Russia Analytical Report, July 7–14, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. While hosting NATO’s SG Mark Rutte on July 14, President Donald Trump unveiled a deal with this alliance that would send weapons to Ukraine within days while also threating Russia with stiff penalties in his renewed effort to end hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. “We’ve made a deal today where we are going to be sending them [Ukraine] weapons and they [NATO countries] [are] going to be paying for them,” Trump was quoted by Wall Street Journal as saying in Rutte’s presence. During the same event the U.S. president also threatened Russia with “secondary tariffs” unless a deal to end the hostilities in Ukraine is reached by early September. “We’re going to be doing very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in 50 days, tariffs at about 100%, you’d call them secondary tariffs,” Trump was quoted by Financial Times as saying. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick later said Trump could choose to impose either tariffs or sanctions on countries that do business with Russia, according to Wall Street Journal. Last week saw Trump repeatedly state his unhappiness with Putin’s unwillingness to agree to an unconditional end of hostilities in Ukraine, promising a “major statement” on Russia on July 14. Thus, his July 14 threats came as no surprise, but they were also met with some skepticism. “It is unclear if... Putin will take Trump’s threat seriously,” Alexander Ward and his co-authors wrote in Wall Street Journal on July 14.“For a frequent flip-flopper like him [Trump], can anyone ever tell which flip or flop is for real?” Susan Glasser wondered in the New Yorker. “The president is a late and very reluctant convert to the approach of trying to confront and isolate Mr. Putin” and the approach he is taking “seems designed to keep him at least one arm’s length away from the conflict,” David Sanger and Maggie Haberman explained in New York Times. That Trump is “coming around on Ukraine” represents a decision that “isn't isolationist or internationalist but realistic,” according to Peggy Noonan.
  2. “Russia’s factories have begun churning out vast quantities of attack drones over the past year, producing a deadly fleet that is now taking to Ukrainian skies in record numbers almost daily,” Matthew Luxmoore and Jane Lytvynenko reported in a July 10 article for Wall Street Journal. Writing for the same newspaper Jillian Kay Melchior also noted the surge in Russian drone production, as did Andrew Kramer of The New York Times. “As Russia’s defense industry continues to ramp up, military analysts expect Russia to routinely launch more than 1,000 drones per volley by autumn,” Kramer warned. These articles indicate that the mainstream U.S. media outlets are catching up with the recent changes in correlation of drone production in Ukraine and Russia in the latter’s favor. In the first and second year of Russia’s full-fledged invasion into Ukraine, such outlets as Wall Street Journal were reporting how use of drones by Ukraine helped to turn the tide in Kyiv’s favor while New York Times reported how “Ukraine has stayed ahead in the drones arm race.” In the third year of the war Forbes declared that “For the first time, Ukraine is launching more long-range drone attacks than Russia.” The coverage of the drone race began to change, however, in 2025. For instance, in January of this year, ECFR’s Ulrike Franke published an article on the web site of this think-tank that estimated that Russia was matching Ukraine’s pace of drone production. Five months later, the press was also noticing this change. For instance, The Times of London’s Anthony Loyd reported from Donbas: “Russia has taken the lead in the drone race, outproducing Kyiv in the manufacture and use of medium-range FPV drones and fiber optic variants that have changed the shape of the entire 1,200 km front line.” Loyd’s May 2025 article was echoed by Politico’s Veronika Melkozerova, who reported in June 2025, citing Zelensky himself, that “Ukraine produces about 100 long-range drones a day, while Russia has managed to scale up production to 300 a day and is aiming for 500.” Russian drone producers managed to boost long-range drone production from 15,000 in 2024 to more than 30,000 this year, as well as up to 2 million small tactical drones, according to Melkozerova.
  3. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to nominate first deputy prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko as his next PM is a victory for his powerful chief of staff Andriy Yermak for whom there appears to be little love lost in Washington. “Svyrydenko is considered a close ally” of Yermak, according to July 14 article in Financial Times. Apart from the new prime minister, changes are expected at education, health, culture, social policy and possibly finance, according to the Economist. The Economist reported on July 6 that a cabinet reshuffle is “imminent” and that is being driven by Yermak whose lecturing approach to diplomacy Americans despair at. While being allied with Yermak, Svyrydenko is also seen as having “strong ties with Donald Trump’s team after leading the minerals talks alongside U.S. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent,” according to Financial Times.

   

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Lavrov meets Kim: Russia’s urgent bid for more troops from North Korea?” Park Chan-kyong, SCMP, 07.14.25.

  • “Russia’s appeals to North Korea for military manpower have taken on new urgency with Sergey Lavrov’s weekend trip to the country. The Russian foreign minister’s visit, his first to North Korea since 2009, signaled Moscow’s growing reliance on its neighbor for troops and engineering support, analysts say—suggesting that Kim Jong-un’s regime could now send more soldiers, “in more direct combat roles,” to shore up the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine. ”Russia may also count on North Korean combat engineers in a potential Dnieper River-crossing operation to seize Kherson,” Doo Jin-ho, a senior researcher at the Korea Research Institute for National Security, told This Week in Asia.”
  • “At a press conference in the coastal city of Wonsan on Saturday, Lavrov made no secret that Moscow would welcome further North Korean military involvement in the war, saying that if Kim offered to send more troops, Russia would have “no reasons to decline this sincere act of solidarity”
  • “According to Doo, “many North Korean special forces” are now reportedly conducting joint operations with Russian troops in Kursk, while others are stationed along Ukraine’s northeastern border between Bryansk and Belgorod. “On Saturday, North Korean leader Kim pledged “unconditional” support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as “all the measures taken by the Russian leadership,” Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.”
  • The urgency of Moscow’s appeal for assistance was laid bare by the back-to-back visits of Putin’s top aides. Last month, former defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced that 1,000 North Korean sappers and 5,000 military construction workers would be deployed to Russia to clear landmines and rebuild devastated infrastructure in Kursk, Russian state news agency TASS reported. Shoigu’s trip, his second in two weeks and made on Putin’s orders, was quickly followed by Lavrov’s.”

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the reception on behalf of Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Choe Son-hui, Wonsan,” RF MFA, 07.12.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “We are sincerely grateful to our Korean partners for the warm welcome, cordiality, and excellent organization of the second round of our strategic dialogue, launched on the initiative of President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Kim Jong-un.”
  • “A defining moment in this historic partnership came in 2024, during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, when the milestone Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed.”
  • “While officially titled a strategic partnership, in essence, this treaty enshrines a genuine alliance.”
  • “The principles set forth in the treaty by President Putin and Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un are being actively and consistently implemented across all areas.”
  • “A landmark of our relations is the close joint work in the context of the special military operation conducted by the Russian Federation to resolve the Ukraine crisis, which the West fomented over many years.”
  • “This is a true brotherhood in arms. Our leaders have agreed to perpetuate the memory of the heroes of this joint struggle for justice.”
  • “Russia and the DPRK honor the allied commitments enshrined in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. This will remain unchanged.”
  • “I would like to highlight the global significance of our joint efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis.”
  • “It is essential to restore the rights of people who were subjected to oppression following the coup in Kiev in February 2014 and the rise of the neo-Nazi regime.”
  • “I believe that—hopefully in the not-too-distant future—the international community will recognize this historic contribution in defense of international law, above all the core principle of sovereign equality and the right of peoples to determine their own destiny.”
  • “Both we and our Korean friends want evil to recede and take practical steps in this direction.”
  • “Today’s talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui, held as part of the second round of the Russian-Korean strategic dialogue, as well as my long, candid, and confidential conversation with Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un, mark an important milestone in advancing our alliance and implementing the decisions made by our leaders.”
  • “I would like to propose a toast to the health and well-being of comrades Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin, to the continued success of my esteemed colleague, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, and to the realization of the cherished hopes and dreams of all those gathered here.”
  • “As Comrade Choe Son-hui said, we are living through trying times. But I am confident that history will judge fairly, and we will be found on the right side of it.”

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions following the second round of Russia-DPRK strategic dialogue at the level of foreign ministers, Wonsan,” RF MFA, 07.12.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Russia and the DPRK are long-standing neighbors and reliable partners, and with the signing of a new treaty in Pyongyang in June 2024, we became allies.”
  • “Today, during my meeting with Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, we reaffirmed that the progressive development of bilateral relations serves the interests of both our nations.”
  • “We believe it is important to take further steps to boost our bilateral trade.”
  • “We share the view that unresolved tensions in the region continue to affect Northeast Asia’s overall stability and hinder prospects for equitable, mutually beneficial cooperation among its nations.”
  • “We highlighted our concern about the counterproductive and dangerous efforts by external powers to build narrow, bloc-based alliances in the Asia-Pacific and to expand NATO’s infrastructure into the region.”
  • · “Our Korean friends reaffirmed their clear support for all the objectives of the special military operation and for the actions taken by the Russian leadership, armed forces, and citizens to achieve these goals.” “In our turn, we once again expressed sincere gratitude for the contribution of the Korean People’s Army servicemen to the success of the operation to liberate the Kursk Region.”
  • “President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the DPRK State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un maintain regular contact. They frequently exchange messages.”
  • “The DPRK leadership drew its conclusions regarding national defense long before the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran”… “We respect the DPRK’s actions and understand the reasons why they carry out their nuclear program.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Limits of a Partnership: Iran-Russia Relations After the Recent Escalation in the Middle East,” Stefan Meister and David Jalilvand, DGAP, July 2025.

  • “Despite the deepening of bilateral ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the formalization of a strategic partnership earlier this year, Russia has offered Iran only rhetorical support.”
  • “Israel’s military strikes on Iran have triggered a moment of reckoning for Tehran’s supposed alliance with Moscow.”
  • “The Iran-Russia relationship remains limited, interest-driven, and devoid of binding commitments.”
  • “Tehran and its partners converge around a shared objective: weakening U.S. global influence and positioning themselves as key actors.”
  • “Russia harbors global ambitions, aiming to position itself as one of the poles in a multipolar world.”
  • “Despite Iran’s transfer of drones and drone blueprints, which has granted Moscow a strategic edge in Ukraine, promised arms shipments […] have failed to materialize.”
  • “An allied authoritarian regime came under severe strain—just months after Bashar al-Assad, a key Russian partner, was toppled in Syria.”
  • “Russia is both unwilling and unable to offer Iran any meaningful support that could shift the balance in Tehran’s favor.”
  • “Ultimately, the Kremlin appears to be betting on its preferred outcome: a protracted phase of instability […] that keeps the region unstable but contained.”
  • “Europe must urgently develop both the mindset and the instruments necessary to reestablish itself as a relevant geopolitical and diplomatic actor.”

“How Russia Stands to Profit from the Israel-Iran War,” Calla O’Neil, National Interest, 07.14.25.

  • “Russia is not all that concerned about the humiliation of Iran despite its strategic partnership.”
  • “With Russia’s long-range drone supply chain secured, Iran’s role as a critical supplier for Moscow’s war is waning.”
  • “Russia is leveraging the crisis to reassert itself as a central diplomatic actor in the region, much as it did during the original 2015 JCPOA negotiations.”
  • “Disruptions to Iranian oil exports could drive reliant states like China to turn increasingly to Russian supplies as a safe alternative.”
  • “The biggest gain for Russia, however, lies not in diplomacy or oil but in the ongoing uncertainty of Western resolve in Ukraine.”
  • “The ongoing tensions between Israel and Iran is thus not a regional crisis for Putin, but a strategic opportunity.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Ukraine's Finances at a Critical Pass,” Lyndsay Howard, Bloomberg Economics, 07.09.25. 

  • “Europe is racing to cover the gap in reduced American military aid. What's less clear is how Kyiv will cover the $3 billion monthly budget shortfall from the loss of funding that it has received from international partners to date after year's end. Economic resilience is crucial for Ukraine's battle to endure as a sovereign state.”
  • “One of Ukraine's main funding vehicles—a $50 billion loan from the U.S. and EU, backed by the interest from $300 billion in frozen Russian assets—will run out by the end of 2025.” Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to press ahead with his war of attrition, aiming to wear down Ukraine not just militarily but economically and socially. This adds risks and costs for Ukraine's near-term economic stability and its longer-term reconstruction plans.”
  • “Ukraine's long-term economic needs will likely exceed the value of those assets and require significant private sector engagement. Postwar recovery efforts will likely constitute the largest reconstruction undertaking in Europe since the Marshall Plan and will need to be financed through an amalgam of international public and private investment funds.”
  • “Public and private sector estimates of Ukraine's reconstruction needs vary widely but range from $500–750 billion to upwards of $1 trillion.”
  • “Ukraine's reconstruction needs will be uneven, with some regions having sustained considerably less, to no, damage than others—preserving meaningful investment opportunities. Roughly 72% of Ukraine's war damage is in its eastern and southern regions surrounding the front line, namely the five regions occupied by Russia that constitute nearly 20% of Ukraine's territory.”
  • “Founding dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School, Graham Allison, touched on Ukraine’s potential when he said that the country must agree to an “ugly peace”—most likely a Korean War-style military armistice—establish its right to a path to European Union membership and then “Ukraine can hope to follow in the footsteps of West Germany, South Korea, and Finland to become a miracle of the 21st century.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“The Drone Factories Fueling Russia’s Unprecedented Assaults on Ukraine,” Matthew Luxmoore and Jane Lytvynenko, Wall Street Journal, 07.10.25. 

  • “Russia’s factories have begun churning out vast quantities of attack drones over the past year, producing a deadly fleet that is now taking to Ukrainian skies in record numbers almost daily. An assault Wednesday was the largest yet, according to Ukrainian officials. In the early morning hours, Russia launched 728 drones and decoy munitions at cities in western Ukraine. The attacks came just hours after President Trump blasted Russia for dragging its feet over peace talks to end the war, saying the U.S. gets “a lot of bulls—” from Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
  • “More than 24,000 drones have barreled toward Ukraine’s towns and cities since the start of this year, according to an analysis of Ukrainian figures by the Center for Information Resilience, a U.K.-based open-source investigations organization. Wednesday’s attack included more drones in a single night than in the entire month of July last year.” They’re constantly beating new records,” said Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman for Ukraine’s air force.”
  • “What paved the way for the unprecedented scale of Wednesday’s drone attacks was an agreement Russia signed in November 2022 with Iran, to purchase and produce Iran’s Shahed attack drones on Russian territory. Russia paid $1.75 billion for the Shahed technology, equipment, source code and 6,000 drones, according to a recent report from C4ADS, a nonprofit organization researching illicit networks worldwide.”
  • “Estimates vary widely on how much it costs Russia to produce a single Shahed drone, with defense analysts putting it anywhere from $35,000 to $60,000. The initial models were shipped directly from Iran, but Russia also paid for the technology and, over time, mastered the different elements of the production chain. In Tatarstan, east of Moscow, facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone expanded to accommodate the requirements of drone manufacture.
  • “For Russia, making the drones locally has been a way of reducing its reliance on Iran—a prescient decision in light of Israel’s bombardment of Iran last month and the depletion of Iran’s own drone stocks through retaliatory attacks on Israel.”
  • “Ukrainian officials say Russia is now producing more than 5,000 of the long-range drones and decoys each month, with some able to fly 2,500 kilometers to their target. That has allowed Moscow to saturate Ukraine’s skies with the flying machines.”

“Russia Intensifies Its Drone War,” Jillian Kay Melchior, The Wall Street Journal, 07.13.25.

  • “Russia's massive drone attacks on Ukrainian cities the past week should be a wake-up call to the West.”
  • “Last Tuesday night Russia launched a record-breaking 741 Shahed-type and decoy drones at Ukraine.”
  • “Russia launched a record-breaking 741 Shahed-type and decoy drones at Ukraine, focusing its attack on the western city of Lutsk.”
  • “Experts… estimate that Russia is producing between 100 and 170 drones daily. They're rolling off the assembly line and into the Ukrainian skies every few days, with Russia concentrating its deadly attention on one city at a time.”
  • “Russia sends huge numbers of drones ‘to exhaust the air defense,’ then follows it up with missiles… that ‘makes it very hard to do differentiated detection and interception.’”
  • “Ukrainian experts worry that by the end of the summer, Russian strike packages will include 1,000 drones or more.”
  • “Ukraine has long relied on mobile ground groups to shoot down Shahed-type drones far from their targets. This was a good solution until Russian drones recently began flying higher than the range of their machine guns.”
  • “Ukraine's struggle to respond to the changing drone threat is a failure of procurement and finances, not ingenuity. ‘The front line is like a Silicon Valley for defense innovation,’ says Daria Kaleniuk.”
    • “In the air, "of course we're overstretched," says Serhii Kuzan, head of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, a Kyiv think tank. Ukrainians have already developed drone interceptors that cost less than $10,000, compared with $50,000 or more for a Shahed-type drone. But Kyiv hasn't yet produced them on a scale that matches Moscow's. Ukraine has only about $10 billion to spend producing weapons this year, though it has the capacity to manufacture three times that or more.”
      • “‘This is a war of resources, and at this point we are losing or have lost the war of resources.’”
      • “‘This is the fastest war in history in terms of newly developed technology,’ Mr. Kuzan says. Russian drones have the range to hit NATO members. Are the allies ready?”

“How drones and video-game techniques are coming together in Ukraine’s war,” The Economist, 07.08.25

  • “Ukraine’s war has been a forcing house of military innovation. Among the more interesting is the use of “video-game incentives” to increase the armed forces’ efficiency in fighting the Russian invasion. The system ensures that successful drone operators get new drones before their less effective colleagues do. Now the process is being upgraded with what Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s digital-transformation minister, has called “Amazon for the military”—a scheme that allows units to buy battlefield kit with points won by destroying Russian vehicles and other targets.”
  • “Gamification came to the drone war in August 2024, when the Army of Drones, a government-backed initiative to acquire drones for the armed forces, launched a “bonus” system. The drone war is well suited for gamification because all kills are recorded by the same drone cameras that are used for flying the aircraft and a system already exists for logging them. (In other forms of combat claims may be exaggerated—combatants may not know the results of a lobbed mortar round.) Once a drone kill is logged, identified and confirmed, it wins a number of points depending on the military value of the item destroyed.”
  • “Critics have decried dehumanizing “video-game wars” since the first Gulf war in 1991. They are dismayed that gamification rewards killing with scores that can be used to win virtual cash for buying more weapons. Traditionalists may worry that gamification undermines the military hierarchy by decentralizing control of supplies. But the use of quantitative targets in war is not new. Body counts were the “primary measure of progress” for American forces in the Vietnam war, notes one historian. They determined who got medals, promotions and even rewards, such as time away from the front. Today’s warriors, who grew up playing video games, will no doubt see gamification as an unsurprising evolution of that idea. “

“From Living Force to Dead: Russia’s 2 Trillion Ruble War Manpower Bill,” Re:Russia, 07.10.25.

  • “An effective commercial ‘contract for war’ remains a key factor enabling Vladimir Putin to carry out offensive campaigns in Ukraine for a second consecutive year, despite extremely high losses and limited tangible gains.”
  • “Among the twelve regions with the highest payments, the average bonus over the past six months reached approximately 2.7 million rubles.”
  • “The total number of new contracts over the six months is around 200,000, which currently roughly corresponds to the scale of Russian troop losses in Ukraine.”
  • “Altogether, in the first half of 2025, expenditure on the ‘manpower’ enabling the Russian offensive should amount to just over 2 trillion rubles.”
  • “If current rates of casualties and replenishment are maintained… annual spending will exceed 4 trillion rubles. This sum is equivalent to 2% of Russia’s GDP.”
  • “According to estimates by Janis Kluge, these enlistment rates slowed significantly in the first half of 2025, particularly in June.”
  • “The sharp increase in bonuses began after Putin’s July 2024 announcement of a federal signing bonus increase… doubling the one-off payment for new contract soldiers.”
  • “The simultaneous decline in the number of signed contracts and the stagnation of average bonus amounts is likely more related to increasing pressure on regional finances than to any genuine ‘saturation’ of the front lines.”
  • “Thus, the current strategy appears to involve halting the growth of bonus payments, or even slightly reducing them, while maintaining the pace of contract recruitment through soft coercion.”
  • “The commercial ‘contract for war’ has become one of the Kremlin’s most effective tools and plays a key role in enabling the Russian army to wage a second consecutive year of major offensives despite heavy losses and modest territorial gains.”

“Transcript: Putin steps up summer offensive against Ukraine. Ben Hall talks to military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady,” Financial Times, 07.10.25.

  • Gady said: “I think it’s fair to say that Russia has been on the advance for the last couple of months.”
  • “The Russian center of gravity of ongoing military operations is clearly the Donbas.”
  • “Russian war aims don’t stop at the Donbas, they go beyond the Donbas, although I should say that Russian war aims, by and large, have not substantially changed since February 2022.”
  • “The most important element in this war is still the infantrymen. And Ukraine still doesn’t have enough infantrymen on the front line.”
  • “The Russians have been pushing since March essentially. They’ve increased the pace of operations, they’ve thrown more manpower, more material into this fight.”
  • “The major issue that Russian forces are still facing is that they can’t really attack in large formations in a fairly well coordinated manner.”
  • “Manpower, again, is extremely critical in all of this.”
  • “Ukraine still hasn’t succeeded in establishing a good training system for operations at the front line.”
  • “War is always a contest of wills, right? And one of the principal aims of this Russian strategic air strike campaign is essentially to break the Ukrainian will to resist.”
  • “Europe, by and large, still has refused to answer some principal or first-order questions when it comes to Ukraine. And that is: what is Ukraine’s role in Europe’s security architecture?”
  • “The hardest thing is usually to get yourself out of a war. And this is also something that Vladimir Putin is seeing right now in Russia, because also he probably would have problems extracting himself from this war with face-saving measures."

“Foreign Fighters 2.0: The Interplay of Technology and Lived Experience in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Jethro Norman, Carnegie Endowment, 07.08.25.

  • “Historically, foreign fighters have been predominantly defined by prior military experience and ideological zeal; however, the Russia-Ukraine war is attracting and requiring a distinctly different kind of participant—one whose value on the battlefield is increasingly linked to technological proficiency rather than traditional combat skills.”
  • “These emergent participants, whom I term ‘foreign fighters 2.0,’ embody a convergence of civilian technical expertise and military operations, potentially redefining conventional boundaries between combatants and civilians.”
  • “At the heart of this transformation is the growing phenomenon of ‘participative warfare,’ a form of conflict participation characterized by digital involvement that extends far beyond traditional physical battlefields.”
  • “With minimal logistical barriers (often just a smartphone, encrypted messaging apps like Telegram, and a budget airline ticket) foreign fighter participation is now accessible to technically skilled civilians.”
  • “Ramon saw in Ukraine the promise of being part of something special and historically significant. He clearly had a moral—even ideological—motivation: ‘This is a fight against fascism, basically… And I truly believe in the European project.’”
  • “‘I just felt, like, the calling, and I was like, I want to go. I need to go. And it’s like, I’m helping out Ukraine, right? But they’re helping me out. I have, like, a fucking purpose again,’” Trevor said.
  • “‘Look for yourself,’ he said, ‘that’s just from today,’” showing hundreds of messages on Telegram from other would-be volunteers.
  • “Despite sophisticated reliance on digital platforms for recruitment, coordination, and operations, volunteers consistently exhibited deep skepticism toward digital communications, fearing surveillance and compromised security.”
  • “These analog spaces became crucial, offering an unmediated environment for trust-building and sharing unfiltered truths about combat realities.”
  • “While digital technologies have facilitated broader and more accessible participation in conflict, they have simultaneously underscored the enduring necessity of face-to-face interactions and secure analog spaces.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine

“Did Trump Really Just Break Up with Putin? It’s never easy to tell which flip or flop the flip-flopper in the White House means,” Susan B. Glasser, New Yorker, 07.10.25.

  • “On Capitol Hill, Republicans seized the moment to announce that they now expected to call a vote as soon as this month on bipartisan legislation—co-sponsored by more than eighty senators [including Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal ]—that would allow Trump to impose a crippling tariff of up to five hundred percent on countries that purchase Russian oil, gas, or uranium.”
  • “Blumenthal and Graham both refer to the bill as “bone-crushing” punishment for those who aid Russia’s war effort; in our conversation, Blumenthal added that he had been told that, more than once, Putin had raised his concerns about the measure privately with Trump—which suggested that its passage might constitute a real inducement for the Russian President to come to the table. But Trump has not yet offered any endorsement beyond saying he was “strongly” looking at the measure. Nor has he asked Congress for additional military assistance for Ukraine, which will soon become an urgent problem, when the $1.25-billion aid package that Joe Biden approved at the end of his Presidency runs out later this summer. There is zero indication at the moment that Trump will ever do so. And, if he doesn’t, will it matter at all to Ukraine’s fate that he once cursed about Putin in a Cabinet meeting?”
  • “For a frequent flip-flopper like him [Trump], can anyone ever tell which flip or flop is for real?”
  • “The point is that nothing is forever with Trump, except his own perceived self-interest. This is the first lesson of Trump, and, in geopolitics or anything else, one that so many have yet to learn.”

“Trump Reluctantly Comes Around to Backing Ukraine. Will He Stick With It?” David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, New York Times, 07.14.25.

  • “Nearly six months after his inauguration, when President Trump pledged he would measure his success by “the wars we end” and “the wars we never get into,” he is adopting an approach toward Russia that on the surface looks much like his predecessor’s: arming the Ukrainians to fight off an invasion. Trump came to this point in a circular fashion, and if these past few months are any indication, there is reason to doubt he will stick with it.”
  • “The president is a late and very reluctant convert to the approach of trying to confront and isolate Mr. Putin.”
  • “The president said last week he was “very strongly” considering backing a bipartisan Senate bill that would impose a new sanctions bill that would allow—but not require—Mr. Trump to impose 500% tariffs on any country purchasing Russian oil or gas. Mr. Trump also lifted a brief U.S. pause on delivering weapons to Ukraine. A plan hatched at the NATO summit in June to arm the Ukrainians by selling American weapons to the Europeans, who in turn would pass them on to Ukraine’s beleaguered forces, is beginning to take shape. Speaking to reporters on Sunday, the president said he planned to provide more Patriot missiles to Ukraine, stressing that the weaponry would be paid for, and that the nation was in “desperate need” of it.” “Because Putin really surprised a lot of people,” Mr. Trump said. “He talks nice and then he bombs everybody in the evening, but there’s a little bit of a problem there. I don’t like it.”
  • “The approach Mr. Trump is taking seems designed to keep him at least one arm’s length away from the conflict. By having the Europeans pay for and funnel the arms, Mr. Trump may hope that he is not regarded as a direct participant in the war. “

“Trump embarrasses the Pentagon with a U-turn on Ukraine,” The Economist, 07.08.25

  • “America alarmed Ukraine, and European allies, when it abruptly halted weapons shipments to Ukraine earlier this month. Just as suddenly, President Donald Trump countermanded the order on July 7th. “We are going to send some more weapons. We have to. They have to be able to defend themselves. They’re getting hit very hard now.” Within hours, the Pentagon confirmed it would send “additional defensive weapons”.”
  • “The U-turn was announced during a White House dinner Mr. Trump was hosting for Binyamin Netanyahu, the visiting Israeli prime minister. Sitting next to him Pete Hegseth, America’s defense secretary, nodded in assent, even though he was the man who stopped the military aid. Another important figure pushing for the halt was Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s under-secretary for policy, who has long advocated shifting resources away from Europe and the Middle East to Asia.”
  • “The affair is a reminder that not even Mr. Trump’s acolytes can predict his zig-zags.”
  • “His decision is a victory for common sense. Ukraine has in recent weeks endured some of the most intense drone and missile bombardments since the start of Russia’s full-on invasion three years ago.”
  • “The best that can be said of Mr. Trump is that although he still dreams of a big deal with Mr. Putin, he is beginning to realize he is being played by the Russian president. He does not want to spend more money on helping Ukraine win, but nor does he want it to collapse on his watch. He probably knows that the defeat of Ukraine would be a geopolitical blow to America, more grievous than the collapse of Afghanistan after America’s withdrawal in 2021. Mr. Biden never recovered from that humiliation—and Mr. Trump has never stopped berating him for it.”

“Zelensky Is the World’s Loneliest Leader,” Rym Momtaz, CEIP, 07.08.25.

  • “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has got to be the world’s loneliest man. Three years into the unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and despite the regular empathic statements of solidarity and support from his European partners, he still has to constantly argue and advocate for real military capabilities.”
  • “He punctuates every statement, tweet, and answer with several thank-yous, to avoid drawing more accusations of ingratitude which he has received from both the Biden and Trump administrations as well as the UK.”
  • “European countries have stepped up in some respects. They started ramping up their military support in the last year of the Biden administration, and since Trump’s inauguration in January, the EU has slightly surpassed the United States in military assistance.”
  • “Instead of issuing empty ultimatums about ceasefires, the Europeans should have already done three things. First, they should have deployed a beefed-up, multi-layered, properly supplied, integrated air defense system inside Ukraine.”
  • “Second, they should have paralyzed the Russian defense industry’s production and regeneration capabilities.”
  • “Third, they should have enabled Ukrainian deep strikes against Russian military installations, central to Moscow’s ability to continue waging this war.”
  • “North Korea alone has provided nearly twice as many 122mm and 152mm artillery shells and 122mm rockets to Russia than the whole of the EU has provided to Ukraine.”
  • “Only twice compared with sixty-one times in last year’s Washington declaration.”
  • “The current nature of support for Ukraine just isn’t strategic or part of a theory of victory that ends the war decisively or with a sustainable settlement.”

“Europe Must Lead to Prevent the Worst in Ukraine,” Nate Reynolds and Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Emissary, 07.07.25

  • “The Pentagon’s decision to suspend shipments of weapons and materiel to Ukraine is the latest reminder that a dangerous complacency about the war has set in on both sides of the Atlantic.”
  • “Putin is increasingly confident that he can force Ukraine to capitulate.”
  • “Threats of more U.S. sanctions sound increasingly hollow to Putin, given the Trump administration’s reluctance to target even those circumventing the existing sanctions regime.”
  • “Ukraine’s air defenses are struggling to protect the country with a finite supply of interceptors that is dwindling over time, especially if U.S. deliveries are halted.”
  • “Without U.S.-provided air defense interceptors, Russia would pummel Ukrainian cities, with more civilian casualties and more families deciding to leave the country.”
  • “It is not too late for Ukraine and its supporters to act to prevent the worst—and, more importantly, to put Ukraine on a path toward a resilient defense that would eventually force Putin to accept a ceasefire.”
  • “Europe needs to seize the initiative on arming Ukraine, avoiding any dangerous vacuum as U.S. supplies halt.”
  • “Europe must finally resolve to use frozen Russian assets by seizing them outright.”
  • “Ukraine’s drone program […] now shapes the battlefield.”
  • “Ukraine will not be a member of NATO or the EU for a long time. But Ukraine is integral to Europe’s own defense.”

“"Without Biden, I don't believe you would have seen that level of support,"—Jake Sullivan,” (interview) Tetryana Kozereva, Suspline, 07.11.25. (also Ukrainska Pravda, 07.08.25)

  • [Interview with former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan after the U.S. Defense Department halted military shipments to Ukraine but prior to the July 8, 2025 Trump administration commitment to resume critical military shipments to Ukraine]
  • TK: It's been a week since the Trump Administration withheld military aid to Ukraine… Do you think that the withheld, or withdrawal or suspension of military support to Ukraine harms the long-term national security interest of the United States in any capacity?
    • JS: “Well, I certainly believe that withholding this needed and deserved weaponry, especially the air defenses, but all of the other military assistance as well harms not only Ukraine in its fight for freedom against the Russian aggressor, it also hurts the United States because it undermines our credibility, and it emboldens and empowers Russia, who is not just an adversary of Ukraine, but is an adversary of the United States of America and NATO as well.”
    • “And furthermore, I think if the Trump’s administration is not prepared to pay for that equipment, many European countries are prepared to do so, and so the Trump administration should make a deal with European countries: they provide the money, and the United States provides the arms.”
  • TK: “What do you think cannot be replaced in terms of American support? Trump administration keeps saying that Europeans need to step in, but many American systems have no analogues.”
    • JS: “Well, I started by mentioning the air defense, the Patriot interceptors, and also another form of interceptor called AMRAAM, which goes in the NASAMS missile defense system, which itself has been very effective in addition to the Patriots. Both of them have to be approved by the United States. Now, as I said, they could be funded by the Europeans. But it's harder for the Europeans to actually supply them, because it's an American system, and we're the ones consistently producing it, and therefore in a position to supply it to Ukraine…”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

“Trump Raises Pressure on Russia With Tariff Threat, Ukraine Weapons Deal,” Alexander Ward, Lara Seligman, Brian Schwartz, Wall Street Journal, 07.14.25.

  • “President Trump threatened Monday to increase economic pressure on Russia if there is no peace deal with Ukraine in 50 days, underscoring his growing anger with President Vladimir Putin as he outlined a deal to send weapons to Ukraine. The U.S. will impose “very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in 50 days,” Trump said.”
  • “Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick later said Trump could choose to impose either tariffs or sanctions on countries that do business with Russia. “Those are both tools in his toolbox,” Lutnick said.”
  • “It is unclear if Russian President Vladimir Putin will take Trump’s threat seriously. Trump has repeatedly promised action against Russia within two weeks if he deemed Putin unserious about signing a peace agreement.”[ATI3] [SS4]
  • “The threats came as Trump said the U.S. reached a deal with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that would send weapons and air defenses to Ukraine within days. The decision to sell American weapons to NATO countries for use in Ukraine is a major policy shift for the U.S., which during the Biden administration donated arms to Kyiv.”
  • “In Congress, a bill proposed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.), a staunch ally of the president, would impose 500% tariffs on nations that trade with Russia, if passed by Congress and signed by Trump.”

"Russia sanctions & new weapons, is Trump stuck in Groundhog Day?," Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 07.14.25

  • “The sanctions, which would impose enormous tariffs of 500% on countries that buy Russian energy, are being pushed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) in a Senate bill that now has some 85 co-sponsors. Trump has not endorsed it yet but has made suggestions he would support it.”
  • “There is a depressing sense of Groundhog Day to the situation President Trump finds himself in again today. Having said that “sanctions cost us a lot of money” at the recent G7 Summit in Canada, signing this latest act into law will simply confirm that he is no longer in control of U.S. policy towards Russia, as he wasn’t during his first term.”
  • “Attempting to undermine Russia by pushing vast tariffs against its main trading partners simply will not work. Anyone who believes that China will suddenly stop importing Russian oil against the threat of U.S. sanctions is a fool or deliberately disingenuous. As it did earlier this year, China will simply respond with tit for tat tariffs against Washington.”
  • “Providing more “defensive” weapons won’t help Ukraine win, though it may arrest the speed of defeat. Not providing weapons won’t help Russia secure a spectacular breakthrough either.”
  • “While the texture of a future peace deal provides considerable scope for compromise on both sides, including on the issue of how the territorial status quo is described, one Russian demand will not change: NATO membership. Unless President Trump can broker Ukrainian acceptance that it will not join NATO, amidst resistance to any compromise from European allies, he will not bring peace to Ukraine, though he might dent the American economy.”

“Trump is interested in new Russia sanctions. But there’s a catch,” Jordain Carney, Rachael Bade and Eli Stokols, Project Syndicate, 07.09.25.

  • “President Donald Trump is ready to sign a punishing Russia sanctions bill that GOP hawks have pushed for months. But only if it changes to give him more control.”
  • “A senior administration official granted anonymity to discuss the president’s view said that “conceptually there’s an openness” to the bill from Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), but the person suggested that the legislation needs to preserve what the White House sees as the president’s sole authority to oversee U.S. foreign policy.”
  • “The current draft of the bill allows the president to waive a 500% tariff on countries that buy Russian oil and uranium for up to 180 days, and Graham said Tuesday he has agreed to revise the bill to allow for a second waiver, subject to congressional oversight.”
  • “The administration’s desired changes would solidify the president’s waiver authority, ensuring that Congress has no power to question Trump should he decide to end the sanctions.”

“Europe must act now to seize Russia’s frozen assets,” J. French Hill, Financial Times, 07.07.25.

  • “The recent European Council meeting in Brussels failed to force Russia to finally pay for its aggression against Ukraine.”
  • “Yet, it’s not too late for Europe to act—at no cost to taxpayers anywhere.”
  • “The council should agree to seize the roughly €258 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets in Europe as a down payment of Russian compensation.”
  • “So long as the war continues, Ukraine’s economy will remain in need of external assistance.”
  • “Russia, however, still owns its immobilized sovereign assets held abroad.”
  • “So far, approximately €28 billion has been disbursed. But it’s not enough.”
  • “Legal scholars and a report commissioned by the European parliament have clearly affirmed that action can be taken to compensate Ukraine under the law of collective countermeasures.”
  • “This step includes full accountability, transparency, good governance and professional asset management to protect Ukraine’s interests.
  • “The U.S. needs to act as well.”
  • “Europe holds tremendous leverage over the outcome of this conflict. It should seize the opportunity while it still can.”

“Declarations: Trump Is Coming Around on Ukraine,” Peggy Noonan, The Wall Street Journal, 07.12.25.

  • “Isolationism is essentially emotional. You're angry at the cost in blood and treasure of your country's international forays and adventures and want to withdraw from the world. ....The problem is that you can quit the world but the world won't quit you.”
  • “Only a fool would carelessly aggress in this world, and only a fool would think he could fully withdraw.“
  • “Vladimir Putin is a monster of history: We used to call him a junior monster here, but no, he's full-size.”
  • Mr. Trump has been trying to broker a peace over Ukraine, and Mr. Putin has been jerking him around since January, saying seemingly plausible things that turn out to be just another tactic in the long cool game… Mr. Trump is renewing U.S. arms shipments to Ukraine, and he is right to do it.”
  • “It won't be good for the world if Mr. Putin winds up taking what he wants of Eastern Europe.”
  • Mr. Trump's decision isn't isolationist or internationalist but realistic. The question is whether he sticks with it and it's enough. In this decision he again moves against the feelings of his base, or rather its influencers and self-proclaimed leaders.”
  • “The GOP will have to think its way through all this. "Isolationist," "interventionist"—those labels don't seem right for now. The party will have to decide, again, what it's about on foreign affairs.”

“Donald Trump's frustration with Vladimir Putin prompts shift of tone on Ukraine,” Financial Times, 07.11.25.

  • “Donald Trump was on the South Lawn of the White House on Friday morning when he was asked about a Russian drone attack that hit a hospital in Ukraine overnight, injuring nine people. “I know,” he said. “You’ll be seeing things happen.” The U.S. president’s comments highlighted how his frustration with Russian President Vladimir Putin for failing to budge in talks to end the war he launched three years ago appears to have reached a tipping point.”
  • “The president spent the early months of his second term pinning the blame for the conflict on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, including during an infamous, public dressing-down in the Oval Office in late February. Since then, Trump has become increasingly unhappy with Russia’s intransigence in talks over a possible ceasefire that would pave the way for the longer-term settlement—a primary foreign policy goal for the U.S. president.”
  • “But while Trump’s rhetoric has raised some hopes in Europe of a potential shift in his attitude, two senior officials involved in defense and security negotiations with Washington said there was still little tangible evidence of the White House taking a more pro-Kyiv stance.”
  • “It was obvious from the first talks after inauguration that Putin wasn’t interested in peace except on his terms. He thinks he can win the war,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “Putin decided there’s no point doing a deal with the U.S. because western support for Ukraine is fracturing anyway. We’ll have to see on the battlefield if he was right.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

"Putin is the main star of diplomacy. I am serious." Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev’s interview to Republic.ru, 07.11.25. Clues from Russian Views. In Russian.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"How Russia Could Exploit a Vacuum in Europe," Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, and Kate Johnston, Foreign Affairs, 07.10.25

  • NATO pledged big defense spending increases at the recent summit to appease Trump, but avoided tough talks on Russia and Ukraine to maintain alliance unity, according to the authors.
  • Europe remains heavily dependent on unique U.S. capabilities—like intelligence, logistics, and missile defense—that would take years to replace, according to the authors.
  • Russia’s military is stronger and more aggressive than in 2022, and a sudden U.S. drawdown would tempt Putin to exploit NATO’s weakened deterrence.
  • Without careful planning and coordination, a rapid U.S. pullback could embolden Russia, destabilize Europe, and increase the risk of conflict, according to the authors.
    • “Pulling back as Russia is ramping up its military capacity and before Europe is ready to defend itself would embolden the Kremlin and raise the risk of another war—this time on Trump’s watch. The best way to prevent a future war in Europe is to make sure Moscow never dares to start one. And that will require Washington and its European partners to design a careful and coordinated handoff. The United States must tell its partners exactly where any new gaps will be—long before they appear,” according to the authors.

“Ukraine: A European Vision of Victory?” Dr. Jack Watling, RUSI, 07.07.25

  • “Europe has the capacity and opportunity to cripple Russia and significantly reduce the threat posed to the continent if its states can coordinate their efforts.”
  • “The window of opportunity is closing.”
  • “American disengagement from Ukraine has prompted European leaders to reaffirm their commitment to supporting Kyiv and emphasize the high stakes for European security.”
  • “In the absence of a clear European theory of victory, policy remains aimed at delaying Ukraine’s defeat without a clear vision of what Europe should be trying to achieve.”
  • “Russia is already approaching the exhaustion of its stockpiled Soviet-era armored vehicles by the end of 2025.”
  • “If the war looks protracted, it will struggle to keep up the rate of recruitment.”
  • “Russia’s exposure to disruption of oil and gas exports is significant.”
  • “Europe can significantly strain Russia’s finances and the sustainability of the war.”
  • “Ukraine’s long-range precision strike campaign can be resourced by Europe to degrade Russia’s ability to build weaponry.”
  • “It is time the continent crafts a vision for how it can underwrite its own security. That vision begins in Ukraine.”

“Who Is Winning the World War?” by Ross Douthat, The New York Times, 07.12.25 “

  • “When future historians study the arc of American foreign policy, they will probably fold all the major events since 2020 into a unified narrative of global conflict.”
  • “If we’re fortunate, that will yield academic treatises with titles like ‘The Empire Tested: America and the World, 2021-2030.’”
  • “It’s useful for Americans to think about our situation in global terms, with Russia and Iran and China as a revisionist alliance putting our imperial power to the test.”
  • “We’ve had a lot of these swings in the last few years… from the rout in Afghanistan to
  • “This sense of multi-theater crisis helped to restore Donald Trump to power.”
  • “Trump’s decision to bomb the Iranian nuclear program and the muted Iranian response has capped off a period in which Tehran’s regional power has crumbled.”
  • “Meanwhile, our NATO allies are boosting their military spending and Trump is suddenly praising the alliance.”
  • “The ultimate outcome of this conflict depends on the revisionist power, the People’s Republic of China, that hasn’t directly joined the fights.... China is at once a much more serious rival to America than either Russia or Iran and also an extremely cautious player.”
  • “American foreign policy needs both a better long-term strategy to stay ahead of China and a lot of short-term Trumpian flexibility. Not restraint or hawkishness alone, but both an openness to peace and a capacity for warmaking, matched to the ebb and flow of a global conflict that won’t have any simple end.”

“The West’s War on Russia Will Go Beyond Ukraine,” Dmitry Trenin, Algora.com, 07.09.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “On the military front, Trump will deliver the remaining aid packages approved under Biden, and perhaps supplement them with modest contributions of his own. But going forward, it will be Western Europe—especially Germany—that supplies Ukraine, often by buying U.S.-made systems and re-exporting them.”
  • “Meanwhile, the United States will continue to furnish Kiev with battlefield intelligence—particularly for deep strikes inside Russian territory.”
  • “None of this suggests the conflict will end in 2025. Nor will it end when hostilities in Ukraine eventually wind down.”
  • “That’s because the fight is not fundamentally about Ukraine.”
  • “What we are witnessing is an indirect war between the West and Russia—part of a much broader global confrontation. The West is fighting to preserve its dominance. And Russia, in defending itself, is asserting its sovereign right to exist on its own terms.”
  • “This war will be long. And the United States—with Trump or without him—will remain our adversary. The outcome will shape not just the fate of Ukraine, but the future of Russia itself.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s talks with Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Wang Yi,” RF MFA, 07.13.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “On July 13, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who arrived in Beijing to take part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Foreign Ministers Council Meeting, held talks with Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Wang Yi. The ministers expressed satisfaction with the positive momentum in the comprehensive Russia-China partnership and held an in-depth discussion on the bilateral agenda, with particular focus on implementing the outcomes of the May summit in Moscow. They also addressed practical areas of cooperation, including humanitarian exchanges.”
  • “The ministers conducted a thorough exchange of views on coordination within the SCO framework. ...The ministers emphasized the importance of strengthening close coordination between Russia and China on the international stage, including at the UN and its Security Council, the SCO, BRICS, the G20 and APEC. They also discussed relations with the United States and prospects for resolving the Ukraine crisis based on the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety, interconnectedness and mutual consistency. Other pressing issues were addressed as well, including the Iran-Israel conflict and developments on the Korean Peninsula.”
  • “The foreign ministers reaffirmed their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other’s core interests, including the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity in all their regional and ethnic diversity.”

“Criticism of the ‘Reverse Kissinger’,” Oleksandr V Danylyuk, RUSI, 11.07.25

  • “Vladimir Putin's aggression in Georgia and Ukraine and his threats against the Baltic states… establish that the Russian Republic believes it can reclaim any territories of the former Soviet Union.”
  • “This doctrine is on a collision course with Xi Jinping's ‘China dream,’ which aspires to undo the ‘Century of Humiliation’… by European and Russian imperialist regimes.”
  • “Territorial disputes between the two autocratic powers are likely to become one of the biggest threats to global stability.”
  • “The looming problem for Mr. Putin is the irredentist Chinese claims… from the Russian acquisition of eastern Manchuria and the Port of Vladivostok.”
  • “China now encroaches on Russian interests in Central Asia and Mongolia through its Belt and Road Initiative.”
  • “Mr. Xi's pursuit of his China Dream is in many ways a mirror of the Putin doctrine.”
  • “Mr. Putin should worry about the roughly 232,000 square miles of eastern Manchuria and Vladivostok that he still controls.”
  • “The FSB report worries about China's spying on Russia and technology acquisition… and recent Chinese maps… carry the Chinese names of all large Siberian cities in the contested areas.”
  • “The U.S. should oppose the Putin doctrine as a challenge to de facto international law… and its adoption by China.”
  • “A good start would be Sen. Lindsey Graham's sanctions bill on purchasers of Russian oil, which is pending in the Senate with 84 cosponsors.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"The old nuclear rules won’t stop proliferation," Henry Sokolski, Financial Times, 07.09.25

  • “The U.S. and Israeli assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities was the predictable result of persistent U.S. and international unwillingness to draw the line properly between safe and dangerous nuclear activities or materials.”
  • “If America and like-minded nations continue to condone nuclear fuel-making and allow Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) violators to leave the treaty with impunity, the bombing of Iran won’t change much.”
  • “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report warned the world that certain nuclear materials and activities were so close to bomb-making, inspections could never detect their military diversion in time.”
  • “The nuclear trajectories of India and North Korea should have made this clear.”
  • “In 1974 was India’s detonation of a ‘peaceful nuclear explosive’—in other words, a bomb.”
  • “North Korea secretly started to make nuclear fuel by enriching uranium… when President George W. Bush finally called this out, North Korea withdrew from the treaty with impunity in 2003 and exploded its first bomb in 2006.”
  • “The troubles with Iran also began with demands to make nuclear fuel.”
  • “Again, the U.S. sat on this information for nearly a decade.”
  • “Enrichment enables weaponization.”
  • “Some will argue that in a multi-polar world, tightening the rules is for fools. The stark alternative of a nuclear Wild West suggests otherwise.”


“Why the next world order will be armed with nukes,” Dmitry Trenin, published in Profil, translated by RT.com,1 07.11.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The West wants to bleed Russia: to exhaust its military, drain its economy, and destabilize its society. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies continue to arm Ukraine, send instructors and ‘volunteers,’ and scale up their own military industries. “Russia will not allow this strategy to succeed. Nuclear deterrence may soon shift from passive posture to active demonstration. Moscow must make clear that it sees an existential threat—and that it will respond accordingly. Sobering signals could include:”
    • “Placing non-strategic nuclear weapons on combat duty.”
    • “Withdrawing from the moratorium on medium- and short-range missile deployments in European Russia, Chukotka, and Belarus.”
    • “Resuming nuclear tests.”
    • “Conducting retaliatory or pre-emptive conventional strikes on targets outside Ukraine.”
  • “Looking ahead, five trends are taking shape:
  1. Active nuclear deterrence in Ukraine.
  2. A revival of the nuclear question in Europe, including France’s ambitions and Germany’s and Poland’s nuclear aspirations.
  3. A deep crisis in the non-proliferation regime, and diminished trust in the IAEA.
  4. Iran’s nuclear program progressing beyond international oversight.
  5. Japan, South Korea—and possibly Taiwan—preparing for nuclear independence.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia Faces Labor Shortage of 11 Million by 2030, Minister Says,” Bloomberg News, 07.14.25.

  • “Russia needs to find the equivalent of 2 million workers a year over the next five years to fill vacancies left by people who are due to retire, Labor Minister Anton Kotyakov told President Vladimir Putin at a meeting on Monday.”
  • “By 2030 we need to bring 10.9 million people into the economy,” Kotyakov said at the televised meeting to discuss demographic policy. “Approximately 800,000 will be new jobs created, and about 10.1 million people will be those reaching retirement age.”
  • “Putin has warned for years that Russia’s shrinking population threatens its political and economic future, and the government has poured billions into programs to try to boost the birth rate, including by offering payments to women who have more children. With unemployment already at a record-low 2.2%, and the war in Ukraine intensifying labor shortages, it’s unclear how Russia will find the people it needs to fill the growing demand for workers.”

“No births, no deaths, no data,” Meduza, 07.14.25

  • Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) stopped publishing nearly all key demographic indicators between May and July 2025.
  • First to disappear were real-time regional figures on births, deaths, marriages, and divorces; then Rosstat refused to release final mortality data for 2024.
  • This blocks researchers from calculating excess mortality linked to the war against Ukraine.
  • Monthly absolute figures—births, deaths, marriages, divorces—and detailed annual mortality data have vanished under a new law.
  • Only the total fertility rate and the fertility rate for third and subsequent children remain, reportedly because they are KPI metrics for governors—but they can’t be verified.
  • Regional civil registry offices have stopped publishing their demographic tables too; data vanished almost completely in just one month.
  • A spike in deaths in spring 2025—up to 40% in some regions—may have triggered the clampdown.
  • Loss of data affects planning for benefits, schools, kindergartens, urban infrastructure—and makes it impossible to measure whether demographic policies work.
  • The lack of transparency mirrors Soviet-era practice when falling life expectancy was hidden in the 1970s.
  • Russia’s birth rate: the average age of first-time motherhood is rising, the birth rate for first children is dropping, second births are only stabilizing, and now third births are declining too.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Ukraine:

Volodymyr Zelenskyy nominates new Ukraine PM in major reshuffle President asks deputy prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko to head his government,” Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 07.14.25.

  • “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Monday he had nominated first deputy prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko to lead his cabinet and “significantly renew its work”, in the most notable shake-up of his government since Russia’s full-scale invasion.”
  • “If approved by parliament, Svyrydenko, who also currently serves as economy minister, would replace current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to become her country’s 19th head of government. Appointed in 2020, Shmyhal has served in the role throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine and is the longest-serving head of government in the country’s history.”
  • Zelenskyy wrote on X that he had met Svyrydenko, 39, who led negotiations on a high-stakes minerals deal with the U.S., and told her a new prime minister was needed in a “transformation of the executive branch”. “We also discussed concrete measures to boost Ukraine’s economic potential, expand support programs for Ukrainians, and scale up our domestic weapons production,” he wrote.”
  • “Svyrydenko is considered a close ally of Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy’s powerful chief of staff. She is also seen as having strong ties with Donald Trump’s team after leading the minerals talks alongside U.S. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent.”

“Ukraine’s front-line farms battle Russians and weather. Heat, drone attacks and recruitment drives are shrinking harvests,” The Economist, 07.13.25.

  • “Ukraine’s farmers, especially those near the front lines, are caught between the demands of the armed forces and Russian attacks. But despite the challenges he faces, Dmytro Maksymov, who farms 1,500 hectares in Kherson province, says dealing with them “is better than occupation””
  • “Agriculture is a mainstay of Ukraine’s economy. Produce worth $24.5bn made up 59% of Ukraine’s exports last year. Its farmers harvested 76m tons of grain and oilseeds in 2024. In 2021, the last year before Russia’s full-scale invasion (and the resulting loss of territory), the figure was 106m tons. This year the weather has been poor. Vitaliy Koval, the minister of agriculture, warns that may cut the harvest by a further 10%. But he thinks higher global commodity prices will mean export income roughly matches last year’s.”
  • “In regions close to the front the Russians have begun sending drones to set fields alight. According to Dmytro Yunusov, Kherson province’s director for agriculture, in the past month Russian drones have burned 1,000 hectares of crops. Mr. Koval calls the attacks “a big threat for us”: the Russians aim to decrease the amount Ukraine has to sell while driving up prices on the world market for their own farmers’ benefit.”
  • Farm labor is scarce all over the country. Some 200,000 farm workers are fighting on the front, says Mr. Koval. “Today’s best tank drivers are yesterday’s combine and tractor drivers,” he says. Farms can apply for a military exemption for 50% of their eligible male workforce, but with recruitment falling short the armed forces are on the hunt for more men. The government is training more women for specialized jobs in agriculture.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Putin’s war in Ukraine may cost him control of the south Caucasus,” The Economist, 07.10.25

  • “Russia’s against Ukraine and the Iranian-Israeli conflict… are redefining the region more consequentially than anything since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which showed its first cracks here in the late 1980s. Mr. Putin’s war against Ukraine inadvertently led to an end to the hitherto intractable conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is now struggling to break free of Russia’s grip and make peace with Turkey. Meanwhile, the conflict between Israel and Iran has boosted the status of oil-rich Azerbaijan, the largest and militarily strongest of the three countries, as an ascending regional power, able to stand up to its bigger neighbors. Backed by Turkey and Israel, which sees it as a strategic ally in its conflict with Iran, Azerbaijan is contemplating joining the Abraham Accords. Only Georgia, once the darling of the West, is moving in the other direction as it slides into an ugly, anti-Western autocracy aligned with Russia.”
  • “Putin’s best hope to regain influence may be through Armenia, which depends on Russia’s energy and food imports, and where Russia still has a military base. What Russia lacks in Armenia, however, is popular support. Having been so overtly betrayed, few Armenians see Mr. Putin as an ally. Yet, paradoxically, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the exodus of 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the disputed territory—painful as it was—has also liberated Armenia from a conflict that had shut its border with Turkey, had forced it to outsource its security to Russia and also made its politics hostage to the Nagorno-Karabakh clans that had close ties with Moscow. “Armenia was de facto a half-colony of Moscow, which treated it as an asset in its relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan,” says Mikayel Zolyan, a historian and analyst in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.”
  • “Russia’s malign activity both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia adds urgency to the [Azerbaiia-Armenia] peace process,.... The window of opportunity is narrow. Missing it could throw the region once again into dangerous geopolitical uncertainty.”

“Georgia’s Warning for Ukraine,” Eka Tkeshelashvili, Foreign Affairs, 07.11.25.

  • Eka Tkeshelashvili warns that Georgia’s experience offers sobering lessons for Ukraine. She argues that a cease-fire alone will not end Russia’s drive for dominance and recalls how, after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, the West repeated many mistakes that now risk being replayed in Ukraine. According to Tkeshelashvili, Moscow will persist in threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty and interfering in its domestic affairs, especially if the United States and Europe normalize ties with Moscow without quickly integrating Ukraine into Western institutions.
  • She writes that Georgia’s democratic transformation posed a challenge to the Kremlin and that each violation of Georgia’s sovereignty tested Western resolve—tests that Washington and Europe largely failed by not setting clear redlines. Tkeshelashvili notes that the initial cease-fire, brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in August 2008, was intentionally vague, and Western governments compounded the problem by failing to help Georgia build effective deterrence and institutional resilience. Over time, she observes, Georgia has been reduced to an authoritarian state aligned with Moscow. To avoid repeating this cycle, Tkeshelashvili concludes, only robust security guarantees for Ukraine can prevent further Russian interventions.

“What to Expect From the Kremlin’s New Overseer of Post-Soviet States,” Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Politika, 07.14.25.Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko has been in charge of Russian domestic policy for a decade. But he recently significantly expanded his sphere of influence. It now extends to elements of foreign policy, including Russia’s relations with former Soviet nations Armenia and Moldova, as well as breakaway Georgian regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”
  • “Kiriyenko’s foreign policy style is noticeably different from that of his predecessors, Vladislav Surkov and Dmitry Kozak. As special envoys of Putin, Surkov and Kozak publicly mainly took part in negotiations—and tried to be discreet about Russia’s interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Under Kiriyenko, Russia’s interference is not only much more public, it is central to Russian strategy in what it terms its “near abroad.””
  • “Sources close to Kiriyenko cited in Russian media have been open about the possibility of running interference campaigns in Armenia to undermine the current government.”
  • “If Kiriyenko can persuade Putin that this sort of flagrant interference is effective, then it’s possible he will be trusted with similar operations in bigger countries.”
  • “For his part, Kiriyenko will be keen to add more countries to his portfolio because that would give him more weight within Russia’s state apparatus.”
  • “Above all, though, he would get more face time with Putin—and in Russian politics, personal access to the president is the most valuable asset.”

“Domestic Failures Haunt Moldova’s Pro-EU Party as Election Looms,” Vladimir Solovyov, CEIP, 07.11.25.

  • “The bilateral summit between the European Union and Moldova that took place on July 4 will likely go down as a milestone in modern Moldovan history.”
  • “While such events are undoubtedly a success for Moldova’s current pro-EU government, in other policy areas its track record is far less impressive.”
  • “Among the thirteen major problems PAS promised to tackle […] it’s difficult to identify a significant positive change on many of them.”
  • “Not a single major corruption case over the last four years has resulted in a jail sentence.”
  • “None of the prosecutors, judges, and politicians who abetted Plahotniuc’s capture of the state […] have faced justice.”
  • “The government’s failure to make public administration more efficient as promised is not limited to corruption.”
  • “Given that Transnistria’s main backer, Russia, is bogged down in Ukraine, Chișinău could exert unprecedented levels of pressure on the separatists. But that has not happened.”
  • “Support for a single party means the EU’s reputation is increasingly tied—at least in the eyes of Moldovans—to the fate of PAS.”
  • “If the vote ends up being cast as an existential struggle between Russia and Europe, Moldova’s economic data and living standards will be of secondary importance.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Footnotes

  1. RT is a Russian-government funded outlet.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by: NATO.

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