussions on a major greenfield project by carmaker Great Wall.”
• “They [Hungary and Serbia] have invested in relations with Russia in order to improve their bargaining positions with the EU and the West in general. That worked for the Hungarians last March when Orban succeeded in trading his veto on EU financial aid to Ukraine for unfreezing 10 billion euros in cohesion funds.”
• “Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto, one of the rare EU member state officials who still visits Moscow, was heard saying at a recent Chatham House event that Hungary would veto Ukraine’s EU membership if Kyiv did not fulfill certain demands posed by Budapest.”
• “Vucic has also been pursuing an intricate balancing act between Moscow and the West, reportedly sending arms to Ukraine through third countries but keeping Serbia very much open for business for the Russians. These days, Russian can be heard on every corner in downtown Belgrade.”
• “The full-scale invasion of Ukraine is accelerating the process of China edging out Russia from Central and Eastern Europe. Putin has become toxic in a way that the Chinese leadership is not. Vucic and Orban would rather be seen in the company of Xi.”
• “Xi’s tour is a timely reminder that there is a third pole in this relationship: China. The last decade has brought home to Eastern Europe’s neo-Titoists that Russia is often all about brotherly love rather than hard cash.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“Russia can afford both guns and butter,” Sergei Karaganov’s interview to Russian state-funded RIA Novosti agency, 07.12.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• “From my point of view, our goal should be to build a society of social capitalism, but controlled by the state. The government should be authoritarian, but with elements of democracy, especially at the grassroots level.”
• “Russia not only stopped its [West’s] expansion, which was inevitably leading to the Third World War, but also accelerated its own moral, spiritual, political and economic revival. Our economy is finally working.”
• “I will say right away that, yes, the danger of World War III is growing today. Where will it emerge? Of course, in Europe, because the main reason for this is the West’s desperate attempt to undermine Russia. That is why I am so insistent today on reviving the role of the nuclear factor, nuclear weapons. … The “balance of fear” that has existed between Moscow and Washington all this time must be revived today. We need to focus on nuclear weapons not only to protect our own Russian national interests, but also to maintain international peace.”
• “Only if the [West] knows the power of our nuclear potential no one in the West will risk using their nuclear weapons against us, realizing that, in this case, they will simply be wiped off the face of the earth.”
• “The main thing is that we should not drag out the conflict with the West in Ukraine for too long. It needs to be resolved within the next two years... a significant part of Ukrainian territories (in the south and east of the country) will become part of Russia. We don't need all of Ukraine. This is too expensive, both morally and economically.”
• “The main thing now is to win [the Ukraine war] quickly enough, within a year and a half, and prevent the world from sliding into a general nuclear Armageddon.”

Counterterrorism:

“A Globally Integrated Islamic State,” Aaron Y. Zelin, WoR, 07.15.24. 

• “It is... important to remember that the Islamic State did not claim any of the attacks in Iran, Turkey, or Russia as being conducted by Wilayat Khurasan. Rather, the Iran and Russia attacks were claimed by the Islamic State’s central media under “Iran” and “Russia,” not a province, while the one in Turkey was actually claimed through the Islamic State’s Wilayat Turkiya. This distinction is important because the Islamic State has always been meticulous in the way it releases information on its attacks and ideology in general. There is nothing random about it. This suggests that something else is at play, especially since, in the past, for example, a previous Islamic State attack in Iran in September 2018 was actually claimed by the Islamic State Khurasan Province. This signals that the way the Islamic State claims attacks has meaning from an organizational perspective.”
• “On top of this, the Wilayat Turkiya claim gave up the fact that this wasn’t just the Islamic State Khurasan Province’s doing, even if the governments in Iran, Turkey, and Russia have pointed directly at it. There is no doubt that it had some role, mainly with the recruitment of individuals online via Central Asian residual foreign fighter networks from the Syrian mobilization remaining in Turkey. It has also taken advantage of disillusioned individuals within Central Asian migrant communities abroad in places like Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Germany. The March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow and a June 2024 plot broken up by Germany in Cologne that was seeking to target the current European soccer championship are noteworthy examples of these intertwined global networks. Both cases had the individual(s) involved traveling to Turkey ahead of actualizing the attack in Russia and the plot being broken up in Germany.”
• “The Islamic State of today is different from the Islamic State of the past, and it has been able to adapt thus far to the pressure that has been put on it with its control of territory in four African countries alongside a renewed external operations capacity, and greater, albeit still small, interest in new foreign fighter mobilizations. This highlights that using the same playbook against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria might not work elsewhere, especially since the U.S. has other policy priorities and does not necessarily have the same ability to act in certain parts of the world, due to adversarial challenges to particular spaces like Russia’s control of the counter-terrorism theater in the Sahel region. Ignoring this new reality will only lead to the Islamic State potentially once again being thrust higher up on the policy agenda. It would then siphon time and resources away from other policy issues that, from a long-term perspective, are probably more consequential to U.S. security. Therefore, getting the reality of the Islamic State today right is more important than ever, and it is better to put more resources toward this now than an even greater amount later when there might be a future crisis.”

Conflict in Syria:

“What Russia Wants in the Middle East,” Hanna Notte, FA, 07.15.24. 

Cyber security/AI: 

“How China and Russia could hobble the internet. The undersea cables that connect the world are becoming military targets,” The Economist, 07.11.24.

• “Western governments have been quietly concerned about the security of undersea cables, which carry most of the world’s internet traffic, for many years. But only recently has the issue come into sharp focus, owing to a series of murky incidents from the Baltic Sea to the Red Sea and a wider realization that infrastructure of all sorts is a target for subversion and sabotage.”
• “Across Europe, Russian spies and their proxies have attacked Ukraine-linked targets, hacking into water utilities, setting fire to warehouses and plotting to strike American military bases in Germany. The fear is that underwater communications could be crippled in a crisis or in wartime, or tapped for secrets in peacetime. And as America and China joust for influence throughout Asia, undersea cables have become a crucial part of their competition.”
• “Cable-cutting may serve broader war aims. “The best way to bring down the US drone fleet, or indeed to undermine the Five Eyes intelligence system, which is hugely dependent on internet surveillance,” write Richard Aldrich and Athina Karatzogianni, a pair of intelligence historians, “would be to attack submarine cables.” War games run by CNAS in 2021 found that Chinese cable attacks “often resulted in the loss of terrestrial internet connectivity on Taiwan, Japan, Guam and Hawaii and forced these islands to rely on lower bandwidth and more vulnerable satellite communications.”
• “The concern is not just sabotage, however, but also snooping. America and its allies know the threat better than anyone, because for decades they have embodied it.”
• “Even with better undersea surveillance and more redundancy in routes, the threat is unlikely to abate. Deep-sea cable cutting once required large naval investments. Increasingly capable naval drones are changing that. “The ability to operate at extreme depths may not be the sole preserve of major powers anymore,” says Sidharth Kaushal of RUSI, another think-tank. The challenge for smaller powers, he says, will often be identifying the precise route of cables. That can take years of peacetime surveillance. It is no wonder, then, that many Western governments would rather keep such details tightly under wraps.”

“NATO and Cyber: Outrunning the Bear,” Suzanne Spaulding and Mark Montgomery, CSIS, 07.08.24. 

• “At its first annual Cyber Defense Conference in Berlin last November, NATO agreed to establish a NATO cyber center. Nailing down the details of such a center, whose working title is the NATO Integrated Cyber Centre (NICC), has proven challenging, and NATO is scrambling to finalize an agreement that can be announced at the summit. All indications are that it will be relatively narrow in scope, with a focus on shared situational awareness, particularly for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).”
• “NATO ultimately needs a mechanism for planning and implementing cyber operational collaboration among the alliance members and with the private sector. Supporting the transition to this operational collaboration should be the priority for the NICC, and the center should immediately begin planning for this next phase, leveraging lessons learned in member countries.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Pro-Kremlin Pundits See Hand of God, Victory for Trump in Wake of Failed Assassination,” RM Staff, RM, 07.15.24.

• “The near assassination of Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania has elicited a roar of comments by Russian politicians, experts and journalists, both pro-Putin and anti-Putin. A number of commentators from both camps agreed that the incident boosts Trump’s electoral chances. As Russian self-exiled liberal expert Boris Pastukhov put it: “It was Trump that was being shot at, but it was Biden who got hit.” Experts on both sides of Russia’s political divide noted that the attempt will contribute to the polarization of America, with one liberal Russian expert noting that the Kremlin will benefit from this trend. Commenting on Trump’s survival, some pro-Kremlin writers wondered if the heavens intervened to save him. Meanwhile, at least two of Russia’s major online retailers tried to profit from the incident.”
• “Below are the expanded versions of some of these and other comments made by Russian officials and experts following the incident. Items are in alphabetical order by last name. This post is also part of Russia Matters’ “Clues from Russian Views” series, in which we share what newsmakers in/from Russia are saying on Russia-related issues that impact key U.S. national interests so that RM readers can glean clues about their thinking.”
  • “Konstantin Blokhin, a leading researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences Center for Security Studies, said: “The assassination attempt makes Trump’s election victory almost inevitable.” “Of course, historical parallels with Kennedy and Reagan beg to be made. But the socio-political background of these attempts is completely different. Under Kennedy, there was no such polarization of American society. Therefore, if the assassination attempt on Trump had been successful, most likely it would have forced his entire electorate to take to the streets, not with banners, but with weapons,” Blokhin said.” (Vzglyad, 07.14.24)
  • “Dmitry Drize of the Kommersant publishing house, which is owned by a pro-Putin billionaire, wrote: “In general, the situation is truly alarming; many, again, outside observers draw parallels with the events of a hundred years ago, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was killed. What happened next is well known, I don’t want something like that to happen again. But, on the other hand, it is very likely that this very thing has already happened, that is, we are living in conditions of a big war.” “If we discard the staging version, the ex-president was a few millimeters from imminent death. Could it be that higher powers intervened?” Drize asked.” (Kommersant Radio, 07.15.24)
  • “Malek Dudakov, a Russian scholar of the U.S., said: “The assassination attempt should motivate Trump to choose a replacement in case something happens to him. I assume that it will be James David Vance, senator from Ohio, because of the entire shortlist of candidates he is the closest to Trump in views. If he becomes vice president, then an attempt on Trump’s life will no longer make sense, given that his place will be taken by an even bigger ‘Trumpist’ than Trump himself.” (Vzglyad, 07.14.24)
  • “Alexandra Filippenko, a Russian scholar of the U.S., warned: “If polarization worsens, it will lead to a dangerous turn in American domestic politics. First of all, this benefits the Kremlin.” (Republic.ru, 07.15.24)
  • “Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s deputy in the Russian Security Council, wrote of Trump: “Now he has already won. If they don't kill him.” (RBC.ru, 07.15.24)
  • “Boris Mezhuev, associate professor of the Faculty of Philosophy at Moscow State University, said: “I don’t think that any special services are behind this. It’s unlikely that we are talking about some kind of planned conspiracy.” “It seems to me that the main reason is the theme of ‘noble violence’, the atmosphere of hatred and the cult of liberal loners capable of killing a potential ‘Hitler,’” Mezhuev said.”  (Vzglyad, 07.14.24)
  • “Boris Pastukhov, a Russian self-exiled liberal political scientist, wrote: “It was Trump that was being shot at, but it was Biden who got hit. A couple of centimeters to one side of Trump's ear separated Biden from victory. These same couple of centimeters in the other direction now brought him closer to almost inevitable defeat. Carried away from the stage by Secret Service agents, Trump, in whom the political animal never sleeps, managed to wriggle out and create a picture that Biden could not defeat.” (Pastukhov’s Telegram channel/Republic.ru, 07.15.24)
  • “Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman, said the U.S. administration "prefers to resolve all issues from a position of strength," including the "use of force" in international affairs, and "now this violence has spilled inside the country." The Kremlin condemned the attack and wished speedy recoveries to the injured. Peskov said Putin has no plans to call Trump after the shooting.” (WP, 07.14.24)
  • "For obvious reasons, [Putin’s] security has already been boosted regardless of aforementioned events," Peskov said, replying to a question on the necessity to increase measures on Putin’s protection following attempts on the lives of ex-U.S. President Donald Trump and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. "The protection of the head of state is ensured at an appropriate level, everything necessary is being done, considering, of course, the international escalation of tensions in general," the Kremlin official stressed.” (TASS, 07.15.24)
  • “Gennady Petrov of Russia’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily, which is generally pro-Kremlin, wrote: “Thanks to the assassination attempt, the ex-head of state becomes the favorite in the presidential race. ... Trump has previously outperformed Joseph Biden in the ratings, and now he may become completely unattainable for him.” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 07.14.24)
  • “Vladimir Vasiliev, senior researcher at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said: “America saw a real president who behaves with dignity under bullets. ... [M]any Republicans believe that the outcome of the November presidential election is already a foregone conclusion. But I think that the assassination factor will be guaranteed to have impact, increasing its popularity, until the end of summer rather than until November.” The assassination attempt on Trump will increase mutual hostility between Trumpists and their ideological opponents, contributing to the splitting of American society, according to Vasilyev.” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 07.14.24)
  • “Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin wrote in a Telegram post entitled “Who and what is behind the assassination attempt on Trump”: “Through many years of politics, the United States has achieved a state literally on the brink of civil war. ... Political opponents in the United States of America and Europe are using an agitated and divided society for their own … selfish interests. This is unacceptable. Fundamental changes are needed in the domestic and foreign policies of Washington and Brussels. Otherwise, the West will face big problems.” (Volodin’s Telegram channel, 07.14.24)
  • “Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, said: “This is not only a manifestation of the internal political life of the United States, but it is also a tradition ... There are dozens of such crimes against American presidents and presidential candidates.” (Republic.ru, 07.15.24)
  • “Russian online retailers Ozon and Wildberries began to sell T-shirts featuring the image of Trump stained with blood after the assassination attempt. "An oversize t-shirt with the ‘attempt on Donald Trump’s life’ print," reads the description on Wildberries. All sizes are available for a 2,000-rubles ($22.8) t-shirt made of cotton and polyester.”  (TASS, 07.15.24)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s acute labor shortage,” Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 07.12.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “After two-and-a-half years of fighting in Ukraine, Russia’s labor shortage has emerged as the root of most of the country’s economic problems. Putin might boast that Russia has “almost no unemployment,” as he did during a visit to China in May. But for many officials, it’s a cause for concern, not pride. Russia’s economy, which has been overheated by military spending, is desperate for more workers. The result is rampant inflation and, ultimately, weaker economic growth and lower standards of living.”
  • “The defense sector is short of about 160,000 specialists, Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said last month – and this is despite 500,000 workers switching from the civilian sector to defense-related firms over the last 18 months.”
• “In a bid to attract workers, defense sector companies have hiked salaries, which fuels consumer demand across the whole economy. Salaries are increasing fastest in Russia’s industrial regions on the Volga, and in the Ural Mountains, where there is a large concentration of arms manufacturers. But the labor shortage affects all Russian regions, and almost every industry. There is “a significant shortage of highly-qualified specialists and low-skilled workers alike” all across Russia, the Central Bank stated in a May report.”
• “The shortfall is not only due to increased demand, but also dwindling supply. Prior to the war, Russia already had a declining number of workers. In June, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko said a decrease in the number of high school and university graduates suggested that Russia was falling into a demographic hole. The Labor Ministry predicts that, by 2030, Russia will be lacking 2.4 million workers. ... It’s clear the problems are not down to demography alone. But what other factors are there?”
  • “Firstly, there are likely fewer labor migrants.”
  • “Secondly, the Russian army is recruiting tens of thousands of working-age men.”
  • “Thirdly, many people left Russia after the invasion of Ukraine – because they were anti-war, or because they feared being made to fight.”
• “To ensure stability, the Russian authorities seem set on using all instruments at their disposal to stimulate economic growth. This will continue to increase the demand for labor, and boost salaries. But it can’t last forever. Bringing in workers from abroad is politically sensitive. And spending cuts leading to increased unemployment and stagnant – or even falling – real incomes – is also something the Kremlin wants to avoid (at least until it can achieve something that can be sold as a military victory in Ukraine).”

“How the war in Ukraine is reviving Russia’s rustbelt,” Polina Ivanova, FT, 07.14.24.

• “As Russia braces for a long war, state orders to arm, fuel, feed and clothe the army are injecting vast sums of money into the economy. This has led to a boom where many expected Western sanctions to deal a painful blow: Russia’s economy is forecast to grow 3% this year, far above the U.S. and most European states.”
• “The effect is most pronounced in rustbelt regions such as Chuvashia in central Russia, which is home to 1.2mn people and where Soviet factories have been revived and are working around the clock to supply the war.”
  • “Some of the most underperforming regions have suddenly started to grow. Manufacturing regions, areas where there is a lot of defense and related industry,” said political scientist Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva. “The most under-developed regions and the low-income segments of the population are the ones that are winning,” Kurbangaleeva said. “That’s where the money is going.”
  • In Chuvashia, seven plants were filling orders for the armed forces before the war; by October 2022, the number had risen to 36, according to the local governor.”
• “By the end of 2023, industrial output was up in almost 60% of Russian regions. Chuvashia recorded the second-highest rate, with its factories producing 27% more than the year before, local data shows.”
• “By August last year, the unemployment rate in Chuvashia had dropped to 2.2%. “Things have become easier,” said a 23-year-old worker at a defense plant. “With the situation in the country, we’re really in demand.”
• “Businesses have pushed up wages to retain staff. The young worker’s pay had increased by “at least twice as much,” while five others said their salaries had also shot up. Anton said his pay [at a plant in Chuvashia] had increased from around Rbs40,000 ($450) a month before the war to Rbs120,000 today.”
• “Inflation, however, has eaten into salary growth. Prices across the country have grown by over 21% since the start of the war, with the cost of food rising even faster.”

“Russian Prosecutors Have Been Very Busy Lately,” Serge Schmemann, NYT, 07.12.24.

• “The charge against [WSJ reporter] Evan Gershkovich is ludicrous: He is accused of spying on Uralvagonzavod, a massive research and industrial complex that makes tanks and has been around since Stalin’s day. The real reason he was seized is as a hostage to swap for some Russian held abroad and as a warning to all Western reporters — or visitors, for that matter — that Russia is not a safe place to be in.”
• “A ban on 81 European Union media outlets, including Der Spiegel and Politico, for “systematically disseminating false information about the progress of the special military operation.” That, of course, is the only legal way to refer to the invasion that has been spreading death and devastation across Ukraine for 870 days as of Friday.”
• “An arrest warrant issued on Tuesday for Yulia Navalnaya — the widow of the Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny, who died in prison in February — on a charge of participating in an “extremist organization.” That would be his Anti-Corruption Foundation, which amassed considerable and credible evidence of corruption by and around Putin.”
• “A declaration on Wednesday by the Russian prosecutor general’s office that The Moscow Times an “undesirable organization” — the next step up after being declared a “foreign agent.” The paper is now an English-language online publication produced outside Russia, but the designation would jeopardize anyone in Russia sharing information with it.”
• “All that has been replaced by a drumbeat of trials, bans and charges that seem to feed on themselves, much as Stalin’s purges took on a terrible life of their own as people turned on one another to survive. It begins with a need to prevent any questioning or criticism of the criminal “special military operation,” and then it metastasizes until anything that might displease Putin and his ex-K.G.B. cohort becomes an enemy to be crushed.”

“Russians’ Preferred Future is a Return to the Prewar Past,” Elena Koneva, Russia.Post, 07.12.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

• “In the quantitative study,³ most respondents stated that the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine would not affect their own life or that of their families in any way. At the same time, we see a big difference in expectations about the impact on the life of Russia (all Russians) versus that on people’s personal lives.”
• “Only 34% of Russians said that life in Russia would not change if Russia lost the war, while 54% said that their own lives would not change. This can be attributed to the gap between the propaganda-driven perception of the war and the perception of one’s personal place in it – “this is not our war.” Therefore, the preferred future is not about achieving the goals of the war as declared in propaganda, but a return to the past, to February 2022, before the war started.”

"Should I Stay or Should I Go? Russian Emigration in Flux," Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva, CEIP, 07.11.24.

• “Recent studies show that 15 percent to 45 percent of Russian emigrants have returned to Russia, and the process is expected to continue, prompting speculation that Russia is gradually reversing its brain drain following the 2022 migration crisis. Yet interpreting the available data and the political significance of these trends is not as straightforward as it may seem. First, the numbers may not accurately reflect the situation, and second, the current circumstances for emigration are highly dynamic compared to previous waves and could change at any moment.”
• “Although numbers on returning Russian nationals may be useful, they are not conclusive evidence of migration flows. … For one thing, returning is often a temporary option in order to regroup and gather the resources for a new attempt at emigration. According to data from the OutRush research project, of the 16 percent of respondents who returned to Russia between March 2022 and September 2022, around 80 percent had emigrated once again by summer 2023.”
• “At least 14 percent of Russian emigrants regularly commute to Russia, and 32 percent plan to travel to Russia for work while living abroad. Around 15 percent of Russian emigrants abroad are still employed by Russian organizations.”
• “A significant portion of the post-2022 Russian exiles is highly educated, urbanized, and mobile, making them a valuable long-term human capital acquisition for host communities. … Additionally, for many of these politically active and well-connected individuals, emigration is simply an extension of their political activism back home. They are a significant political asset for countries interested in supporting the Russian opposition by creating democratic hubs for it.”
• “Emigration is not only a chance for people to find a better place abroad, but also a tool that autocracies strategically use for their own benefit. Studies show that the unrestricted emigration of political activists acts as a pressure valve, helping to reduce dissent, undermine the opposition’s capacity for domestic political mobilization, and tighten autocratic control. At the same time, politically motivated emigration presents two new problems for autocrats.”
  • “First, the political opposition does not necessarily stop its activities once abroad, and politically motivated emigration is a self-perpetuating and continuing process.”
  • “Secondly, Russia’s emigration crisis doesn’t just concern political activists, but is also leading to a critical loss of essential workforce segments, including IT professionals, managers, academics, and entrepreneurs.”
• “Although mass repressive measures against emigres are regularly discussed in the corridors of power, none of these ideas have been introduced, possibly because the Russian regime is not interested in scaring away the entire diaspora. Instead, it needs to lure certain individuals back home while continuing to pressure “troublemakers” abroad.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “What will happen when Russia runs out of Soviet-era reserves to wage war in Ukraine? Economist Igor Lipsits explains,” Republic.ru, 07.15.24. In Russian.
• “Russia’s Political Sclerosis Is Creating Regional Fiefdoms,” Andrei Pertsev, CEIP, 07.02.24.
• “Russian Prosecutors Have Been Very Busy Lately,” Serge Schmemann, NYT, 07.15.24. 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“For Putin, the EU Is a Bigger Threat Than NATO,” Nicholas Lokker, FP, 07.15.24.

• “Russia has woken up to the reality of the EU’s power to drive profound domestic political change. No country illustrates this better than Ukraine. After Ukrainians protested in late 2013 against then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to back away from an EU association agreement—ultimately leading to his ouster in February 2014—Putin attempted to reassert control over the country’s political direction by annexing Crimea.”
• “The bloc’s expansion has been a uniquely effective force for fostering prosperity, stability, and democracy on the European continent over the decades, bringing the region ever closer to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”
• “Furthermore, the success or failure of the next round of EU enlargement will have striking consequences for the future of international order. Russia, by aiming to prevent the EU’s enlargement and impose its own control over Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, is on a campaign to reassert its imperial idea in Europe. This poses an immense challenge to the credibility of the EU’s post-imperial vision to achieve collaborative regional governance through integration—ultimately the raison d’être of the bloc. Russian success would also risk legitimizing expansionism elsewhere by emboldening other countries to follow similar imperial strategies against their neighbors.”
• “To ensure the failure of Russia’s imperialist vision, the EU must follow through on its promises to integrate new members—while becoming more resilient in the process. It would be both a strategic and an ethical failure not to support other European countries wishing to develop resilient democratic political institutions, robust civil societies, and flourishing economies. Russia should not be given a veto.”

“Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit,” Indian Foreign Ministry, 07.09.24. 

• “Prime Minister of the Republic of India Shri Narendra Modi paid an official visit to the Russian Federation on July 8-9, 2024 at the invitation of Putin for the 22nd India – Russia Annual Summit. Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit said.” (MFA of India, 07.09.24)
  • “The Leaders noted the continued strengthening and deepening of the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.”
  • “The Leaders highly appreciated the special nature of this time-tested relationship which is based on trust, mutual understanding and strategic convergence.”
  • “The Sides underlined that India-Russia ties have remained resilient in the backdrop of the prevailing complex, challenging and uncertain geopolitical situation.”
  • “The Leaders agreed to set the bilateral trade target of USD 100 billion by 2030.”
  • “The Sides agreed to continue working together to promote a bilateral settlement system using national currencies.”
  • “The Sides support cooperation in developing shipping between Russia and India via the Northern Sea Route... The Sides their readiness to intensify trade and investment cooperation in the Far East and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.”
  • “The Sides noted the continued special importance of bilateral trade in energy resources and agreed to explore new long-term contracts.”
  • “The Sides noted the importance of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
    • “On Tuesday, Putin led Modi on a tour of an exhibition by Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation. Rosatom officials said this week that it is in talks to build six new nuclear power reactors in India — a fast-growing economy with soaring energy needs.” (WP, 07.09.24)
  • “Russia expressed its strong support for India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.”
  • “Responding to India’s quest for self-sufficiency, the partnership is reorienting presently to joint research and development, co-development and joint production of advanced defense technology and systems.”
  • “Both Sides called for comprehensive reform of the UNSC to reflect contemporary global realities and to make it more representative.”
  • “The Sides highlighted the imperative of peaceful resolution of the conflict around Ukraine through dialogue and diplomacy including engagement between both parties. They noted with appreciation relevant proposals of mediation and good offices aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with international law and on the basis of the U.N. Charter.”

“India in SCO: A part of Russia's Greater Eurasian dream?”, Ayushi Saini, ORF, 07.11.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Undoubtedly, the SCO has benefited India. However, India shares close ties with both Russia and Central Asia, independent of the group. Russia remains India's primary arms supplier, even if India is diversifying its sources in the West and at home. India has set up institutional mechanisms such as India-Central Asia Dialogue and India-Central Asia Summit to engage with Central Asian countries.”
• “However, SCO has given a good platform to India-Central Asia enhanced economic engagement. India has not received any security benefits from the grouping except for securing its energy needs. Considering the level of engagement with the group, India's future does not look bright at SCO as it seems to have lost its relevance in India's regional geopolitical situation. This inconsistency might be a blow to Russia's “Greater Eurasian” vision.”
• “India has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukrainian issue while criticising the war and not supporting Russia's action in general. To balance its global relations, India tries to be closer to China's geopolitical rival—the US and its strongest ally—Russia. However, it will be critical to see how far India can carry forward its “balancing act” between Russia and the U.S. PM Modi’s recent visit to Moscow this month can be viewed as India's attempt to maintain good ties with Russia despite missing the SCO summit. While it may be too early to say if India's membership is threatened, India is undoubtedly giving a cold shoulder to the grouping.”

“Holy Warheads: Russian Orthodox Christianity as Weaponized Culture,” Elaine Wilson, Canopy Forum, 07.11.24. 

• “New mythology and iconography have “replaced the Soviet iconostasis with a new old one, in which traditional Russian and newly canonized saints and warriors from Russian and Soviet history harmoniously coexist.” The endurance of religious thought and gesture from the medieval, to the Soviet, to now, is testament to the freedom of interpretation and the power of creation and coercion that constitutes Russian theologico-political rhetoric and policy. As the Russian folk saying goes: “Свято место пусто не бывает,” or “A sacred space is never empty.” The singular marriage of church, state, and energy in Russia, what Dmitry Adamsky, a scholar of international security, calls “Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy,” is a theologico-political system rooted in historically entangled energies that creates and re-creates a collection of symbols in order to fill any vacuum of power. Russia’s “sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation, … supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia’s gas, oil, and natural resource riches,” relies upon Russian Christian Orthodoxy—and concomitantly the logic of its technologico-political narrative—to ensure Putin’s neo-imperial project.” 

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Armenia Navigates a Path Away From Russia," Thomas de Waal, CEIP, 07.11.24.

• “In a process that began in 2018 and accelerated in 2022, relations between Armenia and Russia have begun to break down. Formal institutional relations remain in place and high-level contacts continue. The economic relationship has become stronger since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, this cannot conceal the fact that the Armenian public’s confidence in Russia has collapsed and that the Armenian government, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, is actively seeking to reduce its dependence on Russia.”
• “In the past two years, the Armenian government has made a series of highly symbolic yet not necessarily practical moves that reflect this shift. Armenia has frozen its participation in the Moscow-led military pact, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). … Armenia has also accepted a European Union (EU)–led civilian border monitoring force, refusing a Russian proposal for the same. It has acceded to the International Criminal Court (meaning that in theory, Putin could be arrested if he sets foot on Armenian soil). Pashinyan has met publicly with two of Russia’s bêtes noires: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and exiled Belarusian leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.”
• “Western officials have reciprocated. … On April 5, 2024, a high-level meeting in Brussels attended by Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, EU High Representative Josep Borrell, and U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a message of political support to Armenia. They also pledged extra financial assistance.”
• “How this dynamic unfolds will to a large degree hinge on external events and choices made by Armenia’s neighbors. In the first place this means Azerbaijan, which remains much more powerful militarily and politically than Armenia and has shown willingness to use force on several occasions in the last few years; only if and when an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement is signed will the threat of new conflict begin to recede. This is a weakness that Russia can continue to exploit.”
• “The course of the war in Ukraine will be another important determining factor … Developments in Georgia and Iran—which are shaped by these bigger trends too—will also be consequential for Armenia.”

“Ethnic cleansing cannot be the price for lasting Armenia-Azerbaijan peace,” Michael Rubin, Washington Examiner, 07.06.24.

• “Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-rule ended on Sept. 19, 2023, when Azerbaijani troops marched into the region, extinguishing one of the oldest Christian communities in the world. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s decision to dynamite the local parliament underscored his hostility to democracy.”
• “Even as Aliyev humiliated U.S. envoys, Secretary of State Antony Blinken kept the gravy train of aid and military equipment flowing to Baku. Freedom House reported this week that “the documented actions of Azerbaijan meet the criteria for ethnic cleansing as understood in the context of the former Yugoslavia conflict” should put that to rest.”
• “Nor is the State Department alone showing deference to Aliyev. On June 26, U.S. European Command congratulated the Azerbaijani army, again making no mention of videos circulating depicting rapes, mutilation, and summary execution of captured Armenian soldiers and civilians alike.”
• “The irony, though, is that while Biden’s aides believe they can string Aliyev along, they have no concept that he strings them along. Aliyev will stall, muddle, and wait for U.S. elections before agreeing to any lasting peace.”
• “Blinken, Power, and Sullivan’s ambition, however, has made any peace less likely as they have forfeited the moral high ground by ignoring ethnic cleansing for the sake of a meaningless and empty signing ceremony.”

Footnotes

1. In the past month, Russian forces have gained 65 square miles of Ukrainian territory, while Ukrainian forces have re-gained 13 square miles, according to the July 9, 2024, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.
2. For details of the pledge of assistance to Ukraine adopted as part of NATO’s July 10 Washington Summit Declaration, see NATO.int.
3. Based on several series of surveys between February 2022 and April 2024 and focus groups in four Russian cities, sociologist Elena Koneva writes about how Russians imagine the future of their country amid the ongoing war.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Photo by Петро Грушко shared under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.