I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern Europe,” Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution, Summer 2017: The author, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, writes that the time has come for a new security architecture for neutral Eastern European countries. The author argues for permanent neutrality for the countries stretching from Finland in Europe’s far north to Serbia in the south. This would begin with discussion within NATO, then discussion with the neutral countries and as a final step, formal negotiations with Russia. Like NATO, Russia would be committed to ensuring the security of states in the region. Russia would also be required to withdraw its troops stationed in the neutral countries, which would be followed by the removal of sanctions. The neutral countries would retain rights to participating in multilateral security operations, and could also join the EU.

“NATO, Russian Troops Rattle Swords Along Hundreds of Miles of Borderland Across Eastern Europe: Moscow and the Transatlantic Alliance Are Staging Large-Scale Exercises to Show They Mean Business,” Paul McLeary, Foreign Policy, 07.18.17: The author, a senior reporter covering national security issues, discusses the military drills taking place in Eastern Europe this summer. For NATO, the largest operation is Saber Guardian 17, featuring 25,000 troops from 20 countries. The scenario for this drill features a militarily advanced enemy invading NATO territory in the countries along the Black Sea. One drill at Romania’s Cincu training range featured 5,000 NATO troops and Romanian and U.S. Apache helicopters coordinating with ground artillery. On Russia’s side, the Zapad or “West” drills will see as many as 100,000 troops participate. The Kremlin has said 12,700 troops will be active in Russia and Belarus for the exercises, just shy of the 13,000 allowed without foreign observers by the 2011 Vienna Document agreement. But the exercises Moscow is planning will likely see those numbers swell “by tens of thousands,” according to experts. NATO is watching Zapad closely, as similar exercises in 2008 and 2014 preceded the invasions of South Ossetia and Crimea, respectively. Also of note are the three Chinese warships set to arrive in Kaliningrad July 21. The ships will participate in drills with Russian air and naval forces.

“Russia Is Testing NATO in the Skies,” Andrew Foxall, The National Interest, 07.23.17: The author, director of the Russia Studies Centre at The Henry Jackson Society, writes that 2016 saw an increase in the number of Russia military air activity “being monitored and responded to” by NATO. Canadian and U.S. airspace has also recently seen Russian jets. Since 2014, the U.S. has averaged ten intercepts of Russian jets each year. During the Cold War, such activity was meant to test NATO members’ defenses in the event of war. So why do so now? One reason is that these actions act as propaganda to demonstrate the Russian military’s “apparent strength and the alliance’s apparent weakness.” A second reason is to gain military intelligence. Individual NATO members can pursue agreements with Moscow like the U.S. and Canada’s “Agreement on Prevent Dangerous Military Activities” to deter such actions. While NATO’s recent reassurance measures are necessary, they need to be backed by more robust measures for risk mitigation.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Congress Must Preserve the INF Treaty With Russia,” Thomas Graham Jr, The National Interest, 07.19.17: The author, a senior U.S. diplomat, writes that destroying the INF Treaty would open the door for Russia to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe. While Russia is currently in violation of the treaty, the U.S. House of Representatives could make the situation even worse thanks to a provision in the FY18 National Defense Authorization Act. The provision legislates that the U.S. “would no longer be bound by the INF Treaty if Russia remains in violation,” and requires the U.S. to develop and test a new, noncompliant missile system. The author urges against throwing out the INF Treaty. Doing so would free Russia of its obligations under the treaty, threatening the security of the U.S. and its allies.

“New START Data Shows US Implementation, Questions About Bomber Force,” Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 07.11.17: The author, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, writes that the U.S. is making progress towards meeting its New START treaty limits by February 2018. New numbers show that ICBM and bomber number have reached the planned force level, and that a majority of the SSBN fleet has also been converted. However, this now raises questions regarding future bomber force structure. “Depending on how many new B-21 bombers the Air Force will deploy how soon and how many will be nuclear-capable, the Air Force might have to withdraw the B-52 from the nuclear mission by the early 2030s.” As a result, the author advises the U.S. Air Force to clarify its bomber force plans.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Trump's Gift to Putin in the Mideast,” Vali Nasr, New York Times, 07.17.17: The author, dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes that the war in Syria has taken a turn advantageous for Russian ambitions in the Middle East. A “major gaffe” by U.S. President Donald Trump has pushed Qatar and Turkey closer together and toward cooperation with Russia and Iran. Secondly, by agreeing to a ceasefire in Syria, Trump “virtually handed the keys to the region” to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Rather than “simplistically” welcoming the ceasefire agreement as a sign of cooperation, the author argues that Trump should have inquired as to Putin’s interest in the region. The answer, argues the author, lies in the amount of oil flowing from the Middle East to the West. Additionally, as a purveyor of military goods or protector for “struggling Middle Eastern regimes,” Moscow would receive greater access to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea, important for energy and military purposes. Putin’s interest in the Middle East is not limited to Syria, as Moscow has made inroads with both Iran and Turkey. The author advises the U.S. to “quickly end the intra-Sunni spat” by not taking sides in the disagreement and to acknowledge that it needs the region’s powers to cooperate in order to accomplish U.S. goals in the region while pushing back against Russia.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“The Man Who Drives Trump’s Russia Connection,” Andrew Roth, The Washington Post, 07.22.17: The author, a Moscow-based reporter for the paper, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump’s connection to Russian oligarch Aras Agalarov has led to “the most punishing scandal of his six-month-old presidency.” The June 2016 meeting in Trump Tower was brokered by Agalarov, who “has emerged as a possible conduit from the Kremlin to Trump.” The oligarch made a name for himself in Russia’s luxury, real estate and entertainment worlds “building political capital in the Moscow region, and increasingly in the Kremlin itself.” The author describes Agalarov as “an eager-to-please business tycoon,” who has helped Russia’s ultra-wealthy satisfy their “Madison Avenue aspirations” through ventures from a luxury footwear boutique to suburban estates and golf courses. Agalarov remained a minor player in the Kremlin until 2009, where he helped solve the issue of constructing a massive university campus on Russky Island for Putin’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. That work earned him an Order of Honor in 2012, which Putin himself bestowed on Agalarov. In an interview last year, Agalarov told the Post that he had organized a Kremlin meeting with Trump in 2013, but Putin canceled at the last minute. “Those contacts put Agalarov in a privileged position after Trump’s unexpected, and apparently Russian-backed, rise to the presidency of the United States.” While the meeting between Trump Jr. and Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya produced “few concrete results,” it nonetheless showed a Trump campaign open to Russian efforts to hurt Hillary Clinton’s campaign – “a compromising situation for Trump.”

“Did the United States Interfere in Russian Elections?” Tom Malinowski, The Washington Post, 07.21.17: The author, who served as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor from 2014 to 2017, writes that in addition to denying claims that Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. election, Russian President Vladimir Putin always points out that the U.S. interferes in elections, too. The author argues that U.S. attempts to promote democracy in other countries, which the author was responsible for as a State Department official, are very different from Russia’s 2016 interference. For Putin, however, there is no difference, shedding light on “a larger truth about U.S.-Russian relations.” Rather than hacking into emails and selectively releasing them to help one side, the U.S. Agency for International Development helped fund some of Russia’s leading nongovernmental organizations before it was expelled from Russia in 2012. This difference between non-partisan and partisan influence “is lost on Putin.” For Putin, foreign policy is “a zero-sum competition with other states,” and he assumes America sees things the same way. Similarly, the U.S. projected pragmatism onto Moscow, not considering that “an insecure dictator such as Putin would view our help for Russians championing free elections as a knife to his throat.” The author argues that idealism is “part of America’s identity,” but suggests being more realistic about it going forward.  

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Seeking to End Sanctions, Trump and Putin Achieve the Opposite,” David Sanger, New York Times, 07.23.17: The author, chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times, writes that while both U.S. and Russian presidents sought to remove the irritant of sanctions, sanctions are not only staying in place, but “are about to be modestly expanded.” The author attributes this turn of events to both leaders “overplaying their hands.” Last summer, Putin decided to turn the “familiar Russian surveillance operation of the American political campaign into ‘active measures.’” While the action did disrupt the election, it undermined Putin’s longer term goal of ending sanctions. The new sanctions will not produce any significant new hurdles for Russia’s economy, but they will “further damage perceptions of Russia’s prospects” and turn away “badly needed Western investment.” Provisions in the measures will likely make Western banks more wary of lending money to Russian companies, as well as hurt Russian privatization efforts. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Europe could also suffer. While it will take time for the effects of these new sanctions to become clear, better relations with Russia are now even less likely than they were a year ago.

“Time for Sober Realism on the US-Russia Relationship,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 07.18.17: The author, the editor of The Nation, writes that the investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller is more important than ever following the news of Donald Trump Jr.’s meeting with a Russian lawyer. The author also advises Democrats to seek an independent commission to safeguard future elections. A reappraisal of how the U.S. approaches its relationship with Russia is also called for. As relations between Russia and the U.S. have plummeted, the risk of nuclear catastrophe have increased, and “the era of cyberwarfare has arrived” with no rules or strictures. These threats require “diplomacy and dialogue, not moral posturing and triumphalism” be used to deescalate tensions. “The bottom line is that opposition to Trump cannot become the same as opposition to common sense.” This common sense includes the need to find ways for the U.S. and Russia to work together to serve mutual vital interests.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Evolving Grand Eurasia Strategy: Will It Work?” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.20.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that rather than a pivot to Asia, Russia’s Eurasian strategy is “a 360-degree vision” with Moscow at the center. The Kremlin is looking to create “a national entity that is distinct amid a vast and highly diverse neighborhood,” which is now being called “Greater Eurasia.” While Eurasia has been traditionally land that is not-quite-Europe and not-quite-Asia, the same lands that were occupied by first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, Greater Eurasia stretches “from Korea to Portugal and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean.” The author argues that a successful strategy for the region would be to focus on ideological noninterference. Russia’s relationship with China takes first priority for the near future. “Moscow needs to persuade Beijing that China’s interests would be best served if its strengths become embedded within collective continent-wide institutions, where others, including Russia, could wield some influence.” Europe also remains important for a variety of reasons. Moscow’s wish for Europe to move away from the U.S. is not likely to happen soon, as NATO appears to be reforming and refocusing. A settlement of the Ukraine crisis would be necessary for a mend between Russia and Europe, but implementation of the Minsk agreement would be political suicide for Ukraine’s leaders. The author notes that Europe should also be concerned about the INF Treaty’s fate. “To eventually achieve a Greater Eurasia, Russia’s strategy needs to be realistic in the near term.”

“How German Condoms Funded the Russian Revolution,” Catherine Merridale, New York Times, 07.17.17: The author, whose recent work includes “Lenin on the Train,” writes that while Lenin himself “lacked the gene for swashbuckling,” the events of 1917 were in part financed through crime and speculation. Much of the money for the Great October Socialist Revolution was channeled through a company specializing in “contraband pharmaceuticals, lead pencils and German condoms.” Exiled in Switzerland, Lenin sought a way back to Russia following news of revolution in Petrograd in March 1917. The Germans agreed to escort him to the Baltic Sea in a special train car. Lenin, desperate for approval from any public figure, called the American Legation in Bern at the last minute and was told to “call back tomorrow” by a young Allen Dulles, future head of the CIA. Germany’s foreign minister later bragged about his country’s role in the assisting the Bolshevik uprising. “Lenin could not risk accepting direct bribes, but it was easy for Berlin to supply his agents with commodities and then forget to send the bill.”

China:

“Why Forecasts of a Chinese Takeover of the Russian Far East Are Just Dramatic Myth,” Alexander Gabuev, Maria Repnikova, South China Morning Post/Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.14.17: Gabuev, a senior associate with the Carnegie Moscow Center, and Repnikova, an assistant professor at Georgia State University, argue that speculation about a Chinese “takeover” of Russia’s sparsely-populated Far East is not grounded in reality. While the population disparity along the 4,200-kilometer China-Russia border is real, the number of Chinese on Russian soil is overstated, as is their desire to migrate to Russia, the authors argue. There are between 400,000 and 550,000 Chinese migrants in Russia, far less than the 2 million Chinese cited at times in Western media, according to the authors. More than half are in the European part of Russia, where the labor market is larger and more dynamic. “The most Chinese-populated Russian city is Moscow, not Vladivostok or Khabarovsk,” the authors note. Moreover, after the collapse of oil prices and the depreciation of the ruble, more Chinese workers are choosing to leave Russia, which has never been a top choice for migrants, given that salaries, at least in the Far East, are on par with those in Heilongjiang, China’s northernmost province.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Needs to Address Its Paramilitary Problem,” Michael Sheldon, The National Interest, 07.19.17: The author, a recent graduate of Malmö University with a degree in Peace and Conflict Studies, argues that the growth in politically-motivated private security actors since the Maidan protests is “undermining the formal security structures of the Ukrainian government.” Political and military power, Sheldon observes, have become inseparable at the unit level, with many battalion commanders also being career politicians or parliamentary members. Interior Minister Arsen Avakov has indicated that he intends to deal with this issue, however, this might be too little too late in a society that has grown disillusioned with the promises and expectations of Maidan.

“I'm a Ukrainian Journalist, and I'm Tired of Living in Fear,” Maxim Eristavi, The Washington Post, 07.20.17: One year after the murder of a prominent Ukrainian journalist, the author -- a research fellow with the Atlantic Council and co-founder of Hromadske International, a Kiev-based independent news outlet -- calls for renewed efforts to solve the crime. The murder of Pavel Sheremet, who was killed in a car bombing, raises questions about how safe it is to be a journalist in Ukraine. “As a Ukrainian journalist, I'm tired of living in fear. I'm tired of being haunted by my father's terrified face,” Eristavi writes. Solving the case “would also be an important step forward on the path to a strong European state, one where justice is available for all, crimes are punished and honest reporting is not an act of life-threatening bravery,” Eristavi writes.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant commentary.

Defense and aerospace:

“The Russian Space Sector: Adaptation, Retrenchment and Stagnation,” Bruce H. McClintock, Space & Defense, Spring 2017: The author, an adjunct policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, writes that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia focused on creating an internationally competitive public space sector as opposed to a private one. However, various factors have contributed to a systemic crisis for Russia’s space enterprise, with stagnation and decreasing market share likely to continue. In the best case scenario, the Russian space industry will survive, but even so, a successful rebuild will take a generation to complete. In the worst case scenario, the space industry will completely collapse, with the exception of military capabilities. The author notes that this is also unlikely. While its “former glory” remains out of reach, the Russian space industry will likely endure stagnation “with the odd success outside of critical national security missions.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.