I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“A Threat to Nuclear Arms Control,” New York Times Editorial Board, New York Times, 07.30.17: The New York Times editorial board writes that moves by the U.S. government to leave the INF Treaty behind pose a threat to the future of nuclear arms control. The 1987 treaty, which “ended a major threat to Europe,” was violated in 2014 when Russia tested a new cruise missile, and again more recently when Russia secretly deployed the missile. Defense bills currently moving through Congress are looking to respond to Russia’s treaty violation by funding a new ground-launched cruise missile. Additionally, a bill that has passed in the House “also states that if the president finds Russia in violation of the treaty 15 months after the defense bill becomes law, the United States will no longer be bound by the treaty.” The authors argue that the U.S. should respond to Russia’s violation via the treaty’s mechanism for dispute resolution, not through destroying “a pillar of arms control.” The House bill also allows the 2010 New START Treaty to expire in 2021 unless Russia complies with the INF Treaty, “an absurd reaction that would free Russia to build up its deployed warheads.” Bills in both the Senate and the House include funds for modernizing other nuclear weapons systems, a program that would cost $1 trillion over 30 years.  The authors argue that if the U.S. steps down from its role as a major force behind nuclear restraints, “there will be little to stop Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea from plowing ahead.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Implications of a Siberian Candidate,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 07.24.17: The author, an expert in foreign policy and security, writes that if Jared Kushner were an ordinary applicant for a government position requiring security clearance, that clearance “would almost certainly” not be granted. U.S. President Donald Trump would also encounter difficulties as an ordinary applicant, even though Trump, who did not have to fill out the questionnaire for national security positions, “has had one less opportunity than Kushner to be deceptive about past dealings with Russia.” Russia’s greatest use for Trump is not in obtaining classified information—they have other means of doing so. Trump is most useful for influencing U.S. policies “in directions favorable to Russia.” One benefit Russia has already gained is the weakening of the Western alliance and the deterioration of U.S. relations with traditional allies. The author argues for “keeping a public spotlight” on Russian election interference while the investigations into the matter continue behind closed doors.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The US Sanctions Bill Is a Win for Russia,” Angela Stent, The National Interest, 07.28.17: The author, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University, writes that the surprising thing about Russia’s retaliatory sanctions is that “they did not come sooner.” The further deterioration in relations following what appeared to be a promising meeting between Trump and Putin in Germany is likely due to domestic pressure on both sides. In Washington, the multiple investigations into the Trump team’s connections to Russia have “made Russia a toxic subject in Washington.” The author notes that, as demonstrated by the 1974 Jackson Vanik amendment, once the new U.S. sanctions bill passes, it “will probably stay on the books for longer than necessary and remove the flexibility and leverage that a president could have in dealing with Russia.” In Moscow, Russian nationalism has played a role. Although Putin’s popularity is still high, much of that popularity stems from “his foreign-policy accomplishments, showing that Russia is a respected world power and that he is a strong leader.” The sanctions bill’s unintended consequences may come from the bill’s restrictions on energy projects involving Russia, a provision which will also harm European and American businesses. The EU has said that it may rethink its own sanctions policy as a result of this bill, which is welcome news for Moscow. The U.S.-Russia relationship could continue to worsen for some time before it gets better.

“Russia’s Plan B: Divide and Conquer?” Nikolas Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 07.28.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that while the beginning of 2017 saw Putin’s “election-related gambles” paying off with a rise in populism, nationalism and pro-Russia leaders in the U.S. and across Europe, by the summer, these “apparent wins had all gone bust.” Although Moscow’s expectations were not fulfilled, it is unlikely that Moscow will change its international policies. Russia would have to make major policy changes for the new U.S. sanctions to be lifted. Additionally, the provisions of the bill make “a new Jackson-Vanik situation” likely. However, this “Russia-skeptic view” is not consistent throughout the West, where other countries see Russian aggression balanced by prospects of real cooperation. This may lead to a push by Moscow to divide the U.S. from its allies on Russia policy, a “time-honored strategy.” The author notes that Putin may find reprieve in the lack of coordination between the U.S. and Europe on the new sanctions. Putin may also make strategic compromises with Europe and Japan, which could create further trouble for the Trump administration.

“Putin's Hopes for Relief Under a Trump Presidency Backfire Spectacularly,” David Sanger, New York Times, 07.30.17: The author, chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times, writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin had hoped U.S. President Donald Trump would treat Russia as a major international power. That expectation “has now backfired, spectacularly.” This has led to a new shift in Moscow’s approach to Washington, with Putin believing that now, “his greater leverage lies in escalating the dispute, Cold War-style.” While Russia’s announcement in relation to the new U.S. sanctions bill specified that 755 U.S. diplomats will be cut, it is unclear how much this will impact day-to-day relations. With chaos in the White House making Moscow nervous, Russia has gone back to old habits, and expelling diplomats is “one of the oldest.” However, an anonymous senior official in the Trump administration has said that the White House still hopes for improved relations. Russia’s announcement, “free of bombast,” also appeared to leave the door open for a reversal in the relationship. Once the sanctions bill becomes law, the sanctions relief Putin was after will be pushed years away.

“To Punish Putin, Economic Sanctions Are Unlikely to Do the Trick,” Eduardo Porter, New York Times, 07.25.17: The author, who writes the Economic Scene column for The New York Times, notes that ambitious sanctions aimed at powerful countries with autocratic governments have a poor track record of success. The author points to a series of examples, from Syria, to Cuba, to Nigeria, of sanctions failing to achieve Washington’s goals. While some argue that sanctions on Russia following the seizure of Crimea kept Moscow out of the Baltic States, others argue that the Baltics simply aren’t as important to Moscow as Ukraine. In the case of Iran, crediting sanctions “overlooks Iran’s choices.” While sanctions have brought economic hardship to Russia’s ordinary citizens, the ruling class often does not partake in the ensuing misery, and “can even benefit from the burst of patriotic fervor” following sanctions. The author concludes that Congress’ move to expand sanctions on Russia is not about changing Moscow’s behavior. “It looks like a signal to American voters that if Mr. Trump sees Mr. Putin as an ally, Congress disapproves.”

“Are Russia and America Headed for a Showdown?” George Beebe, The National Interest, 07.24.17: The author, director of the Center for the National Interest’s intelligence program, writes that tensions between the U.S. and Russia are reaching a boiling point. In the U.S., a varied collection of government, military and intelligence officials “all view Russia as a common foe that has not paid a high enough price for its transgressions.” In Russia, the optimism following Trump’s election has given way to exasperation and now anger. “Each side has legitimate grievances against the other, but each also suffers from serious misperceptions of the other’s intentions.” The author argues that domestic pressure in Moscow and Washington will turn this normally manageable situation into one where exercising restraint will be difficult for both countries. Preventing escalation into military conflict would require expert diplomacy. The author notes that during the Cold War, it took the horror of the Cuban missile crisis to set both sides on a path toward a less volatile relationship. While the author notes that the situation may get worse before cooler heads prevail, he hopes such a crisis will not be necessary again.

“US-Russia Relations Six Months Into the Trump Administration,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution/European Leadership Network, 07.26.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that dealing with Moscow will now again become the work of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Tillerson’s strategy toward Moscow is to “push back when Moscow overreaches or commits aggressive acts, cooperate where interests converge and strengthen strategic stability.” As such, the author recommends contacts between U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and his Russian counterpart, as well as channels of communication intended to avoid accidents in Europe. Additionally, the U.S. should work with the Normandy Format to end the conflict in Ukraine, while keeping in mind that this will require “that Moscow decide it wants a settlement.” Continued discussion on Syria without great expectations and strategic stability talks are also necessary. The “idea of a cyber working group” should also be reived, but with a clearly defined purpose.

“President Trump, Keep in Mind That Russia and the West Think About Negotiations Very, Very Differently,” Kimberly Marten, The Washington Post, 07.25.17: The author, director of the Program on U.S.-Russia Relations at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, writes that Russia’s approach to international negotiations features “striking continuity” over time. The author argues that looking into these common observations may be useful in the event of upcoming U.S.-Russia negotiations on cyber issues. Negotiation, while a useful tool to serve Russian interests, is not “an end in itself or a way to build better relationships.” Moscow also “generally prefers the status quo,” and will only negotiate seriously if it believes the U.S. has an advantage Moscow can’t get by itself. Another tactic is waiting for the other side to reveal its positions and then reacting. Russian negotiators also value “‘khitrost’ (cunning or wiliness),” and U.S. negotiators during the Cold War noted that their Russian counterparts “excelled at manipulating language.” Insults and angry tirades are also used as tactics. History shows that successful negotiation with Russia is possible; however, Moscow “prides itself on being a difficult negotiating partner, and for the United States, forewarned is forearmed.”

“Russian Propaganda Has Flooded US Airwaves. How About Some Reciprocity?” The Washington Post Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 07.29.17: The writers note that while Moscow continues to banish U.S. news outlets from Russian airwaves, “Kremlin-funded mouthpieces” continue to broadcast in the U.S., spreading “misinformation and distrust.” The authors argue that this disparity in access “is unsustainable” and that the U.S. should demand corresponding treatment for its media outlets in the spirit of reciprocity. 

"Latest Diplomatic Rift Places US, Russia on Edge of ‘Tipping Point,’" Paul Saunders, Russia Matter, 07.31.17: The author, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, writes that Russia’s decision to expel hundreds of U.S. diplomats represents a dangerous turn in bilateral relations and could easily accelerate a “dangerous escalatory spiral." While Putin's decision to expel the diplomats appears to be "a belated tit-for-tat response" to the expulsion of Russian diplomats from the U.S. back in December, it is also a warning to Washington. The sanctions have not yet been signed into law by Trump, but once they are, Moscow will need to decide if it will respond further. In addition, there remains the possibility that the U.S. will arm Ukraine. To many Americans who do not remember "what it truly means to face a powerful enemy state," rapid escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and Russia could be a shock. U.S. foreign policy has experienced few constraints in the last two decades. However, if Moscow begins to actively work against the U.S., "Russia could seriously harm U.S. national security interests in ways Americans have not experienced for decades." 

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Why Is Putin Backing North Korea? To Build up Russia as a Great Power,” Samuel Ramani, The Washington Post, 07.26.17: The author, a PhD candidate in international relations, writes that Moscow likes to remind audiences during international crises that Russia is a great power. The Kremlin is trying to prove that Russia is “a better international broker” than the U.S., support its domestic image as a great power and lead those who resist what Moscow sees “as U.S. diplomatic and military coercion.”

China:

“Russia’s China Policy: This Bear Hug Is Real,” Eugene Rumer, National Bureau of Asian Research/Carnegie Endowment, 07.25.17: The author, director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes that the relationship between Russia and China has become “a genuine strategic partnership” in the last 25 years. While Russia is clearly the junior in this partnership, it is also the only partnership available to Moscow. While the West insists on domestic change in Russia, China does not, and it also works with Russia against the Western pursuit of global democratic change. The Kremlin’s focus on domestic stability and “the survival of the ruling regime” make splitting Russia and China unlikely. In addition, Russia’s lack of leverage with China will not help the U.S. address its priorities in the Asia-Pacific. Outreach to Russia by the U.S. could also have unintended consequences. The author concludes that Russia’s partnership with China is likely to continue for some time and that attempts to use Russia against China “are likely to fail.”

“Russia and China Are Sending Their Navies to the Baltic Sea: Is a Formal Alliance Next?” Dave Majumdar, The National Interest, 07.25.17: The author, defense editor of The National Interest, writes that China has sent three naval ships to the Baltic Sea for joint exercises with Russia. The Chinese have sent a destroyer, a frigate and a supply ship, while the Russian navy is deploying Project 20380 class corvettes and anti-submarine warfare helicopters, along with Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer bombers. While these exercises show strong partnership between the two, both Russian and U.S. experts say that a formal military alliance is not likely in the near future. For the U.S., the growing ties between China and Russia might mean the rise of an alliance that dominates Eurasia, something that U.S. foreign policy has historically tried to prevent.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“America's Next Security Competition Will Be in Central Asia,” Ariel Cohen, The National Interest, 07.30.17: The author, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, writes that a power transition in Uzbekistan has paved the way for improved opportunities for and cooperation between Central Eurasian countries. As tensions in the area subside, investors are beginning to see the region as a rich market. Of the Central Eurasian countries, Kazakhstan has been the first to move to a services-based economy, and it is one of the most developed of the former Soviet republics, surpassed only by the Baltic States. For the U.S., the changes in the region need to be seen “as a set of political-military, diplomatic and economic opportunities.” With China and Russia making swift inroads into this part of Eurasia, the U.S. “cannot afford to just sit and look on from the bleachers.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine,” Dmitry Gorenburg, War on the Rocks, 07.26.17: The author, a senior research scientist in the Strategic Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, writes that the new Russian naval doctrine reveals a wide gap “between aspiration and feasible plans.” Among the threats to Russia listed in the doctrine is the ambition of the U.S. and its allies “to dominate the high seas,” coastal territorial claims and other attempts to limit Russia’s “access to maritime resources.” The document only lists three potential specific threats and details the goals and priorities of Russia’s naval policy. The doctrine’s priority areas for the navy’s development includes “ensuring the Russian navy secures its place as the second most powerful naval force in the world,” suggesting that Russia intends to not be surpassed by China’s expanding navy. The navy’s role as “an instrument of deterrence” is also a focus of the document. The doctrine seems to be an attempt by the Russian navy “to protect its procurement budget” and “to ensure its procurement priorities are enshrined in official documents for the long term.” However, the major flaw in the doctrine’s plans is that Russia’s surface ship construction is very slow and not likely to gain speed in the near future. The document, like many others, is more aspirational than realistic, and Russia’s place as the No. 2 navy in the world until 2030 is unlikely.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.