I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“If Putin Wanted to Step up His Fight With America, You’d Know It,” Dmitri Trenin, Foreign Policy, 07.31.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Washington’s passage of new sanctions has ended Russia’s “one-sided truce with the U.S.” However, Russia’s retaliation to the sanctions—expelling diplomats and taking back diplomatic properties—are deliberate acts of anger, not spontaneous ones. Moreover, they target the U.S. government as opposed to “American business interests in Russia.” Putin, the author notes, is likely waiting to see the effects of the new sanctions before making a next move. The Russian president has also conceded the prospect of improved relations in the near future. Making these better relations even further out of reach is “a powerful coalition” in the U.S. made up of groups from the Defense Department to mainstream media that “has embraced a strategy of piling pressure on Russia until it cracks.” The author argues that the newest sanctions on Russia “are certainly not the last.” Russia needs to be careful and to “continue to target its U.S. policies precisely.” While there are many difference between today’s U.S.-Russia tensions and the Cold War, the most important is that the conflict today is mostly set in the governmental and political spheres. The author says that Russia must keep things that way in order to keep intact vital “trade, scientific and technological exchanges, and cultural and humanitarian ties.”

“Russia Signals Tough Pragmatism Toward the United States,” George Beebe, The National Interest, 07.31.17: The author, director of the Center for the National Interest’s intelligence program, writes that “an escalatory cycle” between the U.S. and Russia is not inevitable. Although Russia has taken retaliatory measures targeting the U.S. diplomatic presence in Russia, Moscow is nonetheless “leaving the door open to compromise.” The author cautions that misinterpreting Putin’s openness for negotiation as weakness or Moscow’s aggressions as confirmation of an enemy determined to undermine global democracy is the biggest immediate danger for the U.S. Russia’s signals actually show an attempt “to strike a balance between pragmatic compromise and tough defense” of vital interests. For the U.S., a similar balance is necessary to avoid a potential “bilateral disaster.”

“The Road to a New Cold War,” The Washington Post Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 07.31.17: The Washington Post Editorial Board writes that today’s enmity between Russia and the U.S. is a result of “bad choices” by Russian President Vladimir Putin. These choices, perhaps motivated by domestic politics and foreign policy, are the root of current tensions. While communication between Washington and Moscow is essential for security, Putin should not “expect the West to suddenly forgive or forget.” The authors suggest that Putin “deal with the underlying source of tension” as opposed to looking for new methods of exacerbating it.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Confident Assad Sabotages Putin’s Outreach to Trump in Syria,” Henry Meyer and Ilya Arkhipov, Bloomberg, 08.01.17: The authors, contributors to Bloomberg, write that Russia’s sway over Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is slipping as Assad becomes “increasingly confident about his survival.” In an attempt to regain some of its lost leverage, Russia is now “refusing to provide air support” for an assault on Idlib. While Moscow appears sincere in its efforts to curb the fighting and establish de-escalation zones, some U.S. officials are skeptical about the Kremlin’s “ability to restrain Assad.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Russia Hacked Our Election Because the Spies Took Over,” Alex Hazanov and Yakov Feygin, The Washington Post, 08.02.17: The authors, scholars of Soviet history, write that while there is a long tradition of Russian meddling in U.S. elections, the 2016 election was “the opposite of history repeating itself.” Where the late 20^th century saw the Soviet Union interfering to keep “erratic, perhaps irrational” men out of the White House in order to preserve the international order, in 2016, Russia did just the opposite. The authors argue that this reversal is due to the Kremlin’s foreign policy elite, the cosmopolitan “mezhdunarodniki (internationalists),” being replaced by intelligence operatives. This latter group embraced Russian nationalism in reaction to the ills of Soviet society, and believed vast conspiracies were behind those same ills. Until recently, “experienced, professional diplomats” handled Russia’s foreign policy, like former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov. His “realpolitik-based foreign policy” tempered with public complaints against the West remained partly in place until 2012. However, following Putin’s reelection to the presidency in 2012 and the protests leading up to it, “a cloud of paranoia slipped over the Kremlin.” Putin’s foreign policy speeches began to display “the conspiracy theories popular with the old intelligence agency hard-liners.” The authors suggest that moving forward, the West toughen up its systems “against anti-liberal assaults.” They also suggest that policymakers look to the playbook of Cold War liberals for tactics to “safeguard democracy at home and abroad, and prevent Russia’s desire for disorder from spreading chaos in the United States.”

“Russian Hackers Can’t Beat German Democracy,” Joerg Forbrig, Foreign Policy, 08.03.17: The author, a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin, argues that Russian cyberattacks targeting Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union party ahead of the general election in September will likely have little effect on its outcome. Forbrig cites several reasons for this: The attacks by the Russians are already well know, blunting the impact any revelations might have in the run-up to the election; German public opinion has soured on Russia since its actions in Ukraine—some 75% of Germans now effectively view Russia with suspicion, according to Forbrig; Germans are by and large content with the status quo; Germany’s multiparty system will confound efforts to tilt the election to one party; and Germans overwhelmingly trust their mainstream media outlets. As Forbrig writes, “At most, Russian interference can make the campaign rhetoric more virulent, add complexity to the party landscape and complicate coalition building. But if decades of German postwar politics are anything to go by, the end result will, nevertheless, be a functioning government. And, judging by her ratings, Merkel will be at the helm.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“Will the West Let Russia Dominate the Nuclear Market? What the Westinghouse Bankruptcy Means for the Future,” Nick Galucci and Michael Shellenberger, Foreign Affairs, 08.03.17: The authors, analysts in the fields of nonproliferation and energy, respectively, write that the upcoming decision of a U.S. federal bankruptcy judge on the fate of Westinghouse, a nuclear power company, will have broad implications. Either the U.S. will continue playing a vital role in nuclear nonproliferation, “or instead cede the global market for nuclear energy to Russia.” Russia currently has reactors in place across Europe and Asia, and is set to build more. It “is responsible for 60% of global reactor sales and technical assistance, and is positioned to build 34 reactors in 13 countries at a total value of $300 billion.” As such, Westinghouse is the West’s last chance to remain in nuclear construction. The authors argue that the future of nuclear energy is far too important to be left to one judge, and they suggest measures the U.S. government can take to ensure that the West remains competitive.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Chaos and Order in a Changing World,” Henry Kissinger, CapX, 08.02.17: The famous U.S. diplomat looks back on challenges laid out by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1996 and applies these issues to today’s world. He notes that today, the challenge posed by Russia is focused on Syria and Ukraine, but also “reflects a deeper alienation.” Russia’s sprawling land mass and the absence of natural borders has given rise “to a definition of absolute security, which verges on absolute insecurity for some of its neighbors.” Historically, Russia’s “almost mystic conception of greatness,” its strategically important geographical location and “the willingness of its people to endure hardship” have helped protect the world from would-be conquerors on more than one occasion. For Russia, this has resulted in the “desire to be accepted by Europe and to transcend it simultaneously.” Kissinger likens Putin’s view of international politics to author Fyodor Dostoevsky’s late 19^th century call “for a new spirit of Russian greatness.” This idea was taken up again in the late 20^th century by another author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who called for saving Russians “who had been ‘driven out’ of Russia.” Today, we see this in the Kremlin’s perception of “a 300-year-old Western effort to contain Russia.” Kissinger asks whether the best way for the West to develop relations with Russia is by pressuring Russia into accepting Western views or by a political process. “Either concept requires a defense capability which removes temptation for Russian military pressure.” Kissinger moves on to discussing China, calling it, along with the U.S., one of the world’s “most consequential countries.” Both countries are unused to having an equal, and both see themselves as exceptional. In the Middle East, Russia’s goals and motivations will also impact the emerging world order. Kissinger notes that if the West remains engaged in the Middle East without a coherent plan, chaos will ensue. If the West steps out, its place will be taken by China, India and Russia, who “cannot afford chaos along their borders.” Turning to the Atlantic, Kissinger writes that turmoil in Europe and Asia threaten NATO’s security, but also challenges “the West to contribute to the building of a new world order.” NATO will need to constantly reexamine its capabilities and its goals. He concludes by repeating Margaret Thatcher’s challenge: to redefine Atlanticism in order to contend with a changing world.

“On Russia Sanctions, Trump Has a Point,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 08.07.17: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes that even before the latest round of sanctions was signed into law, sanctions themselves were an overused foreign policy tool. U.S. President Donald Trump has taken issue with the legislation’s limits on executive power. The author argues that Trump “may be right,” as the law curtails the president’s flexibility, which is needed for “delicate negotiations.” Regardless of domestic turmoil, Washington must still continue conducting foreign policy.

“Tillerson Is Right Not to Preach American Values: The US Should See If It Can Promote Democracy by Example,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 08.01.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, argues that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may be doing the right thing in not spending vast amounts of money on counterpropaganda. Rather than fighting back in a propaganda war, the author argues that news organizations should simply be left to do their work. “An African journalist with experience stringing for a U.S. publication is worth a dozen state-funded PR projects.” State-funded propaganda is a tool for those who cannot lead by example, which the U.S. can do well. Perhaps Tillerson has a good understanding of the origins of America’s soft power. “Let him do deals—and let U.S. media and civil society judge those deals from a values standpoint. That's how the U.S. system is supposed to work, and that's what people the world over find attractive about it.”

“Vladimir Putin’s Russia Goes Global,” Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, Wall Street Journal, 08.04.17: Rumer, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, and Weiss, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, write that Russia’s efforts to extend its influence and undermine U.S. values go well beyond its alleged meddling in the 2016 presidential election. In addition to Russia's recent interference in the French election and its military intervention in Syria, the authors point to Russia’s growing ties with Turkey and other countries in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—who, the authors note, has taken “a decidedly autocratic turn and distanced his country from its NATO allies”—are reportedly finalizing a $2.5 billion deal for Turkey to purchase an advanced Russian S-400 air-defense system. The Russians are also making political inroads in Egypt, Libya and the Persian Gulf. And in America’s backyard, the authors note, Nicaragua’s Marxist leader Daniel Ortega has “put out the welcome mat for the construction of mysterious Russian facilities in the capital,” and in Cuba, Russian officials are working to “re-establish a military and intelligence presence.” The connecting thread for Russia’s foreign agenda, the authors conclude, is the “aim of pulling as many international actors as possible away from the rules-based institutions and security arrangements that the U.S. has worked so diligently to build over the past several generations.”

“We’ve Seen This Movie Before. In Russia,” Eugene Rumer, Politico, 08.02.17: The author, director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes that today’s turmoil in Washington is not unlike the tumult in Moscow in the 1990s. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was “a charismatic figure often unable to control his impulses,” who relied heavily on his small group of advisers, “who became known in Moscow as the ‘family.’” While economic power was ostensibly controlled by the prime minister and his cabinet of ministers, in actuality, it was controlled by seven bankers who made themselves extremely wealthy through the privatization campaign. Partisan politics left the legislative branch, the Duma, dysfunctional, as did a new Russian constitution which greatly enhanced the president’s power. The courts suffered a blow in the October 1993 constitutional crisis and never quite recovered. At the end of Yeltsin’s time in office, Russia was left with “economic ruin, shattered confidence and political dysfunction.” Then, picked out by the “family” to protect its interests, Vladimir Putin ascended to power. At the time, the idea of this kind of chaos happening in the U.S. was unthinkable. “The United States is not like the Soviet Union or Russia. But everything there changed rapidly and with no warning, and nobody had expected or predicted it.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“A Russian Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions,” Alexander Gabuev, Korea Economic Institute of America, 08.03.17: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russia went along with the most recent set of sanctions against North Korea because there were no better alternatives. In addition, supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 2321, which imposed economic sanctions on the North Korean regime in response to its recent intercontinental ballistic missile tests, also allowed Russia to be able to continue “to sit at the table” with other international players, Gabuev writes. While Russia believes that nuclear disarmament of North Korea is “impossible in principle,” the author notes that Moscow has several interests at play: preventing further nuclear tests; positioning itself as a leader in nuclear nonproliferation; limiting the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula; and improving trade with both Korean states.

“The Germany That No One Bargained For,” John Vinocur, Wall Street Journal, 07.31.17: The author, a Paris-based columnist for the global edition of The Wall Street Journal, looks at the unexpected role of Germany as U.S. tensions with Russia continue to escalate. The author calls the Siemens gas turbines that were sold to Russia and ended up in Crimea in violation of sanctions an instance of trickery so “gross” that it is suspicious. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel has condemned the new U.S. sanctions, which he argued are designed to keep Russian gas out of Europe in order to promote American sales of the same. While some may have expected German Chancellor Angela Merkel to come out against Gabriel’s support of Russia, this did not occur. In fact, Berlin has supported retaliation against the U.S. Congress, and more U.S.-German tension may rise if the U.S. supplies antitank missiles to Ukraine, an action Germany see as provoking Russia. “Americans contending with reality in Europe seem to have already written off any accompanying German distress.”

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“America's Ukraine Hypocrisy,” Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, 08.06.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, argues that the United States is hypocritical in its condemnation of Russia’s alleged election meddling, particularly in light of the U.S. administration’s role in pushing for the ouster of Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 following the Maidan protests. Western leaders, the author writes, made it clear that they support the efforts of demonstrators to force Yanukovych to approve a partnership agreement with the European Union, and, if he would not do so, “to remove the president before his term expired.” Noting that Yanukovych was democratically elected in an election “international observers considered reasonably free and fair,” the author calls the extent of the Obama administration’s interference in Ukrainian politics “breathtaking.” The author points to the actions of then-assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, who, he notes, personally visited the Maidan protesters and discussed, according to a call intercepted by Russian intelligence, her preferred options among opposition leaders to succeed Yanukovych. Galen Carpenter concludes: “One can legitimately condemn some aspects of Moscow’s behavior, but the force of America’s moral outrage is vitiated by the stench of U.S. hypocrisy.”

“Sending 'Defensive' Arms to Ukraine Would Be Deadly,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 08.01.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that if the U.S. supplies “lethal defensive weapons” to Ukraine, the conflict in the country’s east will become “even bloodier.” While Russia has supplied the separatists with tanks, the author argues that using Javelin antitank missiles on those tanks “would be like swatting flies with a sledgehammer.” Russia may have more tanks than any other country, but most of them are old and disposable. These tanks have been “successfully destroyed” by the Soviet-era arms available to both separatists and Ukrainian troops. Javelins would be necessary to destroy Russia’s top of the line modern tanks, the T-90. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has mostly been fought using Soviet weapons, but if the Ukrainian military begins using more modern weapons, the separatists will respond in kind. “That can only make the war, which has already taken 10,000 lives, even deadlier.”

“How Ukraine Reined In Its Militias. The Lessons for Other States,” Vera Mironova and Ekaterina Sergatskova, Foreign Affairs, 08.01.17: The authors, an expert in international security and a journalist based in Ukraine, write that the Ukrainian government has subdued the independent armed groups that sprung up in early 2014. Through pressuring the groups’ leaders, reversing public opinion and giving enlistment benefits to low-level members, Ukraine’s government was able to control these pro-Ukrainian militia groups ranging from “looting gangs to militias with ties to European white supremacy movements.” The authors suggest that countries with similar problems might try this approach.

“The President Took My Passport Away. But I’ll Keep Fighting for a Modern Ukraine,” Mikheil Saakashvili, The Washington Post, 08.03.17: The author, the former Georgian president, writes that the stripping of his citizenship by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko took him by surprise. Only two years prior, Poroshenko bestowed Ukrainian citizenship on the former Georgian president “in a high-profile ceremony in Kiev.” The reason the action was taken so hastily is obvious, as the Ukrainian constitution expressly forbids stripping anyone of their nationality. Saakashvili writes that he will continue his political activities to fight corruption in Ukraine, even though he is barred from the country.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"'Our Future Will Be Violent Extremism': Kazakhstan—Central Asia’s Most Stable State—Is Waking up to the Fact That Islamic Extremism Has Planted Its Roots and Is Here to Stay,” Reid Standish, Foreign Policy, 08.01.17: The author, associate editor, digital, for Foreign Policy, writes that recent terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan served as “a crude wake-up call that extremism had firmly planted its roots in the country and was growing.” Throughout Central Asia, extremist groups have been arrested, killed or driven abroad, where they’ve joined forces with other groups, like the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As Islamic State loses ground in Syria and Iraq, some fear it will turn toward Central Asia. “The Soufan Group, a security consultancy, estimates that 2,000 Central Asian foreign fighters have joined the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.” Three hundred are from Kazakhstan. While Kazakhstan has been kept safe from the growing trend of global extremism, the recent attacks in Almaty and Aktobe show that homegrown extremists may be the larger threat. According to an Almaty-based attorney who has worked on high-profile extremism cases, Kazakhstan’s approach to counterterrorism is flawed and can be abused to violate human right. “All the conditions are here. This problem will only grow,” she said. “Our future will be violent extremism.”

“CSTO Rift Grows Between Moscow and Astana,” Samuel Ramani, RFE/RL, 08.03.17: The author, a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford, writes that Kazakhstan’s opposition to deploying peacekeepers to Syria reflects the country’s resistance to deploying its forces in conflict zones and its desire to “assert its foreign policy independence from Russia.” Kazakhstan’s opposition to sending troops to Syria, the author notes, reveals “a growing rift between Astana and Moscow over the mandate of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.” Ramani also notes that Kazakhstan’s stance “contrasted markedly” with that of Kyrgyzstan, which has shown willingness to deploy peacekeepers.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“1917—The Year Vladimir Putin Would Rather Forget,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 08.03.17: The author, Europe editor and associate editor for Financial Times, writes that the chaos of 1917 makes it “an inappropriate year to celebrate” in the eyes of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s approval was built on the promise of stability after the tumult of the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin. Additionally, 1917 was the year the masses, not the regime, took control. In an attempt to take “the Bolshevism out of the Bolshevik revolution,” on Nov. 7, 2016, Putin staged a parade evoking not the Russian Revolution, but the patriotism of World War II. “One day Russia might use a Bolshevik revolution anniversary to reflect on the dangers of oppressive political systems. But don’t bet on it being soon.”

“Alexei Navalny: A Genuine Alternative to Vladimir Putin?” Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, 08.07.17: The author, a Moscow reporter for the Financial Times, writes that Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader, faces challenges in his attempt to fashion himself as a viable presidential candidate, especially one that could pose any real challenge to Vladimir Putin. While Navalny has built up a social media following that numbers in the millions, Hille notes that even his “natural allies”—economists, politicians and commentators who are critical of the Kremlin—have been critical of his lack of substance and economic expertise. “Some even say a leader who enjoys cult status among his followers is the last thing the country needs,” she writes.

“The View From the Kremlin: Survival Is Darwinian,” Maxim Trudolyubov, New York Times, 08.06.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Kennan Institute and the editor-at-large of Vedomosti, an independent Russian daily, writes that the Kremlin’s approach to international competition is like “a Darwinian fight for survival.” Where other countries compete for greater political influence or dominance in certain markets, Russia fights for survival. The author argues that the perception of existential threats everywhere one looks accounts for Moscow’s unpredictability, and the constant uncertainty takes its biggest toll on Russia’s citizens and neighbors.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.