Russia Analytical Report, July 21-28, 2025
4 Ideas to Explore
- In an interview with LB.ua, ex-commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeryi Zaluzhnyi issued an existential warning for NATO: “It is... a huge mistake on NATO's part to believe that this banal re-equipment will be a magic wand that will come to their rescue at any moment… New forms and methods of use entail new structures in which they are used,” he said. He also appeared to criticize members of NATO such as Poland for “intensively buying tanks” whereas it should be, with the rest of alliance, “building effective platforms where they can gain some interest is a huge complex approach.” Zaluzhnyi’s most ominous warning for NATO was perhaps as follows: “The fate of this most powerful military bloc [NATO] will most likely be the same as that of the League of Nations,” he said. “It seems to me that if today [a NATO member] were to suffer significantly from aggression by a country such as the one we are currently at war with, it would probably be the end of that alliance,” he predicted. According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine entered a new, radically different phase of its war with Russia in 2024, according to Kyiv Independent’s translation of his Ukrainian-language interview. "Right now, the front line exists mainly for killing," Zaluzhnyi said. "In 2022, tanks rode in front, and personnel followed them… Now, tanks and soldiers have switched places,” Zaluzhnyi said, according to the Kyiv Independent’s translation. "If we try to establish a ceasefire without building up our future defenses, the war will drag on for many more years. It began in 2014—God willing, it will end in 2034," Zaluzhnyi warned, according to the Kyiv Independent’s translation.
- “Ukraine’s once-formidable advantage in drone warfare appears to be eroding along parts of the front line. More Russian drones now prowl for targets up to 25 kilometers behind the contact line, and they have been hitting their targets more effectively,” Franz-Stefan Gady writes in Foreign Policy. “Ukraine’s survival may depend on winning this rapidly evolving air littoral battle, a struggle that is redefining war-fighting and rendering traditional Western doctrines and weapons economics obsolete,” Gady warns.
- “Peace negotiations in Ukraine have not actually failed; in fact, they haven’t really begun,” Samuel Charap argues in The New York Times. Charap urges Donald Trump “to empower a professional team of negotiators to engage the parties,” suggesting that “American mediators could use Mr. Kissinger’s shuttle model, or they could lead talks in a third country.” Meanwhile, Juan Manuel Santos suggests that “a crucial next step is for the parties to agree a framework for guiding longer-term negotiations” to “bridge the gulf between each side’s opening positions; agree on the terms of a ceasefire; and give a structure to the more drawn-out negotiations,” Santos argues in the Economist. “If Putin accepted Trump’s proposal for a ceasefire, Putin could receive numerous benefits,” such as “assurances that Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO anytime soon” and the increased likelihood that some of the West’s Russia sanctions would be dropped, according to Mark N. Katz’s commentary in The National Interest, published three days prior to Trump’s decision to shorten the 50-day deadline, which he gave Putin on July 14 to end the war in Ukraine, to just 10–12 days,1 after which the U.S. would impose 100% secondary tariffs on countries trading with Russia. Speaking on the day Trump shortened the ultimatum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov vowed that Russia will accomplish the goals of its war against Ukraine such as a neutral Ukraine free of nuclear weapons and the non-expansion of NATO. At the same time, in his July 28 remarks, Lavrov did not explicitly mention either the demilitarization of Ukraine or its “denazification,” though both were proclaimed to be among the goals of Russia’s 2022 full-fledged invasion of Ukraine from the very beginning of this invasion. In fact, Lavrov explicitly mentioned both demilitarization and denazification among conditions which “must” be included in a political settlement of the conflict as recently as late last year.2*
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent decision to push through a bill subordinating Ukraine’s two independent anti-corruption agencies to the country’s prosecutor general, whom he appoints, has been met with widespread disapproval in the West and multiple public protests at home. The uproar prompted Zelenskyy to backtrack and promise that a new law would be passed to restore the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Specialized Anti‑Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) with the Ukrainian parliament scheduling a vote on the bill for July 31. However, up to 70 MPs from Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party are reluctant to support a bill restoring the independence of SAPO and NABU, fearing possible prosecution by the two agencies, according to Financial Times. Under Zelenskyy’s leadership, Kyiv has made some progress in tackling corruption—Ukraine’s score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index rose from 30/100 (where 100 means no corruption) in 2019 (to 36/100 in 2023 before declining to 35/100 in 2024.3 The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 resulted in a wash of new money flooding into Ukraine, as well as in the expansion of the executive branch’s powers, in what probably contributed to its backsliding in TI’s 2024 index. It should also be noted that Zelenskyy’s move to curb the independence of NABU and SAPO followed reports that one of these agencies is investigating allies and associates of Zelenskyy, according to the New York Times and Ukrainska Pravda. While Western leaders couched their discontent with Zelenskyy’s attempt to curtail the independence of the two watchdogs in mostly diplomatic terms, Ukrainian activists and Western columnists didn’t mince words when expressing their discontent. “The Russians want to kill us… But you get used to that feeling,” Ukrainian government adviser Liubov Tsybulska wrote in reference to Zelenskyy’s move. “Much worse is feeling danger from those who govern your country—from your own people, to whom you gave up part of your freedoms during wartime,” she wrote, according to Financial Times. This newspaper’s own staff has described “How Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s power grab sparked his biggest political crisis.” Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Jillian Kay Melchior called it "Zelensky's Corruption Blunder," while editors on The Economist’s editorial team have referred to "Outrage in Ukraine as the government attacks anti-corruption watchdogs,” and declared that "Volodymyr Zelensky has made a strategic blunder." In addition, Max Boot asserted in his Washington Post column that Zelenskyy needed to be reminded by Ukrainians what “democracy looks like.” Finally, Marc Champion has described Zelenskyy’s move as handicap” in Bloomberg, warning that “Corruption threatens European aid for arms.”
U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- No significant developments.
- For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “There will be no war like the one on 24 February 2022. Because the more countries we involve in our technological process, the more it will guarantee us a truly reliable partner in the future who can help.”
- According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine entered a new, radically different phase of its war with Russia in 2024, according to Kyiv Independent’s translation of Zaluzhny’s Ukrainian-language interview.
- "If we try to establish a ceasefire without building up our future defenses, the war will drag on for many more years. It began in 2014 — God willing, it will end in 2034," Zaluzhnyi warned , according to Kyiv Independent’s translation of Zaluzhny’s Ukrainian-language interview.
- "Right now, the front line exists mainly for killing," Zaluzhnyi said. "In 2022, tanks rode in front, and personnel followed them... Now, tanks and soldiers have switched places." according to Kyiv Independent’s translation of Zaluzhny’s interview.
- “It is still a huge mistake on NATO's part to believe that this banal re-equipment will be a magic wand that will come to their rescue at any moment.... New forms and methods of use entail new structures in which they are used. As a result, there is a need for a new doctrine of use, a new training system, and new funding. And whoever is the first to come up with this technology today, so that they can return to re-equipment in the future, will be on top.”
- “We can talk about Estonia, for example, or Poland, which is now intensively buying tanks. Building effective platforms where they can gain some interest is a huge complex approach. It's not just about investing in what we would get today, but what they would get in five years. To do this, we need to involve their training system so that they can prepare. So that they can see how this weapon changes the landscape of combat operations and tactics. This is a huge amount of work that needs to be done today in order to see results in five years. But again, I repeat: it has already been 1.5 years since ‘today’ arrived, and there are still no results.”
- Today, NATO remains the only point of reference for Ukraine. It is, first and foremost, the most powerful military bloc. Another question is that the fate of this most powerful military bloc will most likely be the same as that of the League of Nations… God forbid that something like this should happen, but it seems to me that if today (a NATO member — S.K.) were to suffer significantly from aggression by a country such as the one we are currently at war with, it would probably be the end of that alliance. Unfortunately, it cannot withstand any criticism for objective and subjective reasons.”
- [When asked “And the fifth article would hardly work, am I right?] “In military matters, it is futile to predict anything. Anyone who predicts is a charlatan, because it depends on a million facts that cannot be predicted.”
- “Ukraine urgently needs the United States and Europe to transfer more air defense systems and missiles to Kyiv, Ukraine’s commander in chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky said in an interview with The Washington Post — and without a Biden-era ban on deep strikes against Russian military targets.”
- “A fresh supply of air defense weapons including U.S.-made Patriots, drone interceptors and light aviation to shoot down drones could help thwart the Russian attacks, Syrsky said. More mid- and longer-range missiles, including U.S.-made ATACMS and German Taurus systems, would — if issued without restrictions on their use — allow Kyiv to slow Russian weapon production by targeting the infrastructure making its missiles and drones.”
- “‘They are targeting virtually everything — airfields, populated areas, infrastructure facilities,’ Syrsky said of Russia. ‘So, of course, we need supplies of ballistic missiles in order to be able to give the enemy a fitting rebuff.’ ‘The availability of any missile weapons is in itself a deterrent,’ he added. ‘I hope that thanks to President Trump's position, this process will be much easier and … we won't have any of the difficulties we had before.’”
- “Last summer ‘was really very difficult for us,’ Syrsky said. Russia planned further intensive offensive operations, including attacks on the Sumy region. ...With the help of a small group of commanders, he concocted a plan to divert Russian troops by invading Russia's western Kursk region and putting them on the defensive inside their own country for the first time. ... Nearly a year later, an intense Russian counteroffensive has pushed Ukraine out of almost all parts of Kursk. Russian forces are also for the first time trying to break into the Dnipropetrovsk region.”
- “Getting more troops into the field remains a major challenge, Syrsky said, and he acknowledged that ‘everything related to mobilization is very sensitive information.’”
- “While the mandatory draft is only for men ages 25 to 60, Ukraine has begun experimenting with a program to mobilize 18-to-24-year-olds for one-year contracts in exchange for large bonuses and travel permissions.”
- “When Syrsky turns 60 this week, he will reach Ukraine's military retirement age — but he laughed off any suggestion that he would step down.”
- Gady observes, “Ukraine’s once-formidable advantage in drone warfare appears to be eroding along parts of the front line. More Russian drones now prowl for targets up to 25 kilometers behind the contact line, and they have been hitting their targets more effectively.”
- He explains, “Ukraine responded to early setbacks by creating the Unmanned Systems Forces, a separate military branch to unify and scale up drone operations.”
- Gady notes, “Russia has adapted systematically with its Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Technologies, which counters Ukraine’s drone advantages through interception, attacking drone operators, and deploying fiber-optic drones immune to electronic jamming.”
- “If Moscow’s approach allows its forces to establish air littoral superiority, it could severely disrupt Ukraine’s maneuverability, suppress Ukrainian artillery, and raise casualties, threatening Ukraine’s defensive architecture.”
- He highlights, “Ukraine’s Drone Line initiative aims to build a comprehensive counter-drone network, with elite units creating lethal kill zones behind Russian lines.”
- Gady argues, “Modern warfare in the air littoral is shifting from expensive precision strikes to ‘precision mass’—the ability to deliver accurate fires at unprecedented scale using cheap, expendable drones.”
- He concludes, “Ukraine’s survival may depend on winning this rapidly evolving air littoral battle, a struggle that is redefining war-fighting and rendering traditional Western doctrines and weapons economics obsolete.”
- J.D. Maddox argues, “Perhaps the most cunning use of drones on the battlefield is their psychological impact. While reporting confirms their effectiveness in hitting targets, it also reveals the growing mental toll drones are taking on both soldiers and civilians.”
- He observes, “It’s safe to say that everyone in a warzone is, in some sense, held captive by drones. Their cognitive applications — perhaps the most under-analyzed advantage of these systems — are just beginning to come into focus.”
- Maddox outlines, “In a warzone, the sound or sight of a nearby drone often triggers an immediate fight-or-flight reaction. This creates a brief but dependable window to distract enemy personnel — even in hardened or well-defended positions.”
- He explains, “The presence of a drone often prompts efforts to destroy, evade, or hide from it. The sense of inescapable surveillance can lead to the abandonment or weakened control of a location due to fear of detection or targeting.”
- Maddox highlights, “Recent drone operations have driven combatants to entrench themselves, seeking safety inside reinforced hideouts and staying hidden unless venturing outside is safer. This entrenchment signals a paralysis of ground forces under persistent drone presence.”
- He warns, “Drones are not only tactical assets on the battlefield but also potent tools of military propaganda and psychological warfare. Their imagery shapes narratives, influences public perception, and impacts morale on both sides of a conflict.”
- Maddox concludes, “The U.S. military needs an equivalent test — one that demonstrates the strategic potential of drones for influence operations.… Lessons taken from testing drone influence applications should be taught in military schoolhouses at all levels and should be integrated into U.S. and allied military exercises.”
“Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production?” Yauhen Lehalau, RFE/RL, 05.25.25.
- “Russia is ‘now producing three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO is doing in a year,’ NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently told the New York Times. RFE/RL and the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an open-source intelligence group, analyzed Russian and Western weapons production to assess whether Russia really has such a large production advantage over the US and its allies.”
- “Ukrainian and Western officials estimate that Russia produced some 2–2.3 million artillery shells in 2024 … Actual US production of the shells stands at 40,000 per month, or just shy of half a million per year, for a total of about 1.7 million shells made this year in the US and EU.”
- “For Russia to make three times as much every three months, as Rutte said, its factories would have to produce a massive 20.5 million shells this year. According to CIT’s analysis, Russia’s factory expansions in Biysk, Kazan, and other locations may allow it to produce some 4 million 152mm and 122mm shells per year.”
- “Russia still relies heavily on its stock of Soviet-era artillery systems to fire the shells it produces, with reserves of towed howitzers falling from around 12,000 in 2022 to just over 6,000 in mid-2024. CIT analysts assess that the country produces less than 100 new … self-propelled howitzers per year. NATO clearly has the upper hand here.”
- “One area where Russia likely has the upper hand is tanks.”
- “The US and EU outproduce [Russia] by at least a factor of four when it comes to combat aircraft.”
- “Russia had 248 S-400 batteries in 2024 and gained a further 18 in 2025, implying a production capacity of 36 per year. … Raytheon builds some 12 Patriot missile-defense systems per year, while Germany’s Diehl plans to make 8 IRIS-T systems in 2025 and some 800-1,000 missiles for the system per year.”
- “Russia produces some 5,000 long-range drones of various types each month, or 60,000 per year. … NATO does not currently make anything analogous to these cheap kamikaze drones.”
- “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will urge European partners to help fund higher wages for his soldiers fighting Russia’s invasion, in a renewed effort to bolster military recruitment amid growing fatigue in the war-torn country. He also plans to seek help from his western partners to secure an additional seven Patriot air defense systems following confirmation from Germany and Norway that they would soon send three to Kyiv to help defend against Russia’s escalating missile and drone bombardments.
- After more than three years of war, Kyiv’s push to attract new recruits is facing serious problems. A broad mobilization campaign has become increasingly unpopular, fueled by online videos of military recruitment officials forcibly detaining men on the streets, stuffing them into vehicles and sending them to military training centers. Uncertainly about how long the war will go on—and the lack of any promise of demobilization—have also contributed to popular discontent.
- Lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25 has done little to help, and Zelenskyy has rebuffed western advice to drop it any further, citing demographic challenges and lack of public support.
- On the battlefield, Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces had succeeded in slowing Russian momentum and the Russians were suffering huge casualties. But that assessment did not fully align with comments from military analysts or from his own troops on the front line. DeepState, a Ukrainian group with ties to Ukraine’s defense ministry that maps the war, said that Russian forces are advancing on the eastern front at the fastest pace in a year. Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analytical group run by a veteran officer, said the situation for Ukrainian forces around the strategic city of Pokrovsk was “critical.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military aid to Ukraine:
- András Rácz writes, “Donald Trump’s July 14 announcement about supplying modern American weapons to Ukraine – which would first be paid for by European NATO members and then transferred there – constitutes a major policy shift.”
- Rácz observes, “The 50-day deadline that he gave Putin to reach peace indicates that Trump still prefers a managed, gradual turn and not a radical change.”
- He explains, “The United States is ready to put direct pressure on Russia to achieve an end to the war… threatening Russia with ‘devastating’ sanctions and providing Ukraine with long-range, precision strike weapons marks a considerable hardening of the policy line.”
- Rácz notes, “Trump’s announcement confirmed a new framework for financing US military aid in the long term… European countries… paying for US weapons to be delivered to Ukraine could ensure the sustainability of the continuous flow of much-needed American arms over the long run.”
- “Despite the apparent change of policy line, its effects on the battlefield will only materialize months from now – beyond the 50-day deadline given by Trump.”
- Rácz points out, “The more complex a weapon system is, the more time training and integration takes… it is unrealistic to expect any of them to become operational before mid-fall at the earliest.”
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- “US President Donald Trump said he would shorten his timeline for Russian leader Vladimir Putin to reach a truce with Ukraine or face potential economic penalties, ramping up pressure on Moscow to bring the fighting to a halt. “I’m going to make a new deadline of about 10, 10 or 12 days from today,” Trump told reporters in Scotland on Monday during talks with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer.”
- ““I’ll announce it probably tonight or tomorrow,” Trump added. “But there’s no reason to wait. If you know what the answer is,” expressing frustration with Putin for rebuffing previous calls for a ceasefire.”
- “Trump on July 14 initially announced a 50-day deadline on Russia — which would have fallen on Sept. 2 — threatening to impose [100%] stiff economic penalties on Putin if he did not end hostilities with Ukraine.”
- “The Kremlin hasn’t commented publicly so far on Trump’s new deadline. Russia’s ruble weakened more than 2% to breach 81 per dollar in Moscow, its lowest since mid-May, following Trump’s announcement. “So what I’m doing is we’re going to do secondary sanctions, unless we make a deal, and we might make a deal, I don’t know,” Trump added Monday.”
- ““I’m not so interested in talking anymore,” Trump said Monday. “He talks. We have such nice conversations, such respectful and nice conversations, and then people die the following night in a — with a missile going into a town.””
- ““Russia could be so rich, it could be so rich, it could be thriving like practically no other country,” Trump said, adding that Putin had expressed interest in doing trade deals. “He talks about it all the time.””
- “Earlier this month, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened secondary tariffs of 100% on any country trading with Russia if there is no deal to end the war in Ukraine within 50 days. This proposal parallels a bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate, sponsored by Sens. Richard Blumenthal and Lindsey Graham, which would levy secondary tariffs of 500% on countries trading with Russia. … In this article, we review these initiatives, discuss how unintended consequences may render the policies counterproductive and discuss their merits compared to the existing suite of economic measures—the core of which are the G-7 oil price cap and a growing wave of sanctions on the shadow fleet.”
- “The potential response [to secondary tariffs] by Russian trading partners is two-fold. One option is for these nations to shun Russian exports and instead seek importers from alternative sources, thereby avoiding the steep secondary tariffs on imports to the U.S. A second option is to continue trading with Russia and therefore accept the tariffs as a consequence.”
- “It is possible, however, that … damage to Russia [from secondary tariffs] comes at a punitive cost to the United States if it spikes Brent and drives an already teetering U.S. economy into recession. … Elasticities from the academic literature suggest that shutting in even 10% of Russian oil would increase the price of Brent by around $6 from its current level of around $71 per barrel; a reduction of 20% could cause the Brent price to spike by $11.1 Either of these increases would markedly raise the prospects of a recession in the U.S. and many other economies around the globe.”
- “An alternative, and in our view superior, approach is to focus on the existing set of economic measures against Russia, of which the G-7 oil price cap and sanctions on the shadow fleet are the core. This existing suite of measures has several advantages:”
- “One, as we have shown in a Brookings blog post, U.S. sanctions appear to be effective at disrupting oil tanker traffic out of Russian ports without spiking global oil prices;”
- “Two, the level of the G-7 price cap and sanctions on Russian-controlled oil tankers can be scaled up and down incrementally, which gives U.S. policymakers a degree of control they would not have with 100 or 500% tariffs; and”
- “Three, this year’s wave of sanctions on the shadow fleet by the U.S., EU and U.K. make this an ideal time to use sanctions even more aggressively, taking this opportunity to increase pressure on the shadow fleet through lowering the price cap and instituting further enforcement measures.”
For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.
Ukraine-related negotiations:
- “Mr. Trump seems to have come to the conclusion that Mr. Putin is the barrier to the peace in Ukraine that Mr. Trump has promised he will deliver.”
- Charap argues, “If Mr. Trump believes that diplomacy has been tried and has failed, he is mistaken. A few phone calls and a couple of visits are not enough to end a war. ... And no one — maybe not even Mr. Putin himself — knows what he would accept if he were presented with a real negotiation process that required compromises from all sides. Until we test him with such a process, we cannot be sure that he is determined to fight on in any circumstances.”
- “Historically, negotiations to resolve major conflicts have been painstaking and protracted.”
- Charap recommends “Mr. Trump … empower a professional team of negotiators to engage the parties regularly. American mediators could use Mr. Kissinger’s shuttle model, or they could lead talks in a third country with Russian and Ukrainian delegations permanently stationed there.”
- He observes, “Mr. Trump’s insistence on ending the war in Ukraine has already produced some important results. He has greatly shifted the conversation in key capitals, and thanks to his combination of carrots and sticks a variety of consultations have begun.”
- Charap concludes, “Negotiations to end the war in Ukraine have not failed. They haven’t yet properly begun.”
- Mark N. Katz writes, “Putin could strategically benefit from ending the Ukraine war by shifting US focus toward China, reducing dependence on Beijing, and regaining leverage—but he is too proud to do it.”
- Katz observes, “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas that Beijing did not want to see Russia lose its war with Ukraine, citing concerns that the US would then focus more on its rivalry with China.”
- He argues, “An end to the war would also lessen Russia’s growing economic dependence on China, allowing Moscow to try to play the West and China against each other.”
- Katz notes, “A truly Machiavellian Putin, then, would see it in Moscow’s interests to end Russia’s confrontation with the West to encourage the US to turn its attention to confronting China.”
- “If Putin accepted Trump’s proposal for a ceasefire in place, along with assurances that Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO anytime soon, Putin could receive numerous benefits.”
- He explains: “Pressure in Europe would immediately arise to drop Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia, resume buying Russian petroleum, and cut back on the increased defense spending they have pledged.”
- Katz continues, “A ceasefire that leaves Russian forces in control of just the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies… would be popular with much of the Russian public, whose opinion polls indicate that they want to see a peaceful settlement.”
- He concludes, “Putin, of course, has not acted on this Machiavellian logic and is highly unlikely to do so. Hubris, contempt for the West, conviction that Russia will soon prevail against Ukraine… all motivate him to continue the war.”
- Juan Manuel Santos writes, “Direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, most recently towards the end of July, generate some hope that progress can be made towards a negotiated political solution. Yet these talks risk faltering if they are not put on a firmer footing.”
- Santos argues, “A crucial next step is for the parties to agree a framework for guiding longer-term negotiations.”
- Santos notes, “America should work with others, particularly countries that have built trust with both sides, on an initial drafting document… A draft framework would seek to bridge the gulf between each side’s opening positions; agree on the terms of a ceasefire; and give a structure to the more drawn-out negotiations that would follow.”
- He recommends, “The negotiation process must include channels for dialogue involving European leaders; it must also consider Europe’s long-term relationship with Russia… Negotiations on these three tracks—Russia-Ukraine relations, Europe’s security architecture and strategic stability between Russia and America—can be mutually supportive.”
- Santos concludes, “Working towards a just and sustainable end to the war in Ukraine will take time, diplomacy and brave leadership. Seizing the moment to advance negotiations is the important next step.”
"Russia’s bad month of diplomacy," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 07.21.25.
- Nigel Gould-Davies writes, “Trump’s relationship with Putin has never been worse. If NATO implements its new spending commitments, and Trump his sanctions, time may no longer be on Russia’s side.”
- Gould-Davies observes, “For the first time, and using harsh language, Trump clearly blamed Putin for the failure to end the Russia–Ukraine war.”
- He explains, “Trump has implicitly recognized that his policy to end the war by pressuring Ukraine and offering inducements to Russia has failed.”
- Gould-Davies notes, “Trump has now issued an ultimatum to Russia for the first time.”
- “It is a direct result of Putin’s failure to offer even a plausible pretense of interest in peace. His diplomacy is focused far more on deepening ties with close partners abetting his war – above all, North Korea and China – than compromising his war aims with adversaries.”
- Gould-Davies cautions, “The credibility of Trump’s sanctions threat is also in doubt. If implemented, it would result in a massive rise in US import costs. Trump has failed to follow through on earlier threats of sanctions on Russia and has watered down tariffs on other countries.”
- He writes, “After the June NATO summit, which agreed to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP and helped repair transatlantic ties, the Alliance has never felt stronger under a Trump presidency.”
- Gould-Davies concludes, “Six months on, their relations have never been worse. Putin has thrown away a strong diplomatic hand. This may prove as fateful an error as his invasion of Ukraine.”
“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at 11th Terra Scientia National Educational Youth Forum, Solnechnogorsk, July 28, 2025,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 07.28.25. Partially machine-translated. Clues from Russian Views.
- “The territorial integrity of Iraq, Syria, and Libya - something the West seems to care about only in the case of Ukraine - was gravely undermined during the Arab Spring in 2011. These countries remain in a pretty bad shape.”
- “In Europe, the Ukraine issue represents the West’s policy of aiming to inflict a 'strategic defeat' on Russia. “
- “The fact that Europeans genuinely seek to 'defeat us' is confirmed daily. New German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently stated (I’m not sure he understood what he was saying) that Germany must once again become the strongest military power in Europe. It was the strongest military power before World War I and before World War II and started both. Now, he wants Germany to become 'Europe’s top military force' again.”
- “As Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently said, former US President Joe Biden once said in a conversation with him that Russia must be 'destroyed.' Not just strategically defeated, but destroyed. It’s about a war of annihilation. President Trump, though, holds a different view. As he’s repeatedly stated, he is guided by common sense, primarily business and policies that benefit the United States.”
- “We have always advocated dialogue, even in the most difficult times.”… “The dialogue we are conducting with the Trump administration shows that reasonable people remain in the West.”….“President of Russia Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that we are open to dialogue with any other country, including European countries.”
- “In the meantime, a multipolar world is taking shape. This process is objective. No one can do anything about it – not with sanctions, nor with tariff wars, nor even by provoking ‘hot’ wars, as the West is already planning now.”
- “President Putin has set the tasks which we are fulfilling on the international stage, primarily along the line of military contact. These tasks will be accomplished. We insist on what is our legitimate demand: ensuring our security. First, no involvement of Ukraine in NATO and no further expansion of the alliance at all… Second, everyone says: ‘Russia should return to the 1991 borders.’ In 1991, when Ukraine was recognized as an independent state, its main founding principle was its Declaration of Independence, which stated: ‘A non-aligned, non-nuclear, neutral state.’ It was precisely in this capacity that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was recognized.”
- “Territories are not important to us. Sometimes people say: ‘They have occupied territory, it must be liberated.’ These territories are not important to us—we have the largest country in the world.4 What we care about is that people who have lived there for centuries and who are bearers of Russian culture, language, education, and who want to raise their children in this culture, are not exterminated and that their rights are protected. This is an absolutely legitimate demand.”
- “In these exercises, when US and South Korean forces work together, nuclear weapon elements are already appearing. This is worrisome. All the more so given that this AUKUS trio (US–UK–Australia), created to build nuclear submarines for Australia, is also a transfer of nuclear technology, and there are serious doubts whether these actions comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- The authors write, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has marked a paradigm shift in how Europe must conceptualize relations with Moscow… Europe must grapple with the longer-term implications of an era of protracted confrontation with Russia, one that will almost certainly outlast the fighting in Ukraine.”
- They note, “With the United States now playing less of a deterrent role, it is paramount that Europe develop a common strategy toward dealing with… a revanchist Russia.”
- The report argues, “Europe and Russia will likely remain antagonists for years to come. The Kremlin possesses immense disruptive global power and is willing to take great risks to advance its geopolitical agenda, including potentially even risking a land incursion into NATO territory.”
- The authors call for “a new European containment strategy for Russia in full recognition of Europe’s structural complexities… European states, the European Union, and Europe’s NATO members [must] adopt a common strategic approach toward Russia.”
- “This report calls for a new European containment strategy for Russia... More than 75 years have passed since… George Kennan first formulated that strategy in his famous ‘Long Telegram’ from Moscow.”
- They stress, “Today… a wealthy, democratic Europe will have to take on more of the burden of containing Russia’s renewed campaign to expand its influence and weaken the West.”
- “A modern containment strategy must grapple in particular with the role of China, which is both an enabler of Russia’s war effort and a rising global power that will remain the central focus of U.S. foreign policy.”
- “While Russian officials depict Putin's determination to carry on fighting as a necessary, strategic choice, Western analysts see the refusal to compromise as a strategic error with a colossal price tag in terms of international clout, markets for its energy exports and global allies.”
- “Russia's main allies in the Middle East, Iran and Syria, have been severely diminished, and it's losing traditional friends in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
- Tellingly, its chief arms supplier is now pariah state North Korea.”
- “The swift war Putin planned has instead destroyed relations with the European Union and energized NATO, which has admitted new members Finland and Sweden and agreed to boost military spending to 5% of GDP.”
- “Meanwhile, relations have soured with important neighbors including Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan—with Armenia announcing plans to likely leave the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization regional security grouping, and Azerbaijan furious that Putin refused to take responsibility when Russian forces allegedly shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane.”
- “The war has also left Russia's economy deeply dependent on China. In 2021, before the war, Russia exported 49% of its oil and 74% of its gas to Europe, but it slashed imports with the war, and Russia now sells most of its energy at discount rates to China and India.”
- “Russia is now spending nearly 40% of its budget on defense and security.... It estimated the full-year cost could reach 2% of Russian GDP.”
- “Putin's rebuff of Trump's major concessions—barring Ukraine from NATO and letting Russia keep the territories it had seized—suggests that his determination to fight on is not centered on protecting rational Russian security interests and appears to be a more an emotional fixation for Putin, said Michael Kimmage, a Russia expert and professor at the Catholic University of America.... headed that while Putin has been driven partly by concerns over NATO expansion toward Russia's borders, there is also the sense that he is "exacting revenge" on Ukraine for not being an obedient client state like Belarus.”
- “Historically… Russia always enjoyed the most prosperity when it had deep economic ties with its Western neighbors, according to historian Stephen Kotkin of Stanford University in a July article, "Where is Russia's place in the World?"”
"Trump Still Wants Out of Ukraine," John Bolton, The Wall Street Journal, 07.22.25.
- John Bolton writes, “President Trump's decision to send more Patriot air-defenses to Ukraine was the right call… But Mr. Trump seems more interested in extricating himself from Ukraine, diplomatically and militarily.”
- Bolton argues, “These points don't necessarily signal Mr. Trump's newfound support for Ukraine. Instead, they underline Mr. Trump's misery at remaining ensnarled in the Ukraine-Russia conflict—a war he sees as Europe's.”
- He points out, “Reports that Mr. Trump would send long-range missiles to Ukraine proved incorrect. And the Patriot decision, while justifiably welcomed by Kyiv, is only temporary.”
- Bolton notes, “He stressed that Washington isn't giving Kyiv anything, only manufacturing Patriots and getting paid for them by NATO allies who pass them—or previously delivered Patriots—to Ukraine. This is foolish, as if the finances somehow outweighed the decision's geostrategic benefits to America.”
- He writes, “Mr. Trump's determination to avoid the implication of more protracted military aid revealed his unspoken motives… He also hasn't lost political support even from Republicans previously opposed to aiding Ukraine militarily.”
- Bolton warns, “The fundamental issue is Mr. Trump's ignoring of inadequate defense budgets, including the current spending Congress is planning for fiscal year 2026… Without more forward-thinking from Mr. Trump, his second term could become a defense-budget desert.”
- He observes, “The Kremlin and many close observers see the 50-day ‘ultimatum’ to Russia as a license to continue unstinting attacks on Ukraine until the 49th day. That has been the pattern so far, with Russian offensives on a new front still likely.”
- Bolton concludes, “Mr. Trump is building his own off-ramp from Ukraine. He satisfied immediate demands for aid by Ukraine's beleaguered defenders but avoided long-term commitments.”
- Christopher S. Chivvis argues, “For decades, collective European self-defense was merely an aspiration. Today, the time to realize this goal is finally at hand.”
- According to Chivvis, “To ensure that this necessary rebalancing proceeds, the Trump administration must withdraw substantial numbers of U.S. forces from Europe, starting now, and truly shift the burden of the region’s conventional defense onto the continent.”
- Chivvis argues, “The best window for Europe to take on a greater share of the burden for its defense is now—not in five or ten years when political will may have faded or an emergency elsewhere forces a sudden U.S. withdrawal.”
- He asserts, “The reality is that U.S. troop deployments in Europe are larger than necessary to defend core U.S. interests on the continent, so they will remain near the top of the list of cuts.”
- In Chivvis’s view, “Concentrating U.S. resources on nuclear, cyber, and gray-zone defense while leaving land defense largely to European allies will be a more sustainable division of responsibilities as Washington pares down its commitments.”
- Chivvis notes, “Europe has never had a more auspicious moment to take the lead in continental defense. Russia’s attack on Ukraine showed European publics the harsh reality of the threat from Moscow and softened their resistance to increases in military spending.”
- He recommends, “The Trump administration should therefore announce plans to begin an immediate withdrawal of these forces, to be completed by the end of 2026.”
- Chivvis concludes, “In the end, a serious, well-equipped European self-defense will be a more credible deterrent to a Russian attack than a relatively weak Europe perpetually reliant on the United States.”
- “She is uncertain about whether Mr. Trump’s harsher tone toward Mr. Putin in recent days represents a decisive change in his position, but she is skeptical that it would blunt Mr. Putin’s aggression. “I don’t think Putin is really concerned if Trump’s angry, because he thinks there’s a limit to what Trump’s going to do—and I think he’s right,” said Ms. Hill, who formulated Russia policy in the National Security Council during Mr. Trump’s first term (she also served under George W. Bush and Barack Obama). “He’s pretty confident right now, particularly given the chaos in the United States, and the United States undermining its own security.”
- “In the strategic review, Ms. Hill and her co-authors, George Robertson, a former secretary general of NATO, and Richard Barrons, a retired British Army general, called for new investments in British nuclear and conventional forces. They also focused on the home front, arguing that Britain needed a whole-of-society approach to make it more resilient against proliferating threats.”
- “With Mr. Trump’s return to office, Ms. Hill sees parallels between the United States and fallen empires. The president, she said, could end up playing a role like that of Boris Yeltsin, who brought on the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. “Trump is deconstructing the United States, just as Yeltsin deconstructed the Soviet Union,” she said.
- “What Putin has tried to do in retaking Ukraine is a massive blunder, a massive error,” she said, arguing that Russia would not recapture imperial glory and would ruin its economy in the process. “It’s going to be harder this time around to demilitarize the economy,” she said, “than it was with a collapse of the Soviet Union.” And yet Ms. Hill predicted that Russia would survive this misadventure, as it has many others in its history.”
"The Ukraine war will shape the world," Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 07.25.25.
- Martin Wolf writes, “The outcome of the war in Ukraine might shape not just the future of Ukraine, but of European liberal democracy itself.”
- Wolf states, “Ukraine is fighting for the right of a people to choose their own fate. Russia is an autocracy, as it has always been, ruled by a president whose will is law.”
- He cites Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, saying Putin “believes that it is Russia’s divine right to rule Ukraine, to wipe out the country’s national identity, and to integrate its people into a Greater Russia.”
- Wolf argues, “Ukraine is fighting a power intent on dominating Europe. A victorious Russia would be the biggest military power in Europe, directly threatening neighboring members of NATO and the EU.”
- “If the Europeans fail to act effectively, the U.S. stands aside, and the axis of Russia, China and North Korea wins, what will happen to the balance of forces and ideas across the globe?”
- Wolf warns, “We must not repeat the mistakes of the appeasers before the second world war. We must at least give Ukraine the resources it needs.”
- He points out, “The population and GDP (at PPP) of the EU, plus UK, are 3.5 times and 4.8 times as big as Russia’s, respectively. In such a well-matched military contest, resources could be decisive.”
- Wolf concludes, “If democratic Europe cannot act in concert now, it is doomed.”
"Putin's Blitz Has United Ukraine," Jillian Kay Melchior, The Wall Street Journal, 07.23.25.
- Jillian Kay Melchior writes, “The sentiment is widespread as Russia conducts missile and drone attacks on the Ukrainian capital and other cities. Vladimir Putin wants this blitz to demoralize Ukrainians, reassure Russians, and persuade the West that Kyiv is losing.”
- Melchior cites Mamuka Mamulashvili: “Mr. Putin's chief goal is ‘to terrorize the civilian population to influence politics, to start negotiations with Russian conditions.’”
- She observes, “Weary civilians are enraged by the attacks. Many donate to support the military, and the raids could boost voluntary enlistment. 'We are really becoming more united,' Ms. Ustynova says.”
- Melchior quotes Mykhailo Podolyak: “Some have a counter-intuitive interpretation of Russia's drone blitz: It's 'an indicator of a lack of success on the battlefield' for Russia.”
- Melchior adds, “None of the territory Russia has seized this year is strategically or even operationally significant. Ukrainian defenses have held around key fortified districts and fortress cities in the east.”
- She writes, “As this becomes a war of attrition, Russia hopes to establish resource superiority. The Kremlin is ramping up production of missiles and artillery in addition to drones, and it has received Iranian and North Korean military support.”
- Melchior notes, “Ukraine is also stepping up weapons production, but it can't yet make some essential arms, such as interceptors for ballistic missiles. Kyiv also needs Western funding to help Ukrainian arms production match capacity.”
- She concludes, “Mr. Putin wants to erode the American and European will to arm Ukraine, and one way is promoting the myth that Russian momentum is unstoppable and Russian victory is inevitable. But Mr. Putin's drone blitz could backfire with President Trump, who recently announced more support for Ukraine and expressed frustration with the Russian dictator.”
- “Russia is using Ukraine as a testing ground for its air and missile warfare model, which could later be employed in a conflict with NATO countries.”
- “The Russian military’s current model combines massed missile and drone strikes with an economic calculation intended to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses and its financial resources.”
- “Launching large-scale attacks forces Ukraine to use expensive interceptors and air defense missiles to destroy relatively cheap Russian drones and missiles.”
- “The financial asymmetry is crucial: Russia spends less per attack than Ukraine does per interception, aiming for a situation where Ukraine cannot sustain its defense in the long run.”
- “This approach attempts to create a ‘missile-financial balance’—a contest in which economic resources and industrial capacities become as decisive as military effectiveness.”
- If successful, Russia’s strategy could serve as a proof of concept for future operations against better-armed Western or NATO opponents.”
- “NATO’s current stockpiles of interceptors and air defense systems are limited and replenishment is slow, raising concerns about similar exhaustion tactics in a direct confrontation.”
- “The evolving air war over Ukraine is both a humanitarian and strategic crisis, but it is also a laboratory for new types of warfare, with lessons that extend well beyond this conflict.”
- “Let me conclude by saying that we find ourselves at a very [dangerous point where] European leaders, if I may call them that way, would delude themselves into thinking that Russia will not respond, at least not retaliate, themselves, against the European powers for what they are doing in Ukraine and the weapons they are sending to Ukraine to hit Russia.”
- “Let me also say that this point we’re going through is more dangerous than almost anything else we’ve seen during the Cold War. I would say that it’s more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. One of the predictions that I hope we can make sure doesn’t happen is that this present crisis will not stop until and unless we look into the abyss, like they did in 1962, and step back from that. But unlike in 1962, the new nuclear crisis that could put into question the continued existence of much of the world, if not all of it, will not happen over there. It will not happen in the Caribbean or anywhere else.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Spending 5% on defense doesn’t make NATO stronger," Minna Ålander, Financial Times, 07.28.25.
- "West’s Ignorance Fuels a Longer War in Ukraine," George Beebe, Quincy Institute, 07.22.25. Podcast.
- "Allied Arsenal: Building Strength Through Shared Production", Trevor Phillips‑Levine and Andrew Tenbusch, War on the Rocks, 07.22.25.
- "Free Expression: Europe Will Never Keep Its Promises to Trump on Defense," Gerard Baker, The Wall Street Journal, 07.22.25.
- "U.S. Weapons and European Capability Gaps," Justin Bronk, RUSI, 07.28.25.
- "Three Ways America’s World Order Could Collapse," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 07.28.25.
- "Western liberalism’s waning star," Edward Luce, Financial Times, 07.28.25.
- "Liberalism Doomed the Liberal International Order," Stacie E. Goddard, Ronald R. Krebs, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, Berthold Rittberger, Foreign Affairs, 07.28.25.
- “Trump Shouldn’t Settle for European Spending Pledges,” Justin Logan, Foreign Policy, 07.27.25.
- "The growing BRICS divide between carbon and electro-states", Benjamin H Bradlow, Financial Times, 07.22.25.
- “Russia has exhausted its limit of verbal warnings to the West. Strengthening deterrence now requires action,” Russia Direct (video), 07.22.25.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
"Europe’s approach to China and Russia isn’t working," Alexander Gabuev, Financial Times, 07.24.25.
- “Alexander Gabuev writes, “The problem is that for more than three years, this approach hasn’t worked—and nothing suggests it will now.”
- “According to Gabuev, “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told EU officials that Beijing doesn’t want to see Russia lose in Ukraine. That should come as no surprise; it’s not in China’s interests to see its giant nuclear-armed neighbor destabilized, which could be the result of defeat.”
- “Gabuev observes, “Western attempts to pressure China to simply abandon Putin, without outlining an end to the war that would ensure regime continuity in Russia, have yielded no results.”
- He explains, “China believes that even if it did put pressure on the Kremlin, it would get no material incentives from the west in exchange.”
- “Gabuev argues, “Fierce western criticism of Beijing’s support for Moscow has been accompanied by a more muted reaction to India dramatically increasing its purchases of Russian oil… prompting China to conclude that Europe and America are hypocritical.”
- “With Putin refusing to back down, a mercurial Donald Trump in the White House, and Europe showing no signs of going soft on China economically, Beijing sees no incentive to change course.”
- “Gabuev states, “Beijing is grooming Moscow as a long-term junior partner, and unlike the west, is preparing for a post-Putin Russia by cultivating ties to all the players who may one day shape the Kremlin’s trajectory.”
- He concludes, “China won’t dump Russia any time soon, and making frustration over that reality one of the organizing principles of Europe’s China policy won’t help—even if Brussels continues to call out Beijing for moralistic reasons.”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms
- “The study found that there is consensus within the Russian military-analytical community that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is highly dependent on the U.S., both technically and politically. Our analysis concluded that while Russia perceives the UK’s deterrent as a credible threat that is able to impose unacceptable damage to Russia, the credibility of British capabilities is considered relatively weaker than the French due to the UK’s greater reliance on the U.S.”
- “The French deterrent is considered politically and technologically highly independent. France’s political leadership has historically been considered friendlier to Russia, with a more national doctrine. Therefore, while French nuclear capabilities are considered highly credible, it has not been perceived as a threat to Russia. This may now be changing given more explicit statements since 2025 on questions of extended deterrence against Russia.
- “The Russian expert community continues to perceive NATO as a tool for U.S. foreign, defense and security policy. As such, the British and French nuclear deterrents are rarely discussed in the context of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, which primarily focuses on the U.S. nuclear arsenal.”
- “Russian military discussions around NATO’s nuclear deterrence also continue to emphasize the role of strategic conventional capabilities (such as long-range precision strike) in strategic deterrence. Therefore, it is essential that European capitals not only focus on their nuclear capabilities when considering the deterrence of Russia, but also consider the deterrent effect of their strategic conventional capabilities (or lack thereof), including long-range precision strike and missile defense systems, among others.”
- "Increasing the strategic submarine force is among our priority areas. Naturally, the priority in it is the construction of strategic submarine missile carriers, one of the crucial components of our nuclear 'triad' that, I repeat, allows Russia to maintain a balance of forces in the world."
- "Four more Borei-A class submarines are scheduled to join our marine nuclear forces in the coming years."
- "Two of them are currently under construction. They are the latest-generation strategic submarines carrying Bulava ballistic missiles and other cutting-edge weaponry."
- "Currently, the construction of four Yasen-M class multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine cruisers equipped with cruise missiles is underway at the Sevmash shipyard. Plans include the construction of two more submarines of this class."
- "Last year, we approved a comprehensive targeted program to create a fifth-generation strategic submarine."
- "Missile carriers of this class are equipped with high-precision weapons and have modern navigation, communications and sonar equipment."
- "Today, here in Severodvinsk, one of Russia’s leading shipbuilding centers, we are raising the naval flag on the Knyaz Pozharsky strategic submarine cruiser and officially put it in service with the Russian Navy."
- "In the very near future, this new missile-carrying submarine will take up duty to safeguard our maritime borders and strengthening the security of the Fatherland."
- "Such submarines form the core of the naval strategic nuclear forces."
- "With their extensive modernization potential, they will ensure the security of our state for decades to come."
- "Today, there are more than 70 vessels at various stages of construction at Russian shipyards. Here at Sevmash alone, six new nuclear submarines are scheduled to be built by 2030."
“Will Nuclear Weapons Help Prevent a War Between Russia and NATO?” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 07.24.25. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
Ivan Timofeev writes:
- “A larger scale military confrontation between Russia and NATO is looming behind the Ukrainian conflict… When speaking of the low probability of armed conflict between Russia and NATO, it is logical to cite the factor of nuclear deterrence.”
- According to Timofeev, “In international relations, a stable perception of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence has taken hold… But is this really the case?”
- “There are plenty of political reasons for a military clash between Russia and NATO. ... However, the situation may change… At some point, the industrial, financial, and resource capabilities of NATO may surpass Russia’s potential in conventional arms, creating the preconditions for mounting pressure.”
- He notes: “Can such a development be prevented by nuclear deterrence? At first glance, undoubtedly… But when it comes to using nuclear weapons… two alternatives appear: a preventive or a retaliatory strike.”
- “In both scenarios, NATO has the ability to launch retaliatory nuclear and non-nuclear strikes… Russia risks receiving an equally painful blow in response.”
- Timofeev warns: “The danger is that NATO countries may develop an illusion of impunity—that Russia will not dare to use nuclear weapons out of fear of retaliation.”
- “There will be no winners in a nuclear war. There will be winners only if someone shows weakness. The problem is, counting on the weakness of an opponent may prove to be a mistake and catastrophic.”
- In conclusion: “Nuclear weapons remain a cornerstone of deterrence. But the taboo on their use and their ability to avert aggression are once again being called into question.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Nuclear Deterrence is NATO’s Best Weapon Against Russia," Tyler Bowen, War on the Rocks, 07.23.25. (paid access)
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security/AI:
- “Russian state-owned airline Aeroflot was forced to cancel dozens of flights on Monday, after a hacking group claimed credit for a devastating year-long cyber attack,” Courtney Weaver wrote. “The outage suffered by the country’s largest air carrier is the latest in a series of cyber attacks against state-owned Russian enterprises this year, and one of several claimed by a new hacker group called Silent Crow,” she wrote. “By late morning on Monday, 49 flights had been cancelled and dozens more delayed, according to Aeroflot,” according to Weaver.
- “It is not known whether Silent Crow, which posts messages in Russian and only created a Telegram account last December, is linked to a foreign state,” Weaver wrote. “The group said on Monday it had been inside Aeroflot’s IT system for a year, in an attack orchestrated with Cyber Partisans, a group of Belarusian hackers who operate outside their home come country,” according to Weaver.
- “Silent Crow said it had been able to 'obtain and download' Aeroflot’s 'entire array of flight history databases,' destroy 7,000 physical and virtual servers, and steal 20 terabytes of data, including files from company surveillance systems and audio recordings of executives’ conversations,” according to Weaver.
- Reuters journalists report, “During a pivotal push by Ukraine to retake territory from Russia in late September 2022, Elon Musk gave an order that disrupted the counteroffensive and dented Kyiv’s trust in Starlink, the satellite internet service the billionaire provided early in the war.”
- “Musk instructed SpaceX to cut Starlink coverage in areas Ukraine was fighting to reclaim, reportedly due to concerns about provoking Russian nuclear retaliation. The blackout led to a communications crisis for Ukrainian troops, impacting drone operations and artillery targeting.”
- “Military officials say the order stalled the encirclement of Russian forces in Beryslav and shocked Ukrainian and SpaceX personnel. Starlink’s reliability and Musk’s autonomy over the system have since raised international alarm, with some lawmakers warning of the dangers of “concentrated power in unregulated domains.”
- “The U.S. and European governments, along with Ukraine, now depend heavily on Starlink for military communications. Attempts to develop alternatives face technical and financial hurdles. Officials in countries like Poland and Taiwan are pursuing redundancy to avoid overreliance on Musk.”
- “Musk’s control over Starlink and SpaceX’s global clout have grown, and his business decisions, such as the Ukraine shutdown, now influence geopolitics. As one Ukrainian official noted, “their entire front line would collapse if I turned it off.”
- “Ukrainian officials continue to express gratitude but are seeking secure alternatives, recognizing the risks of relying on a single private provider for vital national security infrastructure.”
- Stephen Prince and Elise Stefanik write, “Cyberwar is no longer a future threat—it is today's front line. Whether at the fingertips of Iran, Russia or, most concerningly, China, cyber conflict is now the continuation of war by other tools.”
- They argue, “To compete and win in this new arena, the U.S. must take a bold step and establish a national institution to train and deploy the next generation of digital defenders. We would call it the United States Advanced Technology Academy (USATA).”
- Prince and Stefanik note, “Currently, relatively few STEM graduates pursue careers in government, despite high demand for their skills. As of 2024, the Pentagon was short 30,000 cyber workers.”
- They observe, “China, by contrast, graduates six times more engineers and systematically channels them into strategic sectors such as AI, quantum computing and 6G.”
- The authors write, “Our adversaries are building digital systems designed for surveillance, censorship and control. We must ensure that our digital future reflects the American values of freedom, innovation and the rule of law.”
- “The idea of a national technology academy isn't new. Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt championed it while serving on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, which operated from 2018 to 2021 and stemmed from a bill, one of us, Stefanik, wrote.”
- Prince and Stefanik suggest, “Trump can take the next bold step. He could establish the USATA by executive order, directing the Defense Department and key civilian agencies to define service pathways, assess long-term talent needs and coordinate with the private sector.”
- They conclude, “Let's build the USATA and ensure that the next generation of Americans has the training, equipment and inspiration to fight to secure our digital future.”
- Vasilyeva and Lobzina report, “Russia’s mobile internet networks now have frequent blackouts because of the war with Ukraine,” as authorities shut down data services daily in unpredictable regions to thwart Ukrainian drone attacks that use mobile networks for navigation.
- The shutdowns are highly disruptive for everyday Russians—affecting maps, banking, toll payments, and more—sometimes leaving people stranded and unable to pay for basic needs.
- These blackouts are a sharp reversal for a nation whose government has championed online services; one user called it a “digital gulag.”
- Critics warn that these disruptions could be a pretext for broader information control, while authorities frame them as necessary safety measures in wartime.
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "America Should Assume the Worst About AI: How to Plan for a Tech‑Driven Geopolitical Crisis," Matan Chorev and Joel Predd, Foreign Affairs, 07.22.25.
- "The wrong place to build AI," Christopher S. Chivvis and Sam Winter-Levy, The Washington Post, 07.23.25.
Energy exports from CIS:
"Why Oil Sanctions No Longer Work," Gregory Brew, Foreign Policy, 07.23.25.
- Gregory Brew writes, “Sanctions are conceived to be coercive tools, inflicting economic pain until a state changes its behavior. In practice, however, states resist sanctions, absorbing the costs while exploring ways around them.”
- Brew observes, “Now, the age of oil sanctions as a coercive tool is coming to an end.”
- He explains, “The cases of both Iran and Russia show the rise and fall of oil sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft... Instead of disappearing, the market for sanctioned oil has been reshaped around new realities entirely.”
- Brew notes, “China relies on Iran for about 14.6% of its total crude imports... Beijing, appreciative of gaining a means of leverage over Tehran but unwilling to take the relationship much further, has obscured the trade in customs data to maintain deniability.”
- “Sanctions on Russia have provided attractive commercial loopholes for India, where refiners buy Russian crude at a steep discount and then reexport the products to Europe, pocketing substantial profits.”
- He argues, “In neither case did sanctions change state behavior. Iran defied U.S. pressure on its nuclear program, while Russia has not backed down over Ukraine.”
- Brew warns, “Efforts to isolate both countries… have made these producers dependent on Chinese demand and, in turn, provided Beijing with captive sources of crude and other products.”
- He concludes, “Sanctions on oil can be maintained, but imagining that they will change Iranian or Russian behavior in a meaningful way is a pretense that needs to be dropped. Sanctions have reworked the global oil market, forcing Iran and Russia closer to China and bifurcating global energy flows along geopolitical rather than commercial lines.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- No significant developments.
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- Milana Mazaeva and Paul Sonne report, “Russian authorities are increasingly pursuing corruption cases against regional and military officials, legal maneuverings that are putting the elite on guard and in some cases may be aimed at quelling public anger about battlefield failures.”
- They note, “Government officials in three of the five Russian regions bordering Ukraine have been arrested and accused… of embezzling funds that Moscow had earmarked for border fortifications, cases brought after successful Ukrainian cross-border attacks.”
- The authors observe, “Last year, Russia also began a rare, high-level purge of top military generals and defense ministry leaders through corruption cases.”
- “As a rule, Mr. Putin does not admit battlefield errors or publicly blame loyal aides for lapses… So the anti-corruption cases have become a convenient option, allowing Moscow to appease the public without admitting a failure by the central apparatus.”
- Mazaeva and Sonne report, “In the first quarter of this year, the number of corruption-related crimes identified by the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office rose by 24% compared with the prior year… Corruption cases generally involve public officials.”
- The article concludes, “The specter of corruption cases is adding to the pressure, particularly after Mr. Starovoyt’s death. ‘It’s a very effective category that provides a legal veneer,’ Mr. Szakonyi said. ‘It doesn’t force you to touch upon the other underlying issues of how these people got their positions, how the state is structured or how these decisions got made.’”
- Mary Ilyushina writes, “The apparent suicide of a high-ranking Russian official has sent an alarming signal to the country's political elite about the profound wartime changes to the political system under the guise of a vigorous anti-corruption campaign.”
- Ilyushina reports, “Roman Starovoit, the governor of the Kursk region for five years, was found dead this month… Russian media reported that he was under investigation for corruption surrounding the construction of fortifications along the border with Ukraine.”
- She observes, “Traditional exits once available to embattled officials—resignation, reassignment or a hushed emigration—are rapidly disappearing, as the roster of offenses that the regime interprets as threatening state security grows.”
- Tatiana Stanovaya comments, “A new feature of the Russian regime… has manifested itself. It's kind of a black zone of political responsibility: Any activity or inactivity that… increases the vulnerability of the state… must be mercilessly and uncompromisingly punished.”
- Ilyushina highlights, “In the past year, special services have launched investigations into five former heads of Russian regions, a number unheard of in modern-day Russia, where high-ranking officials usually enjoyed lenient punishments.”
- She notes, “With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the stakes have become much higher and the arrests of officials have become more frequent—though still rarely at the ministerial level.”
- Alexander Baunov calls Starovoit's death a “turning point for the ruling elite even if it remains an isolated case,” comparing it to the purges of the 1930s.
- Alexandra Prokopenko concludes, “Starovoit's death shows how much the pressure has grown within a system from which there is no escape. A senior position, demonstrative loyalty, and even a track record of working toward the war effort are no longer enough to provide protection.”
"Despite all its problems, the economy can enable Putin to continue his war." Vladislav Inozemtsev on why you shouldn’t count on an economic crisis in Russia
Evgeny Senshin, Republic, 07.24.25.
- “Vladislav Inozemtsev asserts that there is no recession in Russia, despite a slowdown in economic growth after last year’s strong performance and high interest rates.
- “In his view, the Russian economy is capable of functioning under conditions of zero growth—people have become used to living without increases in their standard of living, and this does not destabilize the system. “Putin has essentially trained Russians not to expect growth,” the economist says.
- “He notes that serious decline is seen only in individual sectors—metallurgy, automotive, construction, and coal—but overall, there is no crisis.”
- “The economy still has plenty of hidden reserves: large deposits held by companies and banks, as well as household savings. There are no significant problems with budget deficit financing.”
- “Inozemtsev believes the war has become the central factor for the economy: defense spending has surged, but, for now, the system can withstand the pressure. Even with current defense expenditures (13.5–15 trillion rubles in 2025–26), the economy will manage.”
- “The situation would become critical only with further uncontrolled increases in military spending—“the economy can't sustain that.”
- “Business and the government’s economic bloc express dissatisfaction with high interest rates and the outpacing growth of defense spending; development in other sectors is stalling, but catastrophe is not expected.”
- “Inozemtsev concludes that economic hardship will not bring an end to the war or a change in course: “Despite all its problems, the economy can enable Putin to continue his war. And this will last for a long time.”
"Putin's Outdated Image Lays Bare Russia’s Flawed Political Decision-Making Process," Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Politika, 07.25.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- Andrey Pertsev writes, “For more than two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has cultivated an image as a strong leader… But in part because Putin is now an elderly man, his image now seems outdated.”
- Pertsev observes, “In recent months, Putin’s appearances have regularly included strange and sometimes inappropriate pronouncements peppered with impolite expressions.”
- He notes, “Equally embarrassing are Putin’s comments suggesting he does not grasp the real state of affairs in Russia.”
- “Putin has said his ‘good appearance’ is down to exercise, and has bragged about not wearing glasses… The oddness of such claims is amplified by the fact that Putin clearly undergoes regular plastic surgery and cosmetic procedures.”
- Pertsev describes, “While he regularly criticizes Western politicians… nothing actually comes of those threats. Such meaningless grumbling contrasts dramatically with Putin’s ruthless spy and macho man images.”
- He argues, “It would be logical for the Kremlin to try to come up with a new public persona for Putin… For example, he could be marketed as a wise elder statesman. However… either no one has ever suggested this or he has rejected the idea.”
- “Kremlin officials appear to be acting according to an old playbook: do what the tsar wants, and try not to anger him.”
- Pertsev concludes, “A failure to accept what’s happening risks turning Putin into a joke, and exposes serious problems with the political decision-making process in Russia. No one around Putin is willing to alert him to his own mistakes; in authoritarian regimes like modern Russia, such an intervention would simply be too risky.”
- “[Vladimir] Medinsky is often the subject of irony — both in Russia and in the West. Even in the Kremlin, he was called a ‘clown’ … However, Medinsky’s position in the Kremlin has significantly strengthened — especially after the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in March 2022 … [S]ince the summer of 2024, Medinsky has been given control of an entire division of the presidential administration, which oversees issues of cultural and historical-educational policy, the ‘department for creating ideology,’ as the source described it.”
- “What set Medinsky apart was his obsession with Russian history. ‘From the very beginning, he deeply impressed me with his very original, at the time seemingly marginal [concept of] Russian history. It boiled down to the idea that England had always been screwing Russia over, for a thousand years, and that we are actually pure as the driven snow. And everything that’s said about us is all myths…’ recalls an acquaintance of Medinsky.”
- “Under Medinsky, the Ministry of Culture became a full-fledged ideological instrument. … It was Medinsky, according to an acquaintance, who became one of the authors of the presidential decree on traditional spiritual and moral values, signed by Putin in 2022. The document became the foundation of Russia’s new conservative course … Now it is used as a tool of censorship.”
- “Medinsky is one of the few members of the presidential administration who, according to IStories sources, can arrange a meeting or a personal conversation with Putin. … In addition to heading the ‘ideology division’ … Medinsky is part of the inner circle of the president’s daughter [Katerina Tikhonova].”
- “Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin told the authors of this article that Medinsky, as part of the [Russian] negotiating team, exerts ‘psychological pressure’ on Ukrainians and plays the role of an ‘aggressive negotiator,’ declaring that Ukraine does not exist: ‘This appointment is a conscious choice by Putin, because Medinsky plays the role of ideologue… His appointment to the negotiations means that Putin is entering the negotiating process from these ideological positions.’”
- “Michael Calvey was a prominent member of this clan [the money men of early 1990s Moscow]. A charismatic American investor, he embraced the gold rush of the opening of Russian markets with a lucrative trading business, branching out with local partners into private equity. His spirited memoir, ‘Odyssey Moscow: One American’s Journey from Russia Optimist to Prisoner of the State,’ is an Icarus story of how a man seen as a legend in the Russian market ended up behind bars for an imaginary crime.”
- “‘Odyssey Moscow’ is a well-told account of dawning realization that profit and progress are not always bedfellows: wry in tone, at times a tad repetitive — but then so is life in the maw of the Russian Federation’s judicial system. Any outsider who fancies helping themselves to spoils of business in Russia now should read it as a caveat emptor.”
- “‘Our Dear Friends in Moscow’ charts the period parallel to Calvey’s story in the hothouse of liberal Moscow journalism. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan’s memoir is a lament for a ‘broken generation’—a Big Chill for the post-Soviet intelligentsia who had hopes of better things than the giant prison of the Putin state.”
- “Their book is a quest to unearth why so many of their former friends and colleagues became enthusiasts for the Kremlin autocrat. [Petya] Akopov became so zealous a supporter of the attacks on Ukraine that in 2022, the authorities removed one of his articles from publication for being too enthusiastic for the tentative public mood. [Evgeny] Krutikov is a regime loyalist now, ‘tense and bitter’ on a video call with the authors, with a touch of jokey complaint at their probing: ‘You are ruining my karma.’”
“Book Reviews: Russia & Eurasia,” Angela Stent, Survival, Vol. 67, No. 4 (07.25.25): 169–175.
- Stent reviews four recent books on Russia and Eurasia.
- [In “The Illegals,” Shaun Walker] “… chronicles the century-old Soviet and post-Soviet illegals program, a unique form of espionage that Russia has perfected. These were not spies operating under diplomatic cover. They were a separate caste known only to their handlers in Moscow and in-country… Walker concludes … [that the] program routinely failed to deliver. For every illegal who achieved something useful for Moscow, there were a dozen living frustrated lives that bore little espionage fruit’” (p. 350).
- [In “Perfect Storm,” Thane Gustafson attempts] “… to tell the broader story of Russia’s flawed opening to the West in its economic, technological and social dimensions, and the roles these played in its ultimate failure’ (p. 1). He explains how both sides’ unrealistic expectations for economic cooperation after 1991 contributed to the deterioration of overall ties between the West and Russia, culminating in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.”
- [In “Memory Makers,” Jade McGlynn writes that] “… In the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin created a commission to define a new, post-communist, unifying Russian national identity. The attempt failed and, when Vladimir Putin came to power, [Putin] took it upon himself to try again and redeem Russia’s past from the Soviet collapse. He has succeeded in doing that, as Jade McGlynn explains… by rewriting history to promote Russia’s identity as an eternally victorious, indestructible great power. To reject this version of history is to open oneself to state-sponsored invective and possible arrest.”
- [In their memoir, “Our Dear Friends in Moscow,” exiled Russian journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan] “… follow the personal trajectories of [former colleagues,] examining choices they made as Putin’s regime became increasingly repressive… They were working at Izvestia, which, at the beginning of Putin’s term, was still an independent newspaper. Putin soon began to force Yeltsin-era oligarchs to give up their media empires, but the authors believed that the internet would give them the freedom to express ideas without fearing reprisals… [T]hey soon discovered that ‘the FSB [Federal Security Service] had openly set its sights on building a full-scale propaganda and disinformation machine with the help of newspapers’ (p. 250).”
- [In “Odyssey Moscow,” Michael Calvey] “… highlights the arbitrary and corrupt nature of the Russian legal system, and the sub-optimal conditions he experienced in jail—as well as the camaraderie and generosity of his Russian cellmates… A firm believer in capitalism, he adds: ‘I soon came to believe that prison is probably an environment where communism actually works better than the alternatives’” (p. 53).
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Defense and aerospace:
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- “Russia Is Carrying Out Its Largest-Ever Naval Exercises—with One Big Omission,” Peter Suciu, National Interest, 07.25.25.
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
- Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani argue, “Over the past 20 months, Russia’s standing in the Middle East has cratered. Israel’s response to Hamas’s October 7 attacks has devastated the so-called axis of resistance, the Iranian-backed network with which Russia had forged close ties.”
- They write, “U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities severely weakened Russia’s most important regional ally. As a result, Russia’s reputation as a patron and guarantor of security in the region lies in tatters. In the new Middle East now taking shape, Moscow is no longer needed.”
- The authors state, “Moscow’s failures will resound beyond the Middle East. Russia’s abandonment of partners in the region should be a sobering lesson for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party: that in times of crisis, Russia will not be a reliable ally.”
- McFaul and Milani recount, “Putin’s push to expand Russia’s influence in the Middle East initially yielded results. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran provided thousands of deadly Shahed drones to support the effort. Arab monarchies have abstained from UN votes criticizing Russia for the invasion and have not joined the international sanctions coalition.”
- They note, “After Hamas launched its attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, however, Putin’s strategy began to unravel... The Assad regime in Syria, long a valuable Russian client, collapsed spectacularly. Putin gave Assad and his family asylum in Russia but did nothing to repel rebel forces as they took Damascus.”
- The article explains, “Russia suffered an even more serious reputational blow in the Middle East when Israeli and U.S. armed forces bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities in June. Despite Iran’s continued willingness to provide direct military assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine, Putin provided no new military aid to his most stalwart ally.”
- McFaul and Milani stress, “Putin’s decisions not to help Russia’s partners in the Middle East should also send a message to leaders in Beijing about Russia’s value as an ally in the event of war between China and the United States over Taiwan.”
- They conclude, “The initial success of Moscow’s Middle East strategy once suggested that Russia could be a valuable geopolitical partner. That it eventually failed so completely should dissuade Trump and others from courting its architect.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Ukraine:
"Zelensky's Corruption Blunder," Jillian Kay Melchior, The Wall Street Journal, 07.25.25.
- Jillian Kay Melchior reports, “Crowds gathered in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities Tuesday to protest a new law granting the nation's prosecutor general -- a presidential appointee -- control over corruption cases.”
- Melchior notes, “President Volodymr Zelensky said he signed the new law to ‘clear’ Ukraine's ‘anti-corruption infrastructure’ of Russian influence.”
- She explains, “Tuesday's overhaul essentially hands control of these two institutions [the anticorruption prosecutor's office and NABU] to the president's appointee.”
- According to Daria Kaleniuk, “It ‘plays well into the Kremlin narratives that have been trying to portray Ukraine as a corrupt country’ that's ‘not worth supporting’ and ‘Zelenskyy as authoritarian.’”
- Anastasia Radina is quoted: “The most politically dependent law-enforcement official’ can now ‘intervene in high profile cases of corruption.”
- Melchior writes, “The Kremlin will naturally see this as an opportunity to exploit divisions and destabilize Ukraine politically.”
- She points out, “Mr. Zelenskyy wants Western partners to fill the funding gap, but that requires foreign confidence in Ukraine's anticorruption safeguards.”
- Melchior concludes, “Mr. Zelenskyy is now backtracking, but his decision to sign the new law was an unforced error that undermined Ukraine's hard-won progress on corruption at a key moment of the war with Russia. Mr. Putin is the sole beneficiary here. He could only be smiling.”
"Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made a strategic blunder," The Economist, 07.23.25.
- The Economist editorial board writes, “Ukraine’s war effort depends not only on courage and weapons, but on trust: the trust of its own citizens, and that of its Western backers. That compact is now at risk.”
- The Economist states, “On July 22nd the Rada... passed a bill that would place the country’s two main anti-corruption bodies... under the control of the presidency. This was not the work of rogue MPs. It was orchestrated from the top by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his all-powerful chief of staff, Andriy Yermak.”
- The article observes, “The law is a direct threat to the international support that has sustained Ukraine through the war. At home, it has drawn the first anti-Zelenskyy protests since the invasion.”
- It notes, “The new law grants sweeping powers to Ukraine’s prosecutor-general, a presidential appointee who reports directly to the president’s office, to reassign, interfere with or even kill off corruption investigations. No case will now be safe if it steps on the wrong toes.”
- The Economist warns, “What this bill really does is roll back a decade of democratic reform and reassert presidential control over institutions that were painstakingly designed to be independent.”
- The board argues, “If Ukraine begins to resemble the corrupt, autocratic system it once sought to escape, then Western politicians will find it harder to argue that the cause is worth defending. Russia does not have to win on the battlefield; it can win by destroying Ukraine from within.”
- The editorial asserts, “With indecent haste, Mr Zelenskyy signed the new measure on the same day that it was tabled and passed by the Rada. It is not only a bad law: it is also a strategic blunder.”
- The Economist concludes, “If the president values his people’s European future, he must quickly kill the bill that he has just so ill-advisedly signed before it kills the idea of a democratic Ukraine.”
"Ukrainians remind Zelenskyy what democracy looks like," Max Boot, The Washington Post, 07.24.25.
- Max Boot writes, “When protesters took to the streets en masse, Zelenskyy didn't respond like a dictator. Instead of cracking down on protesters, he vowed to reverse course. The outcome of the anti-corruption protests shows that Ukraine remains very much a democracy.”
- Boot explains, “The current controversy concerns the fate of two anti-corruption watchdogs… the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO)—that were set up after the 2014 Maidan Revolution.”
- He notes, “On Monday, law enforcement agents raided NABU's offices as part of a probe into alleged Russian influence in the work of the anti-corruption watchdogs. No evidence has been publicly presented to buttress this charge, which is reminiscent of dictators' tendency to label all opposition groups as foreign agents.”
- Boot observes, “Kyiv and other cities this week have seen the biggest street protests since the Maidan Revolution in 2014, which drove out a Russian puppet. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians marched to protect Ukrainian democracy from the threat of expanding executive power.”
- He points out, “Rather than denounce the demonstrators as traitors or foreign agents, Zelenskyy said in his Wednesday night address to the nation, ‘Everyone has heard what people are saying. It's not falling on deaf ears.’”
- Boot notes, “On Thursday, Zelenskyy announced on X that he had just approved the text of a draft bill that guarantees the ‘independence of anti-corruption agencies’ and ‘upholds the independence of NABU and SAPO.’”
- He argues, “It seems increasingly likely that recent developments, which had the potential to undermine Ukrainian democracy, may instead wind up strengthening it.”
- Boot concludes, “The recent protests show why Ukraine's democracy is worth supporting—and why Putin is determined to wipe it out.”
- “The anticorruption agencies at the heart of Ukraine’s current political turmoil grew out of the pro-Western pivot of 2014, amid popular frustration with graft and reflecting Western demands to crack down on theft of foreign aid. This week showed how potent a political issue corruption still is.”
- “With the agencies recently investigating senior members of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government, this week he and Parliament stripped them of their independence and security forces raided their offices. That, and other moves to muffle criticism and scrutiny, prompted thousands of people to take to the streets in the first mass antigovernment protests in years.”
- “Mr. Zelenskyy quickly reversed course, submitting a bill to Parliament on Thursday to restore the two anticorruption agencies’ autonomy. The agencies themselves endorsed the bill and urged lawmakers to pass it. The question now is whether that will be enough to quell the unrest in a country that had shown remarkable unity since Russia’s full-scale invasion three and a half years ago, despite the flagging popularity of Mr. Zelenskyy, who campaigned for office as a corruption fighter.”
- “[N]o accusation of fraud is more infuriating to Ukrainians than ones of theft from a military that is defending their homes and lives, shooting down missiles and exploding drones that terrorize cities nightly, and holding a roughly 700-mile defensive line in eastern Ukraine. Since the war began in 2022, the anticorruption agencies have scrutinized such spending, which now accounts for about half of Ukraine’s $98 billion national budget, resulting in criminal cases that have enraged Ukrainians.
- “Overall, Ukraine has over the past decade improved governance and tamped down graft, according to a measure by Transparency International. And corruption has not worsened during the war, according to the group. But the country still scores poorly on the group’s corruption index and other independent ratings.”
“Political Crisis in Ukraine. Why Did It Happen and What’s Next?,” Meduza, 07.25.25.
- Meduza reports, “On July 22, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stripped the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) of independence, placing them under the president-appointed prosecutor general, which sparked Ukraine’s largest street protests since the war began and strong Western criticism.”
- The article notes, “Mass protests broke out in all major Ukrainian cities, triggered by the move against the anti-corruption agencies. For many Ukrainians, the law was perceived as an attack on the core ideals of the 2014 Maidan—namely, the fight against corruption.”
- Ukrainian analysts and journalists told Meduza, “Surveys indicate that although there is significant distrust of NABU and SAPO among Ukrainians, corruption itself is seen as an even bigger problem than the war.”
- Meduza highlights, “Zelenskyy justified the law by claiming Russian influence in the anti-corruption structures, but observers see it as an attempt to protect allies close to the president as investigations neared top officials.”
- “The move jeopardized Ukraine’s status as an EU candidate, as maintaining the independence of SAPO and NABU was a key accession condition.”
- The article describes, “Young people and war veterans made up much of the protest, with many expressing the view that they or their relatives did not fight at the front for Ukraine to abandon anti-corruption reforms.”
- One sociologist told Meduza, “The law symbolized a red line for society, cutting deep given that anti-corruption reform is widely seen as one of Ukraine’s only clear successes in recent years.”
- Meduza concludes, “Zelenskyy quickly promised to reverse the law and restore the independence of anti-corruption bodies, but many in society question whether this retreat will be complete and genuine, or if the government will retain informal leverage over these institutions.”5
"Outrage in Ukraine as the government attacks anti-corruption watchdogs," The Economist, 07.22.25.
- The Economist reports, “The passage of Bill 12414, which subordinates Ukraine’s two main independent anti-corruption bodies to the presidentially appointed prosecutor-general during wartime, had the feel of something done in panic.”
- The article notes, “The vote to undermine Ukraine’s most consequential anti-corruption reforms casts a shadow over the country’s future course.”
- “Ukraine has been building up to this moment for several weeks, with what appears to be a growing crackdown on internal dissent.”
- The Economist describes, “In mid-July, in a shake-up of the government, uber-loyalists were promoted, including a new prime minister.”
- “On July 21st, the domestic security service and the prosecutor-general’s office launched dozens of raids targeting officers at NABU and SAPO—the investigative and prosecution pillars of Ukraine’s independent anti-corruption system, set up under Western oversight after the 2014 so-called Maidan revolution.”
- The article observes, “The aggressive nature of some of Ukraine’s anti-corruption campaigners has been polarizing, leaving them short of supporters. But the government’s decision to then launch a full-frontal assault on the Maidan-era reforms implies that something sinister is at work.”
- “The assault on Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure has shocked many inside Mr. Zelenskyy’s own team.”
- Jane Lytvynenko and James Marson write, “When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law on Tuesday gutting [NABU’s] independence by bringing it under the control of a prosecutor appointed by him, the reaction was furious.”
- The authors note, “Supporters of NABU say the institution is imperfect but critical in a country where corruption is endemic. Its independence from other law-enforcement bodies is what allows it to take big swings.”
- Lytvynenko and Marson report, “Zelenskyy has justified his move by pointing to NABU’s inefficiency and saying there was a need to weed out Russian influence from its ranks, but he walked back his stance on defanging the agency after the public outcry.”
- “Fighting corruption has been the slogan of successive administrations in Ukraine—with limited success. Anticorruption campaigns have often served as a pretext for politicians and their business allies to strip rivals of assets and enrich themselves. That has kept Ukraine poor and susceptible to Russian influence.”
- “NABU's investigations quickly rocked Ukraine's elites by detaining high-profile targets, from the son of the interior minister… to a powerful former lawmaker over allegedly inflated uranium contracts.”
- NABU chief Semen Kryvonos says, “People came out for the institution, an institution which is mandated to tackle corruption. Now, with this demand for justice, the ball is in our court. We cannot fail. We don't have that option.”
- Christopher Miller writes, “Andriy Yermak is not Ukraine’s president. But he often acts like one. As the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine... Yermak drafts peace plans, directs back-channel diplomacy and handpicks government officials.”
- Miller notes, “Inside the gilded halls of Kyiv’s presidential compound, Yermak oversees a tight-knit team of around two dozen personally selected, devout advisers ... Together, this group manages the country.”
- He observes, “Almost nothing happens in Ukraine without his knowledge and approval. Nobody gets to the president without going through him.”
- Miller points out, “Yermak has come to personify a debate roiling the country, over whether centralized powers imposed by the wartime administration might cripple Ukraine’s democratic future once the war ends.”
- Interviewed sources tell Miller that Yermak “wields as much influence as Zelenskyy, perhaps more,” and that he has “been accused of manipulating judicial investigations to discredit his rivals and stalling anti-corruption inquiries.”
- “Last week, one of Yermak’s close allies, Yulia Svyrydenko, was appointed Ukraine’s new prime minister—a move widely reported as evidence of his growing hold over Zelenskyy.”
- Miller quotes former chief of staff Oleh Rybachuk: “There’s now no path to Zelenskyy that bypasses Yermak.... Yermak has none [mandate] And yet he makes decisions that override ministers, leads diplomatic delegations and speaks for the state.”
- Miller concludes, “Yermak and Zelenskyy, they’ve eliminated any viable competition for now. But after the war, the reckoning will come.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Ukraine Has a Self-Inflicted Handicap in Its War for Survival," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 07.22.25.
- "Ukraine’s government reshuffle aims to boost national resilience – and repair relations with Trump", Jaroslava Barbieri, Chatham House, 07.22.25.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
- According to the author, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drained its attention and resources, giving post-Soviet neighbors an opportunity to lessen their dependence on Moscow by strengthening ties among themselves and with external partners.
- The author writes that, as Russian military power wanes in the region, countries like Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are securing arms from Europe, India, Turkey, and China, and making peace agreements independently, increasing their sovereignty.
- According to the author, Russia is expected to intensify efforts to hold onto its regional influence after the Ukraine war—through economic leverage, legal pressure, and increased military presence.
- The author notes that new infrastructure and trade routes, such as the Middle Corridor, are connecting the region to global markets, reducing reliance on Russia, yet these projects need more investment and regulatory streamlining.
- According to the author, China and Turkey are expanding economic and security roles in the region, providing regional states with alternatives to Russian dominance and helping them withstand Russian coercion.
- The author writes that, despite these shifts, Russia still wields significant influence via historical ties, energy deals, and migrant remittances, while regional states continue to balance relations with Moscow as beneficial.
- According to the author, the United States should support regional connectivity, trade, and diplomatic engagement in partnership with allies like the EU and Turkey; while not the dominant player, Washington can encourage local agency and limit Russian influence.
- “Over the past few months, in the shadow of the Azerbaijani plane shot down by Russia, a rapid diplomatic maneuver has unfolded, allowing not only for Russia to be sidelined from the peace process but also for it to be fundamentally reshaped and redirected towards the long-anticipated European project of a corridor through the Caucasus and Central Asia, bypassing Russia. Meanwhile, the more Russia-dependent Armenia has taken an effectively passive stance, whereas Azerbaijan has insisted on revising the 2020 and 2022 agreements that had formalized Russia’s mediatory role.”
- “It appears that the Kremlin has underestimated Trump’s 'transactional' approach and his eagerness to play the role of 'peacemaker,' while simultaneously securing a 'win' for the United States. Whereas the administration of Joe Biden, as well as EU leadership, had always been hampered by mutual political distrust in dealing with Aliyev’s 'family-run' oil autocracy, Trump readily assumed the role of mediator and sponsor of the process, against the backdrop of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s shared desire to reduce Russia’s influence.”
- “At the same time, analysts warn that Moscow still holds powerful levers to derail the peace plan. Moreover, perhaps even more than Azerbaijan, whose most forceful levers of influence have also not yet been fully deployed, Armenia is in a vulnerable position, given its far greater dependency on Russia and its far lower capacity to resist Russian pressure.”
- Peter Doran and Dmitriy Shapiro write, “Russia’s declining influence in its own backyard offers President Donald Trump a major opportunity to burnish his peacemaking credentials.”
- The authors observe, “By facilitating a final settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the United States could deal a blow to Russia’s influence activities in the South Caucasus, a major corridor for Western energy and trade links.”
- They note, “During both rounds of fighting, the Kremlin declined to intervene on Armenia’s behalf despite the presence of a reported 10,000 Russian soldiers in the country and its membership in... the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).”
- Doran and Shapiro highlight, “Russia’s influence in the region is on the decline. Moscow can no longer carry out its preferred role as powerbroker and mediator between Yerevan and Baku.”
- “The war in Ukraine has drawn the Kremlin’s attention away from the South Caucasus and weakened its ability to pressure governments along its wider borders.”
- The authors describe, “Standing up to Russia in this way is a new development for Azerbaijan and underscores the significance of the reciprocal crackdown in Baku.”
- “Tensions with Moscow have been rising since December 25, when a Russian missile fired from Chechnya hit an Azerbaijani airliner, killing 38… Putin’s half-hearted apology for the ‘tragic incident in Russian airspace’ fueled ill will in Azerbaijan.”
- Doran and Shapiro conclude, “Trump is keen to be a peacemaker. An additional push by Washington at this point could result in a historic peace between Baku and Yerevan… a deal could expand America’s influence in this energy-rich region of the world.”
"One ‘Red Line’ Is Enough for Russia’s Neighbors," Timofei Bordachev, Vzglyad, 07.23.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
- “It can be assumed that in the future, there should be only one truly “red line” for Russia in relations with them: actions that cause measurable damage to our interests in the economy or security of Russian territory. This includes military-technical cooperation with other powers that can create threats for Russia, not to mention joining hostile alliances, as well as actions that cause direct losses to the Russian economy. Measurable damage is in the appearance there of objects capable of creating threats to Russia or the adoption of their own decisions, not under the pressure of Western sanctions, that limit our foreign economic activity. Everything else is the cost of their internal development, and they can only worry us to the extent that they are capable of leading our neighbors to internal problems. And even then, at a purely hypothetical level of planning peacekeeping operations. Dealing with these issues as if they were our own means getting involved in disputes where Russia, at least at a rhetorical level, will always be used to solve its own domestic political problems. ‘Feeding the trolls’ is definitely not one of Russia’s foreign policy goals. As we do not do now.”
- “Reasonably refraining from answering each neighbor in the language that he himself uses due to the peculiarities of culture and upbringing.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Footnotes
- On his X account, Putin’s deputy in the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned that Trump’s secondary tariffs ultimatum is a “step toward war.”
- "A political settlement must include the demilitarization and de-Nazification, while also ensuring the unaligned, neutral, non-nuclear status for the territories controlled by the Kyiv regime. Of course, any agreements will hinge upon recognizing the political and territorial reality as per the Constitution of Russia,” Lavrov said. “We are ready for any developments." (“We are ready for any developments. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov answered questions from Rossiyskaya Gazeta,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11.27.24.)
- Ukraine was 105th in the list of 180 countries ranked in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index-2024 (with the first being the least corrupt). In comparison, Russia was 154th least corrupt, Belarus was 114th least corrupt and Kazakhstan was 88th least corrupt in 2024.
- A similar proposition was voiced years ago by Dmitri Trenin, then of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
- Up to 70 MPs from Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party are reportedly reluctant to support a bill restoring the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, fearing possible prosecution by NABU and SAPO. The pushback jeopardizes efforts to reverse a controversial law subordinating the agencies to the executive, which sparked mass protests and international criticism. The new bill includes safeguards against Russian influence and will be considered by parliament on July 31. (Financial Times, 07.26.25)
The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.
*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.
Slider photo by AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky.
Russia Analytical Report