Russia Analytical Report, July 14-21, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. For a number of reasons, including Russia’s numerical advantages in troops and air power,1 “Russia’s summer offensive in Ukraine is gaining ground as its forces attack on multiple fronts,” according to The New York Times’ Ivan Nechepurenko and Constant Méheut. Russia gained more than 214 square miles of Ukrainian territory in June compared to 173 square miles in May, according to the data collected by Ukraine’s OSINT group Deep State and analyzed by the two NYT journalists.2 And Russia is not just seeking to capture more territory. “Its goal is to destroy Ukraine’s military potential, its army,” Valery Shiryaev, an independent Russian military analyst, was quoted as saying in the NYT article. According to the data collected by the Institute for Study of War and analyzed by RM staff, Russia’s net territorial control in Ukraine, if only including gains made after the launch of the full-blown invasion in February 2022, increased from 44,229 square miles in May 2025 to 44,463 in June 2025. If one compares the monthly rate of change in Russia’s control of Ukraine’s territory in June 2025 (234 square miles) with the average monthly rates of change in such control in the five preceding months of this year (Period I, 130 square miles) and in the 18 months that had preceded June 2025 (Period II, 153 square miles), then one sees that the June 2025 rate is considerably higher than the average rate during either of these two periods.*
  2. “Mass attacks of Shaheds, an Iranian-designed drone now manufactured in Russia, appear to be overwhelming Ukraine’s beleaguered air defenses, with the drone hit rate reaching its highest levels since Moscow’s invasion,” Charles Clover and Christopher Miller report in the Financial Times. “Ukrainian air force data suggests about 15% of the drones penetrated defenses on average between April and June—rising from just 5% in the previous three months,” these FT journalists report. “The success of the drones in recent months demonstrates how cheap mass can overwhelm even sophisticated and layered air defenses,” especially if the drones are modernized to enable them to fly higher, faster and further, according to the duo.
  3. “The Ukrainian system of power has transformed so much that the name of the prime minister is no longer as important as it once was. In the current system, only the president and his chief of staff really matter,” Konstantin Skorkin writes in reference to the recent cabinet reshuffle in Ukraine. “The latest reboot is generally being explained as a move by the head of the presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, to strengthen his position even further… As his relationship with Washington deteriorated, Yermak felt it was necessary to shore up his influence on domestic policy,” Skorkin explains in his commentary for Carnegie Politika. That Ukraine’s new prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, is a protégé of Yermak is something that Financial Times’ Miller also mentions in his analysis of the latest political developments in Ukraine. Miller focuses his analytical take on “anti-corruption raids on prominent Ukrainian figures and moves to favor loyalists in senior positions.” These actions “have led to accusations that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is sliding into authoritarianism,” Miller writes. “If the institutions meant to enforce checks and balances are turned into political tools, Ukraine risks losing the democratic core it fought to build after 2014,” Miller warns.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Strategic Partnership with Russia: A New Factor in North Korea’s International Identity?” Georgy Toloraya, Valdai Club, 07.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “The Russian-North Korean alliance may become a factor in the creation of a new system of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Of course, it should be designed taking into account the legitimate interests of all partners present here. Given the new balance of power and interests, such a model may become a kind of model for other regions of the world, where the contradictions of the two "camps" seem insurmountable for now.”
  • “On the part of Russia, China and the DPRK, the interests are quite clear, the goals have been formulated many times - but, unlike in the past, they are supported by the factor of force. This is peaceful coexistence, refusal to impose one's ideology and system, attempts at forceful solutions, settlement of existing problems by political and diplomatic methods. This also concerns the nuclear issue, which undoubtedly worries Russia from the point of view of strategic stability and non-proliferation.”
  • “The reality is that new approaches are needed, for example, measures to limit and reduce strategic weapons .., taking into account the legitimate concerns of all parties involved and non-proliferation guarantees. It is time for the opposing side, and first and foremost the US-Japan-ROK ‘troika,’ to abandon the exhausted concept of ‘regime change’ in the DPRK and the de facto subordination of the North within the framework of a more general idea of confronting China and Russia. Russia and the DPRK recently stated that ‘the reason for the growing tension in the subregion is the build-up of military activity by the US and its allies.’ Thanks to the new situation, including the more sober position of the current administrations in the US and South Korea, a window of opportunity for new solutions may appear.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Iran and its nuclear program:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Why Russia Is Gaining Ground in Ukraine,” Ivan Nechepurenko and Constant Méheut, New York Times, 07.19.25.

  • “Russia’s summer offensive in Ukraine is gaining ground as its forces attack on multiple fronts. In June, the country’s numerical advantages in troops and air power produced its biggest monthly gains in territory since the beginning of the year.”3
  • “According to Deep State, a Ukrainian group that maps the conflict using drone footage and its links with the Ukrainian military, Russia gained more than 214 square miles of Ukrainian territory in June, up from 173 square miles in May. Putting those gains in context, Russia is capturing less than 0.1 percent of Ukraine’s vast territory each month. At that pace, it would take Moscow several years to occupy all of the four Ukrainian regions it declared annexed in 2022.”
  • “Last week, Russia launched 728 exploding drones and decoys, according to Ukraine’s Air Force. As Russia builds up its drone-making infrastructure, military analysts expect Moscow to routinely launch more than 1,000 drones per volley by autumn.”
  • “Russia is not only seeking to win new territory in Ukraine. ‘Its goal is to destroy Ukraine’s military potential, its army,’ Valery Shiryaev, an independent Russian military analyst, said in an interview with Redaktsiya, an independent Russian news channel. ‘If there is no army — the state would be defenseless.’”
  • “Spurred by record-high military expenditures, Russia’s budget deficit has reached $47 billion over the first half of the year. Because of lower prices, oil and gas revenues have dropped by more than 16 percent, the country’s Finance Ministry said. Russia still has more than $52.5 billion of liquid assets in its rainy day fund and can probably finance its deficit at least through the current year. But according to Kirill Rodionov, a Russian energy and economy analyst, the Kremlin would need to ‘seriously review its budgetary priorities’ next year.”
  • “According to Dmitri Kuznets, a military analyst with the Russian news outlet Meduza, which was outlawed by the Kremlin and operates from Latvia, both Ukraine and Russia are now losing between 250 and 300 servicemen each day, based on available data.”

“Ukrainian drones are killing ever more soldiers. Russia is grinding ahead but paying an excruciating price,” The Economist, 07.17.25.

  • “The cities of Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk are the next big targets in the Russians’ bid to seize the remainder of the Donetsk region. In 2023 they took Bakhmut, 26km to the north-east, and in February last year they took Avdiivka, 38km south. The fall of these two towns has seemed inevitable ever since, but Russian progress has been extremely slow. In early June Ukrainian intelligence reported they would be the target of a summer offensive. But Colonel Derevyanko, a commander in the 93rd Brigade, says he sees no preparations for one.”
    • “The Russians are inching forward, but the cost in lives is extremely high, and rising. If technology a year ago meant that ‘we could kill 50 Russians,’ says Mr. Derevyanko, ‘now it is five times more.’”
  • “In Pokrovsk, 45km south-west, the Russians are closer. Neither city [Kostiantynivka or Pokrovsk] is in imminent danger of falling. But Colonel Derevyanko says nowhere in Kostiantynivka is safe: Russian drones can see almost anywhere. Before the full-scale invasion in 2022 some 67,000 civilians lived here. Now only 10-20% of them remain.”
  • “‘We control the land’ around Kostiantynivka, says Mr. Derevyanko, ‘but the Russians control 90% of the sky.’”
  • “Drones, Colonel Derevyanko cautions, are not enough. He is happy that Donald Trump will resume sending Ukraine 155mm shells. If they get the weapons, he says, ‘we can stop them taking these cities.’”

“Russia’s drone swarms pierce Ukraine’s defenses at record rate,” Charles Clover and Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 07.21.25.

  • “Mass attacks of Shaheds, an Iranian-designed drone now manufactured in Russia, appear to be overwhelming Ukraine’s beleaguered air defenses, with the drone hit rate reaching its highest levels since Moscow’s invasion. Ukrainian air force data suggests about 15 per cent of the drones penetrated defenses on average between April and June—rising from just 5 per cent in the previous three months. The sheer volume of Russian attacks has also increased sharply this year, with a heavy assault on Sunday night into Monday morning including 426 Shahed style attack drones. ... On Sunday night and Monday morning, around 5.4 per cent of the more than 400 Russian drones hit their targets — a better than average rate than recent months.”4
  • “The success of the drones in recent months demonstrates how cheap mass can overwhelm even sophisticated and layered air defenses, and has shown Moscow’s ability to rapidly adapt fighting techniques to stretch Kyiv’s resources. Russia’s tactical innovations to significantly increase the effectiveness of the slow-moving Shaheds has included modifications to allow them to fly faster and beyond the range of the truck-mounted machine guns that Ukraine typically uses to down them.”
  • “Oleksandr Matviienko, a drone expert at Counteroffensive Pro, a Ukrainian defense tech newsletter, said that to be effective, the new anti-drone drones would need to reach altitudes of 6km and speeds of 200kph to intercept Shaheds. ... ‘Instead of deploying 500 drones nationwide like they used to, Russian forces now target one or two cities at a time,’ he said.”

“Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance: What the United States Can Learn from Ukraine,” Kateryna Bondar, CSIS, 07.18.25.

  • “In the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military and political leadership faced the grim reality that its Soviet-inherited defense industrial base was riddled with corruption, institutional inertia, and a closed culture. Yet this legacy sector, despite its dysfunction, remained indispensable to Ukraine’s survival in the face of an existential threat. What followed was not a slow reform but a wartime transformation. In just three years, Ukraine has cultivated a defense technology ecosystem focused on unmanned systems that is agile and competitive. This report, based on dozens of interviews with Ukrainian officials, entrepreneurs, and military officers, tells the story of how this shift occurred under the extreme pressures of war. More importantly, it draws out the central lesson for the United States and its allies: Any serious effort to prepare for the wars of the future must incorporate options for radical decentralization, bottom-up innovation, and competitive dynamism within the defense industrial base. The Ukrainian case is not conclusive, but it is a crucial example of how free societies should adapt their defense sectors to meet modern threats with speed, agility, and technological ingenuity.”

“How Russia Fights. A Compendium of Troika Observations on Russia’s Special Military Operation,” U.S. Army Document 25-1060, July 2025.

  • “How Russia Fights” highlights six key problems diminishing Russian military effectiveness in its war on Ukraine:
  • 1. Russia’s command structure is over-centralized and rigid: “Russian command and control is characterized by highly centralized and rigid organizational control measures which are dictated from higher to lower headquarters… Russia’s military trusts in the science of command and control more than the art.”
  • 2. Inter-service dysfunction and leadership rotations degrade military effectiveness: “It took only 7 months for Putin to fire all four commanders of the groups of forces in Ukraine.” Russian Gen. Ivan Popov “was relieved and then arrested for maintaining that it was his superiors who were incompetent. Popov claimed, ‘They have stabbed us in the back.’”
  • 3. Russia suffered from poor force generation and forecasting Failures: “By August 2022, President Putin agreed to grow the Russian Armed Forces, and in September he authorized the involuntary mobilization of 320,000 veterans (mobiki). This stemmed from ‘a failure in both command and control.’”
  • 4. Russia did not have adequate training infrastructure: “There is no Russian equivalent to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)… many mobilized troops were sent directly to the front with little or no training.”
  • 5. Russian forces continue to suffer morale and discipline problems: “An officer had five soldiers stripped naked and beaten with truncheons, in front of a battalion-sized formation.” Such hazing, or ‘dedovshchina,’ is entrenched.
  • 6. Endemic corruption “at all levels” degrades military effectiveness: “Corruption remains the lubricant that allows the Russian military to run… every Russian military leader must engage in it to get things done—every leader.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“In squeezing Putin, Trump ‘escalates to de-escalate’ The president now knows that Russia won’t make peace unless the cost of continuing the war goes up,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 07.14.25.

  • “At first, Trump thought it would be easy to persuade his friend Vladimir Putin to stop the war, he explained on Monday. ‘I felt we had a deal about four times.’ But he has finally realized that the only way to get the Russian leader to make peace is by significantly raising the cost of continuing the conflict. With that decision, Trump opened a new chapter in the Ukraine story, one that carries both hope and danger.”
    • “Trump on Monday threatened to impose ‘severe tariffs’ against Russia if it doesn’t make peace within 50 days. And he pledged to provide Patriot missiles, air defense weapons and artillery — selling them to NATO countries that would then pass them on to Ukraine. That military assistance package totals $10 billion, a source briefed on the deal told me. It will give Ukraine and its battered people some breathing space from a Russian barrage that included more than 700 missile and drone attacks on some days last week.”
    • “What Trump didn’t talk about is that the military assistance might also include authorization for some powerful new offensive weapons. I’m told by a source involved in the decision that this is likely to include permission to use the 18 long-range ATACMS missiles now in Ukraine at their full range of 300 kilometers (about 190 miles). That wouldn’t reach all the way to Moscow or St. Petersburg, but it would strike military bases, airfields and supply depots deep inside Russia that are now out of range. The package might also include more ATACMS.”
      • “Trump also considered sending Tomahawk cruise missiles, the same weapons fired against Iranian targets last month. If fired from Ukraine, these could hit Moscow and St. Petersburg, and they were included in discussion as late as Friday. But the Tomahawks are off the delivery list for now, I’m told. They could be deployed later if Trump wants even more leverage.”
  • “Trump’s determination to squeeze Putin was conveyed in a conversation last week with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a source told me. Trump asked Zelensky why he didn’t hit Moscow. ‘We can if you give us the weapons,’ Zelensky said. Trump said Ukraine needed to put more pressure on Putin, not just Moscow but St. Petersburg, too.”
  • “Trump decided to escalate for three reasons, according to a source familiar with administration discussions.
    • First, he believed that Putin was disrespecting him, feigning a readiness to make peace but ignoring the U.S. president’s call for a ceasefire.
    • Second, he saw the efficacy of U.S. military power in the use of B-2 bombers and Tomahawk missiles against Iran.
    • And third, he thought Putin would only negotiate if threatened with greater force. As the Russians like to say, Trump decided to “escalate to de-escalate.”
  • “One question Trump didn’t want to answer in Monday’s Oval Office session was: If Putin decides to escalate further, how far are you willing to go in response? ‘Don’t ask me a question like that, ‘How far?’ Trump snapped. ‘I just want to get the war settled.’”

 "Trump’s overdue pivot on Ukraine," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 07.16.25. 

  • “In the past two weeks, Donald Trump has woken up to something that has long been clear to most observers: Vladimir Putin has been playing him.”
  • “Trump has marked his apparent epiphany by giving Putin 50 days to reach a peace deal in Ukraine or face harsher sanctions, and agreeing to sell US weapons to European allies that will funnel them to Kyiv.”
  • “Provided it is not reversed, his shift throws a lifeline to Ukraine at a moment of military and political vulnerability.”
  • “The president appears to have understood at last that his attempts to secure a Ukraine ceasefire by offering what he assumed Putin wanted (no Nato membership for Kyiv; Moscow keeping the territory it has seized) have failed. Putin wants much more: to crush Ukraine’s independent statehood.”
  • “Trump’s conversion also reflects lobbying by European leaders that toughness is the only way to make Putin engage seriously in negotiations.”
  • “Most consequential is Trump’s commitment to the US weapons sale plan. This places the financial burden squarely on the Europeans and marks a regrettable retreat from the Biden-era approach to the Ukraine war and America’s long history of investing in securing European peace.”
  • “Trump’s 50-day ultimatum to Moscow to strike a deal, backed by the threat of new tariffs on Russia and secondary tariffs on countries that buy Russian energy products, is less credible.”

"Allies' advice on talking to Trump gives Kyiv a win," Michael Birnbaum, Siobhán O'Grady, Ellen Francis and Catherine Belton, The Washington Post, 07.18.25.

  • “The [July 4 Zelensky-Trump] call felt so positive from Ukraine's perspective that it caught Zelensky's staff by surprise. ‘The spirit was uplifted, but it is too early to celebrate,’ the official said. ‘We have to wait for actions.’”
  • “The Ukrainians know better than most how much fortunes can shift with Trump's mercurial moods. ... That shift culminated months of work by European leaders, Republicans on Capitol Hill and others sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause who gave Zelensky strategic advice about how to get Trump back on his side, including how to use the language of transaction and flattery that Trump appears to respond to.”
  • “Zelensky also benefited from Trump's growing frustration with Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
  • “European leaders helped draft language for Zelensky to use to apologize to Trump... And European leaders who have cellphone relationships with Trump... used their moments on the line with him to underscore that Putin was a threat to U.S. interests.”
  • “In their own talks with Trump, European leaders sought to flip the script and assert that Putin was obstructing the president's ambitions to end the war.”
  • “Trump's softened tone could be seen in an exchange between the president and a Ukrainian reporter... The president expressed sympathy to the reporter about the fact that she was living in Poland with her children while her husband fought on Ukraine's front lines.”
  • “‘He seems to be realizing that he can't trust Putin,’ the second European official said. ‘So things are positive, until they change again.’”

Jake Sullivan’s remarks at “The Long View From Aspen.” Speakers: Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, Mark Esper, Jake Sullivan. Moderator: Steve Clemons. Aspen Security Forum, 07.18.25.

  • SC: “Jake, when you when you served both in the Obama administrations and the Biden administrations… some of what you were dealing with, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, a foreign policy for the middle class, you could sort of feel like you were trying to address things that were broken, that weren’t working out… And I’m just interested… looking back with the benefit of hindsight, what could you have gotten better, particularly in the Biden administration? “
    • JS: “Well, first, I’ll start Steve with just taking on a bit your opening premise, which was, in 2024 there was an election, and that election said the American people are no longer interested in the world.”
  • SC: “Not Americans, just a lot.”
    • JS: “Or a lot of Americans… I actually believe the American people continue to believe in principled engagement in the world, and continue to believe that our fate is tied to the fate of people elsewhere. And I think you can see this no more clearly than in the sustained support that the American people have shown for Ukraine. You look at every opinion poll going back to February of 2022, right up until July 2025, and a strong majority of the American people stand behind that. And in fact, it’s President Trump who has shifted on this issue in recent days, not the American people. I do believe…”
  • SC: “How long do you think he’ll hold that position?”
    • JS: “I’m the last person to predict what he will and won’t do. But I think basically now the logic has become clear. He started by saying, I’m going to blame Zelenskyy, I’m going to say Ukraine started the war, and I’m going to pressure him, and that’s going to get me to the end, because he truly believed Ukraine was the obstacle to peace. Well, he tried that strategy, and it became abundantly clear to everybody up to now, and including him, that Putin is the obstacle to peace in Ukraine. And so I think now that he recognizes that he’s going down a track, which I think is right to try to increase support for Ukraine and hopefully increase pressure on Russia. I can’t say how long that will be sustained, but what I can say is strong bipartisan majorities of Americans believe it is right for us to be engaged in support of the Ukrainian people, and they see the larger logic for why.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 “Europe Gets Tougher on Putin; Merz and other leaders look to squeeze Russia's faltering economy. Where's President Trump?” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 07.18.25.

  • “Brussels' latest sanctions package ratchets up economic pressure on Moscow by closing loopholes and punishing foreign companies that circumvent them.”
  • “Friday's package will lower the price cap to $47.60 a barrel, which will be revised every three months, and restrict imports of refined fuel that is produced from Russian crude.”
  • “Europe will further isolate Russia from the global financial system by kicking 22 Russian banks out of the Swift financial-transfer network.”
  • “It will sanction two Chinese banks that have helped Russia circumvent sanctions and a large oil refinery in India that is partially owned by Russia's state-run oil company Rosneft.”
  • “The new sanctions will bar transactions that could revive or repair the pipelines.”
  • “Mr. Merz and other European leaders deserve credit for their resolve, though lower oil and gas prices helped by increased U.S. production have made this easier.”
  • “President Trump could join this effort by backing a bipartisan Senate bill that would empower him to impose 500% tariffs on countries that purchase Russian oil and gas products.”
  • “There's no good excuse for Mr. Trump not to follow Europe's lead now and put more pressure on Russia to negotiate a cease-fire.”

“‘No real alternatives’ Trump’s tariff threat targets buyers of Russian oil. But reality could get in the way. A Discussion with Sergey Vakulenko,” Meduza, 07.16.25.

  • “On July 14, Donald Trump made his promised ‘major statement’ on the war in Ukraine, pledging additional military aid to Kyiv and threatening Russia with new sanctions… To understand how effective such sanctions might be, whether the global market has any real alternative to Russian oil… Meduza spoke with Sergey Vakulenko, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.”
  • M: “Donald Trump was rather vague when threatening secondary sanctions against Russia’s trading partners… So who exactly is Trump targeting?”
    • SV: “The main buyers of Russian oil right now are China, India, and Turkey. Smaller volumes are delivered by pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia.”
  • M: “Can we say, then, that Trump is effectively threatening all of these countries?”
    • SV: “The key question isn’t so much how they’ll react, but whether such secondary tariffs can even work in practice.”
    • “Logically, that would mean 100 percent tariffs on all imports from China, India, and Turkey… At first, Washington’s threats sounded quite serious—some tariffs, particularly on China, were already prohibitively high.”
  • M: “In China’s case, some of those tariffs were even over 100 percent…”
    • SV: “Yes, something like [completely implausible numbers]. But now it’s all being actively rolled back—largely because it turns out there are no real substitutes for Chinese goods, and the tariffs primarily hit American consumers. So no matter how much Trump might want to impose punishing tariffs on China, the U.S. simply can’t afford to do that right now. And it’s roughly the same story with India.”
    • “Turkey’s a bit different, but also very complicated. Ankara is a critical player in the Middle East today, and it’s not in the U.S.’s interest to pick a serious fight with it… Turkey is both an ally and a highly influential mediator in an extremely sensitive region… the fragile balance in Syria today is hard to imagine without Turkey’s involvement.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

“Zelensky Proposes Revival Of Peace Talks With Russia,” Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 07.20.25.5

  • “Diplomatic entreaties... continue -- with both Russia and Ukraine trying in their own ways to appeal to the White House ... [over the weekend] Mr. Zelensky proposed talks on a cease-fire, prisoner exchanges and the return of Ukrainian children deported to Russia during the war. He reiterated an offer for a direct meeting with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, first floated in May. Mr. Putin had then remained silent for days before rejecting the offer.”
  • “Russia did not immediately respond directly to Ukraine's offer. The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, told Russian state television on Sunday that Mr. Putin wanted a peace agreement but that 'the main thing for us is to achieve our goals' in the war.”
    • “Russia is seeking additional territory, a declaration that Ukraine will not join NATO and will remain a neutral state, limits on the future size of Ukraine's Army and recognition of Russian as an official language in Ukraine, among other demands.”
  • “By agreeing to talks and another request from the Trump administration to share profits from future natural resources deals, Ukraine succeeded in winning support for the weapons agreement and the threat of sanctions on the Kremlin's trading partners.''
  • “Ukraine is expecting a first delivery of additional Patriot air defense missiles from Germany, which will then replenish its own arsenal from new purchases from the United States. Seven other NATO countries are expected to follow suit. Ensuring a longer-term supply of air defenses could hasten talks: It would remove an incentive for Russia to delay talks until Ukraine's air defenses run out, when the Russians could threaten ballistic missile attacks on undefended cities and military sites.”

“Trump’s Ultimatum To Putin” in “Starovoit’s Suicide, Trump’s Ultimatum, Internet Disruptions, Kekhman Case, Constitutional Court Reshuffle,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Bulletin No. 14, 07.21.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The failure of recent peace efforts (which were doomed from the outset) has deepened the diplomatic stalemate and contributed to Moscow’s desire for a military solution. Trump has responded to Russia's hardline demands on Ukraine with his own 50-day ultimatum to Putin to make progress on a peace deal. But the absence of a coherent Western response, alongside restrained US signaling, has been interpreted by the Kremlin as a good opportunity to advance its position on the ground.”
  • “Internal divisions in Europe over defense spending and sanctions have exposed pressure points within NATO’s support for Ukraine. In this context, Russia is focusing on achieving territorial consolidation and advancing the narrative that a sustainable peace will require a change of leadership in Kyiv, followed by capitulation to Moscow's demands—an objective it continues to promote both domestically and internationally.”
  • “It remains unclear what specific ‘new approach’ Russia might have proposed [Lavrov reportedly proposed to Rubio] R.Politik has grounds to believe that nothing substantively different was presented...whatever Lavrov presented failed to make a significant impression on Trump. Lavrov later implied that this was because Rubio had not adequately briefed Trump on Russia’s proposals—an audacious assertion, indicating the Russian foreign minister's apparent indifference to jeopardizing his relationship with his American counterpart in favor of not overtly criticizing Trump. Despite Moscow's attempt to project positivity overall, Trump has become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with Putin’s handling of relations with Washington.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Fiona Hill: What Putin (and Trump?) might do next, after Ukraine,” Dan Drollette Jr., Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 07.15.25.

  • “Trump has had aspirations to be president for a long time, and Trump’s had every advantage in life to push him forward—family, money, connections—people were always helping him. … But it was highly unlikely Putin was going to be Russian president.”
  • “At the same time, there are similarities: They’re both remarkably resilient; they’ve both got all kinds of cunning, and they both have a very similar worldview. They both see the world in terms of might makes right, where strength is the only coin. And they both believe in these strange kind of Orwellian spheres of influence.”
  • “But there’s a very distinct difference. Putin is absolutely and utterly ruthless… Trump doesn’t like devastating war; he wouldn’t be contemplating the first use of a nuclear weapon… Trump is very measured in his rhetoric about nuclear weapons. He wants to end wars. He wants to make the world safe for business.”
  • “Putin isn’t going to stop trying, because he’s a war president… He’s too invested. He’s in too deep; there’s been a tremendous loss of life in Russia, approaching a million in terms of people killed and grievously wounded—or wounded enough to be taken off the battlefield… [T]here’s a war political machine that’s been built up around Putin. If Putin were to dismantle that now, I don’t think he could move back to being a peacetime president.”
  • “I think [Putin will] be emphasizing a permanent confrontation with Europe and with NATO—even if the U.S. shifts to being best friends with Russia, he’ll still be trying the same tack. Europe has been put into a state of needing to be in perpetual readiness and deterrence, to make sure that Russia goes no further.”
  • “Everywhere is at risk—from attacks on critical national infrastructure, assassinations, poisonings, sabotage, and efforts of political subversion… You have to start worrying about cyber attacks, GPS blocking, antisatellite actions, cutting undersea cables, rupturing gas pipelines, poisoning water supplies, poisoning people, blowing up warehouses. We’ve seen all of these things, you know.”
  • “China got involved because they thought of it as a kind of proxy war against the United States, back when the U.S. was supporting Ukraine. The Middle East is involved, with Iran openly supporting Russia by building drone factories. And, of course, North Korea sent in troops to aid Russia. If that’s not a war with global ramifications, then I don’t know what is.”

“Trump’s new list of enemy countries could be a self-fulfilling prophecy,” Stephen Kinzer, Boston Globe, 07.16.25.

  • “Many countries have enemies, or believe they do. President Trump has chosen a new one. He is gunning for the emerging coalition of independent-minded countries called BRICS.”
  • “Any country aligning themselves with the anti-American policies of BRICS will be charged an additional 10% tariff,” Trump threatened in a social media post. He had previously warned BRICS not to issue its own currency or to “back any other currency to replace the mighty U.S. dollar.”
  • “If Trump continues dealing with the world through threats, insults, and tariff demands, however, BRICS could become the enemy he fears.”

“NATO must be ready for 2-front conflict with Russia and China, top US commander in Europe says,” John Vandiver, Stars & Stripes, 07.17.25.

  • “The U.S.-led NATO alliance must prepare for the possibility that Russia and China could launch wars in Europe and the Pacific simultaneously, with 2027 being a potential flashpoint year, the top American commander in Europe said Thursday. U.S. European Command’s Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, speaking at a meeting of military and defense industrial leaders in Wiesbaden, said the situation means allies have little time to prepare.
  • “We’re going to need every bit of kit and equipment and munitions that we can in order to beat that,” Grynkewich said.
  • If China’s President Xi Jinping makes a move on Taiwan, he likely would coordinate such an attack with Russian President Vladimir Putin, opening the possibility of a global conflict, he said.
  • “That, to me, means that both of these things could happen together,” said Grynkewich, who also serves as NATO supreme allied commander.”

“World War III has already begun” Dmitry Trenin, World Events Siener Van Rensburg, 07.16.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Many now speak of humanity’s drift towards World War III, imagining events similar to those of the 20th century. But war evolves. It will not begin with a June 1941 Barbarossa-style invasion or a Cuban Missile Crisis-style nuclear standoff. In fact, the new world war is already underway – it’s just that not everyone has recognized it yet. “
  • “For Russia, the pre-war period ended in 2014. For China, it was 2017. For Iran, 2023. Since then, war – in its modern, diffuse form – has intensified. This is not a new Cold War.... This war involves the world’s leading powers: the United States and its allies on one side, China and Russia on the other. It is global, not because of its scale, but because of the stakes: the future balance of power. The West sees the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as existential threats. Its counteroffensive, economic and ideological, is meant to put a halt to that shift.”
  • “The war is no longer about occupation, but destabilization”
  • “The war in Ukraine is becoming a war between Western Europe and Russia.”
  • “We are in for a long war. It will not end like in 1945, nor settle into Cold War coexistence. The decades ahead will be turbulent. Russia must fight for its rightful place in a new world order.”
  • “If escalation is inevitable, we must consider pre-emptive action – firstly with conventional arms. And if necessary, we must be ready to use ‘special means’, including nuclear weapons, with full awareness of the consequences. Deterrence must be both passive and active.”
  • “The only path forward is through bold, strategic action.”

“Interview with the Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.Yu. Drobinin to Komsomolskaya Pravda,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 07.18.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • "America has big problems, as befits a major power. Last summer, the national debt of the United States exceeded $35 trillion… Trump's Big Beautiful Bill will increase the debt by at least $5 trillion. This is despite the fact that Trump ran for office under the slogan of reducing the U.S. debt."
  • "Tariffs, like sanctions, are one of the last means of maintaining hegemony before using military force. It is not because life is good that U.S. President Trump is raising trade tariffs. Otherwise, we would have to accept it or use force."
  • "There is an alternative course of action. It could include accepting the principles of sovereign equality and indivisibility of security, abandoning the policy of sanctions and tariffs, ending the blocking of the work of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and agreeing to the redistribution of voting quotas in the IMF."
  • "In such conditions, the correct long-term strategy is to create parallel macroeconomic contours, outside of American control and coercion… BRICS and many other states are doing this. This is a difficult, but more reliable path to the future."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Nuclear Powers, Conventional Wars: The Dangerous Erosion of Deterrence,” Carter Malkasian and Zachary Constantino, Foreign Affairs, 07.17.25.

  • The authors also argue: “The war in Ukraine has further revealed the limits of nuclear deterrence… When a Ukrainian drone struck a Russian radar installation linked to Moscow’s early warning system for incoming nuclear missiles in 2024, some analysts feared Russia would interpret the attack as a proxy action by the United States to degrade Moscow’s strategic deterrents. And on June 1, a Ukrainian drone operation damaged or destroyed as many as 30 bombers and airborne command-and-control aircraft deep within Russian territory, including planes that can carry cruise missiles. Even after Moscow lowered the threshold in its official doctrine regulating the use of nuclear arms—and despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s saber rattling—Russian nuclear weapons have not stopped Ukraine from targeting the home territory of a nuclear power or attacking its early warning systems or strategic bombers.”
  • “To reduce the potential for rapid escalation, leaders should improve crisis communication, especially between India and Pakistan and China and the United States,” according to the authors.
  • “The United States and its allies will also need to retain a set of military capabilities—including drones, special operations forces, missile defenses, and long-range strike systems—to respond to conventional action without resorting to higher levels of force,” according to the authors.
  • “Finally, leaders should consider operating more covertly. The political scientists Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo have argued that backchannel signals sent through covert actions or quiet diplomacy can avoid public pressure that impedes concessions when actions are out in the open. The Cold War habit of keeping clashes quiet and not publicizing military actions may be worth reinstituting,” the authors argue. 

"Europe: A Bitter Parting," Sergei Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 07.15.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • "Without the settlement of Siberia, Ancient Rus would most likely not have held onto the Central Russian plain, constantly attacked from the South and West, and would not have become a great empire even before Peter proclaimed it as such."
  • "Siberianization—a shift of the country’s center of gravity to the Urals and Siberia—is extremely beneficial, but it’s also without alternative, since the western, European direction is blocked for the foreseeable future by Western policies that provoked the war in Ukraine."
  • "Our relations with Europe are the worst they have ever been in all of history."
  • "The still-wealthy Europe will gladly be rearmed by the United States, restoring its military-industrial complex weakened over the past 35 years, and continuing to provoke tension on the subcontinent via its many clients. This tension is beneficial to them, as long as it doesn't reach a nuclear level or threaten to spread onto U.S. territory."
  • "Europeans are interested in continuing the war; Americans are only uninterested in as much as the conflict escalates to a nuclear level or onto U.S. territory, or risks another Afghanistan-style humiliation."
  • "The offensives our soldiers are conducting must continue.... the main adversary, of course, is not Kyiv (this must be admitted), but united Europe."
  • "Operationally and tactically we are winning for now, although at no small price, but strategically we may begin to lose. The adversary is crossing one 'red line' after another. We talk of 'mirror' responses—this is purely defensive tactics. But even accepting this, in response to a series of strikes already delivered on cities, strategic sites, and now also on strategic forces, it is necessary to strike at the strategic forces of the UK or even France. With the declaration, of course, that any 'counterstrike' will be met by nuclear retaliation. And if even one nuclear warhead flies our way or, moreover, reaches our territory, there will be strikes on cities."
  • "A world, though not (yet) universal, thermonuclear war is already underway. After the attack on Iran, there can be no doubt. But the main target is us."
  • "Naturally, we must again warn London and Paris that if they send troops into Ukraine, they will be considered direct participants in the conflict, and Russia will be forced to begin striking their assets and bases abroad and at first with non-nuclear munitions. Berlin must know that if it reaches for nuclear weapons and continues to de facto wage war against Russia, there will be no mercy."
  • "It is time, at least at the expert level, to abandon the nonsense inherited from the Gorbachev-Reagan era—the assertion that 'there can be no winners in a nuclear war and one should never be fought.' Of course, all measures should be taken to avoid a big war. But that stance not only contradicts doctrines of nuclear weapon use and elementary logic but also clears the way for non-nuclear aggression, which is what has happened to us."
  • "We are not using such functions of nuclear deterrence as prevention of any war and of a conventional arms race. The threat of nuclear retaliation renders such a race pointless."
  • "For now, we are threatened with self-exhaustion in an endless war in Europe, which its elites want. It is urgent to block the road to a looming world thermonuclear war. And for this, above all, we must stop Europe—the main force, both objectively and subjectively, pushing towards it."
  • "A series of steps is needed as soon as possible to sharply increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence. By finally changing our nuclear doctrine, we convinced the Americans of the reality of escalation, but not yet the Europeans. Furthermore, by starting talks with the U.S., we weakened nuclear pressure. In Europe, voices are again saying that Russia will never use nuclear weapons… We need to go up the nuclear escalation ladder."
  • "Now I turn to what is most unpleasant for the reader, but urgently necessary. If all steps (transferring nuclear warheads in the European theater to medium- and short-range carriers, including aircraft, exercises of strategic forces simulating disarming and decapitating strikes on the UK, France, and Germany) do not help, apparently it will be necessary to move to the next step: start striking logistical centers and military bases in countries supporting aggression against Russia. This cannot wait long. With the stipulation that any 'response' will lead to nuclear retaliation on these and other targets."
  • "I perfectly understand that the use of nuclear weapons, even limited, is not just dangerous, but a huge sin. Innocent people, including children, will die en masse. I can imagine the agonized thoughts of our Supreme Commander-in-Chief."
  • "I know that the scenario described chills the blood and will again provoke a storm of indignation at me. But it seems the only possible alternative to getting drawn into an endless, if intermittent, war with the loss of tens and hundreds of thousands of our best men, then all the same rolling toward a nuclear Armageddon and/or the collapse of the country."
  • "Most of our neighbors in the western subcontinent of Eurasia are falling into moral and political decay, once again taking the path of hostility and war. But history does not end—unless we ourselves end it with a global thermonuclear war. After the Greek and Roman flowering, Europe fell into a gloomy and dismal Middle Ages for seven or eight centuries. Let us wait. Perhaps it will revive and become a profitable and desirable partner. With the right policies, we can not only protect our interests, halt the slide toward World War III, but also contribute to a renaissance among our neighbors on the subcontinent."

"Nuclear Weapons in Theory and Practice," Timofey Bordachev, Valdai Club, 07.16.25 Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “The question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as their delivery systems, has long entered the realm of practical reality. Now one can only ponder at what pace this inevitable spread will occur.”
  • “In the relatively near future, we may have about fifteen nuclear powers instead of nine.”
  • “There is, however, no reason to believe that such a development will radically change the foundations of international politics or have catastrophic consequences for the world.”
  • “The creation of nuclear weapons is a technical achievement that formed the basis of modern world politics, determining the power hierarchy in international affairs and a military threat that all states must take into account.”
  • “The most important phenomenon born of nuclear weapons is the emergence of states invincible to external adversaries—something unprecedented in state history.”
  • “Russia and the United States are so much stronger than all the others militarily that no other states could even imagine defeating them.”
  • “Becoming a nuclear superpower is extremely expensive… Even China, with all its economic might, is only now suspected of trying to catch up with Russia and the USA in the number of warheads.”
  • “Most countries do not need arsenals comparable to the superpowers; their nuclear capabilities are oriented only against regional enemies and do not change the global balance of power.”
  • “Some theorists in the West and Russia argue that the spread of nuclear weapons might be a stabilizing, not a dangerous, factor, because these weapons serve as a powerful deterrent and raise the price of war.”
  • “Even if another ten or more countries acquire nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to build sufficient stockpiles to threaten the existence of the U.S. or Russia, let alone humanity. Disasters would be local, not global, and nuclear superpowers would act as peacekeepers.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Energy exports from CIS:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Limits of Putin’s Balancing Act: What the Kremlin Will Sacrifice in Pursuit of Victory in Ukraine,” Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman, Foreign Affairs, 07.16.25

  • Kimmage and Lipman contend that Putin secured domestic stability by sidelining oligarchs, elevating middle-class living standards, and shaping a flexible nationalist ideology.
  • They note that Russia’s apparent internal calm conceals the regime’s iron grip: genuine political parties and elections are absent, and dissent is met with severe punishment.
  • The authors emphasize that Putin views the restoration of Russia’s power and international stature as his historic mission, an ambition evident since his 1999 “millennium manifesto.”
  • According to Kimmage and Lipman, Moscow’s major foreign interventions—Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, Syria in 2015, and Ukraine since 2022—all reflect Putin’s drive to reclaim lost influence.
  • They argue that Russia’s foreign policy has now tipped into overreach and stagnation, exemplified by the protracted and costly war in Ukraine.
  • The authors maintain that Putin may tolerate diminished influence in the Middle East but will jeopardize domestic stability rather than concede defeat in Ukraine.
  • Even with the conflict deadlocked, Kimmage and Lipman write that Putin still portrays it as existential, ready to impose mass mobilization and intensify repression if necessary.
  • They highlight that Russia’s economy strains under sanctions, escalating war expenses, surging inflation, and the loss of European markets.
  • Kimmage and Lipman observe that while domestic unrest remains subdued for now, it could grow if casualties increase and the war drags on.
  • They note that Russia’s elite may cautiously test mild dissent but show no inclination toward overt revolt.
  • The authors warn that if cornered, Putin is likely to abandon any balancing act, resorting instead to full coercion: mass mobilization, ruthless conscription, and a sweeping crackdown on opposition.
  • In this scenario, they conclude, Russia’s “quiet dictatorship” could transform into an unrestrained autocracy—with grave consequences for Ukraine and beyond.

“The Budget is Falling Apart,” Re:Russia, 07.15.25

  • “A combination of sustained increases in spending on the war in Ukraine, an economic slowdown and falling export revenues is pushing Russian economic authorities to reconsider their approach to economic policy.”
  • “To patch up the widening budget gap, they will most likely need to ease monetary policy and accept higher inflation as a consequence.”
  • “Meanwhile, the recently revised federal budget for 2025 is already beginning to unravel.”
  • “The deficit over the first half of the year has nearly exhausted the full-year limit.”
  • “Expenditure is up 20% compared to last year, while revenues—both oil and gas and non-oil and gas—are under pressure from lower oil prices on one side and a continued economic slowdown on the other.”
  • “For the rate cut to have a tangible effect on economic activity, it would need to be reduced by more than 100 basis points.”
  • “Devaluation would reverse the disinflationary trend.”
  • “The costs of rising war expenditure will ultimately have to be borne by the public.”
  • “If current trends continue, the budget deficit could reach 4–5% of GDP by year-end.”
  • “It is clear, however, that a combination of rate cuts and devaluation will reverse the disinflation trend.”

“The Demographic and Labor Market Crisis” in “Starovoit’s Suicide, Trump’s Ultimatum, Internet Disruptions, Kekhman Case, Constitutional Court Reshuffle,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Bulletin No. 14, 07.21.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Labor Minister Anton Kotyakov warned Putin of a looming shortfall of up to 11 million workers by 2030. The vast majority—10.1 million—would be the result of upcoming retirements, while just 800,000 would be new roles that cannot be filled. The Russian economy will require at least 2.4 million additional workers by 2030, demand that moves directly against Russia's demographic trend of a shrinking workforce.”
  • “The shortage of skilled workers is particularly acute, with the number of vacancies per applicant having increased 2.5-fold. Kotyakov noted that the share of citizens aged 60+ is rising steadily, while the number of young entrants to the workforce is declining due to persistently low birth rates.”
  • The Kremlin has offered no major policy reversal. Migration remains tightly controlled and the pension age reform remains in place. However, pressure is building. Putin, who has for years taken a close interest in Russian demographics, has commented publicly on several occasions recently about the need to boost the birth rate as a long-term solution. In the meantime, productivity gains remain elusive and wage inflation is spreading in sectors dependent on state orders or where workforce shortages are acute, such as construction and logistics.”

“There is no Demographic Crisis. Only a Crisis of Care,” Mishal Husain interviews political demographer Jennifer Sciubba, Bloomberg, 07.18.25.

  • MH: “We turned to political demographer Jennifer Sciubba for some expert answers, including—unexpectedly—why her skills have been needed at the Pentagon… “On Russia, was there a perception that the shrinking Russian population meant Russia was not going to be what it is today? That its threat or its capacity to act in an aggressive way would naturally be diminished?”
  • JS: “Yes, there was. The assumption [was] that demography is destiny, which I always work to counter because the same demographic trend in two different places can show up quite differently.”
  • “With Russia there was a desirability bias. And there continues to be among a lot of people, that what they hoped to see happen would happen. Russia’s been shrinking by half a million people a year, life expectancy for men was really low—below 60 because of high alcoholism rates—and the fertility rate was low as well.”
  • “And so there was, on the part of some people, a desire to see that as a sign of a weaker adversary. But they forget the context. Who has power in society? How are these institutions structured? What does that leader want? Those things really matter, and they matter with China as well.”

"Turn to the East 2.0, or Siberization of Russia," edited by Sergey Karaganov, Ilya Kozylov, Sergey Prosekov, Russia in Global Affairs, 07.16.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • “The experience of the tsarist, Soviet, and modern periods shows that the development and powerful growth of Siberia has always led to the strengthening of Russia. Today, the “Turn to the East 2.0” is a strategic choice in which Siberia plays a central role as the spiritual and cultural core, an innovation base, and a driver of Russia’s demographic and economic growth.”
  • “For three centuries, Russia, developing under significant influence from Europe, has achieved a great deal. We created outstanding cultural achievements made possible by the mutual penetration of Russian and European cultural traditions. The country strengthened militarily and gave a powerful boost to industrial production. Without Peter the Great’s military-industrial and administrative reforms, it would have been significantly more difficult for Russia to resist military-political challenges from the South and West. However, Russia’s “European journey” exhausted its usefulness a century ago. Today, Europe is not only unpromising but sometimes harmful, given the spreading miasmas—including transhumanist and posthuman values—coming from there. Of course, we do not intend to abandon the best of our “Europeanness,” but the time has come (and long passed) to switch to a fundamentally different development vector.”
  • “In the apt words of Professor L.E. Blyakher from the Pacific State University, it is time to “return home”—to our Siberian roots, laid down over centuries, including since the time of the Mongol yoke. Siberization of the country is needed—a shift of the spiritual, cultural, and economic center to the East. Russia is destined to become what it has historically been meant to be—Northern Eurasia: a balancer, unifier, and resource base for the reborn giant continent. In this sense, Turn to the East 2.0 is an absolute necessity, logically stemming from global changes.”

“The Number of Suspicious Deaths Among the Russian Elite Is Rising,” Sarajevo Times, 07.17.25.

  • “Former White House advisor on Russia and Kremlin expert Fiona Hill said not all deaths should be lumped together or buried under conspiracy theories, but neither should one be surprised that a non-democratic regime doesn’t function in a democratic way. In an interview, Hill emphasized that this is just one segment of Russia’s ongoing war with the West.
  • “Russia has hardened as an adversary in ways we probably didn’t fully foresee,” she said. Poisonings, assassinations, cyberattacks, sabotage, and threats to infrastructure are just part of the same tactic,” she concluded.
  • The “sudden death syndrome of influential Russians” did not begin with the invasion of Ukraine.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Ukraine:

“What Will a Change of Prime Minister Mean for Ukraine?” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Politika, 07.16.25.

  • “Ukraine has a new prime minister for the first time in five years. The country’s longest-serving head of government Denys Shmyhal has ceded his place to Yulia Svyrydenko, a fellow technocrat. During those five years, however, the Ukrainian system of power has transformed so much that the name of the prime minister is no longer as important as it once was. In the current system, only the president and his chief of staff really matter.”
  • “The current changes are a typical reshuffle that bypasses the ban under martial law on dismissing the cabinet. Svyrydenko has gone from first deputy prime minister to prime minister, while Shmyhal remains in the government as defense minister, replacing Rustem Umerov.”
  • “The latest reboot is generally being explained as a move by the head of the presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, to strengthen his position even further… As his relationship with Washington deteriorated, Yermak felt it was necessary to shore up his influence on domestic policy, and Shmyhal’s fate was decided.”
  • “Yermak’s choice fell on Svyrydenko, the first deputy prime minister and economy minister, who had previously worked under his leadership in the presidential administration. Ukrainska Pravda news website paints a vivid portrait of the new head of government, reporting that she is even more loyal and efficient than her predecessor: she diligently writes down all the president’s instructions in a notebook, and makes her government jet available to the first lady, thanks to which she is on good terms with her.”
  • “In the established power system, the prime minister’s name does not matter—not because of institutions that work like clockwork, but because all branches of power except the presidential vertical have dried up… with each passing day, it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a reverse transformation of this system upon a return to normal life, without states of emergency and martial law. In the meantime, amid a seemingly endless war, even thinking about such a time is beginning to seem utopian.”

"Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused of authoritarian slide after anti-corruption raids," Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 07.17.25.6

  • “Anti-corruption raids on prominent Ukrainian figures and moves to favor loyalists in senior positions have led to accusations that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is sliding into authoritarianism.”
  • “Politicians, activists and diplomats accuse Ukraine’s leader of favoring loyalists and using wartime powers against critics.”
  • “This is a straight-up, Russian-style scenario of dividing society, which could lead to protests in the streets.”
  • “What began as a defense of sovereignty risks sliding into a crusade to reshape the state in the ruling circle’s image. They say this threatens to undermine progress on reform since Ukraine’s 2014 democratic revolution.”
  • “Taking advantage of the war, Zelenskyy is making his first, yet confident, steps towards corrupt authoritarianism.”
  • “A crackdown on the country’s most famous anti-corruption crusader can’t be happening without at least the silent approval from President Zelenskyy, if not active permission.”
  • “Under the guise of war, the authorities persecute those deemed inconvenient: political opponents, local governments, experts, journalists and activists.”
  • “They’re using the mobilization law and wartime secrecy to crush critics, assuming the west is too distracted to notice.”
  • “If the institutions meant to enforce checks and balances are turned into political tools, Ukraine risks losing the democratic core it fought to build after 2014.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Armenia’s Current Political Crisis and the Implications for Democratic Consolidation", Jean‑François Ratelle, Russia.Post, 07.17.25.

  • “In June, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan launched a direct political attack against Catholicos Karekin II, the leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church. What had started as a rhetorical exchange with the clergy has now swiftly escalated into a deeply polarizing confrontation.”
  • “Karekin II and the Church emerged as a leading opposition force, aligning with other political groups. After Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Karekin II and other clerics participated in protests demanding Pashinyan's resignation and accusing him of national betrayal.”
  • “Armenia’s Investigative Committee has ordered dozens of arrests of clergy members, political actors and businessmen. Notable arrestees include Archbishop Galstanyan, Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahian, an MP and Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, whose company, Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), is now facing threats of nationalization.”
  • “Pashinyan finds himself in a precarious position as he gears up for the 2026 parliamentary election.”
  • “Armenia has made democratic progress, but this should not preclude European governments from taking a critical view of developments in the country. The period leading up to Armenia's 2026 parliamentary election will show whether its institutions possess the resilience to navigate the current crisis and foreign influence.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:


Footnotes

  1. “As Russia builds up its drone-making infrastructure, military analysts expect Moscow to routinely launch more than 1,000 drones per volley by autumn,” the two NYT journalists write.
  2. “Putting those gains in context, Russia is capturing less than 0.1 percent of Ukraine’s vast territory each month. At that pace, it would take Moscow several years to occupy all of the four Ukrainian regions it declared annexed in 2022,” the two NYT journalists write.
  3. “The cities of Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk are the next big targets in the Russians’ bid to seize the remainder of the Donetsk region,” according to the Economist.  
  4. German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025. (ISW, 07.20.25)

  5. Zelenskyy said on July 21 that the new round of Ukrainian-Russian talks is to take place on Wednesday, July 23.

  6. Ukrainian law enforcement arrested two investigators as part of a sweeping raid on the premises of anti-corruption officials, throwing a spotlight on Kyiv’s longstanding efforts to strengthen the rule of law. An unnamed employee of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, known as NABU, was detained in Kyiv under suspicion of spying for Russia, the Prosecutor General’s Office said. The head of a local office of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau in the eastern city of Dnipro was also detained as part of the sweep, according to law enforcement. (Bloomberg, 07.21.25)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky.

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